Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents.
Roy Lago Salcedo for private respondents.

VITUG, J.:
For consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar doctrine of non-suability
of the state.
In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the
Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, denying the petition for injunction,
prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional
Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision 2 of
31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on
petitioner's property.
The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered
into a contract 3 on 01 April 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to the
said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards, the
same terms and conditions were also made to apply to another contract, dated 01 May
1990, between the same parties. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed
by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner.
On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint
for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night
shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, 4 before the
Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as NLRC Case No. 1009-00455-90 (or 10-10-00519-90, its original docket number), against the Department
of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency.
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner
and jointly and severallyliable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money

claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards. The petitioner and
Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the
decision became final and executory.
On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. 5 commanding the City
Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents.
Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of
the petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one
(1) unit Toyota Crown. 6 These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the
property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the final
settlement of the case, whichever would come first.
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ
of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was effected without
the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that,
therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant
thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also
pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize
petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.
On 27 November 1991, the NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution; viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are issued:
1. The enforcement and execution of the judgments against petitioner in
NLRC RABX Cases Nos. 10-10-00455-90; 10-10-0481-90 and 10-1000519-90 are temporarily suspended for a period of two (2) months, more
or less, but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year 1991 to
enable petitioner to source and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards
against it;
2. Meantime, petitioner is ordered and directed to source for funds within
the period above-stated and to deposit the sums of money equivalent to
the aggregate amount. it has been adjudged to pay jointly and severally
with respondent Sultan Security Agency with the Regional Arbitration
Branch X, Cagayan de Oro City within the same period for proper
dispositions;
3. In order to ensure compliance with this order, petitioner is likewise
directed to put up and post sufficient surety and supersedeas
bond equivalent to at least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary
award issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Supreme Court or by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental to
answer for the satisfaction of the money claims in case of failure or default
on the part of petitioner to satisfy the money claims;

4. The City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties of

petitioner levied on execution within ten (10) days from notice of the
posting of sufficient surety or supersedeas bond as specified above. In the
meanwhile, petitioner is assessed to pay the costs and/or expenses
incurred by the City Sheriff, if any, in connection with the execution of the
judgments in the above-stated cases upon presentation of the appropriate
claims or vouchers and receipts by the city Sheriff, subject to the
conditions specified in the NLRC Sheriff, subject to the conditions
specified in the NLRC Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs;
5. The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement
against each other for any payments made in connection with the
satisfaction of the judgments herein is hereby recognized pursuant to the
ruling in the Eagle Security case, (supra). In case of dispute between the
judgment debtors, the Executive Labor Arbiter of the Branch of origin may
upon proper petition by any of the parties conduct arbitration proceedings
for the purpose and thereby render his decision after due notice and
hearings;
7. Finally, the petition for injunction is Dismissed for lack of basis. The
writ of preliminary injunction previously issued is Lifted and Set Aside and
in lieu thereof, a Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of two
(2) months but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year
1991, conditioned upon the posting of a surety or supersedeas bond by
petitioner within ten (10) days from notice pursuant to paragraph 3 of this
disposition. The motion to admit the complaint in intervention
isDenied for lack of merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed by
Duty Sheriff is Noted
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for
assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the
petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of
the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly
waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
Agency.
The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued
without its consent," 7 reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character
of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it
from the jurisdiction of courts. 8 It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As has
been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of

any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. 9 True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal
prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any
legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. 10 We have had occasion,
to explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of nonsuability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to
the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the
inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. 11
The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be
sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only
conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear import then is that the
State may at times be sued. 12 The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law 13 or a special law. 14 In this
jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act
No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any
money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." 15 Implied consent, on the other
hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim 16 or when it enters into a contract. 17 In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the
private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered
into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be
made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and
another which is done in its proprietary capacity. 18
In the Unites States of America vs. Ruiz, 19 where the questioned transaction dealt with
improvements on the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay, we held:
The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a
necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of
States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between
sovereign and governmental acts ( jure imperii) and private, commercial
and proprietary act ( jure gestionisis). The result is that State immunity
now extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and
other states in Western Europe.
xxx xxx xxx

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the

proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign,
its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state
may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be
deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters
into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral
part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United
States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of
the highest order; they are not utilized for not dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned
contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages,
holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service,
clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State
to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, . . . Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by
Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the
Commission on Audit. Thus, inCarabao, Inc., vs. Agricultural Productivity
Commission, 20 we ruled:
(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Government
under Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083 stands now merely as
the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the
general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall
issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government
of the (Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth
Act 327 for filing money claims against the Government must be strictly
observed."
We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A.
No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State. The Labor
code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability but the
prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance
with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to
unrestrained execution against it. tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it
does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State
has a liability. 21 In Republic vs. Villasor 22 this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an
alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant's
action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is
based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public
funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. 23
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed against the property
of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby
enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of
execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23139

December 17, 1966

MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS, defendantsappellees.
Alejandro Basin, Jr. and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Felipe T. Cuison for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in
November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The
shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963, and was discharged to the
custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then
handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to
the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.
On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to
recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other
damages.
On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued.
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the complaint
on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is
suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of dismissal.
Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the defendants' suability
under the facts stated.
Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that
defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is
discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.
The Rules of Court, in Section 1, Rule 3, provide:

SECTION 1. Who may be parties.Only natural or juridical persons or entities

authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a natural person; (2) a juridical
person or (3) an entity authorized by law to be sued. Neither the Bureau of Customs nor
(a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs Arrastre Service, is a person. They are merely
parts of the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs is a bureau under the
Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the
Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of Custom, set up under Customs
Administrative Order No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to Dismiss,
pp. 13-15, Record an Appeal). It follows that the defendants herein cannot he sued under
the first two abovementioned categories of natural or juridical persons.
Nonetheless it is urged that by authorizing the Bureau of Customs to engage in arrastre
service, the law therebyimpliedly authorizes it to be sued as arrastre operator, for the
reason that the nature of this function (arrastre service) is proprietary, not
governmental. Thus, insofar as arrastre operation is concerned, appellant would put
defendants under the third category of "entities authorized by law" to be sued. Stated
differently, it is argued that while there is no law expressly authorizing the Bureau of
Customs to sue or be sued, still its capacity to be sued is implied from its very power to
render arrastre service at the Port of Manila, which it is alleged, amounts to the
transaction of a private business.
The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section 1213 of Republic Act 1937
(Tariff and Customs Code, effective June 1, 1957), and it states:
SEC. 1213. Receiving, Handling, Custody and Delivery of Articles.The Bureau
of Customs shall have exclusive supervision and control over the receiving,
handling, custody and delivery of articles on the wharves and piers at all ports of
entry and in the exercise of its functions it is hereby authorized to acquire, take
over, operate and superintend such plants and facilities as may be necessary for
the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and the convenience and
comfort of passengers and the handling of baggage; as well as to acquire fire
protection equipment for use in the piers: Provided, That whenever in his
judgment the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles can be carried
on by private parties with greater efficiency, the Commissioner may, after public
bidding and subject to the approval of the department head, contract with any
private party for the service of receiving, handling, custody and delivery of
articles, and in such event, the contract may include the sale or lease of
government-owned equipment and facilities used in such service.
In Associated Workers Union, et al. vs. Bureau of Customs, et al., L-21397, resolution of
August 6, 1963, this Court indeed held "that the foregoing statutory provisions
authorizing the grant by contract to any private party of the right to render said arrastre
services necessarily imply that the same is deemed by Congress to be proprietary or
non-governmental function." The issue in said case, however, was whether laborers
engaged in arrastre service fall under the concept of employees in the

Government employed in governmental functions for purposes of the prohibition in

Section 11, Republic Act 875 to the effect that "employees in the Government . . . shall
not strike," but "may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the
obligation to strike or to join in strike," which prohibition "shall apply only to employees
employed in governmental functions of the Government . . . .
Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, but not that the Bureau of Customs can be sued. Said
issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution stating only that "the issue on the
personality or lack of personality of the Bureau of Customs to be sued does not affect the
jurisdiction of the lower court over the subject matter of the case, aside from the fact
that amendment may be made in the pleadings by the inclusion as respondents of the
public officers deemed responsible, for the unfair labor practice acts charged by
petitioning Unions".
Now, the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in
nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function
is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of
the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. This is the
doctrine recognized in Bureau of Printing, et al. vs. Bureau of Printing Employees
Association, et al., L-15751, January 28, 1961:
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the
Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. 2657). As such instrumentality of the
Government, it operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary,
Office of the President, and is "charged with the execution of all printing and
binding, including work incidental to those processes, required by the National
Government and such other work of the same character as said Bureau may, by
law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be authorized
to undertake . . . ." (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm. Code.) It has no corporate existence,
and its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act.
Designed to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is primarily a service
bureau and, obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary
profit.
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing

jobs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern.
The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its
function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there
is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are
separate and distinct from those emoloyed in its general governmental functions.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical

personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of
Court.) Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect,
would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and
the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much
less over its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz. 2835; Angat River
Irrigation System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers Union, et al., G.R. Nos. L10943-44, December 28, 1957.)
The situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part
of the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of its own
apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that
of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff
and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this
function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues
and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's
or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing
the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that
the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up
requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place
in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires
arrastre operations.1
Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a
necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs,
so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For
otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing
itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the
necessary means to that end.
And herein lies the distinction between the present case and that of National Airports
Corporation vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203, on which appellant would rely. For there, the
Civil Aeronautics Administration was found have for its prime reason for existence not a
governmental but a proprietary function, so that to it the latter was not a mere
incidental function:
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under
Section 3, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant
concessions rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales
to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of
any property under its management.
These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our
opinion, the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied
from the power to transact private business. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private

entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what
is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. . . .
Regardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public
policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim to
the General Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government
may be filed.
It must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are
strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will
not be lightly inferred. (49 Am. Jur., States, Territories and Dependencies, Sec. 96, p.
314; Petty vs. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Com., 359 U.S. 275, 3 L. Ed. 804, 79 S. Ct.
785). From the provision authorizing the Bureau of Customs to lease arrastre operations
to private parties, We see no authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances where it
undertakes to conduct said operation itself. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the
machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant
to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental
function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
Castro, J., reserves his vote.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 88167 May 3, 1993

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and UP SCHOOL OF
ECONOMICS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 84 NATIONAL
CAPITAL REGION, Q.C., ANGEL PAMPLINA, and The CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the
Philippines School of Economics, was dismissed on June 22, 1982, after he was found
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct for causing the leakage of final examination
questions in Economics 106 under Prof. Solita Monsod. 1
His appeal was denied by the UP Board of Regents, prompting him to seek relief from
the Merit Systems Board (MSB), created under Presidential Decree No. 1409. Under
Section 5(l) thereof, the MSB has the power to "hear and decide administrative cases
involving officers and employees of the civil service."
The University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the MSB. UP relied heavily on the case of University of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, 2 where it was held that administrative matters involving the discipline of
UP employees properly fall under the Jurisdiction of the state university and the UP
Board of Regents.
The motion was denied. Thereafter, in its decision dated July 5, 1985, the MSB
exonerated Pamplina and ordered his reinstatement with back wages. 3 UP, represented
by its Office of Legal Services, moved for reconsideration, but this was denied on
January l0, 1986.

UP then appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which on November 4, 1987, issued
Resolution No. 87-428, sustaining the MSB. 4 The motion for reconsideration was
denied on April 13, 1988.
On June 10, 1988, the petitioners, through their new counsel of record, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a second motion for reconsideration. This was also denied
on August 31, 1988, on the basis of Section 39(b) of PD 807, providing in part that "only
one petition for reconsideration shall be entertained" by the Civil Service Commission.
Pamplina filed a "Manifestation and Motion for Execution of Judgment" of the
Commission, copy of which was received by the Office of the Solicitor General on
October 4, 1988. 5 This was opposed by the petitioners, but in an order dated November
7, 1988, the Commission granted the motion. Nevertheless, Pamplina was still not
reinstated. UP claimed that the resolutions of the Commission had not yet become final
and executory.
Pamplina's reaction was to file a petition for a writ of mandamus on November 11, 1988.
Judge Teodoro P. Regino of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City granted the petition
on April 27, 1989. The respondents (herein petitioners) were ordered to immediately
reinstate Pamplina "to his former position as mimeograph operator without change of
status as permanent employee with back wages from June 22, 1982, up to his
reinstatement, plus salaries for the period of his preventive suspension covering
December 15, 1981 to March 15, 1982." 6
On June 19, 1989, the present petition for certiorari was filed with this Court to seek the
annulment of the decision of the trial court and the orders of the Commission directing
the reinstatement of Pamplina. The petitioners also pray that the decision of the UP
President and Board of Regents ordering Pamplina's dismissal be upheld.
UP contends that under its charter, to wit, Act 1870, enacted on June 18, 1906, it enjoys
not only academic freedom but also institutional autonomy. Section 6(e) of the said Act
grants the UP Board of Regents the power "to appoint, on recommendation of the
president of the university, professors, instructors, lecturers, and other employees of the
university, to fix their compensation and to remove them for cause after an investigation
and hearing shall have been had." Pamplina was dismissed by virtue of this provision.
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction
in administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j)
mandates that the Commission shall have the power to "hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to
it on appeal." And Section 37(a), provides that, "The Commission shall decide upon
appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposititon of a
penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal ordismissal from
office." (Emphasis supplied)

Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations,

regardless of the manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil
Service. 7 Under the 1967 Constitution only government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to
Article IX-B, Section 2(l), which states:
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the
Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was
created by a special law and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service,
UP is therefore governed by PD 607 and administrative cases involving the discipline of
its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Coming now to the petition itself, we note that the petitioners received a copy of the
resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on April 22, 1968.
In Article IX-A, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution, which was already in effect at that
time, it is provided that:
. . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.
This provision was reproduced almost verbatim in Section 28 of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
The petitioners therefore had thirty days from April 22, 1988, or until May 22, 1988,
within which to elevate their case to this Court. They did not do so and instead filed a
second motion for reconsideration, which was not allowed under Article IX, Section
39(b) of PD 807. On top of this, the second motion for reconsideration was filed only on
June 10, 1988, or 19 days beyond the 30-day reglementary period. 8
In this connection, it is stressed that where a motion for reconsideration of a decision,
order or ruling of any Constitutional Commission is denied, the 30-day reglementary
period does not begin anew. The petitioner has only the balance of that period (after
deducting the time elapsed before the motion was filed) to come to this Court
on certiorari.
The assailed orders having become final and executory, Pamplina had every right to
seek mandamus to compel their execution. Respondent Judge Regino was quite correct
when he issued the questioned writ.

The case cited repeatedly by the petitioners, viz., University of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, 9 cannot apply to the present controversy. The reason is that at the time it
was promulgated on January 28, 1971, PD 807 had not yet been enacted. PD 807 took
affect only in 1975.
In ruling in that case "that the President and Board of Regents of the University of the
Philippines possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and removal
of the civil service employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General
Hospital, independently of the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service
Board of Appeals," Justice J.B.L. Reyes relied on the Civil Service Law of 1959, which
then empowered the Civil Service Commission:
Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon
the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and
employees in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters
relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and
employees; and to prebcribe standards, guidelines and regulations
governing the administration of discipline; (Emphasis supplied)
Article V, Section 9(j), of PD 807 simply gives the Commission the power to "har and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with
Section 37 or brought to it on appeal," without the qualifiying phrase appearing in the
above-quoted provision. The petitioners cannot invoke that phrase to justify the special
power they claim under Act 1870.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the assailed
decision of respondent Judge Teodoro P. Regino dated April 27, 1989, and the
challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission, are AFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., took no part.