Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Jiirgen Habermas
translated by Barbara Fultner
T h e MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
2000
00-055886
Contents
Translator's I n t r o d u c t i o n
Reflections o n the Linguistic Foundation o f Sociology:
The Christian Gauss Lecture (Princeton University,
February-March 1971)
vii
I Objectivist a n d Subjectivist A p p r o a c h e s to T h e o r y
F o r m a t i o n in t h e Social Sciences
II T h e P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Constitutive T h e o r y of
Society: T h e F u n d a m e n t a l Role of Claims to Validity a n d
t h e M o n a d o l o g i c a l F o u n d a t i o n s of Intersubjectivity
23
III F r o m a Constitutive T h e o r y to a C o m m u n i c a t i v e
T h e o r y of Society (Sellars a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n ) :
C o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d Cognitive Uses of L a n g u a g e
45
67
V T r u t h a n d Society: T h e Discursive R e d e m p t i o n of
Factual Claims to Validity
85
105
129
I
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Contents
Notes
171
Index
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ix
.
Translator's Introduction
T h e Gauss L e c t u r e s m a r k t h e b e g i n n i n g of H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o p r i a
tion of s p e e c h act t h e o r y a n d c o n t a i n t h e first f o r m u l a t i o n of his for
m a l p r a g m a t i c s . H i s c e n t r a l c o n c e r n is with e x p l i c a t i n g t h e " b i n d i n g
a n d b o n d i n g " force of s p e e c h acts, w h i c h u n d e r w r i t e s w h a t h e calls
t h e i r a c t i o n - c o o r d i n a t i n g power. F o r this p u r p o s e , speech act theoryoffers several advantages. First, it focuses o n utterances r a t h e r t h a n
s e n t e n c e s a n d t h u s aims to be a pragmatic t h e o r y of m e a n i n g , r a t h e r
t h a n a s e m a n t i c t h e o r y completely a b s t r a c t e d f r o m c o n t e x t s of use.
S e c o n d , it gives f o r m a l r e c o g n i t i o n t o n o n a s s e r t o r i c u s e s of l a n g u a g e
3
Translator's Introduction
a n d to t h a t e x t e n t d e p a r t s f r o m typically "cognitivist" a p p r o a c h e s to
semantics. T h i r d , s p e e c h act t h e o r y analytically separates a s p e e c h
act's p r o p o s i t i o n a l from its illocutionary c o m p o n e n t , which m a k e s it
possible to distinguish b e t w e e n w h a t speakers say a b o u t t h e w o r l d
a n d t h e intersubjective relations they establish in d o i n g s o .
4
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intersubjectivity of a c o m m u n i t y of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l egos, a n d so h e
t u r n s to Sellars. Sellars's a p p r o a c h is initially p r o m i s i n g because h e
wants to m o d e l intentionality a n d t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h o u g h t o n t h e
s t r u c t u r e of l a n g u a g e : H e takes a linguistic t u r n w i t h i n t h e philoso
p h y of m i n d . However, his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of l a n g u a g e , a c c o r d i n g to
H a b e r m a s , is essentially objectivist. T h a t is, speakers c o m e to m e a n
t h e s a m e t h i n g s by t h e s a m e w o r d s b e c a u s e t h e y r e s p o n d similarly to
their e n v i r o n m e n t a n d m u t u a l l y observe each o t h e r ' s r e s p o n s e s
f r o m a m o n o l o g i c a l , t h i r d - p e r s o n perspective r a t h e r t h a n f r o m a
dialogical s e c o n d - p e r s o n perspective. T h e y are " m o n o l o g i c a l lan
g u a g e u s e r s " with a full, i n t e n t i o n a l ( i n n e r ) life of beliefs a n d desires,
b u t l a c k i n g a n y i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . But m o n o l o g i c a l lan
g u a g e t h a t c a n n o t b e used for p u r p o s e s of c o m m u n i c a t i n g with oth
ers, H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , is n o t really l a n g u a g e at all. T h u s , in different
ways, Husserl a n d Sellars b o t h p r e s u p p o s e r a t h e r t h a n a c c o u n t for
the existence of intersubjectivity.
It is n o a c c i d e n t that H a b e r m a s ' s a r g u m e n t against Sellars is r e m i
n i s c e n t of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s private-language a r g u m e n t . S a m e n e s s of
m e a n i n g is g r o u n d e d in t h e validity of rules, a n d H a b e r m a s , follow
ing W i t t g e n s t e i n , argues t h a t a subject c a n n o t follow rules in isola
tion. If s o m e o n e is following a r u l e , it m u s t b e at least in p r i n c i p l e
possible for s o m e o n e else to check w h e t h e r she is following t h a t r u l e
correctiy; o n e p e r s o n ' s rule-following b e h a v i o r is, in o t h e r words,
subject to evaluation a n d criticism by a n o t h e r . T h i s p r e c l u d e s any
m o n o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t of rule-following, for it p r e s u p p o s e s that differ
e n t p e o p l e have the s a m e c o m p e t e n c e and are mutually c a p a b l e of
assessing e a c h o t h e r ' s p e r f o r m a n c e . Wittgenstein e m p h a s i z e d t h a t
m e a n i n g is a m a t t e r of use a n d t h a t words a n d s e n t e n c e s are used in
i n t e r a c t i o n with others; his "use theory of m e a n i n g " was in this sense
i n h e r e n t l y p r a g m a t i c a n d intersubjective. As action a n d l a n g u a g e a r e
intimately i n t e r w o v e n , to u n d e r s t a n d a n u t t e r a n c e is to grasp its role
in a l a n g u a g e g a m e , t h a t is, to u n d e r s t a n d it as a m o v e in a r u l e g o v e r n e d , i n t e r p e r s o n a l activity. T h u s b e i n g able to e n g a g e in a
l a n g u a g e g a m e p r e s u p p o s e s sharing a f o r m of life with o n e ' s inter
l o c u t o r s . T h e rules constitutive of such l a n g u a g e g a m e s a r e n o t stipu
l a t e d arbitrarily, b u t h a v e t h e status of c o n v e n t i o n s , a topic to w h i c h I
shall r e t u r n below. H a b e r m a s elaborates o n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a c c o u n t
(i
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C o m m u n i c a t i v e action takes p l a c e a g a i n s t a b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n
sus t h a t it r e n e w s a n d develops. W h e n c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n is
p r o c e e d i n g smoothly, i n t e r l o c u t o r s m a k e w h a t t h e y a r e saying intelli
gible to o n e a n o t h e r , g r a n t w h a t they a r e saying to b e t r u e (i.e., they
a s s u m e t h e r e f e r e n t i a l expressions they a r e using pick o u t objects t o
which t h e attributes they p r e d i c a t e of t h e m actually apply), r e c o g
nize t h e Tightness of t h e n o r m t h a t t h e s p e e c h act claims to fulfill,
a n d d o n ' t d o u b t e a c h o t h e r ' s sincerity. I n short, they m u t u a l l y a c c e p t
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H a b e r m a s h e r e e n d o r s e s a d e s c r i p t i o n t h e o r y of r e f e r e n c e . Interest
ingly, h e also states t h a t o u r e x p e r i e n c e is in t h e first i n s t a n c e sensory
a n d only in t h e s e c o n d i n s t a n c e c o m m u n i c a t i v e (p. 79). In l i g h t of
r e c e n t criticisms to t h e effect t h a t h e n e e d s a t h e o r y of r e f e r e n c e to
avoid s o m e f o r m of linguistic idealism, the Gauss discussion is t h e r e
fore i m p o r t a n t .
9
It is also i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e it c o n t a i n s a n early t r e a t m e n t of t h e
so-called consensus theory of truth, which e m e r g e s f r o m H a b e r m a s ' s ac
c o u n t of t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n or vindication of validity claims.
As we h a v e seen, a claim is discursively v i n d i c a t e d if r a t i o n a l c o n s e n
sus is r e a c h e d c o n c e r n i n g its validity, a n d t h e m e a n i n g of t r u t h , ac
cording to H a b e r m a s , is explicated by specifying t h e c o n d i t i o n s
u n d e r w h i c h validity claims can (or c o u l d ) b e vindicated. All of this
suggests an epistemic c o n c e p t i o n of t r u t h as w h a t is rationally a g r e e d
u p o n u n d e r ideal c o n d i t i o n s . T h e i n t e r e s t of t h e "consensus t h e o r y
of t r u t h , " however, lies n o t so m u c h in w h a t it says a b o u t t h e n a t u r e
of t r u t h , as in w h a t it says a b o u t h o w we reach a g r e e m e n t o n claims
to t r u t h . T h u s it is n o t so m u c h a t h e o r y of truth as a t h e o r y of
justification. A n d in fact, H a b e r m a s has since a b a n d o n e d a n epis
temic c o n c e p t i o n of t r u t h a n d has d e v e l o p e d this c o n c e p t i o n of ra
tional c o n s e n s u s primarily in the c o n t e x t of his t h e o r y of discourse
ethics, which h e d e v e l o p e d after t h e c o m p l e t i o n of The Theory of Com
municative Action.
While t h e Gauss L e c t u r e s focus o n t r u t h as a d i m e n s i o n of validity,
"Intentions, C o n v e n t i o n s , a n d Linguistic I n t e r a c t i o n s " (1976), an es
say m o r e explicitly l o c a t e d within t h e p h i l o s o p h y of action, focuses
o n t h e validity of social n o r m s a n d e x a m i n e s t h e c o n c e p t u a l inter
c o n n e c t i o n s between rules, conventions, n o r m - g o v e r n e d action, a n d
intentionality. R a t h e r t h a n establishing t h e n e e d f o r a t h e o r y of c o m
municative a c t i o n o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t o t h e r t h e o r i e s have failed to
p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t s of intersubjectivity, H a b e r m a s is h e r e
c o n c e r n e d to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e n e e d for a t h e o r y of a c t i o n t h a t is
intersubjective. T h e c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action is to a c c o u n t
for i n t e n t i o n a l action, t h a t is, a c t i o n caused by i n t e r n a l i n t e n t i o n a l
states (in B r e n t a n o ' s sense) of t h e agent, as well as f o r n o r m c o n f o r m i n g action o r b e h a v i o r in t h e sense of a c t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e
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systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . H a b e r m a s ' s g u i d i n g as
s u m p t i o n h e r e is t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of interactive c o m p e t e n c e is
c o n n e c t e d t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of i n t e r n a l m e c h a n i s m s for c o n t r o l
ling behavior, b u t t h a t these two d e v e l o p m e n t s a r e distinct (since
m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d actual b e h a v i o r in conflict r e s o l u t i o n d o n o t
c o i n c i d e ) . His analysis stresses t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n linguistic
c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d e g o d e v e l o p m e n t : " C o m m u n i c a t i v e action is t h e
m e d i u m of socialization" (p. 131). Picking u p o n a t h e m e m e n t i o n e d
above, this essay establishes t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n subjectivity a n d
intersubjectivity by showing t h a t a subject's i n t e n t i o n s a r e socially,
t h a t is, intersubjectively, s t r u c t u r e d .
H a b e r m a s w a n t s to show t h a t b o t h social a n d individual p a t h o l o
gies c a n b e analyzed in t e r m s of d i s t u r b a n c e s in interactive c o m p e
t e n c e . S u c h a n a c c o u n t , however, p r e s u p p o s e s a m o d e l of undisturbed
or normal c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d interaction in t h e t e r m s of his f o r m a l
p r a g m a t i c s . O n this a p p r o a c h t h e n o t i o n of n o r m a l c y is n o t deter
m i n e d by a n y p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e , n o r is it a statistical n o r m ; it is r a t h e r
a culturally invariant n o r m a t i v e n o t i o n .
H a b e r m a s h a s b e e n criticized for p r e s e n t i n g t o o idealized a n ac
c o u n t of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , particularly owing to his n o t i o n of t h e
ideal s p e e c h situation. This last essay shows t h a t h e is very m u c h at
t u n e d t o the e m p i r i c a l vagaries of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I n claiming t h a t
t h e validity basis of s p e e c h h a s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l status, H a b e r m a s cer
tainly does n o t m e a n to imply t h a t we c a n n o t deviate from t h e c o n d i
tions of n o r m a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; otherwise, we would n o t have t o
explicate t h e normative basis of s p e e c h . T h e c o n d i t i o n s of possible
c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e t h u s n o t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n t h e s a m e sense as, say,
Kant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n t u i t i o n s of space a n d time q u a c o n d i t i o n s of
possible p e r c e p t i o n . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e f o r m a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s u n d e r
lying c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e , a c c o r d i n g t o H a b e r m a s ,
unavoidable.
Moreover, as s u c h they f u n c t i o n s o m e w h a t like regulative ideals in t h e
K a n t i a n sense. T h e y a r e n o t inviolable, b u t in cases w h e r e t h e inter
n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of speech is violated, t h e p a t t e r n s of c o m m u n i c a
tion a r e pathologically distorted. We h a v e a l r e a d y seen t h a t
i n t e r l o c u t o r s m a y c h a l l e n g e t h e validity claims raised by o t h e r s a n d
t h e r e b y p r o m p t c o m m u n i c a t i o n shifts from action t o discourse. It is
also possible t h a t t h e claims t o intelligibility, t r u t h , Tightness, o r sin-
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13
H a b e r m a s has recently r e t u r n e d to s o m e of t h e t h e m e s a d u m
b r a t e d in t h e early 1970s. O n e of these is t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e n a t u r e
of t r u t h , as I i n d i c a t e d above. A n o t h e r is t h e distinction b e t w e e n
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e u s e . Yet t h e views
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Acknowledgments
T h i s p r o j e c t w o u l d n o t have b e e n possible w i t h o u t t h e h e l p a n d sup
p o r t of o t h e r s . I a m i n d e b t e d to J e r e m y Shapiro for his e x c e l l e n t
o r i g i n a l translation of t h e Gauss L e c t u r e s , w h i c h m a d e my o w n task
i m m e a s u r a b l y easier. My t h a n k s to H a r r y Heft, J o n a t h a n Maskit, Ste
ven Vogel, C h r i s t o p h e r Z u r n , a n d especially T h o m a s M c C a r t h y w h o
all p r o v i d e d i n v a l u a b l e f e e d b a c k o n t h e translation a n d i n t r o d u c
tion. I w o u l d also like t o t h a n k Pat Davis, w h o t r a n s f e r r e d t h e origi
n a l typescript of t h e lectures o n t o disk, as well as L a r r y C o h e n a n d
J u d y F e l d m a n n of M I T Press for t h e i r assistance. Finally, I a m grate
ful to J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s for his generosity in r e s p o n d i n g to my
queries.
T h e r e a r e c o m p e t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s in t h e social sciences
that differ n o t only in t h e k i n d s of p r o b l e m s t h e y address a n d t h e re
search strategies t h e y apply, b u t in t h e i r f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s .
They diverge i n t h e i r c h o i c e of categorial frameworks a n d i n how
they c o n c e p t u a l i z e their object d o m a i n t h a t is, in h o w they define
what it is they a r e actually studying. T h e s e differences of c o n c e p t u a l
strategy express m o r e d e e p l y r o o t e d conflicts: conflicting views of sci
e n c e a n d cognitive interests. My aim h e r e is n o t to investigate a n d
systematically e x p o u n d these theoretical a p p r o a c h e s . I i n t e n d r a t h e r
to develop a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t u a l strategy for t h e social sciences a n d
to establish its theoretical plausibility a n d p o t e n t i a l . I s h o u l d like to
b e g i n with some c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t
lead to some p r e l i m i n a r y classifications. T h e s e a r e to serve exclu
sively as a provisional delimitation of a c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r y of so
ciety. T h i s t h e o r y d o e s n o t yet exist in a satisfactory f o r m , a n d I can
only discuss a few issues t h a t motivate m e to c o n s i d e r such a n ap
p r o a c h to b e fruitful.
In terms of c o n c e p t u a l strategy, t h e first decision t h a t is of funda
m e n t a l significance for a t h e o r e t i c a l p r o g r a m in t h e social sciences is
w h e t h e r to a d m i t o r reject " m e a n i n g " [Sinn] as a primitive t e r m . I
take t h e p a r a d i g m of " m e a n i n g " to b e t h e m e a n i n g [Bedeutung] of a
w o r d o r a s e n t e n c e . T h u s I a m assuming t h a t t h e r e are n o p u r e or
a priori s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n s ; m e a n i n g always has o r finds a symbolic
expression; to attain clarity, i n t e n t i o n s m u s t always b e able to t a k e o n
1
Lecture I
the p r i o r p r o b l e m of t h e d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n those o b s e r v a b l e
events t h a t we i n t e r p r e t as b e h a v i o r a n d those events t h a t we c a n n o t
i n t e r p r e t as behavior. T h e i n t e r p r e t i v e s c h e m e t h a t allows us t o u n
derstand t h e m o t i o n of a b o d y as t h e e x p r e s s i o n of a n o r g a n i s m , in
o t h e r w o r d s , as t h e m o v e m e n t of a living body, has n o t yet b e e n satis
factorily analyzed. By d e s c r i b i n g an o b s e r v a b l e m o t i o n as behavior,
we ascribe it to an o r g a n i s m t h a t r e p r o d u c e s its life by a d a p t i n g to its
e n v i r o n m e n t . W e u n d e r s t a n d it as a m o v e m e n t b r o u g h t a b o u t by an
organism. I n so d o i n g , we are a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e is a n e n d t y X that
in some b r o a d sense is "responsible" for this m o v e m e n t . I n this con
text, of course, t h e c a t e g o r y of responsibility can b e u s e d only in
scare q u o t e s , t h a t is, w i t h certain reservations. F o r a n a n i m a l c a n n o t
be h e l d responsible for its b e h a v i o r in t h e same sense t h a t a subject
capable of s p e e c h a n d c o g n i t i o n c a n b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e for its ac
tions. N o n e t h e l e s s , we a p p a r e n t l y derive t h e perspective from w h i c h
we i n t e r p r e t m o t i o n s as m o d e s of b e h a v i o r f r o m a private modificat
ion of the p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o u r own social lifeworld. I call this
modification privative b e c a u s e we a r e capable of distinguishing be
havioral r e s p o n s e s f r o m o t h e r events w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o a p p e a l to t h e
category of m e a n i n g . For t h a t c a t e g o r y m a k e s it possible to differen
tiate between b e h a v i o r t h a t I can u n d e r s t a n d as i n t e n t i o n a l action
a n d b e h a v i o r t h a t c a n n o t b e c o m p r e h e n d e d u n d e r this d e s c r i p t i o n .
3
I call b e h a v i o r intentional if it is g o v e r n e d by n o r m s or o r i e n t e d t o
rules. R u l e s o r n o r m s d o n o t h a p p e n like events, b u t h o l d o w i n g to
a n intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d m e a n i n g [Bedeutung]. N o r m s have se
m a n t i c c o n t e n t : t h a t is, a m e a n i n g [Sinn] t h a t b e c o m e s t h e r e a s o n o r
motive for b e h a v i o r w h e n e v e r t h e y a r e o b e y e d by a subject to w h o m
things a r e m e a n i n g f u l . I n this case we speak of a n action. T h e i n t e n
tion of a n a c t o r w h o o r i e n t s his o r h e r b e h a v i o r t o a r u l e c o r r e s p o n d s
t o t h e m e a n i n g of t h a t r u l e . O n l y t h i s normatively g u i d e d b e h a v i o r is
what we call action. It is only a c t i o n s t h a t we speak of as i n t e n t i o n a l .
O b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r fulfills a prevailing n o r m if a n d only if this b e
havior can b e u n d e r s t o o d as p r o d u c e d by a n a c t i n g subject w h o has
g r a s p e d t h e m e a n i n g of t h e n o r m a n d o b e y e d it intentionally. Behav
ior that we o b s e r v e over a p a r t i c u l a r p e r i o d of time can de facto ac
cord with a given n o r m w i t h o u t being n o r m - g o v e r n e d . T h a t is why
we distinguish r e g u l a r b e h a v i o r f r o m r u l e - g o v e r n e d behavior, o r
6
Lecture I
7____
Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation
8
Lecture I
h e r m e n e u t i c s , t h e art of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , instead of a m e a s u r e m e n t
p r o c e d u r e ; b u t it is n o t s u c h a p r o c e d u r e . T h e only t h i n g t h a t w o u l d
allow for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of basic m e a s u r e m e n t o p e r a t i o n s for
m e a n i n g w o u l d be a t h e o r y of o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n
t h a t did n o t m e r e l y g u i d e a n d discipline t h e n a t u r a l faculty of com
m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e , as h e r m e n e u t i c s d o e s , b u t t h a t could also
explain it.
(c) Conventionalism versus essentialism
N o m a t t e r h o w t h e p r o b l e m of m e a s u r i n g t h e m e a n i n g of symbolic
expressions is solved, t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l basis of a t h e o r y of action re
m a i n s distinct from t h a t of a behaviorist theory in t h e strict sense.
For t h e a d e q u a c y of a d e s c r i p t i o n of a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d con
struct, a n u t t e r a n c e o r an action, can b e tested only by r e f e r e n c e t o
t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e subject w h o p r o d u c e d t h e expression. I n m a n y
cases a subject c a p a b l e of a c t i o n m a y n o t b e a b l e to specify explicitly
the n o r m s a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h it orients his behavior. Nevertheless,
insofar as it m a s t e r s n o r m s a n d c a n follow t h e m , it h a s an implicit
k n o w l e d g e of rules. O n t h e basis of this know-how it can always d e
cide w h e t h e r a given b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e c o r r e s p o n d s to a k n o w n
rule at all, t h a t is, w h e t h e r it can b e u n d e r s t o o d as action. T h e sub
j e c t c a n d e c i d e w h e t h e r , in a given case, s u c h a b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e
a c c o r d s w i t h o r deviates f r o m a given n o r m , a n d to w h a t e x t e n t it de
viates from a n u n d e r l y i n g n o r m . T h e situation is similar w i t h r e g a r d
to linguistic u t t e r a n c e s . Usually, c o m p e t e n t speakers a r e able to ex
plicate t h e g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s of t h e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e in w h i c h they
f o r m a n d u n d e r s t a n d s e n t e n c e s only incompletely, if a t all. N o n e t h e
less, every a d e q u a t e l y socialized s p e a k e r has at his disposal a
know-how t h a t e n a b l e s h i m to distinguish p h o n e t i c u t t e r a n c e s f r o m
m e r e s o u n d s , to distinguish semantically m e a n i n g f u l a n d syntacti
cally well-formed s e n t e n c e s f r o m those t h a t are deviant, a n d to o r d e r
such s e n t e n c e s a c c o r d i n g to t h e d e g r e e of t h e i r deviation. T h i s intu
itively available k n o w l e d g e of rules t h a t c o m p e t e n t i y s p e a k i n g a n d
a c t i n g subjects have, which can also b e discursively a r t i c u l a t e d a t a n y
time, provides t h e r e q u i r e d e x p e r i e n t i a l basis for t h e o r i e s of action.
Strictly behaviorist theories, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , d e p e n d exclusively
10
Lecture I
n___
__
12
Lecture I
c a n p r o v e to b e c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t . Rational c h o i c e is g o v e r n e d by
strategies b a s e d o n analytical k n o w l e d g e . T h e y imply derivations
from p r e f e r e n c e rules (value systems) a n d decision p r o c e d u r e s .
T h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e d e r i v e d e i t h e r correctly o r incorrectly. Pur
posive-rational action attains definite goals u n d e r given c o n d i t i o n s .
B u t w h e r e a s t h e m e a n s o r g a n i z e d by i n s t r u m e n t a l action are a p p r o
p r i a t e o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e a c c o r d i n g to criteria of effective c o n t r o l of
reality, strategic action d e p e n d s only on t h e c o r r e c t assessment of
possible b e h a v i o r a l o p t i o n s , which results from derivation u s i n g val
u e s and m a x i m s a l o n e .
By communicative action I u n d e r s t a n d symbolically m e d i a t e d inter
action. It is g o v e r n e d by b i n d i n g n o r m s t h a t define r e c i p r o c a l expec
tations a b o u t behavior a n d that must be understood a n d
a c k n o w l e d g e d o r r e c o g n i z e d by at least two a c t i n g subjects. Social
n o r m s are e n f o r c e d t h r o u g h sanctions. T h e i r m e a n i n g is objectified
in symbolic expressions a n d is accessible only t h r o u g h o r d i n a r y lan
g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n . W h e r e a s t h e effectiveness of t e c h n i c a l rules
a n d strategies d e p e n d s o n t h e validity [ Gultigkeit] of empirically t r u e
o r analytically c o r r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n s , t h e validity [Geltung] of social
n o r m s is e n s u r e d by a n intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t is based o n a
c o n s e n s u s a b o u t values o r o n m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Violating a rule
has different c o n s e q u e n c e s in each case. I n c o m p e t e n t behavior,
which violates proven t e c h n i c a l rules or c o r r e c t strategies, is con
d e m n e d p e r se to failure t h r o u g h its lack of success. T h e "punish
m e n t , " so to speak, is built i n t o its f o u n d e r i n g o n t h e shoals of reality.
Deviant behavior, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , which violates prevailing
n o r m s , triggers sanctions t h a t are c o n n e c t e d with t h e rules only ex
ternally, by c o n v e n t i o n . L e a r n e d rules of purposive-rational action
p r o v i d e u s w i t h a r e g i m e of skills; i n contrast, i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m s fur
nish u s with a r e g i m e of personality structures. Skills e n a b l e u s t o
solve p r o b l e m s , w h e r e a s motivations allow us t o c o n f o r m to n o r m s .
Table 1 s u m m a r i z e s t h e s e definitions. T h e y r e q u i r e a m o r e precise
analysis, w h i c h I c a n n o t u n d e r t a k e h e r e .
T h e o r y f o r m a t i o n in t h e social sciences h a s t h e o p t i o n of defining
t h e object d o m a i n to c o m p r i s e e i t h e r actions of t h e strategic type
only o r b o t h strategic a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions. Strategic action
c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d as a limiting case of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action; it oc-
13
Table 1
Rules of Action
Social Norms
Linguistic Means of
Definition
intersubjectively shared
ordinary language
context-free language
Elements of Definition
reciprocal normative ex
pectations of behavior
conditional predictions;
conditional imperatives
Mechanisms of
Acquisition
internalization of roles
maintenance of institu
tions (conformity to
norms based o n recipro
cal reinforcement)
problem-solving (goal at
tainment, defined in
terms of means-ends
relations)
p u n i s h m e n t based o n
conventional sanctions;
failure against social
authority
curs w h e n o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n i n t e r l o c u t o r s
breaks d o w n as a m e a n s of m a i n t a i n i n g consensus, a n d each assumes
an objectifying a t t i t u d e toward t h e other. For strategic action is based
on rules for t h e purposive-rational choice of m e a n s ; a n d , in princi
ple, each actor can m a k e this c h o i c e by herself. Maxims of b e h a v i o r
in strategic action are d e t e r m i n e d by t h e interests of m a x i m i z i n g
gains a n d m i n i m i z i n g losses in t h e context of c o m p e t i t i o n . In this
case, my o t h e r is n o l o n g e r a n alter e g o whose e x p e c t a t i o n s I can
fulfill (or d i s a p p o i n t ) a c c o r d i n g to intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d
n o r m s . Rather, s h e is a n o p p o n e n t whose decisions I seek t o
influence indirectly by m e a n s of p u n i s h m e n t s a n d rewards. I n s t r u
m e n t a l actions, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , are n o t social actions at all;
rather, they can a p p e a r as c o m p o n e n t s of social actions (i.e., as ele
m e n t s of role definitions). If only strategic actions are a d m i t t e d , we
can d e v e l o p r a t i o n a l choice t h e o r i e s such as t h e o r i e s of e x c h a n g e . If
c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions are a d m i t t e d as well, we can d e v e l o p conven
tional theories of action such as those of W e b e r or Parsons.
T h e third metatheoreticcd decision t h a t I c o n s i d e r to b e of major con
s e q u e n c e is w h e t h e r we s h o u l d choose an atomistic o r a so-called
14
Lecture I
10
T h e t h r e e o p t i o n s t h a t I have m e n t i o n e d , from w h i c h a c o n c e p t u a l
strategy for t h e social sciences m u s t b e c h o s e n , offer c o n v e n i e n t cri
teria for classifying t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t theoretical a p p r o a c h e s , as in
d i c a t e d i n table 2.
I d o n o t w a n t to e x a m i n e t h e relative fruitfulness o f these various
t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s . T h i s overview is i n t e n d e d r a t h e r for t h e
15
Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation
Table 2
Approaches to Social T h e o r y
Meaning as primitive term
not
admissible
admissible
behavior
strategic action
communicative
(and strategic)
action
atomistic
behaviorist
psychology
rational choice
theories (e.g.,
p u r e economics)
"interpretive"
sociology (e.g.,
ethnomethodology)
holistic
biological sys
tems theory
social cybernetics
(e.g., organiza
tional sociology)
structuralist and
functionalist sys
tems theories; sym
bolic interactionism
16
Lecture I
17__
Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation
18
Lecture I
c o m p r i s e b o t h personality structures a n d t h e f o r m s of i n t e r s u b
jectivity within which subjects express themselves by m e a n s of s p e e c h
and interaction.
G e n e r a t i v e t h e o r i e s of society t h a t in o n e way or a n o t h e r p r e
s u p p o s e a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject I shall from n o w o n refer to as
constitutive theories of society, those t h a t base t h e generative process o n
s t r u c t u r e s lacking a subject system theories, a n d , finally, those t h a t ac
c e p t abstract systems of r u l e s for g e n e r a t i n g intersubjective r e l a t i o n s
in which subjects themselves a r e f o r m e d , communicative theories of soci
ety. W e c a n add, as a differentiating feature, t h a t s o m e t h e o r i e s allow
for t h e historical d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e active subject or u n d e r l y i n g
rule systems, w h e r e a s o t h e r s e i t h e r keep to a strict d i c h o t o m y be
tween t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d c o n s t i t u t e d p h e n o m e n a or
at least e x c l u d e t h e logical r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e history of t h e con
stitutive factors. T h i s yields t h e classification s h o w n in table 3.
T h e i n f o r m a t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f this r o u g h overview is t o b e f o u n d in
thenaturally e m p t y b o t t o m right-hand c o r n e r . T h e table serves
to d e l i m i t a t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h t h a t h a s n o t yet b e e n a d e q u a t e l y
d e v e l o p e d . T h e r e f o r e I c a n n o t refer to a n existing body of work. O n
t h e o t h e r h a n d , I c a n a t l e a s t d r a w o n M e a d ' s t h e o r y of role-taking
a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e games. F o r they prefigure t h e
universal p r a g m a t i c s t h a t I take to b e the r i g h t k i n d of f o u n d a t i o n for
social t h e o r y a n d whose basic tenets I should like t o develop. But I
w o u l d first like to c o n s i d e r t h e e x a m p l e of a constitutive t h e o r y of so
ciety t h a t derives f r o m Kant. T h i s e x a m p l e will allow us to b e clear
f r o m t h e o u t s e t a b o u t t h e p r e m i s e s to w h i c h we a r e c o m m i t t e d as
s o o n as we try to conceive of t h e l e a r n i n g process of society as a g e n
erative p r o c e s s . Moreover, t h e characteristic weakness of constitutive
t h e o r i e s will c o m e to light precisely in the p r o b l e m with w h i c h com
m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y begins: t h e derivation of intersubjective r e l a t i o n s
f r o m t h e m o n o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y of
consciousness.
G e o r g S i m m e l d e v o t e d a well-known a p p e n d i x to t h e first c h a p t e r
of his m a j o r w o r k to the q u e s t i o n : "How is society possible?" T h i s is
t h e a n a l o g u e to t h e basic question of t h e Critique of Pure Reason: H o w
is k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e possible? Kant h a d s o u g h t to answer this
question by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t t h e k n o w i n g subject itself constitutes
12
K L _ _
Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation
:
Table 3
Generative Theories of Society
Constitutive Theories
Systems
Theories
Communica
tive Theories
atomistic
holistic
holistic
holistic
not admissible
Neo-Kantianism (Rickert,
Adler); Phe
nomenology
(Husserl,
Schtitz)
romantic so
cial theories
(O. Spann)
structuralism
(Levy-Strauss)
symbolic
interactionism
(G. H. Mead);
theory of lan
g u a g e games
(Wittgenstein,
Winch)
admissible
Marxist phe
nomenology
(Marcuse,
Sartre, Kosik)
dialectical so
cial theory
(Lukacs,
Adorno)
systems theory
of societal de
velopment
(Parsons,
Luhmann)
Types
historiX
cal de- \
velopmenK
of constitu- \
five factors
\
20
Lecture I
S i m m e l goes o n to say t h a t
Owing to these circumstances, the question of how society is possible im
plies a methodology which is wholly different from that for the question of
how nature is possible. The latter question is answered by the forms of cog
nition, whereby the subject synthesizes the given elements into "nature." By
contrast, the former is answered by the conditions which reside a priori in
the elements themselves, whereby they combine, in reality, into the synthesis
"society."
15
T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n is of c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e for t h e starting p o i n t
of all g e n e r a t i v e t h e o r i e s of society, r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r t h e y follow
'
1
2 1 _ _ _
22
Lecture I
must come with, so to speak, so that this consciousness may arise? And what,
therefore, are the forms that this consciousnesssociety as a fact of knowl
edgehas to support? These questions may be called (the subject matter
of) the epistemology of society.
16
II
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of
Society: The Fundamental Role of Claims to
Validity and the Monadological Foundations of
Intersubj ectivity
24
Lecture II
25___
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society
and thus first gives them the dignity of a knowledge which is ultimately
grounded.
2
26
Lecture II
I n o w w a n t t o e x a m i n e m o r e closely two p r o b l e m s t h a t r e s u l t f r o m
t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of a constitutive t h e o r y of society.
We shall see t h a t these p r o b l e m s arise for any conceivable g e n e r a t i v e
t h e o r y of society. I w a n t to show that they c a n n o t be solved within the
framework of a t h e o r y of consciousness a n d that they necessitate the
transition to a t h e o r y of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
Every society t h a t we conceive of as a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d sys
tem of life has a n i m m a n e n t relation to t r u t h . For the reality of
m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s is b a s e d on the p e c u l i a r facticity of claims to va
lidity: In g e n e r a l , these claims a r e naively a c c e p t e d t h a t is, they are
p r e s u m e d to be fulfilled. B u t validity claims can, of c o u r s e , be called
i n t o q u e s t i o n . T h e y raise a claim to legitimacy, a n d this legitimacy
can b e p r o b l e m a t i z e d : It can b e c o n f i r m e d o r rejected. W e can s p e a k
of " t r u t h " h e r e o n l y in t h e b r o a d sense of t h e legitimacy of a claim
t h a t c a n be fulfilled o r d i s a p p o i n t e d . T h u s we say, f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t
a n o p i n i o n o r assertion, as well as a h o p e , wish, o r guess, is c o r r e c t o r
justified, t h a t a p r o m i s e o r a n n o u n c e m e n t has b e e n p r o p e r l y m a d e ,
27.
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society
We i n t e n d a n object t h a t is n o t p r e s e n t t o u s , b u t w h i c h w e k n o w
c o u l d b e directly given to us. I n t e n t i o n a l i t y r e q u i r e s t h e possibility of
t h e virtual p r e s e n c e of objects t h a t could also b e actually p r e s e n t .
O t h e r w i s e we w o u l d n o t b e a b l e t o take quite different i n t e n t i o n a l at
titudes toward t h e same object. T h e i n t e n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of o u r con
sciousness r e q u i r e s t h e possibility of a difference b e t w e e n t h e m e r e l y
m e d i a t e d a n d t h e i m m e d i a t e givenness of objects. A t t h e linguistic
level, we c a n illustrate this difference in t e r m s of t h e division of t h e
declarative s e n t e n c e i n t o a subject expression a n d a p r e d i c a t e ex
pression. T h e subject expression, a n o u n o r definite description, re
fers t o a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t t h a t c a n b e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e positive or
28
Lecture II
negative ascription of p r e d i c a t e s . T h i s r e f e r e n c e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e
t h a t t h e object d e n o t e d b e p r e s e n t . R a t h e r , it suffices t h a t t h e object
c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d a t all as a n identifiable object. It is t o this f e a t u r e
of t h e logic of l a n g u a g e t h a t we owe t h e possibility of contexti n d e p e n d e n t l a n g u a g e use. I n d e e d , t h e m o s t n o t a b l e a c h i e v e m e n t of
linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n is precisely t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of objects
a n d states of affairs t h a t are absent.
W i t h i n t h e b o u n d s of a t h e o r y of consciousness, however, H u s s e r l
c a n n o t m a k e t h e distinction b e t w e e n c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t e x p e r i e n c e
a n d c o n t e x t - t r a n s c e n d e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by m e a n s of referential ex
pressions (which refer to t h e c o n t e x t or s i t u a t i o n ) . Instead, h e inter
p r e t s t h e difference b e t w e e n t h e m e d i a t e d a n d i m m e d i a t e givenness
of objects as a difference b e t w e e n n o n i n t u i t i v e givenness a n d intu
itively fulfilled givenness. T h e m e a n i n g of an i n t e n t i o n a l object t h e n
always r e q u i r e s t h e possibility of t h e intuitively i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n c e
of t h e object. T h e intuitive r i c h n e s s of a n object t h a t is given in evi
d e n c e can h e n c e be u n d e r s t o o d as t h e fulfillment of a c o r r e s p o n d
ing i n t e n t i o n of t h e object. Ideally, t h e stages of fulfillment p o i n t to a
goal in which t h e entire i n t e n t i o n has b e e n fulfilled. T h e full intu
itive p r e s e n c e of t h e object leaves, so to speak, n o trace of unfulfilled
i n t e n t i o n . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n is c o n n e c t e d with a c o n c e p t of t r u t h as
evidence, discussion of w h i c h I shall p o s t p o n e f o r t h e m o m e n t .
H u s s e r l i n t r o d u c e s his t h e o r y of t r u t h w i t h o u t f u r t h e r justification.
H e considers it simply "the p r i n c i p l e of all principles: t h a t . . . every
t h i n g originarily offered to us in ' i n t u i t i o n ' is to b e a c c e p t e d simply
as w h a t it is p r e s e n t e d as b e i n g . " T r u t h c a n t h e n b e d e f i n e d with ref
e r e n c e to t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n . T r u t h is t h e identifying t h o u g h t ,
a c c o m p a n i e d by an evidential e x p e r i e n c e , of s o m e t h i n g i n t e n d e d , as
c o i n c i d i n g with a c o r r e s p o n d i n g intuitively given object. Conversely,
it follows from this t h a t all i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s are i m m a n e n t l y
a n d necessarily related to t r u t h .
7
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The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society
it t h e claim t h a t if t h e object w e r e to c o m e to t h e s t a g e of
self-givenness, it w o u l d a p p e a r j u s t as it is i n t e n d e d , a n d n o t o t h e r
wise. S u c h a c l a i m is e i t h e r legitimate o r illegitimate; its legitimacy
can b e d e m o n s t r a t e d only by t h e intuitive fulfillment of t h e origi
nally "empty" i n t e n t i o n . O f course, positing qualities c a n also be
bracketed or "neutralized," in which case we set aside t h e question of
the legitimacy of t h e claim t h a t a given i n t e n t i o n c a n b e fulfilled pre
cisely as anticipated. I n t e n t i o n s t h a t are not n e u t r a l i z e d in this sense,
however, a r e c o n n e c t e d with a validity claim t h a t c a n b e u n d e r m i n e d
a t a n y t i m e by a failed a t t e m p t to b r i n g t h e i n t e n d e d object to a d e
quate self-givenness.
T h e lifeworld as a w h o l e is a l s o posited. F o r t h e m e a n i n g struc
tures t h a t c o n s t i t u t e t h e lifeworld exist only in t h e manifold of valid
ity claims i n h e r e n t in t h e m . T h e s e claims c o m e t o g e t h e r in the
"general thesis of t h e n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e , " t h a t is, in t h e basic belief of
naive realism t h a t " t h e " world in which I find myself exists a n d has al
ways existed as a n actuality t h a t s u r r o u n d s m e . T h e g e n e r a l thesis
e n c o m p a s s e s t h e totality of life in t h e n a t u r a l world.
8
30
Lecture II
On the one hand, there are new characteristics which are analogous to the
modes of belief but possess, at the same time, themselves doxo-logical
positableness; on the other hand, connected with the novel moments there
are also novel "apprehensions," and a new sense becomes constituted. . . . with
it no new determining parts of mere "things" are constituted, but instead
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The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society
Here clearly emerges the universality with which the realm of knowledge en
compasses all types of activities that derive from emotional and volitional
subjectivity. Correlatively, however, the sphere of the valuating emotions and
the will, in their endeavors and activities, extends to the entirety of subjectiv
ity and all its intentional functions. What this means for science, however, is
that all of evaluative and practical reason is reflected and objectified in sci
ence as the objectification of cognitive reason. In other words, all truth, in
cluding every evaluative and practical truth, finds expression and is
determined in the cognitive forms of theoretical truth, where it also takes
on the forms of cognitive justification.
13
32
Lecture II
33___
.
The I'henomenological Constitutive Theory of Society
34
Lecture II
w h e t h e r we a r e c o n s t r u c t i n g a n u m e r i c a l series o r geometrical
figures, p e r f o r m i n g a c o m p o s i t i o n for p i a n o , o r p r o d u c i n g a sen
t e n c e a n i n t e n t i o n is always fulfilled by a n object t h a t is g e n e r a t e d
a n d was previously i n t e n d e d as s u c h .
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The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society
36
Lecture II
37
...
constitute m u s t b e t h e s a m e as t h a t c o n s t i t u t e d by all o t h e r s . O n l y na
ture is given to m e as objective. I constitute it in m o d e s of givenness
that are t h e s a m e for all o t h e r s . In this objective w o r l d , I c a n e n c o u n
ter the initially c o n s t i t u t e d o t h e r s as e m p i r i c a l subjects:
Accordingly the intrinsically first other (the first "non-Ego") is the other Ego.
And the other Ego makes constitutionally possible a new infinite domain of
what is "other": an Objective Nature and a whole Objective world, to which all
other Egos and I myself belong.
18
38
Lecture II
39____
T h e i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y or reciprocity of perspectives g r o u n d s t h e
identity of m y system of a p p e a r a n c e s with t h a t of t h e bodily
a p p r e s e n t e d other. At t h e s a m e time, t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l W e of
c o m m u n a l i z e d m o n a d s is c o n s t i t u t e d in this identity t h r o u g h
interchangeability.
I have p r e s e n t e d Husserl's a c c o u n t to t h e p o i n t w h e r e I can n o w
discuss t h e t w o m o s t i m p o r t a n t objections to it. B o t h of t h e m indi
cate t h a t Husserl begs t h e q u e s t i o n of intersubjectivity, which h e can
n o t derive o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n s of a p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness.
40
Lecture II
41___
The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society
42
L e c t u r e II
i e
I am the one who performs the epoche, and, even if there are others, and
even if they practice the epoche in direct community with me, [they and] all
other human beings with their entire act-life are included, for me, within my
epoche, in the world-phenomenon, in my epoche, which is exclusively
24
mine/*
This is a f u n d a m e n t a l m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p o s t u l a t e of a p h i l o s o p h y of
consciousness w h o s e starting p o i n t is solitary reflection o n t h e activi
ties of the individual's own subjectivity. It e x c l u d e s in p r i n c i p l e the
possibility that t h e o t h e r s c o n s t i t u t e d by a n d for m e could have ex
actly the same relation t o m e t h a t I have to t h e m as m y i n t e n t i o n a l
objects. Rather, in t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e , I a m m e t h o d o l o g
ically forced to assert myself as t h e p r i m a r y a n d f o u n d a t i o n a l origi
nal ego against all o t h e r egos t h a t g u a r a n t e e t h e intersubjectivity of
my world.
25
E x p e r i e n c e t h a t is intersubjectively c o m m u n a l i z e d i n t h e strict
sense c a n n o t b e conceived w i t h o u t t h e c o n c e p t of m e a n i n g t h a t is
c o m m u n i c a t e d a n d s h a r e d by different subjects. I d e n t i c a l m e a n i n g s
are n o t f o r m e d in t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a solitary subject t h a t
confronts its world in isolation. For m e a n i n g s to b e identical in any
intelligible sense, t h e y m u s t have t h e same validity for different sub
jects. T o a c c o u n t for t h e identity of s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s ,
Wittgenstein p r o p o s e d t h e m o d e l of a r u l e t h a t at least two subjects
must b e able to follow. M e a d r e c o m m e n d s t h e m o d e l of a r o l e t h a t
establishes reciprocally i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t b e h a v i o r
for at least two subjects. C o n c e p t s such as " r u l e " o r "role" m u s t b e
defined from t h e o u t s e t in t e r m s of a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n subjects.
They circumvent t h e n o t i o n of a n y t h i n g like a private conscious
ness t h a t only s u b s e q u e n t i y e n t e r s i n t o c o n t a c t with a n o t h e r con
scious b e i n g . Moreover, t h e primitive t e r m s a r e c o n c e i v e d such t h a t
the intersubjective relation a n d t h e use of symbolic expressions o n
44
Lecture II
t h e p a r t of subjects c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n originate
simultaneously.
C o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r i e s enjoy the a d v a n t a g e of b e i n g able to take
as their starting point t h e intersubjective relation t h a t constitutive
t h e o r i e s a t t e m p t in vain to derive from t h e activity of m o n a d i c con
sciousness. T h e i r task, t h e n , is to give a c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c ac
c o u n t of t h e subjective e x p e r i e n c e s , to which each ego has privileged
access. T h e constitution of t h e objects of possible e x p e r i e n c e about
which we c o m m u n i c a t e with o n e a n o t h e r m u s t also be a c c o u n t e d for
in terms of a theory of o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I should
like to discuss this set of p r o b l e m s in terms of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s theory
of l a n g u a g e g a m e s .
Ill
46
Lecture III
4____
p ^ j i a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society
48
Lecture III
Because the thinking out loud, and the mental acts modeled on them, with
which we have been concerned, are not actions, we have stressed the distinc
tion between rules of performance and rules of criticism. Non-actions, as
well as actions, are subject to rules of criticism, and actions, are subject to
rules of criticisms, and the linguistic non-actions we have in mind are no ex
ceptions. Linguistic rules of criticism play a key role in developing, main
taining, and improving our linguistic character, thus ensuring the existence
of the semantic uniformities, which are the descriptive core of meaningful
speech.
8
50
L e c t u r e III
5d____
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From a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society
13
14
52
L e c t u r e III
I n s o f a r as t h e m e a n i n g of w o r d s b e c o m e s clear i n t h e f u l f i l l m e n t o f a n ex
p e c t a t i o n , i n t h e satisfaction of a wish, in t h e c a r r y i n g o u t o f a n o r d e r , etc., it
a l r e a d y shows itself w h e n w e p u t t h e e x p e c t a t i o n i n t o l a n g u a g e . It is t h e r e
fore completely d e t e r m i n e d in the g r a m m a r .
1 6
T h e m e a n i n g of t h e s e n t e n c e is n o t p n e u m a t i c ; it is n o t e x p l a i n e d by
relating it to i n t e n t i o n s or meaning-giving acts. To t h e contrary, the
m e a n i n g of i n t e n t i o n s can only be specified with r e f e r e n c e to the
m e a n i n g of s e n t e n c e s : " T h e m e a n i n g of the s e n t e n c e is n o t a soul."
S o m e t h i n g is a s e n t e n c e only in a l a n g u a g e . T h u s t o u n d e r s t a n d an
i n t e n t i o n is to u n d e r s t a n d t h e r o l e of a s e n t e n c e in a linguistic sys
tem. B u t in w h a t sense c a n we s p e a k h e r e of a system of l a n g u a g e ?
As we know, W i t t g e n s t e i n m a k e s use of a m o d e l : a l a n g u a g e is like
a g a m e . H e i n t r o d u c e s the c o n c e p t of a g a m e t h r o u g h e x a m p l e s .
T h e first g r o u p of e x a m p l e s consists in simple calculations t h a t can
b e p e r f o r m e d with the aid of signs a n d usage rules for c o m b i n i n g
signs. T h e p a r a d i g m o n which h e draws a g a i n a n d a g a i n is t h e series
of n a t u r a l n u m b e r s . A f u r t h e r g r o u p of e x a m p l e s consist in chil
d r e n ' s games, which h a v e t h e advantage t h a t they c o o r d i n a t e t h e ac
tivities of several p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e t h i r d g r o u p of e x a m p l e s consists
17
18
F r o m a C o n s t i t u t i v e t o a C o m m u n i c a t i v e T h e o r y of S o c i e t y
54
Lecture III
p e r m i t t e d a n d w h a t o p e r a t i o n s m a y b e c a r r i e d o u t w i t h these signs.
W e have to fall back o n t h e m w h e n we d o n ' t k n o w w h a t a p i e c e (such
as a chess p i e c e ) o r a m o v e with a p i e c e is s u p p o s e d to " m e a n . " T h e
use t h e o r y of m e a n i n g , w h i c h m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e m e a n i n g of a word
or s e n t e n c e is t h e role it plays in t h e system of a l a n g u a g e , is derived
f r o m this m o d e l . T h e rules of t h e game, of course, may b e described;
b u t a d e s c r i p t i o n d o e s n o t really c a p t u r e w h a t t h e r u l e s d o . A player
w h o u n d e r s t a n d s t h e rules, that is, one w h o can m a k e moves in t h e
game, n e e d n o t also b e able to describe t h e rules. T h e specific na
ture of a r u l e is e x p r e s s e d in the c o m p e t e n c e of s o m e o n e who mas
ters it r a t h e r t h a n in a d e s c r i p t i o n . T o u n d e r s t a n d a g a m e is to have a
certain k i n d of know-how. U n d e r s t a n d i n g m e a n s m a s t e r i n g a tech
n i q u e . This "mastery" expresses t h e s p o n t a n e i t y with which o n e can
apply a n a c q u i r e d rule i n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d t h u s also t h e creativity of
p r o d u c i n g n e w instances t h a t c o u n t as e x a m p l e s of following the
r u l e . T h i s e x p l a i n s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s interest in the fact that a s t u d e n t
w h o h a s l e a r n e d a p a r t i c u l a r n u m e r i c a l series by o s t e n s i o n has u n
d e r s t o o d t h e u n d e r l y i n g r u l e w h e n h e "knows h o w to go o n by him
self." T h e "and so o n " with which t h e t e a c h e r e n d s a series of
n u m b e r s t h a t is s u p p o s e d to exemplify a rule stands for t h e abstract
possibility of p e r f o r m i n g infinitely m a n y f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s a n d gen
e r a t i n g infinitely m a n y a d d i t i o n a l instances t h a t accord with t h e r u l e .
T h e c o m p e t e n c e t h a t I a c q u i r e i n l e a r n i n g a r u l e of a g a m e o r a
g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e is a generative capacity. W i t t g e n s t e i n never tires of
explaining why t h e cognitive ability of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a rule also re
quires a practical skill, namely, t h a t of acting a c c o r d i n g to t h e r u l e .
T h e m e a n i n g of a r u l e is s o m e t h i n g universal t h a t I c a n exemplify
only t h r o u g h a finite n u m b e r of cases; t h u s I c a n e x p l a i n it to s o m e
o n e else only t h r o u g h ostensive training. T o explain s o m e t h i n g u n i
versal by m e a n s of e x a m p l e s , however, is n o t to get s o m e o n e to
g e n e r a l i z e inductively f r o m a finite n u m b e r of cases. Rather, t h e stu
d e n t h a s grasped t h e universal if a n d only if h e h a s l e a r n e d to see in
t h e t h i n g s s h o w n h i m only e x a m p l e s of s o m e t h i n g t h a t can be seen
in t h e m . Even a single e x a m p l e c a n suffice for this: "So it is t h e r u l e s
g o v e r n i n g an e x a m p l e t h a t m a k e it a n e x a m p l e . " T h e objects o r ac
tions t h a t serve as e x a m p l e s a r e never in a n d of themselves e x a m p l e s
of t h e r u l e . O n l y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a r u l e lets u s r e c o g n i z e t h e u n i 20
f r o m a C o n s t i t u t i v e t o a C o m m u n i c a t i v e T h e o r y of S o c i e t y
56
L e c t u r e III
24
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from a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society
Nevertheless, it is precisely t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e g a m e
that shows the limits of a t t e m p t i n g to u n d e r s t a n d l a n g u a g e o n the
model of a g a m e . W i t t g e n s t e i n himself n o t e s a t o n e p o i n t t h e differ
ence between the arbitrariness of a g a m e u p o n w h i c h we have a g r e e d
and t h e recalcitrance of a l a n g u a g e passed d o w n by tradition, whose
grammar I m u s t obey. A l a n g u a g e is j u s t n o t simply a g a m e ; we have
to take it seriously.
Is meaning then really only the use of the word? Isn't it the way this use
meshes with our life? Isn't its use part of our life?
26
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Lecture III
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From a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society
reason/
This p r o b l e m arises only for r u l e s that, unlike g a m e r u l e s , constitute
not merely a n self-contained c o n t e x t of m e a n i n g b u t r a t h e r t h e
m e a n i n g of objects of possible e x p e r i e n c e . This difference, too, was
n o t systematically a c c o u n t e d for by W i t t g e n s t e i n after h e a b a n d o n e d
the c o n c e p t of a universal l a n g u a g e t h a t r e p r e s e n t s t h e facts a n d has
a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l status.
I would like to discuss briefly t h e two d i m e n s i o n s in w h i c h to de
velop p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e b e y o n d t h e limits of t h e g a m e m o d e l
of l a n g u a g e .
R e g a r d i n g ( a ) , t h e intersubjecdve r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n speakers: Witt
genstein r e d u c e s sameness of m e a n i n g to the intersubjective recog
nition of rules. But h e does n o t e x a m i n e ^ t h e reciprocal r e l a t i o n
between t h e two subjects w h o a c c e p t a r u l e ] for w h o m a r u l e , s u c h as
a semantic c o n v e n t i o n , is valid. [ T h e fact That each p a r t n e r m u s t be
able to anticipate t h e o t h e r ' s expectation^is by n o m e a n s trivial. G. H .
^ M e a d was t h e first t o analyze this f o u n d a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n .
T h e intersubjectivity of a r u l e ' s validity and, h e n c e , s a m e n e s s of
m e a n i n g have t h e s a m e basis: t h e fact t h a t r u l e - o r i e n t e d b e h a v i o r
c a n b e mutually criticizecf/what this d e m a n d s , in t u r n , is n o t reci
procity of behavior b u t reciprocity of expectations a b o u t behavior. A
m u s t b e a b l e t o anticipate a n d identify with B's e x p e c t a t i o n j u s t as B
can in relation to A. This m u t u a l reflexivity of e x p e c t a t i o n s is t h e
condition in virtue of which b o t h p a r t n e r s c a n j o i n in t h e same ex
pectation, identify t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t is objectively p o s i t e d with t h e
rule, a n d "share" its symbolic m e a n i n g . W e can call these expecta
tions intentions.
29
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L e c t u r e III
c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h r o u g h m e a n i n g is possible only o n c o n d i t i o n of si
m u l t a n e o u s m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n . C o m m u n i c a t i o n by m e a n s of
shared meanings requires reaching understanding about something
a n d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t t h e intersub
jective validity of what is b e i n g c o m m u n i c a t e d . By m e a n s of symbol
ized m e a n i n g , s o m e t h i n g t h a t is n o w absent is m a d e p r e s e n t
i n a s m u c h as at least two subjects c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d action c o m e
to s h a r e this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Yet it d o e s n o t suffice t o r e d u c e identity
of m e a n i n g to t h e reciprocal reflexivity of expectations. For this reci
procity p r e s u p p o s e s in t u r n t h e subjects' mutual recognition. By j o i n i n g
in their e x p e c t a t i o n s , subjects constitute m e a n i n g s t h a t they can
s h a r e . H e r e we m u s t s u p p o s e t h a t they themselves were f o r m e d as
subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d action only in c o n n e c t i o n with acts of
m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n . For it is only their c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e ,
t h a t is, t h e i r capacity t o s p e a k ( a n d to act), t h a t m a k e s t h e m subjects.
F r o m this p o i n t of view, intersubjectivity reveals itself as a p a r a d o x i c a l
relation.
Insofar as t h e y take t h e r o l e of subjects, subjects w h o m u t u a l l y rec
ognize e a c h o t h e r as such m u s t r e g a r d o n e a n o t h e r as identical: E a c h
m u s t s u b s u m e b o t h herself a n d t h e o t h e r u n d e r t h e s a m e category.
At the same time, however, t h e r e l a t i o n of reciprocity in r e c o g n i t i o n
also r e q u i r e s t h e n o n i d e n t i t y of e g o a n d other. I n d e e d , each m u s t
affirm h e r a b s o l u t e difference f r o m t h e other. For to b e a subject in
c l u d e s t h e claim t o individuation. This dialectic of t h e e g o was first
d e v e l o p e d by Fichte a n d H e g e l . Obviously o n e is i n i t i a t e d i n t o t h e
p a r a d o x i c a l r e l a t i o n of intersubjectivity t h r o u g h t h e system of per
sonal p r o n o u n s ; H u m b o l d t , in particular, called a t t e n t i o n to this. As
even H u s s e r l realized, reciprocal reflexivity of e x p e c t a t i o n , in which
identical m e a n i n g s a r e constituted, r e q u i r e s t h a t e a c h subject can
identify a n d h a v e a n e x p e c t a t i o n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f r o m h e r o w n posi
tion a n d from t h a t of the other. T h i s requires, in t u r n , t h e simulta
n e o u s p e r c e p t i o n of dialogue roles t h a t a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e to t h e
e x t e n t t h a t a s p e a k i n g a n d acting e g o can identify with h e r o t h e r as
with a n o t h e r ego only if the latter is c a p t u r e d as different f r o m her
self, as n o t identical with herself. W h e n e v e r two subjects c o n f r o n t
o n e a n o t h e r a t t h e level of intersubjectivity in o r d e r to speak o r i n t e r
act with o n e a n o t h e r , t h e y m a s t e r this p a r a d o x i c a l relation. T o b e
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From a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society
able to e n t e r i n t o t h e p a r a d o x i c a l r e l a t i o n of intersubjectivity t h a t
underlies all logically consistent c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a speaker m u s t
have t h e c o m p e t e n c e to apply p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s in a c c o r d a n c e with
rules. She must say "I" to herself, a n d address the other, w h o equally
can say "I" to himself, as "you." At t h e s a m e time t h e two d e l i m i t
themselves as "we" from all outsiders (from " h i m " a n d " t h e m " ) , w h o
are merely p o t e n t i a l p a r t i c i p a n t s in conversation.
This intersubjective r e l a t i o n is e l a b o r a t e d in t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m
of t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t of s p e e c h : t h e s p e e c h act. P a r a d i g m e x a m p l e s
of speech acts a r e "I p r o m i s e y o u I will c o m e " ; "I advise y o u to stop
that"; "I shall describe to y o u h o w y o u s h o u l d go"; a n d so on. I n every
explicit s p e e c h act of t h e f o r m "Mp," M c o n t a i n s a p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n
in the first p e r s o n as t h e g r a m m a t i c a l subject a n d a p e r s o n a l p r o
n o u n in t h e s e c o n d p e r s o n as t h e object, as well as a p e r f o r m a t i v e
verb as t h e p r e d i c a t e . W e use s e n t e n c e s of this f o r m i n u t t e r a n c e s in
order to both g e n e r a t e a n d r e p r e s e n t a relation of intersubjectivity
based on m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n . S p e e c h acts a r e b a s e d on reciprocal re
lations. T h e roles of a s k i n g a n d answering, affirming a n d d e n y i n g , o r
c o m m a n d i n g a n d obeying a r e in principle interchangeable. This
interchangeability, however, h o l d s only o n c o n d i t i o n of simulta
neously r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t individuals w h o a s s u m e d i a l o g u e roles a r e
in principle i r r e p l a c e a b l e a n d u n i q u e . T h e success of a s p e e c h act
d e p e n d s a m o n g o t h e r things o n speakers e n t e r i n g i n t o a n
intersubjective r e l a t i o n by using p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s , a n d this rela
tion m a k e s possible reciprocally t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s assertion of t h e
identity a n d n o n i d e n t i t y of e g o a n d other. T h i s p a r t i c u l a r f o r m of
intersubjectivity c o u l d be e l u c i d a t e d f u r t h e r by investigating the
logic of t h e use of p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s .
R e g a r d i n g ( b ) , t h e r e l a t i o n of speech to s o m e t h i n g in t h e world:
In t h e Tractatus W i t t g e n s t e i n h a d investigated t h e f o r m of a universal
l a n g u a g e t h a t r e p r e s e n t e d facts. All a n d only those s e n t e n c e s o r
p r o p o s i t i o n s [Sdtze] of t h e l a n g u a g e t h a t a r e syntactically c o r r e c t are
empirically m e a n i n g f u l . It is to these a n d only these p r o p o s i t i o n s
t h a t facts c o r r e s p o n d if t h e f o r m e r a r e t r u e . T h u s t h e universal lan
g u a g e was to d e t e r m i n e t h e object d o m a i n of possible empirical a n d
scientific p r o p o s i t i o n s of t h e n a t u r a l sciences a n d could h a v e
claimed a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l status. A p a r t from t h e logical difficulties
62
L e c t u r e III
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From a C o n s t i t u t i v e t o a C o m m u n i c a t i v e T h e o r y of Society
64
Lecture I I I
c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h t h e goal of c o m m u n i c a t i n g s o m e t h i n g a b o u t an
objectified reality.
(3) Sincerity a n d (4) Normative Tightness. All u t t e r a n c e s that are ex
pressive in t h e n a r r o w e r sense (feelings, desires, expressions of will)
imply a claim to sincerity. This claim proves to be false if it turns o u t
t h a t t h e s p e a k e r d i d n o t in fact have t h e i n t e n t i o n s t h a t she ex
pressed. All normatively o r i e n t e d u t t e r a n c e s (such as c o m m a n d s , ad
vice, p r o m i s e s , etc.) imply a claim to n o r m a t i v e Tightness. This claim
is n o t justified if t h e prevailing n o r m s u n d e r l y i n g t h e u t t e r a n c e s can
n o t b e legitimated. I call this use of l a n g u a g e communicative. H e r e we
refer to s o m e t h i n g in the world in o r d e r to p r o d u c e specific interper
sonal relations.
C o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use p r e s u p p o s e s cognitive use, whereby
we a c q u i r e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s , just as, inversely, cognitive use
p r e s u p p o s e s c o m m u n i c a t i v e use, since assertions can only b e m a d e
by m e a n s of constative s p e e c h acts. A l t h o u g h a c o m m u n i c a t i v e the
ory of society is i m m e d i a t e l y c o n c e r n e d with t h e s e d i m e n t a t i o n s a n d
p r o d u c t s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use, it must d o justice to t h e
d o u b l e , cognitive-communicative structure of s p e e c h . T h e r e f o r e in
d e v e l o p i n g t h e t h e o r y of s p e e c h acts I shall at least refer to t h e con
stitutive p r o b l e m s t h a t arise in c o n n e c t i o n with cognitive l a n g u a g e
use.
W i t t g e n s t e i n h a d m a r k e d reservations r e g a r d i n g a t t e m p t s to de
velop a theory of l a n g u a g e . T h e systematic reason for his i n t e r p r e t a
tion of linguistic analysis as a merely t h e r a p e u t i c activity lies in his
m a k i n g an absolute of a single use of l a n g u a g e , namely, t h e c o m m u
nicative. Cognitive l a n g u a g e use n o l o n g e r has a n y claim to inde
p e n d e n c e . W i t t g e n s t e i n believed t h a t t h e plurality of l a n g u a g e
g a m e s t h a t h e discovered e n c o m p a s s e d all conceivable ways of using
w o r d s a n d s e n t e n c e s . H e d i d n o t realize t h a t it covers b u t o n e of sev
eral categories of l a n g u a g e u s e .
After i n t r o d u c i n g his l a n g u a g e g a m e m o d e l , Wittgenstein, if I a m
n o t m i s t a k e n , d i d n o t offer any justification for his a b s t e n t i o n from
theory. T o b e sure, h e h a d a m p l e r e a s o n to consider t h e r o a d s to a
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o r empiricist o r constructivist theory of l a n g u a g e im
passable. Linguistic t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s m , which tries to r e c o n s t r u c t a
6j_____-.
Frorn a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society
IV
Universal Pragmatics: Reflections on a Theory of
Communicative Competence
68
Lecture IV
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Universal Pragmatics
70
L e c t u r e IV
L i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y is c o n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y with a n i d e a l s p e a k e r - l i s t e n e r , in
c o m p l e t e l y h o m o g e n e o u s s p e e c h c o m m u n i t y , w h o k n o w s h i s l a n g u a g e per
fectly a n d is u n a f f e c t e d b y s u c h g r a m m a t i c a l l y - i r r e l e v a n t c o n d i t i o n s as m e m
o r y l i m i t a t i o n s , d i s t r a c t i o n s , shifts o f a t t e n t i o n a n d i n t e r e s t , a n d e r r o r s
( r a n d o m o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ) i n a p p l y i n g his k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l a n g u a g e in ac
tual p e r f o r m a n c e .
a
It s e e m s to m e t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of t h e ideal s p e a k e r is e n t a i l e d by the
c o n c e p t of t h e n o r m a t i v e validity of g r a m m a t i c a l rules a n d the com
p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t of r u l e - c o m p e t e n c e . It is t r u e that grammatical
rules d o n o t a t all c o n t a i n ideal postulates, as g e o m e t r i c a l r u l e s of
m e a s u r e m e n t , for e x a m p l e , d o s u c h as drawing a perfectly straight
line. I n p r i n c i p l e , postulates of p e r f e c t i o n can be fulfilled only ap
p r o x i m a t e l y u n d e r e m p i r i c a l b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s . "Ideal" rulec o m p e t e n c e c a n b e claimed for such postulates in a nontrivial sense,
for t h e idealizations a r e p e r f o r m e d by t h e m e a s u r i n g subjects them
selves. I n t h e case of l a n g u a g e , however, it is n o t t h e speaker w h o ide
alizes, b u t t h e l i n g u i s t a n d in a trivial sense. T h e c o n c e p t of a n o r m
already c o n t a i n s latitude for possible deviations from t h e n o r m . The
m e a n i n g of t h e n o r m a t i v e validity of rules implies t h a t the possibility
exists in principle of violating t h e rule. N o n e t h e l e s s , in t h e linguistic
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e rule system of a l a n g u a g e we d i s r e g a r d all the
e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s can be realized
e i t h e r perfecdy, inadequately, o r n o t at all. T h e linguist posits the
fictitious case of the c o m p l e t e a n d c o n s t a n t fulfillment of postulates
(that a r e fulfillable in p r i n c i p l e ) . Every logical or c o n c e p t u a l analysis
of rule systems must o p e r a t e on this supposition.
T h e r e is n o t h i n g mysterious a b o u t this idealization. B u t we must
distinguish it f r o m t h e e m p i r i c a l a s s u m p t i o n with which Chomsky
gives it o n t o l o g i c a l i m p o r t . I a m r e f e r r i n g h e r e to the hypothesis that
t h e linguistic rule system (like t h e cognitive a p p a r a t u s in Piaget) de
velops f r o m a g e n e t i c basis t h r o u g h t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of biologically
c o n d i t i o n e d m a t u r a t i o n a l processes a n d stage-specific stimulus in
puts. T h e child does n o t u n d e r g o a l e a r n i n g process to c o n s t r u c t the
g r a m m a r of his m o t h e r t o n g u e m e r e l y by l e a r n i n g from t h e available
linguistic data. Rather, g u i d e d by i n n a t e a priori k n o w l e d g e of t h e ab
stract s t r u c t u r e of n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s in g e n e r a l , he can derive that
g r a m m a r from t h e r u d i m e n t a r y linguistic d a t a in his e n v i r o n m e n t by
71
Universal Pragmatics
72
L e c t u r e IV
I have b r o u g h t u p t h e s e p o i n t s in o r d e r t o d e f i n e m o r e precisely
the p r o j e c t of a universal p r a g m a t i c s . Universal p r a g m a t i c s s t a n d s be
tween linguistics o n o n e h a n d a n d empirical pragmatics o n the
other. Linguistics limits itself to linguistic expressions a n d disregards
c o n t e x t s of their possible use. T h e t h e o r y of linguistic c o d e s o n the
o t h e r h a n d , which is c o n c e r n e d with t h e differential m o d e s of lan
g u a g e use, p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e c o n t e x t s in w h i c h m u t u a l u n d e r
s t a n d i n g is possible h a v e already b e e n p r o d u c e d . J u s t w h a t is the
status of t h e s e contexts, in which s e n t e n c e s ( a n d n o n v e r b a l expres
sions) c a n b e u t t e r e d , r e m a i n s u n e x p l a i n e d . Linguistics d o e s n o t
have to c o n s i d e r them, a n d within the theory of linguistic c o d e s they
c o u n t as b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s . Yet t h e c o m p o n e n t s t h a t r e c u r in
every possible s p e e c h situation u n d e r s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s a r e n o t
extralinguistic e l e m e n t s . T h e general structures of possible s p e e c h
e n t e r i n t o t h e very c o n c e p t of a linguistic c o d e . T h e y u n d e r l i e the
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Universal Pragmatics
74
Lecture IV
T o d e l i n e a t e m o r e sharply t h e c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e
t e n c e , I w o u l d like to p r o p o s e a didactically plausible series of steps
of abstraction. T h e abstractions b e g i n with c o n c r e t e u t e r a n c e s . I call
a n u t t e r a n c e " c o n c r e t e " if it is m a d e within a c o m p l e t e l y d e t e r m i n
i n g context. T h e first step is sociolinguistic abstraction. It p r e s c i n d s
f r o m all t h o s e b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s of linguistic r u l e systems that
vary c o n t i n g e n l y a n d are specific only to individual speaker-hearers,
a n d r e t a i n s " u t t e r a n c e s in g e n e r a l i z e d social contexts." T h e s e c o n d
step is universal-pragmatic
abstraction. It p r e s c i n d s from all spatiot e m p o r a l l y a n d socially c i r c u m s c r i b e d contexts a n d r e t a i n s only "situ
ated u t t e r a n c e s in g e n e r a l . " In this way we arrive at t h e e l e m e n t a r y
units of s p e e c h . T h e t h i r d abstraction is linguistic abstraction, which
Universal P r a g m a t i c s
Object d o m a i n
Competence
Theory
u t t e r a n c e s in social
contexts
pragmatic
sociolinguistics
non-context-specific
utterances
communicative
universal p r a g m a t i c s
linguistic expres
sions (sentences)
grammatical
linguistics
propositions
logical
formal logic
76
Lecture TV
11
77___
Universal P r a g m a t i c s
verbs
(grammatical
forms:
interrogative,
5. N o n p e r f o r m a t i v e i n t e n t i o n a l verbs a n d m o d a l adverbs.
I call these classes of linguistic expressions pragmatic universals be
cause they can b e c o r r e l a t e d with universal s t r u c t u r e s of t h e s p e e c h
situation. Classes 1 a n d 2 i n d i c a t e t h e s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s a n d t h e p o t e n
tial participants in conversation. Class 3 i n d i c a t e s t h e s p a t i o t e m p o r a l
and factual e l e m e n t s of t h e s p e e c h situation. Class 4 indicates t h e re
lation
t h e speaker to h e r u t t e r a n c e , a n d t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
speakers a n d h e a r e r s . Class 5, finally, i n d i c a t e s t h e i n t e n t i o n s a n d ex
p e r i e n c e s of t h e speaker.
I d o n o t c o n s i d e r it a d e q u a t e to r e g a r d t h e p r a g m a t i c universals as
c o m p o n e n t s of a m e t a l a n g u a g e in which we can reach an u n d e r
standing a b o u t t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e s p e e c h situation. T h i s view cre
ates t h e misleading impression t h a t t h e universal s t r u c t u r e s of t h e
speech situation are given as empirical b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s i n d e
p e n d e n t of s p e e c h . I n fact, however, we c a n e m p l o y s e n t e n c e s in ut
terances only if we ourselves, by m e a n s of p r a g m a t i c universals,
p r o d u c e t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which c o m m u n i c a t i o n is possible,
thereby p r o d u c i n g t h e s p e e c h situation. W i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to these
universals we c a n n o t even define t h e r e c u r r i n g c o m p o n e n t s of situa
tions of possible s p e e c h , namely, t h e u t t e r a n c e s themselves, t h e in
t e r p e r s o n a l relations g e n e r a t e d b e t w e e n s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s a l o n g with
u t t e r a n c e s , a n d t h e objects a b o u t which s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s c o m m u n i
cate with o n e a n o t h e r . T h i s does n o t affect t h e fact t h a t p r a g m a t i c
universals, at t h e s a m e time as we use t h e m to p r o d u c e the s p e e c h sit
uation, also serve to represent it.
12
78
Universal Pragmatics
Universal Pragmatics
80
Lecture IV
81___
Universal Pragmatics
82
Lecture IV
83
(J niversal P r a g m a t i c s
84
Lecture IV
Lecture V
s is t r u e if a n d only if "p" is t r u e
w h e r e 5 is a n assertoric s e n t e n c e t h a t m e a n s p? T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n
clearly shows t h a t t h e semantic c o n c e p t i o n of t r u t h begs t h e ques
tion of t h e c o n c e p t of p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h . Tarski c a n replace (1)
with
3
(2)
s is t r u e iff/)
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Truth and Society
"P" i t r u e .
T h e m e a n i n g o f t r u t h d o e s n o t consist i n t h e m e t h o d o f ascertain
ing t r u t h ; nevertheless, t h e m e a n i n g of a validity claim also c a n n o t
be d e t e r m i n e d w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e t o t h e possibility of r e d e e m i n g , limit
ing, o r rejecting it. T h a t is why t h e evidential theory of truth, t h e
Husserlian version of which we have e x a m i n e d m o r e closely, defines
t r u t h with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e intuitive fulfillment of a n i n t e n t i o n . T h e
m e a n i n g of t r u t h , a c c o r d i n g to Husserl, refers t o t h e evidence of t h e
intuition of w h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y given. I shall n o t r e h e a r s e t h e argu
m e n t s t h a t have b e e n a d v a n c e d by p h i l o s o p h e r s from Peirce to
88
Lecture V
89__
90
Lecture V
9l__
T r u t h a n d Society
are a d d r e s s e d n o t to t h e u n t r u s t w o r t h y p e r s o n himself, b u t r a t h e r to
third parties. A s p e a k e r s u s p e c t e d of b e i n g i n s i n c e r e can at best b e
cross-examined in c o u r t o r may p e r h a p s " b r o u g h t t o his senses" i n
analysis.
These four claims to validity a r e f u n d a m e n t a l in t h a t they c a n n o t
be r e d u c e d to a c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r . T h e m e a n i n g of intelligibil
ity, n o r m a t i v e Tightness, a n d sincerity c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to t h e
m e a n i n g of t r u t h . W e u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t r u t h is w h e n we grasp t h e
m e a n i n g of t h e claims to validity c o n t a i n e d in constative s p e e c h acts:
T h e pragmatics of assertion is t h e key to t h e c o n c e p t of t r u t h ,
whereas t h e a p p e a l of models such as t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e theory,
which are l o c a t e d in a different s p h e r e , namely, t h a t of iconic r e p r e
sentation, is misleading. T r u t h is n o t a r e l a t i o n of r e s e m b l a n c e . T h e
same h o l d s for t h e o t h e r classes of validity claims. T h e intelligibility
of a n u t t e r a n c e is n o t a t r u t h relation. Intelligibility is a validity claim
that signifies t h a t I h a v e mastery of a specific r u l e - c o m p e t e n c e ,
namely, that I k n o w a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e . An u t t e r a n c e is intelligible if
it is grammatically a n d pragmatically well f o r m e d , so that e v e r y o n e
who h a s m a s t e r e d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e r u l e systems is able to g e n e r a t e
the same u t t e r a n c e . T h u s w h a t we call "analytic t r u t h " c o u l d b e u n
derstood as a special case of intelligibility, namely, t h e intelligibility
of s e n t e n c e s in f o r m a l l a n g u a g e s . But intelligibility h a s n o t h i n g to d o
with "truth." T r u t h is a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d t h e reality
a b o u t which we m a k e s t a t e m e n t s . By contrast, intelligibility is an in
ternal relation b e t w e e n symbolic expressions a n d the relevant system
of rules, a c c o r d i n g to which we can p r o d u c e these expressions.
Sincerity is n o m o r e a t r u t h relation t h a n is intelligibility. Sincerity
is a validity claim c o n n e c t e d with s p e e c h acts b e l o n g i n g to t h e class
of representatives. It signifies t h a t I sincerely m e a n t h e i n t e n t i o n s
that I express exacdy as I have e x p r e s s e d t h e m . A s p e a k e r is sincere if
she deceives n e i t h e r herself n o r o t h e r s . J u s t as " t r u t h " refers to t h e
sense in which I can p u t forth a p r o p o s i t i o n , "sincerity" refers to t h e
sense in which I disclose o r manifest in front of o t h e r s a subjective
e x p e r i e n c e to which I have privileged access. As s o o n as we conceive
of sincerity as a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e expression of a n e x p e r i e n c e
a n d a n i n n e r state q u a entity, we have already m i s u n d e r s t o o d it on
analogy with t r u t h . I n acts of self-representation, I assert n o t h i n g
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unforced force of t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t b e t t e r b e c a u s e it is m o r e
convincing. B u t is it t h e n possible to define t h e m e a n i n g of
truthwhich differs f r o m m e r e certainty precisely in its claim to b e
absoluteby r e f e r e n c e to t h e wobbly f o u n d a t i o n of t h e e n d e a v o r t o
reach c o n s e n s u s discursively? H o w a r e we t o distinguish a r a t i o n a l
from a merely c o n t i n g e n t l y established consensus?
Let us r e t u r n t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e truth of propositions. Constative
speech acts allow us to claim that p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e t r u e . They e n a b l e
us to draw t h e f u n d a m e n t a l distinction b e t w e e n reality a n d a p p e a r
ance. A c c o r d i n g to the c o n s e n s u s t h e o r y of t r u t h , the c o n d i t i o n for
r e d e e m i n g t h e t r u t h of p r o p o s i t i o n s is t h e p o t e n t i a l assent of all
o t h e r p e r s o n s . Now, as a m a t t e r of fact, t h e r e a r e always only a few
persons against whose assent I can c h e c k my assertion's claim to va
lidity. T h e actual assent t h a t I can possibly o b t a i n f r o m a few o t h e r s is
m o r e likely to b e e n d o r s e d by f u r t h e r j u d g e s , t h e less we a n d o t h e r s
see a n y r e a s o n to d o u b t their c o m p e t e n c e to j u d g e . T h e r e f o r e we
shall restrict t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n t h a t has b e e n i n t r o d u c e d
counterfactually as follows: I m a y assert p if every o t h e r competent
j u d g e w o u l d a g r e e with m e in this assertion. B u t w h a t can c o m p e
tence in j u d g m e n t m e a n in this context?
Kamlah a n d L o r e n z e n have p r o p o s e d t h a t c o m p e t e n t j u d g e s m u s t
be c a p a b l e of p e r f o r m i n g a p p r o p r i a t e verification p r o c e d u r e s . T h e y
m u s t h a v e e x p e r t k n o w l e d g e . But h o w can we d e t e r m i n e w h a t sort of
verification p r o c e d u r e is to c o u n t as a p p r o p r i a t e in a given case a n d
who m a y claim to b e a n expert? T h e s e q u e s t i o n s , t o o , m u s t b e sub
ject to discourse t h e o u t c o m e of which in t u r n d e p e n d s o n a c o n s e n
sus a m o n g t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . Expertise is n o d o u b t a c o n d i t i o n t h a t
must b e satisfied by a c o m p e t e n t j u d g e . But we c a n n o t specify any in
d e p e n d e n t criteria for w h a t counts as "expertise"; d e c i d i n g o n t h e
choice of these criteria itself d e p e n d s o n t h e o u t c o m e of a discourse.
T h a t is why, if t h e assent of a j u d g e is to b e t h e test of m y o w n j u d g
m e n t , I s h o u l d n o t like to m a k e his c o m p e t e n c e d e p e n d o n his ex
pertise, b u t simply o n w h e t h e r h e is "rational." W e c a n n o t escape this
d i l e m m a even if we a s s u m e t h a t verification p r o c e d u r e s a p p r o p r i a t e
for compelling c o n s e n s u s a b o u t t h e validity of empirically m e a n i n g
ful assertions c o u l d b e derived from t h e universal-pragmatic features
of descriptive l a n g u a g e o r even if we could t e r m "rational" all
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T h e idealization o f t h e s p e e c h situation is i n t e r l o c k e d i n a c h a r a c
teristic way with an idealization of t h e action situation. T h e c o n c e p t
of " p u r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action," which I have i n t r o d u c e d w i t h o u t
justifying it, requires e x p l a n a t i o n .
U p t o n o w we have d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n two f o r m s of c o m m u n i
cation (or " s p e e c h " ) : communicative action (interaction) a n d discourse.
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T r u t h a n d Society
T h e s e two c o u n t e r f a c t u a l e x p e c t a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e idealiza
tion of reciprocally i m p u t e d accountability, which is inevitable for
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presupposition. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e c o n c e p t of t h e ideal s p e e c h
situation is n o t a n existing c o n c e p t [existierender Begriff] in t h e H e
gelian sense. F o r t h e r e is n o historical society t h a t c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e
form of life t h a t we a n t i c i p a t e in t h e c o n c e p t of t h e i d e a l s p e e c h situ
ation. T h e ideal situation could best b e c o m p a r e d with a transcen
dental illusion [Schein] w e r e it n o t at t h e s a m e t i m e a constitutive
condition of possible s p e e c h i n s t e a d of a n i m p e r m i s s i b l e p r o j e c t i o n
(as in t h e n o n e m p i r i c a l e m p l o y m e n t of t h e categories of t h e u n d e r
standing) . For every possible c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n of t h e
ideal speech situation h a s t h e significance of a constitutive illusion
that is at t h e s a m e t i m e t h e prefiguration [Vorschein] of a f o r m of
life. Of c o u r s e , we c a n n o t k n o w a p r i o r i w h e t h e r t h a t p r e f i g u r a t i o n
is a m e r e delusion ( s u b r e p t i o n ) n o m a t t e r h o w u n a v o i d a b l e t h e
presuppositions t h a t give rise to itor w h e t h e r t h e empirical c o n d i
tions of an even a p p r o x i m a t e realization of this s u p p o s e d f o r m of life
can be b r o u g h t a b o u t in p r a c t i c e . From this p o i n t of view the funda
mental n o r m s of possible s p e e c h t h a t a r e built i n t o universal
pragmatics c o n t a i n a practical hypothesis. T h i s hypothesis, which
must first b e d e v e l o p e d a n d justified in a theory of c o m m u n i c a t i v e
c o m p e t e n c e , is the p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e for a critical t h e o r y of society.
14
T h e notions of i n t e n t i o n a l a n d n o r m - r e g u l a t e d a c t i o n e x t e n d t h e
concept of r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r in two opposite directions. I n
contrast, t h e n o t i o n of interpretively m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n c o m p r i s e s
b o t h c o n c e p t s of a c t i o n a n d sees t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t as c o m p l e m e n
tary. I n this essay, I shall discuss two c o n c e p t u a l levels t h a t t r a n s c e n d
rule-governed b e h a v i o r as well as two c o n c e p t s t h a t are differenti
ated accordingly. In d o i n g so, I will show how to systematically incor
p o r a t e c o n c r e t e action, which I h a v e elsewhere d e l i n e a t e d from
r u l e - g o v e r n e d behavior.
O n e m i g h t object t h a t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t s of i n t e n t i o n a n d
c o n v e n t i o n , let alone t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , are already im
plicit in t h e c o n c e p t of rule-following. After all, Wittgenstein intro
d u c e d t h e c o n c e p t of a r u l e in o r d e r to conceive of t h e expression of
i n t e n t i o n s as a way of following c o n v e n t i o n s . W e d o not use i n t e n
tional expressions such as "to m e a n " a n d "to u n d e r s t a n d , " "to w a n t "
a n d "to desire," "to h o p e " a n d "to fear" in o r d e r t o r e p o r t private
states or i n t e r n a l events, n o r d o we use t h e m to express o u r subjectiv
ity, to manifest our i n n e r life. Rather, in using t h e s e expressions, we
rely on intersubjective s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s , w h i c h give o t h e r partic
ipants in interaction t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to test w h e t h e r we a r e k e e p i n g
t o t h e rules of a n established l a n g u a g e g a m e in a given situation or
not. Wittgenstein basically wants to r e d u c e i n t e n t i o n s to an u n d e r
standing of rules, to k n o w i n g h o w to use rules. H e elucidates this u n
d e r s t a n d i n g of rules paradigmatically with t h e h e l p of simple
a r i t h m e t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n s o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of s i n g u l a r p r e d i c a t e s .
.Scan b e h a v e intentionally insofar as she knows f o r m a t i o n r u l e s o r se
mantic conventions.
T h i s yields a semantically a b r i d g e d c o n c e p t of t h e intentionality of
actions. T h e very p o i n t of t h e semantic c o n c e p t of t h e intentionality
of actions derives from t h e fact t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n implicitly e q u a t e s
s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s with social c o n v e n t i o n s . H e e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n
ing of a r u l e of a r i t h m e t i c o r of p r e d i c a t i o n n o t with r e f e r e n c e to ab
stract rule systems a c c o r d i n g to which we p e r f o r m calculations or
linguistic o p e r a t i o n s , b u t with r e s p e c t to typical c o n t e x t s of use for
such o p e r a t i o n s . H e d o e s n ' t really distinguish b e t w e e n a l a n g u a g e
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I n t e n t i o n s , Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions
a n d t h e g r a m m a r of l a n g u a g e g a m e s . M. R o c h e d e v e l o p s t h e thesis
t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n s c a n only t r e a t i n t e n t i o n s , r u l e s , a n d conven
tions as m u t u a l l y e x p l a n a t o r y p r i m i t i v e t e r m s b e c a u s e t h e y t r e a t se
m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s a n d social c o n v e n t i o n s as i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e :
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , t h e s c h o o l o f c o n c e p t u a l analysis h a s s e e n n o t e n s i o n b e
t w e e n i n t e n t i o n a n d c o n v e n t i o n ; a c c o r d i n g t o its view, t h e l a t t e r c o n t a i n s
t h e f o r m e r a n d vice versa. H a m p s h i r e s h a r e s this c o n c e p t i o n w h e n h e
writes: "Each c o n v e n t i o n o r r u l e t h a t I a c c e p t is a n i n t e n t i o n t h a t I i n d i c a t e " ;
a n d " W h e r e t h e r e is l a n g u a g e u s e , t h e r e m u s t b e t h e i n t e n t i o n t o follow a
c o n v e n t i o n o r r u l e . " I n c o n t r a s t , h o w e v e r , t h e r e is t h e possibility t h a t i n t e n
t i o n a l a c t i o n c a n , i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e , b e t h e o p p o s i t e o f c o n v e n t i o n a l action.
W e h a v e d e a l t w i t h this possibility i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t society
" c a u s e s " a c t i o n s b y e n f o r c i n g c o n v e n t i o n s . A t issue h e r e is t h e possibility
that, by explaining o u r o w n actions o r those of others i n terms of conven
tions, w e o f t e n t e n d t o a b d i c a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e m a n d s o m e t i m e s e v e n
c o n d e m n t h e m , w h i l e w e t e n d t o take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d s o m e t i m e s a p p r o v e
of a c t i o n s b y i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e m i n t e r m s of fulfilled i n t e n t i o n s . . . . A t m i n i
m u m t h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e is a c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e c o n c e p t s o f i n t e n t i o n
a n d c o n v e n t i o n i n s o f a r as t h e o n e r e f e r s t o w h a t w e w a n t t o d o a n d t h e
o t h e r t o w h a t we d o n o t w a n t t o d o .
1
A c c o r d i n g t o R o c h e , this c o n f u s i o n arises b e c a u s e p h i l o s o p h e r s of
l a n g u a g e a r e too q u i c k to identify l a n g u a g e with society. C o n c e p t u a l
analysis
n o r m a l l y r i g h t l y a s s u m e s t h a t t h e analysis of c o n c e p t s r e q u i r e s a n analysis of
" l a n g u a g e g a m e s " a n d o f social " f o r m s of life" ( W i t t g e n s t e i n ) o r t h a t t h e
analysis o f s p e e c h acts r e q u i r e s a n analysis of social acts ( A u s t i n ) . H o w e v e r , it
m i s t a k e n l y i n f e r s f r o m this t h a t c o n v e n t i o n s g o v e r n i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e
p a r a d i g m s o f t h e social c o n v e n t i o n s t h a t s u r r o u n d t h e m a n d t h a t l a n g u a g e
u s e is r e l a t e d t o c o n v e n t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n t h e s a m e w a y as a social
a c t i o n is t o social c o n v e n t i o n s .
2
I r e f e r t o this a r g u m e n t h e r e b e c a u s e it shows t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f ac
tion e x c e e d s t h e capacity of t h e c o n c e p t of rule-following. O n e c a n
m a k e a c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n did n o t h a v e in m i n d
a t h e o r y of action, b u t of m e a n i n g . B u t p h i l o s o p h e r s of l a n g u a g e , es
pecially t h o s e w h o , like W i n c h a n d H a m p s h i r e , h a v e m a d e t h e use
t h e o r y of m e a n i n g t h e basis for a t h e o r y of a c t i o n , fail to see t h a t t h e
c o n c e p t of a r u l e , w h i c h has b e e n d e r i v e d f r o m a n d a n a l y z e d in
t e r m s of e x a m p l e s of g r a m m a t i c a l a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l r u l e s , m a y well
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Intentional Action
Ill
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(1)
(I h e r e b y assert:) 11 is g o i n g to rain.
(T)
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An e x p l a n a t i o n o f S's i n t e n t i o n t o b e c o m e h e a d o f g o v e r n m e n t
m i g h t b e s o u g h t in t h e g e n e r a l disposition to seek r e c o g n i t i o n , o r in
t h e c o n c r e t e desire finally t o o u t d o a friend w h o h a s always b e e n
a h e a d of S, t h a t is, in a m b i t i o n or envy. O n e m i g h t e x p l a i n t h e fact
t h a t 5 m a d e h e r decision at a time w h e n n o o n e e x p e c t e d h e r to d o
so in terms of strong e m o t i o n a l motives: t h e a n g e r at a h u m i l i a t i o n 5
suffered at t h e h a n d s of a rival, a p e c u l i a r e u p h o r i c m o o d S has b e e n
in ever since s h e successfully u n d e r w e n t surgery, a n d so o n . In any
case, we fall b a c k on n e e d s a n d wants, t h a t is, on motives t h a t lie
d e e p e r t h a n i n t e n t i o n s or decisions. N e e d s are Janus-faced: T h e y are
differentiated o n o n e h a n d into dispositions a n d desires (the voli
tional perspective) a n d i n t o feelings a n d m o o d s o n t h e o t h e r (the
p e r c e p t u a l p e r s p e c t i v e ) . Dispositions a n d desires a r e o r i e n t e d to
w a r d situations of w a n t satisfaction; feelings a n d m o o d s perceive
objecs in t h e light of our wants. O u r Bedurfnisnatur is the b a c k g r o u n d
of a partiality t h a t steers subjects to take a stance t o w a r d reality, to
w a r d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s t h a t are cognitively available to
t h e m . T h i s partiality guides b o t h h o w we actively i n f l u e n c e a n d h o w
we affectively perceive situations t h a t are t h e m a t i z e d as c o m p o n e n t s
of our lifeworld r a t h e r than as a n objectified S o m e t h i n g in the world.
Desires a n d w a n t s dispose o n e to choose goals of action; feelings a n d
m o o d s evaluate situations a n d o p e n u p perspectives o n possible
goals of action. Desires a n d wants p r e s u p p o s e t h e evaluation of desir
able o r u n d e s i r a b l e states of affairs, w h e r e a s e m o t i o n s a n d m o o d s
have a dispositional e l e m e n t .
T h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n dispositions a n d e m o t i o n s b e c o m e s
clearer if we conceive of b o t h as interpretations of underlying wants and
needs. N e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s involve b o t h feelings a n d desires. F o r de
sires are i n t e r p r e t e d indirectly, o n t h e o n e h a n d by m e a n s of action
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p r e f e r e n c e s o r ends, a n d o n t h e o t h e r h a n d by m e a n s of affectively
l o a d e d categories a n d situations, t h a t is, by m e a n s of values. E n d s a n d
values are m u t u a l l y i n t e r p r e t i n g . To specify what expressions such as
"beautiful," "terrible," "happy," or " h o r r i b l e " m e a n in a given con
text, we can refer to individual objects o r situations t h a t a r e plausible
as possible goals of action. T o r e n d e r plausible t h e choice of particu
lar ends, we can in t u r n a p p e a l to a c c e p t e d values. T h i s m u t u a l inter
p r e t a t i o n of e n d s against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of values a n d of values by
m e a n s of ends can b e informative b e c a u s e e n d s t e n d to c h a r a c t e r i z e
particular states of affairs w h e r e a s c u l t u r a l values t e n d to express
s o m e t h i n g universal. Moreover, t h e descriptive c o m p o n e n t is m o r e
p r o n o u n c e d in ends, a n d t h e evaluative m o r e in values. I shall r e t u r n
below to this d u a l descriptive-evaluative c o n t e n t of expressions inter
p r e t i n g n e e d s a n d wants.
But first I w a n t to show h o w t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n a l action char
acterizes motives as "final" causes. W i t h i n this f r a m e w o r k it is n o t
possible t o treat motives (i.e., feelings a n d desires) themselves o r t h e
needs they i n t e r p r e t as p h e n o m e n a r e q u i r i n g e x p l a n a d o n . T h e ex
p l a n a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l action m a y b e r e d u c i b l e via ends a n d inten
tions to desires a n d dispositions a n d , ultimately, to feelings a n d
m o o d s . Yet t h e c h a i n of e x p l a n a t i o n e n d s with motives, h o w e v e r
"deeply" r o o t e d they may be. As long as we a r e describing b e h a v i o r as
i n t e n t i o n a l action, motives a r e basic. As s o o n as we u n d e r s t a n d the
n e e d s of individuals in t u r n as t h e result of a p r o c e s s of i n t e r p r e t a
tion, we d i s r u p t the m o n o l o g i c a l m o d e l of a c t i o n of a subject ex
pressing i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s . It is n a t u r a l to s u p p o s e t h a t n e e d
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s d e p e n d o n cultural values a n d o n n o r m s t h a t e m
b o d y such values. However, we c a n n o t r e d u c e an a g e n t ' s i n t e n t i o n s
t o t h e social reality of n o r m s a n d values by way of t h e process of m o
tive f o r m a t i o n w i t h o u t a b a n d o n i n g t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n a l ac
tion. T h u s e x p r e s s i o n s of monologically m i n d e d subjects acting
intentionally are r e p l a c e d with i n t e r a c t i o n g o v e r n e d by i n t e r s u b
jectively r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s a n d v a l u e s a m o n g subjects acting so as
to c o n f o r m to e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h i s p r e s u p p o s e s a causal c o n n e c t i o n
b e t w e e n cultural traditions a n d n e e d s , a n d b e t w e e n institutionalized
values a n d dispositions. T h i s empirical c o n n e c t i o n , however, fails t o
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R i c h a r d N o r m a n shows t h a t n e i t h e r t h e emotivist r e c o u r s e to
b r u t e attitudes, wants, o r feelings n o r t h e decisionist r e c o u r s e to ulti
m a t e decisions suffices for justifying a morally r e l e v a n t action. O n l y
such reasons a r e a c c e p t a b l e as m a k e clear w h y t h e a g e n t in a given
situation has precisely this feeling or t h a t disposition, o r why she has
t h e i n t e n t i o n to a c c o m p l i s h precisely this goal. T h e m e r e assertion
t h a t S in a given s i t u a t i o n has certain i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s lacks
a n y practical justificatory force so l o n g is it is n o t plausible t h a t p e o
ple o t h e r t h a n S in such situations also have e x p e r i e n c e s of this sort
t h a t motivate t h e i r a c t i o n s in this way. A w a n t is o n l y a n intelligible m o
tive if it is i n t e r p r e t e d so t h a t it m a k e s sense to o t h e r s :
T o w a n t simply a s a u c e r o f m u d is i r r a t i o n a l , b e c a u s e s o m e f u r t h e r r e a s o n is
n e e d e d f o r w a n t i n g it. T o w a n t a s a u c e r of m u d b e c a u s e o n e w a n t s t o e n j o y
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I n t e n t i o n s , C o n v e n t i o n s , a n d Linguistic Interactions
its r i c h river-smell is r a t i o n a l . N o f u r t h e r r e a s o n is n e e d e d f o r w a n t i n g to en
j o y t h e r i c h river-smell, f o r t o c h a r a c t e r i z e w h a t is w a n t e d as "to enjoy t h e
r i c h river-smell" is itself to g i v e a n a c c e p t a b l e r e a s o n f o r w a n t i n g it, a n d
t h e r e f o r e t h i s w a n t is r a t i o n a l .
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w h e n h e a d o p t s t h e f o r m e r o f t h e two p o i n t s of view. T h i s c a n b e s e e n f r o m
t h e k i n d of v o c a b u l a r y h e m i g h t u s e . I n s o f a r as h e r e f e r s t o t h e n o t i o n o f
" p e a c e a n d q u i e t , " d i s t u r b a n c e c a u s e d b y n o i s e , t h e c h o k i n g s t e n c h o f traffic
f u m e s , the e n j o y m e n t of a hobby, t h e b e a u t y of flowers, e t c . , h e is i n v o k i n g
publicly s h a r e d c o n c e p t s a n d p u b l i c s t a n d a r d s of e v a l u a t i o n . It is b e c a u s e h e
d o e s so t h a t w e c a n d e s c r i b e a s " r a t i o n a l , " h i s p o t e n t i a l o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e
r o a d s c h e m e f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of his private w a n t s a n d interests.
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IP
It'
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g u e if o n e d o e s n ' t e n v i s a g e a n y p o s s i b l e t e r m s of s e t t l e m e n t ; a n d o n e c a n
n o t h o p e f o r s e t t l e m e n t if o n e ' s " a r g u m e n t s " a r e g o i n g t o b e a r b i t r a r i l y
l o a d e d i n favor of oneself. . . . T o a r g u e f o r m o r a l i t y a t all is t o claim t h e as
s e n t of all r a t i o n a l b e i n g s . B u t t h e o n l y p r i n c i p l e m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e t o all
r a t i o n a l b e i n g s is o n e w h i c h r e g a r d s all of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s as e q u a l l y w o r t h sat
isfying (less, t h e r e f o r e , t h o s e w h i c h a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o t h e r s ) . E v e r y o n e
c a n a g r e e t o this b e c a u s e e v e r y o n e ' s i n t e r e s t s a r e r e s p e c t e d .
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T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n , by u s i n g t h e t e r m "should," r e m o v e s t h e ambi
guity i n h e r e n t i n M e a d ' s o w n f o r m u l a t i o n s of the t e r m "behavioral
e x p e c t a t i o n . " If we u n d e r s t a n d "behavioral e x p e c t a t i o n " i n t h e
p u r e l y cognitive sense of S p r e d i c t i n g t h e b e h a v i o r of Si, t h e n t h e
m e r e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n across m e m b e r s of a g r o u p c a n n o t give rise to a
n o r m . A b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n g e n e r a l i z e d i n this sense would im
ply, for e x a m p l e , that Si knows that S expects in a given situation
t h a t Si will b e h a v e i n a certain way. A n d since some o t h e r m e m b e r S
knows t h a t Si k n o w s this, S t o o will e x p e c t t h a t Si will m e e t S 's ex
p e c t a t i o n . B u t t h e n the "generalized behavioral e x p e c t a t i o n " would
be j u s t a n o t h e r t e r m for " a c c e p t e d t h e o r y of t h e everyday" (in t h e
sense e x p l i c a t e d by J a r v i e ) . Yet t h e c o n c e p t of a b e h a v i o r a l expecta
tion c o n t a i n s n o t only t h e sense of a p r e d i c t i o n , b u t also t h e n o r m a
tive sense t h a t m e m b e r s of a social g r o u p a r e m u t u a l l y entitled to
e x p e c t c e r t a i n types of b e h a v i o r from o n e a n o t h e r .
O n e m i g h t say t h a t t h e o r i e s , too, if t r u e a n d applicable to certain
situations, e n t i t l e o n e to c e r t a i n e x p e c t a t i o n s . However, b e i n g enti
tled to a c o n d i t i o n a l p r e d i c t i o n rests o n the t r u t h of e m p i r i c a l state
m e n t s , w h e r e a s t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t Swill a b i d e by a n o r m is justified
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L Qguage
T h e sociological a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e two m o d e l s of i n t e n t i o n a l a n d
n o r m - g o v e r n e d action u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y p r e s u p p o s e s l a n g u a g e as
t h e m e d i u m of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h c o n n e c t s subjects w h o act. If
the rules are conceived of as semantic c o n v e n t i o n s , t h e n t h e use of
linguistic symbols c a n b e e l u c i d a t e d by m e a n s of t h e c o n c e p t of
rule-following t h a t I h a v e i n t r o d u c e d . However, this r u l e - m o d e l of
l a n g u a g e use is p e r c e i v e d from o p p o s i t e perspectives, d e p e n d i n g o n
w h e t h e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in c o m m u n i c a t i o n is r e p r e s e n t e d as a n i n t e n
tional a c t i o n o r as t h e fulfillment o f a n o r m . I n t h e f o r m e r case, lan
g u a g e is conceived as t h e m e d i u m in which t h e actor expresses h e r
beliefs a n d a t t i t u d e s a n d t h r o u g h w h i c h s h e t r a n s m i t s t h e i n f o r m a
tional c o n t e n t of h e r i n t e n t i o n s by using linguistic m e a n s to m a k e
a n o t h e r a c t o r r e c o g n i z e w h a t s h e m e a n s o r i n t e n d s . L a n g u a g e is es
sentially r e p r e s e n t e d as a medium for transmitting intentional experi
ences. In t h e latter case, l a n g u a g e is u n d e r s t o o d as a m e d i u m
w h e r e i n a consensus o n g e n e r a l situation i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s is s e c u r e d
a m o n g m e m b e r s of a social g r o u p in t h e l i g h t of c o m m o n c u l t u r a l
values a n d n o r m s . Sharing a c o m m o n symbolic system m e a n s be
longing to a n intersubjectively b i n d i n g f o r m of life. H e r e , l a n g u a g e
is r e p r e s e n t e d essentially as a medium of participation in the same
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Interpretation is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t of a m o d e l of communica
tive action. T h e goal of such a m o d e l is to c o m p e n s a t e for t h e respec
tive weaknesses of t h e m o d e l s of i n t e n t i o n a l a n d n o r m - g o v e r n e d
action a n d t o take p r o p e r a c c o u n t of t h e constitutive significance of
linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t of i n t e r p r e t a
tion shows that the m o d e l of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action e m p h a s i z e s t h e
constitutive activities of participants in i n t e r a c t i o n , b u t does n o t re
vert t o a subjectivist position. I n t e n t i o n a l a g e n t s d o n o t e n t e r i n t o
c o m m u n i c a t i v e relations with o n e a n o t h e r after t h e fact, so to speak,
in o r d e r to fabricate a n intersubjective world. Rather, c o m m u n i c a t i v e
action p r e s u p p o s e s the n o r m a t i v e reality of a society j u s t as m u c h as
a n objectifiable reality a n d t h e subjectivity of t h e a g e n t herself. F o r
every i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e f e r s to a c o n t e x t in w h i c h t h e s e t h r e e ele
m e n t s are i n t e r w o v e n : n o r m s a n d values, objects a n d states of affairs,
and intentional experiences.
O f c o u r s e t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n easily l e a d s t o t h e miscon
c e p t i o n t h a t t h e activity of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e a g e n t is in t h e first in
stance t h a t of a cognizing subject w h o first i n t e r p r e t s a situation a n d
t h e n goes a b o u t d i s s e m i n a t i n g t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n socially. T h i s mis
u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n b e a v o i d e d by (a) tying t h e c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i
cative action to t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i n g subjects a s s u m e a n
attitude o r i e n t e d toward r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g r a t h e r t h a n toward
r e a c h i n g success, a n d (b) tying m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g to a c o n s e n s u s
n o t only a b o u t t r u t h claims, b u t also a b o u t sincerity- a n d Tightness
claims. For t h e n t h e p r o c e s s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t m u t u a l l y refer t o
o n e a n o t h e r will b e subject n o t only to t h e p a r a m e t e r s of a g i v e n p a r
ticular context, b u t to the e x a c t i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t a c o n s e n s u s
c a n b e a t t a i n e d o n l y by way of the shared recognition of universal validity
claims. A n d since Tightness a n d sincerity b e l o n g t o these validity
claims as m u c h as p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h d o e s , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (which, in
c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, is conceived of as a process of m u t u a l u n d e r
s t a n d i n g ) m e a n s t h e s e a r c h for a m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t a b o u t a situation
definition. T h i s definition refers to w h a t is c o m m o n l y r e c o g n i z e d as
t h e society's n o r m a t i v e reality, w h a t is m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d as t h e
manifested subjecdvity of a participant, as well as to a c c e p t e d beliefs
a b o u t an objectified reality.
My point of d e p a r t u r e is t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of in
teractive c o m p e t e n c e regulates t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n [Aufbau] of i n t e r n a l
behavioral c o n t r o l s . However, t h e systematic differences b e t w e e n
moral j u d g m e n t a n d t h e actual b e h a v i o r in situations of conflict res
olution show t h a t t h e two lines of d e v e l o p m e n t d o n o t c o i n c i d e . Lin
guistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n is relevant f o r motivational d e v e l o p m e n t in
two respects. O n t h e o n e h a n d , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is t h e m e d i u m
of socialization t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e influences of familial environ
ments are filtered a n d t r a n s m i t t e d to t h e personality system. O n t h e
o t h e r h a n d , l a n g u a g e offers a w a y of o r g a n i z i n g w a n t s a n d n e e d s t h a t
are subject to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; o u r n e e d - b a s e d n a t u r e
[Bediirfnisnatur]
is communicatively s t r u c t u r e d . T h e difference b e t w e e n levels of
moral j u d g m e n t a n d levels of moral action can b e e x p l a i n e d by dis
t u r b a n c e s of t h e socialization process. T h e s e " d i s t u r b a n c e s " can be
analyzed o n two levels: t h e level of p a t h o g e n e t i c p a t t e r n s of t h e lin
guistic e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t are relevant to socialization, a n d t h e level of
t h e s t r u c t u r e s of n e e d s a n d of behavioral controls t h a t d e v e l o p u n
d e r c o n d i t i o n s of systematically distorted c o m m u n i c a t i o n . F r e u d in
troduces t h e e g o f u n c t i o n of u n c o n s c i o u s r e p r e s s i o n as a m e c h a n i s m
of linguistic p a t h o g e n e s i s . T h e repression of conflicts t h a t are n o t
consciously resolved, t h a t is, n o t o n a basis of c o n s e n s u a l action,
leaves traces t h a t t a k e t h e f o r m of c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i s t u r b a n c e s .
Intrapsychic d i s t u r b a n c e s of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n parts of
the personality system a r e a n a l o g o u s t o d i s t u r b a n c e s in family c o m
m u n i c a t i o n . O f c o u r s e t h e analysis of such deviations p r e s u p p o s e s
knowledge [Kenntnis] of t h e k i n d of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t can be
characterized as " n o r m a l . " But w h e n can a c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e c o n
sidered u n d i s t u r b e d , n o t systematically d i s t o r t e d , o r "normal"?
(1) First, we have to explain t h e sense in w h i c h we m e a n to talk
a b o u t the n o r m a l c y c o n d i t i o n s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Obvi
ously, t h e statistical notion of n o r m a l c y is u n s u i t a b l e . A n o r m a l distri
bution of c o m m u n i c a t i v e features tells u s n o t h i n g a b o u t the
n o r m a l c y c o n d i t i o n s of socially effective i n t e r a c t i o n s , unless we have
already classified t h e p o p u l a t i o n s b e i n g e x a m i n e d b a s e d o n clinical
criteria; b u t t h a t w o u l d b e to evaluate t h e m based o n criteria of n o r
malcy. O t h e r w i s e we c o u l d n o t r u l e o u t an " a b n o r m a l " s c e n a r i o ,
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Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology
(as D e v e r e u x ' s e l a b o r a t e e x a m p l e of t h e s h a m a n d e m o n s t r a t e s ) , of
fers a system of p r e f e r e n c e s for m e a n s of r e p r e s s i o n t h a t allow for a
superficial n o r m a l i z a t i o n (i.e., a conventionally r e c o g n i z e d restruc
turing) of t h e i n n e r conflict;
(iii) finally, t h e s y m p t o m s in which t h e u n c o n s c i o u s l y r e p r e s s e d
conflict m a y b e m a n i f e s t e d . ( U n d e r this h e a d i n g D e v e r e u x e x a m i n e s
social roles t h a t institutionalize culturally recognized deviant behav
ior: t h a t of t h e s h a m a n , t h e p e r s o n r u n a m o k , t h e " m a d d o g , " t h e
M o h a v e transvestite, t h e stoic saint, etc. Even w h e r e such roles h a v e
n o t b e e n differentiated, t h e r e a r e cultural definitions f o r "how t o b e
have w h e n o n e is crazy.")
Individual d i s t u r b a n c e s o c c u r t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e n o r m a l i z i n g
activity of a c u l t u r e fails i n such a way t h a t t h e p e r s o n affected h a s t o
improvise f o r herself h o w to i n t e r p r e t t r a u m a t i c events a n d which
m e a n s of r e p r e s s i o n a n d types of s y m p t o m s to c h o o s e . P e r h a p s a
comparative c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n is p r e f e r a b l e t o t h e d i c h o t o m o u s
c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n t h a t j u x t a p o s e s e t h n i c a n d individual distur
bances a n d leads to t h e p o s t u l a t i o n of a n "ethnic u n c o n s c i o u s . " But
even if D e v e r e u x ' s thesis is w e a k e n e d in this sense a n d d i s t u r b a n c e s
a r e classified a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r d e g r e e of cultural stereotyping, t h e
analysis of limit cases is of critical i m p o r t a n c e for t h e culturalistic n o
tion of normalcy.
T h e cross-cultural c o m p a r i s o n of e t h n o p s y c h i a t r i c p h e n o m e n a
shows t h a t t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g of f o r m s of r e p r e s s i o n a n d
of symptoms n o r m a l i z e s t h e u n d e r l y i n g a n o m a l y of a s e r i o u s psychic
conflict o r illness in t h e sense of socially accepted roles. However, it
does so in such a way t h a t t h e a n o m a l y r e m a i n s p e r c e p t i b l e as such.
T h e s h a m a n is psychologically ill in t h e clinical sense e v e n t h o u g h h e
plays a socially r e c o g n i z e d role:
T h e primitive who, after suffering from psychological disturbances, u n d e r
goes a s h a m a n i c t r e a t m e n t that "cures" h i m a n d m a k e s h i m a s h a m a n , i n re
ality o n l y e x p e r i e n c e s a c o n v e n t i o n a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f h i s conflicts a n d
s y m p t o m s w i t h o u t t h e r e b y g a i n i n g a n y real insight i n t o t h e n a t u r e o f h i s
conflicts. . . . T h e s e c u r e s t a k e p l a c e as if t h e t r e a t m e n t c o n s i s t e d m e r e l y i n
r e p l a c i n g conflicts a n d c u l t u r a l r e p r e s s i o n b y c o n v e n t i o n a l c u l t u r a l conflicts
a n d ritualized symptoms, without ever p r o d u c i n g t h e insight which alone
can lead to a real c u r e .
3
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i n c a p a b l e of h e l p i n g a n I n d i a n w h o is i n r e m i s s i o n after a first p s y c h o t i c at
t a c k or u r g e a n d d e f i n e s h i m s e l f as a s h a m a n . A c c o r d i n g t o "relativistic"
n o r m s that govern the limited diagnostic technique I am talking about, one
w o u l d c l a i m t h a t this I n d i a n s h a m a n h a s n o n e e d of p s y c h i a t r i c t r e a t m e n t ,
since h e c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d " c u l t u r a l l y n o r m a l . " H o w e v e r , I h a v e s h o w n t h a t
t h e s h a m a n is e i t h e r a s e v e r e n e u r o t i c o r a p s y c h o t i c in r e m i s s i o n a n d h e n c e
is i n u r g e n t n e e d of p s y c h i a t r i c aid. I n fact, s u c h a n i n d i v i d u a l is i n r e m i s s i o n
only w i t h r e s p e c t t o a single socially d e t e r m i n e d m i l i e u : h i s o w n t r i b e . H e is
m o r e or less well a d a p t e d t o this, a n d only t h i s , m i l i e u . He is not capable of
adapting, and especially not capable of re-adapting. A n o r m a l I n d i a n , i n c o n t r a s t ,
w h o is n o t a s h a m a n , c a n b e well a d a p t e d t o h i s c u l t u r e a n d still r e t a i n his
ability t o c o p e w i t h a v a r i e t y of s i t u a t i o n s . I n m y o p i n i o n , t h e t o u c h s t o n e of
m e n t a l h e a l t h is n o t a d a p t e d n e s s as s u c h , b u t a s u b j e c t ' s a b i l i t y to d e v e l o p
further t h r o u g h successive new a d a p t a t i o n s w i t h o u t losing t h e sense o f his
own temporal continuity.
5
D e v e r e u x p u r s u e s t h e n o r m a l i z i n g activities of c u l t u r e s o m e w h a t
f u r t h e r t h a n p r o p o n e n t s of cultural relativism do. H e shows t h a t dis
t u r b a n c e s a n d deviations themselves are subject to t h e definitions of
normalcy, albeit only i n such a way t h a t the difference b e t w e e n n o r
m a l a n d d e v i a n t b e h a v i o r is simply leveled o u t r a t h e r t h a n m a d e
unrecognizable.
T h e distinction drawn h e r e r e q u i r e s a culturally invariant n o t i o n
of normalcy. It m u s t b e c o r r o b o r a t e d by clinical e x p e r i e n c e , b u t ex
plicated i n d e p e n d e n t l y . I n t h e last passage q u o t e d above, Devereux
cites as t h e d e t e r m i n i n g criterion t h e ability to r e s t r u c t u r e o n e ' s own
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T h e cultural c o n c e p t of n o r m a l c y t u r n s o u t t o b e u n t e n a b l e . Yet a
culturally invariant c o n c e p t of n o r m a l c y t h a t refers n e i t h e r to fea
tures of physical h e a l t h n o r to statistical averages has a n o r m a t i v e
c o n t e n t . How can this c o n t e n t be justified within a n empiricaldescriptive science?
P i a g e t u s e d t h e c o n c e p t of d e v e l o p m e n t a l logic, w h i c h p e r m i t s t h e
i n t r o d u c t i o n of n o r m a t i v e n o t i o n s for p u r p o s e s of e m p i r i c a l analysis.
T h e c o n c e p t has so far b e e n c o r r o b o r a t e d only in t h e d o m a i n of cog
nitive development. H e r e , the n o r m a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n [Wertprdmisse] is
n o t suspect, f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of objectifying t h o u g h t is m e a s u r e d
by t h e level of unequivocally d e c i d a b l e p r o b l e m s , t h a t is, of p r o b l e m s
t h a t have true solutions. P r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h is a validity claim p r e s u p
posed by a n y a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Normative Tightness of a c t i o n a n d evalua
tion is a validity claim t h a t is u n d e r d i s p u t e , b u t c a n still be m a d e
plausible. R e s e a r c h i n t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a l logic of m o r a l j u d g m e n t
d e p e n d s o n this n o r m a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n . Its o n t o g e n e s i s is also m e a
s u r e d a c c o r d i n g to levels of p r o b l e m solving. But in this case we can
n o t rely o n e l e m e n t a r y knowledge of logic, m a t h e m a t i c s , a n d physics
for validating t h e c o r r e c t solutions. W e h a v e to v e n t u r e o n t o t h e u n
stable g r o u n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l ethics in o r d e r to justify t h e thesis
t h a t e a c h h i g h e r level of m o r a l consciousness allows f o r a n increas
ingly a d e q u a t e c o n s e n s u a l solution of increasingly c o m p l e x conflicts
of action. E x p a n d i n g t h e c o n c e p t of t h e capacity for m o r a l j u d g m e n t
i n t o t h e c o n c e p t of interactive c o m p e t e n c e o n c e a g a i n transforms
t h e n o r m a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n . For t h e ability t o p a r t i c i p a t e in interac
tion a n d to m a i n t a i n t h e c o n s e n s u a l basis of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action
even t h r o u g h conflicts includes t h e c o m p e t e n c e to act in a c c o r d a n c e
with m o r a l j u d g m e n t s , b u t , b e y o n d this, also p r e s u p p o s e s t h e validity
basis of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n in its full spectrum. Interactive com
p e t e n c e is m e a s u r e d n o t a c c o r d i n g to t h e ability to solve p r o b l e m s of
k n o w l e d g e a n d m o r a l insight at t h e a p p r o p r i a t e level, b u t a c c o r d i n g
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to t h e ability to m a i n t a i n processes of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d
ing even in conflict situations r a t h e r t h a n b r e a k i n g off c o m m u n i c a
tion o r merely s e e m i n g to m a i n t a i n it.
T h e psychoanalytic c o n c e p t of u n c o n s c i o u s repressioii s h e d s light,
as we shall see, o n t h e t e c h n i q u e of a p p a r e n d y c a r r y i n g o n processes
of r e a c h i n g c o n s e n s u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Unconsciously r e p r e s s e d
conflicts a r i s e e i t h e r intrapsychically as a n i n t e r r u p t i o n of c o m m u
n i c a t i o n within t h e self, o r as a n i n c o n s p i c u o u s b a r r i e r b e t w e e n indi
viduals within t h e f a m i l y u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s t h a t e x c l u d e processes
of m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d h e n c e h e a l i n g (conflict resolution)
t h r o u g h insight. T h e c o n c e p t of n o r m a l c y for e g o s t r e n g t h devel
o p e d by psychoanalysis in this c o n n e c t i o n is m e a s u r e d by t h e de
p e n d e n c e o n strategies of u n c o n s c i o u s r e p r e s s i o n . T h e ego's
s t r e n g t h increases to t h e same e x t e n t t h a t t h e e g o is able t o d o with
o u t s u c h strategies a n d to process its conflicts consciously. T h e n o r
mative a s s u m p t i o n h e r e lies in t h e c o n c e p t of consciousness a n d in t h e
r e l a t i o n to t h e insight i n t o a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y caused psychological
conflict. In a c c o r d a n c e w i t h my c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c r e a d i n g of
t h e basic psychoanalytic assumptions,' I relate these topologically
conceived c o n d i t i o n s of conscious conflict processing t o c o n d i t i o n s
of n o r m a l linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n : Conscious conflict processing
m e a n s conflict p r o c e s s i n g u n d e r conditions of u n d i s t o r t e d
communication.
7
T h u s we r e t u r n to w h e r e we b e g a n o u r reflections, h a v i n g f o u n d
t h a t we c a n n o t avail ourselves of t h e available statistical, clinical, o r
cultural notions of n o r m a l c y t h a t a r e at o u r disposal. R a t h e r we have
to m a k e explicit t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t i n h e r e n t in the n o t i o n of lin
guistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself. T h e expression " u n d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i
c a t i o n " does n o t a d d a n y t h i n g to m u t u a l linguistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g
[Verstdndigung], f o r " m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g " signifies t h e telos i n h e r
e n t in linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I w o u l d like to establish t h e condi
tions of n o r m a l c y of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n by way of a
c o n c e p t u a l analysis of t h e m e a n i n g of "mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g " be
cause I assume t h a t every s p e e c h act h a s a n u n a v o i d a b l e , as it were,
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y necessitating basis of validity. I w a n t to d e v e l o p t h e
thesis t h a t every c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t o r h a s t o c o m m i t to fulfilling uni
versal claims to validity. Insofar as she participates in c o m m u n i c a t i o n
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138
( b a b b l i n g m o n o l o g u e s ) a n d it b e g i n s to react with u n d e r s t a n d i n g
[Verstdndnis] to t h e p h y s i o g n o m i c s c h e m a of t h e m o t h e r ' s face (smil
ing with eye c o n t a c t ) . (b) T h e child l e a r n s to act in a goal-directed
fashion b a s e d o n s c h e m a t a of sensory-motor action. Along with these
b e g i n n i n g s of initiatives to act, we can observe (c) a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n
f r o m r e a c t i o n s t o stimuli to p r o t o - f o r m s of i n t e n t i o n a l action g u i d e d
by p e r c e p t i o n . F r o m t h e very b e g i n n i n g , t h e actions serve t h e dou
ble task of c o n t r o l l i n g t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a n d of f e n d i n g off danger. In
d o i n g this they r e g u l a t e drives a n d affects. T h i s t h i r d aspect sheds
light o n t h e b e g i n n i n g s of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r i n g of i n n e r
n a t u r e . T h e first two aspects r e f e r to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of c o m m u n i
cative r e l a t i o n s a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g capabilities of active a n d pas
sive p a r t i c i p a n t s in i n t e r a c t i o n .
I n t h e s e c o n d half of t h e first year of life, t h e love object " m o t h e r "
is c o n s t i t u t e d for t h e child as an identifiable entity. First, t h e child
l e a r n s to i n t e g r a t e i n t o a single i m a g e two object anticipations: t h e
"good," permissive m o t h e r a n d t h e "bad," restrictive o r a b s e n t o n e .
This synthesis m a r k s equally a cognitive d e v e l o p m e n t (the begin
n i n g s of object p e r m a n e n c e ) and a n increasing r e g u l a t i o n of affects
a n d drives ( b e g i n n i n g s of the t o l e r a n c e for a m b i v a l e n c e ) . T h e
eighth-month anxiety t h a t then follows ( a n d which Spitz analyzes in de
tail) signals t h a t t h e child l e a r n s to distinguish b e t w e e n t h e t r u s t e d
a n d loved object of t h e m o t h e r a n d strangers. T h e child n o longer
reacts only with u n d e r s t a n d i n g to t h e p h y s i o g n o m i c s c h e m a (be it
t h a t of t h e m o t h e r , a mask, o r a s t r a n g e r ) . R a t h e r h e n o w r e s p o n d s to
t h e gestures of a n individual r e f e r e n c e p e r s o n . T h i s alters t h e level of
r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n p a r t n e r s in c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e child identifies
with t h e m o t h e r by imitating h e r gestures. T h i s is an i m p o r t a n t pre
c o n d i t i o n for t h e e x c h a n g e , m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h gestures, w h e r e b y the
child l e a r n s to r e g u l a t e his own activity in relation to that of the
m o t h e r (i.e., giving a n d taking, b e i n g active and passive). For this
self-regulation of the initiative to act, shaking o n e ' s h e a d in denial
plays a significant r o l e .
First t h e child l e a r n s t h e g e s t u r e
with t h e m o t h e r w h o refuses h i m
Later, t h e child uses t h e n e g a t i n g
w h e r e h e rejects a d e m a n d o r offer
of s h a k i n g his h e a d by identifying
s o m e t h i n g by s h a k i n g h e r h e a d .
shaking of t h e h e a d in situations
himself. A n d after l a n g u a g e devel-
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politikon, of society.
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of behavior. T o say n o m e a n s rejection. Spitz describes t h e psychod y n a m i c s of this first nay-saying t h a t is constitutive f o r t h e interper
sonal r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n speakers as follows:
T h e n e g a t i n g g e s t u r e o f s h a k i n g o n e ' s h e a d a n d t h e w o r d " n o " u t t e r e d by
t h e O b j e c t a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d [einverkibt] i n t o t h e e g o of t h e i n f a n t as m e m
o r y t r a c e s . T h e n e g a t i v e affect is s e p a r a t e d f r o m this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s
s e p a r a t i o n t r i g g e r s a f r u s t r a t i o n t h a t is t h e n l i n k e d t h r o u g h a s s o c i a t i o n with
t h e m e m o r y t r a c e i n t h e e g o . If t h e c h i l d i d e n t i f i e s w i t h t h e O b j e c t , t h i s
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h t h e a t t a c k e r is f o l l o w e d b y a n a t t a c k o n t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d ,
a c c o r d i n g to A n n a F r e u d . F o r t h e fifteen-month-old child, this c o n c e p t
t a k e s t h e f o r m o f " n o " (first t h e g e s t u r e , t h e n t h e w o r d ) . T h e c h i l d h a s
a d o p t e d t h i s f o r m o f t h e c o n c e p t f r o m its love o b j e c t . B a s e d o n n u m e r o u s
e x p e r i e n c e s o f d i s p l e a s u r e , t h e " n o " c a r r i e s a n e g a t i v e v a l e n c e . A s a result,
" n o " is s u i t a b l e f o r e x p r e s s i n g a g g r e s s i o n , a n d this is w h y " n o " is u s e d i n t h e
defense m e c h a n i s m of identifying with t h e attacker a n d t u r n e d against t h e
O b j e c t . A s s o o n as this level is r e a c h e d , t h e p h a s e o f d e f i a n c e ( t h e
w e l l - k n o w n " t e r r i b l e twos") c a n b e g i n .
1 0
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linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t of t h e following
r o u g h d e v e l o p m e n t a l sketch is a level of i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t p r e s u p
poses p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y differentiated s p e e c h .
(a) A g r a m m a t i c a l s p e e c h act is distinct from n o n v e r b a l acts a n d
gestures, t h a t is, bodily expressions, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d from sym
bolic b u t n o t propositionally differentiated forms of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
such as music, d a n c e , p a i n t i n g , a n d so on, o n t h e other.
S p e e c h acts a n d n o n v e r b a l expressions c a n b e functional equiva
lents of o n e a n o t h e r . Hailing a cab nonverbally can be r e p l a c e d with
a verbalized call. Silently taking s o m e o n e ' s a r m can, in the a p p r o p r i
ate c o n t e x t , mean t h e s a m e as t h e assurance "I'll h e l p you." I n still
o t h e r cases, t h e r e is a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n catego
ries of expressions. A verbal p r o m i s e can b e k e p t by n o n v e r b a l ac
tions. T h e s e actions t h e n have the meaning that the s p e a k e r "has k e p t
his w o r d . " Linguistic a n d n o n l i n g u i s t i c expressions c a n express t h e
s a m e s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n , a n d t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t of b o t h types of
expression c a n by analyzed from t h e dual perspective of t h e interper
sonal r e l a t i o n a n d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l content. T h e r e r e m a i n s , to be
sure, t h e difference t h a t s p e e c h acts b e c o m e reflexive, t h a t is, they
can be t u r n e d into t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t or c o n t e n t of o t h e r s p e e c h
acts.
T h e linguistic a n d n o n l i n g u i s t i c m e a n s w h e r e b y c o m m u n i c a t i v e
acts are p e r f o r m e d s t a n d on the s a m e level of o r g a n i z a t i o n , so to
speak. T h i s is n o t the case for s p e e c h acts and gestures. For bodily ex
pressions a r e n o t r e l a t e d to the psychological p r o c e s s they express
conventionally i n t h e way t h a t s e n t e n d a l symbols are to t h e i r seman
tic c o n t e n t . T h e y a r e often t h e sign (index) as well as t h e icon of w h a t
they m e a n . B u h l e r has s o u g h t to c a p t u r e this difference b e t w e e n t h e
gestural a n d linguistic functions of m e a n i n g with t h e c o n c e p t s of ex
pressive versus r e p r e s e n t a t i v e function; Bateson with the distinction,
b o r r o w e d f r o m c o m p u t e r science, between a n a l o g a n d digital trans
mission; a n d Arieti with t h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of p r o t o - l a n g u a g e a n d n o r
m a l l a n g u a g e , a j u x t a p o s i t i o n g e a r e d toward p s y c h o p a t h o l o g i c a l
p h e n o m e n a . W h a t defines these c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s is t h e view t h a t
p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n t a i n g e n e r a l predicates. T h e s e m u s t b e c o n n e c t e d
to individual objects t h r o u g h acts of identification, w h e r e a s t h e
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Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology
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p r o d u c e d by m e a n s of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e system of g r a m m a t i c a l rules.
T h e differentiation of p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s d e s c r i b e d u n d e r (b)
gives rise to t h e n e e d t o j u d g e w h e t h e r a p r o p o s i t i o n is true or false,
a n d w h e t h e r an object of w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is asserted can b e
i d e n t i f i e d or n o t , t h a t is, w h e t h e r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n c o u l d b e t r u e o r
w h e t h e r it is meaningless. T h e s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n s p e e c h a n d a n o r
mative b a c k g r o u n d i n d i c a t e d in (c) gives rise to t h e n e e d to j u d g e a
given u t t e r a n c e with r e s p e c t to w h e t h e r it m e e t s socially b i n d i n g val
ues or a prevailing n o r m and is in that sense right or w h e t h e r it vio
lates established structures of e x p e c t a t i o n . Similarly, the split
between s p e e c h a n d a s p e a k e r ' s subjectivity cited u n d e r (d) raises
t h e n e e d to j u d g e t h e s p e a k e r ' s expressed i n t e n t i o n with r e g a r d t o
w h e t h e r t h e s p e a k e r expresses it sincerely or insincerely.
In p e r f o r m i n g s p e e c h acts, we are r e q u i r e d to m e e t universal de
m a n d s t h a t g r o u n d t h e validity of o u r claims. T h e s e d e m a n d s reflect
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n t h e s p e e c h acts a n d t h e i r p r o p e r linguistic
m e d i u m , t h e n o r m a t i v e social reality, a n d t h e i n n e r subjecdve n a t u r e
of t h e speakers. As soon as this validity basis of s p e e c h is established,
different m o d e s of l a n g u a g e u s e c a n b e differentiated d e p e n d i n g o n
w h i c h validity c l a i m is thematically h i g h l i g h t e d : T h e r e a r e cognitive,
interactive, a n d expressive uses of l a n g u a g e . T h e o c c u r r e n c e of these
different m o d e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for
p e r f o r m a t i v e n e g a t i o n , t h a t is, for e x t e n d i n g the n e g a t i o n of sen
tences to s p e e c h acts. At t h e first level of c o m m u n i c a t i o n only t h e be
havioral e x p e c t a t i o n of a n o t h e r can b e n e g a t e d ; at t h e s e c o n d level,
t h e s p e a k e r is able to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n a r e j e c d o n of w h a t is p r o
p o s e d in t h e s p e e c h act (I d o n ' t accept y o u r p r o m i s e ) , a n e g a t e d
s p e e c h act (I a m n o t p r o m i s i n g you t h a t I will c o m e ) , a n d a n e g a t e d
p r o p o s i t i o n (I p r o m i s e t h a t I will n o t c o m e ) .
(3) In discussing t h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " place value of t h e validity
basis, o n e m i g h t t h i n k t h a t it is impossible to diverge from t h e uni
versal d e m a n d s t h a t g r o u n d validity, t h a t t h e i n t e r n a l organization of
s p e e c h is inviolable. If t h a t were t h e case, we would n o t even n e e d to
explicate t h e n o r m a t i v e f o u n d a t i o n of s p e e c h since t h e n o r m a l con
d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m w h i c h a s p e a k e r c o u l d n o t diverge
w o u l d b e of n o i n t e r e s t for analyzing distorted p a t t e r n s of c o m m u n i
cation. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , n o r m a l c y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e e x t e r n a l or-
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of communicative
action:
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n o t be f u r t h e r s t a n d a r d i z e d , is of interest. C o n s i d e r t h e following
examples.
(a) A speaker b e h a v e s t o o informally by i g n o r i n g social distance a n d
trying to create an intimacy t h a t is i n a p p r o p r i a t e in t h e situation a t
h a n d . This k i n d of n o r m violation h a s n o t h i n g to d o with d i s t o r t e d
communication.
(b) A s p e a k e r may b e h a v e awkwardly a n d m a y not feel u p to h a n
dling a particularly f o r m a l situation, such as a r e c e p t i o n , a test, etc.
O r s h e behaves i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y b e c a u s e she d o e s n o t k n o w what t h e
n o r m a d v e c o n t e x t is. This is a case of b e h a v i o r t h a t deviates from t h e
n o r m s o w i n g to i n c o m p e t e n c e . Again, it has n o t h i n g to d o with dis
torted communication.
(c) B o t h of these are q u i t e different f r o m inflexible b e h a v i o r t h a t
stereotypically r e c u r s , b u t is n o t necessarily e x p e r i e n c e d by t h e a c t o r
as a b n o r m a l . This c a t e g o r y i n c l u d e s n e u r o t i c b e h a v i o r p a t t e r n s
u t t e r a n c e s t h a t are forcibly s t a n d a r d i z e d a n d are felt to b e p e c u l i a r
a n d o u t of place by o t h e r s . Again, a split of c o m m u n i c a t i o n can b e
o b s e r v e d : T h i s time, only t h e s p e a k e r takes t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e
suppositions to b e met, while o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s r e g a r d t h e c o m m u
n i c a t i o n as flawed. T h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of speech is d a m a g e d
at t h e level of manifestation; only for t h e s p e a k e r does t h e s e m b l a n c e
of a s m o o t h flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n persist.
(d) If p a r t i c i p a n t s d i s a g r e e a b o u t t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d , if t h e
o t h e r considers c e r t a i n n o r m s of a c t i o n to b e r i g h t t h a t t h e e g o re
j e c t s , o r if t h e o t h e r d o e s n o t a c c e p t t h e e g o ' s i m a g e of herself, t h e n
we c a n n o l o n g e r talk a b o u t deviating behavior; instead, we n o w have
a conflict. T h i s c a n give rise to distortion effects for t h e i n t e r n a l or
ganization of s p e e c h if t h e conflict is r e p r e s s e d a n d disguised a n d
c o n t i n u e s to s m o l d e r u n d e r t h e cover of a p p a r e n t l y c o n s e n s u a l ac
tion. Here, too, t h e r e is a split of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h we shall ex
a m i n e in detail.
I h a v e n o t discussed violations of t h e claim to t r u t h . T h e social
s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of w h a t c o u n t s as vindicating this claim c a n a p p l y
only to the w a r r a n t to g r o u n d t h e claim, which is i m m a n e n t in t h e
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T h e p a r a d o x t h a t I m e n t i o n e d can b e c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e strategies
u s e d to d e f e n d o n e ' s e g o identity. T h e d e f e n d e r , w h o c a n stabilize
his t h r e a t e n e d identity only by s u c c e e d i n g in h a v i n g it r e c o n f i r m e d ,
o n t h e o n e h a n d m u s t s t a n d his g r o u n d in a conflict, b u t o n t h e
o t h e r h a n d m u s t suppress this conflict in o r d e r n o t t o destroy t h e
c o n s e n s u a l f o u n d a t i o n of the m u t u a l l y d e s i r e d r e c o g n i t i o n a n d in
o r d e r n o t to risk t h e b r e a k d o w n of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p .
At this p o i n t , I w a n t to illustrate t h e dynamics of such identity
conflicts with a n e x a m p l e t h a t L a i n g a n d his colleagues c o n s t r u e as
follows.
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Paul:
1. I ' m u p s e t .
2. P a u l is a c t i n g v e r y
dispassionate.
1. P e t e r is u p s e t .
calm
and
2. I'll t r y t o h e l p h i m by r e m a i n i n g
calm a n d just listening.
3. If P a u l c a r e d a b o u t m e a n d
w a n t e d to h e l p h e w o u l d g e t m o r e
involved a n d show s o m e e m o t i o n
also.
3. H e ' s g e t t i n g e v e n m o r e u p s e t . I
m u s t be even m o r e calm,
4. P a u l k n o w s t h a t t h i s u p s e t s m e .
4. H e ' s
him.
5. If P a u l k n o w s t h a t t h i s b e h a v i o u r
upsets me, t h e n he m u s t be intend
ing to h u r t m e .
5. I ' m really t r y i n g to h e l p ,
6. H e m u s t b e c r u e l a n d sadistic.
M a y b e h e g e t s p l e a s u r e o u t o f it, e t c .
6. H e m u s t b e p r o j e c t i n g .
accusing
me
of
hurting
A t t r i b u t i o n s o f t h i s k i n d , b a s e d o n a virtually i n e x t r i c a b l e m i x o f m i s
m a t c h e d e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d p h a n t a s y a n d p e r c e p t i o n , a r e t h e v e r y stuff of
i n t e r h u m a n reality. O n e h a s , f o r i n s t a n c e , t o e n t e r i n t o t h i s r e a l m i n o r d e r
to u n d e r s t a n d h o w o n e p e r s o n ' s attributions a b o u t o t h e r s m a y b e g i n to be
particularly disturbing a n d disjunctive to these others, a n d c o m e to b e re
p e a t e d l y i n v a l i d a t e d by t h e m , so t h a t h e m a y b e g i n t o b e s u b j e c t t o t h e
global attribution of b e i n g m a d .
1 2
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a r e n o t m e t , b u t c o m m u n i c a t i o n is n o n e t h e l e s s n e i t h e r b r o k e n off in
a manifest c h a n g e of a t t i t u d e to strategic a c t i o n n o r c o n t i n u e d at t h e
m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e level of a clarificatory discourse. F o r this reason,
this s e q u e n c e of u t t e r a n c e s is a n e x a m p l e of systematically p r o d u c e d
misunderstandings.
Systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t results f r o m p r o b
lems of s e c u r i n g e g o identity occurs n o t exclusively b u t particularly
frequently within family relations. T h e family is a privileged site of
identity m a n a g e m e n t , n o t only for c h i l d r e n w h o are only just estab
lishing their identity, b u t also for adult family m e m b e r s . I n a d d i t i o n ,
this milieu obliges family m e m b e r s to action t h a t is t h o r o u g h l y ori
e n t e d t o m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; i n societies of o u r sort, i n a n y case,
strategic action is i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e with t h e c o m m i t m e n t s t o con
sensus t h a t h o l d within t h e family. T h e family r e g u l a t e s i n f o r m a l
relationships a n d i n t i m a t e face-to-face i n t e r a c t i o n s within t h e frame
w o r k of a diffuse s t r u c t u r e of roles. Recent l i t e r a t u r e o n e g o psychol
ogy p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i n t e r p e r s o n a l relationships
of this sort always h a v e a dual character: "Object relations" serve b o t h
t h e f o r m a t i o n a n d c o n f i r m a t i o n of a p r o j e c t i o n of o n e ' s identity a n d
t h e satisfaction of drives. I n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s within t h e family
a r e c h a n n e l s of a n affective as well as a cognitive e x c h a n g e , which are
d e t e r m i n e d simultaneously by t h e p s y c h o d y n a m i c s of satisfying
drives a n d of s e c u r i n g o n e ' s identity. T h e s e aspects c a n be s e p a r a t e d
only analytically. T h e diffuse r o l e s t r u c t u r e of t h e n u c l e a r family
m e e t s t h e d u a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relationships t h a t are
p e r m i t t e d within it halfway. W i t h r e s p e c t to t h e personality systems of
its m e m b e r s , t h e family does n o t h a v e particularly s t r o n g functional
specifications. It allows f o r a b r o a d s p e c t r u m of n e e d s to b e m e t .
T h e r e are n o particularly rigid s t a n d a r d s for h o w r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e
tween family m e m b e r s a r e defined; t h e leeway for individual selfp r e s e n t a t i o n is relatively wide since any given aspect of a r e l a t i o n s h i p
c a n b e t h e m a t i z e d at any time. If, of course, individual family m e m
b e r s use a role s t r u c t u r e t h a t is subject to conflict s i m u l t a n e o u s l y for
satisfying their drives a n d for s e c u r i n g t h e i r identities, special regula
tory capacities are called for in o r d e r to resolve e m e r g i n g systemic
p r o b l e m s adequately, t h a t is, w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to strategies of r e p r e s
sion t h a t h a v e oppressive side effects.
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I;
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m e n t , finally, is a q u e s t i o n of b o u n d a r i e s : t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e
family closes itself off o r o p e n s u p , h o w m u c h it constitutes a u n i t
with r e g a r d to family issues a n d m y t h s , o r t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h its in
t e r n a l c o m m u n i c a t i v e n e t w o r k s are tied to extrafamilial forces.
Empirical studies have s h o w n t h a t a family's ability t o solve t h e
above p r o b l e m s s t a n d s in a n inverse relation to its i n t e r n a l p o t e n t i a l
for conflict. T h e latter in t u r n is a f u n c t i o n of t h e distribution of power.
T h e m o r e u n e q u a l l y p o w e r is d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g t h e (adult) m e m
b e r s of a family, t h e h i g h e r t h e probability of a n asymmetrical distri
b u t i o n of t h e c h a n c e s each individual h a s of a t t a i n i n g a satisfactory
b a l a n c e of gratifications. T h e r e s u l t i n g conflicts, however, often
c a n n o t b e carried o u t strategically within t h e confines of t h e family
b e c a u s e they are i m m e d i a t e l y i n t e r t w i n e d with t h e identity m a n a g e
m e n t of the p a r t i c i p a n t s . A family whose p o w e r constellations d o n o t
p e r m i t a solution of t h e p r o b l e m of b a l a n c i n g n e e d satisfaction
a m o n g its m e m b e r s c o n s t r a i n s t h e leeway f o r successfully m a n a g i n g
identities. F e r r e i r a has c o m p a r e d t h e problem-solving b e h a v i o r of
clinically u n u s u a l family g r o u p s of t h r e e a n d f o u r m e m b e r s with cor
r e s p o n d i n g b e h a v i o r of c o n t r o l g r o u p s . As e x p e c t e d , t h e s y m p t o m
atic families d e m o n s t r a t e d a g r e a t e r p o t e n t i a l for conflict (i.e., less
s p o n t a n e o u s a g r e e m e n t of a t t i t u d e s m e a s u r e d p r i o r t o family discus
sions) . T h e y n e e d e d m o r e t i m e to r e a c h decisions in family discus
sions, a n d t h e satisfaction of drives, m e a s u r e d by t h e m u t u a l
sensitivity toward t h e wishes of o t h e r family m e m b e r s , was lower t h a n
in t h e c o n t r o l families.
14
15
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d o m i n a n c e r e l a t i o n s a n d coalition f o r m a t i o n s , as well as by c o r r e
s p o n d i n g tensions, d i s c r e p a n t expectations, r e c i p r o c a l d e p r e c a t i o n ,
a n d so o n . T h e conflicts at issue h e r e t e n d to b e s m o l d e r i n g , partially
c o n c e a l e d o n e s that c a n n o t be publicly played out b e c a u s e the
p s y c h o d y n a m i c p r e c o n d i t i o n s d o n o t exist for r e a c h i n g a n u n d e r
s t a n d i n g m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a n d dealing with these conflicts dis
cursively. C o m m u n i c a t i v e styles that m e d i a t e distance a n d clear the
g r o u n d for discourse, such as j o k i n g , irony, a n d f o r m s of trivializing
a n d n e u t r a l i z i n g , are t h e r e f o r e also e n c o u n t e r e d less often in these
families. T h e p o t e n t i a l f o r conflict affects t h e e x t e r n a l organization
of s p e e c h so as to m a k e likely e x t r e m e manifestations in t h e
a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d d i m e n s i o n s . C o n c e p t s such as pseudo-mutuality,
schism, skew, s e p a r a t e d n e s s , a n d c o n n e c t e d n e s s t h a t have b e e n de
v e l o p e d by r e s e a r c h in s c h i z o p h r e n i a are n o t sufficiently precise for
o u r d i m e n s i o n s . T h e y have b e e n selected as c o u n t e r - c o n c e p t s to t h e
symmetries of a b a l a n c e d role systems (role-reciprocity, c o m p l e
m e n t a r i t y of e x p e c t a t i o n , m u t u a l i t y of u n d e r s t a n d i n g , etc.) a n d
h e n c e they cut across t h e aspects I w a n t to distinguish in what
follows.
Proximity/Distance
T h e well-known studies of Lidz a n d W y n n e ' s r e s e a r c h t e a m s confirm
t h a t t h e distances b e t w e e n individual family m e m b e r s in pathologi
cal families c a n n o t be r e g u l a t e d appropriately. T h e basic roles of t h e
family ( g e n d e r / g e n e r a t i o n ) either are t o o s e p a r a t e d from o n e an
o t h e r or r e m a i n t o o diffuse, so t h a t the b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n genera
tions a n d g e n d e r s r e m a i n overly rigid or insufficiendy differentiated.
This p a t t e r n c a n p e r m e a t e all interactions. T h u s social distances can
n o t b e i m p l e m e n t e d as flexible e i t h e r b e c a u s e t h e disintegration of
the g r o u p w o u l d l e a d to s p l i n t e r i n g a n d alienation or b e c a u s e a co
e r c e d a n d frantic o v e r i n t e g r a t i o n w o u l d lead to a solidarity t h a t is
m a i n t a i n e d by force. T h e c o n c e p t of a p p a r e n t l y m a i n t a i n e d reci
procity (pseudo-mutuality) b e l o n g s in this c o n t e x t .
17
Equality /Difference
Hess a n d H a n d e l have s h o w n how i m p o r t a n t it is for the family sys
tem to allow a n a p p r o p r i a t e leeway for the self-presentation of indi-
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vidual m e m b e r s . I n p a t h o l o g i c a l families t h e m u t u a l l y c o r r o b o r a t e d
c o n g r u e n c e of self-images (i.e., of t h e r e p r e s e n t e d a n d r e c o g n i z e d
identities of m e m b e r s ) is e i t h e r so h i g h t h a t o v e r p o w e r i n g family ste
r e o t y p e s i m p e d e t h e f o r m a t i o n of individuals or so low t h a t t h e col
lective u n i t is t h r e a t e n e d by t h e lack of n o r m a t i v e a g r e e m e n t . W h a t
is decisive h e r e is n e i t h e r t h e d e g r e e of stereotyping n o r t h e d e g r e e
of d i s c r e p a n c y as such, b u t r a t h e r t h e inability to synthesize aspects
of s a m e n e s s a n d difference. T h u s t h e n e e d arises t o mask t h e con
trast b e t w e e n t o l e r a t e d self-images a n d actual b e h a v i o r .
18
Activity /Passivity
T h e u n e q u a l distribution of p o w e r m e a n s t h a t t h e sphere of action
of a p a r t n e r in i n t e r a c t i o n is n o t merely d e l i m i t e d by t h e s p h e r e of
a c t i o n of a n o t h e r family m e m b e r , b u t is d e t e r m i n e d a n d c o n t r o l l e d
by t h e initiatives of t h a t family m e m b e r . I n s y m p t o m a t i c families, we
can often o b s e r v e p a t t e r n s of i n t e r a c t i o n b e c o m i n g solidified. T h e s e
i n g r a i n e d p a t t e r n s c a n b e t r a c e d t o t h e d e p e n d e n c e of o n e s p o u s e
o n a n o t h e r a n d to t h e f o r m a t i o n of coalitions b e t w e e n a t least o n e
p a r e n t a n d o n e or several c h i l d r e n . U. O e v e r m a n n h a s d e v e l o p e d
t h e c o n c e p t of affective solidarity b e t w e e n p a r e n t s , w h i c h is applica
ble in this c o n t e x t a n d is d a m a g e d in t h e families t h a t were studied.
O n c e again, it is n o t t h e u n e q u a l distribution of activities a m o n g
family m e m b e r s as s u c h t h a t is t h e p r o b l e m , b u t r a t h e r t h e m o r e o r
less surreptitiously h a b i t u a l i z e d d o m i n a n c e relations t h a t p r o h i b i t
s h o w i n g a n y c o n s i d e r a t i o n for t h e desires of m a r g i n a l i z e d family
m e m b e r s . T h i s is a p r e c o n d i t i o n of t h e various strategies of exploita
tion i n t e r n a l to t h e family to which we shall r e t u r n .
19
164
Reflections on Communicative Pathology
165
Reflections on Communicative Pathology
L u c K a u f m a n n as well as by U. O e v e r m a n n a n d Y. Schtitze.
K a u f m a n n analyzes t h e first fifteen m i n u t e s of interviews b e t w e e n a
hospitalized p a t i e n t , t h e p a t i e n t ' s family, a n d two physicians. T h e r e
a r e seven cases of n e u r o s e s a n d d e p r e s s i o n , seven b o r d e r l i n e cases,
a n d seven cases of s c h i z o p h r e n i a . T h e study follows a c o d e p l a n
based o n criteria from W y n n e a n d Singer o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d from
t h e Bateson g r o u p o n t h e other. O e v e r m a n n a n d Schtitze use t a p e d
protocols from five visits e a c h with two families; in b o t h cases, t h e
p a r e n t s h a v e s o u g h t c o u n s e l i n g because of p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e i r chil
d r e n w h o h a d j u s t started school. T h e scenes o n w h i c h t h e analysis is
based h a v e been selected partly at r a n d o m , partly based o n t h e i r rel
evance for t h e s u s p e c t e d family conflict. T h e m a t e r i a l is r e c o n
s t r u c t e d at t h e t h r e e levels of s p e e c h acts ( p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ,
s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n , a n d m e a n i n g of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s ) with a
view to h o w t h e u n d e r l y i n g family conflict is at t h e s a m e time ex
p r e s s e d a n d c o n c e a l e d in t h e linguistic m e d i u m . I d o n ' t want to p r e
sent t h e d e t a i l e d results of t h e two studies, b u t will r a t h e r d r a w o n
t h e m in o r d e r t o illustrate m y a c c o u n t of linguistic d i s t u r b a n c e s .
21
166
to someone
other
than
the person
asking
the
(iii) c o m m e n t i n g , in t h e t h i r d p e r s o n , o n t h e p e r s o n e x p e c t i n g an
answer;
(iv) c u r a t o r i a l answer: C answers instead of to a question o r re
m a r k by A;
(v) answer or i n t e r v e n t i o n t h e c o n t e n t of w h i c h h a s n o t h i n g to d o
with w h a t h a s b e e n said.
22
167
Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology
Kaufmann
has
studied
these
pseudo-
c o n f i r m a t i o n s following W y n n e .
A d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n is f o r m u l a t e d i n t h e a n s w e r o r o t h e r r e s p o n s e as a n
a g r e e m e n t or, conversely, a g r e e m e n t is r e c i p r o c a t e d w i t h d i v e r g e n c e . W e
d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s a n d v a r i a n t s of p s e u d o - c o n f i r m a t i o n :
A n s w e r s t h a t , b e c a u s e o f a h e s i t a t i o n , a p a r t i c u l a r c h o i c e of w o r d s , o r t o n e o f
v o i c e leave a d o u b t w h e t h e r t h e s p e a k e r a c c e p t s t h e m e s s a g e o f t h e o t h e r as
valid o r w h e t h e r h e h a s a l r e a d y d i s q u a l i f i e d i t (easy, f r e q u e n t disqualificat
ion) . "Correction" of t h e s e n d e r ' s message by a d d i n g w o r d s o r s o u n d s that
q u e s t i o n t h e v a l u e a n d significance o f t h e s e n d e r ' s c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r sim
p l y a n n u l w h a t h a s b e e n said. "False r e c i p r o c a t i o n , " a c o m m o n p h e n o m e
n o n w h e r e t h e r e s p o n s e is r e c i p r o c a t e d i n a d i f f e r e n t " c u r r e n c y " o r "coin";
the respondent does n o t encounter the interlocutor's message at the same
(logical) level o r d o e s n o t r e s p o n d t o it w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s a m e c o n t e x t .
T h e false r e c i p r o c a t i o n p r a c t i c a l l y always r e p r e s e n t s a d i s t u r b a n c e o f "inter
p e r s o n a l logic" a n d c a n o v e r l a p w i t h t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f p a r a d o x i c a l c o m
m u n i c a t i o n . P s e u d o - c o n f i r m a t i o n s , finally, leave o u t ("forget") s o m e c r u c i a l
b i t o f w h a t t h e o t h e r h a s c o m m u n i c a t e d a n d o p e r a t e as t h o u g h t h e r e m a i n
der were t h e whole. Moreover, t h e above-mentioned tangentialization m a y
f u n c t i o n as a p s e u d o - c o n f i r m a t i o n .
2 4
168
Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology
169
Reflections on Communicative Pathology
170
Reflections on Communicative Pathology
Notes
Translator's Introduction
l.Jvirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., trans. Thomas McCar
thy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984/1987). Hereafter cited as TCA.
2. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to t h e m henceforth as the Gauss Lec
tures. They follow closely u p o n the publication of the English translation of Knowl
edge and Human Interest, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), a n d
m o r e or less coincide with the 1970 G e r m a n publication of On the Logic of the Social
Sciences, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen a n d Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1988).
3. T h e fourth lecture clearly served as basis for the essay "What Is Universal
Pragmatics?" trans. Thomas McCarthy, in Communication and the Evolution of Society
(Boston: Beacon, 1979), pp. 1-68.
4. See J o h n Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press:
1969), 57ff., as well as Jtirgen H a b e r m a s , "Toward a Critique of a T h e o r y of Mean
ing," in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. William H o h e n g a r t e n (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1 9 9 2 ) , p p . 70-72, a n d "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" pp. 6 0 - 6 1 .
5. Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" 13. See also his "Reconstruction a n d
Interpretation in the Social Sciences," in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Ac
tion, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 21-42.
6. This dialogical dimension is lacking in Saul Kripke's discussion of the rule-follow
ing problem, even though the connection of the private language a r g u m e n t with the
rule-following problem is strikingly similar. See Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and
Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
7. Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1994).
172
Notes
8. See T C A : l , p p . 295-328.
9. See Cristina Lafont, The Linguistic
Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), chs. 5-6.
10. See Jiirgen Habermas, "Rorty's Pragmadc Turn," in On the Pragmatics of Communi
cation, ed. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 343-382. For his
account of discourse ethics, see Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans.
Christian L e n h a r d t a n d Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1990), a n d Justification and Application, trans. Ciarin Cronin (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1994). Habermas's critique of empiricist ethics in the essay "On Intentions,
Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions" offers insight into the roots of his funda
mentally intersubjectivist approach to ethics. See pp. 118-125 in this volume.
11. Cf. "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" pp. 35 a n d 54.
12. Jiirgen Habermas, Zur Logic der Sozialwissenschaften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982),
p. 10, a n d T C A l : xli.
13. For further changes, see TCA. Subsequent modifications to the theory have often
been the result of Habermas's response to his critics. See his replies in J. B. T h o m p
son and D. Held, eds., Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982),
Richard Bernstein, ed., Habermas andModernity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985),
and Axel H o n n e t h a n d H a n s Joas, eds., Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1992).
14. See Jiirgen H a b e r m a s , "Toward a Critique of a Theory of Meaning," in
Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. William M. H o h e n g a r t e n (Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 1992).
15. See "Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality,"
in On the Pragmatics of Communication. Here Habermas distinguishes communicative
use of language from epistemic and teleological use.
16. A dialogue between the two has already been initiated. See Jiirgen Habermas,
"Von Kant zu Hegel: Zu Robert Brandoms Sprachpragmatik," in Wahrheit und
Rechtfertigung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999), pp. 138-185. An English translation is
forthcoming in The European Journal of Philosophy.
Lecture I
1. [Although h e assigns primacy to linguistic meaning, Habermas conceives of Sinn
quite broadly. H e does not distinguish in these lectures between "sense" (Sinn) a n d
"reference" (Bedeutung) in the tradition of Frege, for example, as his point of depar
ture is not that tradition but social action theory, where "meaning" is the usual term.
Trans.]
2. Cf. J o h n Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p p .
19ff.
3. Cf. D. S. Shwayder's conceptual analyses in his The Stratification of Behavior (Lon
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965).
173
Notes
4. Cf. A. V. Cicourel, Method and Measurement in Sociology (New York: F r e e Press, 1964).
5. H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1989).
6. N. Malcolm, "Intentional Activity Cannot be Explained by Contingent Causal
Laws," in L. I. Krimerman, ed., The Nature and Scope of Social Science (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 334-350; Th. Mishel, Psychologische Erklarungen
(Frankfurt: 1981).
7. Cf. N . Chomsky's critique of Skinner in J. A. Fodor a n d J. J. Katz, eds., The Structure
of Language (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 547-578.
8. Cf. Krimerman, Nature and Scope of Social Science, Part 7, p p . 585ff, especially the ar
ticles by Watkins, Goldstein, and Mandelbaum.
9. Ibid, p. 604.
10. Ibid., p. 605.
11. Peter L. Berger a n d T h o m a s Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden
City,N.Y.:Doubleday, 1966).
12. G. Simmel, Soziologie (Leipzig: Duncker & Humbolt, 1908; 3rd ed, 1923). [A par
tial translation appears as "How Is Society Possible?" in On Individuality and Social
Forms, ed. Donald Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 6-22. Where
appropriate, references to the English are included in square brackets. Trans.]
13. I b i d , p. 22 [p. 6, translation modified].
14. I b i d , p. 22 [p. 7 ] .
15. I b i d , p. 23 [p. 8 ] .
16. Ibid., p. 24.
17. Ibid., p. 23.
18. In comparison with Rickert's a n d Dilthey's proposals for a t h e o r y of the cultural
or h u m a n sciences, Simmel's brief c o m m e n t s are merely programmatic. O n the
other hand, this program derives immediately form Kant and, unlike the theories of
Rickert and Dilthey, does not aim to provide a foundation for the h u m a n sciences
that developed in the n i n e t e e n t h century. Instead, it is geared toward a constitutive
social theory in the strict sense. The only one who pursued a similar goal and actually
went through with an epistemological foundation of the social sciences is Max Adler
in Das Rdtsel der Gesellschaft (Vienna: Saturn, 1936). More recently, H e l m u t Schelsky
has renewed the call for a "transcendental theory of society"; see his Ortsbestimmung
der deutschen Soziologie (Dtisseldorf: E. Diederich, 1959), 93ff. His empirical work,
however, belongs m o r e to an anthropological theory of society. T h u s the subjectivist
approaches in c o n t e m p o r a r y sociology all derive directly (Schiitz, Berger,
Luckmann, Nathanson) or indirectly (Garfi.nkel, Cicourel, Sacks) from Husserl
rather than from Kant. Rickert's philosophy of value of course has found its way into
m o r e recent sociology via Max Weber and Parsons. However, t h e constitutive prob
lem already receded into the b a c k g r o u n d in Weber, a n d in Parsons it was superceded
by the basic tenets of a moderately empiricist philosophy of science.
174
Notes
Lecture II
1. E d m u n d Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,
trans. D. Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 28ff., p p . 103ff.
Hereafter cited as Crisis.
2. Crisis, 32, p. 119.
3. Crisis, 51, p. 173.
4. Husserl reproaches Kant for the "lack of a n intuitive exhibiting m e t h o d " (Crisis,
30, p. 114).
5. Simmel apparently fails to see the i n h e r e n t difficulty of the architectonic of the
Kantian opus. Max Adler, in contrast, undertakes the following revision. H e intro
duces the social a priori a n d raises this relationship of the singular ego to the commu
nity of many egos to the level of the transcendental determination of the individual
consciousness: "Transcendental epistemology not only teaches that every object nec
essarily belongs to a subject, but m u c h more: to be a n object is f or the t h i n g to belong
to indeterminately m a n y subjects. This plurality must not be u n d e r s t o o d empirically,
but transcendentally, that is, already as characteristic of the individual consciousness
itself'." Adler, DasRdlsel der Gesellschaft (Vienna: Saturn, 1936), p. 111.
6.1 n connection with what follows, see Ernst Tugendhat's excellent study o n the con
cept of t r u t h in Husserl a n d Heidegger:,Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967), part 1.
7. E d m u n d Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Philosophy, book 1, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 24, p. 44.
8. Ideas, 30, pp. 56ff.
9. Crisis, 40, p . 149.
10. Ideas, 117, p . 279.
11. Ideas, 116, p . 277.
12. E d m u n d Husserl, "Meditation iiber die I d e e eines individuellen u n d
Gemeinschaftelebens in absoluter Selbstverantwortung" a n d "Besinnung als
Aktivitat," both in Husserliana, ed. (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 193-211.
13. Ibid., p . 194.
14. Ibid., p. 197.
15. Ibid., p. 199.
16. Vico's epistemic interpretation of t h e phrase factum et verum convertuntur, which
he develops based on the model of geometry, is based o n this insight.
175
Notes
Lecture III
1. To begin with, I shall eschew the question of how it is possible that the same prop
ositional content can pick out many different things: "If we admit one content 'in'
many representings, why n o t admit o n e attribute 'in' m a n y things: platonism for
things as well as platonism for thoughts?" (W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics [Lon
don: Routledge a n d Kegan Paul, 1968], p. 62). Elsewhere, Sellars talks about content
as inherent in [Innewohnen] acts of consciousness (in-esse of attributes in
representings) a n d of content residing within things themselves (in-esse of attributes
in things) (p. 92).
2. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, p. 62.
3. I a m disregarding t h e fact that Sellars from t h e outset interprets acts of conscious
ness objectivistically, that is, as mental episodes: "If anything which occurs or takes
place is to count as an episode, then, whenever an object changes from having one
disposition to having a n o t h e r the c h a n g e is an episode" (ibid, p. 72). Sellars's
physicalism manifests itself in that he conceives of acts of consciousness or
representings as events in the world like objectified natural events.
4. I b i d , p. 64: [Sellars proceeds by identifying contents first with intensions a n d then
with (Fregean) senses. This distinction does not figure in Habermas's account here.
Trans.]
5. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, p. 156.
6. Ibid.
7. I b i d , p. 76.
176
Notes
8. Ibid., p. 157.
9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), 202,
p . 81.
10. [For a similar interpretation of Wittgenstein, see Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on
Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). Trans.]
11. Cf. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 2 4 - 4 4 ; also H. J. Giegel, Die Logic der seelischen
Ereignisse (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969), pp. 99-108, 112, 134.
12. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics,^.
128.
177
Notes
Lecture IV
1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, MA: T h e MIT Press,
1965), pp. 3ff.
2. Cf. E H. Lenneberg, Biological Foundations of Language (New York: Wiley, 1967).
3. Dieter Wunderlich, Tempus und Zeitreferenz imDeutschen (Munich: Hueber, 1970).
4. D. S. Shwayder, The Stratification of Behavior (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1965), p. 288.
5. T h a t is, t h e illocutionary acts analyzed by Searle following Austin a n d Strawson;
see Speech Acts (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
6. By introducing the singular speech act as the elementary unit of speech, we al
ready perform an abstraction: We prescind from the fact that speech acts usually oc
cur in pairs, as questions a n d answers, assertions a n d denials, etc.
7. Even if the performative c o m p o n e n t s are n o t explicitly verbalized, they are always
implicit in the linguistic process. Thus they must be present in the deep structure of
every linguistic utterance.
8. Dell Hymes uses the expression instead for the mastery of linguistic codes; for this
I have suggested the term pragmatic competence.
9. In the most recent linguistic debates, consideration of universal pragmatic rela
tions has led to a revision of the semantic theory initially proposed by Katz, Fodor,
Postal, and others. In the newer conception of generative semantics, drawing o n the
work of McCawley, Fillmore, a n d especially Lakoff, the categorical separation of syn
tactic deep structure and semantic interpretation for meaning-preserving transfor
mations has b e e n d r o p p e d and replaced with the assumption of a semantic deep
structure with pre- a n d postlexical transformations. Accordingly, the process of sen
tence formation begins with a semantic entity whose general characterization also in
volves aspects of universal pragmatics. Ross and McCawley have suggested
interpreting every highest 5 as a performative utterance, that is, as the d o m i n a n t
clause of a speech act. Lakoff a n d others incorporate, in addition to the performative
mode (question, order, assertion, etc.), references to possible speech situations, as
well as focus, presupposition, a n d co-reference into the description of deep struc
ture. Fillmore's suggestion of representing deep structure as a role structure that
would show how elements such as agentives, instrumentals, datives, factitives,
locatives, objectives, e t c , contribute to sentence m e a n i n g approximates a cognitivist
approach to semantics. I cannot predict the course of this discussion within linguis
tics. Nevertheless, there are indications that in describing semantic deep structure,
linguistics will come across a linguistically basic system of reference that might be un
derstood as a representation of the rule system of universal pragmatics.
178
Notes
Lecture V
1. Cf. Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality (New York: Humanities Press,
1963), pp. lOOff.
2. [The G e r m a n here reads: "wobei 's' einen assertorischen Satz mit der Bedeutung
'p' bezeichnet." In keeping with Frege's distinction between sense (Sinn) and refer
ence (Bedeutung), H a b e r m a s can be u n d e r s t o o d as saying that s has p as its reference.
This interpretation fits well with the subsequent discussion of correspondence theo
ries of truth. T h e formulation is particularly interesting in light of Davidson's appro
priation of Tarski's semantic conception of truth. Davidson explicitly uses
Convention T to replace ' means that.' (See Donald Davidson, "Truth a n d Meaning,"
in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).)
Trans.]
3. Cf. E. Tugendhat, in Philosophische Rundschau, vol. 8, no. 2 / 3 , p p . 131-159.
4. T u g e n d h a t (ibid., p. 138) rightly maintains that "if t h e meaning of ' t r u e ' is ex
hausted by the fact that we can replace 'p is t r u e ' by 'p,' t h e n any inquiry into the
truth of j u d g m e n t s is pointless."
5. Cf. K. O . Apel's introduction to C. S. Peirce, Schriflen I (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1968).
6. Cf. H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1989),
a n d Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959).
7. [For a r e c e n t discussion of world disclosure, see Thesis 11, vol. 37 (1994), espe
cially the articles by Kompridis, Lafont, Seel, a n d B o h m a n n . Trans.]
179
Notes
8. This difference may be connected with the fact t h a t empirical beliefs must be
g r o u n d e d in experience\whereas the acceptance or rejection of n o r m s n e e d n o t have',
an immediate experiential connection to external reality. T h e claim of a norm to be"
right may be based o n the reflexive experience of the participating subjects of them
selves. This experience indicates whether o n e "really wants" to accept the n o r m and
whether the interpretation of needs and desires that it expresses "really" picks o u t
what can be understood as "one's own" n e e d s and desires.
1
180
Notes
181
Notes
to L. Kaufmann,
Familie,
16. G. Handel, e d . The Psychosocial Interior of the Family (Chicago: Aldine, 1967).
17. E. G. Mishler a n d N. E. Waxier, Interaction inFamilies (New York: Wiley, 1968).
18. R. D. Hess a n d G. Handel, "The Family as a Psychosocial Organization," in Han
del, The Psychosocial Interior of the Family, pp. lOff.
19. M. T. Siegert, Strukturbedingungen
1977).
von Familienkonflikten
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
Index
184
Index
185
Index
186
Index
a n d intersubjectivity, 60
a n d Kant, 23, 24, 25-26
and lifeworld, 16, 21, 23, 24
social, 26, 37
a n d nonlinguistic intentionalist theory
of meaning, 51
and other egos, 36
a n d phenomenological foundation of
intersubjectivity, 47
a n d Sellars, 45, 46
a n d subjectivist approaches, 173n.l8
o n transcendental history of
intersubjectivity, 3 8 - 4 3
a n d truth, 22, 28-31, 33, 87-88
"Idea of Individual a n d Community
Life in Absolute Self-Responsibility,
T h e " (Husserl), 31
Idealized model of communication,
sorts of failure of, xxi
Ideal speaker-listener (Chomsky),
69-70, 71
Ideal speech situation, xv-xvi, xx,
97-99, 102-103, 1 7 9 n . l l
vs. empirical circumstances, xxii
Ideas . . . (Husserl), 27, 41
Identity, 156
personal, 156
Identity conflicts, 155-159
a n d family relation, 159-165, 170
and pseudo-consensus, xxii, 165-169
a n d systematic distortions, 169-170
Instrumental action, rules of, 109
Intelligibility
and truth, 91
as validity claim, xiv, 63, 90, 91, 93
violation of, 148, 149-151
I n t e n t i o n ( s ) , 5 9 , 110-111
and beliefs, 111
as cause, 114-115
a n d rule-following, 107
Wittgenstein on, 52
Intentional action, xviii, 11, 110-118
and cognitive acts, 118
and language, 125
a n d norm-governed action, 109
Intentional behavior, 5
Intentional expressions, Sellars on,
47-48
Intentionality, xviii, 27-31, 32-34, 36
a n d B r e n t a n o , 27, 110, 114
cognitive vs. noncognitive relation in,
111-112
187
Index
Kamlah, Wilhelm, 95
Kant, Immanuel, 16, 18-19
a n d Husserl, 23, 24, 25-26
and Sellars, 45
Kaufmann, Luc, 165, 166-167
Laing, R. D , 156
Language, 125-127
autonomy of, 143-144
generative theory of, 65
g r a m m a r of, 67
and intentionality, 114
knowledge of rules of, 8-10
a n d m e a n i n g , xxiii
monological, 48-50, 51
reflexivity of, 73-74
Language development, Spitz on,
138-140
Language games, xii, 52-63, 64,
I76n.l8
and analysis of concepts (Roche), 108
background consensus in, 89-90
communicative action in, 100
and communicative theory, 44, 53
a n d dual structure of speech acts, 63
and generative theory of society, 17,
18, 19
g r a m m a r of, 67, 107-108
a n d role or function of expression,
47
Wittgenstein and theory of, 53, 67
Language use
cognitive, xiii, xxiii, 63-64, 76
and disclosure theories of t r u t h , 92
obligation in, 148
pragmatics of, 78-82
and Wittgenstein, 62
communicative, xiii, xxiii, 64, 76
pragmatics of, 82-84
and Wittgenstein, xiii
context-independent, 143
Legitimacy, expectation of, 101
Levy-Strauss, Claude, 19
Lidz, T h e o d o r e , 162
Lies, 154
Lifeworld, xvi
and communicative theory of society,
34-35
constitutive theory of, 25
of Husserl, 16, 21, 23, 24
p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d philosophy of
language on, 68
as posited, 29, 30
188
Index
Lifeworld (continued)
and science, 24-25
social, 26, 37
Linguistic abstraction, 74-75
Linguistic codes, 71-73
Linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n , ix, xviii, 4,
109
a n d absence, 28
in child's development, 137-140
levels of
first, 140-141
second, 141-146
and model of communicative action,
127
and motivational development, 131
mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g as purpose of,
93
normalcy conditions of, 131-137
normative foundation of, 102
Linguistic c o m p e t e n c e , 69-70, 71
Linguistic empiricism, 65
Linguistics, 75
Linguistic transcendentalism, 64-65
Linguistic t u r n of twentieth-century phi
losophy, vii
for Habermas, xii, xxii
a n d Sellars, xii, 47
a n d theory of consciousness, 45
Logic, 75
Logical abstraction, 75
Logical Investigations (Husserl), 27, 41
Lorenzen, Paul, 95
Lorenzer, A., 169
Luckmann, Thomas, 16
L u h m a n n , Niklas, 14, 19
Lukacs, G., 19
Making It Explicit (Brandom), xxiv
Marcuse, Herbert, 19
Marx, Karl, 16
Marxist phenomenology, 19
Mead, G. H., xix, 17, 18, 19, 43, 59,
124
Meaning, 3-4, l 7 2 n . l
a n d action vs. behavior, 4-6
communication as sharing of, 60
and conventionalism vs. essentialism,
8-10
a n d intersubjectivity, x-xi, 43
normativity of, xi
a n d observation vs. understanding,
6-8
and Sellars, 46
189
Index
a n d action, 5-6, 7, 8
a n d communicative action, 12
a n d deviations, 70
fulfilling of, 118-125
M e a d on, 124
a n d rules of action, 109
validity of, 122-123
a n d values, 125
Objective world
vs. intersubjective world, 37
a n d paradox of others, 36-37
Objectivist approach to theory forma
tion, x-xi, xii, 10-11
Object relations, 159
Observation, vs. understanding, 6-8
Oevermann, U , 163, 165
Ontological theories of truth, 86, 87
Other(s)
and constitutive theories of society, 22
Husserl o n , 36-37, 39-40, 42
a n d personal identity; 156
Parsons, Talcott, 13, 14, 19, 118, 123
Passivity, in family relationships, 163
Peirce, C. S., 24, 34, 81-82, 87, 88
Perception, and cognitive language,
xvi-xvii
Performative clause, 90
Performative utterances, 74
Performative verbs, 77
Peters, R. S, 114-115
Phenomenological attitude, 43
Phenomenological foundation of
intersubjectivity, 36, 38, 47
Phenomenology, 19
a n d constitutive theory o f society, 25
a n d intersubjectivity, xi-xii
Philosophical life, Husserl on, 32
Philosophy of language
and game model of language, 59
a n d philosophy of consciousness, 32,
36
a n d Wittgenstein, 52
Philosophy or theory of consciousness
Husserl on, 36
a n d linguistic turn, 45
philosophy of language as replacement
for, 32, 36
solitary reflection in, 43
a n d Wittgenstein, 52
Philosophy in twentieth century, "lin
guistic turn" of. See Linguistic
turn of twentieth-century
philosophy
Piaget.Jean, 70, 135
Popper, Karl, 14, 87-88
Positing(s), 28-30, 34-35, 63
Power relations, and family distortions,
xxii, 161-162
Practical discourse, 9 4
Pragmatic competences, 75
Pragmatics. See also Universal
pragmatics
of assertions, 89, 91
of cognitive language use, 78-82
of communicative language use,
82-84
empirical, 72
resurgence of interest in, xxix
Pragmatic theory of meaning, and
speech act theory, ix
Pragmatic universals, 73, 76-78
Predication, 81-82
Presuppositions of action, xxiii
Private language utterances, 169
Pronouns, 6 1 , 77, 81
Propositions, truth of, 95
Proximity of family members, in patho
logical families, 162
Pseudo-confirmation, 167
Pseudo-consensus, xxii,
165-169
Public standards, 120-121
Pure communicative action, 99-100,
102
Purposive-rational action, 11-12
t
190
Index
Sincerity
and speech vs. speaker's subjectivity,
146
a n d truth, 91-92
as validity claim, xiv, 64, 90, 91, 93
violation of, 151-152, 154
Social action, and Habermas, ix
Social change, on atomistic approach,
14
Social conventions, 107-110
Social cybernetic models, 15
Socialization
and communicative action, xx, 131
deviant processes of, xix
disturbances of, 131
Social lifeworld, 2 6 , 3 7
Social reality, constitution of, 16
Social science (s). See also T h e o r y forma
tion in social sciences
dominant paradigms in, x
a n d meaning, 3-4
theoretical approaches in, 3
Social systems theory. See Systems
theory
Social theory
Habermas's linguistic approach to, ix,
x
of meaning, xxiii
Society
epistemology as i n a d e q u a t e to, 22
vs. n a t u r e , 19-21
truth in immanent relation to, 22, 23,
26-27, 32
Sociolinguistic abstraction, 74
Sociolinguistics, 75
Spann, O., 19
Speech. See aho Ideal speech situation
autonomy of, 144-145
dual structure of, xiii, 63, 76
external a n d internal organization of,
144-145, 147, 154, 169
a n d normative social reality, 144, 146
Speech acts, 55, 61, 73-74, 76
classification of, xiv, 82-84
communicatives, xiv, 82-83, 84, 99
constatives, xiv, 78, 83, 84 (see aho
Constative speech acts)
regulatives, xiv, 83, 84, 99, 149
representatives (expressives), xiv, 83,
84, 99
a n d intentions vs. norms, 109
a n d nonverbal expressions, 142
normative background of, 143-144
191
Index
a n d reason, 85-86
and t r u t h , 86
validity claims for, xiv, 90, 136, 146 (see
also Validity claims)
and Wittgenstein, 62
Speech act theory, ix-x, xiii-xiv, xxiii
and pragmatic universals, 78
and validity claims, xiv
Spitz, R, 137-140
Stierlin, H , 160
Strategic action, 12-13
and communicative action, xviii,
12-13
vs. consensual action, 150
Strategic games, 57
Structuralism, 16-17, 19
Subjectivist approaches i n contemporary
sociology, 173n.l8
Subjectivist approaches t o theory forma
tion, x-xi, 10, 15
Subjectivist theoretical program, 10
Subjectivity, a n d intersubjectivity, xx
Symbolic interactionism, 19
Systematically distorted communication,
viii,xx, 137, 147-149
and conflicts of identity, xxi, 155-159
as circular process, 169-170
in families, xxi-xxii, 159-165,
170
a n d pseudo-consensus, 165-169
examples of, 164-165
as third option, xxii
violations of validity claims, 149-155
Systems theory(ies), 14, 16-17, 18, 19
Tandem p h e n o m e n o n , 166-167
Tangential response, 166
Tarski, Alfred, 86
Taylor, Charles, 115
Teleological m o d e l of action, xix,
113-114, 115-116
and acting subject, 118
Theoretico-empirical discourse, 94
Theories, and expectations, 124-125
T h e o r y of action, ix, xvii
and rule-following, 108
Theory of Communicative Action, The
(Habermas), viii, xiv, xvi
T h e o r y of consciousness. See Philosophy
or theory of consciousness
T h e o r y formation in social sciences
atomistic vs. holistic a p p r o a c h in,
13-14
classification of approaches t o , 14
a n d generative theories of society,
15-22
objectivist vs. subjectivist approaches
to, 10-11, 15
and strategic vs. communicative ac
tion, 11-13
T h e o r y of knowledge, constitutive. See
Constitutive theory of
knowledge
Theory of language, and Wittgenstein,
64
T h e o r y of meaning, xiii-xiv
T h e o r y of rationality, xxii
Tractatus . . . (Wittgenstein), 61
Transcendental community, 26, 42-43,
174n.5
Transcendental history of
intersubjectivity, 38-43
T r u t h , xvi, xxiii, 86
analytic, 91
consensus theory of, xvii, 89, 92-93,
95-99
correspondence theory of, 86, 91
disclosure theories of, 92
as evidence (evidential theory of), 33,
34, 36, 87-88
Husserl on, 22, 28-31, 33, 87-88
a n d intelligibility, 91
a n d normative Tightness, 92
of propositions, 95
and sincerity, 91-92
society's i m m a n e n t relation t o , 22, 23,
26-27, 32
universal-pragmatic meaning of,
89
as validity claim, xiv, 6 3 - 6 4 , 90, 91,
93
violation of, 153-154
Tugendhat, Ernst, 32
Unconscious motives, a n d accountabil
ity, 101
Unconscious repression, 136
Understanding
a n d acceptability conditions, xxiii
of games, 54, 55-56
mutual, 93, 97, 101-102
and consensus, 127
a n d conventions, xix
a n d dual structure of speech,
xiii
and formal pragmatics, ix
192 _
Index
Understanding (continued)
and normalcy of linguistic communi
cation, 136-137
as presupposition of communicative
action, 148
and role-taking, 126
as telos of language, ix
a n d normative social reality, 144
vs. observation, 6-8
and spiral of interpersonal relation
ships, 157, 158
Universalizability of discourse ethics,
principle of, xix
Universal-pragmatic abstraction, 74
Universal-pragmatic m e a n i n g of truth,
89
Universal (formal) pragmatics, viii, ix,
72. See aho Pragmatics
and cognitive use of language, 68
a n d communicative competence, xi, 74,
75
and communicative theory of society,
53
a n d communicative use of language,
68
and critical theory, xv, 103
generative grammar as model for,
65
and generative semantics, 177n.9
of language games, 68
a n d lifeworld, xvi
a n d reflexivity of natural languages,
73-74
and social theory of meaning, xxiii
Uses of language. See Language use
Use theory of meaning, xii, xxiii, 54
Utterance
abstractions from, 74-75
and speech act theory, ix
as unintelligible, 145-146
Validity claims, xiv, xxiii
bases of, 136-137
ontogenesis of, 137-146
transcendental i m p o r t of, 146-155
B r a n d o m on, xxiv
challenging of, xiv, xx
classes of, xiv, 63-64, 90-91
intelligibility, xiv, 63, 90, 9 1 , 93, 148,
149-151
normative rightness, xiv, 64, 90, 9 1 , 92,
93, 152-153, I79n.8
sincerity, xiv, 64, 90, 91, 93, 151-152,
154