Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 1 of 67

Case No. 1
G.R. No. 173807
April 16, 2009
JAIME U. GOSIACO, Petitioner, vs. LETICIA CHING and EDWIN CASTA, Respondents.
Facts:
- The right to recover due and demandable pecuniary obligations incurred by juridical
persons such as corporations cannot be impaired by procedural rules. Our rules of
procedure governing the litigation of criminal actions for violation of B.P. 22 have
given the appearance of impairing such substantive rights, and we take the
opportunity herein to assert the necessary clarifications.
- Before us is a Rule 45 petition which seeks the reversal of the Decision of the CA
which affirmed the decision of the RTC of Pasig. The RTC's decision reversed the
decision of the MeTC of San Juanwhich involved a charge of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
against respondents Ching and Casta.
- On 16 February 2000, petitioner Gosiaco invested P8,000,000.00 with ASB Holdings,
Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The money was loaned to ASB for a period of 48 days with
interest at 10.5% which is equivalent toP112,000.00. In exchange, ASB through its
Business Development Operation Group manager Ching, issued DBS checks
for P8,000,000.00 and P112,000.00 respectively. The checks, both signed by Ching,
were drawn against DBS Bank Makati Head Office branch. ASB, through a letter dated
31 March 2000, acknowledged that it owed petitioner the abovementioned amounts.
- Upon maturity of the checks, petitioner went to the DBS Bank San Juan Branch to
deposit the two (2) checks. However, the checks were dishonored and payments
were refused because of a stop payment order and for insufficiency of funds.
Petitioner informed respondents about the dishonor of the checks and demanded
replacement checks or the return of the money placement but to no avail. Thus,
petitioner filed a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MeTC of
San Juan against the private respondents.
- Ching was arraigned and tried while Casta remained at large. Ching denied liability
and claimed that she was a mere employee of ASB. She asserted that she did not
have knowledge as to how much money ASB had in the banks as such responsibility
belonged to another department.
- Petitioner moved that ASB and its president be impleaded as party defendants.
However, the MeTC denied the motion as the case had already been submitted for
final decision.
- On 8 February 2001, the MeTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it did not
absolve her from civil liability. The MeTC ruled that Ching, as a corporate officer of
ASB, was civilly liable since she was a signatory to the checks.
- Both petitioner and Ching appealed the ruling to the RTC. Petitioner appealed to the
RTC on the ground that the MeTC failed to hold ASB and Roxas either jointly or
severally liable with Ching. On the other hand, Ching moved for a reconsideration
which was subsequently denied. Thereafter, she filed her notice of appeal on the
ground that she should not be held civilly liable for the bouncing checks because they
were contractual obligations of ASB.
- On 12 July 2005, the RTC rendered its decision sustaining Ching's appeal. The RTC
affirmed the MeTCs ruling which denied the motion to implead ASB and Roxas for
lack of jurisdiction over their persons. The RTC also exonerated Ching from civil
liability and ruled that the subject obligation fell squarely on ASB. Thus, Ching should
not be held civilly liable.
- Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA on the grounds that the RTC erred
in absolving Ching from civil liability; in upholding the refusal of the MeTC to implead
ASB and Roxas; and in refusing to pierce the corporate veil of ASB and hold Roxas
liable.
- On 19 July 2006, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and stated that the amount
petitioner sought to recover was a loan made to ASB and not to Ching. Roxas
testimony further bolstered the fact that the checks issued by Ching were for and in
behalf of ASB. The CA ruled that ASB cannot be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case since
it is not a natural person and in the case of Roxas, he was not the subject of a
preliminary investigation. CA also ruled that there was no need to pierce the
corporate veil of ASB since none of the requisites were present.
Issues:
1. Is a corporate officer who signed a bouncing check civilly liable under B.P. Blg. 22;
2. Can a corporation be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case; and
3. Is there a basis to pierce the corporate veil of ASB?
Held:
- B.P. Blg. 22 is popularly known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22
provides: xxx where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the
person or persons, who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be
liable under this Act.
- B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to address the rampant issuance of bouncing checks as
payment for pre-existing obligations. The circulation of bouncing checks adversely
affected confidence in trade and commerce. The State criminalized such practice
because it was deemed injurious to public interests and was found to be pernicious
and inimical to public welfare. It punishes the act of making and issuing bouncing

checks. It is the act itself of issuing the checks which is considered malum
prohibitum. The law is an offense against public order and not an offense against
property. It penalizes the issuance of a check without regard to its purpose. It covers
all types of checks. Even checks that were issued as a form of deposit or guarantee
were held to be within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he may be
held personally liable for violating a penal statute. The statute imposes criminal
penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud another of money or property, draws
or issues a check on any bank with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such
bank to meet the check on presentment. Moreover, the personal liability of the
corporate officer is predicated on the principle that he cannot shield himself from
liability from his own acts on the ground that it was a corporate act and not his
personal act.
The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check
can only be held civilly liable when he is convicted. In the case of Bautista v. Auto Plus
Traders Inc., the Court ruled decisively that the civil liability of a corporate officer in
a B.P. Blg. 22 case is extinguished with the criminal liability. We are not inclined
through this case to revisit so recent a precedent, and the rule of stare decisis
precludes (prevents) us to discharge Ching of any civil liability arising from the B.P.
Blg. 22 case against her, on account of her acquittal in the criminal charge.
Records show that it is ASB who is civilly obligated to petitioner. The petitioner has
been proceeding from the premise that he is unable to pursue a separate civil action
against ASB itself for the recovery of the amounts due from the subject checks. From
this premise, petitioner sought to implead ASB as a defendant to the B.P. Blg. 22 case,
even if such case is criminal in nature.
What supplied the notion to the petitioner that he was unable to pursue a separate
civil action against ASB? He cites the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particularly the provisions involving B.P. Blg. 22 cases, which state that: Rule 111,
Section 1Institution of criminal and civil action. x x x (b) The criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. Upon
filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complainant or information
also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages,
the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If
the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded
by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment. Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial
of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
We are unable to agree with petitioner that he is entitled to implead ASB in the B.P.
Blg. 22 case even if the Rules require the joint trial of both the criminal and civil
liability. A basic maxim in statutory construction is that the interpretation of penal
laws is strictly construed against the State and liberally construed against the
accused.
Nowhere in B.P. Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may be impleaded as an
accused or defendant in the prosecution for violations of that law, even in the
litigation of the civil aspect thereof.
The substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable obligations against
a debtor-corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure. Nothing
in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against
the juridical person on whose behalf the check was issued. What the rules prohibit is
the reservation of a separate civil action against the natural person charged with
violating B.P. Blg. 22, including such corporate officer who had signed the bounced
check.
In theory the B.P. Blg. 22 criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing
check in behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the
corporation itself, such civil liability arising from the Civil Code. B.P. Blg. 22 itself fused
this criminal liability of the signer of the check in behalf of the corporation with the
corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by allowing the complainant to
recover such civil liability not from the corporation, but from the person who signed
the check in its behalf.
The implied institution of the civil case into the criminal case for B.P. Blg. 22 should
not affect the civil liability of the corporation for the same check, since such implied
institution concerns the civil liability of the signatory, and not of the corporation. B.P.
Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the signatory of the check which is distinct
from the civil liability of the corporation for the amount represented from the check.
The civil liability attaching to the signatory arises from the wrongful act of signing the
check despite the insufficiency of funds in the account, while the civil liability
attaching to the corporation is itself the very obligation covered by the check or the
consideration for its execution. Yet these civil liabilities are mistaken to be indistinct.
The confusion is traceable to the singularity of the amount of each.

- In the B.P. Blg. 22 case, what the trial court should determine whether or not the
signatory had signed the check with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit
in the bank account, while in the civil case the trial court should ascertain whether or
not the obligation itself is valid and demandable. The litigation of both questions
could, in theory, proceed independently and simultaneously without being ultimately
conclusive on one or the other.
- While the RPC imposes subsidiary civil liability to corporations for criminal acts
engaged in by their employees in the discharge of their duties, said subsidiary liability
applies only to felonies, and not to crimes penalized by special laws such as B.P. Blg.
22. Nothing in B.P. Blg. 22 imposes such subsidiary liability to the corporation in
whose name the check is actually issued. Should the check signatory be unable to pay
the obligation incurred by the corporation, the complainant would be bereft of
remedy unless the right of action to collect on the liability of the corporation is
recognized and given flesh.
- There are two prevailing concerns should civil recovery against the corporation be
pursued even as the B.P. Blg. 22 case against the signatory remains extant. First, the
possibility that the plaintiff might be awarded the amount of the check in both the
B.P. Blg. 22 case and in the civil action against the corporation. For obvious reasons,
that should not be permitted. Considering that petitioner herein has no chance to
recover the amount of the check through the B.P. Blg. 22 case, we need not contend
with that possibility through this case. Nonetheless, as a matter of prudence, it is best
we refer the matter to the Committee on Rules for the formulation of proper
guidelines to prevent that possibility. The second concern is over the payment of
filing fees in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and the civil action against the corporation.
Generally, we see no evil or cause for distress if the plaintiff were made to pay filing
fees based on the amount of the check in both the B.P. Blg. 22 case and the civil
action. After all, the plaintiff therein made the deliberate option to file two separate
cases, even if the recovery of the amounts of the check against the corporation could
evidently be pursued through the civil action alone.
- In petitioners particular case, considering the previous legal confusion on whether
he is authorized to file the civil case against ASB, he should, as a matter of equity, be
exempted from paying the filing fees based on the amount of the checks should he
pursue the civil action against ASB. In a similar vein and for a similar reason, we
likewise find that petitioner should not be barred by prescription should he file the
civil action as the period should not run from the date the checks were issued but
from the date this decision attains finality. The courts should not be bound strictly by
the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or
injustice would result.
- The petition is DENIED, without prejudice to the right of petitioner Jaime U. Gosiaco
to pursue an independent civil action against ASB Holdings Inc. for the amount of the
subject checks, in accordance with the terms of this decision.
Case No. 2
G.R. No. 104392
February 20, 1996
RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division) HON. RUBEN
C. AYSON, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch IV,
Baguio City, and ALFREDO BOADO, respondents.
Facts:
- Petitioner Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting
employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City pLoakan, Baguio
City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority.
- One of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by
private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the
accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioner's driver, Herminio Andaya, with
the RTC of Baguio City, Branch III. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by
private respondent Boado against petitioner himself.
- Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him,
citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the trial court, denied
petitioner's motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could
proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the
petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case.
- Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the CA, maintaining that
the civil action could not proceed independently of the criminal case because no
reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in the criminal case.
- CA dismissed his petition on the authority of Garcia v. Florido, andAbellana
v. Marave, which it held allowed a civil action for damages to be filed independently
of the criminal action even though no reservation to file the same has been made.
Therefore, the trial court correctly denied petitioner's motion to suspend the
proceedings in the civil case.
- Hence this petition for review on certiorari. There is no dispute that private
respondent, as offended party in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring
a separate civil action, based on the same accident, either against the driver or
against the latter's employer. The question is whether despite the absence of such
reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against

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petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 2176. Whoever by
act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible. Xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Art. 2177
states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the above-quoted provisions
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Revised Penal Code.
- However, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that a
civil action under these provisions of the Civil Code may be brought separately from
the criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must be reserved.
- Petitioner argues that the civil action against him was impliedly instituted in the
criminal action previously filed against his employee because private respondent did
not reserve his right to bring this action separately.
- Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the present
civil action against Andaya's employer. He contends that the rights provided in Arts.
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights and, their enforcement cannot
be conditioned on a reservation to bring the action to enforce them separately.
Private respondent cites in support of his position statements made in several
cases to the effect that the requirement to reserve the civil action is substantive in
character and, therefore, is beyond the rule making power of this Court under the
Constitution.
Held:
- The SC have reached the conclusion that the right to bring an action for damages
under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, 1, otherwise it should
be dismissed.
- Rule 111 clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all
civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have
been instituted with the criminal case. The right of the injured party to sue separately
for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from
quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be
deemed instituted with the criminal action.
- A careful examination of the cases, will show that approval of the filing of separate
civil action for damages even though no reservation of the right to institute such civil
action had been reserved rests on considerations other than that no reservation is
needed.
- The short of it is that the rulings in these cases are consistent with the proposition
made that, on the basis of Rule III, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when
such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal
action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has
been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved
or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the
accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding
that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29
of the Civil Code.
- Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the action for recovery of
the civil liability must be tried in a single proceeding has always been regarded a
matter of procedure and, since the rule making power has been conferred by the
Constitution on this Court, it is in the keeping of this Court. Contrary to private
respondent's contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be
brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights,
but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. The
requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code,
by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the
offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever
questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought
separately.
- The requirement that the right to institute actions under the Civil Code separately
must be reserved is not incompatible with the independent character of such actions.
There is a difference between allowing the trial of civil actions
to proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and requiring that, before they
may be institutedat all, a reservation to bring them separately must be made. It is the
conduct of the trial of the civil action - not its institution through the filing of a
complaint - which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the
criminal case.
- The right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must
be reserved to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission
against the same party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his
subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary
liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused.

- In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver.
Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been
held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action
(whether arising from the crime or from quasi delict) is reserved, there would be no
possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would
be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the
institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not
result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule
requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double
recovery for the same act or omission.
- It does not matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious
liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case,
the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to bring or institute a separate
action (whether arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling
that a decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer
"not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because
the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee" is
true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with respect
to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Since whatever is recoverable against the
employer is ultimately recoverable by him from the employee, the policy against
double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or
omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his
employer.
Case No. 3
G.R. No. 128927
September 14, 1999
REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RAMON
SUA, respondents.
Facts:
- Petitioner appeals to us through this petition for review the Decision of the CA which
acquitted her of the crime of estafa but held her liable nonetheless for the value of
the checks she indorsed in favor of private respondent.
- Petitioner, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from Monrico Mart certain grocery
items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de
Guzman: (a) for P140,000.00; (b) for P28,000.00; (c) 1987 for P42,150.00; and, d) for
P125,000.00. These checks were signed at the back by petitioner. When presented
for payment the checks were dishonored because the drawer's account was already
closed. Private respondent Ramon Sua informed Arturo de Guzman and petitioner
about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4)
charges of estafa were filed against petitioner with the RTC of Dagupan City. Arturo
de Guzman was charged with two (2) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. These cases
against petitioner and de Guzman were consolidated and tried jointly.
- The court a quo acquitted petitioner of all the charges of estafa but did not rule on
whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private
respondent. The trial court found Arturo de Guzman guilty of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22
on two (2) counts and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months and
one (1) day in each of the cases, and to pay private respondent P167,150.00 as civil
indemnity.
- Private respondent filed a notice of appeal with the trial court with regard to the civil
aspect but the court refused to give due course to the appeal on the ground that the
acquittal of petitioner was absolute. Private respondent then filed a petition for
mandamus with the CA praying that the court a quo be ordered to give due course
to the appeal on the civil aspect of the decision. The CA granted the petition and ruled
that private respondent could appeal with respect to the civil aspect the judgment of
acquittal by the trial court.
- The CA rendered the assailed Decision insofar as it sustained the appeal of private
respondent on the civil aspect and ordering petitioner to pay private respondent
P335,000.00 representing the aggregate face value of the four (4) checks indorsed by
petitioner plus legal interest from the notice of dishonor.
- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. CA issued a Resolution
noting the admission of both parties that private respondent had already collected
the amount of P125,000.00 from Arturo de Guzman.
- The CA ruled that private respondent could not recover twice on the same checks.
Since he had collected P125,000.00 as civil indemnity, this amount should be
deducted from the sum total of the civil indemnity due him arising from the estafa
cases against petitioner. The appellate court then corrected its previous award,
which was erroneously placed, at P335,000,00, to P335,150,00 as the sum total of
the amounts of the four (4) checks involved. Deducting the amount of P125,000.00
already collected by private respondent, petitioner was adjudged to pay P210,150.00
as civil liability to private respondent.
- Hence, this petition alleging that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding
petitioner civilly liable to private respondent because her acquittal by the trial court
from charges of estafa was absolute, the trial court having declared in its decision
that the fact from which the civil liability might have arisen did not exist.

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Issue:
Whether respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error in requiring
petitioner to pay civil indemnity to private respondent after the trial court had acquitted
of her of the criminal charges.

Held:
- We cannot sustain petitioner.
- Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court specifically provides: "Extinction
of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceed from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist."
- The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that
the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the
civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted.
- Under Art. 29 of the Civil Code: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious. In a criminal case where the judgment of acquittal
is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or
not acquittal is due to that ground.
- An examination of the decision in the criminal cases reveals these findings of the trial
court: that accused Remedios Nota Sapiera is the owner of a sari-sari store inside the
public market; that she sells can(ned) goods, candies and assorted grocery items; that
she knows accused Arturo De Guzman, a customer since February 1987; that de
Guzman purchases from her grocery items including cigarettes; that she knows
Ramon Sua; that she has business dealings with him for 5 years; that her purchase
orders were in clean sheets of paper; that she never pays in check; that Ramon Sua
asked her to sign subject checks as identification of the signature of Arturo de
Guzman; that she pays in cash; sometimes delayed by several days; that she signed
the four (4) checks on the reverse side; that she did not know the subject invoices;
that de Guzman made the purchases and he issued the checks; that the goods were
delivered to de Guzman; that she was not informed of dishonored checks; and that
counsel for Ramon Sua informed de Guzman and told him to pay . . . . In the case of
accused Remedios Nota Sapiera, the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy.
- Based on the above findings of the trial court, the exoneration of petitioner of the
charges of estafa was based on the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient
evidence showing conspiracy between her and the other accused Arturo de Guzman
in defrauding private respondent. However, by her own testimony, petitioner
admitted having signed the four (4) checks in question on the reverse side.
- We affirm the findings of the CA that despite the conflicting versions of the parties,
it is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by de Guzman were signed by
petitioner at the back without any indication as to how she should be bound thereby
and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof.
- The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability
since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration
from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An
accused acquitted of estafa may be nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts
established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for
the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.
- Finally, with regard to the computation of the civil liability of petitioner, the finding
of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is civilly liable for the aggregate value of the
unpaid four (4) checks subject of the criminal cases in the sum of P335,150.00, less
the amount of P125.000.00 already collected by private respondent pending appeal,
resulting in the amount of P210,150.00 still due private respondent, is a factual
matter which is binding and conclusive upon this Court.
- WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the CA ordering petitioner to
pay the private respondent the remaining amount of P210,150.00 as civil liability, is
AFFIRMED.
Case No. 4
G.R. No. 169554
October 28, 2009
NIEVA M. MANEBO, Petitioner, vs. SPO1 ROEL D. ACOSTA and NUMERIANO
SAPIANDANTE, Respondents.
Facts:
- Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 83300.
- On May 4, 2000, at 6:30 p.m. at Barangay San Mariano, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija,
Bernadette M. Dimatulac, the victim, and Flordeliza V. Bagasan were seated beside

each other on a papag watching television inside the church of the Kaibigan
Foundation, Inc. Suddenly, a man identified as respondent Acosta, with an
unidentified male companion, both with short firearms, entered the church
premises. Respondent Acosta approached the victim and Bagasan and, at an arm's
length distance, respondent Acosta shot the victim several times on the head and
body causing her instantaneous death. Severino Sardia (Sardia), who was standing in
front of his house heard several gunshots and saw two men with short firearms run
out of the Kaibigan Foundation, Inc. Chapel. The two men immediately boarded an
owner-type jeep without a plate number parked along Maharlika Highway and
proceeded to the direction going to San Leonardo town. While the driver of the jeep
was in the process of backing up his vehicle, Sardia recognized the driver as
Numeriano Sapiandante (respondent Sapiandante), the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Tagumpay, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija.
A complaint for murder was filed by Nieva Manebo (Manebo), sister of the victim,
against respondents Acosta and Sapiandante before the Special Action Unit (SAU) of
the NBI.
The findings of the SAU recommending the filing of a murder case against
respondents and a certain John Doe was referred to the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor (OCSP), DOJ, for preliminary investigation. Respondents, in turn, filed
directly with the DOJ a counter-charge of perjury, offering false witness and violation
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1829 against Manebo, Bagasan, and Sardia.
Respondents denied the accusations against them. Respondent Acosta claimed that
on May 4, 2000, he was on a special assignment in San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija,
pursuant to a directive issued by Police Chief Inspector Fernando Galang; that there
was no reason for him to kill the victim, as he had no grudge against her; that
Bagasan's description of him did not fit his physical attributes; that there was a
substitution of witness, considering that the person beside the victim when she was
shot was identified in the police report as Liza Gragasan and not Flordeliza Bagasan.
Respondent Sapiandante denied that he was the driver of the get-away vehicle, as
he did not know how to drive nor was he a holder of a driver's license; that Sardia
had a grudge against him because of the dismissal of the case filed by the former
against him; and that respondent Acosta never testified for him in a case, contrary to
Sardia's claim.
State Prosecutor Melvin J. Abad issued a Joint Resolution, approved by the Chief State
Prosecutor, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
recommended that the foregoing Joint Resolution be approved and the attached
information for murder against respondents SPO1 Roel D. Acosta, Bgy. Captain
Numeriano R. Sapiandante, and a certain John Doe be filed before the proper court
and that the counter-charge for perjury, offering false witness, and violation for P.D.
1829 against Severino S. Sardia, Flordeliza Bagasan and Nieva M. Manebo be
dismissed for lack of merit.
An Information for murder was filed with the RTC, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City against
respondents and a certain John Doe, committed as follows: That on or about May 4,
2000, at around 6:30 p.m. in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said three (3) accused, two (2) being
armed, conspiring, confederating and acting together, and mutually helping each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with malice, intent to
kill and treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one BERNADETTE
M. DIMATULAC, with accused SPO1 Roel D. Acosta suddenly and unexpectedly firing
several shots at her with the use of his firearm and accused John Doe and Numeriano
Sapiandante, acting as back-up and driver, respectively, thereby inflicting upon the
said BERNADETTE M. DIMATULAC mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of her death.
Respondents filed their motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a
Resolution dated March 2, 2001. On March 23, 2001, respondents filed their appeal
with the DOJ Secretary.
In the meantime, the murder case filed in the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, was
transferred to the RTC of Manila, Branch 18. Warrants of arrest for respondents were
issued on February 28, 2003.
On June 27, 2003, the DOJ Secretary issued his Resolution reversing the appealed
resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the appealed
resolution is hereby REVERSED. The Chief State Prosecutor is directed to move for
the withdrawal of the information filed against respondents and to report the action
taken hereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
The DOJ said that denial and alibi are inherently weak for they can easily be fabricated
and is invariably received with caution. Truly, alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of an accused. Nevertheless, this judicial dictum presupposes the
absence of any doubt as to the positive identification of the accused. In other words,
the prosecution is not relieved of the required quantum of proof simply because the
defense invoked is alibi. Where questionable, alibi assumes strength and significance
which is the situation in the present case.
In the course of the investigation, it was gathered that the victim was shot while
watching television in the company of one Liza Gragasan. Still in a state of shock,
Gragasan was then not available to provide any information as regards the incident.
Nonetheless, PCI Guibong sent a formal letter to Gragasan to provide information on
the shooting incident. Gragasan never responded to the invitation. Instead, a certain

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Flordeliza Bagasan who executed an affidavit after more than four (4) months
alleging that she was seated beside the victim and witnessed the actual shooting. In
turn, Bagasan gave a description of the assailant which, admittedly, does not fit the
physical attributes of respondent Acosta. Complainant Manebo could only ascribe
the variance to the insinuation that respondent Acosta, short of undergoing plastic
surgery, altered his image to avoid being recognized. Bagasan's delayed testimony
coupled with an erroneous description, casts a thick cloud of doubt on her credibility.
Such testimony deserves no consideration at all.
The same is true with the testimony of witness Sardia as regards the alleged
participation of respondent Sapiandante. Sardia was not among those mentioned in
the police report. Surprisingly, his testimony was likewise belatedly executed.
Granting that he was already a resident of the barangay where the incident occurred,
no reason was given as to why it took him a long period of time to give a statement
about the killing. Fear could not have been the reason because as early as June 1998,
he filed a complaint for attempted murder against Sapiandante which was later
dismissed. As it were, the victim, involved in several criminal incidents, likewise filed
a number of cases rooted from the complaint of one Alicia Yambot against Sardia as
reported by PCI Guibong. Sardia's testimony may also not be given credence with
respect to respondent Acosta since he did not witness the actual shooting of the
victim. The evidence against respondents Acosta and Sapiandante lack the required
quantum of proof sufficient to indict them for the offense charged.
Pursuant to the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw the Information.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the OP which, rendered its Decision dismissing the
appeal and affirming in toto the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. The OP found the
findings of fact and conclusions of law of the DOJ Secretary to be amply supported
by substantial evidence. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
OP in an Order dated March 5, 2004.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 43 with the CA. Meanwhile, the
RTC of Manila, Branch 18, issued an Order dated June 22, 2004, which resolved to
suspend the resolution on the motion to withdraw information filed by the
prosecutor, considering that respondents were still at-large and had not been
prejudiced by the petition for review filed with the CA and also in deference to the
appellate court. The RTC ruled for the suspension of the implementation of the
warrants of arrest for respondents as moved by the respondents' counsel until after
the resolution of the petition filed before the CA. On August 31, 2005, the CA
rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
The CA said that the OP committed no error in affirming the resolution of the DOJ
Secretary; that courts will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations
and leave to the investigating prosecutor a sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause for the filing of information against the offender. The CA found that all was not
lost for petitioner, since the denial of her petition did not mean an automatic
dismissal of the information following the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, as the RTC
was mandated to independently evaluate the merits of the case; and it may agree or
disagree with the recommendation of the DOJ Secretary, since reliance on the latter
alone would be an abdication of the RTC's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA, the OP and the Secretary of Justice committed grave errors
in the appreciation of facts and of laws in recommending the dismissal of the
complaint based solely on the matters, which are best, determined during a fullblown trial.
2. Whether or not the Secretary of Justice may disregard the provisions of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which became effective on September 1, 2000,
particularly Sections 5 and 6.
3. Whether or not there is probable cause to charge the respondents for the crime of
murder.
Held:
Second Issue:
- Section 5. Contents of the Petition. x x x x If an information has been filed in court
pursuant to the appealed resolution, a copy of the motion to defer proceedings filed
in court must also accompany the petition. x x x x
- Section 6. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The failure of the petitioner
to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall constitute sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition.
- Respondents filed their petition for review with the DOJ Secretary on March 23, 2001.
On August 20, 2001, they filed with the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, a Motion
to Suspend Proceedings pending a final determination of the merits of their petition
by the DOJ Secretary. On August 27, 2001, respondents filed with the DOJ a
document captioned as Compliance where they submitted the motion to suspend
proceedings filed in the RTC.
- The motion to suspend proceedings was only filed with the RTC after respondents
had already filed their petition for review with the DOJ which explains why the

petition was not accompanied by a motion to suspend proceedings. Immediately

after the motion to suspend proceeding was filed with the RTC, respondents
submitted a copy of such motion with the DOJ. Under the circumstances, we hold
that there was substantial compliance with the requirements under Section 5 of
Department Circular No.70.
First and Third Issues:
- These refers to the question of whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the
Office of the President, which adopted the finding of the DOJ Secretary that there
was no probable cause to indict respondents for murder.
- Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty
in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial
determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.
However, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of
probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when
necessary for the orderly administration of justice. We find that the present case
warrants the application of the exception.
- Probable cause existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person
of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that
the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being based
merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute
certainty. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies
probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence to
justify a conviction.
- To determine the existence of probable cause, there is a need to conduct a
preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has
been committed; and (b) there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof.28 It is a means of discovering which person or persons may be reasonably
charged with a crime.
- The conduct of a preliminary investigation is executive in nature. The may not be
compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public prosecutors
function, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in
his findings. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must
have been done in an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. It must have been so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law.
- In this case, we find that the DOJ committed a manifest error in finding no probable
cause to charge respondents with the crime of murder.
- In reversing the findings of the prosecutor, the DOJ Secretary found that the police
report prepared after the killing incident stated that the person seated beside the
victim, who was watching television when shot, was Liza Gragasan. However, the DOJ
Secretary continued that more than four months after the incident, a witness
appeared in the person of Flordeliza Bagasan who claimed to be seated beside, and
witnessed the actual shooting of, the victim. The DOJ Secretary found Flordeliza's
description of respondent Acosta different from the latter's physical attributes. He
then ruled that Flordeliza's delayed testimony, coupled with her erroneous
description of respondent Acosta, cast a cloud of doubt on her credibility. The DOJ
Secretary also did not give credence to witness Sardia's testimony on respondent
Sapiandante's participation in the incident. He found that Sardia was not among
those mentioned in the police report, and that his testimony was likewise belatedly
executed without any reason given for such delay; that fear could not have been
Sardia's reason, since in June 1998, he had already filed a complaint for attempted
murder against respondent Sapiandante, which was later dismissed; and that Sardia
did not witness the actual shooting of the victim. We are not persuaded.
- The execution of Bagasan's affidavit four months after the incident should not be
taken against her, as such reaction is within the bounds of expected human behavior.
Bagasans action revealed a spontaneous and natural reaction of a person who had
yet to fully comprehend a shocking and traumatic event. Moreover, a witness' delay
in reporting what she knows about a crime does not render her testimony false or
incredible, for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people to
get involved in a criminal case. The DOJ Secretary's finding that the description given
by Bagasan did not fit the physical attributes of respondent Acosta is not persuasive,
since Bagasan was able to positively identify respondent Acosta.
- The identification made by Bagasan, with respect to respondent Acosta was
corroborated by another witness, Sardia, who saw Acosta with another unidentified
male companion rushing out of the chapel where the killing incident took place.
Sardia was familiar with the face of respondent Acosta, since the latter was a witness
in a case of frustrated murder against Sapiandante. Although Sapiandante denied in
his counter-affidavit that respondent Acosta ever became such witness, this
allegation should be proven during the trial of the case. Sardia was also able to
positively identify Sapiandante as the driver of the get-away vehicle. The DOJ

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Secretary did not also find the statements given by Sardia as credible, as the latter
was not among those mentioned as a witness in the police report. We do not agree.
- The failure of the police report to mention Sardia's name as a witness would not
detract from the fact that he saw respondent Acosta with an unidentified man
running away from the chapel and riding the waiting get- away vehicle driven by
Sapiandante. Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of the
performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries and
should not be given undue significance or probative value for they are usually
incomplete and inaccurate.
- We also do not agree with the DOJ Secretary's finding that since Sardia's affidavit was
also belatedly executed, the same is not credible. Eitnesses are usually reluctant to
volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in or
dragged into criminal investigations due to a variety of valid reasons. Fear of reprisal
and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case are sufficient
explanations for a witness' delay in reporting a crime to authorities. The DOJ ruling - that fear could not have been the reason, because as early as 1998 Sardia had
already filed a complaint for attempted murder against Sapiandante, which was
already dismissed -- is merely speculative. We need not over-emphasize that in a
preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is
probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should
be held for trial. Considering the foregoing, we find that the CA erred in affirming the
DOJ's finding of the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for murder.
- WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Secretary of Justice is hereby ORDERED to
direct the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila to withdraw the Motion to
Withdraw the Information for Murder already filed in the trial court.
Case No. 5
G.R. No. 10905
December 9, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CASIANO MARFORI, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
- The defendant and appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the
crime of injurias graves (aggravated slander), and sentenced to 6 months and 1 day
of destierro (banishment) for a distance of 25 kilometers from the municipality where
the crime was committed, to pay a fine of P65, together with subsidiarydestierro as
prescribed by law on failure to pay this fine, and to pay the costs.
- The complaint charges the accused with having spoken of the complaining witness in
a manner which reflected adversely upon her virtue and good name, in the presence
of several witnesses.
- The complaint was originally filed in the court of a justice of the peace who held a
preliminary investigation and discharged the accused on the ground that he was not
guilty of the crime with which he was charged. The justice of the peace appears to
have been of opinion that the crime of injurias graves had not been committed, and
that it was a mere misdemeanor of the class defined and penalized in book 3 of the
Penal Code.
- A report of the proceedings was forwarded to the provincial fiscal by the justice of
peace, and the complaining witness having renewed the complaint in the Court of
First Instance, an information was filed in that court and the accused brought to trial
thereon without further proceedings.
- Upon arraignment, when the accused was called upon to plead, counsel for the
accused respectfully declined to proceed, on the ground that the court was without
jurisdiction to bring the accused to trial, no order remainding the accused for trial
having been issued by a competent magistrate as a result of a preliminary trial held
in accordance with law. The trial judge appears to have been of opinion that the
report of the proceedings had at the preliminary trial held by the justice of the peace
disclosed a reasonable probability that the crime charged had been committed and
that the accused had committed it; that the justice of the peace had erred in
discharging the accused; and that he should have remanded the accused for trial.
Basing his action on these grounds, he overruled the objections of counsel, and
ordered the parties to proceed with the trial.
- Counsel for the accused there and then excepted to the ruling of the court, insisted
on the right of the accused to a preliminary trial as prescribed by law; and when called
upon to plead, the accused stood mute, so that the court was compelled to direct the
entry of a plea of not guilty in his behalf.
- Counsel for appellant reiterates in this instance his contention in the court below,
and the Attorney-General moves this court to reverse the judgment convicting and
sentencing the accused and remand the record to the trial court for further
proceedings, according to law.
Held:
- Preliminary investigations in criminal cases may be waived, and that waiver will be
presumed unless timely objection is made when the accused person is brought to
trial. In the absence of such a waiver, the law expressly secures the right to a
preliminary trial to all persons in these Islands charged with crimes cognizable in

courts of first instance, except in the city of Manila, where an investigation conducted
by the prosecuting attorney in the manner prescribed by law may be substituted
therefor.
The right of an accused person to a preliminary investigation before a committing
magistrate, or within the city of Manila, to the proceeding substituted therefor by
law, is a substantial one. Its denial, over the objection of the accused, is prejudicial
error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.
The record in this case clearly discloses that the accused in the case at bar was
brought to trial, over his objection, without having been committed or remanded for
trial by an investigating magistrate. The justice of the peace who held the preliminary
investigation dismissed the original complaint against the accused, being of opinion
that there was no probable cause to believe him guilty of the offense with which he
was charged; and although a so-called "report" of the proceedings was forwarded to
the fiscal, and doubtless submitted to the trial judge, original jurisdiction to commit
the accused for trial as result of those proceedings was vested exclusively in the
justice of the peace before whom they were had.
Then order of the justice of the peace discharging the accused did not operate as a
final acquittal, and was not a bar to the rearrest of the accused and his prosecution
for the offense with which he was originally charged. If the fiscal was not satisfied
with the action of the justice of the peace in the premises, he could have secured the
arrest of the accused upon a new complaint, and sought an order remanding the
accused for trial, in a second preliminary investigation had before either the justice
of the peace who held the first investigation or before the judge of the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of his functions as a committing magistrate.
It would manifestly defeat the end sought to be attained by the provisions of law for
the holding of preliminary investigations if either the fiscal, or the trial judge, or both
acting together were permitted to make use of the record of the proceeding had
before a justice of the peace, at a preliminary trial, as a result of which the accused
was discharged, for the purpose of bringing the accused to trial, despite the order of
discharge, and over his objection based on the ground that he has not been
remanded fro trial as a result of a preliminary trial.
The judgment convicting and sentencing the accused of the crime with which he is
charged should be reversed with the costs of both instances de officio and the record
remanded to the court below, for such further proceedings as may be proper in the
premises.

Case No. 6
G.R. No. 85468
September 7, 1989
QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, respondents.
Facts:
- Brought up for review before this Court is the order of the Sandiganbayan denying
petitioner's motion to quash the information against him in Criminal Case entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Quintin S. Doromal," and the Sandiganbayan's
order suspending him from office during the pendency of the case.
- In October 1987, Special Prosecution Dionisio A. Caoili conducted a preliminary
investigation of the charge against the petitioner Doromal, a former Commissioner
of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for- violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his
shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International
Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of
electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower
and Youth Council (or NMYC).
- On January 25,1988 Caoili filed in the Sandiganbayan an information against the
petitioner alleging: That in or about the period from April 28, 1986 to October 16,
1987, in Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a public officer, being then Commissioner of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully have direct or indirect financial interest in the Doromal International
Trading Corporation, an entity which transacted or entered into a business
transaction or contract with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the
National Manpower and Youth Council, both agencies of the government which
business, contracts or transactions he is prohibited by law and the constitution from
having any interest.
- The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court questioning
the jurisdiction of the "Tanodbayan" to file the information without the approval of
the Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
- On June 30, 1988, this Court annulled the information in accordance with its decision
in the another casewhere it ruled that: xxx the incumbent Tanodbayan (called
Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain
powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to
conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 6 of 67

Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost
effective February 2, 1 987. From that time, he has been divested of such authority.
Upon the annulment of the information against the petitioner, the Special Prosecutor
sought clearance from the Ombudsman to refile it. The Ombudsman, Honorable
Conrado Vasquez, granted clearance but advised that "some changes be made in the
information previously filed." Complying with that Memorandum, a new information,
duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that: xxx
the above-named accused [Doromal] a public officer, being then a Commissioner of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading
Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company
participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is
prohibited by law and the constitution.
Petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash" the information for being: (a) invalid because
there had been no preliminary investigation; and (b) defective because the facts
alleged do not constitute the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion
to quash.
On August 22, 1988, the Special Prosecutor filed a "Motion to Suspend Accused
Pendente Lite" pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. 3019. Over the petitioner's objection
(because the President had earlier approved his application for indefinite leave of
absence as PCGG commissioner "effective immediately and until final decision of the
courts in your case"), the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite from
his position as PCGG Commissioner and from any other office he may be holding. His
motion for reconsideration of that order was also denied by the Court.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion: (1) in denying the petitioner's motion to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. 12893; and, (2) in suspending the petitioner from
office despite the President's having previously approved his indefinite leave of
absence "until final decision" in this case.
The petitioner contends that as the preliminary investigation that was conducted
prior to the filing of the original information in Criminal Case No. 12766 was nullified
by this Court, another preliminary investigation should have been conducted before
the new information in Criminal Case No. 12893 was filed against him. The denial of
his right to such investigation allegedly violates his right to due process and
constitutes a ground to quash the information.
The public respondent argues that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary
because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter a violation
of Section 3 (H) of R.A. No. 3019 in relation to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner allegedly waived the second preliminary investigation by his
failure to comply with the Court's Order directing him to submit a statement of new
or additional facts, duly supported by photo copies of documents which he would
present should a new preliminary investigation be ordered.

Held:
- The petition is meritorious. A new preliminary investigation of the charge against the
petitioner is in order not only because the first was a nullity (a dead limb on the
judicial tree which should be lopped off and wholly disregarded") but also because
the accused demands it as his right. Moreover, the charge against him had been
changed, as directed by the Ombudsman.
- While the first information charge that the DITC entered into a business transaction
or contract with the DECS xxx which is prohibited by law and the constitution from
having any interest, the new information alleges that the petitioner unlawfully
participated in a business through DITC xxx which act or participation is prohibited by
law and the constitution.
- The petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation of the new charge is secured to
him by the following provisions of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
That right of the accused is "a substantial one." Its denial over his opposition is a
"prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."
- The need to conduct a new preliminary investigation when the defendant demands
it and the allegations of the complaint have been amended, has been more than once
affirmed by this Court.
- The Solicitor General's argument that the right to a preliminary investigation may be
waived and was in fact waived by the petitioner, impliedly admits that the right exists.
Since the right belongs to the accused, he alone may waive it. If he demands it, the
State may not withhold it.
- However, as the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the
complaint or information, the proceedings upon such information in the
Sandiganbayan should be held in abeyance and the case should be remanded to the
office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation.
- There is no merit in petitioner's insistence that the information should be quashed
because the Special Prosecutor admitted in the Sandiganbayan that he does not
possess any document signed and/or submitted to the DECS by the petitioner after
he became a PCGG Commissioner. That admission allegedly belies the averment in

the information that the petitioner "participated' in the business of the DITC in which
he is prohibited by the Constitution or by law from having any interest.
The Sandiganbayan in its order correctly observed that "the presence of a signed
document bearing the signature of accused Doromal as part of the application to bid
... is not a sine qua non", for, the Ombudsman indicated in his
Memorandum/Clearance to the Special Prosecutor, that the petitioner "can rightfully
be charged ...with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited
by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family
corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest." (pp. 107-108, Rollo).
Since the petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid information with
an offense punishable under the Constitution and the laws, the law's command that
he "shall be suspended from office" pendente lite must be obeyed. His approved
leave of absence is not a bar to his preventive suspension for, as indicated by the
Solicitor General, an approved leave, whether it be for a fixed or indefinite period,
may be cancelled or shortened at will by the incumbent.
Since his preventive suspension has exceeded the reasonable maximum period of
ninety (90) days provided in Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines
(P.D. 807), it should now be lifted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The
Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of
the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the
proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation. The preventive
suspension of the petitioner is hereby lifted. No costs.

Case No. 7
G.R. Nos. 105965-70
August 9, 1999
GEORGE UY, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, OMBUDSMAN and ROGER C. BERBANO,
SR., Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, respondents.
Facts:
- This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul and set aside the resolution
of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioner's motion to quash the six (6) informations
charging him with violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and to
permanently enjoin the respondents from proceeding with the criminal cases insofar
as petitioner is involved.
- Petitioner was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine Navy. He was designated by his
immediate supervisor, Captain Luisito F. Fernandez, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for
Comptrollership, to act on the latter's behalf, during his absence, on matters relating
to the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch, O/NG. This included the authority to sign
disbursement vouchers relative to the procurement of equipment needed by the
Philippine Navy.
- On July 2, 1991, six (6) informations for estafa through falsification of official
documents and one (1) information for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019 were
filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and nineteen (19) co-accused.
- On September 20, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order directing a
comprehensive re-investigation of the cases against all the twenty (20) accused. After
conducting the re-investigation, the Special Prosecutor issued an Order
recommending that the informations for estafa through falsification of official
documents be withdrawn and in lieu thereof, informations for violation of Section 3
(e) of R. A. No. 3.19 be filed against eleven (11) accused, which included the
petitioner. In a Memorandum dated December 5, 1991, Special Prosecutor Aniano A.
Desierto reduced the number of those to be charged under R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, to five (5), including petitioner.
- Acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the five (5) remaining accused,
the Special Prosecutor issued an Order dated February 18, 1992 dropping two (2)
more names from the five (5) officers recommended for prosecution, and
recommending that six (6) separate informations for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A.
3019 be filed against the petitioner, LCMDR. Rodolfo Guanzon and LT. Teddy Pan.
- On April 21, 1992, the petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
informations on the following grounds: (1) The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged or the person of the accused; (2) The officer who has filed
the informations had no authority to do so; (3) The facts charged do not constitute
an offense; and (4) More than one (1) offense is charged.
- On June 10, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued the now-assailed Resolution denying
petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit. It passed upon the grounds set forth
by petitioner in this wise: On the first issue raised by accused-movant, we are not
inclined to rule that this Court has no jurisdiction over the person of accused-movant
or over the offenses charged herewith. xxx Unless and until the Highest Tribunal rules
otherwise, this Court has no judicious recourse but to entertain and try the various
criminal cases filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor involving military officers
and men accused of committing crimes "in relation to their office," and those
involving violation of Republic Act No. 3019 xxx We cannot likewise sustain accusedmovant's stance that the officer who has filed the informations in the cases at bar
had no authority to do so. Both the offense charged and the person of accusedmovant being within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, it stands to reason that
the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the instant criminal charges belong

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 7 of 67

to, and are the exclusive prerogatives of, the Office of the Ombudsman xxx. Neither
are we impressed with the asseveration that the acts charged in the amended
informations at bar do not constitute an offense. Such a claim cannot stand in the
face of unequivocal rulings of the Supreme Court, thus: The fundamental rule in
considering a motion to quash on the ground that the averments of the information
are not sufficient to constitute the offense charged is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential elements of the offense, as
defined in the law. Xxx in consonance with the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements,
the quashal of the informations at bar cannot be sustained since they are sufficient
in form and substance to charge indictable offenses. Xxx finally, we find no merit in
the argument that more than one offense is charged in the criminal informations at
bar. Precisely, the prosecution split the original information into six (6) distinct
amended informations pertaining to six (6) criminal violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
3019, as amended. Such is but proper under the premises considering that the acts
subject of the criminal cases at bar were allegedly committed on six (6) different
purchase orders and there is no showing that they were committed on similar dates
or singular occasion.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases or
the person of the petitioner;
2. Whether or not the respondents Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor have the
authority to file the questioned amended information;
3. Whether or not the act or omission charged constitutes an offense.
Held:
- Petitioner and the Solicitor General submit that it is the court-martial, not the
Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner. Emphasizing the
fundamental doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action, they claim that at the time the
amended informations were filed on July 2, 1991, the controlling law on the
jurisdiction over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is P.D. 1850.
- Since petitioner is a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, he falls
squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War (C.A. 408, as amended) mentioned in
the aforecited Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850.
- Petitioner and the Solicitor General concede (accept) the subsequent passage of
Republic Act No. 7055, "An Act Strengthening Civilian Supremacy over the military by
returning to the civil courts the jurisdiction over certain offenses involving members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, other persons subject to military law, and the
members of the Philippine National Police, repealing for the purpose certain
presidential decrees" which expressly repealed P.D. 1850. They nonetheless argue
that petitioner's case falls within the exception provided for in said Section 1 of R. A.
No. 7055, and, therefore, still cognizable by courts-martial, since the alleged
commission of the offense for which petitioner is charged with is "service-connected
."
- We rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over petitioner, at the time of the
filing of the informations, and as now prescribed by law. Republic Act No. 8249, the
latest amendment to P. D. 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan (otherwise known as the
"Sandiganbayan Law"), provides the prevailing scope of the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction. It can be deduced from said provisions of law that both the nature of the
offense and the position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non before
the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case.
- In the instant case, while petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R. A.
No. 3019, as amended, which is an offense covered by Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, his position as Lieutenant Commander (LCMDR.) of the
Philippine Navy is a rank lower than "naval captains and all officer of higher rank."
Thus, not falling within the "rank" requirement stated in Section 4, exclusive
jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the regular courts. Consequently, it is the
regional trial court that has jurisdiction over the offense charged.
- It is not correct that under R. A. No. 7055, the courts-martial retain jurisdiction over
petitioner's case since the offense for which he is charged is "service-connected." The
second paragraph of Section 1 of R. A. No. 7055 limits the nature of "serviceconnected crimes or offenses" to those defined only in Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92 and
95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408.
- It is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the
corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The
Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.15
- WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the Sandiganbayan is ordered to dismiss Criminal Cases and to
inform this Court of the action taken hereon within fifteen (15) days from finality of
this decision.

Case No. 8
G.R. No. 114944
May 29, 2002
MANUEL C. ROXAS and AHMED S. NACPIL, petitioners, vs. HON. CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ, Ombudsman and JOSE DE FERRER, Deputy Special Prosecutor, and the
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
Facts:
- Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner Manuel C. Roxas seeking to
set aside our Decision dated June 19, 2001 which dismissed the instant petition,
anchored on the following arguments:
o The instant case does not attempt to unnecessarily and excessively entangle the
honorable court with the task of unduly reviewing or interfering with the
prosecutorial prerogatives of the Ombudsman.
o There exist more than sufficient reasons for the honorable court to find violation
of due process and grave abuse of discretion in the instant case when the totality
of the circumstances is tested in the crucible of fundamental fairness.
o The decision has serious and far-reaching implications in the administration of
justice considering that because of it, no decision of the Ombudsman in the
determination of probable cause will ever achieve finality.
- Respondents were required to file their respective comments to the motion. In its
Comment, the Office of the Special Prosecutor argued that the issues presented in
the Motion for Reconsideration have already been raised, resolved and passed upon
by this Court. On the other hand, the Solicitor General, in his Comment, maintained
that petitioner Roxas was not denied due process since he was no stranger to the
proceedings; the reinvestigation was just a continuation of the investigation of the
case where petitioner was a party-respondent.
- Manuel C. Roxas was the Chairman, while Ahmed S. Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids
and Awards Committee of the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National Police
(PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. After
the public bidding, General Cesar P. Nazareno created a Technical Evaluation
Committee, headed by General Mario Tanchanco, which was sent to Korea and Japan
to conduct ocular inspections of the plant facilities and equipment of the five
qualified proponents. Thereafter, the Technical Evaluation Committee
recommended for procurement the Morita Isuzu and Nikki-Hino fire trucks.
- Meanwhile, the Bids and Awards Committee voted to recommend to Director
General Cesar Nazareno the procurement of Ssangyong fire trucks. Instead of acting
on this recommendation, Gen. Nazareno created a Review Committee headed by
Gen. Gerardo N. Flores, which found that there was a failure to bid. Gen. Nazareno
thus instructed the Bids and Awards Committee to reconsider its earlier
recommendation and to conduct further evaluation of the proponents, but this time
limiting itself to the two Japanese brands recommended by the Technical Evaluation
Committee, namely, Morita Isuzu and Nikki-Hino. The Bids and Awards Committee
subsequently voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of
Nikki-Hino.
- The contract of sale of sixty-five units of Nikki-Hino fire trucks was executed between
Gen. Nazareno, on behalf of the PC-INP, and Tahei Company, Ltd. The corresponding
Purchase Order was prepared and signed by Col. Nicasio Custodio, Chief of the PNP
Logistics Support Command; Major Obedio Espea, Acting Chief, PNP Procurement
Center; Gen. Cesar Nazareno; and DILG Secretary Luis Santos. Thereafter, Custodio,
Espea and Nazareno, together with the PNP Chief Accountant, Generosa Ramirez,
prepared the disbursement vouchers, authorizing the payment to Tahei Co., Ltd. of
the sum of P167,335,177.24, as marginal deposit for the sixty-five fire trucks. The
COA subsequently discovered that while the disbursement voucher indicated the bid
price of Tahei Co., Ltd. to be only P2,292,784.00 per unit, the purchase order showed
the unit price as P2,585,562.00, resulting in a discrepancy of P292,778.00 per unit of
fire truck or a total of P19,030,570.00.
- After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military
recommended the indictment of all respondents, except Generosa Ramirez. On
review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
complaints against Manuel Roxas, Ahmed Nacpil, Diosdado Codoy, Juhan Kairan and
Generosa Ramirez. This was approved by the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman
in a Memorandum dated April 15, 1993. Hence, formal charges were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espea and
Santos, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18956.
- Flores and Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter,
on October 19, 1993, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal
of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the
Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan,
and ordered their inclusion as accused in Criminal Case No. 18956.
- Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Accordingly, the Office
of the Ombudsman filed an amended information with the Sandiganbayan
impleading Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan as co-accused. Thus, Roxas and Nacpil filed with
this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the
orders of the Ombudsman directing their inclusion as accused in Criminal Case No.
18956.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 8 of 67

- The petition was dismissed in our Decision dated June 19, 2001 on the ground that
the Ombudsman did not lose jurisdiction over petitioners after the charges against
them were dismissed, considering that the reinvestigation was merely a repeat
investigation. Likewise, petitioners were not denied due process when the
Ombudsman issued the assailed orders because they were able to file their counteraffidavits during the preliminary investigation.

Held:
- We find merit in the Motion for Reconsideration. The records show that the
participation of petitioner Roxas in the transactions complained of is limited.
- During the reinvestigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the
indictment of petitioners on the assumption that: "The said persons of the Bids and
Awards Committee who voted for the Nikki-Hino perfected and awarded the contract
to Nikki-Hino. Their cooperation was indispensable for the consummation of the
contract which was irregular."
- Ordinarily, we will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine
whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probable guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. However, we find that the
case at bar falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule, more specifically,
the constitutional rights of the accused are impaired and the charges are manifestly
false. In cases where the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were unable to
agree on whether or not probable cause exists, we may interfere with the findings
and conclusions.
- We recognize that the power to investigate offenses of this nature belongs to the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor. While the Ombudsman may have erred in
disregarding the recommendations of the Special Prosecution Officers which appear
to be substantiated by the record, he should be allowed an opportunity to review his
decision and, where necessary, correct it.
- It appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor
reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process of law
requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right
to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings. It is
significant to note in this case that no motion for reconsideration was filed from the
resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against petitioners. Hence,
petitioners had a right to consider the complaint against them as closed. Indeed,
every litigation must come to an end; otherwise, it would become even more
intolerable than the wrong and injustice it is designed to correct.
- For all intents and purposes, petitioners were no longer parties in the criminal action.
Evidently, the Office of the Special Prosecutor thought so too. It did not give
petitioners notice of the reinvestigation, which would have enabled them to
participate in the proceedings. But when it later found probable cause against
petitioners, it should have first given them notice and afforded them an opportunity
to be heard before ordering their inclusion in Criminal Case No. 18956.
- The finding of probable cause against petitioners in proceedings which they had
neither knowledge of nor participation in violated their right to procedural due
process. They should have been notified that the complaint against them has not yet
been finally disposed of; or that the fight was not yet over, so to speak. They should
have been apprised of their possible implication in the criminal case to enable them
to meet any new accusations against them head-on, and to prepare for their defense.
Case No. 9
G.R. No. 147932
January 25, 2006
LAILA G. DE OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
MAGDALENA B. DACARRA, and ERLINDA P. ORAYAN,Respondents.
Facts:
- This petition for certiorari assails the Resolutions of the Secretary of the Department
of Justice ("DOJ Secretary") which denied Laila G. De Ocampos ("petitioner") petition
for review of the investigating prosecutors finding of probable cause against her for
homicide in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 ("RA
7610") and for violation of the same provision of RA 7610. The DOJ Secretary also
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
- Respondent Magdalena B. Dacarra executed a Sworn Statement stating that on 4
December 1999, her nine-year-old son Ronald complained of dizziness upon arriving
home at about six in the evening. Ronald then vomited, prompting Magdalena to ask
what happened. Ronald replied that petitioner, who was Ronalds teacher, banged
his head against that of his classmate Lorendo Orayan. Magdalena inspected Ronalds
head and saw a woundless contusion. Due to Ronalds continued vomiting,
Magdalena brought him to a quack doctor on 5 December 1999. The following
morning, Magdalena brought Ronald to the East Avenue Medical Center where he
underwent an x-ray. The attending physician informed Magdalena that Ronalds head
had a fracture. Blood oozed out of Ronalds nose before he died on 9 December 1999.
Lorendo also executed a sworn statement narrating how petitioner banged his head
against Ronalds.

- During the inquest proceedings, Asst. QC Prosecutor Maria Lelibet Sampaga ("inquest
prosecutor") ruled as follows: Evidence warrants the release of the respondent for
further investigation of the charges against her. The case is not proper for inquest as
the incident complained of happened on December 4, 1999. Further, we find the
evidence insufficient to support the charge for homicide against the respondent.
There is no concrete evidence to show proof that the alleged banging of the heads of
the two minor victims could be the actual and proximate cause of the death of minor
Ronald Dacarra y Baluton. Besides, the police report submitted by the respondent in
this case states that said victim bears stitches or sutures on the head due to a
vehicular accident. There is no certainty, therefore, that respondents alleged
wrongdoing contributed or caused the death of said victim.
- The case was referred to Asst. QC Prosecutor Lorna F. Catris-Chua Cheng
("investigating prosecutor") for preliminary investigation. She scheduled the first
hearing on 6 January 2000.
- Respondent Erlinda P. Orayan, Lorendos mother, attended the hearing of 6 January
2000 and alleged that petitioner offered her P100,000, which she initially accepted,
for her and her sons non-appearance at the preliminary investigation. Erlinda
presented the money to the investigating prosecutor.
- On 7 January 2000, Jennilyn Quirong, who witnessed the head-banging incident, and
Melanie Lugales, who claimed to be another victim of petitioners alleged cruel
deeds, filed their sworn statements with the Office of the QC Prosecutor.
- On 18 January 2000, petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit. Petitioner invoked
the disposition of the inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence to support the
charges against her. Petitioner assailed the omission in Magdalenas sworn
statement about Ronalds head injury due to a vehicular accident in November 1997.
Petitioner pointed out the absence of damage or injury on Lorendo as borne out by
his medical certificate. Petitioner contended that the head-banging incident was not
the proximate cause of Ronalds death, but the failed medical attention or medical
negligence. Petitioner also alleged that Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales have
immature perception. Petitioner further asserted that the causes of death stated in
Ronalds Death Certificate are hearsay and inadmissible in the preliminary
investigation.
- The investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause against
petitioner for the offenses charged: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is
respectfully recommended that [petitioner] be charged with Homicide in relation to
Art. VI, Sec. 10 of R.A. 7610 and Violation of Art. VI, Sec. 10(a) of R.A. 7610 with no
bail recommended for the Homicide since par. 6 of Art. VI of Sec. 10 of R.A. 7610
provides that: "For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts
punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, par. 2 and 263, par. 1 Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other
intentional mutilation and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion
perpetua when the victim isunder twelve (12) years of age." Bail recommended: No
bail recommended Homicide, in relation to Art. VI, Sec. 10, R.A. 7610; and Twenty
Thousand pesos (P20,000.00) Viol. of Sec. 10(a) of R.A. 7610.
- In her appeal to the DOJ, petitioner contended that the investigating prosecutor
showed bias in favor of complainants Magdalena and Erlinda for not conducting a
clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procuring the autopsy report. Petitioner argued
that the investigating prosecutor erred in concluding that her alleged act of banging
Ronald and Lorendos heads was the cause of Ronalds injury and that such was an
act of child abuse. Petitioner also alleged that it is the Office of the Ombudsman
which has jurisdiction over the case, and not the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
- The DOJ Secretary denied the petition for review. The DOJ Secretary held that there
was no bias in complainants favor when the investigating prosecutor did not conduct
a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procured the autopsy report as nothing
precluded her from doing so. It upheld the investigating prosecutors finding that
Ronalds injury was the direct and natural result of petitioners act of banging Ronald
and Lorendos heads. It stated that petitioner never denied such act, making her
responsible for all its consequences even if the immediate cause of Ronalds death
was allegedly the failed medical attention or medical negligence. It held that
assuming there was failure of medical attention or medical negligence, these
inefficient intervening causes did not break the relation of the felony committed and
the resulting injury.
- The DOJ Secretary rejected petitioners claim that she is innocent as held by the
inquest prosecutor. The inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case. She merely
recommended petitioners release for further investigation since the case was not
proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient.
- The DOJ Secretary ruled that whether the statements of the causes of death in the
death certificate and autopsy report are hearsay, and whether Jennilyn Quirong and
Melanie Lugales have immature perception, are evidentiary matters which should be
determined during trial. The DOJ Secretary also sustained the investigating
prosecutors conclusion that the banging of Ronald and Lorendos heads is an act of
child abuse.
- Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the DOJ Secretary denied in his
Resolution dated 19 April 2001.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 9 of 67

Issues:
1. Whether petitioner was denied due process during the preliminary investigation; and
2. Whether there is probable cause against petitioner for homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 and for
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.
Held:
- The petition lacks merit.
Procedural Issue
- The OSG contends that instead of Rule 65, Rule 43 is applicable to the present case.
OSG argues that the petition should be dismissed outright for being filed with this
Court, instead of with the Court of Appeals, under a wrong mode of appeal. On the
other hand, assuming Rule 65 applies, the OSG points out that the petition
for certiorari should be filed with the Court of Appeals.
- The resolution of the DOJ Secretary is appealable administratively to the Office of the
President since the offenses charged in this case are punishable by reclusion
perpetua. From the Office of the President, the aggrieved party may file an appeal
with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 43.
- Even assuming that the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in
rendering the assailed Resolutions amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
petitioner should have filed the instant petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. Hence, on the issue alone of the propriety of the remedy sought by
petitioner, this petition forcertiorari must fail. However, considering the gravity of
the offenses charged and the need to expedite the disposition of this case, the Court
will relax the rules and finally resolve this case in the interest of substantial justice.
First Substantive Issue
- The Court rejects petitioners contention that she was denied due process when the
investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing. A clarificatory
hearing is not indispensable during preliminary investigation. Rather than being
mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer
as evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule 112. The use of the
word "may" in a statute commonly denotes that it is directory in nature. The term
"may" is generally permissive only and operates to confer discretion.
- In this case, the investigating prosecutor no longer conducted hearings after
petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit. This simply means that at that point the
investigating prosecutor believed that there were no more matters for clarification.
It is only in petitioners mind that some "crucial points" still exist and need
clarification. In any event, petitioner can raise these "important" matters during the
trial proper.
- Petitioner was not deprived of due process since both parties were accorded equal
rights in arguing their case and presenting their respective evidence during the
preliminary investigation. Due process is merely an opportunity to be
heard. Petitioner cannot successfully invoke denial of due process since she was
given the opportunity of a hearing.
- Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits. Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether the respondent is probably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence. If the investigating prosecutor is
already satisfied that he can reasonably determine the existence of probable cause
based on the parties evidence thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings
and resolve the case.
- Petitioner argues that she was denied the right to examine evidence submitted by
complainants when the investigating prosecutor unilaterally obtained a copy of the
autopsy report from the PNP Crime Laboratory. Petitioner fails to persuade us.
Though the autopsy report is not part of the parties evidence, the Rules on
preliminary investigation do not forbid the investigating prosecutor from obtaining
it. Neither is there a law requiring the investigating prosecutor to notify the parties
before securing a copy of the autopsy report.
- Petitioner mistakenly cites Section 3(d) of Rule 112 in arguing that the investigating
prosecutor should not go beyond the evidence presented by complainants in
resolving the case. This provision applies if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or
if subpoenaed fails to submit her counter-affidavit within the prescribed period. Such
is not the case here where petitioner filed her counter-affidavit and both parties
presented their respective evidence.
Second Substantive Issue
- Petitioner argues that the head-banging incident was not the proximate cause of
Ronalds death and insisted that efficient intervening events caused Ronalds death.
- We do not agree. There is probable cause for the offenses charged against petitioner.
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty of the crime.
- In the present case, Ronald, a nine-year-old student, died five days after his teacher
allegedly banged his head against that of his classmate Lorendo. There is nothing in

the records showing petitioners specific denial of the occurrence of such act.
Petitioner simply stated that "the head-banging incident happened but she did not
perpetrate it." In effect, petitioner admits the occurrence of the head-banging
incident but denies committing it.
The alleged intervening events before Ronald died, namely: (a) the consultation with
a quack doctor, and (b) the three-day confinement in the East Avenue Medical
Center, are not sufficient to break the relation of the felony committed and the
resulting injury. Were it not for the head-banging incident, Ronald might not have
needed medical assistance in the first place.
What is determined during preliminary investigation is only probable cause, not
proof beyond reasonable doubt.25 As implied by the words themselves, "probable
cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or moral certainty.
Asserting her innocence, petitioner continues to invoke the disposition of the inquest
prosecutor finding insufficient evidence for the charges against her. As correctly ruled
by the DOJ Secretary, the inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the case but merely
recommended it for further investigation since it was not proper for inquest and the
evidence was then insufficient. Moreover, petitioners active participation in the
preliminary investigation without questioning the propriety of such proceedings
indicates petitioners agreement with the recommendation of the inquest prosecutor
for the further investigation of the case.
Petitioners single act of allegedly banging the heads of her students had two distinct
victims. Therefore, petitioner has to face prosecution for cruelty to each victim. For
Ronalds death, petitioner is being charged with homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable
by reclusion perpetua. However, this does not mean that petitioner is being charged
with the distinct offenses of homicide and child abuse for Ronalds death. On the
other hand, for her cruelty to Lorendo, petitioner is being charged with violation of
Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable by prision mayor in its minimum
period. Petitioners alleged banging of the heads of Ronald and Lorendo is clearly an
act of cruelty.
In a petition for certiorari like this case, the primordial issue is whether the DOJ
Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The Court rules that the DOJ Secretary did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in finding that there is probable cause to charge petitioner of the crimes
of homicide and child abuse. The Court further rules that the investigating prosecutor
did not act with grave abuse of discretion in securing motu proprio the autopsy report
and in not calling for a clarificatory hearing. This ruling does not diminish in any way
the constitutional right of petitioner to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven.

Case No. 10
G.R. No. 132159
January 18, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CESAR GIVERA y GAROTE, accusedappellant.
Facts:
- This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC, Branch 102, QC finding accusedappellant Cesar Givera guilty of murder of Eusebio Gardon and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the suit.
- Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on April 10, 1996,
whereupon he was tried.
- For the prosecution, the victim's daughter Milagros Gardon and his niece Melinda
Delfin were presented as witnesses. On the other hand, only accused-appellant
testified in his defense.
- The incident took place at about 4 p.m. on May 2, 1993 at Purok IV, Area 5, Laura St.,
Old Balara, in Diliman, Quezon City.
- To prove the fact and cause of death of Eusebio Gardon, the prosecution presented
in evidence the testimony of medico-legal officer which shows that the victim
sustained one fatal stab wound possibly caused by a single bladed weapon. In
addition, he sustained abrasions in his lower chin, possibly hitting a rough surface, as
well as an incised wound caused by a bladed weapon, on his posterior middle left
arm. The stab wound appears to be fatal because it pierced the pericardium and left
ventricle of the heart, which could be the immediate effect of hemorrhage, shock
and eventual death of the victim.
- Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He denied any involvement in the killing of
the victim who was his relative by affinity. Accused-appellant claimed that at the time
of the incident on May 2, 1993, at around 4:00 p.m., he was having a drink in his
cousin's house, some 30 meters away from the victim's house. Accused-appellant
said he was fetched by his cousin, Recto Gardon, because Maximo and the victim
Eusebio Gardon were having an altercation. He went to pacify the protagonists and
then led the victim to his house. Without his knowledge, however, Eusebio went back
and again engaged Maximo in a fist fight, as a result of which the victim Eusebio was
knocked down. Accused-appellant said he was going to help the victim get up, but he
saw the victim's son, Ronilo Gardon, coming with a bolo. He, therefore, ran away and

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 10 of 67

left the victim behind. He added, that he did not see if his three companions did
anything more than box the victim. Accused-appellant said he learned that the victim
had died only two days after the incident.
- Accused-appellant was arrested on May 4, 1996 at the East Avenue Medical Center.
He stated that the children of the victim implicated him in the killing of Eusebio
Gardon only because he was present when the incident happened.
- On August 29, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant
guilty of murder.
- Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant's sole assignment of error is that DUE TO THE
PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT, THE COURT A QUO HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
Held:
- The appeal has no merit.
First
- The prosecution presented evidence which shows beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant and his companions, all of whom were convicted of murder in
another case, were responsible for the killing of Eusebio Gardon on May 2, 1993.
- Milagros Gardon's testimony, an excerpt from which is quoted at the beginning of
this opinion, is spontaneous, detailed, arid consistent. There are apparent lapses in
the testimony of Milagros, nonetheless, a close reading of the records will show that
indeed it was accused-appellant who was stoning the house because when the
witness followed the victim outside, she saw accused-appellant throwing stones at
their house. She then saw accused-appellant hitting the victim with stones. In the
process, Laura was also hit. In any event, these discrepancies are minor and
insignificant and do not detract from the substance of her testimony.
- This Court has time and again said that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon
the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of
weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility
because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony.
- All things considered, we think the trial court correctly dismissed accused-appellant's
claim and gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. From the
fact that the victim died and that accused-appellant and his companions were the
last persons seen with the victim before he died, it can be concluded that they are
responsible for the victim's death.
Second
- The allegations of conspiracy in the information have been established. The victim
was at home sleeping after coming from a drinking session, when the accusedappellant and his companions stoned his house to force him to come out. When they
failed, one of them, Epifanio (Onying) Gayon, went inside the victim's house and told
him to come out. Disoriented because he was drunk, the victim went with Onying.
Once the victim was outside, accused-appellant pelted him with stones, while Onying
started raining fistic blows on him. Then Onying and accused-appellant ran away to
lure him to go toward the bridge where the other two, Arturo Gayon and Maximo
Givera, were waiting. When the victim reached the place, he was attacked by the
gang. He was kicked and boxed by Onying and when Arturo shouted "Sige todasin na
yan!," Maximo stabbed the victim.
- The evidence thus clearly and convincingly shows a coordinated action by the group
in the execution of the crime. In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the
conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What is important is that all
participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to
unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design to bring about the death of the
victim. The act of each conspirator in furtherance of the common purpose is in
contemplation of law the act of all. Consonant with this legal principle, accusedappellant is guilty of the crime of murder as if he himself dealt the deathblow that
sent the victim to his grave.
Third
- Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case. Where conspiracy is
directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the
method, time and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident
premeditation can be appreciated. But in an implied conspiracy, such as in this case,
evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of proof as to how and
when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time elapsed before it was
carried out, so that it cannot be determined if the accused had "sufficient time
between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept the
consequences." There should be a showing that the accused had the opportunity for
reflection and persisted in effectuating his criminal design which the prosecution
failed to establish in the case at bar.
- Nor can the qualifying circumstance of treachery be taken into account. Treachery is
the deliberate and unexpected attack on the victim, without any warning and without
giving him an opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault. For treachery
to be appreciated, it must be shown to be present at the inception of the attack,

otherwise, even if present at a subsequent stage, it cannot be considered. In the

instant case, the victim cannot be said to have been totally oblivious of the impending
attack by all the group of accused-appellant. He thus had every opportunity to escape
from the attack. In fact, his daughter Milagros testified that prior to the stoning
incident, the victim had been threatened with harm by accused-appellant the
moment he went out of his house, which is why she stayed beside her father to make
sure he did not go out of the house. Indeed, the victim had been forewarned of the
danger posed by accused-appellant and his group.
- By coming out of his house and running after two of the assailants, the victim showed
that he was prepared for the attack by accused-appellant and his gang and could have
been hardly surprised when he was actually attacked. The fact that the victim may
have been surprised because he had not expected that he would be outnumbered
when he saw two other attackers waiting for him under the bridge is not sufficient to
show that the victim was completely unaware of the attack that might come from his
assailants.
- The presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superiority was correctly
appreciated in this case. The victim was unarmed and was clearly outnumbered by
the four assailants, with one of them armed with a knife.
Fourth
- Accused-appellant claims that his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May
4, 1996 was made without a warrant. This is not true. He was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the court on April 27, 1995. However, as the records show, the
warrant of arrest was returned unserved by the arresting officer on June 7, 1995 as
accused-appellant could not be found. He was finally found only on May 4, 1996.
Now, no alias warrant of arrest is needed to make the arrest. Unless specifically
provided in the warrant, the same remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled
or quashed. The ten-day period provided in Rule 113, 4 is only a directive to the
officer executing the warrant to make a return to the court.
- Accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object thereto
because he failed to move for the quashal of the information before the trial court,
entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial. As this Court has held, any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
- On the matter of the admissibility of the testimony of the medico-legal taken in the
first case, involving the three other accused for the death of the same victim, offered
in evidence in the case at bar, this Court must declare the same inadmissible. As
correctly contended by the defense, because they did not have the opportunity to
cross-examine Dr. Baltazar, his testimony cannot be used in evidence against
accused-appellant.
- Still and all the fact and cause of death of the victim had been sufficiently proved by
the accounts of the two eyewitnesses, corroborated by the offer in evidence of the
death certificate of the victim.
Fifth
- The award of damages by the trial court, in favor of the victim should be modified.
Aside from the award of P50,000.00 as indemnity, the heirs of Eusebio Gardon are
entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages irrespective of proof thereof.
Case No. 11
G.R. No. 141699
August 7, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON D. LIM, DANILO S. SY,
JACKILYN O. SANTOS and ANTONIO U. SIO, accused-appellants.
Facts:
- For automatic review before us is a decision rendered by the RTC of Caloocan City
(Branch 129), convicting accused Wilson D. Lim, Danilo S. Sy, Jackilyn O. Santos and
Antonio U. Sio for violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA
7659, and sentencing all the accused to suffer the supreme penalty of death. (xxx
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and deliver to a buyer about One
Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety Four and 60/100 (1,994.60) grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as `Shabu, a regulated drug.
- Upon their arraignment on May 13, 1999, accused-appellants Wilson Lim, Jackilyn
Santos and Antonio Sio, duly assisted by their respective counsels, pleaded not
guilty. Appellant Danilo Sy, represented by counsel, refused to enter a plea, thus,
pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial
court entered a plea of not guilty for him.
Prosecutions version of facts
- About 11:00 oclock in the morning of 27 March 1999, PO2 Nening Villarosa,
Intelligence Operative, Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF), Camp
Crame, was summoned by her "superior, Superintendent John Lopez, for a briefing
in the latters office regarding a buy-bust operation wherein the former will act as a
`poseur-buyer. The `sting operation would take place at the Apollo Motel, Second
Avenue, Caloocan City. After the briefing, Superintendent Lopez gave PO2 Nening
Villarosa a leather portfolio containing one million, two hundred twenty thousand

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 11 of 67

pesos (P1,220,000.00), to be used as payment for 2 kilos of methamphetamine

hydrochloride, locally known as `shabu. Of the P1.22 million purchase money, only
P6,000.00 were genuine, while the rest were `boodle money.
- Around 11:45 in the morning of the same day, PO2 Villarosa left Camp Crame for
Apollo Motel. She was in her car together with an `informer who would introduce
her to the `shabu seller and a female companion. Other members of the buy-bust
team followed in their respective vehicles. When they reached Apollo Motel, they
were met by appellant Danilo S. Sy, who told PO2 Villarosa and the `informer to
proceed to Room 3 of the motel.
- Inside Room 3, PO2 Villarosa showed appellant Danilo Sy the money as payment for
the `shabu. PO2 Villarosa, however, did not allow appellant Danilo Sy to bring out of
the room the money, allegedly to be shown to the owner of the `shabu. Appellant
Danilo Sy went out of the room and after 5 to 10 minutes later, he returned together
with appellants Wilson Lim and Jackilyn Santos. Upon request of appellant Wilson
Lim, he was also shown by PO2 Villarosa the purchase money. Thereafter, "appellants
Danilo Sy and Wilson Lim went out of the room leaving behind appellant Jackilyn
Santos. After about one (1) hour, appellant Danilo Sy returned and informed PO2
Villarosa that there would be a `slight delay of 20 minutes because the shabu was
`still being prepared.
- About 4:00 P.M., appellants Danilo Sy and Wilson Lim returned together with
appellant Antonio U. Sio, who was carrying a `Giordano paper bag containing the
`shabu. Inside the paper bag were 2 cartons, each containing a big transparent
plastic sachet of one (1) kilogram of `shabu each. In the negotiation for the sale of
the `shabu, appellant Jackilyn Santos stated that the `shabu was `Class A and of
good quality. To prove her point, appellant Jackilyn Santos sniffed a sample of the
drug in the room. After being convinced of the genuineness of the `shabu, PO2
Villarosa gave the portfolio containing the money to appellant Antonio Sio who also
gave the former the bag of `shabu.
- Thereafter, PO2 Villarosa called up, through her cellphone, Superintendent John
Lopez and said, `boss, nandito na sa akin, the signal for the team to pounce on the
appellants. While on her way to the motel garage, she met her fellow operatives
rushing towards Room 3 of the motel to arrest appellants.
Defenses version of facts
- Appellant Danilo Sy denied having conspired with the other accused in selling shabu
to poseur buyer PO2 Nening Villarosa. In the morning of March 27, 1999, appellants
daughter Jane Daphne Sy joined the elementary graduation rites of her class.
Appellant and the other members of the family attended the ceremonies which
lasted until past 12:00 noon. After the celebration, appellant brought his family to
their house.
- At past one oclock in the afternoon, appellant proceeded to Apollo Motel to meet
his girlfriend co-accused Jackilyn Santos, who had checked in the motel since March
20, 1999. Appellant and Jackilyn Santos occupied Room 20 at the third floor.
Appellant and Jackilyn Santos made love and thereafter talked about the plans of
appellant to leave the country on March 29, 1999 in anticipation of putting up a
business. They ordered foods to be served in their room.
- In the late afternoon, when appellant and Jackilyn Santos were taking a nap, persons
who turned out to be police officers kicked the door of Room 20. The police officers
told them that they were being arrested. The police officers forcibly took them down
to the second floor. They were hauled to Camp Crame and charged with the two
other accused. Appellants licensed firearm and personal belongings were taken from
him. Despite his persistent demand, these personal belongings were never
returned."
- Appellant Wilson Lim likewise denied the allegations of PO2 Villarosa and testified
that he was the manager of the Apollo motel whose tour of duty was from 10:00 a.m.
to 10:00 p.m.; that his office was located at the ground floor of the motel which was
just behind the counter where the customers registered their names; that at around
4:00 p.m. of March 27, 1999, he was inside his office attending to some documents
while the cashier and counter clerk of the motel were at the counter; that while inside
his office, he heard a commotion outside; that he went out and told their security
guard to see what was happening; that the security guard came back and told Wilson
that his gun was taken by the raiding team; that Wilson got scared so he went inside
his office and suddenly some policemen made a search in the counter and then
entered his office where they also made a search therein; that while the search was
going on, he asked the policemen what they were doing and he was told that they
were looking for something; that he asked them if they had any search warrant and
they told him they had none; that he was subsequently arrested without any warrant;
that during the commotion, he heard a gunshot and one of the motel employees
recovered an empty shell of a .45 cal. bullet which was later given to the counter;
that he did not meet PO2 Villarosa inside room No. 3; and, that he had not seen her
nor Supt. John Lopez and SPO3 Rolando Sayson at the Apollo motel.
- Antonio Sio adopted the trial courts digest of his testimony: "xxx. In the morning of
March 27, 1999 (Saturday), he reported for work as a supervisor of a Garment Factory
in Balut, Tondo, Manila. Later, he called up his girlfriend and they checked in at the
Apollo Motel at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon. They occupied Room 4 on the second
floor. At about 4:00 p.m., and while he and his lover were inside the room, about 5
men forcibly opened and entered the room. The men announced a raid and searched

the room but found nothing. After getting his wrist watch and wallet, the men
arrested and handcuffed him without being informed of the crime he had supposedly
committed. He was brought to the ground floor and boarded into a vehicle. After
about 15 minutes, 4 men also boarded the same vehicle and they left the Apollo
Motel for Camp Crame. Before he was brought to PAOC-TF, Camp Crame, his
girlfriend had been allowed to leave the Motel by one of the arresting officers. He
first came to know of the crime imputed to him and the other accused the following
day (Sunday) because they were brought to an Inquest Prosecutor. During the
inquest, no `shabu or buy-bust money was presented. This is the first time he has
been charged with selling `shabu which he does not even know the appearance of.
The testimony of the poseur-buyer is not true. He never went to Room 3 of the Apollo
Motel on the date of the incident. While he and his girlfriend were inside Room 4, he
heard a gunshot from the outside. At about 4:00 p.m., he went down to inform the
cashier that he and his lady companion were checking out. When he returned to his
room, he heard the commotion which led to his arrest.
- Appellant Jackilyn Santos testified that she and Danilo Sy were lovers and they had
checked in at the Apollo motel since March 20, 1999; that she stayed at the motel
until March 27, 1999 but did not sleep there every night as Danilo took her home
when he left the motel at dawn; that on March 27, Danilo arrived at the motel at past
1:00 p.m; that they made love, ate and talked about Danilos impending trip to
Brunei; that while they were taking their nap, somebody knocked at the door and
when she slightly opened the door, about 5 to 6 men in civilian clothes entered the
room and a raid was announced; that she was only wrapped in a blanket and she was
ordered to dress up while accused Danilo argued with the men on why they were
being arrested; that she and Danilo were brought downstairs and then to PAOCTF at
Camp Crame.
- On February 2, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision. It gave full faith and credit
to the version of the prosecution. It found the testimony of poseur buyer PO2 Nening
Villarosa to be direct, positive and credible. It also found that the accused acted
together to achieve the goal of getting hold of a million pesos in the sale of shabu.
The court did not believe the defense of alibi invoked by the appellants since they
were at the motel where the poseur buyer claimed to have delivered the money and
got the shabu; and held that the requirement of physical impossibility to be at
the locus criminis was not proven. It also ruled out that there was illegal raid since
none of the accused could even mention any possible reason for the imagined raid.
It concluded that what was conducted was a buy-bust operation where the
appellants were caught in flagrante delicto, hence, no need for a warrant of arrest. It
further declared that the inconsistencies cited by the accused referred only to minor
details and collateral matters which did not affect the substance of the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses.
- Hence, herein automatic review.
Issue:
1. Whether or not appellants were arrested in the actual commission of the crime
charged due to a buy-bust operation or appellants were apprehended during a raid
conducted by the police.
2. Whether the arrests of the appellants were lawful and valid.
Held:
First Issue
- The general rule is that factual findings of the trial court are accorded respect and
are not disturbed on appeal unless there appears in the record some facts or
circumstances of weight and influence which the trial court has overlooked or the
significance of which it has misappreciated or misinterpreted.
- After a thorough and painstaking examination of the records of this case, we found
material facts and circumstances that the trial court had overlooked or
misappreciated which, if considered, would alter the result of the case. These facts
and circumstances cast serious doubts on the story of the poseur buyer PO2 Nening
Villarosa and the other prosecution witnesses as to the alleged buy bust operation,
thus lending credence to the claim of the defense that what actually happened is a
raid without a proper warrant of arrest and search warrant.
- First, rhere is nothing in the transcripts to show that she was told by the informer
that appellant Sy was appellant Lims man or that the informer knew Sy or Wilson
beforehand. It is incredible that at the first meeting of appellant Sy and PO2 Villarosa
where no proper introduction took place, the latter simply followed Sys instructions
as if they knew each other beforehand and had previous arrangement to meet, when
in fact, based on the prosecution evidence, there was no such arrangement between
PO2 Villarosa and Sy or between Sy and the informer.
- Second, it is highly incredible that during the period of four (4) hours that she was
inside the room waiting for the arrival of the shabu, none of the appellants despite
the opportunity to do so, bothered to count the money considering that it was their
first transaction with PO2 Villarosa. Moreover, if indeed the bag of money was
inspected by both appellants Danilo Sy and Wilson Lim, they could have easily
discovered that only twelve (12) pieces of P500 bills amounting to Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) were genuine while the rest consisting of more than P1 Million Pesos
were boodle money.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 12 of 67

- Third, it is difficult to believe PO2 Villarosas testimony that all the appellants
introduced themselves to her by full names when there appeared nothing in the
transcripts that she ever introduced herself to them nor was there any conversation
that took place between them. Besides, it is highly incredible that any person
engaged in an illegal transaction, such as a sale of shabu in a large scale at that, would
recklessly divulge his complete identity.
- Fourth, PO2 Villarosas narration as to when appellant Jackilyn Santos sniffed shabu
in her presence was also self-refutative.
- Fifth, if indeed, as testified to by PO2 Villarosa and Supt. Lopez, there was a prior
agreement of the availability of the shabu between the informer and Wilson Lim, as
owner of the shabu, as to the time, place and amount, why was the shabu not yet
ready for disposition and Villarosa was still made to wait for it? It is quite dubious
that such an illegal activity had to be transacted for such a long period of time when
according to Supt. Lopez there had already been a previous arrangement with
appellant Wilson Lim.
- Sixth, it is not in accordance with ordinary human conduct and therefore
unbelievable that no explanation was given to PO2 Villarosa, who was made to wait
by the seller, why there was a delay of four (4) hours in the preparation of the shabu
when there was supposed to be a previous arrangement for the purchase thereof.
- Seventh, the alleged frequent calls made by PO2 Villarosa to Supt. Lopez and vice
versa, while she was inside room No. 3, especially the call where Villarosa even told
Supt. Lopez the number of people inside room No. 3, all made in the presence of
Jackilyn Santos, stretches far too thinly our understanding of ordinary human
behaviour. It is quite incredible that such actions would not arouse the suspicion of
Jackilyn Santos if really the latter was in the same room with Villarosa waiting for the
shabu and was in conspiracy with her co-accused.
- Eight, if indeed PO2 Villarosa acted as poseur buyer in this case, why did she
immediately leave the room after her last cellphone call to Supt. Lopez signaling that
the transaction was already consummated when the police operatives were still on
their way to the room to arrest the appellants? There is much to be desired in the
manner the police authorities effected the arrest of the appellants. It generates in
the mind a persistent nagging uncertainty that a buy-bust operation actually took
place.
- Ninth, the failure of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises a doubt
whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was
actually recovered from the appellants. It negates the presumption that official
duties have been regularly performed by the PAOC-TF agents.
- Tenth, doubts as to the existence of the buy-bust money produce reasonable
uncertainty as to the credibility of the evidence for the prosecution that appellants
were arrested by reason of the buy-bust operation. SPO3 Armando Ballon,
investigator of the PAOC Task Force, testified that the genuine money amounting to
Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) was not turned over to him but only the xerox copy
of the 12 pieces of P500 bills.31On the other hand, Supt. Lopez testified that his asset
misplaced the genuine money.
- We have held that where the testimonies of two key witnesses cannot stand
together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and their
story a mere concoction.
- Under the afore-discussed facts and circumstances surrounding the arrests of
appellants, we find more credible appellants contention that what actually took
place at around 4:00 p.m. of March 27, 1999 was not a buy-bust operation but a raid
conducted in the Apollo motel.
- PO2 Villarosa, on cross-examination, affirmed her affidavit wherein she stated that
on her way to her car after she already got the shabu, she saw Wilburt Lim arrive
riding in a Mitsubishi Lancer car. Why then should Wilburt be arrested and charged
when he arrived after the alleged buy-bust operation? The only cogent reason
therefor is that what was conducted by the police operatives was a raid whereby the
latter rounded up everybody they found in the motel.
- The trial court gravely erred in finding that appellants were arrested as a result of
buy-bust operation.
Second Issue
- The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed
in order to validly effect the same.
- The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizure
refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain
exceptions found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Not one of the above
exceptions attended the arrest of appellants. Hence, the raid conducted on the
premises by the police without any search warrant or warrant of arrest was illegal.
Since the warrantless arrests were invalid, the search conducted on the premises was
not one which is incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest. Thus, the search in the
motel, without the benefit of a search warrant, was clearly illegal and the shabu
allegedly seized thereat are inadmissible in evidence against appellants.

Case No. 12
G.R. No. 171465
June 8, 2007
AAA *, petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union and ENGR. JAIME O.
ARZADON, respondents.
Facts:
- This petition for certiorari assails the December 16, 2005 Order of the RTC, Branch
27, San Fernando, La Union in dismissing the rape case filed against private
respondent Jaime O. Arzadon for lack of probable cause; and its February 3,
2006 Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center
from February 28, 2001 to August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m.,
Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an office located at another building but when
she returned to their office, the lights had been turned off and the gate was closed.
Nevertheless, she went inside to get her handbag.
- On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He
told her to go near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe
and forced her to lie on the pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She wept and cried out for help but to no avail
because there was nobody else in the premises.
- Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her
family. But when she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape,
she narrated the incident to her parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a
complaint for rape against Arzadon.
- Asst. City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a Resolution finding probable cause and
recommending the filing of an information for rape. Arzadon moved for
reconsideration and during the clarificatory hearing petitioner testified before the
investigating prosecutor. However, she failed to attend the next hearing hence, the
case was provisionally dismissed.
- On March 5, 2003, petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint with a comprehensive
account of the alleged rape incident. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner
appeared for clarificatory questioning. On June 11, 2003, the investigating prosecutor
issued a Resolution finding that a prima facie case of rape exists and recommending
the filing of the information.
- Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested that a panel of prosecutors be
constituted to review the case which was denied as probable cause was found to be
present.
- An Information for rape was filed before the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union
on February 6, 2004. Arzadon filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance All Court
Proceedings Including the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and to Determine Probable
Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest" which was granted the motion
and directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand for
determination of probable cause.
- Arzadon also appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors finding probable
cause before the Department of Justice. On July 9, 2004, then Acting Secretary of
Justice Merceditas Gutierrez found no probable cause and directed the withdrawal
of the Information in Criminal Case No. 6415.
- Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however, Secretary of Justice Raul
Gonzales reversed the July 9, 2004 Resolution and issued another Resolution finding
that probable cause exists. Thus, a new Information for rape was filed against
Arzadon.
- Arzadon filed an "Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause for the
Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest." In an Order dated August 11, 2005,
respondent Judge Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her
witnesses to take the witness stand.
- Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
claiming that the documentary evidence sufficiently established the existence of
probable cause. Pending resolution thereof, she likewise filed a petition with this
Court for the transfer of venue which was granted in a Resolution dated January 18,
2006. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25. However,
the proceedings have been suspended pending the resolution of this petition.
- On December 16, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed Order
dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for being the wrong mode of appeal;
and
2. Whether or not respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
Held:
First issue
- The petition has merit.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 13 of 67

- A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is distinct from a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 in that the former brings up for review errors of judgment
while the latter concerns errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground
under Rule 45. However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be
considered a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged that the
respondents abused their discretion in their questioned actions, as in the instant
case.
- While petitioner claims to have brought the instant action under Rule 45, the grounds
raised herein involve an alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Judge Carbonell. Accordingly, the Court shall treat the same as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
- We must point out the procedural error committed by petitioner in directly filing the
instant petition before this Court instead of the Court of Appeals, thereby violating
the principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. It is well-settled that although the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. In this case, however, the gravity of the offense
charged and the length of time that has passed since the filing of the complaint for
rape, compel us to resolve the present controversy in order to avoid further delay.
Second issue
- We rule in the affirmative.
- Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed the case for lack of probable cause on the
ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders to take the
witness stand.
- He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause "to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce." However, in the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar, the
Court explained that this constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the
judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt
to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
- What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this
procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
- There is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper
which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The
determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made
by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged is the
function of the investigating prosecutor.
- In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 without
taking into consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of
prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005 Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of which
sustain a finding of probable cause against Arzadon. He failed to evaluate the
evidence in support thereof. Respondent judges finding of lack of probable cause
was premised only on the complainants and her witnesses absence during the
hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of probable
cause.
- After a careful examination of the records, we find that there is sufficient evidence
to establish probable cause. The gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge by the
accused of the private complainant under any of the circumstances provided in
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Petitioner has categorically
stated that Arzadon raped her, recounting her ordeal in detail during the preliminary
investigations. Taken with the other evidence presented before the investigating
prosecutors, such is sufficient for purposes of establishing probable cause. It is wellsettled that a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which engenders a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably

guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require that the evidence would
justify conviction.
- It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that
petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. Considering there is
ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to support a finding of probable cause,
it was unnecessary for him to take the further step of examining the petitioner and
her witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioners absences in the
scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in prosecuting the case. In
fact, the records show that she has relentlessly pursued the same.
Case No. 13
G.R. No. 129670
February 1, 2000
MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HON.
ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC, Quezon City; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
- Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A.
No. 7610.
- His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by
the police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San
Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been
contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioner's room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City.
- An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 in the evening
of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan
Hotel where petitioner was staying. When petitioner opened the door, the police saw
him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear, whereupon they
arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the
arresting officers, an information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was
filed on April 7, 1997 against petitioner in the RTC, Quezon City.
- On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained
on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the
Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law
on Which He is Charged.
- On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against
petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor
children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talingting. In all the
cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, petitioner
had sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution
and xxx given money [by petitioner] as payment for the said [acts of] sexual
intercourse."
- No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for
bail in the nine cases.
- On May 16, 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving petitioner's Omnibus
Motion, as follows: xxx there is probable cause to hold the accused under detention
xxx the accused is entitled to bail xxx the case is set for arraignment on May 23, 1997
xxx
- On May 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him.
Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment
scheduled on May 23, 1997. On May 22, 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed
that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the
same be done prior to his arraignment.
- On May 23, 1997, the trial court denied petitioner's motions to reduce bail bonds, to
quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was
arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then
ordered him released upon posting bail bonds.
- On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, assailing the trial
court's order, dated May 16, 1997, and its two orders, dated May 23, 1997, denying
his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of May 16,
1997, respectively.
- While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were
filed against petitioner, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which
were all consolidated.
- On June 30, 1997, CA rendered its decision. The appellate court invalidated the first
two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the grant of bail to petitioner
but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition making arraignment
a prerequisite for the approval of petitioner's bail bonds to be moot and academic. It
noted "that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned, represented
by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that he has already been
released from detention." The CA thought that the aforesaid conditions in the May
16, 1997 order were contrary to Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides
that "[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 14 of 67

accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable."
- With respect to the denial of petitioner's motion to quash the informations against
him, the appellate court held that petitioner could not question the same in a petition
for certiorari before it, but what he must do was to go to trial and to reiterate the
grounds of his motion to quash on appeal should the decision be adverse to him.
- Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. In ruling that the condition imposed by respondent Judge that the
approval of petitioner's bail bonds "shall be made only after his arraignment"
is of no moment and has been rendered moot and academic by the fact that
he had already posted the bail bonds and had pleaded not guilty to all the
offenses;
2. In not resolving the submission that the arraignment was void not only
because it was made under compelling circumstance which left petitioner no
option to question the respondent Judge's arbitrary action but also because
it emanated from a void Order;
3. In ruling that the denial of petitioner's motion to quash may not be
impugned in a petition for certiorari; and
4. In not resolving the legal issue of whether or not petitioner may be validly
charged for violation of Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 under several
informations corresponding to the number of alleged acts of child abuse
allegedly committed against each private complainant by the petitioner.
Held:
- First. As already stated, the trial court's order, dated May 16, 1997, imposed four
conditions for the grant of bail to petitioner:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial
of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these
cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to
enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;
- CA declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of
condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot and academic.
Petitioner takes issue with the CA with respect to its treatment of condition (d) of the
May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes petitioner's arraignment a
prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is
void and that his arraignment was also invalid because it was held pursuant to such
invalid condition.
- We agree with petitioner that the appellate court should have determined the
validity of the conditions imposed in the trial court's order of May 16, 1997 for the
grant of bail because petitioner's contention is that his arraignment was held in
pursuance of these conditions for bail.
- In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial
court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent,
prevent his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got
tired and lost interest in their cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the
arraignment, approval of petitioner's bail bonds should be deferred until he could be
arraigned. After that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long as
he is notified of the date of hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under
Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized. This seems to be the
theory of the trial court in its May 16, 1997 order conditioning the grant of bail to
petitioner on his arraignment.
- This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in
cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise
the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information
is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the
arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the trial court could ensure the
presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his
presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b)
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused
shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or these
Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment
is required.
- On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment
would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a
motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash
can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a
motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on
bail. These scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right not to be
put on trial except upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with
a crime and his right to bail.

- It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the
bail bonds shall be made only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should
instead have declared void. The condition imposed in the trial court's order of May
16, 1997 that the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must
be present at the hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For
another condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to
appear at the trial without justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman
shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in
the notice. In such case, trial shall proceed in absentia."
- Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to
be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at
arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt, (b) during trial whenever
necessary for identification purposes, and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless
it is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or
representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and
cannot be waived.
- Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could delay the proceedings by
absenting himself from the arraignment. But once he is arraigned, trial could proceed
even in his absence. So it thought that to ensure petitioner's presence at the
arraignment, petitioner should be denied bail in the meantime. The fly in the
ointment is that such court strategy violates petitioner's constitutional rights.
- Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of
petitioner on May 23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the
arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail
bonds shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the
arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for
the grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent
proceedings against him are valid.
- Third. Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose
motion to quash is denied is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to trial
without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash
during trial on the merits or on appeal if an adverse judgment is rendered against
him. However, he argues that this case should be treated as an exception. He
contends that the Court of Appeals should not have evaded the issue of whether he
should be charged under several informations corresponding to the number of acts
of child abuse allegedly committed by him against each of the complainants.
- In Tano v. Salvador, the Court, while holding that certiorari will not lie from a denial
of a motion to quash, there may be cases where there are special circumstances
clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal. In such cases, the accused may
resort to the appellate court to raise the issue decided against him. This is such a
case. Whether petitioner is liable for just one crime regardless of the number of
sexual acts allegedly committed by him and the number of children with whom he
had sexual intercourse, or whether each act of intercourse constitutes one crime is a
question that bears on the presentation of evidence by either party.
- Petitioner's contention is that the 12 informations filed against him allege only one
offense of child abuse, regardless of the number of alleged victims (four) and the
number of acts of sexual intercourse committed with them (twelve). He argues that
the act of sexual intercourse is only a means of committing the offense so that the
acts of sexual intercourse/lasciviousness with minors attributed to him should not be
subject of separate informations. He cites the affidavits of the alleged victims which
show that their involvement with him constitutes an "unbroken chain of
events." Petitioner says that child abuse is similar to the crime of large-scale illegal
recruitment where there is only a single offense regardless of the number of workers
illegally recruited on different occasions. He contends that only 4 informations,
corresponding to the number of alleged child victims, can be filed against him.
- The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or
female, is or is deemed under 18 years of age. Exploitation in prostitution or other
sexual abuse occurs when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate, or group. Each incident of sexual intercourse and
lascivious act with a child under the circumstances mentioned in Air. III, 5 of R.A.
No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct offense. The offense is similar to rape or act
of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in which each act of rape or lascivious
conduct should be the subject of a separate information.
Case No. 14
G.R. No. 141529
June 6, 2001
FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
- The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked
to set aside two resolutions of CA which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed
conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 15 of 67

- For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted

of estafa by the RTC of Pasig City and was sentenced to four years and two months
of prision correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in
addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in
no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years."
- He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the
cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial
court.
- After the records of the case were transmitted to the CA, petitioner filed with the
said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant
Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General
opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00
and be required to secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of
his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until
final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior
notice to the court and private complainant."3 Petitioner filed a Reply, contending
that the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive
bail.
- The assailed resolution of the CA upheld the recommendation of the Solicitor
General.
- A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail
fixed by respondent court, but was denied in a resolution issued on November 25,
1999. Hence, this petition.
Assignment of errors:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the
bail of the provisional liberty of petitioner pending appeal in the amount of P5 .5
million.
2. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in basing the
bail for the provisional liberty of the petitioner on his civil liability.
3. The respondent Court of Appeals unduly restricted petitioner's constitutional liberty
of abode and travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.
Held:
- Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount,
effectively denied him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent
court for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil
liability to private complainant Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation, and argues
that the Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the accused to be a
guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail.
- The Sol Gen maintains that no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed to the CA
for fixing the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00 considering the severity of the penalty
imposed, the weight of the evidence against petitioner, and the gravity of the offense
of which petitioner was convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the P5,500,000.00 not
only corresponded to civil liability but also to the amount of fraud imputed to
petitioner. The Solicitor General further pointed out the probability of flight in case
petitioner is released on bail, it having been established that petitioner was in
possession of a valid passport and visa and had in fact left the country several times
during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. It was also shown that
petitioner used different names in his business transactions and had several abodes
in different parts of the country.
- Petitioner's case falls within the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules
of Court (Bail when discretionary).
- There is no question that in the present case CA exercised its discretion in favor of
allowing bail to petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated that it was doing so
for "humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by
petitioner's admission he went out of the country several times during the pendency
of the case, for which reason the court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of
bail at P5,500,000.00.
- The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. The
obvious rationale is that imposing bail in an excessive amount could render
meaningless the right to bail.
- At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
advises courts to consider several factors in the setting of the amount of bail. Thus,
the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the
accused may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure
against the same. Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate
level, or requiring the person to report periodically to the court and to make an
accounting of his movements.
- In the present case, where petitioner was found to have left the country several times
while the case was pending, the CA required the confiscation of his passport and the
issuance of a hold-departure order against him.
- Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been
imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the

combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform
the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts.
Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be
meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable,
excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to bail.
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated
to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which
petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression that the
amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this
we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction
of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.
The Court is not precluded from imposing in petitioner's case an amount higher than
P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate
increase is dictated by the circumstances.
It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on
appeal is non-capital offenses is discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the
convicted accused exceeds six years and circumstances exist that point to the
probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his
bail previously granted should be cancelled. In the same vein, the Court has held that
the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be exercised with
grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact
convicted by the trial court.
Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals that he secure
"a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a
resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final
judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice
to the court", claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.
Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him
from leaving the Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the
order. In fact, the petition submits that "the hold-departure order against petitioner
is already sufficient guarantee that he will not escape. Thus, to require him to inform
the court every time he changed his residence is already unnecessary."
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by
petitioner, are not absolute rights.
The order of CA releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals
is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure
that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires
his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that
petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the
court in case he does so.

Case No. 15
G.R. No. 158763
March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners, vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
Facts:
- This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision of the CA and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
xxx Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest
for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal xxx.
- On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Isabela, which were later
identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
- Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1
Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel
Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the RTC of Santiago City.
- On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them
to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be
arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on
automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on
the ground of reasonable doubt.
- Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he
executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo
B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as
the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
- Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet
dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal.
On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of
arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 16 of 67

urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall

and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that,
since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be
properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of
State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case
and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently,
he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner
Miranda. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad,
but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October
2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a TRO, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint
Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001,
and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer
for a TRO against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases.
Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On
19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced dated
15 November 2001, and issued the TRO while referring the petition to the CA for
adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we
referred said motion to the CA in view of the previous referral to it of respondents
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, CA rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and
ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well
as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in
a Resolution dated 12 June 2003. Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Errors:
1. CA gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D.
Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and
November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and,
erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by
then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused
cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.
2. CA gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and
36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial
Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue
the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
3. CA committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No.
36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the
regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of
dismissal issued therein having become final and executory.
Held:
- Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
- The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of
Appeals ruling that: [A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not
submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the
accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of
arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police
or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his
person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court. Thus, an accused must
first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his
petition for judicial reliefs.
- Proceeding from this premise, CA ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio
cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived
of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary
investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."
- Petitioners counter the finding of the CA by arguing that jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners
argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court
can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over

their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent
Motion.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act
upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs
sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law
is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can
be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion
before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law,
such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in
the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of
his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the
law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes,
but is not limited to, detention.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the
applicant being in the custody of the law. There is an exception to the rule that filing
pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the
consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the
case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of
the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil
cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in criminal
cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact
that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of
the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by
the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases
when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction
over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused
can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over
the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody
of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e.,
the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon
seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to
be in the custody of the law.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in
applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we
allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable
that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being
held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the
other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody
of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would
remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest
who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of
probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find
probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.
Pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues
in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day
and at any time of the day and night. Furthermore, the continued absence of the
accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight
is indicative of guilt.

Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
- We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge
Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases
against the petitioners.
- After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner
Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of
Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest
on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "xxx prudence dictates (that)
and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."
- Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge
Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the
warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the
future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 17 of 67

even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest,
the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors
resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
- The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest
is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Judge Anghad is referring to the
following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
- After a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, we find that Judge Anghad gravely
abused his discretion.
- Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge
Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however,
focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause.
In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2
Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years
in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone
who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was
given in exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4)
it was given during the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where
"Santiago City voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda
camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of
DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with
different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
- Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things,
that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before
the Secretary of Justice.
- Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and interpret it to the discredit of
SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the prosecution in the
Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused
therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against
different accused for the same crime.
- We cannot let unnoticed Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after
we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order
prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day
after the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to
beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of
the informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad)
creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders
set aside by the nullified proceeding.
- In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the CA did not recall or
reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed
Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest. According to the
petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a
personal determination of probable cause.
- We disagree. Whether CA ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or merely
ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is
merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not
be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the
other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction.
- Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified; therefore
those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
- Even if CA had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on a
determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to
do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the CA, and
are also available to this Court, allowing both the CA and this Court to personally
examine the records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the
prosecutor.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment.
- In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of the Criminal Cases,
alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory.
- The Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the
assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed
upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001.

- Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this
Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them
in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001,
around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14
November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this
Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad
"deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for
murder."
- Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on
15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001
Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a TRO
enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the
respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao
had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
- While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as
disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of
indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part
of respondent, the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs
just and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for
the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
- In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does
not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the
accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was
dismissed.
- WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The TRO issued by this Court is hereby LIFTED.
Case No. 16
G.R. No. 129782
June 29, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. BALWINDER SINGH, GURMOK
SINGH, DALVIR SINGH, DIAL SINGH, AMARJIT SINGH, MOHINDER SINGH, MALKIT
SINGH DHILLON, JOHINDER SINGH and KULDIP SINGH, defendant, BALWINDER SINGH,
MALKIT, SINGH, MOHINDER SINGH and DALVIR SINGH, defendants-appellants.
Facts:
- Appellants Balwinder, Malkit, Mohinder and Dalvir were convicted of the crime of
Murder for killing Surinder Singh, and Frustrated Murder for stabbing Dilbag Singh.
Each of them were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for murder,
and the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum
for frustrated murder.
- It appears that these four (4) appellants, who are Indian nationals, were charged with
murder and frustrated murder along with their six (6) compatriots, namely: Gurmok,
Dalvir, Dial, Johinder, Kuldip and Amarjit Singh. Only these four (4) appellants were
prosecuted because the rest of their co-accused are at-large, except for Dial Singh,
who died while under detention.
- Dilbag Singh, private complainant for frustrated murder, recounts that on November
26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning while he was cleaning his motorbike in front
of the Mendiola Apartment in Barangay Canlalay, Bian, Laguna, Dalvir, Balwinder,
Gurmok, Jarnail, Amarjit, Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip- all surnamed Singh-Johander Singh
Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived, shouting foul remarks in their native
language and demanding Surinder Singh to come out of the apartment. When
Surinder Singh came out of his apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab him but Surinder
Singh was able to move away. Dalvir Singh told his companions to hold Surinder Singh
as he will kill him. Thereafter, Dial Singh and Johinder Singh each held the right and
left arms of Surinder Singh, with Kuldip Singh pushing Surinder Singh on his back.
Dalvir Singh then stabbed Surinder Singh, hitting him on the right side of his stomach,
and causing him to fall on the ground. Dial Singh remarked that Surinder Singh failed
to give money and if others will likewise refuse, the same fate will befall them. As
Surinder Singh tried to get up, Malkit Singh Dhillon and Jarnail Singh started hitting
him with lead pipes all over his body, while Johinder Singh and Dial Singh punched
and kicked Surinder. Amarjit Singh, who was holding a gun, warned everyone not to
help Surinder Singh or else he will shoot. Thereat, when all these things were going
on, private complainant Dilbag Singh tried to stop them but Balwinder Singh stabbed
him on the left side of his back. Gurmok Singh likewise stabbed him with a bolo, but
he was not hit as he was able to move to one side. After that, the ten (10) accused
Indians left.
- Dilbag Singh and Surinder Singh, both injured, were brought to the Perpetual Help
Hospital by Jaswinder Singh, Johinder Singh Gill, Balwinder Singh Gill and Alwan
Singh, for treatment. There, Surinder Singh was pronounced dead on arrival.
- On the basis of the sworn statement, the Chief Investigator of the Bian Police Station
filed on November 28, 1993, a complaint for the crime of homicide with the MTC of
Bian, Laguna for purposes of preliminary investigation.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 18 of 67

- On January 7, 1994, after finding probable cause, the MTC recommended to upgrade
the charges to "Murder" and "Frustrated Murder", and forwarded the records of the
case to the Provincial Prosecutor.
- On February 17, 1994, 3rd Assistant Prosecutor of Laguna rendered a resolution
recommending that only Dalvir Singh be charged with homicide, and that frustrated
homicide be filed against Balwinder and Gurmok Singh. Thereafter, the Information
for homicide was filed against Dalvir Singh, and frustrated homicide against
Balwinder and Gurmok Singh with the RTC of Laguna. Before arraignment, private
complainants Dilbag Singh and their heirs of Surinder Singh, thru their counsel,
moved for reinvestigation.
- On June 30, 1994, a "resolution on reinvestigation" resulted in the filing of two (2)
Informations.
- Upon arraignment, three (3) appellants, Balwinder, Malkit and Mohinder Singh,
manifested that they are not entering any plea. Thus, the court entered for them a
plea of not guilty pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
- On October 6, 1994, appellants filed a petition for bail. While hearing the petition for
bail, appellants filed a motion to inhibit and a petition for change of venue. On
December 13, 1995, RTC of San Pedro, Laguna denied the petition for bail.
Appellants version of events
- Appellant Dalvir Singh testified that on November 26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the
morning, he was conducting his buy and sell business along Brgy. Canlalay, Bian,
Laguna. While collecting from his customers, he was accosted by Jaswinder, Dilbag
and Surinder Singh to stop at the corner of the street. When he stopped, he alighted
from his motorcycle. Jaswinder, Dilbag and Surinder Singh accused him of squealing
their status to the immigration authorities. Then, Jaswinder Singh punched him.
Appellant Dalvir Singh retaliated by slapping Jaswinder Singh afterwhich, Jaswinder
Singh, went inside his apartment to get a pipe. When Surinder Singh was about to
stab him, he wrestled the knife from him and, in the process, private complainant
Dilbag Singh was stabbed on his back with the same knife. As Dalvir Singh grappled
for the possession of the knife from Surinder Singh, both of them fell down, with him
landing on top of Surinder Singh and that was the time when Surinder Singh was
stabbed on the right portion of his stomach. Then, Surinder Singh lost his grip and
appellant Dalvir Singh was able to get hold of the knife. Appellant Dalvir Singh was so
nervous that he left the place on his motorcycle while holding the knife. He threw the
knife along the highway of Bian, Laguna.
- Wilfredo Rivera corroborated the testimonies of appellant Dalvir Singh. According to
him, he testified in court in exchange for the favor extended to him by an Indian
national who is a friend of appellant Dalvir Singh.
- After trial, appellants were convicted of the crime charged.
Assignment of errors:
1. The court a quo erred in sanctioning errors and irregularities of procedure which
resulted in denial of due process to accused-appellants.
2. The court a quo erred in accepting the prosecutions version of the incident which
gave rise to these cases, overlooking the testimonies of the three (3) unbiased
witnesses thereto.
3. The court a quo erred in awarding excessive damages against accused-appellants.
Held:
First error
- According to appellants, the prosecution failed to conduct a preliminary investigation
for the upgraded crime of murder and frustrated murder. This claim lacks basis.
- Evidence on record reveals that when private complainants filed a motion for reinvestigation to upgrade the charge to murder and frustrated murder, in the course
thereof, the prosecutor who handled the reinvestigation conducted another
preliminary investigation. "Subpoenas were issued and sent to both contending
parties requiring them to appear and be present on the scheduled date and time for
the said re-investigation, and to present, or submit, their evidence in support of their
complaints and defense, respectively." The prosecutor propounded clarificatory
questions to the prosecution witnesses revealing the necessity to raise the category
of the criminal charge to murder and frustrated murder.
- Appellants likewise alleged that the procedure followed by the trial court in resolving
their petitions for bail departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings,
because the prosecution presented its evidence ahead of appellants, and the
presentation of the prosecution took 10 months, while the accused were afforded
only two days to rebut the prosecution evidence. This allegation is misplaced.
- In hearing the petition for bail, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong. Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides that the burden of proof in bail application lies in the prosecution.
- In bail proceedings, the prosecution must be given ample opportunity to show that
the evidence of guilt is strong. While the proceeding is conducted as a regular trial, it
must be limited to the determination of the bailability of the accused. It should be
brief and speedy, lest the purpose for which it is available is rendered nugatory. While
the prosecution tarried too long, such fact did not amount to a denial of due process

because bail is granted only "where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or
innocent," which is not attendant in this case.
- Appellants claim that no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove the
allegations in the amended information, and that "there is nothing in the records of
these cases which support the statement of the court a quo that "the documentary
evidence, as well as the testimonies of the xxx witnesses presented by the
prosecution in a petition for bail, was considered as automatically reproduced at the
trial on the main cases", is misleading.
- On May 30, 1995, the trial court declared that the evidence presented during the bail
hearings are considered automatically reproduced at the trial of the main case. In
fact, Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that "the evidence
presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically reproduced at
the trial."
- Appellants contend that they were deprived of their rights to be heard and to present
evidence with the issuance of the trial court Order dated February 24, 1997.
Appellants were given all the opportunity to be heard and defend their cause but
opted not to utilize the same by its continued refusal to proceed with the trial.
Nevertheless, appellants were given time to file their formal offer of exhibits to
bolster their defense. This negates the appellants claim of denial of due process.
Second error
- Appellants fault the trial court in accepting the prosecutions version. This Court is
convinced that appellants are guilty of the crime charged. Appellants Dalvir Singh
admitted stabbing the deceased and wounding Dilbag Singh, which was claimed to
have been caused while grappling for the possession of the knife. This version
invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
- After invoking self-defense, for exculpation, appellants have the burden of proving
their allegation to substantiate such assertion, which they failed to do so.
- Immediately after the incident, private complainants Dilbag and Jaswinder Singh,
reported the circumstances surrounding the death of Surinder Singh, and the stab
wound sustained by Dilbag Singh to police authorities. Both of them revealed the
presence of all the appellants and disclosed their participation in the incident.
- The other errors allegedly committed by the trial court call for the calibration of
credibility of witnesses, which we find no reason to disturb since it is best left to the
trial court to pass upon, having had the opportunity to observe firsthand the
demeanor and actuation of the witnesses while on the witness stand.
Third error
- In the case for frustrated murder, the trial court awarded private complainant Dilbag
Singh the amount of P16,000.00 representing his hospitalization and medical
expenses, and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. For his hospitalization and medical
expenses, the receipts submitted to support said claim amounted only to P370.50.
Hence, private complainant Dilbag Singh is entitled only to the said amount. The
award of attorneys fees is hereby deleted. Nonetheless, private complaint is entitled
to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for the suffering he endured from
appellants felonious acts.
- In the case for murder, the following amount of actual damages were duly proven
P16,500.00 funeral expenses and air ticket/freight of the cadaver $600.27. The
amount of P400.00 for hospitalization expenses should be deleted for not being
supported by evidence. The trial courts award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000.00 moral damages are affirmed. The award of P500,000.00 as attorneys
fees and P5,760,000 as compensation for loss of earning capacity, are likewise
deleted for lack of basis
Case No. 17
G.R. No. 88555 November 21, 1991
EDUARDO N. ASWAT, petitioner, vs. BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEJANDRO GALIDO, in his
capacity as Commander of the Southern Luzon Command, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Camp Guillermo Nakar, Lucena City, respondent.
Facts:
- In this Petition for Habeas Corpus, petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the
General Court-Martial which was convened by then respondent Brigadier General
Alejandro Galido as Commanding General of the Southern Luzon Command
("SOLCOM") to try petitioner for a specification (offense) committed outside a
military reservation or installation.
- Petitioner Eduardo N. Aswat and victim Felix B. Nebres were both enlisted men of
the AFP respectively holding the ranks Private First Class and Corporal. Aswat and
Nebres were assigned to the SOLCOM but Aswat was detailed as caretaker of
Brigadier General Galido's Baguio resthouse while Nebres was assigned to act as a
personal driver of Brigadier General Galido's wife. On 29 December 1988, petitioner
was involved in a shooting incident at Dominican Hills, Baguio City, which resulted in
the death of Nebres.
- Petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the Baguio City police authorities and was
briefly incarcerated at the Baguio City Jail until he was transferred to a SOLCOM

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 19 of 67

detention cell on 31 December 1988. Petitioner has been detained at the SOLCOM
Headquarters in Camp Guillermo Nakar, Lucena City since then.
On 20 April 1989, petitioner was charged before a SOLCOM General Court-Martial
with violation of Article 94 of the Articles of War, the specification being homicide.
While the court-martial proceedings were going on, petitioner filed the instant
petition, contending: (1) that the specification of homicide with which he was
charged was committed outside a military installation and hence the offense was
cognizable by a regular, civilian court; (2) that he is entitled to be released on bail as
a matter of right pursuant to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution; and (3) that he
should be given his due base pay and other pay, aside from the allowances he has
been receiving, computed from the time of commencement of his detention.
The Court en banc issued the writ of habeas corpus and required respondent to make
a return of the writ before the Third Division of the Court.
Petitioner seeks to make a distinction between offenses committed outside and
those committed inside a military installation or reservation. He assails the
jurisdiction of the SOLCOM-GCM, alleging that the specification of homicide was
committed in Baguio City and in an area outside any military installation or
reservation.

Held:
- As the law now stands, as long as the accused is subject to military law, as defined
under Article 2, A.W., he shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. Article 94,
A.W., in its original form, did refer only to offenses committed inside a Philippine
military reservation as falling within the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In 1948,
however, R.A. No. 242 amended Article 94, A.W. by providing that offenses
committed outside a military reservation shall also be punished as a court-martial
may direct, but only "when the offended party (and each one of the offended parties
if there be more than one)" is similarly subject to military law.
- There is no question that both petitioner and the deceased Nebres were subject to
military law at the time the latter was shot and killed.
- When the petitioner asked for the affirmative relief of bail from the SOLCOM-GCM,
he in effect recognized the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial. Hence,
petitioner is properly deemed estopped to deny such jurisdiction.
- Petitioner next contends that his right to bail is explicitly guaranteed in Section 13,
Article III of the Constitution. Although the right to bail applies to "all," the Court has
very recently ruled that the guarantee is not without any exception.
- Petitioner is a person subject to military law, and under Article 70, A.W., "any person
subject to military law charged with crime or with a serious offense under these
article shall be placed in confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require."
Confinement is one way of ensuring presence during sessions of the General CourtMartial; the more important reason underlying the authority to impose confinement
is the need to enable the proper military authority to instill discipline with the
command and thereby achieve command efficiency. By confining the petitioner,
petitioner's unmilitary conduct may be curtailed from spreading within the ranks of
the command. The necessity for such confinement is a matter properly left to the
sound discretion of petitioner's superior officers.
- The authority of the respondent to order the arrest and confinement of the petitioner
flows from his general jurisdiction over his command. Petitioner being assaigned to
SOLCOM, he is directly under the command of then Brigadier General Galido.
- The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns his right to receive base pay and
other pay during the pendency of his detention. At present, petitioner is receiving a
monthly allowance of P540.00. The law defines "pay" to include "base pay and all
additional pay for the length of service or type of duty such as longevity pay and flying
pay," and distinguishes "pay" from "allowances" which is limited to "quarters,
subsistence, travel, and such other allowances as may by law become payable to
army personnel."
- The Court resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Habeas Corpus for lack of merit.
Case No. 18
G.R. No. 148571
September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge
Regional Trial Court of Manila and MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN
CRESPO, respondent
Facts:
- Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government,
through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No.
0522 dated June 16, 1999 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
- Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a
TRO by the RTC of Manila which TRO prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a
petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ
in a Petition before this Court. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the
Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition

request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within
which to file a comment and supporting evidence.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its
October 17, 2000 Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices
changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that
private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and
executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America,
represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition which alleged that Jimenez was the subject of an
arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the
following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud; (4) false statements; and (5) illegal campaign
contributions. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the
issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest"
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an
"Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that petitioners application
for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set
the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the
hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant
should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001.
Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one
million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Issues:
1. In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing
before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled
to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is "No."
2. Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can
be issued.
3. Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending.
Held:
- The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
- Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for
Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1) the issues were fully considered by such
court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and position
papers on the matter; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and
legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of
sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid
extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law."
- For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following
reasons: "(1) the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have
the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower
courts ought to follow; (2) the CA had in one case ruled on the issue by disallowing
bail but the court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all
other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are
pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the CA, which, unless guided
by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to
grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them opportunity to
flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its
obligations under existing extradition treaties."
- As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless
the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to
correct the errors imputed to it. However, there are exceptions: (1) when the issue
raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. As
a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non,
when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely
argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.
- In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in
extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 20 of 67

proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no
local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.

- Extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by
facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to the
other.
- It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the
jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and
international law.
- In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding
ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state.
We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of
suppressing crime in our own country.
The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
- An extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that
both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process. More pointedly,
our duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our
confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic
rights of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that
the accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and
basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the
treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its
unconstitutionality.
The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
- As pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not
criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused
are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not. An
extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call
into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin
with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the
state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only
relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
extraditee x x x.
- It is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the
innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such determination during the
extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition
is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person
charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim
to try that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter
into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction.
- The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether
the person sought is extraditable.
Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
- Our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty,
and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that
its implementation will serve the national interest.
- Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the
requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder
paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition
treaty that hinges on reciprocity.
- We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the
requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the
Treaty, are satisfied.
There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
- Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption
finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of
confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit
to trial in the requesting country.
- Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested
state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the
crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the
processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all
cost.

Substantive Issues
First: Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing Before the Issuance of a Warrant of
Arrest?
- Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused,
a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and
that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid
extradition.
- Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived
of his constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there
is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the
formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
- Section 6 of PD 1069 states: SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest;
Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the
presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to
appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may
issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any
where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice.
Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the
summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case
or set another date for the hearing thereof. (2) The order and notice as well as a copy
of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused
and the attorney having charge of the case."
- Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for
hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
- It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word
"immediate" to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be
rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing
entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from
them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate."
- By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima
facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest
and detention of the accused.
- It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from
these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of whether the
accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to "best serve
the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances
existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the
extradition request was prima facie meritorious.
- He actually concluded from these supporting documents that "probable cause" did
exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated: In the instant petition, the
documents sent by the US Government in support of its request for extradition of
herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable
cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee."
- We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition
and for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its
supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a
prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
- Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest
and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to
prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended
that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the
escape of the accused from the requested state.
- Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not
require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
- To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution
itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants
and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
- All we required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon
which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify
the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause."
- In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice
of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with
the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and
necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of
defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding?
Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a fullblown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case
superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 21 of 67

- Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a)
they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his
discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this
study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
- On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is
at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform
or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be
given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second: Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
- Respondent maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all
persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are
the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence
of guilt is strong.
- On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine
Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition
request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
- The constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
- The constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
- That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress,
extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal
cases against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
- Respondents detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does
not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine
that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the same
time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. 64 Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.
- In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard
subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence,
there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
- His arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs
filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that
the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty;
(2) the extradition judges independent prima facie determination that his arrest will
best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3)
his opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an exception
to the no-initial-bail rule.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
- Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the
power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
- The Court ruled that bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon
a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.
- Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived
essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the
burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive,
not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations.

1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
- While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of
the House of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will
disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded.
- It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United
States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have
been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their
representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the case.
2. Anticipated Delay
- Respondent Jimenez contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy,
it would be unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not
convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature. They
are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes
conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
- Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses
that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the
country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request
for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the
process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting
government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines
cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our
government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for
Extradition.
- In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court
at anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment,
even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the extradition court
may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in
accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Summation
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the
request expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that
may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition
Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings
are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the
fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal
process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed
its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty
partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic
rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in
which guilt or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not
one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is
more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the
accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once
escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is
sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty
and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has
discretion to require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to
personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case
exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential
extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled
hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the
applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a)
there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court
in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the
principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a
matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts
of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A
subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed,
available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to
be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary
nature of extradition.

7.

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This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a
bulwark of democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of
the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of
the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility
arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to
implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad
discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review
authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow
contortions, delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest these
summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of
international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a
treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not
be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably
delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral
justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed
to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while
safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose.
11. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial
Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with
all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty
with the United States as well as our Extradition Law.
Case No. 19
G.R. No 80906
September 5, 1988
Amaya vs. Ordonez
Citation from another case: Whatever the fiscal recommends as the amount of bail for
the provisional release of an accused is only recommendatory. The Judge still retains
the discretion to apply the precedents laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the
reasonable nature of the bail to be required. It is not bound by the Fiscals
recommendation. More binding are the decisions of the Supreme Court.
Case No. 20
A.M. No. MTJ-97-1139
October 16, 1997
ROBERTO ESPIRITU, complainant, vs. JUDGE EDUARDO JOVELLANOS, 8th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, respondent.
Facts:
- Respondent is judge of the 8th MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan. He is charged
with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, and gross partiality in connection
with the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case for frustrated murder which the
herein complainant, Roberto Espiritu, had filed against Weny Dumlao.
- Roberto Espiritu, as complainant, alleged that at around 7:30 in the evening of July
16, 1994, while he was with a group which included Eulogio Pabunan, Arnel Guerra,
Januario Peregrino, and Marcelino Bautista, Weny Dumlao approached him and fired
at him three times, as a result of which complainant was wounded; that complainant
was able to run away; and that Dumlao wanted to kill complainant because the latter
had filed a case against Dumlao's brother, Victor, for the murder of complainant's
son Rolly.
- After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent judge ordered on August 18,
1994 the arrest of Dumlao and fixed the amount of bail for his provisional liberty at
P20,000.00. However, in an order dated September 7, 1994, he reduced the amount
of the bail to P10,000.00, stating that Dumlao's father had asked for the reduction.
On September 12, 1994, he ordered "any peace officer under whose custody
[Dumlao] may be found" to release the latter in view of the fact that Dumlao had
posted bail for P10,000.00. Then on October 12, 1994 he dismissed the complaint,
citing, among other reasons, the fact that Dumlao had filed a case against Roberto
Espiritu and others as a result of the same incident complained of.
- It appears that Dumlao had filed on July 27, 1994 a countercharge against
complainant and others for attempted murder and illegal possession of firearm.
Dumlao claimed that as he approached Espiritu's group, Arnel Guerra shot him,
although Guerra missed him; that as he ran towards his house, other members of the
group also fired at him; and that Espiritu's group challenged him and his father to
come out and fight.
- Dumlao's complaint was dismissed on August 15, 1994 for insufficiency of
evidence. After a reinvestigation of the two cases, however, Assistant City Prosecutor
Paz de G. Peralta directed the filing of an information for attempted murder against
complainant Roberto Espiritu, Arnel Guerra, Andres Espiritu, Marlino Bautista,
Januario Peregrino, Abrillo Peregrino, Eulogio Pabunan, Dario Pabunan, and Landio
Pabunan even as she affirmed the dismissal of Criminal Case against Dumlao.
- Espiritu sought a review in the Department of Justice, but his petition was denied for
having been filed late and for his failure to attach the affidavits submitted during the

preliminary investigation. Espiritu filed the complaint in this case, alleging

irregularities committed by respondent judge in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation of his complaint against Dumlao.
- Complainant claimed that this was not the first time that respondent judge had
shown ignorance of the rules on criminal procedure, because on September 29, 1994,
in People of the Philippines v. Cesario Sanchez, Criminal Case No. V-0092, respondent
judge had been reprimanded by the Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan
(Branch 50) for approving the bail bond of the accused when the latter had not yet
been arrested.
Issue:
The charges against respondent judge relate to basically two acts committed by him: (1)
granting bail to Weny Dumlao in the reduced amount of P10,000.00 and (2) dismissing
the criminal complaint against Dumlao.
Held:
- Complaint is that respondent judge is guilty of ignorance of the law, bias, and
partiality for Dumlao as shown by the following: (a) respondent judge granted bail
and later reduced its amount when the fact was that, at that time, Dumlao was not
in the custody of the court; (b) there was no written motion presented for the
reduction of bail, which is a necessity since MCTCs are courts of record; and (c)
pursuant to the 1981 Bail Bond Guide the bail for frustrated murder should be
P12,500.00.
- It is indeed true that, in general, bail presupposes that the applicant is under arrest,
detained, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. In this case, it appears that on July 16,
1994, shortly after the incident, Weny Dumlao surrendered to the police, but the next
day (July 17, 1994) he was released to the custody of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Emiliano Matro. 13
- Apparently, therefore, when Dumlao applied for bail on September 7, 1994 to
respondent judge, Dumlao was not in custody. Nor was his release to the custody of
Assistant City Prosecutor Matro in accordance with law.
- Under Rule 114, 15 of the Rules of Court, the release on recognizance of any person
under detention may be ordered only by a court and only in the following cases: (a)
when the offense charged is for violation of an ordinance, a light felony, or a criminal
offense, the imposable penalty for which does not exceed 6 months imprisonment
and/or P2,000 fine, under the circumstances provided in R.A. No. 6036; (b) where a
person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of the
imposable principal penalty, without application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
or any modifying circumstance, in which case the court, in its discretion, may allow
his release on his own recognizance; (c) where the accused has applied for probation,
pending resolution of the case but no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of
filing one; and (d) in case of a youthful offender held for physical and mental
examination, trial, or appeal, if he is unable to furnish bail and under the
circumstances envisaged in P.D. No. 603, as amended (Art. 191).
- Although then not in legal custody, Dumlao subsequently submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court when on September 7, 1994 he personally asked respondent
judge to admit him to bail and reduce its amount.
- Respondent judge thus correctly granted bail to Dumlao.
- Respondent judge erred, however, in fixing the amount of bail at P20,000.00 and
reducing it to P10,000.00 and in doing so without a hearing.
- Under the Bail Bond Guide, the amount of bail in cases of frustrated murder is
P12,500.00.
- Either respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law or he deliberately
disregarded it to favor the accused. Considering that part of his duties as a judge is
conducting preliminary investigations, it is his duty to keep abreast of the laws,
rulings, and jurisprudence regarding this matter. It is apparent that he has not. In
failing to do so he failed to live up to the injunction of the Code of Judicial Conduct
to "maintain professional competence."
- Further demonstrating either deliberate disregard of the law of gross ignorance of
the same, respondent judge granted bail to Weny Dumlao without notice to the
prosecution, in violation of Rule 114, 18.
- In this case, the failure to give notice to the prosecution may be due to the fact that
there was no written motion filed but only, as respondent judge himself admitted,
an oral request by Dumlao and his father that the amount of the bail be reduced.
What respondent judge should have done was to have Dumlao put his request in
writing and then schedule the incident for hearing with notice to the prosecution.
Instead, he readily granted the request, which indicates rather clearly respondent
judge's partiality. This partiality was nowhere more evident than in the private
conference which he had with the Dumalaos in his chambers without the presence
of the opposing party, the complainant in this case.
- With respect to the charge that respondent judge, with grave abuse of authority,
dismissed the case filed by complainant against Weny Dumlao, the holding of a
hearing for the purpose of asking "clarificatory" questions presupposes the filing by
the parties of their affidavits but at the time he examined Dr. Patawaran he had not
yet received the counteraffidavit of Weny Dumlao, then what he should have done
was to wait until the counteraffidavit was filed and in the meantime not examine Dr.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 23 of 67

Patawaran. What is particularly objectionable was the examination of Dr. Patawaran

as a witness without the presence of the parties.
Nor is there any excuse for respondent's consideration of Dumlao's counteraffidavit
despite the fact that it had been filed several days late. Dumlao received the
order requiring him to file his counteraffidavit and that of his witnesses on September
12, 1994. As under Rule 112, 3(b) Dumlao had only 10 days from receipt of the
subpoena within which to comply, his counteraffidavit should have been filed not
later than September 22, 1994. However, it took him 19 more days after the
reglementary period had expired before he finally filed his counteraffidavit on
October 11, 1994. Dumlao did not ask for an extension, yet respondent judge allowed
the counteraffidavit.
Respondent claims that: The acceptance of the Counter-Affidavit is not my duty. It
is my Clerk of Court who received the Counter-Affidavit and when I look into the
records, the Counter-Affidavit was already there in the record and I was also
preparing a Resolution to that case, so I have to take cognizance of the CounterAffidavit. After all, there was no one month yet that lapsed so I have to take
cognizance of the Counter Affidavit. And immediately after that, I issued a
Resolution.
The contention has no merit. The duty of the clerk of court was to receive the
counteraffidavit. It was respondent judge's responsibility to see to it that what was
received in his court had been filed on time. Nor is it true that when respondent judge
saw the counteraffidavit, it had already been attached to the records.
What has been just said applies as well to respondent judge's claim that responsibility
for furnishing complainant a copy of the counteraffidavit was not the court's
responsibility but Dumlao's. The service of the counteraffidavit on complainant
should indeed be made by Dumlao and not by the court, but respondent judge
should have seen to it that this duty had been complied with upon the filing of the
counteraffidavit. The "serve and file" rule is so basic for respondent judge not to
know it. It was not fair for respondent judge to consider a pleading which the other
party knew nothing about because it had not been served on him.
In dismissing Criminal Case No. 2346, it would seem respondent judge simply relied
on the counteraffidavit of Dumlao for his resolution, particularly the following
portion of Dumlao's counteraffidavit: The medical certificate of private complainant
Roberto Espiritu doesn't categorically state that the wound is a gun shot wound and
if the letters GSW in handwritten form in a ballpen appear therein is an information
coming from and supplied by said complainant, other entries are typewritten, it is
not a gun shot wound as ascertained and examined by the attending doctor; the
complainant was never confined in the hospital; there is no exit of the bullet but no
finding whether said bullet is embedded and found inside the body of the alleged
victim-complainant; if the private-complainant ever sustained any wound, it is one
that is self-inflicted in a vain effort to substantiate a false charge of a serious offense
of frustrated murder making it appear as a consequence of a gunshot; the medical
certificate doesn't state the healing period of the self-inflicted wound; medical
certificate is attached and marked as Annex "E" to form part hereof.
The foregoing acts of respondent judge clearly demonstrate partiality.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Eduardo U. Jovellanos GUILTY of gross
misconduct and imposes on him a FINE of P20,000.00, with a WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar offenses will be dealt with more severely.

Case No. 21
G.R. No. L-1771
December 4, 1947
SY GUAN (alias LIM HONG), petitioner, vs. RAFAEL AMPARO, Judge of First Instance of
Manila, respondent.
Facts:
- Sy Guan alias Lim Hong is under prosecution with two others for visiting an opium
den. The case is now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, to which the
accused appealed from a sentence of one month and one day of imprisonment
imposed by the municipal court.
- Failing to appear when the case was called for trial, Sy Guan's bond, for P300, was
ordered forfeited and a warrant for his arrest was issued. Upon being rearrested, this
prisoner offered to put up a new bond. The offer was rejected by the Honorable
Rafael Amparo, Judge "in view of the fact that Sy Guan has heretofore jumped his
bail."
- The present petition for certiorari, alleging lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
appropriate remedy is mandamus, and, as the application contains sufficient
allegations essential in a petition of this character, we shall consider this proceeding
as one to compel the respondent judge to admit the petitioner to bail.
- Petitioner denies that he fled or avoided going to trial. He alleges misunderstanding
on his part and change of address as the cause of his non-appearance.
- Assuming for the sake of this case that the petitioner purposely "jumped" his bail,
that facts does not operate as a forfeiture of his right to temporary liberty. Except
where bail is a matter of right, irrespective of such circumstance the breach of a prior
bond is a compelling reason for the refusal of bail in the same cause. But where bail
is a matter of right and prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such
right bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance.

- Bail before conviction is a constitutional right of an accused, except in prosecutions

for capital offenses where the proof of guilt is strong. (Article III, section 1, paragraph
16, Philippine Constitution.) Other than this, the Constitution makes no exceptions.
The probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater
discretion than to intend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted,
such amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision of the same section and
paragraph cited, that excessive bail shall not be required. Petitioner shall be released
upon filing a new bond with sufficient sureties, without special judgment as to costs.
Case No. 22
G.R. No. L-5371
March 26, 1953
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AQUINO MINGOA, defendantappellant.
Facts:
- Defendant was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the CFI of
Romblon for being found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the
municipal treasurer. He was unable to produce the missing fund amounting to
Php3,938.00 upon demand by the provincial auditor.
- Having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he
appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case here on the ground
that it involved a constitutional question.
- It is not disputed that upon examination of his books and accounts, defendant, as
accountable officer, was found that, required to produce the missing fund, he was
not able to do so. He explained that some days before he had, by mistake, put the
money in a large envelope which he took with him to show and that he forgot it on
his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. He did not testify in court
and presented no evidence in his favor.
- Defendant's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome the
presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the fund which was found
missing. If the money was really lost without defendant's fault, the most natural thing
for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability.
But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the
flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the
loss to the police. Defendant had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who
wanted to examine his accounts.
Held:
- It is now contended that lacking direct evidence of actual misappropriation the trial
court convicted defendant on mere presumptions - presumptions of criminal intent
in losing the money under the circumstances alleged and presumptions of guilt from
the mere fact that he failed, upon demand to produce the sum lacking.
- As to the first presumption, it is irrelevant as the trial court did not believe
defendant's explanation that the money was lost, considering it mere cloak to cover
actual misappropriation.
- As to the second presumption, the same is authorized by article 217 of the RPC: The
failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
- The contention that this legal provision violates the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained.
The question of the constitutionality of the statute not having been raised in the
court below, it may not be considered for the first time on appeal.
- The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are
proved. It makes the failure of public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper
demaand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
- An officer has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the
presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has
failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is
but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is
no rational connection between the two.
- The statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, giving the accused an
opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will
stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations.
Case No. 23
G.R. No. 116736
July 24, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE,
MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA and JOHN DOE, accused, BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE
and MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA, accused-appellants.
Facts:
- A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural and logical
consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more serious than
that intended. An accused who originally intended to conceal and to bury what he

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 24 of 67

thought was the lifeless body of the victim can be held liable as a principal, not simply
as an accessory, where it is proven that the said victim was actually alive but
subsequently died as a direct result of such concealment and burial.
- In the present case, Appellant Garcia cannot be held liable as a principal because the
prosecution failed to allege such death through drowning in the Information. Neither
may said appellant be held liable as an accessory due to his relationship with the
principal killer, Appellant Ortega, who is his brother-in-law.
- This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
and Manuel Garcia from the Decision, dated February 9, 1994 written by Judge
Adriano R. Osorio, finding them guilty of murder.
- During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia pleaded not guilty to the
charge. After trial in due course, the court a quo found the accused guilty.

Evidence for the Prosecution

- Diosdado Quitlong testified that on October 15, 1992 at about 5:30 in the afternoon,
he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San
Andres were having a drinking spree in the compound near the house of Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. at Valenzuela, Metro Manila. While they were drinking, accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were drunk arrived and joined them.
- The victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the back
portion of the house. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him and later they
heard the victim Andre Mar shouted, "Don't, help me!" That he and Ariel Caranto ran
towards the back portion of the house and saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top
of Andre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a canal with his face up and stabbing
the latter with a long bladed weapon.
- Ariel Caranto ran and fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father of accused Benjamin,
Jr. That he went to Romeo Ortega in the place where they were having the drinking
session to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr.
- Romeo Ortega went to the place of the stabbing and together with Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal and brought Andre
Mar to the well and dropped the latter inside the well. That Romeo Ortega, Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia then dropped stones to the body of Andre Mar
Masangkay inside the well.
- NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat testified that he conducted autopsy on
the cadaver of Andre Mar Masangkay. The cause of death is multiple stab wounds,
contributory, asphyxia by submersion in water.
Evidence for the Appellants
- Appellant Manuel Garcia testified that in the early morning of October 15, 1992, he
and his wife, Maritess Garcia, brought their feverish daughter, Marjorie, to the Polo
Emergency Hospital. He left the hospital at seven o'clock in the morning, went home,
changed his clothes and went to work. After office hours, he and Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. passed by the canteen at their place of work. After drinking beer, they left at eight
o'clock in the evening and headed home. En route, they chanced on Diosdado
Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar Masangkay, who invited them to join their
own drinking spree.
- Appellant Garcia's wife came and asked him to go home because their daughter was
still sick. To alleviate his daughter's illness, he fetched his mother-in-law who
performed a ritual called "tawas." After the ritual, he remained at home and attended
to his sick daughter. He then fell asleep but was awakened by police officers at six
o'clock in the morning of the following day.
- Masangkay approached him and asked where his sister was. He answered that he did
not know. Without warning, Masangkay allegedly boxed him in the mouth, an attack
that induced bleeding and caused him to fall on his back. When he was about to stand
up, Masangkay drew a knife and stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm, thereby
immobilizing him. Masangkay then gripped his neck with his left arm and threatened
to kill him. Unable to move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came and, to avoid
being stabbed, grabbed Masangkay's right hand which was holding the knife.
Quitlong was able to wrest the knife from Masangkay and, with it, he stabbed
Masangkay ten (10) times successively, in the left chest and in the middle of the
stomach. When the stabbing started, Ortega moved to the left side of Masangkay to
avoid being hit. 15 Quitlong chased Masangkay who ran towards the direction of the
well. Thereafter, Ortega went home and treated his injured left armpit and lips. Then,
he slept.
The Trial Court's Discussion
- The Court is convinced that the concerted acts of accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr.,
Manuel Garcia, Jr. and one Romeo Ortega in lifting, carrying and dumping the victim
Andre Mar Masangkay who was still alive and breathing inside the deep well filled
with water, head first and threw big stones/rocks inside the well to cover the victim
is a clear indication of the community of design to finish/kill victim Andre Mar
Masangkay.
- Wounded and unarmed victim Andre Mar Masangkay was in no position to flee
and/or defend himself against the three malefactors.
- Conspiracy and the taking advantage of superior strength were in attendance. The
crime committed by the accused is Murder.

Issue:
What are the criminal liabilities, if any, of Appellants Ortega and Garcia?
Held:
- We find the appeal partly meritorious. Appellant Ortega is guilty only of homicide.
Appellant Garcia deserves acquittal.
First Issue: Liability of Appellant Ortega
- The prosecution witnesses described the commission of the crime and positively
identified appellants as the perpetrators.
- The witnesses for the defense attempted to prove denial and alibi.
- In this regard, the trial court held: The Court has listened intently to the narration of
the accused and their witnesses and the prosecution witnesses and has keenly
observed their behavior and demeanor on the witness stand and is convinced that
the story of the prosecution is the more believable version. Prosecution eyewitness
appeared and sounded credible and his credibility is reinforced by the fact that he
has no reason to testify falsely against the accused. It was Diosdado Quitlong who
reported the stabbing incident to the police authorities. If Quitlong stabbed and killed
the victim Masangkay, he will keep away from the police authorities and will go in
hiding xxx
- Unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which,
if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility must
be respected.
- In the instant case, we found no reason to reverse the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies insofar as Appellant Ortega is
concerned. The narration of Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to be
spontaneous and consistent. It is straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus, it
clearly deserves full credence.
- In asserting alibi and denial, the defense bordered on the unbelievable. Appellant
Ortega claimed that after he was able to free himself from Masangkay's grip, he went
home, treated his injuries and slept. This is not the ordinary reaction of a person
assaulted. If Ortega's version of the assault was true, he should have immediately
reported the matter to the police authorities, if only out of gratitude to Quitlong who
came to his rescue.
- The natural tendency of a person under attack is to defend himself and not to persist
in choking a defenseless third person.
- Murder or Homicide? Although treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength were alleged in the information, the trial court found the presence
only of abuse of superior strength.
- We disagree with the trial court's finding. Abuse of superior strength requires
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take advantage of such superiority. It
must be shown that the accused purposely used excessive force that was manifestly
out of proportion to the means available to the victim's defense. In this light, it is
necessary to evaluate not only the physical condition and weapon of the protagonists
but also the various incidents of the event. In his testimony, Witness Dominador
Quitlong mentioned nothing about Appellant Ortega's availment of force excessively
out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim to defend himself.
- Victim Masangkay was a six-footer, whereas Appellant Ortega, Jr. was only five feet
and five inches tall. There was no testimony as to how the attack was initiated. The
accused and the victim were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the
foregoing testimony and circumstances can be interpreted as abuse of superior
strength. Hence, Ortega is liable only for homicide, not murder.
Second Issue: Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia
- Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court "is based on mere
assumption and conjecture xxx" Allegedly, the medico-legal finding that the large
airway was "filled with muddy particles indicating that the victim was alive when the
victim inhaled the muddy particles" did not necessarily mean that such muddy
particles entered the body of the victim while he was still alive. Thus, the prosecution
evidence shows Masangkay was already "dead" when he was lifted and dumped into
the well. Hence, Garcia could be held liable only as an accessory.
- We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the RPC states that
criminal liability shall be incurred by "any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The
essential requisites for the application of this provision are that (a) the intended act
is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit
graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor's wrongful acts.
- In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to the well, Appellant
Garcia was committing a felony. The offense was that of concealing the body of the
crime to prevent its discovery, i.e. that of being an accessory in the crime of
homicide. Although Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was
still alive when he assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the well, he is still liable
for the direct and natural consequence of his felonious act, even if the resulting
offense is worse than that intended.
- Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. But the autopsy
conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that the victim at that time was

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 25 of 67

still alive, and that he died subsequently of drowning. That drowning was the
immediate cause of death was medically demonstrated by the muddy particles found
in the victim's airway, lungs and stomach. It was proven that his airpassage, or
specifically his tracheo-bronchial tree, was filled with muddy particles which were
residues at the bottom of the well. Even his stomach was half-filled with such muddy
particles. The unrebutted testimony of the medico-legal officer that all these muddy
particles were ingested when the victim was still alive proved that the victim died of
drowning inside the well.
- The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that.
Appellant Garcia had intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter intentionem covered
by Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a person may
be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to kill. In spite of the
evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held liable as principal in the crime
of homicide, there are, however, two legal obstacles barring his conviction, even as
an accessory as prayed for by appellants' counsel himself.
- First. The prosecution's evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with the
stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates
only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim
Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right. Appellant
Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an information that
charges murder by means of stabbing.
- Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia assisted in
"concealing . . . the body of the crime, . . . in order to prevent its discovery," he can
neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19, par. 2 of
the RPC. The records show that Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant
Ortega, the latter's sister, Maritess, being his wife. Such relationship exempts
Appellant Garcia from criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the RPC.
Case No. 24
G.R. No. L-37364
May 9, 1975
BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., petitioner, vs. MILITARY COMMISSION 2, CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, and SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, and SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, *respondents.
Facts:
- Following the proclamation of martial law in the Philippines, petitioner was arrested
on September 23, 1972 for complicity in a conspiracy to seize political and state
power in the country and to take over the Government. He was detained at Fort
Bonifacio in Rizal province.
- On September 25, 1972, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus in which he questioned
the legality of the proclamation of martial law and his arrest and detention. This Court
issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it, and required respondents to file their
respective answers. On September 17, 1974, this Court dismissed the petition and
upheld the validity of martial law and the arrest and detention of petitioner.
- In the present case, petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of military commissions to
try him, alone or together with others, for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition
and explosives, for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder.
- The original petition in this case was filed on August 23, 1973 which sought to restrain
the respondent Military Commission from the proceeding with the hearing and trial
of petitioner on August 27, 1973.
- Because of the urgency of the petition, this Court called a hearing on Sunday, August
26, on the question of whether with its membership of only nine (9) Justices, it had a
quorum to take cognizance of the petition in view of the constitutional questions
involved. At that hearing, this Court asked the parties to agree to seek from the
Military Commission a postponement of petitioner's trial the following day. The
purpose was to relieve the Court of the pressure of having to decide the question of
quorum without adequate time to do so.
- When the proceedings before the Military Commission opened the following day,
petitioner questioned the fairness of the trial and announced that he did not wish to
participate in the proceedings even as he discharged both his defense counsel of
choice and his military defense counsel.
- On September 4, 1973, a supplemental petition alleging the creation of the Special
Committee and questioning the legality of its creation was filed. Thereafter,
petitioner was required to file a reply and was granted additional time after the lapse
of the original period, but instead of doing so, petitioner asked for the admission of
a second supplemental petition challenging the continued enforcement of martial
law in the Philippines, in the light of Presidential statements to the effect that with
the coming into force of the new Constitution on January 17, 1973, martial law was
"technically and legally" lifted.
- On March 24, 1975, petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order Against Military Commission No. 2"; praying that said Commission
be prohibited from proceeding with the perpetuation of testimony under its Order

dated March 10, 1975, the same being illegal, until further orders from the Supreme
Court.
- On April 1, 1975, this Court issued a Resolution, stating that "for lack of a necessary
quorum", it could not act on petitioner's Urgent Motion for Issuance of temporary
Restraining Order Against Military Commission No. 2, inasmuch as this case involved
a constitutional question.
- On April 14, 1975, this Court also issued a restraining order against respondent
Military Commission No. 2, restraining it from further proceeding with the
perpetuation of testimony under its Order dated March 10, 1975 until the matter is
heard and further orders are issued.
- Acting on petitioner's motion to withdraw the petitions and motions in this case, and
there being only three (3) Justices (Justices Fernando, Teehankee and Muoz Palma)
who voted in favor of granting such withdrawal, whereas seven (7) Justices (Justices
Castro, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Aquino, Concepcion and Martin) voted for its
denial, the said motion to withdraw is deemed denied (Section 11, Rule 56 of the
Revised Rules of Court).
Held:
- The Justice who voted to deny the withdrawal are of the opinion that since all matters
in issue in this case have already been submitted for resolution, and they are of
paramount public interest, it is imperative that the questions raised by petitioner on
the constitutionality and legality of proceedings against civilians in the military
commissions, pursuant to pertinent General Orders, Presidential Decrees and Letters
of Instruction, should be definitely resolved.
- In regard to the merits, We Resolve by a vote of eight (8) Justices to dismiss the main
as well as the supplemental petitions.
Military Commissions
- We have that the respondent Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfully
constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians,
including the petitioner.
- The Court has previously declared that the proclamation of Martial Law
(Proclamation No. 1081) on September 21, 1972, by the President of the Philippines
is valid and constitutional and that its continuance is justified by the danger posed to
the public safety.
- Petitioner nevertheless insists that he being a civilian, his trial by a military
commission deprives him of his right to due process, since in his view the due process
guaranteed by the Constitution to persons accused of "ordinary" crimes means
judicial process. This argument ignores the reality of the rebellion and the existence
of martial law. It is, of course, essential that in a martial law situation, the martial law
administrator must have ample and sufficient means to quell the rebellion and
restore civil order. Prompt and effective trial and punishment of offenders have been
considered as necessary in a state of martial law, as a mere power of detention may
be wholly inadequate for the exigency. "It need hardly be remarked that martial law
lawfully declared," observed Winthrop, "creates an exception to the general rule of
exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of
war, as well as those of a civil character, triable, at the discretion of the commander,
(as governed by a consideration for the public interests and the due administration
of justice) by military tribunals."
- Indeed, it has been said that in time of overpowering necessity, "public danger
warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process." According to
Schwartz, "The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must, however, give
way in areas governed by martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public
safety, legal processes can be superseded and military tribunals authorized to
exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in court."
- In any case, We cannot close Our eyes to the fact that the continued existence of
these military tribunals and the exercise by them of jurisdiction over civilians during
the period of martial law are within the contemplation and intendment of Section 3,
paragraph 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. These are tribunals of special and
restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency and national
security.
- When it has been established that martial law is in force, the responsibility for all acts
done thereunder must be taken by the authorities administering it.
- In the case at bar, petitioner is charged with having conspired with certain military
leaders of the communist rebellion to overthrow the government, furnishing them
arms and other instruments to further the uprising. There is no question that the
continuing communist rebellion was one of the grave threats to the Republic that
brought about the martial law situation. Under General Order No. 12, jurisdiction
over this offense has been vested exclusively upon military tribunals. It cannot be
said that petitioner has been singled out for trial for this offense before the military
commission. Pursuant to General Order No. 12, all "criminal cases involving
subversion, sedition, insurrection or rebellion or those committed in furtherance of,
on the occasion of incident to or in connection with the commission of said crimes"
which were pending in the civil courts were ordered transferred to the military
tribunals. This jurisdiction of the tribunal, therefore, operates equally on all persons
in like circumstances.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 26 of 67

- Neither are We impressed with petitioner's argument that only thru a judicial
proceeding before the regular courts can his right to due process be preserved. The
guarantee of due process is not a guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in
criminal cases. A military tribunal of competent jurisdiction, accusation in due form,
notice and opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial tribunal, adequately
meet the due process requirement. Due process of law does not necessarily means a
judicial proceeding in the regular courts. It implies due notice to the individual of the
proceedings, an opportunity to defend himself and "the problem of the propriety of
the deprivations, under the circumstances presented, must be resolved in a manner
consistent with essential fairness." It means essentially a fair and impartial trial and
reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.
- Here, the procedure before the Military Commission assures observance of the
fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due notice, an essentially fair and
impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of the defense.
- It is, however, asserted that petitioner's trial before the military commission will not
be fair and impartial, as the President had already prejudged petitioner's cases and
the military tribunal is a mere creation of the President, and "subject to his control
and direction." We cannot, however, indulge in unjustified assumptions. Prejudice
cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the great confidence and trust
reposed by the people upon the President and the latter's legal obligation under his
oath to "do justice to every man". Nor is it justifiable to conceive, much less presume,
that the members of the military commission, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, the Board of Review and the Secretary of National Defense, with
their corresponding staff judge advocates, as reviewing authorities, through whom
petitioner's hypothetical conviction would be reviewed before reaching the
President, would all be insensitive to the great principles of justice and violate their
respective obligations to act fairly and impartially in the premises.
Administrative Order No. 355
- We also find that petitioner's claim that Administrative Order No. 355 actually "strips
him of his right to due process" is negated by the basic purpose and the clear
provisions of said Administrative Order. It was precisely because of petitioner's
complaint that he was denied the opportunity to be heard in the preliminary
investigation of his charges that the President created a Special Committee to
reinvestigate the charges filed against him in the military commission. It is intended
that the Committee should conduct the investigation with "utmost fairness,
'impartiality and objectivity' ensuring to the accused his constitutional right to due
process, to determine whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that the
offenses charged were in fact committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof."
- The infirmity of his contention is apparent from the fact that the committee "shall
have all the powers vested by law in officials authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations." We have held as implicit in the power of the investigating Fiscal or
Judge in the discharge of his grave responsibility of ascertaining the existence of
probable cause, is his right to cross-examine the witnesses since "cross-examination
whether by the judge or by the prosecution supplies the gap by permitting an instant
contrast of falsehoods and opposing half-truths, mixed with elements of truth, from
which the examining judge or officer is better able to form a correct synthesis of the
real facts."
- In the case at bar, petitioner's representative in the Committee having been
conferred with "all the powers" of officials authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations, is, therefore, expressly authorized by Presidential Decree No. 77 to
subpoena the complainant and his witnesses and "profound clarificatory questions".
Preliminary Investigation
- Equally untenable is petitioner's contention that his constitutional right to due
process has been impaired when the anti-subversion charges filed against him with
the military commission were not investigated preliminarily in accordance with
Section 5 of the Anti-Subversion Act, but in the manner prescribed by Presidential
Decree No. 39, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 77.
- Contrary to petitioner's contention, Section 1[b] of Presidential Decree No. 77
specifically grants him the right to counsel, and Presidential Decree No. 328 amended
Presidential Decree No. 39, precisely to secure the substantial rights of the accused
by granting him the right to counsel during preliminary investigation.
- Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1700, the accused shall have the right "to crossexamine witnesses against him" and in case the offense is penalized by prision
mayor to death, the preliminary investigation shall be conducted by the proper Court
of First Instance.
- As to whether or not the denial to an accused of an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses against him in the preliminary investigation constitutes an infringement of
his right to due process, We have to advert to certain basic principles. The
Constitution "does not require the holding of preliminary investigations. The right
exists only, if and when created by statute." It is "not an essential part of due process
of law." The absence thereof does not impair the validity of a criminal information or
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case.
- It is also evident that there is no curtailment of the constitutional right of an accused
person when he is not given the opportunity to "cross-examine the witnesses

presented against him in the preliminary investigation before his arrest, this being a
matter that depends on the sound discretion of the Judge or investigating officer
concerned."
Perpetuation of Testimony
- Petitioner claims that the order of the Military Commission for the perpetuation of
the testimony of prosecution witnesses is void because no copy of the petition was
previously served on him. Thus, as a consequence, he was not given the opportunity
to contest the propriety of the taking of the deposition of the witnesses. It must be
noted that petitioner does not dispute respondents' claim that he knew of the order
allowing the taking of the deposition of prosecution witnesses on March 31, to
continue through April 1 to 4, 1975.
- The provisions of Presidential Decree No. 328, dated October 31, 1973, for the
conditional examination of prosecution witnesses before trial, is similar to the
provisions of Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 7 of Rule
119 of the Revised Rules provides: Deposition of witness for the prosecution.
Where, however, it shall satisfactorily appear that the witness cannot procure bail,
or is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial, as directed by the order of the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning thereto, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined or his deposition immediately taken. Such
examination or deposition must be by question and answer, in the presence of the
defendant or after reasonable notice to attend the examination or the taking of the
deposition has been served on him, and will be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to attend the
examination or the taking of the deposition after notice hereinbefore provided, shall
be considered a waiver. The statement or deposition of the witness thus taken may
be admitted in behalf of or against the defendant. His testimony taken, the witness
must thereupon be discharged, if he has been detained.
- The foregoing was taken substantially from Section 7 of Rule 115 of the old Rules of
Court, with the difference, among others, that the phrase "or after one hour notice"
in the old Rules of Court has been changed to "or after reasonable notice" in the
Revised Rules of Court.
- We hold that the taking of the testimony or deposition was proper and valid.
Waiver of Petitioners Presence
- There is conflict among the authorities as to whether an accused can waive his right
to be present at his trial. Some courts have regarded the presence of the accused at
his trial for felony as a jurisdictional requirement, which cannot be waived.
- In defense of the first view, it has been stated that the public has an interest in the
life and liberty of an accused and that which the law considers essential in a trial
cannot be waived by the accused.
- In support of the latter view, it has been argued that the right is essentially for the
benefit of the accused, and that "since the accused, by pleading guilty, can waive any
trial at all, he should be able to waive any mere privilege on the trial that is designated
only to aid him in shielding himself from such result."
- Under the present Constitution, however, trial even of a capital offense may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused. It is now provided that "after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified."
- On the basis of the aforecited provision of the Constitution which allows trial of an
accused in absentia, the issue has been raised whether or not petitioner could waive
his right to be present at the perpetuation of testimony proceedings before
respondent Commission..
- As a general rule, subject to certain exceptions, any constitutional or statutory right
may be waived if such waiver is not against public policy. The personal presence of
the accused from the beginning to the end of a trial for felony, involving his life and
liberty, has been considered necessary and vital to the proper conduct of his defense.
- There are certain rights secured to the individual by the fundamental charter which
may be the subject of waiver. The rights of an accused to defend himself in person
and by attorney, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to a
speedy and public trial, and to meet the witnesses face to face, as well as the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, are rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. They are rights necessary either because of the requirements of due
process to ensure a fair and impartial trial, or of the need of protecting the individual
from the exercise of arbitrary power. And yet, there is no question that all of these
rights may be waived.
- Considering the aforecited provisions of the Constitution and the absence of any law
specifically requiring his presence at all stages of his trial, there appears, therefore,
no logical reason why petitioner, although he is charged with a capital offense, should
be precluded from waiving his right to be present in the proceedings for the
perpetuation of testimony, since this right, like the others aforestated, was conferred
upon him for his protection and benefit.
- It is also important to note that under Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Court (Deposition of witness for the prosecution) the "Failure or refusal on the part
of the defendant to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition after
notice hereinbefore provided, shall be considered a waiver."

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 27 of 67

- It is for the foregoing reasons that the writer of this opinion voted with the six (6)
Justices who ruled on the full right of petitioner to waive his presence at said
proceedings.
- Finally, it is insisted that even if said orders and decrees were valid as martial law
measures, they have ceased to be so upon the termination of the emergency. In the
absence of any official proclamation by the President of the cessation of the public
emergency, We have no basis to conclude that the rebellion and communist
subversion which compelled the declaration of martial law, no longer pose a danger
to public safety.
- It is important to note here that an accused being tried before a military tribunal
enjoys the specific constitutional safeguards pertaining to criminal trials. Thus, he is
entitled to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation, to meet the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf, and
to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
- As in trial before civil courts, the presumption of innocence can only be overcome by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. These tribunals, in
general, are "bound to observe the fundamental rules of law and principles of justice
observed and expounded by the civil judicature." Section 11 of the Manual for
Courts-Martial specifically provides that the "rules of evidence generally recognized
in the trial of criminal cases in the courts of the Philippines shall be applied by courtsmartial." This is applicable to trials in the military commission .
- There is, therefore, no justification for petitioner's contention that such military
tribunals are concerned primarily with the conviction of an accused and that
proceedings therein involve the complete destruction and abolition of petitioner's
constitutional rights. This is not, however, to preclude the President from considering
the advisability of the transfer of these cases to the civil courts, as he has previously
announced.
Case No. 25
G.R. No. L-37933
April 15, 1988
FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO, petitioners, vs. HON. RAMON
E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu and TEODORO DE LA
VEGA, JR., respondents.
Facts:
- On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando,
Rogelio Baguio and the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were
charged with the crime of murder. On August 22, 1973 all the above-named accused
were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following
the arraignment, the respondent judge set the hearing of the case. All the acused
including private respondent, were duly informed of this.
- Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from
his detention center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted
the fiscals handling the case (the petitioners herein) to file a motion with the lower
court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that
private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of
Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
- The lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the private
respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in
court.
- After due trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the
five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private
respondent.
- On November 16, 1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
questioning the above-quoted dispositive portion on the ground that it will render
nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However,
this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated November 22, 1973.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned,
escapes from the custody of the law.
2. Whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who
has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf
and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.
Held:
- In its Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners,
respondent court expressed the opinion that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, the private respondent, who was tried in absentia, did not lose his right
to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and present his evidence. The
reasoning of the said court is that under the same provision, all accused should be
presumed innocent. Furthermore the lower court maintains that jurisdiction over
private respondent de la Vega, Jr. was lost when he escaped and that his right to
cross-examine and present evidence must not be denied him once jurisdiction over
his person is reacquired.

- We disagree.
- First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused-private respondent when he appeared during the arraignment and
pleaded not guilty.
- In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his
arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished
by appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case.
- Was that jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law and
failed to appear during the trial? We answer this question in the negative. Jurisdiction
once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is
terminated, notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
- "Trial in absentia" may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that
there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that
he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. In this case, all the above
conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia.
- As the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in
the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled
hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on
the notice issued by the lower Court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the
Police Blotter that private respondent escaped from his detention center. Even the
trial court considered his absence unjustified.
- The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973
Constitution, correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the
prosecution and the other accused in the absence of private respondent, but it erred
when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and rendered a
decision as to the other accused only.
- Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the
evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused
who who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his
evidence and moss e the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings
for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia.
- The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still
presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence
presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the
opportunity to be heard.
- Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to
cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during
the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court has
consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and crossexamination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. In the same vein,
his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit
and protection, may be waived by him.
- Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by
the provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c) of
Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our Constitution: xxx
The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular
date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present
during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of
the trail and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on
said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody in regained xxx
- It is our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an escapee who has been duly
tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to
confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.
Case No. 26
G.R. No. 118435
June 20, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO SERZO, JR., accusedappellant.
Facts:
- The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our Constitution, our laws and
our Rules of Court. During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial and even on
appeal, the accused is given the option to be represented by a counsel of his choice.
But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this option during arraignment and trial,
the court shall appoint one for him. While the right to be represented by counsel is
absolute, the accused's option to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such option
cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules or
to prejudice the equally important rights of the state and the offended party to
speedy and adequate justice.
- Appellant was charged with murder. Thereafter, pre-trial was waived and the case
proceeded to trial on the merits. After arraignment and trial, appellant was found
guilty as charged.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 28 of 67

- On August 22, 1990, Alfredo together with his wife Adelaida Alcantara were staying
inside their house comfortably watching television when at around 11:30 in the
evening, Susana Serzo, mother of the accused, and one Epifania Bentilacion came
knocking at their doorsteps and pleading for help to bring out her grandchildren who
were being held inside their house by her son, the accused in this case.
- The spouses were able to rescue the grandchildren and to bring them to a safer place.
When returning to their house, Alfredo Alcantara who was walking just armslength
ahead of his wife, was attacked by accused Mario Serzo from behind. Accused
stabbed Alfredo at his back forcing the latter to scamper for his dear life. However,
accused was able to overpower him thereby causing his fall in the canal where he
was repeatedly stabbed by the accused. Adelaida Alcantara shouted for help but was
likewise attacked by the accused as she was only half-meter away from her husband.
- The Medico-legal Officer testified in Court that the victim sustained three (3) stab
wounds, two at the back and one in his chest, which instantaneously caused the
victim's death.
- Arraignment was set by the trial court on January 8, 1991, during which appellant
appeared without counsel. Consequently, the trial court appointed Atty. Wilfredo
Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for the arraignment only. Appellant, however, moved that
the arraignment be reset and that he be given time to engage a counsel of his own
choice, which the trial court granted.
- On February 11, 1991, appellant appeared without a counsel de parte. He was
nonetheless arraigned with the assistance of Counsel de oficio Wilfredo Lina-ac. He
pleaded "not guilty." Pre-trial was waived and trial was set.
- The hearings scheduled on April 22, 1991 and May 6, 1991 were cancelled on motion
of Public Prosecutor. On both dates, appellant appeared with Atty. Lina-ac. On May
13 and June 3, 1991, trial proceeded with the testimonies of prosecution witnesses.
On behalf of appellant, Atty. Lina-ac cross-examined the said witnesses. On June 17,
1991, trial was again cancelled as appellant appeared without counsel. On August
13, 1991, the prosecution rested its case.
- On November 4 and 11, 1991, presentation of evidence for the defense was reset as
appellant was not ready to testify and he manifested his intention to secure the
services of a counsel de parte. On March 3, 1992, Atty. Lina-ac was relieved as
counsel de oficio in view of appellant's manifestation and refusal to cooperate with
said counsel. On April 6, 1992 appellant appeared without counsel, forcing the trial
court to appoint another counsel de oficio, Bella Antonano. Counsels for both parties
agreed to reset the trial, but appellant refused to sign the minutes of the
proceedings.
- On April 27, 1992, over vehement objection from the prosecution, hearing was reset
for the last time as appellant was still looking for a counsel de parte. On August 25,
1992, appellant appeared without counsel; thus, the trial court appointed Atty.
Bonifacia Garcia of the PAO as appellant's counsel de oficio. Again, trial was
postponed. On September 1 and October 19, 1992, trial was postponed on motion
of Atty. Garcia. Appellant again refused to sign the minutes of the proceedings for
both trial dates. On November 5, 1992, appellant refused to cooperate with Atty.
Garcia by declining to take the witness stand, forcing the defense to rest its case.
- Appellant wrote Judge Angeles three times within the period beginning December
16, 1992 until April 2, 1993, seeking legal advice and the early resolution of the case.
Branch Clerk of Court replied to him twice, informing him that Judge Angeles was
prohibited by law from giving legal advice to litigants in cases pending in his court.
Ruling of the Trial Court
- In its Decision, the trial court noted that appellant simply refused to secure the
services of a counsel de parte and to present evidence in his defense despite ample
opportunity accorded to him.
- The defense particularly the accused assisted by counsel however refused to present
any evidence despite several opportunities afforded by the Court. As early as the
arraignment stage, accused refused to be assisted by a counsel de oficio from the
PAO insisting that he be assisted by a counsel of his own choice. For several settings,
accused and her mother were allowed to secure the services of a counsel de parte.
However, they failed to present one. Hence, the Court, to avoid further delay in the
proceedings of the case, was constrained to assign a counsel de oficio from the PAO.
- During the presentation of evidence for the defense, accused and counsel could not
present any witness as accused refused to cooperate and to testify in Court. Hence,
the defense waived its right to present any evidence.
- Consequently, the trial court convicted appellant on the basis of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. Appellant was positively identified as the assailant by
the widow, Adelaida Alcantara, who survived his attack.
Issue:
Appellant alleges that he had been denied effective legal representation. His thesis is
that the trial court did not give him enough time to engage a counsel de parte,
effectively depriving him of the chance to present evidence in his defense.
Held:
- The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution. It covers the
period beginning from custodial investigation, well into the rendition of

judgment, and even on appeal. Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides this right
to an accused not only during trial but even before an information is filed.
The Rules of Court grants an accused the right to counsel under the following
provisions (Rule 112 Preliminary Investigation; Rule 113 Arrest; Rule 115 Rights
of the Accused).
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court makes it compulsory that the trial court inform the
accused of his right to counsel prior to arraignment. Even on appeal, the accused is
still afforded the right to counsel under Rule 122 which is stressed in Rule 124.
Republic Act No. 7438 was enacted providing that any person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
A deprivation of the right to counsel divests the accused of an equality in arms
resulting in the denial of a level playing field.

Right to Counsel De Parte Is Not Absolute

- An accused may exercise his right to counsel by electing to be represented either by
a court-appointed lawyer or by one of his own choice. While his right to be
represented by counsel is immutable, his option to secure the services of counsel de
parte, however, is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance the privilege to retain
a counsel of choice against the states's and the offended party's equally important
right to speedy and adequate justice. The court may restrict the accused's option to
retain a counsel de parte if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or
the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to represent
the accused for a valid reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.
- The right to counsel de parte is, like other personal rights, waivable so long as (1) the
waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law and (2) the waiver is
unequivocally, knowingly and intelligently made.
- In the present case, appellant claims that he was not given sufficient time to engage
a counsel de parte, thereby preventing him from presenting evidence in his defense.
Appellant had been given ample time to secure the services of a counsel de parte,
but his subsequent appearances in court without such counsel and his act of allowing
this situation to continue until the presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of
intention to do so. It even appears that he was merely delaying his own presentation
of evidence on purpose to the prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and the
orderly administration of justice.
- Appellant did not demonstrate in what way the services of his counsels de oficio were
unsatisfactory. He did not cite any instance substantiating his claim that he was not
effectively represented. He was afforded a chance to be heard by counsel of his own
choice, but by his own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such right.
- The facts of this case do not constitute a deprivation of appellant's constitutional
right to counsel because he was adequately represented by three court-appointed
lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano and Atty. Garcia. Courts are not required to
await indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are also
mandated to promote the speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Crime and Punishment
- We find no cogent reason to reverse the conviction of appellant. It is enough that the
death of the victim and the responsibility of the person who caused such death are
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Both elements were duly established by the
prosecution witnesses.
- The Court affirms the trial court's appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment
of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of
execution.
- Appellant waited for the victim and his wife and pounced on them swiftly and without
warning. The victim and his wife were already on their way home after transferring
appellant's children to a safe place. They were unarmed as they had absolutely no
idea that appellant would attack them right then and from behind. The manner of
the attack tended directly and especially to insure the execution of the crime without
risk to appellant and virtually no chance for the victim to defend himself.
Damages and Indemnity
- Actual and moral damages require the presentation of proof before they can be
awarded. Without any factual basis, the award of moral damages is not justified.
Case No. 27
G.R. No. 129295
August 15, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN MORIAL, LEONARDO
MORIAL alias "CARDING" NONELITO ABION * alias "NOLY", defendants-appellants.
Facts:
- Two of the three appellants herein were sentenced to death by the RTC of Southern
Leyte for Robbery with Homicide.
- The other was sentenced to suffer only the penalty ofreclusion perpetua on account
of minority.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 29 of 67

- Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty.

- The prosecution theorized that the accused committed the robbery in the early
evening of January 6, 1996 so they would have money to spend for the dance later
that night. To obtain the money or to silence any witnesses, the accused killed the
occupants of the house, Paula Bandibas and her three-year old grandson Albert.
- Gabriel saw accused Nonelito Abion slap Paula Bandibas' neck. Paula fell and was
stabbed by accused Edwin Morial with a small, sharp, pointed weapon. Accused
Leonardo Morial stood outside the house. Gabriel also saw Paula Bandibas' grandson,
Albert Bandibas, run towards his grandmother's garden. Gabriel then heard the
crushing sound of a stone against flesh.
- Benjamin Morial, Paulas common-law husband, moved back and saw Paula lying on
the floor with a cut in her neck. He shouted for help. Responding to his cries,
Benjamin's neighbors, includingbarangay kagawads Patricio Abion and Rufino
Guilao, rushed to his house. Benjamin asked his neighbors to help search for Albert,
who was found shortly some 50 meters from the house. Albert Bandibas laid flat on
the ground with two stones near his head. Benjamin requested Patricio to send
someone to report the incident to the police.
- Gabriel revealed to the grieving Benjamin that he witnessed Paula's killing and that
the three accused, Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abion, were the
perpetrators. Benjamin advised Gabriel not to tell anyone about what he knew for
fear that they would all be killed since the Abions were "saturated in [their] place."
Gabriel heeded Benjamin's advice.
- The police found wounds in Paula Bandibas' stomach, breast and neck. Albert
Bandibas had a contusion on the right side of his head. Beside him were two stones.
- Benjamin disclosed to the officers his three suspects, the accused in this case. He
advised them to bring only Leonardo and Edwin Morial into custody and not to
include Nonelito Abion, who had many relatives in Cagnituan. As a former barangay
captain of 22 years, he knew that the Abions were "most feared" in Cagnituan.
Benjamin did not tell the police that Gabriel Guilao had witnessed the incident.
- The investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez yielded an extra-judicial confession
from accused Leonardo Morial, who was assisted by Atty. Tobias Aguilar.
- The accused, all first-degree cousins, interposed denial and alibi as their defense.
They denied being together at the time of the incident.
- Edwin and Leonardo went with the police officers and arrived at the station at around
3:00 dawn the next day. The police told them to go to sleep. The suspects were
interrogated after they awoke at past 6:00 that same morning. Edwin was advised to
tell the truth so he would not be killed. Nevertheless, he refused to admit his alleged
participation in the killings. Someone then struck his left hand with a pistol. His hand
swelled. A policeman in uniform warned him that if he did not tell the truth, he would
be brought to the toilet.
- According to the accused, Edwin was subsequently brought to the lavatory where he
was boxed at the back and instructed to undress. As Edwin stood naked, hands on his
side, six tires were placed around his body. A towel soaked with water was pushed
into his mouth. Fortunately, the towel did not go all the way to his throat since
another policeman, a certain Leoni Egido, advised Edwin's tormentors to stop and
have pity on him. Edwin said that around seven policemen were in the toilet with him
though he could not identify any of them in court. He claimed that he did not have
his hand examined by a physician since he was afraid.
- Leonardo refused to own up to the incident so a policeman called two other
policemen and directed them to gag Leonardo. The two held Leonardo's arms while
the other stuffed a shirt into his mouth. One of them inflicted three successive painful
blows on Leonardo's left side as the two others continued to hold his hands. Leonardo
was then seated and his gag removed. The police told Leonardo to confess to the
killings. Leonardo professed that he did not witness the incident and could not tell
them anything about it. Again, they gagged his mouth and the same policeman who
had hit him then boxed him twice, this time on his right side. Thereafter, they
released their hold and advised him to confess so they would not kill him. Leonardo
repeated that he did not know anything about the incident. When a policeman
attempted to box him again, Leonardo finally admitted that Nonelito Abion and
Edwin Morial were responsible for the death of Paula Bandibas. Leonardo's
interrogation lasted one and a half to two hours.
- Leonardo's statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman informed him
that they were going to contact a lawyer to assist him during the investigation.
Leonardo was told that his counsel would be a certain Atty. Aguilar whose office was
very near the police station. Leonardo consented. Having prepared Leonardo's
statement, the police then told Leonardo to come with them to Atty. Aguilar's office,
which was about 50 meters from the police station. There, he saw Atty. Aguilar for
the first time. The lawyer read to him the document and asked him whether its
contents were true. The police had instructed Leonardo to answer "yes" if he was
asked that question, and Leonardo heeded the instructions.
- Leonardo denied that Atty. Aguilar examined his body for any injuries. Atty. Aguilar
did ask Leonardo if he was forced or intimidated to execute the extra-judicial
confession. Leonardo did not tell his lawyer about his injuries since a police officer
had warned him that he would be mauled again should he do so. Leonardo then
signed the extra-judicial confession, after which Atty. Aguilar affixed his. The signing
over, Leonardo was brought back to the police station. Later in court, Leonardo

claimed that he merely made up all the statements in the document because he was
afraid.
- After trial, the RTC rendered a decision convicting all the three accused.
- Appellants' conviction rests on two vital pieces of evidence: the extra-judicial
confession of appellant Leonardo Morial and the eyewitness account of Gabriel
Guilao.
Held:
- The Court finds Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was
effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation.
- A custodial investigation is understood to mean as "any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant manner." It begins when there is no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as
a suspect,i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a
confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.
- A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights, which attach
upon the commencement thereof. These are the rights (1) to remain silent, (2) to
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be
informed of the two other rights. The prosecution must prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the accused was accorded said rights before he extrajudicially admitted his guilt to the authorities.
- SPO4 Fernandez testified that the investigation he conducted resulted in an
admission by Leonardo Morial that he was one of those who participated in the
robbery with homicide. SPO4 Fernandez asked Leonardo whether he was willing to
reduce his statement into writing and to sign the same. The suspect answered
positively. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right "to remain silent and [to]
have a counsel[,] [and informed him that] whatever will be his answer will be used as
evidence in Court."
- Leonardo told the investigator that he had no money to pay for the services of
counsel. SPO4 Fernandez informed him that there are many lawyers in their
municipality and named some of them. Leonardo said he did not know any of the
lawyers mentioned. SPO4 Fernandez thus volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the
suspect, to which Leonardo Morial consented. SPO4 Fernandez then contacted Atty.
Aguilar.
- Atty. Tobias Aguilar had a short conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was
willing to answer the questions that may be propounded by the police investigator.
Atty. Aguilar warned him that the statements that he may give might be used in
evidence against him. Leonardo said he was willing to answer the questions
voluntarily. Thereafter, SPO4 Fernandez conducted the investigation in Cebuano.
Midway into the investigation, after the police investigator had asked "all the
material points," Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator that he be given leave as he had
a very important engagement. The investigator agreed to the lawyer's request.
- Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions
in his absence. He also instructed the police that, after the written confession had
been prepared, the accused and the document containing the confession should be
brought to his office for "further examination." Atty. Aguilar was in the police station
for less than thirty minutes from the start of the interrogation.
- Atty. Aguilar asked the accused whether he was maltreated while he was away and
examined the suspect's body for contusions or abrasions. Leonardo told him that he
was not harmed by the police officer. The lawyer then studied the document to
determine whether its contents conformed to the answers given by the accused in
his (counsel's) presence. He propounded questions to Leonardo with reference to the
document. Atty. Aguilar asked him whether he understood its contents and whether
he was willing to sign it. Leonardo replied in the positive and signed the document in
the presence of Atty. Aguilar and the policeman-escort.
- The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial interrogation must
continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof.
- SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by claiming that when the
lawyer left, he knew very well that the suspect had already admitted that he
(Leonardo) and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar
rationalize his abandoning his client by saying that he left only after the latter had
admitted the "material points," referring to the three accused's respective
participation in the crime. For even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys
the right to counsel from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its
termination indeed, "in every phase of the investigation."
- An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer
be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant
answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession."
- Section 2(a) of R.A. No. 7438 requires that "[a]ny person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel." The last paragraph
of Section 3 of the same law mandates that "in the absence of any lawyer, no
custodial investigation shall be conducted." The right of appellant to counsel was
therefore completely negated by the precipitate departure of Atty. Tobias before the
termination of the custodial investigation.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 30 of 67

- Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, by
his "coming and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt
departure before the termination of the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that
the framers of the 1987 Constitution contemplated when it added the modifier
"competent" to the word "counsel." Neither can he be described as the "vigilant and
effective" counsel that jurisprudence requires. Precisely, it is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant
behavior during the custodial investigation that the Constitution abhors and which
this Court condemns.
- Even granting that appellant consented to Atty. Aguilar's departure during the
investigation and to answer questions during the lawyer's absence, such consent was
an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section
12 (3), Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be waived unless the same
is made in writing and in the presence of counsel. No such written and counseled
waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.
- Appellant's policeman-escort was also present in the lawyer's office as attorney and
client discussed the voluntariness of the latter's confession. One can hardly expect
the suspect, in the face of such intimidating presence, to candidly admit that he was
coerced into confessing. As appellant Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his
right to counsel during custodial investigation, his extra-judicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence against him. The confession is also inadmissible against
appellant Leonardo Morial's co-accused, Nonelito Abion and Edwin Morial. The rule
on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another. An exception to the res inter alios acta rule
is an admission made by a conspirator. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator provided
that the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than by such act or declaration. The
exception, however, does not apply in this case since the confession was made after
the alleged conspiracy and not while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.62
- Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession executed by
Leonardo Morial, the testimony of eyewitness Gabriel Guilao certainly deserves
credence.
- The Court has held that the weight of testimony of a witness is not impaired or in any
way affected by his relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper
motive on the part of the witness. A person who was close to the victim would not
callously violate his conscience by blaming it on someone he believed innocent
thereof, especially if the accused were his blood relatives.
- The accused have no other excuse other than alibi.
- The trial court correctly ruled when it found the accused guilty of robbery with
homicide. It was established that all the elements of the crime were present; i.e., (1)
the taking of personal property perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation
against a person; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain oranimus lucrandi; and (4) on the occasion of the
robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide was committed.
- The trial court also correctly ruled that the accused conspired to commit the crime.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony, and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of
the accused before, during and after the crime, which are indicative of a joint
purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. Where the acts of the
accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident
and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals. To exempt himself from criminal
liability, the conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the unlawful plan to commit the felony.
- In this case, it was established that after the killing of Paula, the accused even stayed
inside the house for about ten (10) minutes, presumably to look for the hidden
money. After about ten (10) minutes, they left the house of Benjamin and went
home. Clearly, Paula and Albert were already dead or dying but not one of the
accused lifted a finger to show any pity or remorse. Hence, they should all be made
liable for the crime.
- Dwelling was correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because of the
sanctity that the law accords to the privacy of the human abode. The home is
considered a sacred place to its owners, and one who goes to another house to
slander or hurt him, or do him wrong, more guilty than he who offends him
elsewhere.
- However, evident premeditation is inherent in robbery and should not have been
considered against the accused. Treachery could only be appreciated in crimes
against persons, the same way with disregard of respect due to sex and age which
can be considered only in cases of crimes against persons and honor.
- Accused Edwin Morial should still be spared the death penalty. Appellant Edwin
Morial, who was over 15 but under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of
the crime, is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
Accordingly, the penalty next lower, i.e.,reclusion temporal, shall be imposed upon
him in its maximum period, there being one aggravating circumstance (dwelling).
Said appellant is further entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Case No. 28
G.R. No. 130644
October 27, 1997
THE MINOR FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, represented in this suit by his mother
MARGARITA G. LARRANAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
- On October 1, 1997, petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction seeking to annul the information for kidnapping and serious illegal
detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan Larranaga alias Paco, filed in the
RTC of Cebu City as well as the warrant of arrest issued as a consequence thereof.
- Petitioner as an alternative remedy prays for the annulment of the order of the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Cebu denying Larranaga's motion for a regular preliminary
investigation and that it be conducted by a panel of prosecutors from the Office of
the State Prosecutor, Department of Justice. On October 6, 1997, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Petition praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to relieve
her son from his alleged illegal confinement or to grant him bail.
- On September 15, 1997, some PNP CIG authorities went to the Center for Culinary
Arts located at Quezon City to arrest Francisco Juan Larranaga. Larranaga, thru his
lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit remonstrated against the warrantless arrest. The
police did not carry out the arrest on the assurance that Larranaga would be brought
to Cebu City by his lawyer on September 17, 1997 for preliminary investigation.
- On September 17, 1997, Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of Cebu. He moved that his client
be given a regular preliminary investigation. He also requested for copies of all
affidavits and documents in support of the complaint against his client and that he
be granted a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days from their receipt to file the
defense affidavit. The motion was denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that
Larranaga should be treated as a detention prisoner, hence entitled only to an
inquest investigation.
- Atty. Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in person. He was warned that his
failure would be treated as waiver of his client's right to a preliminary investigation
and he would be proceeded against pursuant to section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Atty. Armovit's verbal motion for reconsideration was denied by the city
prosecutor.
- On September 19, 1997, Larranaga, thru counsel, rushed to the Court of Appeals
assailing the actuations of the Cebu prosecutors thru a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. Larranaga's effort to stop the filing of a criminal
information against him failed. It turned out that on September 17, 1997 the said
prosecutors had filed an information with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga with
kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The prosecutors recommended no bail.
- On September 22, 1997, counsel filed a Supplemental Petition with the Court of
Appeals impleading the RTC of Cebu City to prevent petitioner's arrest. The move
again proved fruitless as Larranaga was arrested on the night of September 22, 1997
by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the RTC of Cebu City,
the Honorable Priscila Agana. A second Supplemental Petition was filed by
Larranaga's counsel in the Court of Appeals bringing to its attention the arrest of
Larranaga. On September 25, 1997 the Court of Appeals' dismissed Larranaga's
petitions, hence, the case at bar.
- On October 16, 1997, we temporarily restrained the presiding judge of Branch 7 of
the RTC of Cebu from proceeding with the case to prevent the issues from becoming
moot.
- The Solicitor General submitted that ". . . it is within petitioner's constitutional and
legal rights to demand that a regular preliminary investigation rather than a mere
inquest be conducted before resolving the issue of whether or not to file
informations against him." He asked that ". . . the petition be given due course and
petitioner be accorded his right to preliminary investigation." He further
recommended that ". . . during the pendency thereof, petitioner be released from
detention."
Held:
- We agree.
- Petitioner is entitled not to a mere inquest investigation but to a regular preliminary
investigation.
- Section 7 of Rule 112 cannot be invoked to justify petitioner's inquest investigation.
Said section clearly provides that "when a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, the complaint or
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of
the offended party or arresting officer or person."
- The records do not show that petitioner was "lawfully arrested." For one the
petitioner was not arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the
arresting officers that he would instead be presented in the preliminary investigation
to be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997. For another, the arresting

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 31 of 67

officers had no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a
crime committed some two (2) months before.
- The right of petitioner to a regular preliminary investigation pursuant to section 3 of
Rule 112 cannot stand any diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a capital
offense kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Its filing in court means his arrest
and incarceration as in all probability he would not be allowed bail. His conviction will
bring him face to face with the death penalty. Petitioner's counsel was not
unreasonable when he demanded from the city prosecutors that he be furnished
copies of the affidavits supporting the complaint and that he be given a nonextendible period of twenty (20) days to submit defense affidavit. As well pointed out
by petitioner's counsel, the precipitate denial of his motion xxx prevented petitioner
from preparing and submitting the affidavits of some forty (40) classmates, teachers,
proctors and security guards who had previously made known their willingness to
testify.
- Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a chance to be heard in a capital
offense case should have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. Instead, Rule
112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by one
whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. A preliminary investigation should
therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a
potential accused can be protected from any material damage."
Case No. 29
G.R. No. L-12442
August 10, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO P. ESCALANTE, defendantappellant.
Facts:
- On the November 7, 1916, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo
presented a complaint in the Court of First Instance of said province, charging the
defendant with a violation of section 2662 of the Administrative Code. The complaint
alleged: xxx willfully, unlawfully and criminally take and misappropriate and fail duly
to account for and enter in the customhouse books P12,000 collected by him on
October 19, 1916, which sum he appropriated to his own use and for his personal
gain to the prejudice of the Philippine Government until October 24, 1916, and did
not pay and turn into the treasury said misappropriated sum until after he had been
required so to do; acts committed with violation of law.
- Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arrested and arraigned upon the 22d
day of November, 1916. Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded guilty to the crime
charged in the complaint. In view of the voluntary confession of guilt made in open
court by the defendant the lower court found him guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of fifteen months and to pay the costs
of the prosecution.
- He was further sentenced to be disqualified forever from holding any public office or
employment of any nature whatever within the Philippine Islands. He was further
deprived of all accrued leave.
Assignment of errors:
1. No preliminary investigation having been previously held, the court a quo never
acquired any jurisdiction over the case and the accused;
2. The accused not having been ever informed of his right to appear with the aid of
counsel, he was deprived of his constitutional right to have counsel and consequently
the proceedings held were null and void.
Held:
First Error
- While defendants in criminal actions are entitled of right (a) to a preliminary
examination and (b) to be represented by an attorney, they are renounceable rights.
The right to a preliminary investigation is a personal right conferred by statute and
may be waived.
- If no objection is raised in the court below on the ground that there has been no
preliminary investigation the accused will be deemed to have waived his right thereto
and such objection cannot be raised for the first time upon appeal.
- It is true that under the provisions of General Orders No. 58 persons accused of crime
are entitled to attorneys for their defense if they have the means, or if they are
without such means to have attorney de officio appointed by the court but that right
is a personal one and may be waived also. It is waived when the defendant voluntarily
submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and proceeds with the defense. Under
such circumstances the prosecution may go to trial without violating that particular
right of the accused.
Second Error
- When the appellant fails to raise the question of his right to have an attorney and to
have a preliminary examination in the trial court that question will not be considered
when raised for the first time in the Supreme Court. The failure of the record to
disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to have
counsel and to have a preliminary investigation is not sufficient ground to reverse the
judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 32 of 67

- There is nothing in the record in the present case to show that the defendant raised
these questions in the court below. The doctrine omnia praesumuntur rite te
solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium is specially applicable against the
contention of the appellant. Paragraph 31 of section 334 of Act. No. 190 provides
that the court will presume that "that law has been obeyed," until the contrary is
shown.
- We find nothing in the record which would justify a modification of the foregoing
rules of law. The defendant was the cashier of the department of customs in the city
of Iloilo. That fact would indicate that he was a man of at least ordinary intelligence.
- It will be remembered that the lower court, in its sentence, deprived the defendant
of his accumulated leave. We assume that the defendant was in the civil service and
was entitled to certain leave privileges. The law under which the defendant was
accused provides for no such punishment. That part of the sentence, therefore, is
null and void.

years and the maximum necessarily would have to be more than five (5) years but
not more than ten (10) years. That would certainly be not in accordance with the
purpose of the law on indeterminate sentence; in fact it would run counter to its
spirit.
- We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that in cases where the application of the
law on indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the
lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not
be applied. Under this opinion, it is obvious that the trial court did not err in
sentencing the appellant to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1) day.

Case No. 30
G.R. No. L-3565
April 20, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NANG KAY alias SY
KEE, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
- Emma R. Delgado, herein petitioner, together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano
and Catalino Bautista alias Atty. Paulino Bautista, the last named still at large, was
charged with estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents resulting in
deceiving one Erlinda Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the
United States.
- All the accused (except Catalino Bautista) pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and
trial on the merits ensued. Herein petitioner Emma R. Delgado was assisted and
represented by her counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco.
- On December 13, 1973, the date set for the continuation of the defense evidence,
said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite proper and previous notice.
- Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for postponement on the ground allegedly
that he was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted. The trial fiscal
objected, believing that the motion was dilatory because there had been numerous
postponements in the past at petitioner's behest. The trial Court sustained the fiscal's
objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to have waived presentation of her
evidence, and considered the case submitted for decision.
- Thereafter, a judgment of conviction was rendered by the trial court.
- Accused Gloria C. Tortona did not appeal from the aforesaid decision. Accused Celia
Capistrano and petitioner Emma R. Delgado appealed to the Court of Appeals raising
the issue of "whether or not on the basis of the evidence and the law the judgment
appealed from should be maintained."
- CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court as to herein accusedpetitioner Emma R. Delgado and reversing the judgment as to Celia Capistrano.
- Believing that there was irregularity in the sending of notices and copy of the decision
as petitioner was not informed or notified of said decision by her counsel on record,
herein petitioner filed on February 17, 1977 with respondent Court of Appeals an
"Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment, to Recall the Records and Allow the
Movant to Personally Receive Copy of the Decision. This motion was denied by
respondent CA.
- An Order was issued by respondent Court of First Instance of Manila directing the
arrest of herein petitioner Emma R. Delgado and the confiscation of her bond for
failure to appear at the execution of judgment on May 11, 1977.
- Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the Order denying her Motion to
Set Aside Entry of Judgments, etc., invoking as one of the grounds therein, the newly
discovered fact that petitioner came to know for the first time only on May 19, 1977
that Atty. Lamberto G. Yco is not a member of the Philippine Bar. Petitioner prayed
that she be granted a new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her right to
be defended by competent counsel. CA denied petitioner's motion.

Facts:
- In the CFI of Rizal, Nang Kay alias Sy Kee was charged with illegal possession of
firearms in that in his possession were found three grease guns and two Thompson
Submachine guns, and empty magazines, without the necessary license.
- In court he appeared without counsel and upon being arraigned, he pleaded guilty.
He was sentenced to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1) day, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay costs.
- He now appeals to this Court on the ground that the trial court failed to inform him
at the arraignment of his right to be assisted by counsel. The Solicitor General also
questions the correctness of the penalty imposed, expressing the opinion and making
the recommendation that the law on indeterminate sentence should have been
applied.
- Counsel for the appellant makes citations that it is the duty of the court to inform the
defendant in a criminal case of his right to have counsel, and that should the court
fail to do so, its action constitutes a reversible error.
- In this, we agree with the said counsel. However, contrary to the claim of said counsel
that the record in this case shows that the court failed to inform the appellant of his
right to have counsel, we believe that the record merely fails to show that the court
complied with this duty. In other words, the record of the case is silent on this point.
Both the minutes of the court session during which appellant was arraigned as well
as the certificate of arraignment signed by the Clerk of Court merely show that the
case was called for arraignment, the accused appeared without counsel, and that
upon being arraigned, he pleaded guilty to the charge.
- As stated, the record of the case does not show whether or not the court informed
the appellant of his right to have counsel, but of course this cannot be interpreted in
the sense that the court failed to so inform him of such right.
- Because of the presumption that the law has been complied with, it is to be
presumed in this case that the court has complied with its duty and that it has
informed the appellant that he may have counsel, even a counsel de oficio if he
wanted to.
- It has been held in the case of U. S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 746, that when the
appellant fails to raise the question of his right to have an attorney in the trial court,
that question will not be considered when raised for the first time in the Supreme
Court. In the present case, it does not appear that this point was ever raised in the
court below.
- As to the application of the law on indeterminate sentence, the Solicitor General
merely says that the trial court failed to apply said law, and he recommends that it
be applied, without giving his reasons for said recommendation. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the letter of the law on indetermine sentence (Act No. 4103)
as amended by Act No. 4225, particularly the latter part of section 1 thereof, supports
his contention, the offense in the present case being penalized by special law.
- Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act
56 and Republic Act No. 4 penalizes the criminal act of the appellant with
imprisonment of not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10)years. So, if we
applied the law on indeterminate sentence, the penalty as recommended by the
Solicitor General would be not less than five (5) years and not more than a period
exceeding ten (10) years. That penalty could hardly be regarded as favorable to the
accused, considering his plea of guilty. We should not lose sight of the fact that the
law on indeterminate sentence as a rule is intended to favor the defendant in a
criminal case particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment.
- Under the special law on illegal possession of firearms applicable to this case, already
referred to, if we had no law on indeterminate sentence in this jurisdiction,
considering the plea of guilty entered by the appellant, the trial court could well and
lawfully have given him a prison sentence of five (5) years. If we are now to apply the
law on indeterminate sentence in the instant case, the prison term would to be more
than five (5) years for the reason that the minimum could not be less than five (5)

Case No. 31
G.R. No. L-46392
November 10, 1986
EMMA DELGADO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a new trial and therefore, all the assailed orders
of respondent courts should be vacated and set aside, because her "lawyer," Atty.
Lamberto G. Yco, is not a lawyer.
Held:
- We find the petition impressed with merit.
- An accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal
case filed against her before the RTC. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is
great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering
the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly
be a denial of due process.
Case No. 32
G.R. No. 17584
March 8, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO
SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
- Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old, by striking him with
automobile that he was driving, herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime of

homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and one day
of prision correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial.
- The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a highway
6 meter wide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow space between
a wagon standing on one side of the road and a heap of stones on the other side
where the were two young boys, the appellant did not take the precaution required
by the circumstances by slowing his machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant
care that under the circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take in order to
avoid possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did occur, as his
automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as the result
of the accident.
Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was filed,
is valid and constitutional.
Held:
- This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in General
Orders No. 58, the defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not
authorized to amend General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof
because its provisions have the character of constitutional law.
- For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the
Constitutions of the States, but is left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls
within the realm of public statutory law.
- In pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, each States, each State has the
authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the
rules of criminal procedure.
- Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to
give to its provisions the effect of law in criminal matters.
- From what has been said it clearly follows that the provisions of this General Order
do not the nature of constitutional law either by reason of its character or by reason
of the authority that enacted it into law.
- It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because this order was made its
own by the Congress of the United States for, as a mater of fact, this body never
adopted it as a law of its own creation either before the promulgation of Act No.
2886.
- Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of statutory law, the
power of the Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the question is considered
only on principle. Our present Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, the
subject of our inquiry, is the legal successor to the Military Government as a
legislative body.
- Firstly, it was the Military Government of the army of occupation which, in
accordance with international law and practice, was vested with legislative functions
and in fact did legislate; afterwards, complying with the instructions of President
McKinley which later were ratified by Congress the legislative powers of the Military
Government were transferred to the Philippine Commission; then, under the
provisions of section 7 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly
was created and it functioned as a colegislative body with the Philippine Commission.
Finally, by virtue of the provisions of sections 12 of the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, known as the Jones Law, the Philippine Commission gave way to the Philippine
Senate, the Philippine Assembly became the House of Representatives, and thus was
formed the present Legislature composed of two Houses which has enacted the
aforesaid Act No. 2886.
- As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends General Orders No.
58. The Philippine Commission, at various times, had amended it by the enactment
of laws among which we may cite Act No. 194, regarding preliminary investigation,
Act No. 440 relating to counsels de oficio and Act No. 590 about preliminary
investigations by justices of the peace of provincial capitals. Later on, and before the
enactment of Act No. 2886, herein controverted, the Legislature had also amended
this General Orders No. 58 by the enactment of Act No. 2677 regarding appeals to
the Supreme Court of causes originating in the justice of the peace courts and by Act
No. 2709 which deals with the exclusion of accused persons from the information in
order to be utilized as state's witnesses.
- These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine Commission as well as by our
present Legislature are perfectly within the scope of the powers of the said legislative
bodies as the successors of the Military Government that promulgated General
Orders No. 58.
- It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attributed of sovereignty.
This assertion is right; but it is also true that by reason of the principle of territoriality
as applied in the supression, of crimes, such power is delegated to subordinate
government subdivisions such as territories. As we have seen in the beginning, the
territorial legislatures have the power to define and punish crimes, a power also
possessed by the Philippine Legislature by virtue of the provisions of sections 7,
already quoted, of the Jones Law. These territorial governments are local agencies of
the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty resides; and when the territorial

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 33 of 67

government of the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public crimes it does so by

virtue of the authority delegated to it by the supreme power of the Nation.
This delegation may be made either expressly as in the case of the several States of
the Union and incorporated territories like Porto Rico and Hawaii, or tacitly as is the
case with the Philippines, which is an organized territory though not incorporated
with the Union.
As a matter of fact, the crimes committed within our territory, even before section 2
of General Orders No. 58 was amended, were prosecuted and punished in this
jurisdiction as is done at present; but then as now the repression of crimes was done,
and is still done, under the sovereign authority of the United States, whose name
appears as the heading in all pleadings in criminal causes and in other judicial papers
and notarial acts.
There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the Philippines prescribing
the name to be used as party plaintiff in criminal cases.
The fact that the political status of this country is as yet undetermined and in a
transitory stage, is, in our opinion, responsible for the fact that there is no positive
provision in our constitutional law regarding the use of the name of the People of the
Philippine Islands, as party plaintiff, in criminal prosecutions, as is otherwise the case
in the respective constitutional charters of the States of the Union and incorporated
territories a situation which must not be understood as depriving the Government
of the Philippines of its power, however delegated, to prosecute public crimes. The
fact is undeniable that the present government of the Philippines, created by the
Congress of the United States, is autonomous.
This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines reaches all judicial actions, the
case at bar being one of them; as an example of such autonomy, this Government,
the same as that of Hawaii and Porto Rico cannot be sued without its consent.
The doctrine acknowledges the prerogative of personality in the Government of the
Philippines, which, if it is sufficient to shield it from any responsibility in court in its
own name unless it consents thereto, it should be also, as sufficiently authoritative
in law, to give that government the right to prosecute in court in its own name
whomsoever violates within its territory the penal laws in force therein.
Limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the complaint in criminal
matters, it is within the power of the Legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal
complaint as long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be informed of the
nature of the accusation is not violated.
Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the mention of the People of
the Philippine Islands as plaintiff in the title of the information constitutes a vice or
defect, the same is not fatal when, as in the present case, it was not objected to in
the court below.
We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by
Act No. 2886, do not partake of the same character as the provisions of a
constitution; that the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any
constitutional provisions and that the court a quo did not commit any of the errors
assigned.

Case No. 33
G.R. No. L-9341
August 14, 1914
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SERVANDO BAY, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
- On the night of June 7 of the present year, 1913, in Mindoro, in the jurisdiction of
this Court of First Instance, the above- named accused accidentally met Florentina
Alcones walking along the beach, and, on finding that she was alone, did maliciously
and criminally drag her toward a place covered with underbrush, and there by means
of force and intimidation did lie with her against her will.
- The accused, having been brought before the councilman and asked had he
committed the crime of which he was charged, admitted that he had; that thereafter
the accused was sent to the justice of the peace, who held him for trial.
- Upon his evidence the accused was convicted in the court below of the crime with
which is charged in the information and sentenced to seventeen years four months
and one day of reclusion temporal, together with the accessory penalties.
- Counsel for appellant lays great stress upon certain apparent contradictions and
inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the witnesses for the prosecution, and
vigorously contends that the trial court erred in accepting as true the testimony of
the complaining witness and of the witnesses called by the prosecution to
corroborate her.
- He emphasizes what he calls the inherent improbability of the story told by the
offended woman, and points to the facts that she appears to be much more than
twice the age of the accused, and anything but attractive in her personal appearance
. His contention is that the charge of rape is a pure fabrication, and that it was brought
by the woman for the sole purpose of wreaking her vengeance and spite upon the
accused, with whom she had a quarrel over the trespass of one of his carabaos on
her land.

Held:
- It is true that there are some apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the
testimony of some of the ignorant witnesses called for the prosecution, and that it is
somewhat difficult to understand how the accused, a young married man, could have
been so lost to all sense of right and decency as to assault a woman so much older
than himself, a neighbor, and an old friend of his family. But her evidence, supported
by that of other witnesses for the prosecution, is so convincing and conclusive that
we are forced to believe that he did it in fact commit the atrocious crime with which
he is charged.
- We recognize that in cases of this nature it is the duty of the courts to scrutinized
with the utmost care the story told by the complaining witness and the witnesses
called to corroborate her, especially when it appears either that the offended party
did not make immediate outcry or that there was any unexplained delay in instituting
criminal proceedings. But in the case at bar it conclusively appear that the offended
woman sought assistance and made formal and official complaint immediately after
the commission of crime under such conditions as practically to prelude the
possibility of a conspiracy between herself and the other prosecuting witnesses to
press a false charge against the accused.
- There can be no possible doubt that the party passing in a boat the deserted place
where the crime was committed was attracted by her cries and complaints, and that
the arrival of those aboard was a fortunate coincidence which she could not well have
anticipated, had she planned the filing of false charges against the accused. There
can be no question also that she went immediately to the councilman of her barrio
to make complaint against the accused, accompanied by some of the passengers on
the boat. And there can be no question also that as a result, these proceedings were
instituted forthwith in the court of the justice of the peace.
- There is a direct conflict in the testimony as to whether the accused, when the
complaint was made to the councilman of the barrio, did or did not admit his guilt,
and this evidence is so contradictory that it would be difficult if not possible to make
an express finding on this point. But whatever be the truth as to these alleged
admissions of his guilt, the evidence leaves no room for doubt that neither at the
moment when the party in the boat came upon him in company with his victim nor
when he appeared before the councilman upon her complaint did he claim, as he
does now, that her charge that he had assaulted her was a pure fabrication, invented
for the purpose of wreaking vengeance upon him.
- There can be no possible doubt that he was present when the party on board the
boat were attracted to the place where she raised her outcry charging him with the
assault, and that he was present later or when he presented her complaint to the
councilman of the barrio. Under such circumstances, we are convinced that an
innocent man would instantly and indignantly repudiate such a charge, and attempt
there and then to establish his innocence, explaining how he came to be there
present with the woman, and the conditions under which she had made the false
charge.
- The witnesses called both for the prosecution and the defense go into considerable
detail as to all that occurred at the time when the party on board the boat responded
to the calls of the woman and immediately thereafter, and yet there is not the
slightest indication in the evidence that there was on the part of the accused any such
indignant denials and protests as would be expected from an innocent man suddenly
confronted with such a charge under such circumstances. Indeed his conduct at that
time was, to our minds, wholly at variance with that which might fairly be expected
from him, granting the truth of his testimony and that of the other witnesses for the
defense.
- Having in mind the fact that the trial judge saw and heard the witness testify, and
upon a full review of all the evidence, we are of opinion that there is nothing in the
record which would justify us in disturbing the findings of the court below as to the
degree of credit which should be accorded the various witnesses, or as to the guilt of
the accused of the crime of which he was convicted.
- We find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the substantials rights of the
accused, and the judgment entered in the court below convicting and sentencing him
should, therefore, be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
So ordered.
Case No. 34
G.R. No. 7081
September 7, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TAN TENG, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
- This defendant was charged with the crime of rape a certain Oliva Pacomio, a girl 7
years of age.
- After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Charles S. Lobingier, judge, found the
defendant guilty of the offense of abusos deshonestos, as defined and punished
under article 439 of the Penal Code, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period
of 4 years 6 months and 11 days of prision correccional, and to pay the costs.
- The offended party, Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of age, was, on the 15th day of
September , 1910, staying in the house of her sister, located on Ilang-Ilang Street, in
the city of Manila; that on said day a number of Chinamen were gambling had been

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 34 of 67

in the habit of visiting the house of the sister of the offended party; that Oliva
Pacomio, on the day in question, after having taken a bath, returned to her room;
that the defendant followed her into her room and asked her for some face powder,
which she gave him; that after using some of the face powder upon his private parts
he threw the said Oliva upon the floor, placing his private parts upon hers, and
remained in that position.
- Several days later, perhaps a week or two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio discovered that
the latter was suffering from a venereal disease known as gonorrhea. It was at the
time of this discovery that Oliva related to her sister what happened upon the
morning of the 15th of September. The sister at once put on foot an investigation to
find the Chinaman. A number of Chinamen were collected together. Oliva was called
upon to identify the one who had abused her. The defendant was not present at first,
later he arrived and Oliva identified him at once as the one who had attempted to
violate her.
- Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station
and stripped of his clothing and examined. The policeman who examined the
defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took
a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant. The result of the
examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.
Assignment of Errors:
1. The lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians about having
taken a certain substance from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail
and regarding the chemical analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the
physical condition of the accused with reference to a venereal disease.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the complainant was suffering from a venereal
disease produced by contact with a sick man.
3. The court erred in holding that the accused was suffering from a venereal disease.
4. The court erred in finding the accused guilty from the evidence.
Held:
- During the trial the defendant objected strongly to the admissibility of the testimony
of Oliva, on the ground that because of her tender years her testimony should not be
given credit. The lower court held that she had sufficient intelligence and
discernment to justify the court in accepting her testimony with full faith and credit.
With the conclusion of the lower court, after reading her declaration, we fully concur.
- The defense in the lower court attempted to show that the venereal disease of
gonorrhea might be communicated in ways other than by contact such as is described
in the present case, and called medical witnesses for the purpose of supporting the
contention.
- The offended party testified that the defendant had rested his private parts upon
hers for some moments. The defendant was found to be suffering from gonorrhea.
The medical experts who testified agreed that this disease could have been
communicated from him to her by the contact described. Believing as we do the story
told by Oliva, we are forced to the conclusion that the disease with which Oliva was
suffering was the result of the illegal and brutal conduct of the defendant. Proof,
however, that Oliva constructed said obnoxious disease from the defendant is not
necessary to show that he is guilty of the crime. It is only corroborative of the truth
of Oliva's declaration.
- In the court below the defendant contended that the result of the scientific
examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at
or about the time he was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the
fact that he was suffering from gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to
compel the defendant to testify against himself.
- The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection, the
examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that
the defendant was suffering from said disease.
- Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court upon this question, said: But the
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself, is
a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. The
objection, in principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare
his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we are not considering how far a
court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited,
whether voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the evidence if
material, is competent.
- To admit the doctrine contended for by the appellant might exclude the testimony
of a physician or a medical expert who had been appointed to make observations of
a person who plead insanity as a defense, where such medical testimony was against
necessarily use the person of the defendant for the purpose of making such
examination. The doctrine contended for by the appellants would also prevent the
courts from making an examination of the body of the defendant where serious
personal injuries were alleged to have been received by him. The right of the courts
in such cases to require an exhibit of the injured parts of the body has been
established by a long line of decisions.

- The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his
guilt.
- The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral
examination of prisonersbefore trial or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting
unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime.
- The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the
fact of a defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his identity. Such an
application of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted. Such
an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, can not violate the
privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused
as a witness it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility.
- The doctrine contended for by the appellant would also prohibit the sanitary
department of the Government from examining the body of persons who are
supposed to have some contagious disease.
- We believe that the evidence clearly shows that the defendant was suffering from
the venereal disease and that through his brutal conduct said disease was
communicated to Oliva Pacomio.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 35 of 67

Case No. 35
G.R. No. L-39254
June 20, 1975
CENON C. SOLIS, DELFIN SOLIS, and BONIFACIO L. SOLIS, petitioners, vs. HON. JAIME
R. AGLORO, in his capacity as Judge, Court of First Instance of Batangas, Second
Branch; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
- The stress in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding against respondent Judge
Jaime R. Agloro is the alleged transgression of the constitutional rights of
petitioners, the accused for murder to speedy trials and to be free from being twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, when respondent Judge granted
the motion of the other respondent, the People of the Philippines, to revive the
aforesaid criminal case which had been provisionally dismissed.
- The recital of facts in the petition insofar as the issue of speedy trial is concerned
lends plausibility for the grant of the remedy sought. With the comment, however,
of the Solicitor General, representing the respondents, it does seem that the case for
petitioners is not as strong as the vigorous advocacy of their counsel would make it
appear. As to the claim that there was a violation of the constitutional guarantee
against being twice put in jeopardy, the admission that the case was dismissed
provisionally witH the consent of petitioners deprives it, of any persuasive force.
There is thus no legal basis for the allegation that there was a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge. We cannot accede to the plea that the
remedy of certiorari and prohibition lies.
- An information for murder was filed against petitioners. During arraignment, they
enter a plea of not guilty. Trial was set on August 1972, which was postposed twice
to October 1972 and on November 1972 on the failure of the prosecution witnesses
to appear despite being notified. On the last date mentioned there was a reiteration
by petitioners of their objection to any further postponement, based on the ground
of the infringement of their constitutional right to speedy trial.
- Respondent judge issued a provisional order of dismissal wherein there was express
mention of defense counsel announcing "the readiness of the accused to give their
express conformity to the provisional dismissal of this case. The prosecuting Fiscal
submitted the matter to the sound discretion of the Court."
- The court called for the accused and asked them singly and individually, whether they
are willing to have this case dismissed with their express conformity, explaining, to
them that such dismissal will mean possible revival of this case against them, to which
each answered in the affirmative.
- On September 24, 1974, respondent People of the Philippines filed a motion to revive
the case. There was an opposition on the part of petitioners, based on the alleged
disregard of their right against being twice put in jeopardy of punishment. Then came
on May 7, 1974 the challenged order of respondent Judge granting their motion to
revive the case.
- The imputation of grave abuse of discretion hurled against the actuation of
respondent Judge cannot be sustained. The petition then, as was noted, cannot
prosper.
Held:
- This Court had accorded due recognition to the right to a speedy trial. It was from the
pen of Justice Malcolm that this constitutional guarantee was identified with a trial
free from "vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay."
- It is essential then that there be a showing that the trial be protracted for such a
period as could be justly characterized as causing vexation, manifesting caprice, and
resulting in oppression. The circumstances of this case, as rendered clear in the
comment of the Solicitor General, not denied by petitioners, are hardly that. It cannot
be gainsaid that the delay was attributable not only to the prosecution but to the
accused, now petitioners. It would be less than justifiable, therefore, to attribute to

respondent Judge conduct amounting to a grave abuse of discretion for reinstating

this case that was provisionally dismissed. There was no infringement of the
constitutional right to speedy trial.
Neither was there a violation of the constitutional right of petitioners against being
put in jeopardy of punishment. In the order provisionally dismissing the case, it was
explicitly made clear that defense counsel announced "the readiness of the accused
to give their express confirmity to the provisional dismissal of [their] case."
It was therein stated that respondent Judge "called for the accused and asked them
singly and individually, whether they are willing to have this case dismissed with their
express conformity, explaining to them that such dismissal will mean possible revival
of this case against them, to which each answered in the affirmative."
It was set forth in the dispositive portion that the case "is hereby ordered dismissed
with the express conformity of the accused Cenon C. Solis, Delfin Solis and Bonifacio
Solis y Lualhati alias Pacio, with cost de oficio." There being such a provisional
dismissal, there is no merit to the contention that a revival of the case would amount
to a disregard of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
"It is true jeopardy had attached with a valid complaint having been filed in a court
of competent jurisdiction and defendants having been thereafter arraigned and
pleaded. It had not terminated, though. There was neither conviction nor acquittal.
There was thereafter a dismissal without prejudice. Defendants knew, or ought to
have known, that the complaint could thus be filed again. They could have objected;
they did not. Had they stood fast on what they conceived to be their rights as
defendants, things might have been different. Matters could have definitely ended
then and there. The jeopardy, clause could have been thereafter appropriately
invoked. The dismissal would have been unconditional in character. That is not,
however, how things developed. What transpired instead was a dismissal clearly
without prejudice."
If, therefore, the plea that petitioners would be placed in double jeopardy cannot be
sustained, they have only themselves to blame, agreeing as they did to the
provisional dismissal of the case. This is so in this case, although there may be
instances where the accused may appropriately invoke the right to speedy trial to
bolster the plea of double jeopardy.

Case No. 36
G.R. No. L-64362
February 9, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE RAFAEL M. DECLARO,
Regional Trial Judge, Branch II, Region VI, Kalibo, Aklan, and EDGAR
IBABAO, respondents.
Facts:
- As a result of a traffic accident that occurred at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of
July 7, 1980 at Numancia, Aklan, Edgar lbabao was charged for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. A certain Crispin Conanan was the offended party.
(1028-N)
- On October 1, 1980, an information for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed against the same accused in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan.
Eduardo Salido as the offended party. This second case arose from the same incident.
(1421)
- Upon the arraignment of the accused in Criminal Case No. 1028-N, he entered a plea
of not guilty. The case was first set for hearing on January 19, 1983. Both the offended
party and the prosecuting fiscal, however, failed to appear at the scheduled hearing
despite due notice. Counsel for the accused thus verbally moved for the dismissal of
the case for lack of interest on the part of the prosecution. This motion was granted.
A motion for reconsideration of the said order was filed by the fiscal on January 27,
1983. The motion for reconsideration was granted in an order dated May 27, 1983.
The case was, therefore, set for trial. However, upon a motion for reconsideration
filed by the accused, the inferior court issued another order dated August 30, 1983,
dismissing the case anew.
- Considering that the said case had been dismissed on January 19, 1983, counsel for
the accused filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 1421 on the ground that the
dismissal of the prior case is a bar to the prosecution of the latter. In an order dated
March 23, 1983, the trial court dismissed Criminal Case No. 1421 on the ground of
double jeopardy. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the prosecution but this
was denied on May 11, 1983.
- The petitioner assails the order of dismissal dated March 23, 1983 in Criminal Case
No. 1421. Petitioner argues that double jeopardy has not set-in in this case because:
(1) The dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1028-N was at the instance and with the
express consent of accused and his counsel; (2) The second offense charged is not
the same as the first, nor is it an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof,
nor does it include or is necessarily included in the first; and (3) Criminal Case No.
1028-N is not yet terminated.
Issue:
Can an order of dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused after
arraignment for the failure of the prosecution to appear on the first day of hearing be a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense?

Held:
- Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 9. Former conviction or
acquittal or former jeopardy. - When a defendant shall have been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
- To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense
as that in the first.
- Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) when the
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
- Petitioner - the dismissal of the case was at the instance and with the consent of the
accused and his counsel which constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right against
double jeopardy and, therefore, such dismissal will not bar another prosecution.
- Respondent - although the dismissal was at the instance and with the consent of the
accused, it was in reality an acquittal by reason of the prosecution's failure to prove
his guilt, thus barring another prosecution for the same offense.
- The petition is impressed with merit.
- Although there are criminal cases which were dismissed upon motion of the accused
because the prosecution was not prepared for trial since the complainant and/or his
witnesses did not appear at the trial and where this Court held that the dismissal is
equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the defendant for
the same offense the facts and the circumstances of the present case do not warrant
a similar ruling.
- In the present case, the accused was duly notified that the case was set for hearing
on January 19, 1983. On said date of hearing neither the complainant nor the fiscal
appeared despite due notice. This was the first date of hearing after arraignment.
The court a quo should not have dismissed the case and should have instead reset
the case to another date to give the prosecution another day in court.
- The rights of the offended parties, who usually take active part in the trial, are equally
entitled to the protection offered by the courts to the public at large in the trial of a
criminal case. Thus, while a violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial can
serve as a basis for the dismissal of a case, this must be balanced with the right of the
prosecution to due process.
- In the instant case, the complaining witness and the prosecutor failed to appear only
in the first hearing. Even if the court did not dismiss the case but merely postponed
the hearing to another date, there would not have been a denial of the right of the
accused to a speedy trial. The right of the accused to have a speedy trial is violated
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when,
without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without his case being tried. None of said situations exists in the present case.
- It cannot be said that there was a violation of the constitutional right of the accused
to a speedy trial. As we observed, the more prudent step that the court a quo should
have taken was to postpone the hearing to give the prosecution another opportunity
to present its case. The court a quo had in fact reconsidered its order of dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 1028-N and reset it for trial. lt should have maintained said action
instead of granting the motion for reconsideration of the accused. The dismissal of
the case by the trial court on the ground that the accused is entitled to a speedy trial
is unwarranted under the circumstances obtaining in this case.
- Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is made with the express consent of
the accused, or upon his own motion, only if it is predicated on either of two
grounds, i.e., insufficiency of the evidence or denial of the right to a speedy trial. In
both cases, the dismissal will have the effect of an acquittal. Since the dismissal in
this case does not fall under either of these two instances and it was made with the
express consent of the accused, it would not thereby be a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense.
Case No. 37
G.R. No. L-4069
March 5, 1951
RODOBALDO GANDICELA, petitioner, vs. DEOGRACIAS LUTERO, Judge of Municipal
Court, Iloilo City, respondent.
Facts:
- This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioner against the
respondent judge of the Municipal Court of the City of Iloilo.
- The petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries. When the trial
of the case was finally set on July 17, 1950, "the City Fiscal appeared for the
prosecution and informed the court that there was a private prosecutor authorized

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 36 of 67

to present the case in court, and that he is not ready to enter into trial for Fiscal
Daguay is the one handing this case, who is at present appearing in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo."
- The court, "taking into consideration that Attorney Mapa has not entered had
appearance in this case and that this case has been dragging along for so many weeks,
today being the last day set for trial, hereby orders that this case be dismissed
without prejudice on the part of the City Fiscal, City of Iloilo, to file another
information, with costs de oficio."
- The petitioner contends that "the dismissal of the case without prejudice by the
respondent judge upon the failure of the prosecution to enter into trial violates the
constitutional right of your petitioner to a speedy trial; the respondent judge ought
to have dismissed the case definitely;" and alleges "that there is no appeal nor any
plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law from the
aforementioned order of the respondent judge, except the petition
for certiorari and mandamus."
- The respondent Municipal Judge Deogracias Lutero filed his answer alleging "that the
order of dismissal by the respondent on July 17, 1950 is in accordance with the
petition of the petitioner through his counsel, Attys. Puig and Penaredondo, who
appeared for the petitioner as accused in criminal case No. 6394;" that "the order of
dismissal without prejudice is in accordance with the circumstances of the case and
the protection of the rights of the accused to an immediate and speedy trial which
the law sanctions;" and "that the remedy is an appeal to the Court of First Instance if
any for the order of dismissal."
Held:
- After considering the petition of the petitioner and the answer of the respondent, we
are of the opinion, and so hold, that neither certiorari nor mandamus lie in the
present case.
- Not mandamus, because the respondent judge in ordering the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, did not unlawfully neglect the performance of a ministerial act or
an act which the law specifically enjoined him to do so as a duty resulting from his
office, since the respondent could neither grant or refuse to grant the petition of the
attorneys for the petitioner to have the case dismissed.
- Not certiorari, because the respondent judge did not act without jurisdiction or in
excess thereof did not act without prejudice the criminal case No. 6349 against the
petitioner, for the simple reason that the Municipal Court of Iloilo, presided over by
the respondent, had jurisdiction to dismiss or not to dismiss the case and postpone
the trial thereof to another date; and if the municipal court had jurisdiction to dismiss
the case definitely as contended by the petitioner, it had also jurisdiction to dismiss
the case "without prejudice on the part of the city fiscal to file another information,"
because a court having jurisdiction to decide a legal question or in conformity with
the law, does not lose its jurisdiction if the court decide erroneously against or not in
accordance with the law. The existence and subsistence of the court's jurisdiction
does not depend upon the correctness of the court's resolution. And lastly, the
respondent judge could not have acted with grave abuse of discretion, because the
court or judge has no discretion but must follow the law in dismissing definitely or
without prejudice a criminal case against a defendant.
- Besides, the respondent judge, in dismissing the case without prejudice on the part
of the fiscal to the file another information, has acted, not only within the court's
jurisdiction, but correctly, because the case was dismissed with the express consent
of the accused or petitioner, who move for the case.
- If the defendant or petitioner did not move for the dismissal and the respondent
dismissed the case, the dismissal would be definite or a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense, even if the court or judge erroneously states in the order of
dismissal that it be without prejudice on the part of the city fiscal; to file another
information, because the court can not change the nature and legal effects of such
dismissal, and the petitioner can not be prosecuted again for the same offense. But
where a defendant expressly consents to, by moving for, the dismissal of the case
against him, as in the present case, even if the court or judge states in the order that
the dismissal is definite or does not say that the dismissal is without prejudice on the
part of the fiscal to file another information, the dismissal will not be a bar to a
subsequent prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.
Case No. 38
G.R. Nos. L-34756-59 March 31, 1973
MANUEL MATEO, JR., ROBERTO MARTINEZ alias RUBEN MARTINEZ, ENRIQUE
CONCEPCION and ESMERALDO CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON. ONOFRE VILLALUZ, as
Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, respondents.
Facts:
- The novel issue presented in this prohibition proceeding arose from the gnawing fear
that the prized ideal of "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" implicit in the due
process guarantee may be set at naught. Petitioners are among those being tried by
respondent Judge for the offense of robbery in band with homicide.
- An extrajudicial statement by one Rolando Reyes, who was later on likewise indicted
for the same offense, implicating petitioners, was subscribed before respondent

Judge. That was the background of a motion for his disqualification, as the aforesaid
Rolando Reyes, when called upon to testify as an additional witness for the
prosecution impugned his written declaration stating that it was executed as a result
of a threat by a government agent.
It is now contended that such a repudiation would not sit well with respondent Judge,
who had thus placed himself in a position of being unable to pass on such question
with that degree of objectivity required by due process, although admittedly, such a
move did not fall squarely within one of the specific grounds to inhibit
judges. Respondent Judge turned down this plea for disqualification.
Hence, this petition, based on the asserted violation of a constitutional right not to
be convicted of an offense without due process of law.
On or about June 4, 1971, the American Express Bank at Sangley Point, Cavite, was
robbed and an American serviceman was killed. In connection with that robbery, and
the death of the serviceman, four (4) criminal actions were filed against petitioners
for robbery in band with homicide.
It was the Honorable Respondent Judge who ordered District State Prosecutor
Cornelio Melendres [or] Assistant City Fiscal Enrique A. Cube to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
Petitioners Manuel Mateo, Jr. and Esmeraldo Cruz were arraigned on June 24, 1971
while petitioners Roberto Martinez @ Ruben Martinez filed a Motion To Dismiss on
the ground of "insufficiency of evidence for failure of prosecution (1) to prove the
existence of conspiracy, and (2) to identify the accused by competent evidence."
Petitioner Roberto Martinez @ Ruben Martinez filed his motion to dismiss with a
Supplemental Motion based on the claim that "the pre-trial identification by
prosecution witness Elliot Grey of your accused Roberto Martinez in a police line-up
in the absence of defendant's counsel is unconstitutional; and the in-court testimony
of said Elliot Grey identifying your accused Roberto Martinez is inadmissible in
evidence and should be stricken out from the records".
Another suspect in the Sangley Point Robbery one Rolando Reyes was arrested.
On October 5, 1971, when petitioner's Motion to Dismiss together with the
Opposition thereto were submitted for resolution, the Honorable Presiding Judge in
an Order ruled that 'pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the New Rules of Court, let the
Motion to Dismiss be resolved until after the prosecution has presented and rested
its evidence as against Rolando Reyes. ... It appears that the said Rolando Reyes had
executed an extra-judicial statement on October 1, 1971 and had signed and sworn
to its truth before the Honorable Respondent Judge; and, in that statement had
implicated petitioners; evidently, the Honorable Respondent Judge was aware of
this, and it was for this reason that he had deferred ruling on petitioner Ruben
Martinez' motions and supplemental motion to dismiss 'until after the prosecution
has presented and rested its evidence as against Rolando Reyes.'
Rolando Reyes, however, was tried separately from and in the absence of petitioners;
so that the proceedings against him did not constitute evidence against petitioner.
Petitioner Manuel Mateo filed an Opposition to the prosecution's Motion to Present
Additional Evidence on the ground that 'to allow the prosecution to present
additional evidence in favor of the State after the prosecution has rested, while the
accused has a pending motion to dismiss under consideration would be prejudicial to
the substantial rights of herein accused because it would effectively deprive him of a
fair trial.'
Respondent Judge granted the prosecution's 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence'
ruling that 'it is well settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that it is
within the sound discretion of the court whether or not to allow the presentation of
additional evidence after the parties have rested their case.'
On February 3, 1972, the prosecution called Rolando Reyes as an additional witness,
and in the course of his testimony, marked an extrajudicial statement purportedly
executed by him. Rolando Reyes repudiated it, stated that he had executed it because
he had been threatened by a government agent. The statement purports to have
been subscribed and sworn to before the respondent Judge.
As soon as the foregoing facts were made of record in the case, defendants
[petitioners herein] verbally moved to suspend the proceedings to enable them to
file a motion to disqualify the Honorable Respondent Judge; and the motion for
suspension was granted.
Petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Disqualification of respondent Judge contending
that respondent Judge 'in the exercise of his sound discretion [should] disqualify
himself from sitting in this case under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137
of the Rules of Court,' because Rolando Reyes had repudiated the statement that he,
Reyes, had sworn to before the Honorable Respondent Judge and the latter perforce
would have to pass upon that repudiation.

Issue:
Whether the circumstance of a party having subscribed before respondent Judge an
extra-judicial statement purporting to describe the manner in which an offense was
committed, later on repudiated by him as the product of intimidation in the course of
his having been asked to testify against petitioners, would suffice to negate that degree
of objectivity the Constitution requires? The answer must be in the affirmative.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 37 of 67

Held:
- This Court looks upon such failure of respondent Judge to disqualify himself as a grave
abuse of discretion correctible by prohibition.
- The petition is meritorious.
- The Court cannot consider the circumstances disclosed as sufficient to call for the
disqualification of respondent Judge.
- It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that
degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being
fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision
arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who
does not play favorites.
- A judge should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the
duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as
to his integrity."
- Nor is this to imply that prior to Gutierrez, there had been no awareness of the due
process aspect of an impartial tribunal even if not explicitly referred to.
- Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in Gutierrez as the fundamental
requisite of impartiality for due process to be satisfied, the Rules of Court provision
on disqualification when revised three years later in 1964 contains this additional
paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."
- It is made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside of pecuniary interest,
relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there
may be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling
for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to
preferences or predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such
should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better course for a judge
is to disqualify himself. What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial
administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is due process vindicated.
- The imperfections of human institutions being such, what is fit and proper is not
always achieved. The invitation to judges to disqualify themselves is not always
heeded. For that matter, it is not always desirable that they should do so. It could
amount in certain cases to their being recreant to their trust.
- There is respectable authority for the view that with the possibility of a trial tainted
by partiality, this Court can step in to assure for the demands of due process.
- Petitioners can assert then, and rightly so, that we the power to set aside the order
denying the motion disqualification. While the discretion in the first instance belongs
to respondent Judge, its exercise is subject to our corrective authority.
- There can be no question as to its being considered abused if it can be shown that to
refuse inhibition is to cast valid doubts as to a court's impartiality. The specific issue
then that must be resolved is
- Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted
before him in such extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in
the slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later declaration that
there was intimidation by a government agent exerted on him.
- His sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted. The absence
of the requisite due process element is thus noticeable.
- It was he who attested to its due execution on October 1, 1971 wherein Rolando
Reyes admitted his participation in the crime and in addition implicated petitioners.
At that time, their motion for dismissal of the charges against them was pending; its
resolution was deferred by respondent Judge until after the prosecution had
presented and rested its evidence against affiant, who was himself indicted and tried
for the same offense, but in a separate proceeding. It cannot be doubted then that
respondent Judge in effect ruled that such extra-judicial statement was executed
freely.
- With its repudiation on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into
the picture there is apparent the situation of a judge having to pass on a question
that by implication had already been answered by him.
- Respondent Judge was called upon to review a matter on which he had previously
given his opinion. It is this inroad in one's objectivity that is sought to be avoided by
the law on disqualification. The misgivings then as to the requirement of due process
for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" not being met are more titan justified.
Hence the conclusion reached by us.
- To avoid any further controversies of this nature, lower court judges are well-advised
to limit themselves to the task of adjudication and to leave to others the role of
notarizing declarations. The less an occupant of the bench fritters away his time and
energy in tasks more incumbent on officials of the executive branch the less the
danger of his being a participant in any event that might lend itself to the
interpretation that his impartiality has been compromised. There is much to be said
for displaying zeal and eagerness in stamping out criminality, but that role is hardly
fit for a judge who must bide his time until the case is before him. He must ever be
on guard lest what is done by him, even from the best of motives, may be thought of
as eroding that objectivity and sobriety which are the hallmarks of judicial conduct.
Thus should he attend to the performance of the sacred trust that is his.

Case No. 39
G.R. No. L-38229
August 30, 1974
BASILIO S. PALANG, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE MARIANO A. ZOSA, judge of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V, and JULIETO P. HERRERA, respondents.
Facts:
- This petition for certiorari and prohibition was predicated on the fear and the
misgivings that the trial judge, respondent Mariano A. Zosa, may find it difficult to
live up to the ideal of due process clause which requires a "hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal, ... every litigant [being] entitled to nothing less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."
- The basis of the complaint was that after respondent Judge had acquitted private
respondent Julieto P. Herrera of the crime of estafa, with the statement in his opinion
that the charge was nothing but a "clear concocted story" with the testimonies being"
rehearsed and rehashed therefore, maliciously presented by the [offended party,
now petitioner] causing great damage and prejudice [to Herrera's moral and social]
standing and a destruction of [his] image as well as (his) character ..., the aforesaid
Herrera, thus acquitted, now private respondent here, filed an action for damages
against the complainant, now petitioner. It is his submission here that considering
the language used by respondent Judge, he would not be able to decide such civil
case justly and impartially.
- Private respondent Herrera filed a motion to withdraw opposition, wherein he
alleged: "1. That respondent [Julieto P. Herrera] sincerely believes in the early
disposition and termination of the above-entitled case, that it realizes to withdraw
his Opposition to herein Petitioner's petition; 2. That, time is of the essence, and by
way of his withdrawal, the above-entitled case can therefore be calendared on the
earliest possible time by the court who may eventually be assigned, thereby tried on
the merits; 3. That this motion of herein respondent [Julieto P. Herrera] is made for
reason of expediency in order that early disposition of the case by way of trial on the
merits be attained."
- With the withdrawal of the opposition of respondent Julieto P. Herrera, the
undersigned finds no reason why he should not inhibit himself from trying Civil Case
No. R-13620, entitled "Julieto P. Herrera, Plaintiff v. Basilio Palang, Defendant." In
view of this development, the undersigned respectfully manifests that he voluntarily
inhibits himself from conducting the trial of the said case. Therefore, the dismissal of
the above-entitled petition appears to be in order.
- This voluntary inhibition by respondent Judge is to be commended. He has lived up
to what is expected of occupants of the bench. The public faith in the impartial
administration of justice is thus reinforced. It is not enough that they decide cases
without bias and favoritism. It does not suffice that they in fact rid themselves of
prepossessions. Their actuation must inspire that belief. This is an instance where
appearance is just as important as the reality. A judge must not only be pure but
beyond suspicion. At least, that is an ideal worth striving for. What is more, there is
deference to the due process mandate.
Case No. 40
G.R. No. L-30104
July 25, 1973
HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO
LORENZANA, petitioners, vs. HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and SIMEON CARBONNEL, respondents.
Facts:
- It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I the City Court of Manila
presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by appropriate
informations all dated January 16, 1968, eight (8) criminal actions against respondent
Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana, as follows:
a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case No.
F-109192, also for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109192, alsofor
slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109193, for maltreatment;
b. Against Simeon Carbonnel (id.) (1)Criminal Case No. F-109197, for maltreatment;
(2) Criminal Case No. F-109196, for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No.
F-109198, for light threats; (c) Against Francisco Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and
Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised
Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal Case No. F-109200, for
slander."
- The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held on March 4, 1968, March 18,
1968, March 23, 1968, March 30, 1968, April 17, 1968, April 20, 1968, May 4,1968,
May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15, 1968, June 22, 1968, June 29, 1968, August 3,
1968 and August 10, 1968. All the fourteen (14) trial dates except March 4 and 18,
and April 17, 1968 fell on a Saturday.
- This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents
Calo and Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases,
desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases
scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday),
Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases."

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 38 of 67

- The trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and
their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia
- During all the fourteen (14) days of trial, spanning a period of several months (from
March to August, 1968), the accused were at all times represented by their respective
counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the
accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only one (1) day when Atty.
Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. This was on
April 20, 1968.
- At the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said respondent crossexamined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any case, no
pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted an irregularity
correctible on certiorari. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel,
asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda.
- Respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to or pointed out any
supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum submitted in
their behalf is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the merits of
the cases.
- The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23, 1968. This was
postponed to September 28, 1968 at the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as
counsel respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again to October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock
in the morning, this time at the instance of Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh
who had, in the meantime, also entered his appearance as counsel for respondents
Calo and Carbonnel. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon any
supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings.
- After proceedings duly had, there was an order from him "declaring that 'the
constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely
affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases
lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open
the public';" and ordering the city court Judge, now petitioner, "to desist from
reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered
already in the criminal cases (in question) ... pending in his Court, until further orders
of this Court.'"
- Neither in such pleadings nor in the memorandum filed, although the diligence
displayed by counsel was quite evident, was there any persuasive showing of a
violation of constitutional guarantee of a public trial, the basic issue to be resolved.
Rather it was the mode of approach followed by counsel Andres R. Narvasa for
petitioners that did manifest a deeper understanding of its implications and
ramifications.
Issues:
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is the meaning to be
accorded the constitutional right to public trial. Specifically, did respondent Judge
commit a grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of such a guarantee the
holding of the trial of the other respondents inside the chambers of city court Judge
Gregorio Garcia named as the petitioner.
Held:
- Accordingly, it is for us to grant the merits prayed for.
- The hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate occasions without
objection on their part, and without an iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as
to any other person so minded being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident
that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or
intentional secrecy.
- For reasons to be more fully explained in the light of the facts ascertained the
unique aspect of this case having arisen from what turned out to be an unseemly
altercation, force likewise being employed, due to the mode in which the arrest of
private petitioner for a traffic violation was sought to be effected by the two
respondent policemen thus resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight
criminal cases being tried jointly by city court Judge in the above manner we rule
that there was no transgression of the right to a public trial, and grant the petition.
- The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this
petition explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was
entitled.
- Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal
and unjust manner.
- The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. There is no
ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that
character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so.
- The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is
afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and
not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his
terse summation the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to
arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in
procedural due process.

- Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what
cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. Its the usual course of events that
individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the well recognized
exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may
be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals.
- What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties,
and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the
trial was held. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative of this right?
The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was thereby
excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would
reduce the number of those who could be our present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others.
- Reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had
been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of
respondent policemen. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this
petition.
- One other objection to the conduct of the proceedings by the city court Judge may
be briefly disposed of. Respondent Judge would seek to lend support to an order at
war with obvious meaning of a constitutional provision by harping on the alleged
abdication by an assistant fiscal of his control over the prosecution. Again here there
was a failure to abide by settled law. If any party could complain at all, it is the People
of the Philippines for whom the fiscal speaks and acts. The accused cannot in law be
termed an offended party for such an alleged failure to comply with official duty.
Even assuming that respondent policemen could be heard to raise such a grievance,
respondent Judge ought to have been aware that thereby no jurisdictional defect was
incurred by the city court Judge.
- There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by respondent Judge to
assure the reality as against the mere possibility of a trial being truly public. If it were
otherwise, such a right could be reduced to a barren form of words. To the extent
then that the conclusion reached by him was motivated by an apprehension that
there was an evasion of a constitutional command, he certainly lived up to what is
expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection ought to have convinced him
though that such a fear was unjustified.
- WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting aside, and
declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix
Domingo November 29, 1968 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion. The
writ of prohibition sought by petitioner is likewise granted, commanding respondent
Judge or any one acting in his place to desist from any further action in Criminal Case
No. 74830 of the Court of First Instance of Manila other than that of dismissing the
same.
Case No. 41
G.R. Nos. 111206-08
October 6, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accusedappellant.
Facts:
- Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for
the shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman.
Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two
(2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and
MAUREEN HULTMAN.
- When Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during the course of the trial, the
Information for Frustrated Murder against accused was amended to MURDER.
- In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against accused, bail
was set at twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) each. No bail was recommended for
the murder of Roland John Chapman. A petition for bail was thus filed by accused.
Hearing was set on August 9, 1991, while his arraignment was scheduled on August
14, 1991.
- Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, pleaded that Leino should be allowed to
testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and the inconvenience of recalling
him later to prove the two (2) frustrated murder charges.
- The defense suggested that if the prosecution wanted to present Leino to testify on
all three (3) charges, it should wait until after the arraignment since the prosecution
would still have to wait until after accused had been arraigned before it could present
Leino.
- Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges.
- After a searching examination of the witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador issued a
search warrant, authorizing the NBI to search and seize the silver metallic gray, 1983
Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate number PDW 566.
- Accused informed the NBI that he just came from the Makati police station where he
was also investigated. He told Lim that he was given a statement to the Makati police
and was brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for paraffin test.
- Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the whereabouts of his
Lancer car at the time of the shooting. Accused claimed that his car was involved in

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an accident a few weeks back and was no longer functioning. The car had been
parked in his mother's house at Dasmarias Village since then. Due to the lateness of
the evening, the group decided to continue the investigation the following day. The
next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim pressed accused on
what really happened at Dasmarias Village. Accused said he did not see anything.
Lim apprised accused that he would be confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused
sank into silence. Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was
requested to join the lineup composed of seven (7) men and he acceded. Cadenas
was called from an adjoining room and Ranin asked him to identify the gunman from
the lineup. Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to accused. Accused merely stared at
Cadenas.
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the unoccupied
house, into the street, in a line-up. Leino noticed that one of them was wearing
sunglasses. Since Leino could not yet speak at that time due to the extensive injury
on his tongue, he wrote down on a piece of paper a request for one of the men in the
lineup to remove his sunglasses. Leino handed this written request to his father. The
men in the lineup were herded back inside the house. After a couple of minutes, they
again stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup, Leino
identified accused as the gunman.
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado went
to see security guard Vicente Mangubat at his post, at the residence of his employer
in Dasmarias Village. Baldado interviewed Mangubat and invited him to the Makati
police station where his statement was taken.
Pat. Baldado fetched Mangubat from his house and brought him to the Makati police
station. At the station, Baldado told him to wait for a man who would be coming and
see if the person was the gunman. Mangubat was posted at the top of the stairs at
the second floor of the station. After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati
police Major Lovete. He ascended the stairs, passed by Mangubat and proceeded to
Major Lovete's office at the second floor. While accused was going up the stairs, Pat.
Baldado inquired from Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat initially
declined to identify accused, saying that he wanted to see the man again to be sure.
He also confided to Pat. Baldado that he was nervous and afraid for accused was
accompanied by a police Major. When accused came out from Major Lovete's office,
Pat. Baldado again asked Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded
his head in response.
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's house and asked
him again if accused was really the gunman. Once more, Mangubat answered in the
affirmative. Pat. Baldado told Mangubat that he would no longer ask him to sign a
statement which he (Baldado) earlier prepared.
Mangubat was also questioned by the NBI agents. Director Lim asked Mangubat if he
could recognize the gunman. Mangubat said he could. Mangubat was shown twelve
pictures of different men and was asked to identify the gun gunman from them. He
chose one picture, that of accused, and identified him as the gunman. Mangubat's
statement was taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the next day to make a
personal identification.
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the presence of
the media. At that time, accused's counsels, Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the
office of then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco protesting to the submission of accused
to identification. They pointed out that since the cases against accused had already
been filed in court and they have secured a court order for the transfer of accused to
the Makati municipal jail, any identification of accused should be made in the
courtroom. Asst. Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was part of their
on-going investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels acquiesced but requested that
identification be made without the presence of the media. Velasco turned them
down and explained that if accused is not identified n the lineup, the media coverage
would favor accused.
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup at Lim's
office and remained seated. Ranin was compelled to bring to the SOG office the men
composing the lineup and he asked them to go near accused. Ranin then told
Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat pointed to accused as the gunman. With the
identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its investigation.
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of confinement in
the hospital, she ceased to be a breathing soul on October 17, 1991.
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station at around
5:00 p.m. upon invitation of Chief of Police Remy Macaspac and Major Lovete who
wanted to ask him about the ownership of the Lancer car parked in his mother's
house. He readily gave a statement to the Makati police denying complicity in the
crime. He submitted himself to a paraffin test. He was accompanied by the Makati
police to the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame and was tested negative for
gunpowder nitrates. After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany
him to the NBI for he had earlier committed to his mother that he would present
himself to Director Lim. He furnished Lim with the statement he earlier gave to the
Makati police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at the NBI against his will.
The NBI agents forced him to join the lineup and placed him in the number seven (7)
slot. He observed that the man who was to identify him was already in the room. As
soon as he walked up to the lineup, Cadenas identified him as the gunman. A second

identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes Park. The NBI agents
brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly identified him
as the gunman in a lineup. A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He
was then seated at the office of Ranin for he refused to join another lineup. Despite
his protest, the NBI agents insisted on the conduct of the identification and ordered
a group of men to line up alongside him. While thus seated, he was identified by
Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he was not assisted by counsel at any
stage of said investigation. 88On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to
have a night out but instructed her to be home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received
her first salary in her first job and she wanted to celebrate with friends. At the time
of the shooting, he and his wife were sleeping in their house. He woke up at around
5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a security guard came to their house and informed
them about the killings.
Atty. Malvar, lawyer of the accused, admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware
of the irregularities committed in the off-court identification of their client. When
asked what he did to remedy this perceived irregularity, Malvar said he objected to
the conduct of the lineup. When further pressed whether he filed a petition for
review raising this issue with the Department of Justice upon the filing of the cases
therewith, he said he did not. He offered the excuse that he deferred to Atty.
Jimenez, the principal counsel of accused at that time. He also declared that although
they knew that arraignment would mean waiver of the alleged irregularities in the
conduct of the investigation and preliminary investigation, he and Atty. Jimenez
allowed accused to be arraigned.
On cross-examination, a reported declared that the source of his two stories was the
NBI and they were based on information available to the NBI at that time.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR.
of the crimes charged.
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed
a Motion for New Trial, alleging for the first time that the trial court erred in
considering as submitted for decision not only the petition for bail but also the case
on the merits. He claimed that accused's right to adduce further evidence was
violated. His motion for new trial was denied.

Assignment of Errors:
1. The lower court erred in finding that the accused had been positively identified by
Jussi Leino, Cadenas and Mangubat as the one who shot him, Roland Chapma and
Maureen Navarro Hultman.
2. The prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
3. The publicity given the case against the appellant was massive, overwhelming, and
prejudicial as to effectively deprive the accused of right to impartial trial.
4. The lower court erred in finding that the killing of Chapman and Hultman and the
shooting of Leino was attended by treachery.
5. The lower court erred in granting exorbitant moral and exemplary damages and loss
of earning capacity.
6. The lower court erred in awarding attorneys fees of Php3,000,000.00.
7. The lower court erred in rendering judgment on the merits and on the petition for
bail at the same time without giving the accused the opportunity to present
additional evidence in his defense on the merits of the case and denying the
accuseds motion for new trial.
Held:
First Error
- It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by the
prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification
constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the
prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate
and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the
fingerprint or DNA testing.
- Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru
show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness
to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the
suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-ofcourt identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the
trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process.
- In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
- We hold that the alleged irregularities cited by appellant did not result in his
misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino's

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identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal

that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons.
Appellant cannot gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts
of the shooting before he personally identified him. The burden is on appellant to
prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of
impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-ofcourt identification by Leino. We have no reason to doubt the correctness of
appellant's identification by Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a
Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino.
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a
sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It
was sufficiently established that Leino's extensive injuries, especially the injury to his
tongue, limited his mobility.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to
have remembered appellant's face when the incident happened within a span of five
(5) minutes. Five (5) minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the
picture of appellant.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that Cadenas did not
witness the crime. He stresses that when the Dasmarias security force and the
Makati police conducted an on-the-spot investigation on the day of the incident,
neither came across Cadenas. The next day, in the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI
agent interviewed Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He merely replied:
"Nakita ko pero patay na." He did not volunteer information to anyone as to what he
supposedly witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation.
He went to the NBI the next morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991, that he
gave his statement to the NBI. Cadenas allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that
the NBI tortured him.
We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to the
authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial. He related
that he feared for his and his family's safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with
his own eyes the senseless violence perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant
belonged to an influential family. It was only after consistent prodding and assurance
of protection from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with the authorities.
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT, citing the
testimony of defense witness Pat. James Baldado of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado
testified that Mangubat failed to identify appellant as the gunman the first time he
was brought to the Makati police station. Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's
story. He declared he positively identified appellant as the gunman at the Makati
police station. He averred that the day after he identified appellant, Pat. Baldado
returned to his place of work in Dasmarias and asked him again whether appellant
was the gunman. Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado said he
would no longer ask him to sign a statement earlier prepared by Baldado. In said
statement previously prepared by Baldado, Mangubat was supposed to state that
appellant, whom he saw at the Makati police station, was NOT the gunman. We give
more weight to the testimony of Mangubat. We find nothing in the records to suspect
that Mangubat would perjure himself. The Court cannot be as generous to Pat.
Baldado of the Makati Police. Mr. Hultman has proved that the Makati police,
including some of its jail officials, gave appellant favored treatment while in their
custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less than a congressional investigation.

Second Error
- First, accused claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in
previous shooting incidents for this contravenes the rule that evidence that one did
or omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or
omitted to do the same or similar thing at another time. Second, the NBI failed to
conduct an examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of
the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the
prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunman's car as white, but the trial court
found it to be silver mettalic gray. Fourth, appellant could not have been the gunman
for Mangubat, in his statement, said that he overheard the victim Maureen Hultman
plead to the gunman, thus: "Please, don't shoot me and don't kill me. I promise
Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also contends that a maid in a house near the scene of
the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: "Daddy
don't shoot. Don't." Fifth, the NBI towed accused's car from Dasmarias Village to
the NBI office which proved that the same was not in good running condition. Lastly,
the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was negative of
nitrates.
- We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.
- Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated
the rule on res inter alios acta when he considered his involvement in previous
shooting incidents. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, we
examine its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant.
If the impact is slight and insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome
the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party.
- In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome
character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the linchpin of the

inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting appellant. As

aforestated, the appellant was convicted mainly because of his identification by three
(3) eyewitnesses with high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the
bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate
appellant. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the
positive identification of appellant.
We are not impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses' description
of the color of the gunman's car. Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said
the car was somewhat white ("medyo puti"); Mangubat declared the car was
white; and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray. These alleged discrepancies
amount to no more than shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as
they do to colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering the
speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the break of dawn,
these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution
eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.
Appellant cites a newspaper item where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying
to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The evidence on record, however,
demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly
established that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons:
Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not
"Daddy."
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of
nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has "xxx proved
extremely unreliable in use xxx

Third Error
- Appellant blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the publicity given
to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was pressure
on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly followed the
developments in the case (as no less than Vice-President Joseph Estrada and then
Department of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon attended some of the hearings and,
President Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen Hultman while she was still
confined at the hospital).
- He submits that the trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and
disruptive influences which attended the prosecution of the cases. He claims there
were placards displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators inside the
courtroom clapped their hands and converted the proceedings into a carnival. In
another instance, he was allegedly given the "finger sign" by several young people
while he was leaving the courtroom on his way back to his cell.
- We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial
due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case
at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then
and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
free press.
- Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage
does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge
and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members
of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases.
The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen
straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of
our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world.
- At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial
judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of
the case.
- We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they do not
disclose that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did
he consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or
conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the case at bar.
- Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against the press for
prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than
seven (7) newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports
for his defense. The defense's documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper
clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to cast
doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.
- Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that the trial judge voluntarily inhibited himself
from further hearing the case at bar to assuage appellant's suspicion of bias and
partiality. However, upon elevation of the trial judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition
to this Court, we directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the
administration of justice.
- We found nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality
against the trial judge.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 41 of 67

Fourth Error
- Appellant claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman and
Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman
consciously and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the
execution of the crime. Appellant asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not
prove treachery.
- Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for the shooting
incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street since the
victims were unknown to appellant and vice-versa. It appreciated the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
- We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman.
- The shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to
defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that appellant
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that
appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were
strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was
short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. We
have consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not,
by itself, constitute treachery. Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant
should only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
- As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that
treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that
after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the
pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car.
When appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some
distance between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and
ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging
for mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely
placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them.
There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the
shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which appellant used to prepare for a
mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself.
Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar
as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
Fifth and Sixth Errors
- Appellant posits that the awards of moral and exemplary damages and for loss of
earning capacity of Maureen Hultman, Roland Chapman and Jussi Leino were
exorbitant. He likewise claims that the trial court's award of attorney's fees was
excessive.
- The trial court should not have lumped together the awards for moderate or
temperate and exemplary damages at Php500,000.00, without specifying the
particular amount which corresponds to each, as they are of a different kind. We
shall, however, consider their propriety and reasonableness.
- Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed by
appellant, we increase the amount of moral damages to Php1,000,000.00 pesos for
the death of Chapman.
- Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be awarded to
her mother, Vivian Hultman, and her natural father.
- We reject the argument. Under the Family Code (Article 190) which was already in
effect at the time of Maureen's death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father, is entitled
to the award made by the trial court.
- It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her natural
father. During the trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on
their claim of damages. Hence, we find that the award of damages in their favor has
sufficient factual and legal basis.
- Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of
Php1,000,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is unjustified or, at the very least,
exorbitant and should be reduced. We hold that the award is amply justified by the
circumstances.
- We find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the circumstances of
the case.
- In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of Maureen
Hultman, a girl in the prime of her youth. Hultman and her companions were gunned
down by appellant in cold-blood, for no apparent reason. Appellant's vicious
criminality led to the suffering of his victims and their families.
- We find that an award of Php1,000,000.00 to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral
damages is justified and reasonable.
- As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed with treachery,
appellant is additionally adjudged liable for the payment to Leino Php2,000,000.00
as exemplary damages.
- We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the LOSS OF
EARNING CAPACITY OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.

- In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in Philippine pesos,
of Forty capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with appellant that this amount is highly
speculative and should be denied considering that Leino had only earned a high
school degree.
- We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Php13,000,000.00 for loss of earning
capacity of deceased MAUREEN HULTMAN. We find that the award is not supported
by the records.
- It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's heirs is not factored
in. The rule is well-settled that the award of damages for death is computed on the
basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, and not the beneficiary.
- Appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the amount of
Php3,000,000.00, claiming that the same is exorbitant. We disagree.
Seventh Error
- Appellant urges that the hearings conducted on the cases, where no less than fortyone (41) witnesses were presented by the parties, were merely hearings on the
petition for bail concerning the murder charge for the killing of Roland Chapman, and
not a trial on the merits of all three (3) cases. Appellant insists that after the
termination of the hearing, he still had the right to adduce evidence at the trial
proper. He claims he was denied due process when the trial court considered all the
cases submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to present its
surrebuttal evidence.
- Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first hearing of
the cases on August 9, 1991. The incident then pending was appellant's petition for
bail for the murder of Chapman. It will be remembered that, initially, there was only
one murder charge against appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death
during the course of the proceedings on October 17, 1991.
- At the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution was appellant's
petition for bail. The prosecution sought to present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino,
to testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and inconvenience since all three
(3) charges involved one continuing incident. Appellant objected to the testimony of
Leino insofar as the two (2) frustrated murder charges were concerned. He argued
that since the pending incident was the petition for bail with respect to the killing of
Chapman, any testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in which bail were
recommended was irrelevant.
- Accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented Jussi Leino as its first witness
to testify on all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense.
- The merits of the cases and the petition for bail were heard simultaneously and
appellant acquiesced thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to present additional
evidence was not abridged by the trial court. On the contrary, the records disclose
that the trial court afforded the defense fair opportunity to adduce its evidence. It
took the defense almost one and a half years to submit its evidence. The defense
presented more than twenty (20) witnesses and several documentary evidence. It
was only after the trial court rendered a decision against appellant that he filed a
motion for new trial, through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time,
he alleged that the joint decision of the cases, both on the merits and on the petition
for bail, was irregular for he was not given a chance to present further evidence to
corroborate his alibi. We note that in his motion for new trial, appellant did not even
identify his alleged additional witnesses and the substance of their testimonies. Nor
was it shown that he could not have produced these evidence at the trial with
reasonable diligence. Appellant's motion was a patent ploy to delay the decision on
his cases. His motion was properly denied by the trial court.
Case No. 42
G.R. No. 83281
December 4, 1989
FLORENTINO OZAETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JALWINDOR
MANUFACTURERS, INC., respondents.
Facts:
- In an action for damages arising from alleged infringement of patent, RTC of QC
rendered a decision requiring petitioner to pay private respondent P200,000.00
actual damages, P50,000.00 exemplary damages, P10,000.00 attomey's fees plus the
costs of the suit.
- Petitioner appealed to the CA, and when petitioner was required to file the brief, he
filed a motion for extension of time to file brief in the said Court and this was granted
in a resolution dated June 18, 1987 giving him a period of sixty (60) days from June
5, 1987 or until August 4, 1987 within which to file his brief.
- On July 17, 1987 petitioner filed a motion to suspend proceedings before the
appellate court due to the pendency of the case with the Philippine Patent Office
wherein petitioner sought to nullify the patent of private respondent.
- In a resolution dated July 30, 1987, private respondent was required to file its
comment to the motion within ten (10) days from notice. Said comment was filed on
August 29, 1987 to which petitioner filed a counter-comment and private respondent
was required to file a reply.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 42 of 67

- On January 27, 1988 a resolution was issued by the appellate court denying the
motion to suspend proceedings which was received by petitioner on January 30,
1988. A motion for reconsideration dated February 15, 1988 was filed by petitioner
to which an opposition was filed by private respondent. On March 7, 1988 the motion
was denied which was received by petitioner on March 11, 1988.
- On March 15, 1988 petitioner filed a motion for extension of thirty (30) days within
which to file brief on the ground that counsel is practising alone and he had other
cases to attend to. This was denied in a resolution dated March 22, 1988. A motion
for reconsideration thereof was filed by petitioner.
- On April 13, 1988 petitioner filed a motion to admit appellant's brief attaching the
same to the motion. On April 18, 1988 the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for
failure of petitioner to file the brief on time and denied the motion for
reconsideration of the resolution dated March 22, 1988. A copy of said resolution
was received by petitioner on April 21, 1988 on which date private respondent filed
a manifestation and motion to strike out the motion to admit brief and the attached
brief in the same case.
- Petitioner then filed on April 22, 1988 an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the
resolution dated April 18, 1988. The motion to admit brief of petitioner was denied
in a resolution dated April 22, 1988. On May 5, 1988 the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's omnibus motion for reconsideration.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief on
time was proper.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in considering the appealed judgment
final and executory for failure of petitioner to file the appellant's brief within the
required time.
Held:
- The petition is devoid of merit.
- The pendency of the administrative proceedings before the Philippine Patent Office
to nullify the patent of private respondent which appears to have been filed earlier
than the complaint for damages is not one of the grounds for the suspension of
actions under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the said
motion did not therefore suspend the period within which petitioner was required to
file the appellant's brief which was due to expire on August 4, 1987.
- The petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings on July 17, 1987. He did not
take any step to file appellant's brief but simply awaited the resolution of the motion
which was denied on January 27, 1988. Again a motion for reconsideration of said
resolution was filed by petitioner which was also denied on March 7, 1988. It was
only upon such denial and after the expiration of seven (7) months from the last day
of filing the brief that the petitioner filed a motion for extension of thirty (30) days
within which to file the brief i.e., on March 15, 1988. Correctly indeed, CA denied said
motion. Petitioner again sought a reconsideration of said resolution and asked for
another extension.
- On April 13, 1988 petitioner filed appellant's brief which the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal on April 18, 1988 and denied the motion for reconsideration of
its March 22, 1988 resolution.
- Petitioner and his counsel were grossly negligent. Knowing that the period within
which to file the brief was to expire on August 4, 1987, they should have filed a
motion for extension of time within which to file the brief or a suspension of time
within which to file the same pending resolution of the motion to suspend the
proceedings in the case. However, instead of taking any of these steps they assumed
that the filing of the motion to suspend proceedings automatically suspended the
running of the period within which to file the brief, an assumption that is not
supported by the Rules or any other authority.
- When petitioner filed on March 15, 1988 a motion for thirty (30) days extension of
time within which to file the brief, the motion was filed was past the period of time
sought to be extended. The rule is explicit that such motion for extension of time
must be filed before the expiration of time sought to be extended.
- The right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail of the same
must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal
is lost. More so in this case where petitioner not only neglected to file the appellant's
brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an extension of time for a
cogent ground before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.
Case No. 43
G.R. No. L-48547
October 31, 1941
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ANG GIOC (alias ANG GIOC
KO, alias TOMAS) THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
- On October 30, 1926, respondent Ang Gioc, together with Sio Go, Gang Kan, and Chua
Chui, was charged with the crime of frustrated murder in the Court of First Instance
of Manila. On November 5, 1926, he was released on bail.

- After a protracted trial, which lasted several months, Ang Gioc and one of his coaccused, Sio Go, were found guilty and sentenced to twelve years and one day
of cadena temporal, with the case accessories of the law, and to indemnify the
offended party in the sum of P1,100.
- Ang Gioc and his sureties were duly notified to appear before the court on March 28,
1928, for the reading of the sentence, but the former failed to appear and thereupon
the trial judge ordered his arrest and the confiscation of the bond furnished for his
temporary release.
- The order of arrest could not be served on Ang Gioc because, according to the police
authorities, he had escaped to China.
- The record shows that his bondsmen were given more than the usual period of time
(four months) to locate Ang Gioc, but they failed to find him. The record also shows
that between the years 1928 and 1941 several warrants issued for the arrest of Ang
Gioc, but all attempts to arrest him proved futile because he could not be found.
- He was, however, finally arrested on February 18, 1941, nearly thirteen years from
the date fixed for the reading of the sentence. He was subsequently brought before
the court and the sentence was read to him, against the objection of the Solicitor
General, he was allowed to file a bond for his temporary release.
- In perfecting the record on appeal it was found that the stenographic notes taken
during the trial were not transcribed and that the two stenographers who took the
notes were already dead. The matter was referred to several stenographers who
stated that they could not transcribe the notes because the deceased had used
systems known only to themselves.
- Ang Gioc petitioned the Court of Appeals to remand the cause to the court below for
a new trial, while the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the
ground that "the present impasse is solely due to accused-appellant having jumped
the bail, before the sentence of the court could be read to him and evaded arrest for
thirteen years." The Court of Appeals decided to remand the cause to the court below
for a new trial, stating that from the affidavits and other documents submitted by
Ang Gioc in support of the petition for bail pending the appeal, it appeared that Ang
Gioc was not a fugitive from justice.
Issue:
Whether, upon the facts stated, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to remand the
cause to the court of origin for a new trial.
Held:
- In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses in his behalf.
- He has also the right of appeal; but this is a purely statutory, not a constitutional,
right.
- All these rights have been recognized and established in order to make sure that
justice is done to the caused, and no more. They were not intended to enable the
accused to defeat the very ends of justice.
- When, therefore, through cunning or malice he succeeds in thwarting the course of
the law, he should not be heard to complain if, as a result of his own misconduct, he
is deemed to have waived rights which he would otherwise have enjoyed. An accused
person must suffer the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts.
- There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused
himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the
benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either
expressly or by implication.
- When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision,
he will be deemed to have rendered against him.
- Ang Gioc was duly notified to appear before the trial court for the reading of the
sentence, but failed to do so; and when an order was issued for his arrest, the warrant
could not be served on him because he could not be found. The fact remains that the
succeeded in evading arrest for nearly thirteen years. The record shows that upon his
failure to appear for the reading of the sentence, the trial court declared the
confiscation of the bond filed by Ang Gioc, and later issued the corresponding order
of execution. This action of the court amounted to a judicial declaration that Ang Gioc
was a fugitive from justice, and such declaration cannot after the lapse of nearly
thirteen years be converted by proof aliunde. A contrary view would encourage
accused persons to trifle with the administration of justice, and provide means of
guilty parties to escape punishment. We reject it without the least hesitation by
declaring the Ang Gioc had waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered
against him.
- Having arrived at the conclusion that Ang Gioc had waived his right of appeal the
Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction of the appeal filed by him, except to dismiss
it; and that court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the cause to be
remanded to the court of origin for a new trial.

Case No. 44
PEOPLE VS. PILLADO
75 O.G. 5735
Case No. 45
G.R. No. L-10875
April 28, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
LAMBINO, defendant-appellant.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 43 of 67

plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

SEBASTIAN

S.

Facts:
- On August 25, 1952, appellant herein was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan with the crime of malversation of public fund as in the amount of
P16,267.65 in an information filed by the provincial fiscal, which was later on
amended in order to change the amount to P16,287.65.
- After his arrest, the case was set for his arraignment on February 12, 1953, but upon
his petition, said arraignment was postponed several times until finally on March 12,
1903, appellant was duly arraigned and entered the plea of not guilty.
- The case was set for hearing for May 11, and 12, 1954, but, upon petition of the
accused, said hearing was postponed to May 26, then to June 17, June 29 and July
13, 1954. However, on the last date, the hearing of the case did not take place,
because the appellant then filed a motion wherein he alleged that there has been no
preliminary investigation in the case and that the information contained vague and
indefinite avernment of the date of the commission of the crime charged, and the
court again postponed the hearing to July 29, 1954
- Before the commencement of the trial, appellant reiterated his petition for
preliminary investigation, but it was denied on the ground that "the court has studied
the record of the case and is satisfied with the preliminary investigation conducted
thereon." The trial was proceeded on and the prosecution, presented its first witness
who testified that he examined the accounts of the appellant as municipal treasurer
of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, and found the shortage alleged in the information.
- When his witness was about to finish his testimony, appellant, through counsel,
asked the court that he be permitted to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and
to substitute it for that of guilty, that he be given the benefit of the indeterminate
sentence and that the reading of the sentence be deferred. The trial court granted
this petition and forthwith ordered that the accused be again arraigned and, upon
being rearraigned, appellant voluntarily entered the plea of guilty; and agreeing to
appellant's petition, the lower court fixed August 17, 1954 as the date of
promulgation of the judgment.
- Decision was rendered on July 31, 1954, whereby the court found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds and took into
account his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance.
- On August 14, 1954, appellant filed a petition to withtdraw his plea of guilty on the
ground that when the instant case, was called for hearing last July 29, 1954, the
undersigned accused inadvertently and inadvisedly entered a plea of guilty to the
information, having yielded to do so only after being seduced and influenced by
outside intervention of other persons as further explained his affidavit of merits
hereto attached and made an integral part of this petition; that in truth and in fact
he did not very well understand the true import and full extent of the consequences
of his ill-considered plea, and that after more intillegent consultation, deeper
discernment and mature deliberation, he has finally come to regret his plea of guilty,
and now most solicitously begs to withdraw the same.
- Despite this motion, the lower court promulgated the decision.
- Appellant orally announced his intention to appeal, but instead of filing the
corresponding notice of appeal, he presented on August 24, 1954, a motion of
reconsideration and new trial, alleging that there have been errors of law and
irregularities in the trial of the case and that new and material evidence has been
discovered which, if admitted, would probably change the judgment.
- Said motion was overruled by the lower court for lack and, on August 28, 1954, the
formal notice of appeal was filed and thus the was elevated to the court of Appeals
which certified it to this Court for the reason that appellant in his brief, raises only a
question of law.
Assignment of Errors:
1. The lower court erred in not granting appellant's motion for preliminary investigation
filed on July 13, 1954.
2. The lower court erred in not granting appellant's petition of August 14 to withdraw
his plea of guilty to substitute it for that not guilty.
3. The lower court erredin overruling appellant's motion for reconsideration of the
decision a new trial thereof.
Held:
First error
- We find no irregularity in the actuation of the lower court, firstly because that
petition for preliminary investigation was filed by appellant after he had entered his
plea of not guilty on March 12, 1953.

- It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a preliminary investigation may be waived

and that the accused may waive it expressly or impliedly.
- In the case at bar, the information was filed originally with the court of first instance
an after its filing the accused was ordered arrested, hence we presume that before
the issuance of such order of arrest, the Honorable Judge presiding the lower court
must have made the corresponding investigation provided for in Sec. 4 of Rule 108.
- Before the commencement of the trial, appellant reiterated his petition for a
preliminary investigation, which was overruled, nevertheless appellant took no steps
to bring the matter to higher courts an stop the trial of the case; instead he allowed
the prosecution to present the first witness who was able to testify and show the
commission of the crime charged in the information.
- By his conduct, we held that he waived his right to a preliminary investigation and is
estopped from claiming it.
Second error
- We find appellant's contention completely untenable.
- He claims to have pleaded guilty because "he has been seduced and influence by
outside intervention" and that "he did not very well understand the true import and
full extent of the consequences of his ill-considered plea, and that after more
intelligent consultation, deeper discernment and mature deliberation, he has finally
come to regret his plea of guilty."
- Record shows that as early as June 17, 1954, appellant was already considering the
advisability of pleading guilty, as his counsel so announced, when they then
petitioned for the postponement of the hearing at a later date. Likewise, the record
shows that the accused entered his plea of guilty after a witness for the prosecution
had testified so convincingly that the appellant has committed the crime charged in
the information. At that time he was assisted by an attorney and he pleaded guilty
only after consultation with him.
- It could hardly be conceived that he involuntarily pleaded guilty without realizing the
consequences of his plea. On the other hand, we find that the withdrawal of a plea
of guilty in order to interpose a motion to quash or substitute therefore a plea of not
guilty, at any time before judgment, is not a matter of strict right to the accused but
of sound discretion to the trial court.
- Obviously appellant herein should not be allowed to gamble with his plea of guilty by
withdrawing it after he learned the penalty imposed upon him.
Third error
- We find appellant's contention also untenable, for by the plea of guilty he admits all
the facts alleged in the information and, by that plea, he is precluded from showing
that he has not committed them.
- Even granting that the evidence he has discovered later on may have some influence
in the matter, we find that the same, if at all, would only tend to prove that he
disposed of the rice entrusted to him, selling it on credit without authority, thus
malversing the proceeds thereof, so that the evidence in question would in nowise
relieve him from responsibility and, therefore, it would not alter the decision of the
lower court.
- The Solicitor General recommends that the principal penalty imposed upon the
accused be affirmed in toto. We find, however, that said penalty was erroneous,
because the lower court took into consideration the plea of guilty entered by the
accused after a witness for the prosecution had sufficiently proved the crime at bar.
Obviously, such plea of guilty cannot be given consideration as mitigating
circumstance for it was entered after the prosecution had presented part of the
evidence.
Case No. 46
G.R. No. 123161.
June 18, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LIBERATO DUKDUK SOLAMILLO and
JULIAN SOLAMILLO, accused-appellants.
Facts:
- For automatic review is the Decision dated September 20, 1995 of the Regional Trial
Court declaring Liberato Dukduk Solamillo and Julian Solamillo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of death.
- Upon arraignment with the assistance of counsel, appellant Liberato Dukduk
Solamillo and Edgardo Ebarle pleaded not guilty, while appellant Julian Solamillo
entered a plea of guilty. Eddie Trumata was not arraigned as he has been at large.
- The prosecution filed a motion praying that Edgardo Ebarle be discharged as an
accused to be utilized as a state witness. However, he died before he could testify.
- The victim owned the Liberty Bakery and Grocery located at Rizal Avenue, Isabela,
Basilan. His employees were appellant Julian Solamillo, Edgardo Ebarle and Eddie
Trumata, who lived together in the bakery. On March 2, 1994, Edgardo Ebarle, Eddie
Trumata and appellants were at the bakery. Aleli Guiroy, the victims daughter, saw
them when she arrived at around 5:00 p.m. until she left at 6:10 p.m. The next
morning, Aleli returned to the bakery but was unable to open the doors. She sought
help from her uncle, Lorenzo Guiroy who, in turn, asked Warlito Gonoz to accompany

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 44 of 67

her back to the bakery. When Warlito peeped through a window, he saw the victim
lying on the floor. Immediately, they reported the matter to the police. PO3 Celso
Tan Sanchez arrived and found the victims dead body, a wooden stool, a bolo and a
piece of bakawan (firewood), all with blood. The table drawers were open and the
bakery was in disarray.[8] Aleli informed PO3 Sanchez that her fathers P20,000.00,
wallet and Seiko watch were missing.
- Julian surrendered to the police in Bacong, Dumaguete where he was detained until
he was turned over to the Isabela police.[21] He pleaded guilty during the arraignment
because a policeman named Bayabos threatened to kill him.
- On September 20, 1995, the trial court rendered a Decision, finding the accused guilty
of Robbery with Homicide.
- Appellants Liberato and Julian Solamillo, in their brief, contend that the trial court
erred in finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and in imposing
upon them the death penalty.
Held:
- We disagree.
- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient basis for conviction as long as: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, facts and circumstances consistent with
guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and
probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
- These facts and circumstances are present here and constitute sufficient evidence
which warrants the conviction of both appellants.
- We find that Liberato failed to overcome this presumption. He could not provide a
satisfactory explanation why the victims belongings were in his
possession. Moreover, he could not show any ill motive on the part of SPO4 Oreta
that would impel the latter to fabricate evidence against him. SPO4 Oreta enjoys the
presumption that he has regularly performed his official duty. Liberato likewise failed
to overthrow this presumption.
- We find untenable Liberatos explanation that he went to Zamboanga City after the
commission of the crime to look for his brother Julian. True, flight per se cannot prove
the guilt of an accused, but if the same is considered in the light of other
circumstances, it may be deemed as a strong indication of guilt. His flight to
Zamboanga City when linked with his presence at the bakery, the crime scene, and
his possession of the victims effects upon his arrest, strongly indicate his participation
in the commission of the crime. Thus, the trial court correctly held that the
circumstances taken together point to the fair and logical conclusion that appellant
Liberato Solamillo is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.
- For his part, appellant Julian Solamillo maintains that the trial court erred in
disregarding his tacit withdrawal of his guilty plea. He claims that policeman Bayabos
threatened to kill him if he will plead not guilty.
- Section 5, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides
that (a)t any time before the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may
permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of
not guilty. The tenor of the quoted provision is clear. There should be a categorical
declaration from the accused that he is withdrawing his plea of guilty and substituting
it with a plea of not guilty.
- There is nothing in the records to show that Julian filed a motion to withdraw his plea
of guilty or that he, in any manner, manifested unequivocally that he was
withdrawing his plea.
- Without any unequivocal act on his part, the trial court could not assume that he was
withdrawing his original plea. Furthermore, by appellants own admission, he went to
Dumaguete City with the intention of surrendering to the authorities. This belies his
contention that he was threatened into entering a guilty plea for if he was truly
innocent, why is it that his first instinct was to surrender?
- Even assuming that Julian made an improvident plea of guilty and subsequently
withdrew it, such fact does not operate to automatically exculpate him from criminal
liability. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilty are set aside only if such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible
evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.
- In the instant case, the trial court, in determining the guilt of appellant Julian
Solamillo, relied on the extensive evidence of the contending parties, not merely on
his plea of guilty. Indeed his conviction can be sustained based on independent
evidence other than his plea. Thus, whether or not his plea of guilty was
improvidently made is inconsequential for the simple reason that his conviction was
based on other evidence proving his culpability for the offense charged.
- In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime primarily classified as one against
property and not against persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the
following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion

of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in
a generic sense, was committed.
In this case, the prosecution amply established the said elements. Appellant Julian
Solamillos contention that he cannot be held liable for homicide because he only took
money but did not participate in the victims killing is untenable. What is essential in
robbery with homicide is that there is a direct relation and intimate connection
between robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the
former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.
The rule is well-established that whenever homicide has been committed as a
consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery shall also be held guilty as principals of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide whether or not they actually participated in the
killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.
Appellant Julian Solamillo justifies his taking the money because he needed it for his
fare. Such an excuse is ridiculous and self-serving. By his own account, Edgardo Ebarle
and Eddie Trumata were the ones who killed the victim. If this were so, why did he
leave the bakery immediately after the incident? And why did he proceed to
Dumaguete City to surrender? His conduct is certainly inconsistent with rational
human behavior. For, if he were really guilt-free, he should have reported the
incident to the authorities instead of taking the money and fleeing to Dumaguete
City.
Julian insists that he did not participate in killing the victim and that he could not have
prevented it since the other accused threatened to kill him if he interfered. But he
failed to show that the threat was of such character as to leave him no opportunity
for escape or to prevent the homicide. Accordingly and considering his self-admitted
participation in the robbery, he is liable for the complex crime of robbery with
homicide.
However, the trial court erred in appreciating against appellants the aggravating
circumstances that the crime was committed: (a) by a band; (b) with evident
premeditation; (c) with deliberate cruelty; and (d) with treachery. The trial court
declared that the crime was committed by a band because there were four (4)
persons who committed the offense. This aggravating circumstance requires that
there should be at least four persons who commit the crime, all of whom should be
armed. Even if there are four offenders, but only three or less are armed, it is not a
band. Here, there is no evidence that all four accused were armed at the time of the
perpetration of the crime. Hence, this circumstance cannot be appreciated against
the appellants.
When it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had
elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. Here,
we cannot discern from the records the presence of the foregoing essential element.
The trial court held that the crime was committed with deliberate cruelty considering
that the victim suffered twenty-one (21) hack and stab-wounds, contusions and
abrasions on the different parts of his body. The number of wounds is not the
criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. The mere
fact that wounds in excess of what is necessary to cause death were inflicted upon
the body of the victim does not necessarily imply that such wounds were inflicted
with cruelty. It is necessary to show that the accused intentionally and deliberately
increased the victim's suffering. In this case, there is no evidence showing appellants
intent to commit such cruelty.
Regarding damages, the trial court failed to award civil indemnity to the victims
heirs. When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled
to the amount ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim without
need of any evidence or proof of damages.
As to Aleli Guiroys claim that she spent P20,000.00 for her fathers funeral expenses
and that there was at least P20,000.00 in the bakerys secret compartment when the
robbery occurred, we find the same unsubstantiated.
Temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved
with certainty.
As for the award of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages, we find the same to be
unjustified. Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that in criminal offenses,
exemplary damages as a part of civil liability may be imposed only when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Considering the
absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime charged, no
exemplary damages may be awarded. And since there are no exemplary damages,
the award of P20,000.00 as attorneys fee is also deleted.
As to the trial courts award of moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00, we find
the same to be excessive. In similar cases,[51] we awarded the victims heirs the
amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages. For verily, moral damages are not intended
to enrich the victims heirs; rather they are awarded to allow them to obtain means
for diversion that could serve to alleviate their moral and psychological sufferings.

Case No. 47
PEOPLE VS. LIM HOA
MAY 30, 1958

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 45 of 67

Case No. 48
G.R. No. 181900
October 20, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DEMETRIO SALAZAR, AccusedAppellant.
Facts:
- This is an appeal from the June 8, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed with modification the conviction of accused-appellant Demetrio for two (2)
counts of Statutory Rape.
- On September 6, 1999, two Informations were filed before the RTC charging accusedappellant with two (2) counts of statutory rape. It was alleged that accused-appellant,
on two (2) separate occasions, had raped a 12-year-old girl, AAA.
- On December 6, 1999, in his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. On
December 13, 1999, pre-trial of the case was terminated. Accused-appellant escaped
from detention until he was caught, and the hearing of the case began on July 27,
2000.
- Meanwhile, on February 22, 2000, AAA purportedly executed an Affidavit of
Desistance wherein she stated that she was not raped by accused-appellant and that
she no longer intends to pursue the cases filed against accused-appellant. During the
hearing, she explained that her own mother forced her to execute the affidavit upon
threat of harm.
- The prosecution established that AAA is the daughter of BBB with whom accusedappellant was cohabiting. AAA, BBB, and accused-appellant all lived in the same oneroom house located in Northern Samar. AAAs biological father, CCC, was serving
time at the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa when the incidents occurred.
- The first rape occurred at about 10:00 in the evening of May 18, 1999. At the time,
AAA was only twelve (12) years old. While BBB was out gambling, AAA who was then
sleeping in their house was awakened by accused-appellant who had been drinking.
He placed his hand over her mouth, removed her panty, and inserted his penis inside
her vagina. AAA felt pain in her vagina and tried to scream but was stifled by accusedappellants hand over her mouth. She cried instead. Afterwards, accused-appellant
stood up and returned to where he was previously sleeping.
- When her mother had arrived, AAA told her about the rape. BBB, however, did not
believe her and simply dismissed her claims.
- On June 25, 1999, at around midnight, accused-appellant again raped AAA. Accusedappellant first slapped her. He then placed a handkerchief inside her mouth, spread
her arms, and inserted his penis inside her vagina while kissing her right cheek. After
the act, accused-appellant stood up, drank coffee, and proceeded to go to sleep. AAA
again told the incident to her mother, who had arrived from another bout of
gambling. BBB confronted accused-appellant. After a short argument, BBB again
dismissed her daughters claims.
- For his part, accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that on the
date of the alleged first rape, he was at his farm at Sitio Napunod, Barangay
Caburihan, Lavezares, Northern Samar, making copra. He claimed that the farm is six
(6) kilometers away and could only be negotiated by hiking for one (1) hour. He
further claimed that he was at the farm from May 15, 1999 to May 23, 1999.12
- As to the second alleged rape, accused-appellant alleged that while he was at their
house in XXX, AAA was not there. He claimed that AAA and her brother, EEE, asked
permission from, and was allowed by, their mother BBB to watch a show at the town
proper of Lavezares in the evening of June 25, 1999. AAA and EEE allegedly returned
home at 7:00 of the following morning.
- The defenses sole witness was accused-appellant, who alleged that the relatives of
the victims father, CCC, did not approve of his relationship with BBB. CCCs relatives
wanted to take custody of AAA. Accused-appellant claimed that the instant cases
were instituted to wrest custody of AAA from BBB and himself.
- The RTC issued its Decision dated July 7, 2003 finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable dount of the two (2) counts of statutory rape. Let the records of the entire
cases together with the transcript of stenographic notes be forwarded to the
Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review.
- The CA issued the assailed decision, affirming the decision of the RTC. However, it
modified the penalty imposed from death penalty to reclusion perpetua. The CA
found accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape instead of statutory
rape. The CA reasoned that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to establish
that the rape victim was twelve (12) years old at the time of the crimes. Further, the
CA stated that a baptismal certificate is not sufficient proof of the age of a person.
Thus, the victims age was not established. The CA then modified the penalty imposed
upon accused-appellantfrom death penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Assignment of Errors
1. The trial court gravely erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witness xxx and in totally ignoring/disregarding the version of the
defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite the fact
that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:
- The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Error
- The victims Affidavit of Desistance cannot be given any weight.
- Accused-appellant claims that the instant case should have been dismissed by the
trial court, considering that AAA had executed an affidavit of desistance exonerating
accused-appellant from the crimes charged. The CA, however, did not give any
weight to such affidavit on the following reasoning: The affidavit of desistance relied
upon by appellant could not be given any probative weight considering that it was
not duly sworn to. Further, when private complainant was confronted about it, she
testified that her mother threatened to kill her should she refuse to execute the
affidavit.
- In any event, AAAs purported Affidavit of Desistance cannot cause the dismissal of
the case. It must be pointed out that the alleged affidavit was executed after the case
had already been instituted. Thus, the Court already had acquired jurisdiction over
the case and control over the proceedings.
- Indeed, the Affidavit of Desistance of private complainant is highly suspect.
Apparently, she executed it on the basis of a consideration of P5,000, which was later
increased to P100,000. After her testimony had been rendered, however, appellant
refused to pay the amount agreed upon, thereby prompting her to recant the
Affidavit.
- She had stated therein that "the accused is indeed innocent of the crimes charge[d]
since in truth, he never molested me sexually as charged." Such statement was a
mere legal conclusion, bereft of any details or other indicia of credibility, much less
truth. More likely, it emanated not from this young girls mouth, but from a trained
legal mind. Moreover, while she affirmed her Affidavit on the stand, she also
declared, on clarificatory question from the judge, that she was 14 years old when
she was molested and raped by appellant. These facts raise doubts as to the reliability
of her statements in her Affidavit.
- At this point, we reiterate that, by itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court. In the
present case, private complainant lost the right or absolute privilege to decide
whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case had already reached and
must therefore continue to be heard by the court a quo.
Second Error
- AAAs testimony should be given full weight and credence.
- Next, accused-appellant questions the trial courts reliance on the testimony of AAA.
Citing People v. Domogoy, accused-appellant posits that AAAs testimony must be
received with caution.
- Here, the contention is that AAA was only twelve (12) years old at the time that she
was raped. Clearly, the trial court correctly gave great weight to the testimony of
AAA. Moreover, given the fact that the CA upheld the findings of the trial court on
the factual issues of the case, the Court is bound by the trial courts assessment of
the witnesses.
Third Issue
- Accused-appellant is guilty of simple rape.
- In order for the accused to be found guilty of the crime of statutory rape in this
jurisdiction, two (2) elements must concur: (1) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) that the victim is below twelve (12) years old, thus:
The two elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge
of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code is now in Article 266-A, par. 1-d, in view of the amendments
introduced by R.A. 8353. Statutory rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under par. d, "when the offended party is under 12 years of age."
- Here, while it is undisputed that the first element is present, accused-appellant
questions the presence of the second. Conformably, the CA ruled that indeed the fact
that the victim was twelve (12) years old at the time of the commission of the crimes
was not sufficiently established. However, contrary to such finding of the CA, this
Court has ruled that in statutory rape cases, a baptismal certificate is sufficient to
prove the age of the victim.
- Without a doubt, the baptismal certificate of AAA that was presented during the trial
of the case coupled with the testimony of DDD, the aunt of AAA, sufficiently
established that the victim was twelve years old at the time the crimes were
committed. Having been born on April 10, 1987, when the first rape occurred on May
18, 1999, AAA was exactly 12 years, one month, and 8 days old at the first rape
incident.
- However, that AAA was already 12 years old when she was raped, the second
element for statutory rape that "that the victim is below twelve (12) years old" is not
present. Consequently, the finding of the appellate court for simple rape is correct,
not on the ground of the age of AAA not being proved, but on the fact that she was
no longer below 12 years of age at the time the crime was committed.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 46 of 67

Fourth Issue
- Reclusion Perpetua is the proper penalty.
- The crime of simple rape having been established, the next question is what penalty
should be imposed upon accused-appellant. At the time the crimes were committed
by accused-appellant, the penalty for the crime of simple rape was contained in Art.
266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
- Thus, simple rape, when qualified by the circumstance that the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, would be
properly punishable with the death penalty. Otherwise put, when the two
circumstances of minority and relationship concur, then the proper imposable
penalty shall be deathnow qualified by Republic Act No. 9346.
- In the instant case, aside from minority of the victim it was alleged in the informations
filed before the trial court that accused-appellant is the victims stepfather. Minority
of AAA and her relation to accused-appellant was the qualifying circumstance that
the trial court considered in imposing the penalty of death on accused-appellant.
However, in order to become the victims stepfather, accused-appellant must
necessarily have been legally married to AAAs mother. This was not the case. No
evidence was adduced during the trial to establish that AAAs mother and accusedappellant were ever legally married. Moreover, although the fact that accusedappellant was the common-law husband of the victims mother, such circumstance
cannot be appreciated, although proved during the trial, as it was not alleged in the
informations and would thereby violate the constitutional right of accused-appellant
to be informed of the charges against him.
- The CA imposed the correct penalty of reclusion perpetua against accused-appellant
as provided under Art. 266-B in relation to Art. 266-A, paragraph (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, there being no qualifying circumstances.
Case No. 49
G.R. No. L-16916
November 29, 1962
FRANCISCO Q. DUQUE, HUGO S. ESTRADA, MARIA C. MAGSANO and RESTITUTO C.
BASA, petitioners, vs. HON. AMADO S. SANTIAGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, EMETERIO M. CASTAEDA and CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, respondents.
Facts:
- This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul and set aside an order of the Court
First Instance of Pangasinan dated 3 February 1960 in criminal case No. U-335 and
for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the respondent judge from proceeding
with the arraignment of the petitioners and the trial of said criminal case pending
final judgment on this petition.
- On 18 July 1959, the respondent Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed an information
charging the petitioner with libel upon complaint by the respondent Province
Governor Conrado F. Estrella and praying for damages in the sum of P200,000.
- On 31 July 1960 the petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the transfer of
the case from the Urdaneta branch to the Dagupan branch of the court, for the
quashing of the information, on the ground that the facts charged therein do not
constitute the offense of libel since the publish parts of the article claimed to be
libelous are but a fair and true report of the acceptance speech delivered by then
candidate Francisco Q. Duque, one of the herein petitioners, and an appraisal and a
just comment or a candid criticism of past official acts of the respondent Conrado F.
Estrella in connection with his announced intention to run for re-election as governor
of Pangasinan and for that reason the above mentioned published parts of the article
are or constitute a privileged communication under article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code; and praying further in the alternative, for a bill of particulars specifying the
time, place and occasion of the alleged public utterances and conversation between
the petitioners Francisco Q. Duque and Restituto Basa, and at the same time denying
the truth of the charges and the part alleged taken thereon by the petitioner
Francisco Q. Duque; and setting up a counterclaim for damages against the
respondents Emeterio M. Castaeda and Conrado F. Estrella for the malicious filing
of the information against the petitioners.
- After hearing held on 27 August 1959, the court presided over by the respondent
judge entered an order dated 3 February 1960 denying petitioners' motion to quash
for the reason that the published parts of the article are not privileged and even if
they were so, still they would not be a legal ground for the quashal of the information,
because, in the opinion of the respondent judge who presided over the court, the
privileged character of the allegedly libelous publication should be set up as a
defense.
- The prayer in the motion for a bill of particulars was also denied for lack of merit, but
the petition of both the public and private prosecution for the striking out of that
part of the omnibus motion regarding the claim for damages based on malicious
prosecution was granted. The court further held that the information does not suffer
from the infirmity of duplicity of offenses charged, a point not raised in the motion
but most likely in the course of the argument.
- The respondent judge directed the clerk of court to set the assignment of court to
set the arraignment of the defendants, the herein petitioners, at the earliest available
date in the calendar of the court.

- Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to quash,
reiterating the reasons and argument advanced in the omnibus motion and claiming
that the information charges both libel and slander (oral defamation) contrary to
section 12, Rule 106, Rules of Court, for it charges that the accused Duque and Basa,
before the publication of the libel complained of, uttered the substance of the
libelous article publicly and privately.
- On 30 April 1960 the motion for reconsideration was denied, the court setting the
arraignment of the accused for 16 May 1960 at 8:00 a.m.
- On 10 June 1960, upon the petitioners' filing of a bond in the sum of P200, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by this court restraining the respondent judge of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan from proceeding with the arraignment of
the herein petitioners and trial of the criminal case for libel.
- The petitioners contend that the information should be quashed, because it does not
charge an offense, or if it does the allegedly libelous publication is a fair comment
and comes under the protection provided for in article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
- Respondents maintain that petitioners' contention is untenable, because they claim
that even if the publication were a privileged communication petition, the privileged
character of the publication is not a legal ground for the quashal of the information,
for it is a matter of defense. They argue that assuming that publication is privileged,
it does not mean that it is actionable, for the privileged character simply does away
with the presumption of malice which the plaintiff to prove in such a case.
Held:
- Whether comment made by the petitioner fair or not on matters of public interest,
or he prompted by personal ill-will or spite and caused its publication not merely in
response to duty but just to injure the reputation of respondent Governor Estrella,
or justifiable grounds for such comment on the person, office and reputation of
respondent Governor Estrella exist or do not exist, are matters which may only be
determination after the trial of the petitioners.
- Although a publication which imputes political corruption petition, or the use of
political influence or privileges pecuniary gain is libelous per se, still as already
adverted to above, since the privileged character or nature destroys the presumption
of malice, the onus of proving malice is on the plaintiff and whether malice of
defendant exists the same can only be proved after trial of the case on the merits.
- Next issue: whether the information, charges more than one offense. The
information charges the petitioners with the crime of libel committed on or about 28
June 1959. The petitioners maintain that the information charges both libel and
slander, because after setting out the published parts of the article claimed to be
libelous the information further alleges and charges: That to make effective their
scheme and premeditated plan to dishonor, discredit and besmirch the good name
and reputation of the herein complainant, accused Francisco Q. Duque and Restituto
Basa, before the circulation of the libel contained in the aforementioned issue of the
Pangasinan Courier, and to prepare the ground for the same, uttered and mentioned
the substance of the said libelous article quoted above in public and also in private
conversations; xxx
- Such allegations are made to strengthen the charge of malice which is necessary to
support a conviction of the crime of libel.
- The orders complained of entered by the respondent judge in the exercise of its
power and jurisdiction cannot be deemed to be, and does not amount to, a grave
abuse of discretion to entitle the petitioners to the writ prayed for by them. The
denial of a motion to quash on the ground that the publication of the parts of an
article claimed to be libelous is privileged and that the information charges two
offenses is interlocutory and cannot be appealed.
- Whether the publication is privileged or not and the information suffers from the
infirmity of duplicity, the trial court will have to pass upon them and if passed upon
adversely to the petitioners the same may be raised and reviewed on appeal.
Case No. 50
G.R. No. L-22250
May 22, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EULOGIO BALAO, defendantappellee.
Facts:
- Because of an open letter published in a local paper on November 4, 1959, herein
defendant-appellee Eulogio Balao, then a Senator, filed two actions against the
writer, Gregorio Co, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City).
- One action was criminal in nature and charged the offense of libel; the other was civil
and sought recovery of damages. At the trial of the civil case Senator Balao took the
witness stand, and in answer to certain questions propounded to him gave some
statements which were claimed to be defamatory and on the basis of which Co
subsequently filed a complaint for grave slander against him.
- I was put to shame because I was being attacked by a known extortionist ... and a
man of no consequence because he has no visible means of living; xxx I do not invite
criminals; xxx I cannot avoid felicitatious even to criminals. At least, it is a gentleman's
attitude even towards criminals; xxx which words and expressions were directed to
the said Gregorio Co, thereby casting dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 47 of 67

latter, to his damage and prejudice, in such amount as may be awarded to him under
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
On November 21, 1962 the defendant moved to quash the information on the ground
that the statements attributed to him were covered by the rule of absolute privilege.
The prosecution opposed, and the motion was denied. A motion for reconsideration
was filed and was similarly opposed.
On August 20, 1963, the Quezon City court issued the order of dismissal now
appealed from, as follows: After considering the "Motion for Reconsideration", the
Opposition" thereto, the "Manifestation" and "Motion" presented by the defense
counsel, and the "Rejoinder to the Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Quash", and
the Private Prosecutor having been given 10 days from July 31, 1963, within which to
file any pleading thereto, this Court, after going over all the pleadings, hereby
reconsiders its Order dated December 28, 1962, and hereby DISMISSES this case with
costs de oficio.
In dismissing the case, Quezon City Court took into account the evidence presented
in support of the defendant's motion for reconsideration and concluded that the
alleged defamatory statements were covered by the mantle of privilege.

Issue:
Whether or not a motion to quash hypothetically admits the allegations in the
information and merely challenges their sufficiency to charge an offense, and that the
privileged character of the defamatory statements cannot be determined from such
allegations and hence should be raised at the trial.
Held:
- In the another case, this Court did uphold the trial court's order denying the
defendant's motion to quash an information for libel on the ground that whether or
not the comments complained of as libelous were privileged was a matter which
should be raised as a defense at the trial.
- There the issue of when the question of privilege should be invoked was squarely
raised in the lower court in connection with the motion to quash, and was ruled upon
by said court to the effect that the question should be invoked at the trial.
- In the Duque case no evidence was considered by the court regarding the privileged
character of the alleged libelous statements, since the prosecution immediately
challenged the propriety of such evidence in a motion to quash.
- In the present case, the question is raised for the first time on appeal and the
evidence in support of the defendant's claim of privilege was allowed to go into the
record without objection on the part of the prosecution. The lower court did not err,
therefore, in taking such evidence into consideration.
- The Solicitor General limited his brief to the procedural aspect of the order of
dismissal, and is silent as to the question of whether or not, in the setting in which
the statements of the defendant were uttered, that is, while he was testifying in court
as the plaintiff himself in the civil case for recovery of damages by reason of the libel,
and considering the allegations in his complaint and the questions propounded to
him, those statements were pertinent and relevant to the subject of the inquiry so as
to constitute privileged communication.
- The lower court, in quashing the information, ruled affirmatively on the question,
and since the burden to show its error rests on the appellant and no such showing
has been made, we find no reason to decree a reversal.
Case No. 51
G.R. No. L-10427
May 27, 1957
EULOGIO MILL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. NICASIO YATCO,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,respondents.
Facts:
- Executive Orders Nos. 400 and 58 issued by the President of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines and made effective January 1, 1942, and August 1, 1945, respectively,
created the City of Greater Manila whereby Quezon City was absorbed by and
became a part of the City of Greater Manila.
- On August 8, 1946, an information for murder committed in Quezon City, then a part
of the City of Greater Manila, was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila,
against petitioner Eulogio Mill.
- Upon being arraigned on December 14, 1955, in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
defendant pleaded "not guilty" to this information. The delay in the arraignment of
the defendant for 8 years since the filing of the information until his arraignment
therefor, was due to his success in evading arrest.
- On October 10, 1946, before the arraignment of the defendant, Republic Act No. 54
was enacted by Congress expressly repealing said Executive Orders Nos. 400 and 58
and restoring Quezon City to its former status as a distinct and separate chartered
city. On January 3, 1956, after the passage of Republic Act No. 54, counsel for the
defendant Eulogio Mill filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a motion to
quash the information in said case and in another case in which the same defendant
was charged with the crime of frustrated murder (not involved in these proceedings),
apparently committed at the same occasion, on the ground that the Court had no

jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof, which motion was granted by order of the
Court.
This motion was predicated on the assumption that the Court had lost jurisdiction to
try these two cases as of the date of the approval of Republic Act No. 54 and the
revival of Quezon City on October 10, 1946.
On January 21, 1956, the City Attorney of Quezon City filed an information with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), which was amended on January
26, 1956, accusing the petitioner Eulogio Mill of the same crime of murder for which
he had been previously charged in Criminal Case No. 221 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, and to said amended information the defendant pleaded "not guilty" upon
arraignment.
On February 21, 1956, and upon learning that the offense with which he stands
charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, is one for which he had
allegedly been in jeopardy in Criminal Case No. 221 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, which had been dismissed, defendant Eulogio Mill filed a motion to withdraw
his plea of not guilty and to allow him to submit a motion to quash.
This motion was set for hearing and after the parties were heard in oral Judge Nicasio
Yatco issued in open court following order: For lack of sufficient merits, the motion
to quash filed by counsel for the accused dated February 21, 1956, is hereby DENIED.
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that said order is
contrary to law and established-jurisprudence. But the respondent Judge denied the
motion for reconsideration in the following language: There being no valid and
convincing reasons alleged in the motion for reconsideration of counsel for the
accused to disturb the order of this Court dated February 25, 1956, the same is
hereby denied.
Alleging that he has no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the protection of his fundamental right not to be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, petitioner herein filed in this Court the present
certiorari and prohibition proceedings with preliminary injunction.
This petition was given due course by this Court which provided by resolution of
March 19, 1956, to let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition be
issued upon filing by the petitioner of a bond in the sum of P200, and this requisite
having been fulfilled, the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction was issued.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the remedies of certiorari and prohibition lie in this case.
2. Whether an accused may, as a matter of right, withdraw his plea of "not guilty" to
file a motion to quash.
Held:
- Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, prescribes: SECTION 1. Time to move to quash or
plead. Upon being arraigned the defendant shall immediately, unless the court
grants him further time, either move to quash the complaint or information or plead
thereto, or do both. If he moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is
withdrawn or overruled he shall immediately plead.
- This section provides that upon arraignment the defendant shall immediately either
move to quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or to do both. He must
do so before he pleads thereto, and it was held that while he could demur as a matter
of right before he entered his plea, once he had pleaded not guilty, his withdrawal of
such plea, in order to "demur", became a matter of judicial discretion. This ruling
applies to a motion to quash.
- The information in the case at bar appears to be on its face a sufficient information,
and permission to withdraw the plea of not guilty in order to interpose a demurrer
to the information in a prosecution for murder was properly denied where the
information appeared to be sufficient. In that case this Court reiterated its ruling that
the withdrawal of a plea of not guilty in order to demur became a matter of judicial
discretion. In the case at bar there is no showing that the respondent Judge abuse his
discretion in not allowing the petitioner to withdraw his former plea of not guilty.
- Coming now to the main question at issue, we may say the following: Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court prescribes: SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with gave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgement be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board, or officer, as the law requires, with costs.
- The Rules specifically direct that if the defendant moves to quash before pleading,
and the motion is overruled, "he shall immediately plead" (section 1, Rule 113); which
means, obviously, that trial should go on.
- Although in the light of the foregoing decisions an order denying a motion to quash
is not appealable because the order is merely interlocutory, yet, that does not mean
that the final judgment that may be rendered in the case could not be appealed.
- In another case, this Court held "that neither certiorari nor prohibition lie against an
order of the court granting or denying a motion to quash an information. If the courts
have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cases and to decide the motion to

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quash, appeal in due time is the obvious and only remedy for the public prosecutor
or the accused, as the case may be."
- In view of the foregoing, we hold that in the case at bar the writs of certiorari and
prohibition applied for do not lie, for the order objected to is only interlocutory, and
petitioner can in due time appeal from the final judgment that the Court of First
Instance of Rizal may render in the case if it were adverse to him.
Case No. 52
G.R. No. 172716
November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO,
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.
Facts:
- The petition seeks the review of the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.
- Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with
two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail
for his temporary release in both cases.
- Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted
out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash
the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
- The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
- After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A.
No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his
bail and ordered his arrest.
- Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the
motion remained unresolved.Relying on the arrest order against petitioner,
respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners
loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
- RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture
of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest
petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the
MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
- Petitioner explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes
his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for
absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action
seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.
- Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be
placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in
Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No.
82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No.
82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material
only to determine his penalty
- Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision
forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits,
respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light
offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the
slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to
property.
Issues:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366.

2. If in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double

Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Held:
- Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
Divest him of Standing to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
- Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation
of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule
124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee
or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.
- The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a prearraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence.
- The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more
evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who
absents himself from post-arraignment hearings.
- Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond
(subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30
days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried
in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted
to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere nonappearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive
without standing.
- RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend
the scheduled proceeding" at the MeTC is belied by the records.
- Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A.
No. 2803.
- Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released
days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration.
His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
- Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 Bars his Prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366
- The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioners
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. The case turns on the question whether Criminal
Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner
adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense
of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the latter requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
- We find for petitioner.
- Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are
Material Only to Determine the Penalty
- The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article
365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
- Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking
into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
- Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in
which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
manifest.
- The notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of
crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is
nothing new.
- Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution
for the Same Quasi-Offense
- The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or
acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasioffense, regardless of its various resulting acts.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 49 of 67

- The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under
the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated where, in barring
a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act.
- Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code
- The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually
incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both
under the Revised Penal Code.
- Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies
falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2)
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
- In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony
but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
- Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling
under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs
the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the
complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling
under either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple noncrime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to
light, less grave or grave offenses.
- Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing"
of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or
less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts.
The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light
offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case
Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
- The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of
all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their
number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately.
- Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single
charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for
each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges
under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.
- Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing
formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying
as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted
belatedly).
Case No. 53
G.R. No. 149453
April 1, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE
PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO
ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
Facts:
- Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the
application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the
respondent and his co-accused with the said court.
- In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with
multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as
Manuel Montero, a former Corporal of the Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin
Abalora, who was 16 years old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy
Redillas, Meleubren Sorronda, who was 14 years old, Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the
44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap
of the Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri, former Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion
of the Philippine Army, bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
- The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express

consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when
he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination
of witnesses.
- The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine
whether the requirements for its application are attendant.
- The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first
determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended
parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the
cases were revived only after the two-year bar, the State must be given the
opportunity to justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It emphasized that
the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in
prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is not precluded from
presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.
Assignment of Errors:
1. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
2. The time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
Held:
First Error
- The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
because the essential requirements for its application were not present when Judge
Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, 1999.
- The petitioners maintain that the respondent did not give his express consent to the
dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The
respondent allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and
during the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or
even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were
allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge Agnir, Jr.
According to the petitioners, the respondents express consent to the provisional
dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims of the respondents
motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to the application of the
time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule.
- The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be remanded to
the RTC to determine whether private complainants were notified of the March 22,
1999 hearing on the respondents motion for judicial determination of the existence
of probable cause. The records allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling city
prosecutor was furnished a copy of the notice of hearing on said motion.
- The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its
Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for
the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir,
Jr. stating that the respondent and the other accused filed separate but identical
motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases should the trial court find no probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them.
- The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the public and
private prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He
contends that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during the
March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial determination of the existence of
probable cause because criminal actions are always prosecuted in the name of the
People, and the private complainants merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
- The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners
meritorious.
- Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: Sec.
8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional
dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine
of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been
revived.
- Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the
Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of
the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused
moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of
the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 50 of 67

4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional

dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the
time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the
requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal
case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense
necessarily included therein.5
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been
revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been
revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless
he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is
a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply
its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a
provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing
amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The
mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal10does not amount to express
consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to
such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods
provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new
rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed
periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of
double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the
Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense
necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary
investigation. However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case, the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted
their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses
for the State have emerged, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted
before an Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary
investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are
charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included
therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded;
or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded
from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the
right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, "the fiscal is not called by
the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute
but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that
justice."
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of
the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not
file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part,
the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause
and for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a personal
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for
its examination.
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or
expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases
The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of
Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from
repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such
admissions.
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to
add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly
included therein. This the Court cannot and should not do.
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion
for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of
the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before
said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of probable
cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion
for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689,
however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on

said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his
motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely
five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a
copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were separately
given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by
them, including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were residents
of Dipolog City or Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.
- There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies
of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was
any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the private
prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion and the
hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The
said heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondents motion
and to protect their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.
- Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present
when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit
set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-9981679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the
respondent.
Second Error
- The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly
consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-9981689 and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondents motion before
the hearing thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively
against the State.
- To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and
his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly
impair, reduce, and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the accused
for multiple murder.
- The respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive
right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in
question since [t]he States witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their
testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically
expedient in April 2001 for them to do so.
- According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or substantive, may be
retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused. He asserts that the two-year
period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was
more than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him. In any event, the
State is given the right under the Courts assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the
Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar
under the new rule.
- The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy to the
prejudice of the State because the prohibition against the revival of the cases within
the one-year or two-year periods provided therein is a legal concept distinct from the
prohibition against the revival of a provisionally dismissed case within the periods
stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover, he claims that the effects of a provisional
dismissal under said rule do not modify or negate the operation of the prescriptive
period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised
Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the application of Section 8, Rule 117
because a complaint or information has already been filed against the accused, which
filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period under Article 90.
- The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of limitations.
Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the
sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such
statutes are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty founded on the liberal
theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of
the government to explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary for the
protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability. The
periods fixed under such statutes are jurisdictional and are essential elements of the
offenses covered.
- On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the timebar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of
the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.
- The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the right of the State
to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but
subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon
the lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably,
to have abandoned or waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 51 of 67

The dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for
the same crime or another crime necessarily included therein. 37 He is spared from
the anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in any new indictments.
The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year periods
provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the delay. By the same token, if a
criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded
within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are
not thereby diminished. But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred
by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the
effect is basically the same.
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied
retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the
steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be punished. A procedural law
may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve
intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the Court.
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance
and implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be
applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the
history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective
application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied
and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in
particular.
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years
under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of
one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with
the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party.
The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court
balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy
disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused.
It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due
process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to
revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to
the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is
shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a
denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency
of the time-bar.
A mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case.
The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not
derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject
him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a
normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to
suffer those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence.55 He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the
passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and
thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that
plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State
and the accused; not for the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that
the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public
prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the
criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving
the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had
considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect
on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State
would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to
revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under
the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State
would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within
which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule
in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of
justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the
computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in
effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar.
It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases
against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year
period under the new rule.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the
accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive
application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused.

- To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the
revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused
before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to
comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a
rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year or two years as
the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring
the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the effective
date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and
fairness, so is the State.
- In this case, the eleven informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
were filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within the two-year
period.
- In the sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners meritorious.
- IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED.
Case No. 54
G.R. No. 148000
February 27, 2003
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE PATERNO V. TAC-AN (in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 84, Batangas
City) and MARIO N. AUSTRIA, respondents.
Facts:
- This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for the nullification of the
Order dated August 1, 2002 and the subsequent Order denying the motion for
reconsideration issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84 of Batangas City in
People vs. Mario Austria.
- On February 22, 2000, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Batangas City against Mario N. Austria for falsification of public official document.
- Several people were listed in the Information as witnesses for the People of the
Philippines including their respective addresses/places of station/assignment.
- The trial court set the arraignment of the accused and the initial pre-trial on August
1, 2000. Apparently, out of the eleven witnesses listed in the Information, only the
first three witnesses were notified of said arraignment and pre-trial. When the case
was called for pre-trial, the trial court discovered that none of the three witnesses
who were allegedly earlier notified by the court was in attendance.
- On motion of the accused and over the objection of the public prosecutor, the trial
court issued an order dismissing the case for failure of said witnesses to appear
before it. The bail bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty was thereby
cancelled.
- The public prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, contending
that the trial court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it dismissed the case simply
because three of its witnesses who were notified failed to appear at the initial pretrial. The public prosecutor asserted that it had eleven witnesses but only three were
subpoenaed by the trial court. He argued further that the dismissal of the case was
not authorized under Republic Act No. 8493.
- The trial court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration of the public
prosecutor.
- The trial court posits that under R.A. No. 8493 pre-trial is mandatory and the
presence of the complaining witnesses is likewise required during the trial for the
parties to participate in the plea bargaining and stipulation of facts during said
proceedings. If the complaining witnesses are absent, the principal purpose of the
pre-trial cannot be achieved.
- It was incumbent on the public prosecutor to procure the attendance of its witnesses
for the pre-trial but this, he failed to do. The trial court stated that there were
instances in the past when the public prosecutor manifested to the trial court that it
had no witness for the pre-trial and moved for the dismissal of criminal cases. The
trial court contended that if the dismissal of the case was precipitate, it was the fault
of the public prosecutor and not the trial court
- It is evident that the presence of the complaining witnesses is likewise mandatory
because they have to participate in the plea bargaining and the stipulation of facts.
- Upon motion of the accused on the ground that the presence of the complaining
witnesses is likewise mandatory and that the accused is entitled to speedy trial, the
Court was compelled to dismiss the case. Said dismissal is neither capricious and
precipitate.
- The prosecution must endeavor to secure the presence of its complaining witnesses
or any witnesses by any form of communication such as telephone, telegram, or
letter. That is the essence of vigorous and adequate prosecution. In fact prosecutors
must interview their witnesses before the trial or before the hearing in Court. There
were instances in the past when the trial prosecutor manifested to the Court that it
had no witnesses and moved for the dismissal of the case during arraignment and
pre-trial.
- The People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the nullification of the
orders of the trial court. It alleged that the trial court acted without jurisdiction or

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with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering

the dismissal of the case and denying its motion for reconsideration.
- The Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition on the ground that
the errors committed by the trial court were mere errors of judgment which are not
correctible by a writ of certiorari. The appellate court also stated that a reinstatement
of the Ccriminal Case will place the private respondent in double jeopardy.
- Petitioner filed the present petition for the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which alleges that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling
that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case simply because three witnesses of its
eleven witnesses failed to appear at the initial pre-trial of the case. In fact, R.A. 8493
does not contain any provision which mandates a trial court to dismiss a criminal case
for failure of the witnesses of the prosecution to appear at the pre-trial.
Held:
- The petition is impressed with merit.
- Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution
listed in the Information, whether or not said witness is the offended party or the
complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the dismissal of a criminal case.
- Although under the law, pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of the
private complainant or the complaining witness is however not required. Even the
presence of the accused is not required unless directed by the trial court.
- Even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the State appeared for the
pre-trial, the same can and should proceed. After all, the public prosecutor appeared
for the State.
- The trial court thus acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed the case merely
because none of the witnesses notified by the trial court appeared for the pre-trial.
The State, like the accused is also entitled to due process in criminal cases. The order
of the trial court dismissing the criminal case deprived the State of its right to
prosecute and prove its case. Said order is, therefore, void for lack of jurisdiction, and
is of no effect. The right of the State to prosecute the case and prove the criminal
liability of the private respondent for the crime charged should not be derailed and
stymied by precipitate and capricious dismissal of the case at the initial pre-trial
stage.
- For justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been
wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily
a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the
society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then
must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State
and offended party, on the other.
- The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the reinstatement of the case does not
place the private respondent in double jeopardy.
- The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. The violation of the States right to due process
raises a serious jurisdiction issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Any judgment or
decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a lawless
thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it
exhibits its head.
- Respondent Judges dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy.
- To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense
as that in the first.
- Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it
violated the right of the prosecution to due processs.
- In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.
Case No. 55
G.R. Nos. 131799-801
February 23, 2004
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee vs. FELICIANO ULIT y TAMPOY, appellant.
Facts:
- Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati Cityfinding appellant Feliciano Ulit y Tampoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of two counts of qualified rape. In the same decision, the appellant was convicted of
two counts of acts of lasciviousness.
The appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty during the arraignment.
In the meantime, Lucelle (victim) was undergoing psychiatric treatment at the
Philippine General Hospital.
In November 1996, her uncle, the appellant, did something to her. When the
prosecution asked her what happened, Lucelle did not answer. When asked if she
wanted to continue with her testimony, again, she did not respond. The trial was
reset to June 2 and 9, 1997. When trial resumed on June 9, 1997, Lucelle was
questioned by the prosecution on direct examination, but still, she gave no answer.
She cried profusely in open court. When asked by the court if she wanted to proceed
with the trial, she remained silent. The trial was reset anew to July 9 and 14, 1997.
In the meantime, the trial court ordered that Lucelle be subjected to physical and
psychological examinations at the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH). During
the trial on July 14, 1997, Lucelle refused to take the witness stand. The trial was reset
to July 21, 1997. During the hearing on October 20, 1997, the prosecution presented
Lucelle anew to continue with her testimony on direct examination. She declared
that the appellant raped her in November 1996 and many other times thereafter.
Instead of asking questions to elicit the facts and circumstances before and during
the commission of the crimes, the prosecutor asked Lucelle to identify her signature
in her sworn statement and to affirm the truth of its contents. She did so.
The public prosecutor then marked the sworn statement in evidence as Exhibit "H,"
and then manifested to the court that he had no more questions for the witness on
direct examination.
Believing that the appellant had been abusing their daughter, Celso and Lourdes
brought Lucelle on March 5, 1997, to Barangay Chairman Romeo Medina. On their
way, Lucelle adamantly refused to tell her parents what the appellant did to her.
However, when they reached the barangay headquarters, Lucelle told the barangay
chairman that the appellant sexually abused her. Thereafter, Lourdes filed a
complaint with the barangay chairman against the appellant for sexually molesting
Lucelle.
Barangay Tanod Fernando David testified that on March 6, 1997, the barangay
chairman ordered him and Barangay Tanod Antonio Echavez to invite and bring the
appellant to the barangay hall. The barangay chairman asked the appellant if he
raped Lucelle and the latter replied that he did. A Sinumpaang Salaysay was prepared
in the Office of the Barangay Chairman in which the appellant admitted that he raped
Lucelle in February 1997, and on March 2, 1997, despite her resistance, and that he
threatened to kill her and her family if she divulged the incidents to her parents.13 The
appellant signed his statement in the presence of the barangay chairman and the
barangay tanods.
From the barangay headquarters, the appellant was brought to the Makati City Police
Headquarters where Celso, Lourdes and Lucelle filed a complaint against him for rape
and acts of laciviousness. SPO4 Lilia Hogar of the Womens Desk Unit took the sworn
statements of Lourdes and Lucelle.14 She conducted a custodial investigation of the
appellant who was without counsel during which the latter admitted having raped
the victim. SPO4 Hogar also prepared a report on her investigation of the victims
complaint.
When the prosecution offered in evidence the appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay
before the barangay chairman as part of the testimony of Barangay Tanod Fernando
David, the appellant objected to its admission on the ground that the appellant was
not assisted by counsel and that, he was forced and coerced into signing the same.
Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the statement as part of Davids testimony.
The appellants counsel, likewise, objected to the admissibility of Lucelles sworn
statement on the ground that she was incompetent to give the same because of her
mental illness. The trial court admitted the sworn statement of Lucelle in evidence as
part of her testimony.
When the case was called for trial again, his counsel manifested to the court that the
appellant was changing his plea in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-385 and 97-387 from "not
guilty" to "guilty." He also manifested that he would no longer adduce any evidence
in his defense in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-386 and 97-388 because the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes charged therein.
The trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of all the crimes charged.
The trial court declared that even prescinding from the appellants plea of guilty, the
prosecutor adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant for
qualified rape. The trial court ruled that although Lucelle did not testify on the
contents of her sworn statement the same were admissible in evidence as part of the
res gestae.

Issue:
- The trial court erred in sentencing the accused Feliciano Ulit with a death penalty
despite his adminssion of guilt.
Held:
- The appellant does not contest his conviction for rape and the validity of the
proceedings in the said cases in the trial court. He pleads, however, that he be spared
the death penalty. He asserts that he was so remorseful for the crimes he committed

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and that he pleaded guilty so that the proceedings before the court would be
shortened and simplified.
An appeal thus opens the whole case for review, and the appellate tribunal may
consider and correct errors though unassigned and even reverse the decision of the
trial court on the grounds other than those the parties raised as errors.
Appellants Plea of Guilty in Criminal Case No. 97-385 (Qualified Rape) was
Imprudently Made. Undoubtedly, the appellant was charged with a capital offense.
When the appellant informed the trial court of his decision to change his plea of "not
guilty" to "guilty," it behooved the trial court to conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea as mandated
by Section 6, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The raison detre for the rule is that the courts must proceed with extreme care
where the imposable penalty is death, considering that the execution of such
sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown that even innocent persons have at
times pleaded guilty. Improvident pleas of guilty to a capital offense on the part of
the accused must be averted since by admitting his guilt before the trial court, the
accused would forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the
meaning, significance and the dire consequences of his plea.
The focus of the inquiry must be on the voluntariness of the plea and the full or
complete comprehension by the accused of his plea of guilty so that it can truly be
said that it is based on a free and informed judgment.
In this case, the trial court failed to make a searching inquiry into the appellants
voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of guilty.
First. The trial court did not ask the appellant his reasons for changing his plea, from
not guilty to that of guilty, and the cogent circumstances that led him to decide to do
so.
Second. It appears in the Informations filed by the Public Prosecutor that the
appellant opted not to avail himself of his right to a regular preliminary investigation
and refused to execute a waiver under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Third. The trial court also failed to ascertain from the appellant whether he was
assisted by counsel when he executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the
barangay hall; and, if he was not so assisted by counsel, whether he had waived his
right thereto, before and when he signed his Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Fourth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant why he was pleading guilty to a rape.
Fifth. The trial court did not explain the following to the appellant, in plain and simple
terms so as to be understood by him: (a) the elements of the crime of qualified rape;
(b) the circumstances of relationship and the minority of the victim; and (c) that his
plea of guilty to qualified rape would not mitigate the penalty for the crime in light
of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Sixth. It was not explained to the appellant that if convicted of qualified rape, he
would be civilly liable to the victim in the amount of P50,000 as moral damages
and P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.
Seventh. Neither did the trial court inquire from the appellants counsel whether the
meaning and the consequences of a guilty plea were explained to the appellant in a
language or dialect known to and understood by him.
Eight. The trial court failed to delve into and ascertain from the appellant his age,
educational attainment and socio-economic status.
Ninth. The trial court failed to ask the appellant to narrate the facts and
circumstances surrounding the incident of qualified rape.
Tenth. The appellant was not asked if he desired to adduce evidence in Criminal Case
No. 97-385 in spite of his plea of guilty.
In this case, the prosecution had already rested its case when the appellant decided
to change his plea. In fact, the trial court granted the prosecutions motion that the
evidence it had presented be considered proof of the degree of culpability of the
appellant. It is incumbent upon this Court to determine whether the evidence
adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
appellants guilt for qualified rape.
The Prosecution Adduced Proof of the Appellants Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt of
the Crime of Rape.
We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the prosecution
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim in
November 1996. The victim declared in her sworn statement, on direct examination
and her testimony on clarificatory questions made by the trial court, that indeed, the
appellant raped her in November 1996.
We do not agree with the ruling of the trial court that the contents of the sworn
statement of Lucelle are hearsay, simply because she did not testify thereon and
merely identified her signatures therein. By hearsay evidence is meant that kind of
evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credence to be attributed to
the witness herself but rests solely in part on the veracity and competence of some
persons from whom the witness has received the information. In criminal cases, the
admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision
while the accused shall enjoy the right to confront and cross-examine the witness
testifying against him. Generally, the affidavits of persons who are not presented to
testify on the truth of the contents thereof are hearsay evidence. Such affidavit must
be formally offered in evidence and accepted by the court; otherwise, it shall not be

considered by the court for the simple reason that the court shall consider such
evidence formally offered and accepted.
In this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn
statement which she herself had given. As gleaned from the said statement, she
narrated how and when the appellant raped and subjected her to lascivious acts. She
was cross-examined by the appellants counsel and answered the trial courts
clarificatory questions. The prosecution offered her sworn statement as part of her
testimony and the court admitted the same for the said purpose without objection
on the part of the appellant.
The Prosecution Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt that the Appellant Raped the
Victim in February 1997
The trial court convicted the appellant of rape on the basis of Lucelles sworn
statement, the testimony of her mother, Lourdes Serrano, the appellants
statement executed in the Barangay Chairmans Office, and the testimony of Dr.
Armie Soreta-Umil. We agree with the trial courts findings and conclusion.
Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement
to the barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in
evidence against him because he was not under arrest nor under custodial
investigation when he gave his statement.
The Sufficiency of Evidence on Lucelles Relationship with the Appellant, her
Minority, and the Propriety of the Imposition of the Death Penalty
The appellants conviction for two counts of rape having been duly established by the
prosecution, we now come to the question of the penalty to be meted upon him.
The relationship between the appellant and the victim has been adequately
established. The allegations in both Informations that the appellant is the victims
"uncle," "a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree" is specific enough
to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. The prosecutions
evidence has also shown that the appellant is the victims uncle, being the older
brother of the victims mother, a fact that the appellant himself admitted.
The same cannot, however, be said with respect to the age of the victim. In the
present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document was presented
and offered in evidence to prove Lucelles age. While the victim testified that she was
born on February 19, 1986, therefore 11 years old when the appellant twice raped
her, the same will not suffice as the appellant did not expressly and clearly admit the
same as required by Pruna.
Another issue that needs to be settled is the third paragraph of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that, "[w]henever rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
imposable penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death."
In the determination of whether the death penalty should be imposed on the
appellant, the presence of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
crime is crucial. In the cases at bar, although the relationship of uncle and niece
between the appellant and the victim has been duly proven, the alternative
circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against the appellant. While it is true
that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes
against chastity, regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower
degree of the offended party, it is only taken into consideration under Article 15 of
the Revised Penal Code "when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in
the same degree of the offender." The relationship of uncle and niece is not covered
by any of the relationships mentioned.
Hence, for the prosecutions failure to prove the age of the victim by any means set
forth in Pruna, and considering that the relationship of uncle and niece is not covered
by any of the relationships mentioned in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, the appellant can only be convicted of rape in its aggravated form, the
imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the crimes,
the appellant should be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of
rape, conformably to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.

Case No. 56
G.R. No. L-836
March 30, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANACLETO MAGDANG, JOSE
CADUNGON and AMPARO SUMUGAT, defendants-appellees.
Facts:
- In December, 1942, the defendants-appellees were charged with malicious mischief
in the justice of the peace court of Culasi, Antique. The complaint alleged that they
had plowed land planted with mongo thereby damaging the owner in the sum of
fifteen pesos. They asserted the right to cultivate the land. Found guilty by the justice
of the peace, they appealed to the court of first instance.
- There the trial was postponed several times. On March 10, 1944, the case was called
for hearing. The provincial fiscal was absent. Counsel for defendants moved for
dismissal. Whereupon the judge made this order: xxx Finding their motion justified,

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 54 of 67

the case is hereby dismissed, with costs de oficio. The fiscal filed a notice of appeal
on March 20, 1944.
The Solicitor General contends in this Court that the order should be revoked,
because it does not appear that the provincial fiscal had been officially notified of the
actual date of hearing.
The records of the case now before us demonstrate how incomplete and informal
the proceedings wereobviously due to the emergency caused by the war. We find
therein that the fiscal never asserted in writing that he had not been notified. On the
other hand the judge says that said officer "failed to appear in court this morning
without any reason" which fairly implies that the fiscal had been notified, notice
being a fundamental requirement which must be presumed to have been complied
with.
In situation similar to the one asserted here by the prosecution, the fiscal or the party
affected should first make representations in the court below (in a motion for
reconsideration or new trial) as to the alleged non-receipt of notice, so that the trial
judge may have an opportunity to make an official statement on the point or see to
it that the records are completed.
Considering that the question involves a petty offense possibly mixed up with a civil
litigation, we see no justification in letting it clutter court records for a long time,
especially in the absence of a clear case.

Case No. 57
G.R. No. 128587
March 16, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y
CHEN, Respondents.
Facts:
- On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to
this Court via this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Manila granting private respondent
Lawrence C. Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3) charges
filed against him, namely: (1) (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2) (Illegal Possession of
Firearms); and (3) (COMELEC Gun Ban).
- During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations
and instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence
obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not
Guilty" be entered for him.
- On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios,
Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly known as shabu. In the course of the
investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph
Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then
set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order
another supply of shabu.
- At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio (workers of
Wang) were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to
SPO2 De Dios and company.
- Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced
themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was
Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back
compartment of the BMW car. When frisked, there was found inside the front right
pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm
automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other
members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the
following items: (a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance
with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known as
shabu; (b) cash in the amount ofP650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical
scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there,
Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
- On 19 December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation to the effect that it had
rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two cases for
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban. Accordingly, trial
continued.
- Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the
dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search
warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him.
- The prosecution filed its Opposition alleging that the warrantless search was legal as
an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now time for
the defense to present its evidence.
- Respondent judge issued the herein assailed Resolution granting Wangs Demurrer
to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence. Hence, this
petition15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial court erred
-

Issues:
1. Whether the prosecution may appeal the trial courts resolution granting Wangs
demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without
violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
2. Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this
case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
Held:
- It must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal
by mere filing of a notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal directly to
this Court.
- An order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on
the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the
accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has previously made some
exceptions. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
- The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded
as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever it exhibits its head."
- Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it
violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
- In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.
- Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing a criminal case by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence. The
general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable.
- The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the
prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on
the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal
case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would
be to place the accused in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the
case ends there.
- A judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the
lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
- Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon
a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In
resolving accuseds demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain
whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or
support a verdict of guilt.
- The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the
trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave
abuse of discretion. Once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy.
- Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even an
appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance
when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a
sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal,
the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the
trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice.
- Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then Secretary of
Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed
with the Court in the present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review on

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certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is different from a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions
which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the
issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the
intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis either of the law
or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if
the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one
of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the
remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction
and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction
in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower
courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for
certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an
appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for
certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the
lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the
private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of
Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for
certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to
an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from
the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review
should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the
decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within
fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the
petitioners motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, a
petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of
judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is
generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the
tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a
plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not
required before appealing a judgment or final order.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this case,
this petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal
order of the trial court by appeal without violating private respondents right against
double jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of
certiorari, which definitely this Court has the power to do, when there is a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, the instant
petition will nevertheless fail on the merits as the succeeding discussion will show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest
and the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be
conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.
However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which
thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may
be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at
bar, the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted
him of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted
in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search.
None of these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The
accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter
the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched
his car. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest.
Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he had
just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up
Pistol that the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front
pocket of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not
give an outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket
as was done by the accused. The arresting officers had no information and knowledge
that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in
possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.

- Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with
magazine that were found and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car
were not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the
Daewoo handgun was underneath the drivers seat of the car. The police officers had
no information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car, or that
the accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere
suspicion that there was shabu therein.
- The warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car were
without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall
under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, and is
therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty.
- The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded
the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the
incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a
consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the
case for lack of evidence.
- Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest three (3) instances
when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting
officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime which had
just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending.
- For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a)
of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
- The case at bar did not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private
respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police.
He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the
parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his
person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later
on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible
offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto
under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent
any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view
of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
- Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5.
What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang
was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck
and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of
shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of
the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto.
- The inevitable conclusion is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the
warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
- In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was
like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became a suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the fugitive finger that
triggered his arrest. The identification of the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officer (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Case No. 58
G.R. No. 165996
October 17, 2005
RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, Petitioner vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
Facts:
- This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the June 14,
2004 Order of respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25160, which denied
petitioners motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and set the case for
presentation of evidence for the prosecution; as well as its July 28, 2004
Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
- On February 10, 1999, petitioner Rodolfo G. Valencia, then governor of Oriental
Mindoro was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information
filed against petitioner reads: xxx did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally cause undue injury to the Province of Oriental Mindoro, and at the same
time give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to one CRESENTE UMBAO,
a candidate who ran and lost in the 1992 election, by then and there appointing said
Cresente Umbao as Sangguniang Bayan member of Pola, Oriental Mindoro, within
the prohibitive period of one (1) year after an election, in flagrant violation of Sec. 6,

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 56 of 67

Art IX B of the Constitution, to the damage and prejudice of the Province of Oriental
Mindoro and to the government as a whole.
Upon arraignment on April 13, 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Mr. Rodolfo G. Valencia was the Governor of the Province of Oriental Mindoro, for
having won in the gobernatorial race in the May 1992 local and provincial election.;
During the 1992 election, Mr. Cresente Umbao of Pola, Oriental, Mindoro ran for the
position of councilor in the Municipality of Pola, Oriental Mindoro but he lost.
On October 17, 1992, Councilor Antonio Mercene, Jr. of Pola, Oriental, Mindoro died
thus creating a permanent vacancy in the membership position of Sanguniang Bayan
of Pola, Oriental Mindoro.
On December 1, 1992 then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia of Oriental, Mindoro,
appointed Cresente Umbao to the position of a councilor in the Municipal Council of
Pola, Oriental Mindoro on the vacancy left by the death of Councilor Mercene.
The Prosecution contends that this appointment is in violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
3019 as it gives among other, unwarranted benefit to Mr. Cresente Umbao who is
disqualified to be appointed within a period of one year after having lost in May 1992
local election for councilor.
The accused maintains that the appointment of Lumbao was in the performance of
his duty and that it was made in good faith pursuant the Local Government Code.
The Court orders both counsels and the accused to sign each and every page of the
Joint Stipulation of Facts. Thereafter, a pre-trial order be issued on the bases of the
agreement of both parties as embodied in this Joint Stipulation of Facts. The Joint
Stipulation of Facts however remained unsigned by petitioner. Only the signature of
the Special Prosecutor and petitioners counsel appear on the last page thereof.
Prosecutor Danilo F. Salindong rested the case based on the Joint Stipulation of Facts
and waived the presentation of testimonial or documentary evidence for the
prosecution.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence because the
prosecution failed to present, mark or offer evidence that would substantiate the
charge against him. Petitioner asserted that the Joint Stipulation of Facts is
inadmissible because it lacks his signature. Even if the same be admitted, the
information is dismissable for failure of the prosecution to submit evidence to
establish the injury caused to the government and the presence of manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in the appointment of
Cresente Umbao, which are among the essential elements of the crime of violation
of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
The prosecution filed an Opposition/Comment alleging that petitioners Motion for
Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence is premature because the prosecution has yet to
formally offer the Joint Stipulation of Facts.
On February 20, 2004, the Sandiganbayan reiterated its March 26, 2003 Resolution
directing petitioner and counsels to sign the Joint Stipulation of Facts.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration claiming that his
former counsel was not authorized to enter into any agreement and that he came to
know of the existence of said stipulations only on January 12, 2004.
Considering petitioners refusal to acknowledge the Joint Stipulation of Facts or to
sign the Pre-trial Order, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed June 14, 2004 Order
recalling the Pre-trial Order; denying the motion for leave to file demurrer; and
setting the case for presentation of the prosecutions evidence.
Hence, the instant petition contending that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the assailed June 14, 2004 Order and July 28, 2004 Resolution.

Issues:
1. Was petitioners Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence premature?
2. May the prosecution be allowed to present evidence after it orally manifested its
intention to rest its case?
3. Was petitioner denied his right to speedy trial?
Held:
- Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, provides: SEC. 23. Demurrer to evidence.
After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with
or without leave of court.
- Corollarily, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 34. Offer of
evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
- A demurrer to evidence tests the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecutions
evidence. A demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same must be filed
after the prosecution rests its case. But before an evidence may be admitted, the
rules require that the same be formally offered, otherwise, it cannot be considered
by the court. A prior formal offer of evidence concludes the case for the prosecution
and determines the timeliness of the filing of a demurrer to evidence.
- In the present case, petitioners motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence is
premature because the prosecution had yet to formally rest its case. When the
motion was filed on January 19, 2004, the latter had not yet marked nor formally
offered the Joint Stipulation of Facts as evidence. It is inconsequential that petitioner

received by mail on January 27, 2004, a motion and formal offer of evidence
dated January 20, 2004 from Prosecutor Salindong, because, as aptly observed by the
Office of the Ombudsman, the records of the Sandiganbayan bear no such motion or
formal offer of evidence filed by the prosecution.
Under Section 12, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, the filing of a pleading or paper shall
be proved by its existence in the case records. The absence of the motion to rest the
case in the records of the Sandiganbayan and the failure to offer the Joint Stipulation
of Facts prove that the prosecution did not formally rest or conclude the presentation
of its evidence, rendering petitioners motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence,
premature.
At any rate, had the prosecution actually filed said motion and formally offered the
evidence before the Sandiganbayan, the motion for leave to file demurrer to
evidence still suffers prematurity because it was filed on January 19, 2004, or one day
before the date of the motion and offer, i.e., January 20, 2004. In fact, even petitioner
admitted in his motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence that the prosecution
failed to mark and offer any evidence against him.
Anent the second issue, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the prosecutions request to present additional evidence. Admission of
additional evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
It must be emphasized that the primary consideration in allowing the reopening of
a case is for the accused to have his day in court and the opportunity to present
counter evidence.
Appellants claim that the trial courts concession to "reopen" the case unduly
prejudiced him is not well taken. We note that appellant had every opportunity to
present his evidence to support his case or to refute the prosecutions evidence
point-by-point, after the prosecution had rested its case. In short, appellant was
never deprived of his day in court. A day in court is the touchstone of the right to due
process in criminal justice. We are unable to hold that a grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-called "reopening" in order
to complete the testimony of a prosecution witness.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot claim denial of due process because he will have
the opportunity to contest the evidence adduced against him and to prove his
defenses after the prosecution concludes the presentation of its evidence. Moreover,
the order of the trial court granting the reception of additional evidence for the
prosecution is not technically a "reopening" of the case inasmuch as the latter had
yet to formally rest its case. A motion to reopen presupposes that either or both
parties have formally offered and closed their evidence.
The State is also entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, a fair opportunity
to prosecute and convict. The Court has always accorded this right to the
prosecution, and where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled the
offending court action.
The haphazard manner by which Prosecutor Salindong handled the case for the State
will not pass unnoticed by the Court. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to bring
the criminal proceedings for the punishment of the guilty. Concomitant with this is
the duty to pursue the prosecution of a criminal action and to represent the public
interest. With these standards, we thus find Prosecutor Salindong remiss in the
performance of his responsibilities. He gravely abused his discretion by resting the
case without adducing evidence for the State and without ensuring that petitioner
had signed the Joint Stipulation of Facts before it was submitted to the
Sandiganbayan. As a result, the prosecution was denied due process.
In light of the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan was therefore correct in allowing the
State to adduce additional evidence. The State should not be prejudiced and deprived
of its right to prosecute cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the
Special Prosecutor. A contrary ruling would result in a void proceedings.
The public prosecutor violated his bounden duty to protect the interest of the
offended party. The public prosecutor was duty-bound to exhaust all available proofs
to establish the guilt of the accused and bring them to justice for their offense against
the injured party.
Likewise guilty for serious nonfeasance was the trial court. Notwithstanding its
knowledge that the evidence for the prosecution was insufficient to convict,
especially after the public prosecutor tenaciously insisted on utilizing Nuada as state
witness, the trial court passively watched as the public prosecutor bungled the case.
The trial court was well aware of the nature of the testimonies of the seven
prosecution witnesses that have so far been presented. Given this circumstance, the
trial court, motu proprio, should have called additional witnesses for the purpose of
questioning them himself in order to satisfy his mind with reference to particular
facts or issues involved in the case.
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that petitioner was deprived of her day in court.
Indeed, it is not only the State, but more so the offended party, that is entitled to due
process in criminal cases. Inasmuch as the acquittal of the accused by the court a
quo was done without regard to due process of law, the same is null and void. It is as
if there was no acquittal at all, and the same cannot constitute a claim for double
jeopardy.
The right to speedy trial cannot be successfully invoked where to sustain the same
would result in a clear denial of due process to the prosecution. While justice is
administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 57 of 67

mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice
is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of
public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by
the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are
to give meaning to that intent.
As significant as the right of an accused to a speedy trial is the right of the State to
prosecute people who violate its penal laws. The right to a speedy trial is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays.
In the instant case, allowing the prosecution to present additional evidence, is a
lawful exercise of due process and is certainly not intended to vex or oppress the
petitioner. In the balancing test used to determine whether an accused had been
denied speedy disposition of cases, the scales tilt in favor of allowing the prosecution
to adduce further evidence. Slowly but surely, justice and due process would be
afforded to the prosecution and to petitioner as well who would have the chance to
present counter evidence. On the other hand, to erroneously put premium on the
right to speedy trial in the instant case and deny the prosecutions prayer to adduce
additional evidence would logically result in the dismissal of the case for the State.
There is no difference between an order outrightly dismissing the case and an order
allowing the eventual dismissal thereof. Both would set a dangerous precedent which
enables the accused, who may be guilty, to go free without having been validly tried,
thereby infringing the interest of the society.
All this time, however, petitioner never invoked his right to speedy trial. The rule as
consistently applied in this jurisdiction is that objections to the sluggish disposition
of the case must be positively invoked by the accused and a demand therefor must
be openly made.
We see no reason to deviate from the jurisprudential holdings and treat the instant
case differently. Petitioner never contested the prosecutorial proceedings nor timely
challenged the pendency of the case after arraignment. It was only in the Motion for
Reconsideration of the June 14, 2004 order denying the demurrer to evidence and
setting the case for reception of additional evidence for the prosecution, that
petitioner insisted on his right to speedy trial.
Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, failure of the accused to move for
dismissal prior to trial constitutes a waiver of his right to speedy trial. His failure
therefore to timely question the delay in the disposition of the case amounted to an
implied acceptance of such delay and a waiver of the right to question the same. Like
any other right conferred by the Constitution or statute, except when otherwise
expressly so provided, the speedy trial right may be waived when not positively
asserted. Thus, if there was a delay in the disposition of the case, petitioner is not
entirely without blame.
While petitioner is free to acknowledge or reject the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the
trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in ordering petitioner to sign
the same considering that said stipulation was not yet formally offered by the
prosecution. At that stage, said document cannot yet be considered "officially" an
evidence for the prosecution. The refusal therefore of petitioner to affix his signature
in the said stipulation or in the Pre-trial Order embodying the same is sufficient
justification for the trial court to recall the latter and in the exercise of its sound
discretion, set the case for presentation of the prosecutions evidence.
Finally, if petitioner disagrees with the denial of his motion for leave to file demurrer
to evidence, his remedy is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed with the
presentation of his evidence and to appeal any adverse decision that may be
rendered by the trial court. The last sentence of Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, provides that "the order denying a motion for leave of court to file demurrer
to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or certiorari
before judgment."

Case No. 59
G.R. No. 151931.
September 23, 2003
ANAMER SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTHERS
MARKETING CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:
- This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal
Procedure of the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City, dated November 19,
2001, and its Order dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the said court on the civil aspect thereof and to allow her to present
evidence thereon.
- On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner
Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court
of Legazpi City.
- Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
- On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from
J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for
these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private complainant Check No. 067481

drawn against the Prudential Bank by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount
of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance that it
was a good check.
Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed
account (Account Closed). The petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She
replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid
Bank which was also returned with the word DAUD (Drawn Against Uncollected
Deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with
Leave of Court alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the
following reasons: (a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena
Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the
check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that
the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in order
to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the
petitioner replaced it with a second one.
The first transaction had therefore been effectively novated by the issuance of the
second check. Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not for insufficiency
of funds, but for DAUD, which in banking parlance means drawn against uncollected
deposit.
According to the petitioner, this means that the account had sufficient funds but was
still restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared.
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner
of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount
of the check as payment for her purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for
the prosecution did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena
Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the
private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena Jaucian
Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners
breach of the warranty that the check was a good one is not synonymous with the
fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit under Article 315(2)(d).
Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to
present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. On January 14, 2002, the
court issued an order denying the motion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that
after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due
process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she
was not civilly liable to the private respondent. The petitioner invokes the
applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that
before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should have been first
accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.

Held:
- The petition is meritorious.
- According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
- The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
- When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount
thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
- Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon
the filing thereof in court.
- Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual
damages.
- No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in
the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action.
- The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed.
- Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged
therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently

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awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute
a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with
the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the
civil and criminal actions.
The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. Moreover, the
civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and
indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the
criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental
to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that
criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the
sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of
the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, the
action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to
indemnify the former.
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two
actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment
of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the
accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State
on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the
delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the
defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.
The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect of the action, the quantum of evidence is
preponderance of evidence.
The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the
offended party. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce
its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court should render judgment not only on the criminal
aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect.
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability
of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover,
the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on
the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the
judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the
aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the
judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file
a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he
waives the same. The aforecited rule reads: Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the
prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with
or without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused
may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without
leave of court, the accused waives his right to present evidence and submits the case
for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its
grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the
prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion within a nonextendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the
demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before the
judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion to
dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable

doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of
court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for
decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the
accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce
evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his
demurrer is denied by the court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the
trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to
evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused
to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect of the case would be
a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process is
thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.:[11]
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
When the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced
evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on
record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue
an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to adduce
evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal
evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the
basis of the evidence of the prosecution and the accused.
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d)
of the Revised Penal Code. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly
instituted since there was no waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability
nor a reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before the
institution of the criminal action.
The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court
issued an order granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner
was not criminal but only civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the civil
aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the
private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence
thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process.

Case No. 60
G.R. No. 188560
December 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
NORMAN, Accused-Appellant.

vs.

RICKY

ALFREDO

Facts:
- This is an appeal from the September 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court which found accusedappellant Ricky Alfredo y Norman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
rape.
- Accused-appellant was charged in two (2) separate Informations. On June 21, 2001,
accused-appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
Prosecutions Version of Facts
- On April 28, 2001, AAA was awakened by a beam of light coming from the gaps in the
walls of the shack directly illuminating her face. She then inquired who the person
was, but nobody answered. Instead, the light was switched off. After a few minutes,
the light was switched on again. Thereafter, a male voice shouted, "Rumwar kayo
ditta no saan kayo nga rumwar paletpeten kayo iti bala!"9 AAA remained seated.
Then, the male voice uttered, "Lukatam daytoy no saan mo nga lukatan bilangan ka,
maysa, duwa" AAA immediately woke BBB up. Just then, the male voice said,
"Pabitaken kayo iti bala." AAA cried out of fear.
- Anxious that the person outside would kill her and her son, AAA lit the gas lamp
placed on top of the table, and opened the door while her son stood beside it. As the
door opened, she saw accused-appellant directly in front of her holding a flashlight.
AAA did not immediately recognize accused-appellant, as his hair was long and was
covering his face. She invited him to come inside the shack, but the latter
immediately held her hair and ordered her to walk uphill. Helpless and terrified, AAA
obeyed him. All the while, accused-appellant was behind her.
- Accused-appellant placed the lit flashlight in his pocket and ordered AAA to remove
her clothes. When she refused, accused-appellant boxed her left eye and removed
her clothes. When she also attempted to stop accused-appellant, the latter angrily
slapped her face. Completely naked, AAA was again ordered to walk uphill. Accused-

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 59 of 67

appellant ordered AAA to stop and lie on top of the stump, after accused-appellant
boxed her thighs. Accused-appellant then bent down and spread open AAAs legs.
After directing the beam of the flashlight on AAAs naked body, accused-appellant
removed his pants, lowered his brief to his knees, went on top of her, and inserted
his penis into her vagina. Accused-appellant threatened to box her if she moves.
Accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and inserted his penis into her vagina
and moved his buttocks up and down. After being satisfied, accused-appellant stood
up and lit a cigarette. Afterwards, accused-appellant went on top of AAA again and
tried to insert his penis in the latters vagina. His penis, however, has already
softened. Frustrated, accused-appellant knelt and inserted his fingers in her vagina.
After removing his fingers, accused-appellant held a twig about 10 inches long and
the size of a small finger in diameter which he used to pierce her vagina. Dissatisfied,
accused-appellant removed the twig and inserted the flashlight in her vagina. After
accused-appellant removed the flashlight from AAAs vagina, he went on top of her
again, pressing his elbows on her upper breasts and boxing her shoulders and thighs.
Subsequently, accused-appellant stood up and warned her not to report the incident
to the authorities. Immediately after, he left her at the scene.
- The trial court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and rendered its
Decision dated February 17, 2006, finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts of
rape. The case was then transferred to the CA. The CA affirmed the judgment of
conviction by the trial court.
Assignment of Errors:
1. By the nature of the offense in the two (2) informations filed against accusedappellant, the latter has no other plausible defense except alibi that should not just
be brushed aside if there are material inconsistencies in the claims of the witnesses
for the prosecution.
2. The decision convicting accused-appellant heavily relied on the demeanor of the
witnesses for the prosecution during the trial when the ponente of the decision did
not have any opportunity to hear the witnesses.
3. The then and there conduct of accused-appellant is unlikely to yield a guilty verdict.
Held:
- We sustain accused-appellants conviction.
- Accused-appellant contends that he could not offer any other defense except denial
and alibi. It should be noted that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused
to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. He must
likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime
scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
- A review of the records in the instant case would reveal that accused-appellant failed
to present convincing evidence that he did not leave his house, which is only about
150 meters away from the shack of AAA, in the evening of April 28, 2001.
Significantly, it was also not physically impossible for accused-appellant to be present
on the mountain where he allegedly raped AAA at the time it was said to have been
committed.
- It has been held, time and again, that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and
crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses. It is evidence
negative in nature and self-serving and cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive

evidence.There being no strong and credible evidence adduced to overcome the

testimony of AAA, no weight can be given to the alibi of accused-appellant.
As between the statement made in an affidavit and that given in open court, the
latter is superior
Accused-appellant contends also that there were material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in the latters respective affidavits, to
wit: (1) whether accused-appellants penis was erect or not; and (2) whether AAA
indeed recognized accused-appellant when they were already on the mountain or
while they were still in the shack.
Discrepancies do not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness, for affidavits,
being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of
searching inquiries by the investigating officer or due to partial suggestions, and are,
thus, generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.
The validity of conviction is not adversely affected by the fact that the judge who
rendered judgment was not the one who heard the witnesses.
We do not agree. The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the
one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial, but
merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the judgment erroneous,
especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion.
The guilt of accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
This Court is satisfied that the prosecutions evidence established the guilt of
accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, accused-appellant
is charged with two counts of rapeone under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code and the other under par. 2 of Art. 266-A.
Elements of rape under par. 1(a) of Art. 266-A of the Code are the following: (1) that
the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(3) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.

- Elements of rape under par. 2 of Art. 266-A of the Code are as follows: (1) that the
offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2) that the act of sexual assault is
committed by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice or by
inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person;
and that the act of sexual assault is accomplished by using force or intimidation,
among others.
- The prosecution has sufficiently established the existence of the foregoing elements.
When AAA was called to the witness stand, she gave a detailed narration of the
incident that transpired in the evening of April 28, 2001 and early morning of April
29, 2001. AAA categorically asserted that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of
her and even sexually assaulted her against her will with the use of force, threat, or
intimidation.
- The decision of the CA as to the damages awarded must be modified.
Case No. 61
G.R. No. 111610
February 27, 2002
ROMEO P. NAZARENO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRIQUE M.
ALMARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 15, Naic, Cavite, and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Facts:
- Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of CA which found and
declared that no grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the
Decision dated October 12, 1992 of Judge Enrique M. Almario of the RTC Cavite, in
Criminal Case No. NC-564 dismissing, for having been filed out of time, petitioners
appeal from a judgment dated November 8, 1985, of conviction for serious physical
injuries, rendered by the MTC of Naic, Cavite.
- An Information dated December 1, 1983 petitioner Romeo Nazareno and his wife,
Elisa Nazareno, were charged with Serious Physical Injuries in the Municipal Trial
Court of Naic, Cavite and that upon arraignment, both pleaded "not guilty" to the
offense charged.
- After trial on the merits, the said court set the promulgation of judgment for April 24,
1986, but the same was postponed due to petitioners filing of a motion to re-open
the case on the ground of non-presentation of a vital witness who could not be
produced during the trial proper.
- On November 27, 1987, after Presiding Judge Manuel C. Diosomito was suspended,
Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Jr. issued a resolution denying
the motion to re-open.
- Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with a prayer
for a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction.
- In the meantime, Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge Icasiano, Jr. set the promulgation
of judgment on April 15, 1988. On April 15, 1988, Acting MTC Judge promulgated the
Decision dated November 8, 1985 of Judge Manuel C. Diosomito acquitting Elisa
Nazareno but convicting the petitioner as charged.
- On the same date, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining Judge Icasiano, Jr. from proceeding with the promulgation of said
judgment since a copy of the same resolution containing the temporary restraining
order was received by the Metropolitan Trial Court only after said date.
- Petitioner filed in CA a supplemental petition to declare the nullity of judgment, on
the ground that the decision, having been signed by Judge Diosomito, should have
also been promulgated by him, and not by Acting Judge Icasiano, Jr. Petitioner also
alleged that the decision is void since at the time of the promulgation of the decision
by Judge Icasiano, Jr., Judge Diosomito who signed the subject decision has already
retired from office. Said supplemental petition was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Reconsideration of the said decision of the appellate court was also denied.
- Petitioner interposed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court
questioning the February 11, 1991 decision of the Court of Appeals but the same
failed for having been filed out of time, more specifically twelve (12) days late.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the Supreme Court in a
Resolution dated September 18, 1991. On October 3, 1991, petitioner received a
copy of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, and on the same date
he filed his notice of appeal with the said Municipal Trial Court of Naic, appealing its
decision to the Regional Trial Court.
- On October 10, 1991, the records of the case were forwarded to the Regional Trial
Court, presided by the respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario who dismissed the
appeal of petitioner for having been filed out of time. Reconsideration was sought by
petitioner but the same was denied by respondent Judge Almario.
- UPetitioner interposed a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals upon the premise that respondent Judge Almario, in dismissing the appeal,
unlawfully neglected to perform a duty resulting from his office to give due course to
petitioners appeal which was already approved. The appellate court dismissed the
petition. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied.
Issues:
1. The appeal interposed by peititoner as accused in Criminal Case No. 2335 of the MTC,
presided by the respondent judge was filed on time.

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 60 of 67

2. The filing of a supplemental petition, followed by a motion for reconsideration, in CAGR No. 14329 (Criminal Case No. 2335), as well as the filing of a petition for review
on certiorari with the Supreme Court in GR No. 97812 and followed by a motion for
reconsideration interrupted the running of the 15-day period within which to perfect
petitioners appeal from the court decision of the MTC in Criminal Case No. 2335.
3. The respondent court as well as the respondent judge, clearly committed or
exceeded their authority or acted in excess of jurisdiction when they dismissed
petitioners appeal from the decision of the MTC to the RTC, as well as their motion
for reconsideration filed in CA-GR No. 14329 of the respondent judge and the
respondent court respectively.
4. Under the circusmtances of the case and in the exercise of its sound discretion in
order to dispense justice to petitioner, this honorable tribunal may validly and legally
give due course to the present petition and to declare the decision of the lower court
as null and void as the trial judge who pended the decision had long retired from the
service at the time of the promulgation on April 15, 1988.
Held:
- The crucial argument raised by the petitioner is but a repetition of his main assertion
in his prior petition for review in G.R No. 97812 before this Court which,
unfortunately, was dismissed on a technicality - failure to file the petition within the
prescribed period. Considering the transcendental importance of the issues herein
raised which involve the precious liberty of a person and to finally settle this cycle of
unsettled questions of law, justice dictates that this Court resolve this petition on the
merits.
- There is one vital fact that renders the instant petition meritorious, which is
petitioners last issue for consideration, namely, the error committed by the trial
judge, Judge Icasiano, Jr., in promulgating a decision penned by another judge, Judge
Diosomito, who has ceased to be a member of the judiciary at the time of the
promulgation of the decision.
- A judgment promulgated after the judge who signed the decision has ceased to hold
office is not valid and binding.
- In like manner, a decision penned by a judge during his incumbency cannot be validly
promulgated after his retirement. When a judge retired all his authority to decide
any case, i.e., to write, sign and promulgate the decision thereon also "retired" with
him. In other words, he had lost entirely his power and authority to act on all cases
assigned to him prior to his retirement.
- In the instant case, therefore, Judge Icasiano, Jr. could not validly promulgate the
decision of another judge, Judge Diosomito, who has long "retired" from the service.
The decision dated November 8, 1985 of Judge Diosomito, as promulgated by Judge
Icasiano, Jr., in Criminal Case No. 2335 of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite is
a void judgment.
- A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in
the case at bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal
Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory.
In contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed nonexistent. Thus, there was
no effective or operative judgment to appeal from.
- A void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is
void.
- Admittedly, petitioner made possible the failure of the prior petition for review (G.R
No. 97812) before this Court to proceed by reason of its late filing as well as his
choices of remedial measures. It is within the power of this Court to temper rigid
rules of procedure in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the Rules
of Court be faithfully observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses
that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended
to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher
objective they seek which is the attainment of justice and the protection of
substantive rights of the parties. Thus, the relaxation of procedural rules, or saving a
particular case from the operation of technicalities when substantial justice requires
it, as in the case at bar, should no longer be subject to cavil.
Case No. 62
G.R. No. 141524
September 14, 2005
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and
CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.
ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro,Respondent.
Facts:
- Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob
Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and
titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction
before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of

Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of
Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed various motions with the trial court.
Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent
heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2)
the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the
Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge
Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners
motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development
in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the
respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them
was improper; (2) the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was
denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be
determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of
del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual
matters that could be determined only after trial.
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their
motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue
of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for
the trial proper.
The trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had
already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on
March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion
for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing
the motion for reconsideration3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days
later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and paid the appeal fees
on August 3, 1998.
The court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days
late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice
of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial
court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal. CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day
period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they
received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the
appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules.

Issue:
The issue essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have
filed their notice of appeal.
Held:
- The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right
to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules.
- BP 129, as amended, provides: Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases
shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x
- Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: SEC. 3. Period of
ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order. The period to appeal shall
be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
(emphasis supplied)
- An appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits
which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action.
- Petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998
order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial
of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 61 of 67

period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998.
We sustain petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion
for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on
time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final
order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal
period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted
to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only
interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having
filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only
one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their
MR. Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh
period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the order dismissing their motion
for reconsideration.
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.26 It has the sole
prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
This "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasijudicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals
by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
We hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh
period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying
their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule
41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days
from notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes
significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another
opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error
of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of
courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15day appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3,
1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
A party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the
"final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original
appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion
for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the
fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

Case No. 63
G.R. No. 170979
February 9, 2011
JUDITH YU, Petitioner, vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Facts:
- Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for
estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC.
- In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged.
- Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new
trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would
exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted.
- In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for
new trial for lack of merit.
- On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging
that pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a "fresh period" of

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 62 of 67

15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial,
or up to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.
On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a
copy of Neypes for his guidance.
On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being
filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.
On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision. On
January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution. On
January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and
for the execution of the decision.
The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecutions
motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period
provided by the Rules of Court, applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in
Neypes.
The respondent People of the Philippines filed a manifestation stating that Neypes
applies to criminal actions since the evident intention of the "fresh period rule" was
to set a uniform appeal period provided in the Rules.
Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to extend
the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the
pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to
the interpretation of the appeal periods in civil cases.

15-day appeal period should be counted. The 15-day period to appeal is no longer
interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration;
litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day
period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or
resolution.
- While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement
of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal
cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedur.
- We agree with the OSGs view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused
on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same
treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal
case where no less than the liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the
protection we must extend to matters of liberty cannot be overstated.
- We hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on November 16,
2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date
of receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.

Issue:
Whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal
cases.

Facts:
- This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to annul and set aside the decision of respondent Court of Appeals acquitting private
respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua of the crime of estafa.
- On April 14, 1961, private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua,
father and son, were elected President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Surigao
Development Bank, a private development bank, with a capital of P1 Million, duly
subscribed and paid-up.
- Out of its total capitalization, P500,000.00 was subscribed by DBP in accordance with
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 85 as amended; the other P500,000.00 are by private
stockholders.
- Pursuant to a resolution of the Board of Directors, the capital of P1 Million was
deposited with the Pacific Banking Corporation in Manila and private respondents
Felipe Plaza Chua as President and Melchor Avila Chua as Treasurer, were authorized
to sign checks and withdrawal slips to effect withdrawal from the depository bank.
- The Surigao Development Bank formally started operations on April 19, 1961. On the
same date, said respondents started withdrawing from the deposit various amounts
by means of checks drawn against the Pacific Banking Corporation amounting to a
total of P999,000.00, leaving a balance of P1,000.00.
- An examination of the books of accounts as well as the operations of the Surigao
Development Bank was conducted by the Central Bank of the Philippines which
revealed a shortage of P480,000.00 and which increased to P555,000.00.
- Based on their findings, Acting Superintendent of Banks Jose S. Martinez wrote
herein private respondents, asking them to authorize the Pacific Banking Corporation
to furnish the Central Bank with the records of deposits of Surigao Development Bank
together with photocopies of the checks drawn against the latter, and further asking
them for a conference regarding the examination. Due to the refusal of private
respondents to come to Manila for the conference, the Acting Superintendent of
Banks referred the matter to the Monetary Board.
- On July 10, 1962, the Monetary Board passed a resolution directing private
respondents to refund and deposit with Pacific Banking Corporation the shortage of
P555,000.00; to require their permanent separation as President and Treasurer; to
disqualify them from being directors thereof and/or holders of such other positions
therein as will enable them again to exercise influence over the management of the
affairs and operations of said bank; and to limit the bank's activities to accepting loan
re-payments and servicing of its deposit liabilities.
- On August 11, 1962, the private respondents wrote the Monetary Board denying the
shortage and asking for a reconsideration of its decision. On October 30, 1962,
Resolution No. 1281 was passed by the Monetary Board denying the request.
- The Court directed the Pacific Banking Corporation to produce the bank statements
of deposits and withdrawals of the Surigao Development Bank, but the Central Bank
could not conduct the necessary examination due to an injunction issued by the Court
of Appeals.
- On July 2, 1968, an information was filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila
charging herein private respondents Felipe Plaza Chua and Melchor Avila Chua with
the crime of estafa.
- Both accused-private respondents pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the
trial, the amount of shortage proved was P499,000.00.
- The trial court rendered its decision finding private respondents guilty of the crime
charged.

Held:
- We find merit in the petition.
- The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right it is a statutory
privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as
provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
provisions of the law. The period to appeal is specifically governed by Section 39 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), as amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
- Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides: SEC. 39. Appeals. The period for
appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in
all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in
habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the
notice of the judgment appealed from.
- Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: SEC. 3. Period of

the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall be interrupted
by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time
to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: SEC. 6. When
appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new
trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has
been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period
begins to run.
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day
period within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days
from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
This "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasijudicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari
to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for
reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues
involved in the case. The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the
appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the

Case No. 64
G.R. No. 41859
March 8, 1989
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, FELIPE PLAZA CHUA and
MELCHOR AVILA CHUA, respondents.

- Both private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 21, 1975, the
Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing the decision of the trial court and
acquitting private respondents.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent CA has jurisdiction to render a decision entirely
disregarding the findings of facts made by the trial court which are duly supported by
the evidence consisting mainly of documents and instead, adopt its own findings of
fact based (a) on speculation and conjecures, (b) on misapprehension of facts, and
(c) contrary to the documents and exhibits of the case, thus, leadint it to no other
alternative but to formulate inferences and conclusions which are absurd and
positively impossible.
2. Whether or not the respondent CA has jurisdiction to render a decision by relying on
an exhibit which was not formally offered, much less admitted in evidence during the
trial.
3. Whether or not the respondent CA has jurisdiction to render a decision by relying on
a document and giving the same a meaning completely contrary to its contents thus
distorting the corret context of the same.
Held:
- We rule in the affirmative.
- Section 11 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court defines the power of the appellate court
on appeals taken to it: Section 11. Power of Appellate Court on Appeal Upon
appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance, the appellate court may
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed
by the trial, remand the case to the Court of First Instance for new trial or retrial, or
dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied).
- The reason behind this rule is that an appeal of a criminal case opens its entire
records for review in order to resolve not only questions of law but also questions of
facts. The Court of Appeals may thus re-examine and re- weigh all the evidence on
record and affirm, modify or reverse the findings of facts and conclusions of the lower
court. That its findings of facts or conclusions are erroneous do not thereby deprive
it of its jurisdiction over the appealed criminal care as the mere fact that the court
decides the question wrongly is utterly immaterial to its jurisdiction.
- In the case at bar, the appeal of private respondents having been regularly taken to
the Court of Appeals, the appellate court was clothed with the power and authority
to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. In so doing, it
re-examined and re-weighed the evidence on record and came to the conclusion that
private respondents were not guilty of the crime charged as the withdrawal of the
alleged shortage was done without intent to defraud nor was damage or prejudice
caused thereby to Surigao Development Bank or the Development Bank of the
Philippines.
- Whether this conclusion was based merely on speculations and conjecture, or on a
misapprehension of facts and contrary to the documents and exhibits of the case, is
not for us to determine in a petition for certiorari wherein only issues of jurisdiction
may be raised. Neither can we determine whether the constructions given by the
appellate court to a document is right or wrong as errors in the appreciation of
evidence may not be reviewed by certiorari because they do not involve any
jurisdictional question.
- The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of
its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. It is available only for these purposes and not to
correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings or conclusions. The
mere fact that the court decides the question wrong is utterly immaterial to the
question of its jurisdiction.
- Errors of judgment may be corrected in a timely appeal from the judgment on the
merits. Such remedy, however, is not available in the case at bar, the decision
involved being one of acquittal. An appeal therefrom by the People would run
counter to the accused's constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
- We discern in this petition for certiorari a subtle attempt to have us review the
judgment of the appellate court on the merits. While the petition at bar is
denominated a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and the issues raised therein ostensibly dealt with the jurisdiction of the appellate
court, petitioners' attack on the appellate court's jurisdiction is premised on the
conclusions that (a) the findings of facts of the appellate court were based on
conjectures and speculations, or on misapprehension of facts and contrary to the
documents and exhibits; (b) the exhibit relied upon by the appellate court has not
been offered nor admitted in evidence during the trial; and (c) the appellate court
gave to a document a meaning contrary to its contents. But how valid and tenable
these premises are remains a question. To determine their validity would entail a
review and re- evaluation of the evidence on record as well as the procedure taken
vis-a-vis the conclusions arrived at by the appellate court; in effect, a review of the
judgment of acquittal, which we cannot do in a petition for certiorari and without
violating the private respondents' constitutional right against double jeopardy.
- Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines
cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." The

Criminal Procedure Cases | Page 63 of 67

argument that the judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore,
null and void, is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the
lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect
the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be
rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be. The
rule therefore, in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is not reviewable by
a higher court, for an appeal by the government from the judgment would put the
accused in second jeopardy for the same offense.
- WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Case No. 65
G.R. No. L-18769
May 27, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
VILLANUEVA, defendant and appellee.

plaintiff

and

appellant,

vs.

DIEGO

Facts:
- On May 14, 1957, Diego Villanueva, Chief of the City Delivery Section of the Cebu City
Post Office, was accused before the municipal court of Cebu City of having committed
the crime of infidelity in the custody of document.
- Waiving his right to a preliminary investigation, Villanueva asked that the case be
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
- An information was subsequently filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu charging
Villanueva of the same offense that he was charged before the municipal court of
Cebu City, and, then being arraigned, he pleaded not guilty.
- After due trial the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in a decision dated December 27,
1960, acquitted the accused of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence. The
decision "likewise orders the reinstatement of Mr. Diego Villanueva to the position
he held at the time he was suspended, payment of his back salaries and other
emoluments which he failed to receive in view of his suspension."
- The City Fiscal of Cebu City received a copy of the same on January 17, 1961. On
January 18, 1961 the City Fiscal filed a notice of appeal, to the Supreme Court, from
the decision in so far as it orders the reinstatement of the accused to the position he
held at the time he was suspended and the payment of his back salaries and other
emoluments which he failed to receive in view of his suspension, upon the ground
that said portion of the decision is contrary to law.
- On April 5, 1961, the counsel for the accused filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
filed by the City Fiscal, upon the grounds (1) that the appellant failed to serve copy
of the notice of appeal on the accused and (2) that the appellant had failed to file a
record on appeal.
- On May 26, 1961 the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered an amendatory
decision modifying its original decision of December 27, 1960.
- In due time, the City Fiscal of Cebu filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court from
the amendatory decision dated May 26, 1961, with respect to that portion of the
amendatory decision which directs the reinstatement of the accused to the position
he held at the time he was suspended, upon the ground that said portion of the
amendatory decision is contrary to law.
Assignment of Errors:
1. The lower court erred in ordering in its original decision the reinstatement of Mr.
Diego Villanueva to the position he held at the time he was suspended, payment of
his back salaries and other emoluments which he failed to receive in view of his
suspension.
2. The lower court erred in promulgating an amendatory decision, considering the fact
that it has already lost jurisdiction over the case after the appeal was filed by the City
Fiscal.
3. That granting arguendo that the amendatory decision issued by the trial court was
legal, nevertheless, it erred in ordering the reinstatement of the accused Diego
Villanueva to the position he held at the time he was suspended.
Held:
- We agree with the Solicitor General that the lower court committed an error when it
promulgated its amendatory decision on May 26, 1961.
- The original decision, dated December 27, 1960, was considered promulgated on
January 14, 1961 when the accused was served with a copy of said decision. The City
Fiscal of Cebu received a copy of the decision on January 17, 1961, and on the
following day he filed a notice that he was appealing to the Supreme Court from that
decision in so far as it orders the reinstatement of the accused.
- On April 5, 1961 counsel for the accused filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The
motion to dismiss the appeal was filed more than two months after the notice of
appeal had been filed. Counsel for the accused must be laboring under the
impression that the appeal referred only to the civil aspect of the case and so the
appeal must be perfected by the filing of a record on appeal.
- The lower court was of the impression that the notice of appeal of the City Fiscal did
not have the effect of perfecting the appeal from the original decision dated
December 27, 1960. That is why the lower court, in its amendatory decision dated
May 26, 1961, made these statements: "Since the Court has not as yet acted on the

motion to dismiss the appeal, it is the considered opinion of the Court that the civil
aspect of the case as contained in the dispositive part of the decision may still be
modified and the Court motu proprio amends the dispositive part of its decision of
December 27, 1960 ... and "the Court finds the motion to dismiss of the defense wellfounded and thereby orders said appeal dismissed."
We hold that the lower court erred in ordering the dismissal of the appeal of the City
Fiscal of Cebu City upon the grounds alleged in the motion to dismiss, namely: that
the accused was not served with a copy of the notice of appeal, and that the appellant
had not filed a record on appeal.
We also hold that the lower court erred when it considered itself as still having
jurisdiction to promulgate the amendatory decision dated May 26, 1961.
The fact that no copy of the notice of appeal in a criminal case is served upon the
opposite party is not fatal to the perfection of the appeal as long as the notice of
appeal had been filed on time. An appeal from the decision in a criminal case relating
to the civil aspect of the case does not have to be perfected by the filing of a record
on appeal as in civil cases. The fact that the decision or order, in a criminal case covers
certain civil matters incident to the case does not thereby change the nature of the
case from criminal to civil as would require the filing of a record on appeal in
connection with the appeal from the decision or order referring to the civil aspect of
the case.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that the court has power to alter, modify, or
even set aside, its own decisions, and even order a new trial, at any time before the
decision becomes final, or before an appeal from that decision has been perfected.
In the present case, we hold that when the City Fiscal of Cebu City fixed his notice of
appeal on January 18, 1961, appealing from the original decision dated December 27,
1960, the appeal was thereby perfected and the Court of First Instance of Cebu had
lost jurisdiction to amend its decision. The amendatory decision promulgated by the
lower court on May 26, 1961 is null and void, because said court no longer had
jurisdiction to issue said amendatory decision.
The City Fiscal appealed from the amendatory decision with respect to that portion
of the amendatory decision which ordered the reinstatement of the accused.
Inasmuch as we have ruled that the amendatory decision is null and void, this case
should be considered now at the present instance or the appeal of the City Fiscal
from the original decision.
It is the contention of the City Fiscal of Cebu, and the Solicitor General joins in this
contention, that the lower court cannot order the reinstatement of the accused
Diego Villanueva and at the same time order the payment of the salaries and other
emoluments that he failed to receive during the period of his suspension. This
contention is only partly correct. This Court has already held that in criminal cases
where the accused is a person in the service of the government and as suspended
during the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the court may order his
reinstatement to the office he held at the time he was suspended, in the event of his
acquittal. This Court has held, however, that it is not within the power of the court,
in the event of an acquittal, to order the payment of the salaries and other
emoluments which the accused had failed to receive during the period of his
suspension from office.
Wherefore, the original decision of the court a quo, dated December 27, 1960, is
hereby modified by eliminating therefrom that portion which orders the payment of
the salaries and other emoluments which the accused Diego Villanueva failed to
receive in view of his suspension. In all other respects the said original decision is
affirmed. The amendatory decision dated May 26, 1961 is declared null and void.

Case No. 66
G.R. No. 170180
November 23, 2007
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
- The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only
ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised
and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.
- On appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A.
No. 9165) (xxx possession, control and custody of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in
a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more or less 25 grams, without first
securing the necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper government
agency).
- On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
- Bautista (one of the Barangay tanods) testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17
March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along the National Highway in La

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Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag,
alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something. They approached him but
the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest
and thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado
(Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his
bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of
eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was
then that petitioner was taken to the police station for further investigation.
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the tanod and
Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned
out to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof.
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
the RTC rendered judgment against him.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals to which the
appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals, finding no cogent reason to overturn
the presumption of regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of
evidence of ill-motive on their part, agreed with the trial court that there was
probable cause to arrest petitioner.
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime
charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first
time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against him by the
barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag that followed
was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the marijuana leaves
purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a
poisonous tree.

Held:
- The Court finds and so holds that a reversal of the decision a quo under review is in
order.
- We observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by petitioner to
the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active
participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in
his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his
acquittal.
- However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is
indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified
only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. Evaluating the evidence on record in its
totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner
without a warrant is not lawful as well.
- Petitioner maintains that after he was approached by the tanod and asked to show
the contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the
house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag.
He denies ownership over the contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that
he saw it for the first time at the barangay captains house.
- Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case on the
general thrust of the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioners arrest
stands out just the same.
- Based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of the
circumstances of warrantless arrest was obtaining at the time petitioner was
arrested. By their own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the
time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense.
The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioners warrantless
arrest.
- For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two
(2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.
- Petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was
finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as
the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate
to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in,
was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. Petitioner
testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when
they approached him.
- It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after
being closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would
attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must
not always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt.
- The supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot
be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his
warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct

under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion
they have been harboring based on petitioners behavior.
Petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana
leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him
as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante
delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot
therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner
was incidental to a lawful arrest.
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution albeit based on
conflicting testimonies on when petitioners bag was actually opened, it is apparent
that petitioner was already under the coercive control of the public officials who had
custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the
prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the consent was asked
and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his
alleged "consent."
Petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver
of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.
We likewise find that it has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the
marijuana leaves purportedly taken from petitioners bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements
must concur: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court
of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The existence of dangerous drugs
is a condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it
being the very corpus delicti of the crime.
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecutions case its failure to prove
that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly
seized from the accused. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited
drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same
specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the records
only show that he was taken to the house of the barangay captain and thereafter to
the police station. The Joint Affidavit40 executed by the tanod merely states that they
confiscated the marijuana leaves which they brought to the police station together
with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt41 issued by the Aringay Police Station merely
acknowledged receipt of the suspected drugs supposedly confiscated from
petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when petitioners
bag was opened, they also gave conflicting testimony on who actually opened the
same. Even more damning to its cause was the admission by Laya, the forensic
chemist, that he did not know how the specimen was taken from petitioner, how it
reached the police authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane wrapping of
the marijuana. The non-presentation, without justifiable reason, of the police officers
who conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such was the
case, is fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish the crucial
link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana leaves from the time they were
first allegedly discovered until they were brought for examination by Laya.
The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to establish
the chain of custody over the seized marijuana as such "[f]inds prominence only
when the existence of the seized prohibited drug is denied." We cannot agree.
To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioners testimony
that the marijuana was taken from his bag, without taking the statement in full
context. Contrary to the Court of Appeals findings, although petitioner testified that
the marijuana was taken from his bag, he consistently denied ownership thereof.
Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership of the seized drugs
before the principle of chain of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In
conjunction with this, law enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary duty
to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence is
constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must
exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence. Each
person who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was
cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration
or replacement while in custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to
be used against an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the
prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often
disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords every
accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon
the prosecution.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the
presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to

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prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result
in petitioners exoneration from criminal liability.
- WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio
Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt
Case No. 67
G.R. No. 170233
February 22, 2007
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, REYNALDO
DIN y GONZAGA, and FERNANDO INOCENCIO y ABADEOS,Appellants.
Facts:
- Nuevas was charged before the RTC of Olongapo City with illegal possession of
marijuana in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended.
Din and Inocencio were likewise charged with the same crime, before the same court.
- Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the charges.
- The RTC rendered a Decision dated 4 April 2002, finding all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
- PO3 Teofilo B. Fami testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he and SPO3
Cesar B. Cabling conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug
trafficking along Olongapo City. They had received information that a certain male
person, more or less 54" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the
upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a
delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person
who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as Nuevas, alight from
a motor vehicle. They accosted Nuevas and informed him that they are police
officers.
- Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain
Vangie, an associate, and two other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily
pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana
dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges,
Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make the delivery of
marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos.
- Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag
belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it
"marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." After confiscating the items,
Fami and Cabling brought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III
for proper documentation. Fami further testified that a receipt for the property
seized was issued by Cabling and that a field test was duly conducted on the
confiscated items. They were likewise physically examined on the basis of which
corresponding medical certificates were issued.
- Fami revealed that when the receipt of evidence seized was prepared, all three (3)
accused were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he was the one
who escorted all the accused during their physical examination. He also escorted all
three to the Fiscals office where the latter were informed of the charges against
them.
- Cabling testified that the arrest of Nuevas was the result of a tip from Famis
informant, conceding though that the name of Nuevas was not included in the list of
persons under surveillance. Cabling restated that Nuevas had voluntarily submitted
the plastic bag he was holding and that after Nuevas had been informed of the
violation of law attributed to him, he admitted his willingness to cooperate and point
to his other cohorts. When Fami and Cabling proceeded to the identified location of
Nuevass cohorts, they chanced upon Din and Inocencio along the road
- All three were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated
to the Court for automatic review. On 14 July 2003, Nuevas filed a manifestation and
motion to withdraw appeal. The Court granted Nuevass withdrawal of appeal and
considered the case closed and terminated as to him.
- Din and Inocencio argued that the trial court erred: (1) in finding them guilty of the
crime charged on the basis of the testimonies of the arresting officers; and (2) n not
finding that their constitutional rights have been violated. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
- With respect to appellants claim that their constitutional rights have been violated,
the appellate court stated that the search in the instant case is exempted from the
requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants themselves waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling
and Fami testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never
presented evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the instant case, the exclusionary rule
does not apply.
Issue
Validity of the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers.
Held:
- The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless
searches and seizure made by the police officers and the admissibility of the evidence
obtained by virture thereof.

- Appellants maintain that there was no basis for their questioning and the subsequent
inspection of the plastic bags of Nuevas and Din, as they were not doing anything
illegal at the time.
- Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and
any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
The constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions,
namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
- The courts below anchor appellants conviction on the ground that the searches and
seizure conducted in the instant case based on a tip from an informant fall under one
of the exceptions as Nuevas, Din and Inocencio all allegedly voluntarily surrendered
the plastic bags containing marijuana to the police officers.
- We differ.
- First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the
first exception, warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests.
- In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence
of the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had
committed an offense. The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be
said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113.
- Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine.
- An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be
seized without a warrant. If the package is such that an experienced observer could
infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items
that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
- Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that
Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the
police officers. In Nuevass case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic
bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth. In Dins case, the marijuana found upon
inspection of the plastic bag was "packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." It
cannot be therefore said the items were in plain view which could have justified mere
seizure of the articles without further search. On the other hand, the Court finds that
the search conducted in Nuevass case was made with his consent. In Dins case,
there was none.
- Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to
the search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and
search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
- In Nuevass case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the
incriminating bag to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt
to exculpate himself from any criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police,
gave them the plastic bag and even revealed his associates, offering himself as an
informant. His actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to
find excuses, blame others and save oneself even at the cost of others lives. Thus,
the Court would have affirmed Nuevass conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal.
- However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds
that no such consent had actually been given.
- Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;
and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

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- The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. Neither can Dins silence at the time be construed as
an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search.
- Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Dins conviction cannot be sustained
based on the remaining evidence. The Court has repeatedly declared that the
conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the prosecution. As such, Din deserves an acquittal.
- In this case, an acquittal is warranted despite the prosecutions insistence that the
appellants have effectively waived any defect in their arrest by entering their plea
and by their active participation in the trial of the case. Be it stressed that the legality
of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.
Inspite of any alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves cannot be admitted in
evidence against the appellants, Din more specifically, as they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.57
- Turning to Inocencios case, the Court likewise finds that he was wrongly convicted
of the crime charged. Inocencios supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves
was sought to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was
carrying. Taking a look at an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while held
by another, is not the same as taking possession thereof. Indeed, the act attributed
to Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even
conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to show by convincing
proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din
to possess the illegal items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in his testimony that
he had no part in any delivery of marijuana dried leaves.
- WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City is reversed
and modified. Appellants Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos
are hereby ACQUITTED.
Case No. 68
G.R. No. 84481
April 18, 1989
MINDANAO SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. (formerly Davao Savings & Loan
Association) & FRANCISCO VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, POLY
R. MERCADO, and JUAN P. MERCADO, respondents.
Facts:
- On September 10, 1986, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, a complaint against defendants D.S. Homes, Inc., and its directors,
Laurentino G. Cuevas, Saturnino R. Petalcorin, Engr. Uldarico D. Dumdum, Aurora P.
De Leon, Ramon D. Basa, Francisco D. Villamor, Richard F. Magallanes, Geronimo S.
Palermo Felicisima V. Ramos and Eugenio M. De los Santos (hereinafter referred to
as D.S. Homes, et al.) for "Rescission of Contract and Damages" with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
- On September 28, 1986, Judge Dinopol issued an order granting ex parte the
application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On September 22, 1986, the private
respondents amended their complaint and on October 10, 1986, filed a second
amended complaint impleading as additional defendants herein petitioners Davao
Savings & Loan Association, Inc. and its president, Francisco Villamor, but dropping
Eugenio M. De los Santos.
- On November 5, 1986, Judge Dinopol issued ex parte an amended order of
attachment against all the defendants named in the second amended complaint,
including the petitioners but excluding Eugenio C. de los Santos.
- D. S. Homes. Inc., et al. and the Davao Savings & Loan Association (later renamed
Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. or "MSLA") and Francisco Villamor filed
separate motions to quash the writ of attachment. When their motions were denied
by the Court, D.S. Homes, Inc., et al. offered a counterbond in the amount of
Pl,752,861.41 per certificate issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines, a banking
partner of petitioner MSLA, which the lower court as counterbond.
- On July 29, 1987, MSLA and Villamor filed in the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari to annul the order of attachment and the denial of their motion to quash
the same. They alleged that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing
the ex parte orders of preliminary attachment and in denying their motion to quash
the writ of attachment, D.S. Homes, Inc., et al. did not join them.
- On May 5, 1988, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and
remanded the records to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for expeditious
proceedings. Dissatisfied, the petitioners appealed to this Court.
Held:
- The only requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment under Section
3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court are the affidavit and bond of the applicant.
- No notice to the adverse party or hearing of the application is required. As a matter
of fact a hearing would defeat the purpose of this provisional remedy. The time which
such a hearing would take, could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or
dispose of his property before a writ of attachment issues. Nevertheless, while no
hearing is required by the Rules of Court for the issuance of an attachment, a motion

to quash the writ may not be granted without "reasonable notice to the applicant"
and only "after hearing".
The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that objections to the impropriety or
irregularity of the writ of attachment "may no longer be invoked once a counterbond
is filed," when the ground for the issuance of the writ forms the core of the complaint.
After the defendant has obtained the discharge of the writ of attachment by filing a
counterbond under Section 12, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, he may not file another
motion under Section 13, Rule 57 to quash the writ for impropriety or irregularity in
issuing it.
The writ had already been quashed by filing a counterbond, hence, another motion
to quash it would be pointless. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals correctly observed,
when the ground for the issuance of the writ is also the core of the complaint, the
question of whether the plaintiff was entitled to the writ can only be
determined after, not before, a full-blown trial on the merits of the case.
May the defendant, after procuring the dissolution of the attachment by filing a
counterbond, ask for the cancellation of the counterbond on the ground that the
order of attachment was improperly issued? That question was answered by this
Court when it ruled that "the obligors in the bond are absolutely liable for the amount
of any judgment that the plaintiff may recover in the action without reference to the
question of whether the attachment was rightfully or wrongfully issued."
The liability of the surety on the counterbond subsists until the Court shall have finally
absolved the defendant from the plaintiff s claims. Only then may the counterbond
be released. The same rule applies to the plaintiffs attachment bond. "The liability of
the surety on the bond subsists because the final reckoning is when the Court
shall finally adjudge that the attaching creditor was not entitled to the issuance of
the attachment writ."
-- Nothing follows --

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