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Epictetus Purportedly the most influential stoic.

Epictetus was a Greek speaking Stoic philosopher. He was born a slave at Hierapolis, Phrygia, and
lived in Rome until his banishment, when he went to Nicopolis in north-western Greece for the rest
of his life. His teachings were written down and published by his pupil Arrian in his Discourses.
Epictetus taught that philosophy is a way of life and not just a theoretical discipline. To Epictetus,
all external events are determined by fate, and are thus beyond our control; we should accept
whatever happens calmly and dispassionately. However, individuals are responsible for their own
actions, which they can examine and control through rigorous self-discipline.
Life
Epictetus was born c. 55 A.D., presumably at Hierapolis, Phrygia. The name his parents gave him is
unknown; the word epktetos in Greek simply means "acquired." He spent his youth as a slave in
Rome to Epaphroditos, a wealthy freedman and secretary to Nero.
Early in life, Epictetus acquired a passion for philosophy, and with the permission of his wealthy
owner, he studied Stoic philosophy under Musonius Rufus, which allowed him to rise in
respectability as he grew more educated. He somehow became crippled, with Origen stating that his
leg was deliberately broken by his master, and Simplicius stating that he had been lame from
childhood.
Epictetus obtained his freedom some time after Nero's death in 68 A.D., and began to teach
philosophy in Rome. About 93 A.D. Emperor Domitian banished all philosophers from the city, and
Epictetus fled to Nicopolis in Epirus, Greece, where he founded a philosophical school.
His most famous pupil, Arrian, studied under him when a young man and claimed to have written
the famous Discourses from his lecture notes, which he argued should be considered comparable to
the Socratic literature. Arrian describes Epictetus as being a powerful speaker who could "induce
his listener to feel just what Epictetus wanted him to feel." Many eminent figures sought
conversations with him, and the Emperor Hadrian was friendly with him and may have listened to
him speak at his school in Nicopolis.
He lived a life of great simplicity, with few possessions but in his old age he adopted a friend's child
who would otherwise have been left to die, and raised him with the aid of a woman. Epictetus was
never married. He died sometime around 135 A.D. After his death, his lamp was purchased by an
admirer for 3,000 drachmae.
Thought
No writings of Epictetus himself are known. His discourses were transcribed and compiled by
his pupil Arrian . Arrian also compiled a popular digest, entitled the Enchiridion, or Handbook. In a
preface to the Discourses, addressed to Lucius Gellius, Arrian states that "whatever I heard him say
I used to write down, word for word, as best I could, endeavouring to preserve it as a memorial, for
my own future use, of his way of thinking and the frankness of his speech." Logic provides valid
reasoning and certainty in judgment, but it is subordinate to practical needs. The first and most
necessary part of philosophy concerns the application of doctrine, for example, that people should
not lie; the second concerns reasons, e.g. why people should not lie; while the third, lastly, examines
and establishes the reasons. This is the logical part, which finds reasons, shows what is a reason,
and that a given reason is a right one.
Both the Discourses and the Enchiridion begin by distinguishing between those things in our power
and those things not in our power .
That alone is in our power, which is our own work; and in this class are our opinions, impulses,
desires, and aversions. What, on the contrary, is not in our power, are our bodies, possessions, glory,
and power. Any delusion on this point leads to the greatest errors, misfortunes, and troubles, and to
the slavery of the soul.
We have no power over external things, and the good that ought to be the object of our earnest

pursuit, is to be found only within ourselves. The determination between what is good and what is
not good is made by the capacity for choice . Prohairesis allows us to act, and gives us the kind of
freedom that only rational animals have. It is determined by our reason, which of all our faculties
sees and tests itself and everything else. It is the right use of the impressions that bombard the mind
that is in our power:
Practise then from the start to say to every harsh impression, "You are an impression, and not at all
the thing you appear to be." Then examine it and test it by these rules you have, and firstly, and
chiefly, by this: whether the impression has to do with the things that are up to us, or those that are
not; and if it has to do with the things that are not up to us, be ready to reply, "It is nothing to me."
We will not be troubled at any loss, but will say to ourselves on such an occasion: "I have lost
nothing that belongs to me; it was not something of mine that was torn from me, but something that
was not in my power has left me." Nothing beyond the use of our opinion is properly ours. Every
possession rests on opinion. What is to cry and to weep? An opinion. What is misfortune, or a
quarrel, or a complaint? All these things are opinions; opinions founded on the delusion that what is
not subject to our own choice can be either good or evil, which it cannot.
Reason alone is good, and the irrational is evil, and the irrational is intolerable to the rational. The
good person should labour chiefly on their own reason; to perfect this is in our power. To repel evil
opinions by the good is the noble contest in which humans should engage; it is not an easy task, but
it promises true freedom, peace of mind, and a divine command over the emotions . We should
especially be on our guard against the opinion of pleasure because of its apparent sweetness and
charms. The first object of philosophy, therefore, is to purify the mind.
Epictetus teaches that the preconceptions of good and evil are common to all. Good alone is
profitable and to be desired, and evil is hurtful and to be avoided. Different opinions arise only from
the application of these preconceptions to particular cases, and it is then that the darkness of
ignorance, which blindly maintains the correctness of its own opinion, must be dispelled.
Philosophy should provide a standard for good and evil. This process is greatly facilitated because
the mind and the works of the mind are alone in our power, whereas all external things that aid life
are beyond our control. The gods too gave us the soul and reason, which is not measured by breadth
or depth, but by knowledge and sentiments, and by which we attain to greatness, and may equal
even with the gods. We should, therefore, cultivate the mind with special care. If we wish for
nothing but what God wills, we shall be truly free, and all will come to pass with us according to
our desire; and we shall be as little subject to restraint as Zeus himself.
Every individual is connected with the rest of the world, and the universe is fashioned for universal
harmony. We should conduct ourselves through life fulfilling all our duties as children, siblings,
parents, and citizens.
For our country or friends we ought to be ready to undergo or perform the greatest difficulties. The
good person, if able to foresee the future, would peacefully and contentedly help to bring about their
own sickness, maiming, and even death, knowing that this is the right order of the universe. We
have all a certain part to play in the world, and we have done enough when we have performed what
our nature allows. In the exercise of our powers, we may become aware of the destiny we are
intended to fulfill.

We are like travellers at an inn, or guests at a stranger's table; whatever is offered we take with
thankfulness, and sometimes, when the turn comes, we may refuse; in the former case we are a
worthy guest of the gods, and in the latter we appear as a sharer in their power. Anyone who finds
life intolerable is free to quit it, but we should not abandon our appointed role without sufficient
reason. The Stoic sage will never find life intolerable and will complain of no one, either God or
human. Those who go wrong we should pardon and treat with compassion, since it is from
ignorance that they err, being as it were blind.
It is only our opinions and principles that can render us unhappy, and it is only the ignorant person
that finds fault with another. Every desire degrades us, and renders us slaves of what we desire.
The final entry of the Enchiridion, or Handbook, begins: "Upon all occasions we ought to have
these maxims ready at hand":
Conduct me, Zeus, and thou, O Destiny,
Wherever thy decree has fixed my lot.
I follow willingly; and, did I not,
Wicked and wretched would I follow still.

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