2006 Political Law Case Digests

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005

Facts: UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB
products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing
operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the
issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant
directing the police to seize finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins. No
fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of
Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items
be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the
motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the
seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain
view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox,
were valid under the plain view doctrine.

Held: It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized
things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that
the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior
justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b)
the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police
that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not
enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of
officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered

inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be
stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof
were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the
contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the
plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

PEOPLES JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN

G.R. No. 143372 December 13, 2005

Facts: On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the Peoples Journal claiming that a certain Francis Thoenen,
a Swiss national who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors pets that he finds in his domain. It also claimed that BF
Homes residents, in a letter through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara, requested for the deportation of Thoenen to prevent
the recurrence of such incident in the future. Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration
he enjoyed in the community. He is seeking for damages.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a social and moral duty to inform the public
on matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the moral public (sic) of the people, and that the
story was published in good faith and without malice.

Issue: Whether or not the news report fall under privileged communication and therefore protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech.

Held: The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is not protected speech. In the instant case, even if we assume that
the letter written by Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost its character when the matter was published in
the newspaper and circulated among the general population, especially since the individual alleged to be defamed is
neither a public official nor a public figure.
Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two levels. First, the BF Homes residents did not ask for the
deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for verification of
Thoenens status as a foreign resident. The article is also untrue because the events she reported never happened.
Worse, the main source of information, Atty. Efren Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer.
There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially
advances societys interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate. Calculated falsehood falls into that class of

utterances which are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality
The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection

CUSTOMS SEARCH

TOMAS SALVADOR vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 146706. July 15, 2005

Facts: On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations Squadron conducted routine
surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check on reports of alleged drug trafficking and smuggling
being facilitated by certain PAL personnel. They were ordered to keep close watch on the second airplane, an Airbus
300 parked inside the Domestic Airport terminal. At around 11:30 that same evening, three (3) persons had boarded
the Airbus 300. The team did not move, but continued its surveillance. At 12:15 a.m. the team leader reported that the
three (3) persons who earlier boarded the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their abdominal areas bulging and then
boarded an airplane tow truck with its lights off. At the Lima Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and
stopped the tow truck. The team leader identified himself and asked the four (4) persons on board to alight, and
approached Aurelio Mandin whose uniform was partly open, showing a girdle. Then, a package wrapped in brown
packaging tape fell. Suspecting that the package contained smuggled items, the leader yelled to his teammates,
Positive! Thereupon, the rest of the team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused who surrendered without a
fight. The team searched their bodies and found that the three were wearing girdles beneath their uniforms, all
containing packets wrapped in packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5) packets, while petitioner and Santos had four
(4) each. The team confiscated the packets and brought all the accused to the PAFSECOM Office.

Issue: Whether or not the seized items are admissible in evidence.

Held: Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and seizures may lawfully be effected sans a
search warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) search in plain view; (3)
customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations; and (6) search incidental to a lawful
arrest.
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives was to conduct
a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of

the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a
customs search. As such, the team properly effected the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised
police authority under the customs law. Law enforcers who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and
tariff laws are authorized to search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo or other movable property
when there is reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of
the tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person suspected of
holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, vs. HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA

G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005

Facts: On July 2, 1996 the accused were arrested fro possession and transport of marijuana leaves (in bricks). They
were charged with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, with the information containing the fact that they
were in possession of and were transporting, selling or offering to sell 42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops.
The accused was then arraigned, pleaded guilty and convicted. Subsequently they applied for probation. Thereafter
the prosecutors office filed two motions to admit amended information (claiming that the marijuana recovered was
42.410 kilos, not grams) and to set aside the arraignment of the accused; the accused then moved to quash the motion
raising the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not double jeopardy attaches.

Held: To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has
been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is
that the information is valid. The inescapable conclusion, then, is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it
sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the
accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with.
Moreover, an administrative order of the Supreme Court designated Regional Trial Courts to exclusively try and

decide cases of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, regardless of the quantity of the drugs
involved. (PP. vs. Velasco)
Therefore, the requisites of double jeopardy being present, the defense attaches.

EMINENT DOMAIN

REPUBLIC, as represented by the NIA vs. CA and FRANCISCO DIAZ

G.R. No. 147245. March 31, 2005

Facts: Manuel Diaz owned approximately 172 hectares of property devoted to the planting of palay. The property was
located in La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and allegedly yielded between 132 to 200 cavans of palay per hectare
every year. After Manuel Diazs death, his son, Franciso Diaz, was appointed administrator of the property.
In 1972, the National Irrigation Administration bulldozed ten (10) hectares of the Property to build two irrigation
canals. Although the canals when finished occupied only a portion of the 10 hectares, the entire area became prone to
flooding two months out of every year because of the side-burrow method NIA used in the construction of the canals.
NIA completed the canals without instituting expropriation proceedings or indemnifying the propertys owners.
Respondent then sought compensation from NIA for the land affected by the canals, as well as for losses due to
unrealized profits. In 1980, NIA belatedly offered to buy the portions of the Property occupied by the canals pursuant
to NIAs expansion program. The 1980 deeds of sale were never implemented. Respondent did not receive any
consideration pursuant to these deeds. On 20 August 1993, respondent, as administrator of the Property, filed an
action for damages and just compensation against NIA. NIA countered that respondents right to bring the action had
prescribed in accordance with RA 3601, as amended by PD 552. NIA also argued that respondents failure to pursue
the implementation of the 1980 deeds of sale amounted to laches.

Issue: Whether or not prescription or laches bars the respondents right to just compensation.

Held: The principle of laches finds no application in the present case. There is nothing inequitable in giving due
course to respondents claim for compensation. Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be
compensated if his property is taken for public use.
Eminent domain is the inherent power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to
promote public welfare. No one questions NIAs authority to exercise the delegated power of eminent domain.
However, the power of eminent domain is not limitless. NIA cannot exercise the power with wanton disregard for
property rights. One basic limitation on the States power of eminent domain is the constitutional directive that,

private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
The thirteen-year interval between the execution of the 1980 deeds of sale and the 1993 filing of the complaint does
not bar the claim for compensation. This Court reiterated the long-standing rule that where private property is taken
by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale,
the owners action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.

BAIL
JUDGE NAPOLEON INOTURAN, vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362. May 6, 2005

Facts: Mario Balucero was charged before the RTC of Makati Branch 133, the presiding judge of which is Napoleon
Inoturan, with the violation of BP 22. Balucero, however, failed to appear during arraignment despite notice. Inoturan
then issued a bench warrant against him. Balucero was subsequently arrested in Bacolod City, but was released upon
posting of a property bail before the MCTC of Pulupundan, Negros Occidental, which order was signed by Judge
Manuel Limsiaco, Jr. The arraignment of Balucero was subsequently set, but he failed to appear notwithstanding his
receipt of notices. Inoturan then ordered that the property bond be cancelled and forfeited. He then ordered Ignacio
Denila, the Clerk of Court of the MCTC to forward the property bond. Unable to comply with Inoturans order, Denila
was cited in contempt and was detained. Denila was ordered released by Limisiaco. Upon investigation, the Office of
Court Administrator found that Judge Limsiaco ordered the release of the some other accused although they did not
post bail. Limsiaco was administratively charged for gross ignorance of the law and negligence in the performance of
his duties.

Issue: What are the requisites before an order for release can be given in cases of bail?

Held: Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
conditioned upon his appearance before any court as required under the conditions herein after specified. It is thus
clear that without bail, an accused under detention cannot be released. As found by the investigating Judges, accused
Balucero did not post bail but still respondent Judge Limsiaco ordered his release.
A person applying for bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty. Indeed, bail is
unavailing with respect to an accused who has not voluntarily surrendered or has yet to be placed in legal custody. In
this case, Limsiaco issued the Order for the release of accused Balucero on November 21, 1996 or fifteen (15) days
before December 6, 1996, the day he was actually arrested.
Moreover, Limsiaco acted without authority in approving Baluceros alleged application for bail. Section 17, Rule 114

of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that if the accused is arrested in a province, city of municipality,
other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge
thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
Here, respondent should not have approved Baluceros application for bail. It is only one of the 14 Branches of the
RTC in Bacolod City which has the authority to act thereon.

POLICE POWER

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005

Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town
passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common
terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the City of Lucena
are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, minibuses, and buses shall use the grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as
unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue
taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject and
lawful means.

Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena,
they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of
police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena
Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner

would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by
the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it
right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are
exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its
reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were
measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.

Case Digests on Constitutional Law II

MANOTOC v. CA
Facts:
Criminal complaints were filed by some clients of the Manotoc Securities, Inc., to which
petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. is a principal stockholder, after the torrens title
submitted to and accepted by the same were suspected to be fake. The cases were
assigned to different trial courts. In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail, with
FGU Instance Corporation as Surety.
Petitioner then filed motion for permission to leave the country in each trial courts
stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities.". His motion was denied thus he elevated his petition to
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter
of right, the courts which granted him bail could not prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.The same was denied hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail, has an
unrestricted right to travel?
Held:
Petitioner's contention is untenable. A court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the
nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail
as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of
the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required
as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates
as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right.
Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states that The liberty of abode and of
travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in
the interest of national security, public safety or public health. The order of the trial
court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the
said constitutional provision.

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS
Facts:
Marcos petitions to enjoin the respondents from implementing President Aquino's
decision to bar his return together with his family to the Philippines. He wishes to be
permitted to return to the country and die in the Philippines. The petitioner invokes his
right enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the right to return to his own country, though
not included in the Bill of Rights, is a generally accepted principle of International Law
which under our Constitution is part of the law of the land. However, respondent's
arguments include that the case involves a political question as it pertains to whether
the two rights claimed by the petitioner impinge on or collide with the more primordial
and transcendental right of the state to security and safety of its nationals. The
petitioner contends that the president is without power to impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so. He further asserts that under International
Law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
Issues:
Whether the right of abode and right to travel invoked by the petitioners should warrant
their return in the Philippines.
Held:
No. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but
it is the view of the Court that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of International Law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of
the land/ However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel. The resolution of
the problem is difficult because the persons involved are the deposed dictators and his
family from whom billions of dollars are believed to be recovered. The constitutional
guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the
preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute terms,
admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public
interests.

SILVERIO v CA
Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act.
Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure
order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioners passport, based on the finding
that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the
accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the permission of the court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.

Held:
The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been
issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid
restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself
available whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges
may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to
return. So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the
necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior
permission of the Court where the case is pending.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while
theliberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion
to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security,
public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which
did not appear in the 1973 text. Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution
was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime
when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to
travel upon application of an interested party.

Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to
travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in
any criminalproceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that
criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue
delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes

Aberca vs. Ver Case Digest

Aberca vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1989)
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of
plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa
(TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT)
underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,

Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members
of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were
arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel;
that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order
to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs
constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously
known to and sanctioned by defendants.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza,
alleging among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention
in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2)
assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in
the performance of their official duties.
ISSUE:
1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution?
2. If such action for damages may be maintained, may a superior officer under the notion of respondent
superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose
constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
HELD:
1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners right and
cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights.
The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the
right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.

2. YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein. The doctrine of
respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant
(i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military
and their subordinates. Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language
of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to
answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added
meaning and a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to
supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions
committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors
that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous
or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly
be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage
suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons
who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors

G.R. Nos. 144506-07 April 11, 2002 People v. Uy

G.R. Nos. 144506-07. April 11, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY TING UY
FACTS:
Appellant Jerry Ting Uy, a Taiwanese national, was arrested in a buy-bust operation. Marked
money bills were retrieved from him, and three plastic bags of shabu were confiscated found
underneath the drivers seat. He was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. However, he
contended that he was a victim of frame-up and that the evidence seized in the warrantless
arrest is inadmissible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence seized in the warrantless arrest is inadmissible.

HELD:
No. Clearly, the search made by the police officers in the instant case was incidental to a lawful
arrest. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully arrested, caught as he was in flagrante delicto as a result of
a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers.
The Constitution generally proscribes searches and seizures without judicial warrant. Any
evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding
(Sections 2 and 3(2), Article III). The rule is not absolute, however. Searches and seizures may
be made without warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) the search was incident to a lawful arrest; (2) the search is of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) the search concerns violation of customs laws; (4) the seizure of evidence in
plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures (People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 [1999]).
A buy-bust operation is vastly different from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests in the course of
a buy-bust operation, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the accused but also in the permissible
area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested,
or that which may furnish him the means of committing violence or of escaping (People vs.
Cueno, 298 SCRA 621 [1998]). In other words, a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under
his immediate control.