Ty vs CA

GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000

FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony
in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both
weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent
of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed
Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April
1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC
a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that
a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured
before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the
provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for
doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.
HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife
who sought damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her
mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from
her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as
legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation where the
husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make
the application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an
action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and
subsisting and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly
support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally
entitled thereto.

Eugenio v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May 17, 1990

FACTS: Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August
28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in
1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence
in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner
refused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse
cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of
heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court ordered that
the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the
lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
HELD: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides: Persons charged with duty of burial- if the
deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the
burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased. Albeit, petitioner claims he is
the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not
recognize common law marriages where a man and a woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where
they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions. In addition, it
requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another
woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

REPUBLIC VS. CA 236 SCRA 257

FACTS:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by a City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge
of Castro's parents.Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the
documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the
marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage
was unknown to Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered
she was pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple
parted ways. Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he
marital status before leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage
license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila.
Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued
to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to
establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the
marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate
the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?
HELD:
At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall
be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being
one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the
marriage void ab initio.
It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a
judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret
marriage" - a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as
initially unknown to the parents of the former.

PEOPLE V. JANSSEN
FACTS:
On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdea and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before
Reverend Father H. Janssen, a Catholic parish priest of the municipality of San Jose,
Antique, to have their names inscribed in the marriage registry, which was done. On
December 30, 1928, the banns were published in his parish in San Jose, Antique.
As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked the defendantappellant to marry them before that date. Upon petition of the defendant-appellant, the
Bishop of Jaro issued the following dispensation on December 29, 1928 authorizing the
solemnization of the marriage as long as there are no legal impediments to the marriage.
On January 4, 1929, the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, gave the authority to
solemnize marriage. By virtue of the above-quoted dispensation, and in view of said
authority of the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, the defendant-appellant on
January 6, 1929, solemnized the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdea to Juana S. del Rosario
ISSUE
Whether or not appellant violated violated section 2 of Act No. 3412,
HELD
The law does not impose upon priests or ministers of religion the duty In holding that it is
the duty of the accused to inquiring into and determining the residence of the
contracting parties before solemnizing marriage. It is sufficient to know that the license
has been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of
said license that said official has complied with his duty of ascertaining whether the
woman who desires to get married resides habitually in his municipality.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is solemnized by a
church, sect, or religion whose rules and practices require proclamation or publicity, it is
not necessary that said proclamation be made during ten days, unless said rules or
practices so require.
By virtue whereof, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant is absolved
from the information, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil 1

FACTS:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez were man and wife and had one child, Domingo de
Leon. Eulogio de Leon died in 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with
Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez had a child named
Melecio Madridejo. On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to
Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30 years of age, by virtue of articulo mortis, by the parish
priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son in her
first marriage, and Melecio Madridejo, her son in her second husband. The parish priest
failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid
HELD: Yes, the failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate does not
affect the validity of their marriage because it is only an irregularity of a formal requisite.
Failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary
does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential

requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her husband
ANGEL SANCHEZ,
This resolution concerns a motion for the reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court. The
main argument in support of the motion is that the lots not fully paid for at the time of the death of
Miguel Trias, which lots were, by provision of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120), subsequently
transferred to the widow's name and later paid for by her out of the proceeds of the fruits of the lands
purchased, and for which titles were issued in the name of the widow, belong to the latter as her
exclusive paraphernal properties, and are not conjugal properties of her deceased husband and
herself. In our decision we laid down the rule that upon the issuance of a certificate of sale to the
husband of a lot in a friar lands estate, purchased by the Government from the friars, the land
becomes the property of the husband and the wife, and the fact that the certificate of sale is thereafter
transferred to the wife does not change the status of the property so purchased as conjugal property
of the deceased husband and wife. The reason for this ruling is the provision of the Civil Code to the
effect that properties acquired by husband and wife are conjugal properties. (Art. 1401, Civil Code of
Spain). The provision of the Friar Lands Act to the effect that upon the death of the husband the
certificate of sale is transferred to the name of the wife is merely an administrative device designed to
facilitate the documentation of the transaction and the collection of installments; it does not produce
the effect of destroying the character as conjugal property of the lands purchased. Hence, the
issuance of the title, after completion of the installments, in the name of the widow does not make the
friar lands purchased her own paraphernal property. The said lands, notwithstanding a certificate of
sale, continue to be the conjugal property of her deceased husband and herself.
The case of Arayata vs. Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654, cited by the movants, is not applicable to the case
at bar because it refers to the superior rights of the widow recognized in Section 16 of Act No. 1120
over transfers made by the husband which have not been approved by the Director of Lands. As a
matter of fact the syllabus in said case is as follows:
Widow's rights. The widow of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands acquired by the
Government has an exclusive right to said lands and their fruits from her husband's death,
provided that the deceased has not conveyed them to another during his lifetime and she
fulfills the requirements prescribed by the law for the purchase of the same.
A minor ground for the reconsideration is that the decision of Judge Lucero, having been set aside by
the Court of Appeals, could not be affirmed by Us. The setting aside of the said decision was due to
the fact that newly discovered evidence was found regarding the partition of the estate of the
deceased. The setting aside of the decision was not aimed or directed at the judge's ruling that the
properties acquired by the husband during his lifetime from the friar lands estate were conjugal
properties of the husband and the wife..
The third ground raised is that the lots were never partitioned as conjugal assets of Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer. One of the arguments adduced in favor of the claim of the movants that the
properties in question, which were acquired during the lifetime of Mariano Trias, were never

partitioned is that, according to the records of the Register of Deeds and according to the friar lands
agents, the alleged partition of the said properties as conjugal properties of the deceased Mariano
Trias and Maria C. Ferrer had not been registered in said offices. The failure to make the registration
is perhaps due to the neglect the heirs. The fact, however, remains that the exhibits presented in
Court, especially Exhibit "3-Trias" and Annex "E", which are the project of partition and the approval
thereof, cannot be ignored by this Court. The neglect of the parties in not actually partitioning the
properties do not argue in favor of the fact that partition was not a actually decreed. Adjudications
may be made pro indivisowithout actual division or partition of the properties among the heirs.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the judgment rendered declared
final. So ordered.