Our study is the

rst to try a default manipulation as a way to inuence savings decisions

of low-income tax

lers. More generally, ours is one of the few to investigate how defaults
a
ect experiment provides an opportunity to see whether the large impact of
default interventions in the previous literature generalize to other, policy rel
evant settings.
The fact that we

nd no discernible e
ect of the d
efault manipulation raises questions about
the power of defaults for di
erent populations and the mechanisms underlying default effects.
In this section, we discuss potential explanations for the contrasting results,
drawing
efault manipulation raises questions about
the power of defaults for di
erent populations and the mechanisms underlying default effects.
In this
erent populations and the mechanisms underlying default effects.
In tntial explanations for the contrasting results, drawing
efault manipulationefault manipulation raises questions about
the puss potential explanations for the contrasting results, drawing raises ques
tions about
the power of defaults for default manipulation raises questions about
the power of defaults for di
erent populations and the mechanisms underlying default effects.
In this section, we discuss potential explanations for the contrasting results,
drawingi
erent populations and the mechanisms underlying default effects.
In this section, we discuss potential explanations for the contrasting results,
drawing
, we discuss potential explanations for the contrasting results, drawing
on ancillary evidence from our surveys of tax

lers and tax preparers.

In our survey of tax pr
e