Freedom

of Expression and Right to Privacy

MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-32066
August 6, 1979

FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began the production of a
movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was based mainly on the copyrighted but
unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in
Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story". The book narrates the events which
culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla who was then a mayoralty candidate of the
Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the
November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then
in power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder. In the book, Moises
Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history." Although the
emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions
which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his
mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as
his girlfriend.

On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, for and in
behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes,
corrections and deletions in the movie. On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some
bargaining, the petitioner and private respondent executed a Licensing Agreement
where the petitioner agreed to pay the private respondent the sum of P20,000.00
payable without need of further demand, as follows: P5,000.00 on or before Oct. 10,
1961; P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or before November 30,
1961. Also the Licensor (private respondent) grants authority and permission to
Licensee (Petitioner) to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for
purposes of producing the PICTURE, and in connection with matters incidental to said
production, such as advertising and the like, as well as authority and permission for the
use of LICENSOR's name in the PICTURE and have herself portrayed therein, the
authority and permission hereby granted, to retroact to the date when LICENSEE first
committed any of the acts herein authorized.

After its premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was shown in different
theaters all over the country.

Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the
Agreement, on December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit
against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner:

1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the
Complaint;
2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the
corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom;
3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and
4) to pay the costs.

Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla
depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and was a public figure; that
private respondent has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing
Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and that he signed the same only
because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner
sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement as it constitutes an infringement
on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the private
respondent.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not private respondent have any property right over the life of Moises
Padilla since the latter was a public figure.
2. Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and of the press.

RULING:

1.
Yes. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled
"The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life
and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, a
privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his
memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and
to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."

Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's
right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public
information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no
matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that
petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner
admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab
story of torture and brutality.

2. No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear
that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the
freedom of speech and of the press. It would be too much to insist that at all times and
under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other
societal values that press for recognition.

The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the
press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the
movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation."

In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into
account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances
presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered
into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly
because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon
matters of essentially private concern.