Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Galapon
Facts: Pursuant to the National Housing Authority (NHA) Circular No. 13, the NHA conducted
in 1987 the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) census and tagging of structures as pre-qualifying
requisites for determining the potential lot beneficiaries in the Peafrancia ZIP zone in Paco,
Manila. In the census, the petitioner was determined to be an absentee structure owner of the
dwelling unit tagged as Structure No. 86-313,while respondent Eduardo Galapon and three
others were censused to be the renters of the petitioner in the structure. The petitioner, then a 78year old widow living in her son's dwelling unit had been renting Structure No. 86-313 out as a
source of income.
NHA Circular No. 13 disqualified any absentee or uncensused structure owner from owning a lot
within a ZIP zone. Alarmed that she might be disqualified to own the 50-square meter, the
petitioner filed a petition for change of status from absentee structure owner to residing structure
owner with the Awards and Arbitration Committee (AAC) of NHA.
The AAC recommended the approval of the petitioner's petition for change of status but
the NHA denied such petition. The petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President. On
October 13, 1997, the OP found the petitioner and the respondents to be the long-standing bona
fide qualified applicants and awarded the disputed lot and the structure to both of them in equal
shares. The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents were disqualified to be awardees of Lot 12, Block
2, Peafrancia ZIP Project.
Held: No. The respondents were the censused renters or occupants of Structure No. 86313. Such status could not automatically be changed by their judicial ejectment at the petitioners
instance, considering that their right to become lot beneficiaries of the ZIP was consistently
recognized by the AAC, the NHA, the OP and the CA. The respondents, being qualified homelot
beneficiaries of Lot 12, Block 2, enjoyed the right of pre-emption vis--vis Structure No. 86-313,
which was a right granted to them as the censused renters of the structure to have the first option
to acquire or to purchase the structure.
Petiton Denied.
NIEVES A. SAGUIGUIT vs. People
G.R. No. 144054
Petitioner was charged with eight counts of violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law. The RTC found petitioner guilty as charged. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC. The instant case calls for a reexamination and modification, if not
abandonment, of rulings to the effect that the mere issuance of a check which is
subsequently dishonored makes the issuer liable for violation of BP Blg. 22
regardless of the intent of the parties . Petitioner respectfully submits that it was
not the intention of the lawmaking body, to make the issuance of a bum check
ipso facto a criminal offense already; there must be an intent to commit the
prohibited act, and subject check should be issued to apply on account or for value.
Issue: Whether or not the Court can delve into the policy behind or wisdom
of B.P. 22.
Held: No. Under the doctrine of Separation of Powers, the Court cannot
delve into the policy behind or wisdom of a statute, i.e., B.P. Blg. 22, matters of
legislative wisdom being within the domain of Congress. 5 Even with the best of
motives, the Court can only interpret and apply the law and cannot, despite doubts
about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice have no right to encroach on
the prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has not been shown that they have
acted with grave abuse of discretion. And while the judiciary may interpret laws and
evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to strike them down if they are
proven to be infirm, this solemn power and duty do not include the discretion to
correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.
Issue: WON DO 119 and RA 8999 are both invalid and constitutionally infirm.
Held and Ratio:
On RA 8999
RA 8999 never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a RA 9054. By
creating an office with previously devolved functions, RA 8999, in essence sought to
amend RA 6074, which is an organic act which enjoys affirmation through a plebiscite.
Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute such as RA 8999.
The amendatory law needs to be submitted also to a plebiscite which is lacking in the
case of RA 8999. RA 6734 devolved the functions of the DPWH to ARMM which
includes Lanao del Sur.
On DO 119
- DO 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over
infrastructure projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of EO
426 which implements the transfer of control and supervision of the DPWH to the ARMM in line
with RA 6734. The office created under DO 119 having essentially the same powers with the
District Engineering Office of Lanao del Sur as created under EO 426, is a duplication. The DO
in effect takes back powers which have been previoulsy devolved under EO 426. RA 9054
however has repealed DO 119 because the former seeks to transfer control and supervision of
DPWH offices to ARMM.
Issue: Whether or not the question of who was the rightful Senate President
is a political or justiciable question.
Held: The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of
these members did not depend on the Senates full discretionary authority, but
was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not
only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection
proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it.
The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
Held:
The instant petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The
Sandiganbayan grievously erred and clearly abused its judicial
discretion when it repeatedly and continuously denied COCOFED, et
al. the opportunity to present their evidence to disprove the
baseless allegations of the Ill-Gotten Wealth Cases that the
sequestered assets constitute ill-gotten wealth of Cojuangco and of
former President Marcos, an error that undeniably and illegally
deprived COCOFED, et al of their constitutional right to be heard.
The Court to be sure agrees with the thesis that, under present state of
things, the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General have no power, by
themselves, to convert the sequestered shares of stock. That portion,
however, about the reference to the separation of powers being gratuitous
does not commend itself for concurrence. As may be noted, the reference to
the separation of powers concept was made in the context that the
ownership of the subject sequestered shares is the subject of a case before
this Court; hence, the need of the Courts approval for the desired conversion
is effected.
authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the
internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized under its legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, to operate
gambling on the internet for the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated
internet gambling since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and
gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to another
entity such as SAGE.
RULING:
No. A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to
corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will
and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either
by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and
regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public.
It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise
may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be
granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the
service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the
franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language. While
PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operators and/or management
contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its
franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE.
Bengzon v. Drilon
G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the
Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the
Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for
the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals
as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.
Issue:
whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriatons Act
Held:
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides
limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is,
therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this
reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the item veto power to avoid inexpedient riders
from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure. What was done by the
President was the vetoing of a provision and not an item.
FACTS:
Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the
UnitedNationsRevolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a
special fundand subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint
project of thePhilippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat
Island.Petitioners are the complainants for illegal dismissal and damages. Private respondent
allegedthat respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed
diplomaticimmunity.
ISSUE:
Whether special agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity.
RULING:
The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of
theDepartment of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE
inaccordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
wherethe Philippine Government was a party. Our courts can only assume jurisdiction over
privaterespondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench.
the second issue, the Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor-General that the presidents act
is a political question beyond the authority of the Court to review when the grant of power is qualified or
subject to limitations, the issue becomes whether the prescribed qualifications have been met, then it
becomes a question of legality and not wisdom, so is not a political question. It is then subject to the
Courts review power. As to the third issue, the Marines only assist the PNP, the LOI itself provides for
this. In fact, the PNP Chief is the leader of such patrols and in no way places the over-all authority in the
Marines.
Petition is dismissed.
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several communications from Mr. Ibesate,
treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking the former to admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and
offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
In his answer, petitioner said that he should not be made accountable since it was private respondent Pastor Buhat
and Mr. Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting
at that time.
Thereafter, petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, president of the Negros Mission, and asked for a convention
to settle the dispute between petitioner and Pastor Rodrigo. Pastor Buhat denied the request of petitioner because
there was no quorum. The two exchanged heated arguments until petitioner left the office. However, while on his way
out, he heard Pastor Buhat saying, "Pastor daw inisog na ina iya (Pador you are talking tough) which prompted him
to go back and overturn Pastor Buhats table, scatter books in the office, bang Buhats attach case and throw the
phone.
Petitioner received a letter inviting him and his wife to attend the meeting to discuss the non-remittance of church
collection and the events that transpired between him and Pastor Buhat. A fact-finding committee was created to
investigate petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational
funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an offense
against the person of employer's duly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination of his services.
(Nakakainis tong part na to dahil appeal nang appeal! Hahaha)
1) Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. = decision rendered in favor of petitioner
2) SDA appealed to NLRC = decision rendered in favor of respondent
3) Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration = reinstated decision of Labor Arbiter
4) SDA filed motion for reconsideration = decision rendered in favor of respondent (grabe ang kulit!)
Hence, this recourse to the court by the petitioner.
Issues:
WON the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of
church and state;
Held: NO.
Ratio Decidendi:
The principle of separation of church and state finds no application in this case. The rationale of the principle of the
separation of church and state is summed up in the familiar saying, "Strong fences make good-neighbors." The idea
advocated by this principle is to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid
encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive
jurisdictions.
The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking
cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the
church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the
government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of
membership. Examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affaits are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of
religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance. The case at
bar does not even remotely concern any of the given examples. What is involved here is the relationship of the
church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the
practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. The matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in
nature, is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.