People vs.

De Los Santos
March 31, 1950

went to the yard and took a piece of wood to defend himself, but the
appellant, still holding the knife, ran after him and fell on the ground.

Facts:
Juan Delos Santos was charged and convicted of parricide for killing wife
Mercedes.

Prosecution contended that the appellant was actuated by hate and

resentment against the Patron family because the father of Andres had
bailed out a certain Fr. Palilio in connections with a criminal case which the
appellant filed against the priest. The witnesses testimonies negated the
claim of the appellant that the stabbing is accidental.

One evening, Juan caught another man, their neighbor Asuerto, lying on top
of his wife.
Juan raised his bolo to slash the man but the bolo landed on Mercedes.

ISSUE:
Held:
Court denied his claim of 2 mitigating circumstance, 1) provocation, 2)
passion and obfuscation.
There was only one mitigating circumstance, passion and obfuscation
because it arose from one and the same cause, should be treated as only
one.
Sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Doctrine:
Art. 13. No. 6

Passion and Obfuscation under RPC Art.13 (6)

Title:

People vs Cauyan, 128 SCRA 504

Nature of Action: Automatic Review of the lower courts decision

FACTS:
Constancio Cauya , was convicted by the CFI of Quezon of 2 criminal cases.
First is murder of Claudia Amat, which sentenced him to 20 years reclusion
temporal and frustrated murder of Andres Patron, which sentenced him to
an indeterminate penalty of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as
minimum to 12 years of prision mayor. Appellant appealed to the CA of its
resolution dated January 18, 1971, eliminating passion and
obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty
should be reclusion perpetua.
9:30 in the evening of April 7, 1961, Claudia Amat, 58 years old, was heard
by her husband, Maximo Patron, and her son, Andres Patron shouting,
Huag, pare! Tama na, pare! Andres Patron, 21 years old, rushed to the
stairs and saw the appellant stabbing his mother. When the appellant saw
him, he stabbed Andres on the armpit and other parts of the body. Andres

Whether or not the appellate court erred in rejecting passion and

obfuscation under Art. 13 (6) of the RPC in favor of the accused?
HELD:
The appellate court is correct in rejecting passion and obfuscation as a
mitigating circumstance in favor of appellant. In order that the said
circumstance can be considered, it is necessary to establish the existence
of an unlawful act sufficient to produce a situation of mind, and must be
shown that the act which produced the passion and obfuscation is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity
(People vs Gervacio, 24 SCRA 960).
It was not unlawful on the part of Maximo Patron, husband of the deceased,
when he acted as bondsman of the priest. And it was not shown that the
act of having bailed the priest was so proximate in point of time to the
commission of the crime as to preclude a sober realization of the
wrongfulness of action taken by appellant.
ACCORDINGLY, appellant is guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Claudia Amat the sum of
P30,000 and to pay the cost.
Art 13. No 10
January 21, 1929 G.R. No. 30125 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee, vs. JUAN ALANGUILANG, defendant-appellant.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
According to the information, the accused Juan Alanguilang was charged with the crime of
parricide, having killed his lawful wife, Aurelia Brion, and the Court of First Instance of

Laguna which tried the case on its legal merits, sentenced him to life imprisonment, with the
accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay
the costs.
The appellant appealed from said judgment on the ground that the court abused its authority in
denying the repeated motions for the postponement of the hearing of the case presented by the
defense; that the conviction of the accused is based on contradictory or incredible testimony;
and even supposing that he was responsible for the death of his wife, he never intended to kill
her, and that if he did ever chastise her, his mind at that time obfuscated and under the
influence of jealousy.
Upon examining the record we find nothing to indicate that the court abused its authority or
discretion in not granting the postponment of thehearing requested, not by the attorney de
oficio but by another attorney who was not then present. When said petition was denied the
trial had not yet commenced and the court had only then ordered the reading of the
information, and proceeded with the hearing without said attorney then presenting any petition
for a period in which to prepare for the trial.
The last two assignments of the error refer to the weight of the evidence. And it is found that it
sufficiently shows that the accused, prompted by jealousy and armed with a piece of firewood,
abused his wife, striking her with said piece of wood on the arm and on the abdomen until he
finally caused her death. We consider the testimony of Clemente Alanguilang and Petronilo
Balam, who partially witnessed the attack, worthy of credit. It is corroborated by the
contusions found on the deceased's body at the autopsy; also the statements of the little boy
Buenaventura, the accused's own son, made to the chief of police (Exhibit X) and the affidavit
of said boy made before the justice of the peace (Exhibit Y); also the affidavit made by the
Victoria Magnaye before the same justice of the peace (Exhibit Z). It is true that these
witnesses, the boy Buenaventura and Victoria Magnaye, in testifying during the hearing of the
csae, tried to exculpate the accused and stated having signed said Exhibits X, Y and Z without
knowing their contents; nevertheless, in our opinion, the statements and affidavits made made
by these witnesses before the chief of police and the justice of the peace deserve more credit,
wherefore we do not believe either the exculpatory statements with which they defended the
accused or the explanation they gave as to why they signed said documents.
The record does not show any modifying circumstance. The obfuscation alleged by the defence
cannot be taken into consideration. In order that the circumstance of obfuscation can be
considered, it is necessary to establish the existence of an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such a condition of mind; and that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by the considerable length of time, during which
the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. (U. S. vs. Pilares, 18 Phil., 17; U. S. vs.
Taylor, 6 Phil., 162; U. S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486.) These requisites were not proven in the
record.

Not finding any error of law or fact, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in all its
parts, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Art 13. No. 14

Article 13 Mitigating Circumstance: Passion and obfuscation
People vs fontalva
Facts:

while Diosdado Tormon was inside a vehicle, at the front seat of a

public vehicle, the appellant, who was then carrying weaving
materials of a lady passenger, threw them on the ground,
approached the deceased, and stabbed him in the stomach with a
butcher's knife.

The victim uttered a cry of pain, "Araguy." Appellant ran away,

leaving the butcher's knife stuck into the stomach of the
deceased.

The driver shouted to a policeman directing traffic nearby that

somebody was stabbed. 5 The policeman, who turned out to be
Pat. Yance of the Maasin Police Force, responded upon hearing the
shout.

He intercepted the fleeing accused, held him tight as he was

struggling to get away, took from him the scabbard of the
butcher's knife, brought the accused, who had already ceased
struggling, to the municipal building, and turned him over to the
Chief of Police.

The deceased was taken to the Iloilo Mission Hospital. The

butcher's knife was still stuck in his stomach, so Dr. Salvador G.
Aguirre, who attended to him, pulled it out, and saw that seven
and three-fourths (7-) inches of its blade had penetrated into the
body of the deceased.

He died the next morning in the said hospital. Dr. Aguirre issued a
medical certificate on his finding, viz.: "Iloilo Medical Center, Inc.,
Palmares Bldg., Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, Dec. 7, 1968

because of a stab wound in the abdomen. Exploratory laparotomy

was done. He expired on December 3, 1968.

Findings on Exploration: 1. The abdomen is filled with about 2-3

liters of blood.

2. Thru and thru perforation in the jejunum 4 in number.

3. The momentum cut into half.

4. The transverse colon has 4 lacerations at one point and at

another point the colon is cut into half. There is a small wound in
the left lateral pentoneum level of splenic flexture. Salvador G.
Aguirre, MD." 11 Dr. Aguirre also issued the death certificate of the
deceased in which he stated that the deceased died as a result of
the stab wound inflicted on him.

There was a previous incident that caused the bad blood between
the accused and the deceased.

On the evening of November 16, 1968, a fight ensued between

them. The deceased, who was taller and bigger than the accused,
slapped the accused and ordered him to kneel down.

However, before the accused could kneel down, Justino Rosano, a

barrio councilman, intervened, separated the protagonists, and
ordered the deceased to go home.

The deceased went home but the accused stayed awhile. Upon
leaving the place, he was heard to remark that for what was done
to him, he would not let a month to pass before he would retaliate.
So it did come to pass.

Issue:

w/n the mitigating circumstance

obfuscation should be appreciated.

of

passion

and

Held:

What was done to him on that fateful day of November 16,

1968 when he was subjected to treatment offensive to his
dignity, having been slapped and asked to kneel down in the

attitude of a supplicant, certainly could give rise to the feeling

of passion or obfuscation.

There is a host of cases from United States v. Ferrer, 26 a

1901 decision, to People v. Pareja, 27decided in 1969, that so
attests. Conduct of that character, in the language of United
States v. Salandanan, would ordinarily be expected to have
produced such powerful excitement as to overcome reason
and self-control.

" Unfortunately for appellant, however, this mitigating

circumstance cannot be invoked because the killing took place
one month and five days later.

The language of Justice Malcolm in United States v. Sarikala is

relevant: "As to the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation we likewise cannot agree that it can be taken into
consideration because more that twenty-four hours
elapsed after the insults of Cotton to the accused and
the criminal act. "In the relatively recent case of People v.
Constantino, such a plea was likewise rejected. There the
killing took place after four days.

As pointed out by Justice Romualdez in People v. Alanguilang:

"in order that the circumstance of obfuscation can be
considered, it is necessary to establish the existence of
an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and that said act which produced
the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the perpetrator might recover his
normal equanimity."

Reference may also be made to People v. Dagatan, where this

Court could not consider the presence of this mitigating
circumstance as the act that caused the resentment "took
place long before the commission of the crime." People v.
Gervacio had another way of putting it, "a time not far
removed from the commission of the crime." The lower
court, therefore, did not commit any error in refusing to credit
appellant with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.

sentencing appellant Aurelio Mojica to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Diosdado Tormon in the amount of P12,000.00, is
affirmed. No costs.

violence and intimidation. Threatened Princess that he would kill her family
if she told anyone about the incident.
Court affirms sentence of reclusion perpetua.
Art 13. No. 16

People vs. Dela Cruz

August 6, 2002

Art.13 no.15

Facts:
Antonio dela Cruz was found guilty of rape and was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua
Antonio was a faith healer, he met complainants mother Trinidad in 1996 in
one of his healing sessions and stayed at their house in Real, Quezon from
January to March, 1996. There he met her daughter Princess, 13 years old,
who accompanied Antonio in healing sessions. Princess called Antonio Lolo.
March, 1996 Antonio, with permission from Trinidad, took Princess to
Manila. Mother allowed daughter though classes were still ongoing because
Antonio promised to buy clothes and school materials for Princess. They
stayed in Antonios house in Quezon City.
March 15, 1996 Antonio invited Princess to sleep with him. Princess
complied. Princess woke up from pain of Antonios penis penetrating her
vagina.
She went back to Quezon Province and told a close friend about what
happened. To avoid embarrassment from the gossips, she went to her
father in Quezon City.
June 1996 - Princess, with assistance of her father, filed a complaint for
rape on March 15, 18, 20.
After investigation, prosecution only counted March 15 as rape.
March 18, 20 were only qualified seduction and acts of lasciviousness.
Medical examinations showed that Princess is in a non-virgin state.
Issue:
1

Court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.

Claims that he used no force to have sex with victim, claims it
was consensual, no resistance.
Court relied in weakness of defense

Held:
Antonio took advantage of his moral ascendancy, dominion and influence
over Princess. Moral ascendancy, dominion and influence substitute for

People vs. Turalba G.R. No. L-29118 February 28, 1974

Facts: Pablo Fernandez, the victim while engage in his routinary chore at
around seven oclock in the evening of April 29 was struck with shotgun
blast. The two witnesses Nemesio Fernandez and Ernesto Fernandez, the
victim's brother and son, respectively positively identified Artemio Turalba
as the perpetrator of the crime because at the time that they heard the
shot they saw the accused running way with a shot gun. Juanito Par, a rural
policeman was near the store of Fernadez at the time he was shot. Par
focussed his flashlight at Turalba and identified him as the gunwielder who
was fleeing from the scene of the shooting. He chased Turalba within the
school premises. Being unarmed, he could not arrest Turalba. He gave up
the chase. He rendered assistance in taking Pablo Fernandez to the
hospital. He said that the shotgun held by Turalba was similar to Exhibit E.
Policeman Emilio Calibo summons police and Constabulary men together
with Police Sergeant Osmundo de la Cruz and Constabulary Sergeant
Ernesto Liberato towards the house of the suspect. They recovered a
shotgun which smelt gunpowder meaning that it was recently fired. On the
other hand, appellant Turalba denied that he was the killer of Pablo
Fernandez. He testified that at the time of the shooting, he was in front of
the store of Narcisa Obello, which was opposite his house. He was
conversing with her and with Celestino Serafica, Benigno Obello and his
father. His house was about three hundred meters away from the house of
Pablo Fernandez. While engrossed in the conversation, they heard a
gunshot. Since the store was about to close. Narcisa Obello told them to go
home. He went home to sleep. Guerrero Castillo, a neighbor of Turalba,
testified that he informed the latter's counsel, also a resident of Carosucan
Sur, that it was Gregorio Manipon who shot Pablo Fernandez. Said counsel
did not bother to file any complaint against Manipon. The chief forensic
chemist conducted a paraffin test and the result was negative for
gunpowder residue but the chemist clarified that she did not know whether
the paraffin cast, which was tested, was taken from the hands of Manipon
and Turalba within seventy-two hours from April 29, 1964. Nitrates would
remain in their hands only within three days after the firing of a gun.
Turalba contends that, because the paraffin test showed that his hands
were negative for gunpowder and because another suspect, Gregorio
Manipon, was pointed out as the possible killer, his (Turalba's) guilt was not

proven beyond reasonable doubt. That contention has no merit. The

negative result of the paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that Turalba
was not the gunwielder. The Solicitor General points out that he might have
used gloves when he handled the shotgun (Exh. E). The accused contends
that he had no motive in the perptrationn of the crime however sometime
in 1962 at a wedding party, when Pablo Fernandez delivering a speech as
barrio lieutenant,Bernabe Turalba, appellant's father, was making an
unnecessary disturbance. Fernandez was annoyed. He struck Bernabe on
the head with a piece of wood. Artemio Turalba was present on that
occasion. Because of that humiliating incident, the Turalba family harbored
a grudge against Pablo Fernandez.
On May 11, 1964 at 1:00 pm Artemio Turalba surrendered to the office of
Atty. Querubin Raceles of Asignan as the the former is suspected and
charge of murder. Artemio Turalba was released for having the bail bond.
Issues: 1.WON Artemio Turalba is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender to the authorities.
Held: he surrendered to the police of Villasis on May 11, 1964. The
municipal judge of Villasis approved his bail bond. The municipal judge of
Asingan had issued an order on that day, May 11, 1964, authorizing the
Villasis town judge to approve Turalba's bail if "he surrenders" to the Villasis
police. Appellant's case is similar to the Yecla case where "five days after
the commission of the crime and two days after the issuance of the order
for the arrest of the appellant, the latter presented himself in the municipal
building to post the bond for his temporary release". It was held that his
surrender "to post a bond for his temporary release was in obedience to the
order of arrest and was tantamount to the delivery of his person to the
authorities to answer for the crime for which his arrest was ordered".
Voluntary surrender to the authorities was mitigating in that case. "The law
does not require that the surrender be prior to the order of arrest." (People
vs. Yecla and Cahilig, 68 Phil. 740).

GR L-3765 JUNE 21, 1951 Art.13no. 19

J. MONTEMAYOR
PEOPLE vs MORO SABILUL
(Mitigating Circumstances must be based from established evidence and
not from statements & contentions alone.)
Facts:
Moro Sabilul was charged with Murder in CFI Zamboanga. Without
taking any evidence and merely on the basis of the
statements and contentions made by the provincial and counsel de
oficio, which were conflicting, Presiding Judge Pablo

Villalobos sentenced:
Defendant is charged and found guilty of Murder. Sentenced to Prisio Mayor.
Attended by (3) Mitigating Circumstances: (a) acted upon an impulse so
powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation (b) voluntary surrender and (c) plea of guilty. No Aggravating
Circumstances.
Taking also into consideration that the accused is a Yakan belonging to
the Non-Christian Tribes and hopelessly ignorant,
Sec. 106 of the Admin Code for the Dept. of Mindanao and Sulu was
applied.
Defendant thru counsel appealing and claims that the Lower Court erred in
Applying Art. 248 sub section 1 of RPC instead of
Art. 247 applying the penalty of destierro.
The Court however agreed with the Solicitor Generals claims that there has
been a possible misunderstanding on the part of
Accused-Appellant when he entered the plead of guilty and that his counsel
believed the plea of guilty was conditioned on the
penalty provided for Art. 247 of the RPC. Counsel should have known that
an accused may not enter a conditional plea of
guilty in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a certain penalty
be imposed.
Issue:
The trial court dictated its decision in open court containing facts or
findings of facts which are not supported by the evidence
for the simple reason that no evidence whatsoever has been presented.
Decision:
Court SET ASIDE the decision appealed and acted on SolGens
recommendation. Remanded to the Trial Court for a new trial.
Rationale:
What the trial court did was to listen to the conflicting statements and
claims of the Fiscal and Counsel de Officio, accepted
some and rejected others and then dictated its sentence on what it thought
to be the facts of the case, plus the plea of guilty of
the accused. The procedure is wrong.
Finding of fact of a court must have basis and support. The court
should not content itself with a plea of guilty but should
receive evidence to satisfy itself.
The decision enumerates as one of the mitigating circumstances the fact
that the accused acted upon an impulse so powerful
as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. No witness, not event
the accused was put on the witness stand. So
naturally this supposed mitigating circumstance could not have been
established.
The same thing may be said of Voluntary Admission and on the
circumstance that the accused is a Yakan belonging to the
non-Christian Tribe and hopelessly ignorant. No evidence was taken.
In cases where grave crimes are charged, it is advisable to take additional
evidences as to the guilt of the accused and the

circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime. Evidence

should be sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
or leave no room for reasonable doubt as to the possibility of a
misunderstanding on the part of the Accused-Appellant.
As correlated to the Mitigating Circumstances Par. 6 (Passion or
Obfuscation)
Prosecution stated that: The Victim Moro Lario and the Appellants wife
Mora Masilayan had been maintaining illicit relation,
because of this appellant divorced her according to Moro Custom and to
avenge the dishonor caused him, surprised the victim
taking a bath in a river, attacked causing multiple wounds and killed him,
with a Pira a Yakan bladed weapon.
Defense stated that: Wife went to the river to fetch water but the deceased
saw her, attacked and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her, she shouted for help and heard by the husbandappellant, finding the deceased was still on top of his wife,
attacked, pursued and eventually killed Lario with a bladed weapon.
GR No. L-47741 April 28, 1941 art. 13. No. 28
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs SANTIAGO S.
VELASQUEZ,
HORRILLENO,
The present case involves only a matter of law.
Hence the Honorable Court of Appeals has certified to this superiority.
That question is this: In view of the facts admitted by the appellant,
whether or not the same is found guilty of embezzlement of public funds,
defined and punished by Article 227 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the original ruling of the lower court the following facts:
Towards the period from September 9, 1937 to December 6, 1938, the
appellant was a public official, who held the position of assistant cashier at
the provincial treasury of Pangasinan, with office in the town of Lingayen in
the same province.
In that time, the appellant, in his capacity of assistant cashier of
Pangasinan provincial treasury, received inthe town of Lingayen, municipal
treasuries of Malasiqui, Tayug, Binalonan, San Quintin, Rosales and
Manaoag,various amounts of money amounting to the total sum of P1,
701.26, without any receipt issued by the aforementionedamounts. These
funds were the "Red Cross", the "Anti-Tuberculous" and "Boy Scouts".
The December 6, 1938,delegates auditors, Messrs. Blas Pedro Velasco Giron
and, to take the test and calibration of the funds in the custodyof the
appellant, in the above capacity, found a deficit of P1, 701.26, the appellant
could not explain.
So this, onseveral occasions, from December 9, 1938 until January 30,
1939, was paid to the provincial treasury of the defraudedamount
Pangasinan.
On appeal, the appellant argues that the amounts were not
misappropriated public funds, so you can not find defendant guiltyof the
crime.

Having admitted that he had received the amounts in question, in the

performance of their official several municipal treasuriescharge of this
province, the amounts mentioned are public funds, it has to answer,
according to Article 609 of the RevisedAdministrative Code, which provides:
ART. 609.
Disposition of funds collected by public officials.
- Except as otherwise specially provided, must accountfor all funds
officially received by a public
official in any capacity or on any occasion,
as government funds.
This Court repeatedly has already decided that when a public official
receives any money, for safekeeping, the charactersacquired public funds
(GR No. 44363, December 17, 1937, People v. Castro, GR No. 41747,
August 30. 1935,People vs. Sibulo, RG No. 40714,. Aug. 7, 1939).
In view of these decisions, it is clear that the appellant, to receive
theamount of P1, 701.26, which funds were "Red Cross", the "AntiTuberculous" and "Boy Scouts", responsible for such sum became .
Unable to thus give a satisfactory explanation of the lack of money, when
the test and calibration of his books weremade by the auditors, has been
guilty of the crime of embezzlement of public funds, the prosecutor alleged
in complaint.
We are with the Hon Attorney General has in estimating the return made by
the appellant in the amount defrauded as specialmitigating circumstance
without aggravating the offset.
This will also be ordered the appellant to suffer the minimum degree inthe
penalty prescribed by law.
With the only modification, therefore, the appellant shall mean condemning
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six months andone day to four years,
two months and one day of prision correccional, we uphold the original
ruling, in all other parts, thecosts to the appellant.
So is ordered.

Art. 14. No. 3

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROLANDO DAGANI y
REYES CALLEJO, SR. and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. and OTELLO SANTIANO Y
LEONIDA,
Facts :
The appellants are security officers of PNR. On about 4:45 pm of
September 11, 1989 the group of Javier was drinking at the canteen located
at the compound of PNR. The appellants as security officers of PNR was
instructed to look for the commotion created allegedly by the group of
Javier. Dagani first entered then Santiano. A fight ensued then Javier was
Shot by Santiano using his service firearm a 38 caliber while Dagani was
holding Javiers hands and in an out of balance position. They invoke the
justifying circumstance of Self- Defense and Lawfuk exercise of duty. The
trial court and CA still convicted them of Murder with treachery under art
248 of RPC. The case went to SC for review.
Held:

The SC held that the unlawful aggression which is an indespensible

element of self defense is not present for it is proven that Javier was not
able to use his 22 caliber, if there were really unlawful aggression it is not
imminent because Dagani has overpowered Javier. The SC also are not
persuaded that they are in lawful exercise of duty.
Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as
the deliberate employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of
a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
intended victim might raise. Treachery is present when two conditions
concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and forms of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods and forms of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
person.[45]
This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the
wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the
time the attack was made, or the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not
by themselves render the attack as treacherous.[46] This is of particular
significance in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused
whereby he gained an advantageous position over the victim when the
latter accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless.[47] The means
employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be
shown to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to
insure the consummation of the crime and at the same time eliminate or
reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended victim.[48] For the rules on
treachery to apply, the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the
accused, unexpected by the victim, and without provocation on the part of
the latter.[49] Treachery is never presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it
is required that the manner of attack must be shown to have been attended
by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.[50]
The prosecution failed to convincingly prove that the assault by the
appellants had been deliberately adopted as a mode of attack intended to
insure the killing of Javier and without the latter having the opportunity to
defend himself. Other than the bare fact that Santiano shot Javier while the
latter had been struggling with Dagani over the possession of the .22
caliber gun, no other fact had been adduced to show that the appellants
consciously planned or predetermined the methods to insure the
commission of the crime, nor had the risk of the victim to
retaliate been eliminated during the course of the struggle over the
weapon, as the latter, though struggling, had not been
completely subdued. As already stated, this Court must emphasize that the
mere suddenness of the attack, or the vulnerable position of the victim at
the time of the attack, or yet even the fact that the victim was unarmed, do
not by themselves make the attack treacherous.[51] It must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that the means employed gave the victim no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and that such means had been
deliberately or consciously adopted without danger to the life of the
accused.[52]

For these reasons, the Court is inclined to look upon the helpless position of
Javier as merely incidental to the attack, and that the decision to shoot
Javier was made in an instant.
appellant Santiano may only be convicted of Homicide.[54] The penalty,
therefore, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
reclusion temporal.
The Office of the Solicitor General is correct in that the courts a quo failed
to consider the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of official position under Article 14 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, since the accused, a PNR security officer
covered by the Civil Service, committed the crime with the aid of a gun he
had been authorized to carry as such.[55] Considering that the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, as duly appreciated by the courts a
quo, shall be offset against the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of official position, the penalty should be imposed in its medium
period, pursuant to Article 64 (4) of the aforesaid Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the sentence of appellant
Santiano will consist of a minimum that is anywhere within the full range
ofprision mayor, and a maximum which is anywhere within reclusion
temporal in its medium period. This Court hereby fixes it to be from eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15304
dated June 20, 2002 is MODIFIED. Appellant Otello Santiano y Leonida is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of an indeterminate sentence from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.Appellant
Santiano is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P31,845.00 as funeral and burial expenses,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and
P1,000.00

Doctrine: Not alleged treachery (Alevosia under RPC Art.14 (16) Art 14. No
7
Title:

People vs. Raquinio, 17 SCRA 914

Nature of Action: Direct appeal on questions of law

FACTS: Juan Raquinio, is guilty of frustrated homicide with the aggravating

circumstance of treachery offset by voluntary surrender in mitigation.

Early afternoon of November 8, 1957, complainant Apolonio Ravina, with

his helper Luciano, drove his jeep to the river bank to load and transport to
market the fish catch for today. Agustin Raquinio, local barrio lieutenant
and head-man of the fishermen, told Ravina that he promised to load the
fishes to Gaspar Retutal, in which the defendant Juan Raquinio is a helper.
Agustin Raquinio and the complainant engaged in defeated discussion, the
latter reminded Agustin that he should be given the preference to transport
and told Agustin: We did not come here to force ourselves to you.
Complainants mother, sensing trouble, called him. And when he turned to
go to his mother, defendant stabbed him at the stomach with a small bolo.
Complainant took to his heels, collapsed at the ground at a distance about
25 meters. Defendant wanted to pursue him, but Agustin Raquinio held him
fast, grabbed the bolo in his hand.
In Appellants brief, hopes that the Supreme Court may spotlight his theory
that the crime committed falls under the level of physical injuries. A direct
appeal on questions of law precludes a review of the facts. The defendant
waived his right to inquiry into these facts.
ISSUES: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding of frustrated
homicide for lack of intention to kill? And Whether or not the lower court
erred in considering treachery as an aggravating circumstance when it is
not alleged in the criminal charge against him?
HELD:
Appellant used a lethal weapon, a bolo. The thrust, sudden and
unexpected- was directed to a vital part of the body, the abdomen. If
Agustin did not hold him fast, he would have finished his victim. The
wounds suffered by the latter would have been fatal, were it not for the
timely and adequate medical assistance. Intention to kill, a mental process,
may be inferred from the nature of weapon used, the place of wound, the
seriousness thereof and the persistence to kill the victim. Be it all present,
the crime is frustrated homicide.
Had treachery been claimed, the crime would have risen to the level of
frustrated murder. But the information did not allege treachery. How the act
was perpetrated has to be proved to achieve this end, it is inescapable that
the act be described. To show the conditions under which the attack was
perpetrated, an aggravating circumstance which is part of the act may
be related. Else, a gap may result, the narrative incomplete. So it is, that
evidence of an aggravating circumstance is not intended to bring about a
change in the nature of that crime averred, for the worse. Rather, it serves
the purpose of aiding the court in assessing the penalty to be imposed "in a

more or less severe form, within the limits prescribed for the offense
charged in the complaint or information".
The decision appealed from is not infirm. It is accordingly affirmed. Costs
against appellant.
Art 14. No. 8
G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. FLORO RODIL
defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Facts: Lt. Masana together with Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica was having lunch when their attention
was called by Rodil. Masana, in civilian clothing, went outside and asked Rodil, after
identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun thatwas tucked under his shirt had a
license. Instead if answering Rodil attempted to draw his gun but Fidel grabbed the gave and
gave it to Masana. The three wentinside the restaurant and Masana wrote a receipt for the gun
and he asked Rodilto sign it but the appellant refused to do so. Masana refused to return the
gunto Rodil and as Masana was about to stand up Rodil pulled out his dagger and stabbed
Masana several times on the chest and stomach causing his death after several hours. Chief of
Police Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant
embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the
accused-appellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the
municipal building ofIndang, Cavite.
Issue: WON the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated.
Held: YES. The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it
is obvious that the victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as aPC officer to the accused who
is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit andtherefore inferior both in rank and social
status to the victim.The term "rank"should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such,
refers to a high social position or standing as a grade in the armed forces.The aggravating
circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of
the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar. The evidence of the
prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was present as
he was taking his lunchin the same restaurant when the incident occurred. As a matter of fact,
the saidchief of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused from behind, wrested
the dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the municipal building of Indang. And
appellant admittedly knew him even then as the town chief of police, although he now claims
that he went to the municipal building to surrender tothe chief of police who was not allegedly
in the restaurant during the incident. Chief of police is considered a public authority or a person

in authority forhe is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is
specifically duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the law.

Article 14 morada and disregard of age Art 14. No 13

People vs. Butag
Facts:

Around 8:30 o'clock on the evening of September 23, 1987,

while coming from the Kingdom Hall of the Jehovah's
Witnesses at Cavite City, Violeta Parnala and her common-law
husband, Clark Din, knocked on the main door of their twostorey house at 8790 Bautista St., Dalahican, Cavite City, but
got no response.

Clark Din then went to the back of the house and stoned the
window of the room occupied by Violeta's son, six-year old Jay
Vee Parnala Custodio, and the housemaid, Teresita Rosalinas.

As Violeta continued knocking on the front door, Manley

Reginaldo suddenly opened it and hurriedly went out, followed
by two others, namely Nonoy Bracamonte and appellant.

Caught by surprise, Violeta started shouting, prompting the

intruders to run away. She then called her husband who
immediately ran in pursuit.

Failing to catch up with the three, Clark Din returned to the

house. He saw Pat. Sahagun and Pat. Punzal standing at the
gate, and both accompanied him to the house.

Inside, the lights were off but the television set was on. They
opened the lights as they searched for the housemaid Teresita
and Jay Vee .

They discovered that the bathroom door upstairs was locked

when they tried to open it, so Clark Din went down to his wife
to get the key.

When the door was opened and the light turned on, they saw
Teresita, feet and hands tied and mouth gagged, lying dead
on the floor, bathed in blood.

Jay Vee was found in the washroom, his dead body immersed
in a water container. Per autopsy report, Teresita suffered one
(1) incised and six (6) stab wounds, and Jay Vee sustained
three (3) incised and fourteen (14) stab wounds.

Trial court =guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with

double homicide- reclusion perpetua

Issue:

w/n the trial court erred in not considering the aggravating

circumsrtances present in the case.

Held:

The lower court, however, erred in not considering the age of the
deceased as an aggravating circumstance. Jay Vee Parnala was
barely six years old when ruthlessly stabbed fourteen
times before his body was submerged in the pail.

Likewise, the trial court erred in disregarding morada which

aggravated the offense inasmuch as the crime took place
and was committed by the accused-appellant in the house
of the victims. The accused-appellant showed greater perversity
in his deliberate invasion of the tranquility and privacy of the
Parnala's domicile.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED,

finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the presence of
two aggravating circumstances, morada and disregard of
age, the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Twelve (12) Years of Prision Mayor to
Twenty (20) Years of Reclusion Temporal for the death of Jay Vee
Parnala and another indeterminate penalty of Twelve (12) Years of
Prision Mayor to Twenty (20) Years of Reclusion Temporal for the
death of Teresita Rosalinas and to indemnify the heirs of deceased
Jay Vee Parnala and Teresita Rosalinas in the amount of P50,000.00
each in line with recent jurisprudence.

G.R. No. 191063

October 9, 2013 Art. 14. No.16
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALDRIN M.
GALICIA, Accused-Appellant.
Facts: On 11:45 am, June 10 2004 at N. Gonzalez st., corner F
Platon st.,Brgy II, Poblacion, Tanauan city Batanggas, Jun Asuncion
and herein appellant shot the pajero of honorable judge Voltaire
Rosales which killed the latter. They were positively identified by
the witnesses Flores a worker in a diner along N. Gonzales whom
she claims that she even invited the accussed to come to the diner
for it was raining which make her see the accused faces and
Enriquez an agent for insurance company who often pass by the
street who positively identifies the endure motorcycle of the
accused. they were convicted by the trial court which was affirmed
by the CA for murder with treachery punishable under art. 248 of
RPC. on appeal of Galicia while asuncion still remain at large he
avers that the trial courts decision is erroneous for it give
credence to the testimonies of the witnesses even though it has
discrepancies.
Held:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that appellant Aldrin M. Galicia is ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim Judge Voltaire Rosales the amount of P
00,000.00 as civil indemnity;P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all in addition to the interest
on all these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6 from date of
finality of his Decision until fully paid.
s we have observed, the testimonies of Flores and Enriquez when
taken together, would point to the culpability of Galicia and his
cohort as the perpetrators in the killing of Judge Voltaire Rosales. It
may be true that Flores did not witness the actual shooting as she
recounted only the time immediately prior to and after the
shooting transpired. However, such missing detail as to the actual
shooting was supplied by state witness Enriquez who testified in a
straightforward manner how Galicia and his co-accused fired upon
the Pajero.
In the same vein, contrary to the finding of the CA, we appreciate
the existence of the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation. The essence of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. In
this case, it was clearly shown that the two accused who were
"riding in tandem" hatched the means on how to carry out and
facilitate the commission of the crime. The time that had elapsed
while the accused were waiting for their victim to pass by, is
indicative of cool thought and reflection on their part that they

clung to their determination to commit the crime. We are therefore

convinced that the elements of evident premeditation were
established by the trial court with equal certainty as the criminal
act itself.23 Since the crime has already been qualified to murder
by the attendant circumstance of treachery, the other proven
circumstance of evident premeditation should be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance.
The crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with reclusion
perpetua to death. For the death of Judge Voltaire Rosales, given
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation that
attended the commission of the crime, the penalty of death should
have been meted against Galicia. However, due to the dictates of
Republic Act No. 934625 prohibiting its imposition, the lower
courts correctly sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua only
Art 14. No 14
People vs. Alcala 46 Phil 739
Facts: On the evening of June 13, 1921, the deceased Eugenio
Rubion was in his house in company with his wife and children.
The deceased's mother-in-law, Agripina Robinita, with her
husband, Ciriaco Aguinaldo, was also there. After having taken
their supper, the deceased and Ciriaco Aguinaldo drank some
wine, and afterwards all retired to sleep. The deceased went to the
hand-rail of the door and rested there. About midnight, his wife,
Emeteria Eje, who was sleeping within the house, was awake by
the noise produced by a blow. She got up, looked out, and saw the
accused Valentin Alcala upon Eugenio Rubion, holding the latter by
the neck, while the appellant, Paulo Alcala, who had a club in his
hand, held the knees of the deceased. Upon seeing this, Emeteria
Eje exclaimed: "Jesus Christ! What have you done with my
husband?" The accused warned her to keep quiet, and she ran
within the house, stepping the hand of her mother who woke up
and called her husband, who said: "Eugenio, what is that? Eugenio,
light," to which Emeteria answered: "They are Valentin and his
brother." Ciriaco Aguinaldo went downstairs and found Eugenio
Rubion at the base of the staircase with his face downward and
between the two accused, one of whom, Valentin, who had a
leather scabbard on his waist, said, "take care not to say anything
of what has happened."
Then, Valentin and the herein appellant, brought the corpse of
Eugenio Rubion to the house, placed the body with his face
downward over a pillow, within the mosquito net, where Emeteria
Eje had slept, whom Valentin Alcala abused after all other persons
who were there had run away. Finally, Valentin left after
threatening Emeteria Eje, saying, "If you report all that has

happened, I will kill you; and if you are obliged to testify, you must
testify against Tranquilino and Catalino, tenants of Kalaw."
Issue: WON the accused committed aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and of the crime having been committed in the dwelling
of the offended party.
Held: The accused sought the nighttime for the perpetration of the
crime, the fact is that they at least took advantage of it, for they
approached the house at an early time, and yet they did not
commit the crime until late in the night. This is sufficient in order
that the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity may be held to
exist.
As to whether the crime must be held to have been committed in
the dwelling of the offended party, we take it that, although the
accused were found with the deceased at the foot of the staircase
of the house, that place must be regarded as an integral part of
the dwelling of that family. The porch of a house, not common to
different neighbors, is a part of the dwelling.
Therefore, hold that the crime proven in this case is homicide with
two aggravating circumstances, to wit, nocturnity and that of the
act having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party,
and we find the herein appellant guilty of such a crime

Doctrine:
Aggravating Circumstance of Minority in relation to Art.
266-B of RPC Art 14. No. 30
Title:

People vs. Lomaque, 687 SCRA 383

Nature of Action:

Review of Lower Courts Decision

years of age by then and there caressing her breast, and her vagina,
smelling her private parts and inserting his finger inside her vagina. XXX
AAA was born on September 15, 1985 to BBB by her first husband. She was
about eight (8) years old at the time Lomaque started abusing/molesting
her. The first act of molestation was when Lomaque asked AAA to remove
his growing mustache and take out white hair from his head. Lomaque,
while lying on AAAs lap, started to smell and sniff her private parts, and
thereafter inserted his finger inside her vagina. From then, the rape by
sexual intercourse is a series of acts against the victim, sometimes when
everyone is asleep, when BBB is in the hospital, while everyone is watching
television, while Lomaque initially held BBBs breast and positioned his
back at AAA, and when Lomaque also asks AAA to hold his penis and
inserted into AAAs mouth and rub it to her lips.
AAA eventually became pregnant, brought by her mother to the hospital
and find out that Lomaque was the father. After giving birth, she returned
home and saw Lomaque kissing her younger sister. Afraid that her sister
will suffer the same, AAA, decided to file a complaint with help of Bantay
Bata 163.
The appellant entered a plea of not guilty and defense of denial and alibi.
The Court of Appeals affirms the decision of the RTC as mentioned above.
ISSUES:
Whether the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
appellant for the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness. Basically,
appellant assails the credibility of AAA. Thus, the resolution of the issue
rests upon the credibility of the testimony of the offended party.
HELD:

FACTS:
Appellant was charged under separate Informations for 13 counts of Rape
by Sexual Intercourse allegedly committed against his stepdaughter
"AAA." Crime of RAPE (Paragraph 1 of Article 266- A of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by RA 8353 in relation to Section 5 of RA 7610). June 5,
1999, AAA, accused' own stepdaughter, a minor 14 years of age by then
and there removing her shorts and inserting his penis inside her vagina and
thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent.
In addition, appellant was also charged with Acts of Lasciviousness in
relation to Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7610. May 8 1993, the
accused with force and intimidation did then and there commit acts of
lewdness upon the person of one AAA his own stepdaughter a minor 8

There is no plausible ground to disturb the findings of the trial court

respecting the credibility of AAA. Her momentary inaction will neither
diminish nor affect her credibility. The filing of complaints of rape in
months, even years after their commission may or may not dent the
credibility of witness and of testimony, depending on the circumstances
attendant thereto. Neither the failure of AAA to struggle nor at least offer
resistance during the rape incidents would tarnish her credibility. Physical
resistance need not be established when intimidation is brought to bear on
the victim and the latter submits herself out of fear. Also, the fact that
AAA resumed her normal life after the commission of the alleged rapes
cannot be taken against her. Moreover, appellant contends that it
challenges human credulity that he was able to sexually abuse AAA
despite the many people around them. As has been repeatedly ruled, rape
can be committed even when the rapist and the victim are not alone.

Lust is no respecter of time and place. Rape is not impossible even

if committed in the same room while the rapists spouse is sleeping or in a
small room where other family members also sleep.

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the Partial
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30 (RTC), finding
appellant guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The penalty
We, therefore, sustain the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on the
appellant not by reason of RA 9346 but because that is the penalty
provided for by the law for simple rape.
Rape by sexual assault in Article 266- A(2) of the RPC is punishable under
Article 266-B by prision mayor. The latter article also provides that if the
rape is committed with any of the 10 aggravating/qualifying circumstances
therein enumerated, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal.
The 10 attendant circumstances partake the nature of special qualifying
circumstances. Under the first circumstance, the minority of the victim and
the relationship of the offender to the victim must both be alleged in the
Information and duly proved clearly and indubitably as the crime itself.
They must be lumped together and their concurrence constitutes only one
special qualifying circumstance. However, in this particular case, while the
special qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged and proved, the
circumstance of relationship of AAA was not clearly established.
Also, appellant is found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. The imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period since the victim was under 12 years of age
at the time the crime was committed. Since the minority of the victim is
considered an aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its
maximum period that ranges from sixteen (16) years, five ( 5) months and
ten (10) days to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.

Art 14. No. 31

G.R. No. 193839

November 27, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JAVIER CAAVERAS, AccusedAppellant.

SERENO, CJ:

At about 8:30 p.m. on 30 November 1993, appellant, together with three unidentified persons,
was drinking liquor in the house of Oriel Conmigo (Oriel) in Barangay San Isidro, Sagnay,
Camarines Sur.3 Claro Sales (Claro) arrived and asked the men if Judas, referring to a person
named Gregorio Carable, was there.4 Oriel answered that Judas was not.5 A short while later,
Claro came back and again asked if Judas was in the house. This time, appellant and his
companions answered that they were, in fact, Judas. Claro then left, but the three unidentified
persons followed him outside.6
On the road outside, the unidentified persons repeatedly punched Claro.7 Just as he was about
to escape, appellant went out of the house and struck him on the head with a grande beer
bottle.8 Claro was able to take only five more steps and then collapsed.9 Matea Pielago
(Matea), who was nearby, trained her flashlight on the face of the assailant, enabling her to
recognize appellant despite the brownout as the one who had struck Claro.10 She shouted
for help when she saw Claro bleeding.11
Teresita Tria (Teresita), a neighbor of Oriel, saw appellant and the unidentified persons go back
to Oriels house.12 She heard one of them say, "You should have shoot [sic] him."13
Alvin Camu (Alvin), who heard the sound of the beer bottle as it struck something, went to
Oriels house, where he thought the sound came from.14 Oriel informed him that appellant had
struck Claro on the head.15 Alvin even saw appellant in Oriels house going out through the
kitchen door.16 Alvin then went to the road, where he saw broken bottles and Claro lying face
down in the canal,17 already dead. He then left to report the matter to the police.18
Dr. Roger Atanacio (Dr. Atanacio), municipal health officer, examined the body of Claro the
following day and found contusions and massive hematoma on the left side of the victims
neck, forehead, and left lower back.19 Dr. Atanacio pronounced the cause of death as "cardiorespiratory arrest, cervical cord, compression due to contusion with massive hematoma
neck,"20 explaining that the center of cardio-respiration is located at the base of the neck.21
Trauma on that part may affect normal respiration and cardiovascular activity, which was what
happened in this case and actually caused Claros death.22
An Information dated 7 February 1994 was filed before the RTC charging appellant and the
three unidentified persons with the crime of murder qualified by treachery, evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength.23A warrant of arrest24 for appellant was issued
on 24 February 1994, but he was able to elude the authorities for almost 10 years and was
arrested only on 3 October 2003.25

Appellant was arraigned on 11 November 2003. During pre-trial, he stipulated that if the name
Javier Caaveras was to be mentioned during the course of the trial, it would refer to him; that
he was at Barangay San Isidro, Sagnay, Camarines Sur, on 30 November 1993; and that he was
admitting the existence of the autopsy report and Certificate of Death of Claro.26
In his defense, appellant testified that on 30 November 1993, he went to the house of Oriel at
San Isidro, Sagnay, Camarines Sur for the fiesta.27 Oriel was the cousin of his wife and
godfather of his son.28 There was a brownout when appellant arrived at around 7:00 p.m.29
He saw six persons, more or less, drinking liquor at the annex of the house.30 At the dining
area, he was served food by Oriel and was later invited to join the people at the annex to drink
liquor.31 He saw that only three other persons, to whom he was introduced by Oriel, were
left.32 The three men sat at one end of the table, while he and Oriel were at the other.33
While drinking, he heard a person outside shouting that Judas must come out.34 The second
time this person shouted, one of the three men at the other end of the table answered that Judas
was there, and the three then proceeded to go outside.35 He and Oriel remained at the annex,
and they heard some arguing and chasing outside.36 Oriel got up and tried to look, but came
back saying that he could not clearly see because it was dark.37The two of them continued
drinking until the liquor ran out.38 Appellant went home with Ramil Ecleo, who corroborated
this statement.39 The defense also presented police blotter entries concerning the death of
Claro. These entries showed that only a spot investigation had been conducted on the
incident.40 Also, appellant was never identified or mentioned as the assailant or suspect in the
police blotter entries.41
In the course of appellants testimony, the prosecution presented two more Informations for
murder against him: one for the murder of Jose Espiritu, Jr. on 20 July 1986 in Tigaon,
Camarines Sur,42 and the other for the murder of Ludem Sumayang on 29 September 2002 in
San Jose, Puerto Princesa.43
RULING OF THE RTC
On 25 September 2006, the RTC promulgated a Partial Decision44 finding appellant guilty of
the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
inherent accessories provided by law.45Appellant was also ordered to pay Claros heirs the
amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity, 50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as temperate
damages.

act complained of, it was error to appreciate the qualifying circumstances. Thus, he could only
be found guilty of the crime of homicide.
Appellant pointed to alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Matea and Teresita. While
Teresita testified that three persons including appellant went after Claro, Matea specified that
the three unidentified persons went after the victim and appellant only followed later on.48
According to appellant, such inconsistency went into the very question of his involvement.49
Also, appellant pointed out that there was a brownout during the incident, making it highly
unlikely for the witnesses to have allegedly seen him commit the crime. According to him, the
claim that Matea trained her flashlight on his face, enabling her to identify him, was not in
accord with the common experience of persons witnessing a deplorable crime.50 Knowing that
he had been identified, appellant could have killed her as well.
It was also argued that there were inconsistencies between the testimonies of the witnesses and
the findings of Dr. Atanacio. Teresita and Matea both testified that they saw blood coming out
of the head of Claro after he was struck with a beer bottle. On the other hand, the medical
findings showed that there were no lacerations on his body; thus, there could not have been any
bleeding.51
In their testimonies, Oriel and Alvin admitted not having seen the actual incident. Thus, it was
contended that their testimonies could not have been the basis for appellants conviction.52
Even Dr. Atanacios findings should not have been given credence, because he admitted that he
did not open Claros body. Thus, his report should be properly denominated as a necropsy, and
not an autopsy, report.53
Finally, appellant argued that the RTC erred in appreciating treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength as qualifying circumstances. In the Partial Decision, no specific act pointing
to the presence of treachery was ever identified.54 Neither was it shown that appellant and his
companions took advantage of their combined strength to consummate the killing of Claro.
Granting that the four of them indeed attacked the victim, mere superiority in number is not
enough for a finding of superior strength.55
Thus, appellant prayed that he be acquitted or, in the alternative, that he be convicted only of
the crime of homicide.56
RULING OF THE CA

With the appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, the RTC found that all the elements of murder were present: a) a person was
killed; b) the accused killed that person; c) the killing was attended by a qualifying aggravating
circumstance; and d) the killing was neither parricide nor infanticide.46
On appeal to the CA, appellant argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.47 Furthermore, even assuming that he committed the

On 21 June 2010, the CA rendered a Decision57 affirming in toto that of the RTC. The CA
ruled that the alleged inconsistency regarding the moment when appellant went out of the
house referred only to a collateral matter and did not deviate from the fact that he had been
identified as the assailant.58 The brownout did not negate the positive identification of
appellant, since Teresita testified that her house and that of Oriel were lit by kerosene lamps.
That Matea boldly shone her flashlight on appellants face did not make her any less credible

as a witness.59 On the contrary, it only showed her presence of mind and courage in the face of
a startling and frightful experience.
On the lack of blood on the body of Claro, the CA noted with approval the argument of the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). The beer bottle that was used to strike him still
contained beer; and with the improvised lighting sources coupled with the sight of a seemingly
dead body, the liquid could have easily been mistaken for blood.60
According to the CA, the RTC was correct in appreciating treachery. When appellant struck
Claro, the latter was already in a helpless state, being in no position to defend himself.61
Hence, this appeal, with the parties adopting their respective arguments in their briefs filed
before the CA.
ISSUES

These declarations of the witnesses show a complete picture of what happened before, during,
and after the attack on Claro by appellant. We take note that Oriel is a relative by affinity and
close friend of appellant. Despite some effort on his part to "hide some material facts," as noted
by the RTC,62 he still provided enough evidence pointing to appellant as the assailant.
No stock can be placed in the theory that the witnesses did not see appellant because the police
blotters written immediately after the incident did not mention him in any way. Police Officer 1
Dave John de Quiroz, who identified the police blotter entries, admitted that the result of a spot
investigation is usually written not in the blotters but on a separate sheet.63 According to him,
the result of an investigation is the complaint against the suspect.64 While it is usually the
police who prepare the complaint, they would not have a copy if it was prepared by a lawyer.65
In this case, the complaint and the affidavits of the witnesses were executed with the assistance
of a private lawyer. Appellant cannot rely on the police blotters as a comprehensive record of
the investigation conducted by the police. While the blotters were silent as to his involvement
in the crime, the complaint and the affidavits of the witnesses named him as the perpetrator.

1. Whether it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had killed Claro; and
2. Whether treachery or taking advantage of superior strength attended the commission of the
crime.
OUR RULING
We partially grant the appeal.
We affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA that appellant indeed struck Claro with a beer
bottle, leading to the victims untimely death. Taken together, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses clearly point to appellant as the assailant.
First, contrary to the contention of appellant that the three unidentified persons were not his
companions, Oriel positively declared having received appellant together with the three other
persons at his home. Furthermore, Oriel testified that after Claro had asked about "Judas" for
the second time, appellant and the three others went after Claro outside.
Second, Matea saw appellant hit Claro on the head with a beer bottle after the three
unidentified persons had finished punching the victim. We dismiss the improper imputations on
Mateas credibility based on the argument that it is not in accord with common human
experience for one to shine a light on the face of a person who has just committed a crime. The
CA was correct in holding that her actuation meant nothing more than that she exhibited
courage and presence of mind, knowing that she might be able to help, as indeed she did, in
bringing the perpetrators to justice.
Third, Teresita heard one of appellants companions say, "You should have shoot [sic] him"
while they were going back to Oriels house. Alvin even saw appellant at Oriels house after
Oriel revealed that appellant had struck Claro.

However, while we entertain no doubt that appellant killed Claro, we find that treachery was
improperly appreciated by the CA.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party might
make.66 Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements
are shown: a) the malefactor employed means, method, or manner of execution affording the
person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b) the means, method, or
manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. Treachery
involves not only the swiftness, surprise, or suddenness of an attack upon an unsuspecting
victim,67 rendering the victim defenseless. It should also be shown that the mode of attack has
knowingly been intended to accomplish the wicked intent.68
Thus, the second element is the subjective aspect of treachery.69 It means that the accused
must have made some preparation to kill the deceased in a manner that would insure the
execution of the crime or render it impossible or hard for the person attacked to resort to selfdefense or retaliation. The mode of attack, therefore, must have been planned by the offender
and must not have sprung from an unexpected turn of events.70
We have had occasion to rule that treachery is not present when the killing is not
premeditated,71 or where the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is
just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act
of the victim,72 or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment.73
In this case, there was no time for appellant and his companions to plan and agree to
deliberately adopt a particular means to kill Claro. The first query of Claro was regarded as

innocent enough and was given no attention. It was the second query that was considered
impertinent, and witnesses testified that appellant and his companions went after Claro
immediately after it was uttered. Even the choice of weapon, a beer bottle readily available and
within grabbing range at the table as appellant followed outside, shows that the intent to harm
came about spontaneously. We also find that the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.
Superiority in number does not necessarily amount to the qualifying circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength.74 It must be shown that the aggressors combined forces in
order to secure advantage from their superiority in strength.75 When appreciating this
qualifying circumstance, it must be proven that the accused simultaneously assaulted the
deceased.76 Indeed, when assailants attack a victim alternately, they cannot be said to have
taken advantage of their superior strength.77
In this case, the unidentified companions of appellant punched Claro first. He was already
about to escape when he was struck by appellant on the head with a beer bottle.1wphi1 Thus,
the attack mounted by the unidentified persons had already ceased when appellant took over.
Also, the fact that Claro would have been able to escape showed that the initial attack was not
that overwhelming, considering that there were three of them attacking. Clearly, there was no
blatant disparity in strength between Claro, on the one hand, and appellant and his companions
on the other.
In the light of the foregoing, the crime committed was homicide, not murder. Under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed for the crime of homicide is reclusion
temporal. Considering that no aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be selected from the
range of the medium period of reclusion temporal, with the minimum penalty selected from the
range of prision mayor. Thus, we impose the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 4 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion tempora as
maximum. As to the award of damages to Claro' s heirs, we find that the award granted by the
R TC is in keeping with prevailing jurisprudence on homicide.78
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. We find appellant GUILTY of the
crime of HOMICIDE. He is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum and ORDERED to pay the heirs of Claro Sales the amounts of P50,000
as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as temperate damages, at the legal
rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until these damages are fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 15 alternative circumstances

People vs. Balondo
Facts:

From the records and varied written admissions of the accused,

Diego Balondo, that on Sept. 29, 1966, at about 6:00 o'clock a.m.,
he was in his farm in the barrio of Balacson, Kawayan, Subprovince
of Biliran, Leyte.

That he stayed in his farm for about three hours clearing his
camote plantation; that at about 9:00 o'clock in that same day, he
went home to take his breakfast; that at about 1:00 o'clock, he
saw Gloria Bulasa going to the direction of the nipa grooves of the
Ayono Asilo, behind the Aglipayan church;

that upon seeing her, he followed behind surreptitiously; that

upon seeing her cutting the banana leaves he told her, "why, you
are here again to cut the banana leaves?",

that the late Gloria Bulasa answered, 'it is none of your business
for it's the property of the government'; that he got furious and
immediately grabbed her by his left hand strangled her by the
neck and pushed her violently to the ground face downward;

that he firmly held her left arm and neck; rode on her back and
pinned her down with his knees and then continuously lifting her
head and smashed her face against the mud; that he choked and
buried her face in the mud for about an hour until she died.

And that when she was already dead, he lifted her from the mud
and laid her flat on her back, and then he held her by the feet,
dragged her to a place from where he killed her, at a distance of
thirty brazas;

that he covered the body with nipa leaves to keep her from the
sunlight; that the deceased was carrying a knife for cutting the
banana leaves, and she was a niece of the accused from a second
degree cousin;

that he sliced and took the flesh from the thighs, legs and shoulder
by the use of the knife of Gloria Bulasa because his bolo was dull,
after which he threw the knife away;

that he cut away also the feet; that he intended to slice all the
flesh of the cadaver but he was caught by the darkness of the
night;

that he put the sliced flesh with a piece of rattan, tied it and
brought it to his farm; that upon reaching his farm, he started to
build a fire and barbecued the sliced pieces of human flesh
(roasted it) and he ate the barbecued pieces of human flesh and
used it as a viand for the roasted banana fruits;

One mitigating circumstance can be considered in favor of

the defendant, namely, the circumstance of his having made
a voluntary plea of guilt in court before the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution.

We, therefore, find that the defendant had committed

the
crime
of
murder,
with
two
aggravating
circumstances that should be counted against him, and
one mitigating circumstance in his favor. However, for
lack of the required number of votes by the members of the
Court, for the imposition of the maximum penalty of death,
the Court has resolved to modify that portion of the judgment
of the trial court which imposes the penalty of death, by
imposing on the defendant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is

modified. The defendant is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Gloria
Bulasa in the sum of P12,000.00, and to pay the costs. It is so
ordered.

that the taste of the human flesh was bitter and poignant like a
gall bladder; that he killed Gloria Bulasa first to taste the human
flesh if its good; that after doing all those atrocious acts, he went
home at about 7:00 o'clock in that evening.

The Court of First Instance of Leyte found the defendant Diego

Balondo guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer
the extreme penalty of death.

Issue:

w/n The trial court erred in declaring that 2 other

aggravating circumstance are present namely, that
means employed or circumstance brought about which
add ignominy to the natural effects of the act, and that
the victim was the niece of the accused.

Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, the

alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken
into consideration only when the offended party is the

Held:

spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or

adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the
same degree of the offended (U.S. vs. Insierto, 15 Phil,
358).