Bay Ariel N.

Sto Tomas
Logic Tue 7:30-9:30
Atty. Dean Pamaran
Missing the Point
And, the fact that somebody was appointed to the position of President of the University is of no moment. It would
only mean that the accused Crisostomo must have to vacate the office as mandated by Section 9, Article XVI I of the
Constitution X X X X.( RAYMUNDO G. GARCIA, complainant, JUDGE AMANTE Q. ALCONCEL)
Ad Hominem
In the absence of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such crime against the accusedappellants, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty stands. Especially here, where an astute analysis
of MADAC operative Bilasons testimony does not indicate any inconsistency, contradiction, or fabrication. (People
v. Aure, G.R. No. 185163)
Begging the Question
The Solicitor General, rather than face the question squarely, says the petitioner could be validly replaced in the
instant case because his appointment was temporary and therefore could be withdrawn at will, with or without cause.
Having accepted such an appointment, it is argued, the petitioner waived his security of tenure and consequently ran
the risk of an abrupt separation from his office without violation of the Constitution. 5
While the principle is correct, and we have applied it many times, 6 it is not correctly applied in this case. The
argument begs the question. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and
it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary. (Fuego v. Civil Service
Commission)
Red Herring
Even the majority Decision gives no clue, and perhaps the majority has no clue on what those reasonable standards
are. As Justice Florentino Feliciano said in his concurrence in Taada v. Tuvera:[19]
x x x The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the
statute, has been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement
constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and
its people.
This is the red herring for the majority Decision to speak as if there were a way to tweak EO 1 so that it becomes
acceptable to the majority when in reality there is no way that can be done without loss of dignity to the incumbent
presidency. The tweaked EO, according to the Decision, must include all past administrations in its coverage, and
can identify its priority; but a reading of the Decision already indicates that the moment the prioritization hints at
focusing on the Arroyo administration, then the majority is ready to once again strike it down. Such proposition is to
require the Aquino administration to engage in hypocrisy to fact-find on the elephant in the room without talking
about that elephant in particular because the majority finds that to talk about that particular elephant without talking
about all other elephants is to deprive that particular elephant of its equal protection right. This Court has imposed
an unbearable and undignified yoke on the presidency. It is to require the Aquino Presidency to pretend that

addressing the reported graft and corruption of the Arroyo administration was never a major campaign promise of
this Presidency to the people. (Louis Barok C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission)

Appeal to Pity
When respondent failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRCs 30 November 2006 Resolution within
the reglementary period, the Resolution attained finality and could no longer be modified by the Court of Appeals.
The Court has ruled as follows:
[I]t is a fundamental rule that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions
are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, and, of course, where the judgment is void. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final
and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that
purpose.
It cannot be argued that prescriptive periods are mere procedural rules and technicalities, which may be brushed
aside at every cry of injustice, and may be bent and broken by every appeal to pity. (AGG Trucking v. Yuag)
Hasty Generalization
We feel that the rationale behind the aforequoted doctrine is that the pirated copies as well as the master tapes,
unlike the other types of personal properties which may be seized, were available for presentation to the court at the
time of the application for a search warrant to determine the existence of the linkage of the copyrighted films with
the pirated ones. Thus, there is no reason not to present them (Italics supplied for emphasis).[50]
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of
the copyrighted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost
in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true
nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case
could lead to no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible
requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta should always be construed within the
factual matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the
vice of overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.(Columbia Pictures v. CA)
Ambiguity
Mere showing of irreconciliable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical)
illness. (Republic v. CA, Art. 36, FC)

Appeal to Inappropriate Authority

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:[8]
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court
to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
(Republic v. Molina)