Insurance v. sps. Gregorio GR. NO.

174104

FACTS:

January 10, 1968, Vidal Gregorio and Julita Gregorio, respondents, obtained
a loan from the Insurance of the Philippine Islands Corporation, the petitioner. By way
of security for the said loan, executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of petitioner
over a parcel of land known as Lot 6186 of the Morong Cadastre, then covered by Tax
Declaration No. 7899 issued by the Municipal Assessor's Office of Morong, Rizal.
When the respondents failed to pay his loan from the petitioner, the results of which
the property Mortgage were extrajudicially foreclosed. So, on Feb. 20, 1996,
petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against respondents alleging that in 1995,
when it was in the process of gathering documents for the purpose of filing an
application for the registration and confirmation of its title over the foreclosed
properties, it discovered that the said lots were already registered in the names of third
persons and transfer certificates of title (TCT) were issued to them.
On

Claiming that respondents acted in a fraudulent and malevolent manner in

enticing it to grant their loan applications by misrepresenting ownership of the subject
properties, petitioner prayed for the grant of actual and exemplary damages as well as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Then, the respondents contended that their
obligations in favor of petitioner were all settled by the foreclosure of the properties
given as security therefor. In the alternative, respondents argue that petitioner's cause
of action and right of action are already barred by prescription and laches. The RTC,
decided in favor of the peteioner. However, this was reversed by the CA, it ruled that
petitioner's action for damages is barred by prescription and laches.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner right of action in filing was barred by prescription and laches
HELD:
Petitioner filed an action for damages on the ground of fraud committed against
it by respondents. Under the provisions of Article 1146 of the Civil Code, actions

upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff or upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four years from the time the cause of action accrued.
8

Petitioner filed an action for damages on the ground of fraud committed against
it by respondents. Under the provisions of Article 1146 of the Civil Code, actions
upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff or upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four years from the time the cause of action accrued.
8

The Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that petitioner's cause of action
accrued at the time it discovered the alleged fraud committed by respondents. It is at
this point that the four-year prescriptive period should be counted. However, the Court
does not agree with the CA in its ruling that the discovery of the fraud should be
reckoned from the time of registration of the titles covering the subject properties.
The Court notes that what has been given by respondents to petitioner as
evidence of their ownership of the subject properties at the time that they mortgaged
the same are not certificates of title but tax declarations, in the guise that the said
properties are unregistered. On the basis of the tax declarations alone and by reason of
respondent's misrepresentations, petitioner could not have been reasonably expected
to acquire knowledge of the fact that the said properties were already titled. As a
consequence, petitioner may not be charged with any knowledge of any subsequent
entry of an encumbrance which may have been annotated on the said titles, much less
any change of ownership of the properties covered thereby. As such, the Court agrees
with petitioner that the reckoning period for prescription of petitioner's action should
be from the time of actual discovery of the fraud in 1995. Hence, petitioner's suit for
damages, filed on February 20, 1996, is well within the four-year prescriptive period.

Torts And Damages Case Digest: Gatchalian

V. Delim (1991)
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991
Lessons Applicable: Personal Injury and Death (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable:

FACTS:

July 11,1973: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames" mini bus at

Aringay, La Union bound for Bauang, of the same province. The

bus bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the
road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch.
Gatchalian got injured with physical injuries on the leg, arm and
forehead
Mrs. Adela Delim visited the passenger and later paid for their
hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave transportation
expense of P12 in going home from the hospital and they were made to
sign a Joint Affidavit stating that they are no longer interested to file a
complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said
Thames.
Gatchalian filed in the CFI an action extra contractu to recover
compensatory and moral damages stating that the mishap had left her
with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the
forehead, generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her
part
as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her
friends
scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of
opportunities for employment

Delim averred that it was a fortuitous event

CFI: dismissed because of the Joint Affidavit

CA: affirmed

ISSUE: W/N Gatchalian is entitled to damages

HELD: YES. CA, CFI REVERSED and SET ASIDE 1) P15,000 actual or

compensatory damages to cover the cost of plastic surgery for the removal
of the scar on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30,000 moral damages; and 3)
P1,000 attorney's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at the legal
rate of 6% per annum counting from the promulgation of this decision until
full payment thereof

A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched

in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of
a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that,
seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the
document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in
its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial
doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit
To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an
injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case,
would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence
exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that
standard unenforceable.
To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical
injuries to passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the carrier must
clearly show not only that the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely
independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible to avoid.
The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with
the bus after the snapping sound
Court of Appeals, however, found that at the time of the
accident, she was no longer employed in a public school since, being a
casual employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off.
Her employment as a substitute teacher was occasional and episodic,
contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers.
A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if
that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which
actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner
Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition
that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the

woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of

bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her
conditio ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously
disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery may be expected to be
correspondingly modest.
In view of the testimony, and the fact that a considerable amount
of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973 which may be expected to
increase not only the cost but also very probably the difficulty of
removing the scar, we consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover
the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable
moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the
part of the common carrier

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES V. C & A CONSTRUCTION LINES, GR. NO.

156034
FACTS:
M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc.,
anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo
oil tank. A Captain Demetrio T. Jusep after he received an information that typhoon was going to hit
in Manila at about 8 hours. So, he instructed the crew to get away from the Napocor power barge. To
avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. 9 He succeeded in avoiding the power
barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the
deflector wall constructed by respondent.10 The damage caused by the incident amounted to
P456,198.24.11
Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, The
trial court ruled that petitioner was not guilty of negligence because it had taken all the necessary
precautions to avoid the accident. Applying the "emergency rule", it absolved petitioner of liability
because the latter had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening
situation. It further held that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot
be held liable as the cause of the damage sustained by respondent was typhoon "Katring", which is
an act of God. But then, the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed and set
aside.14 It found Capt. Jusep guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the North
Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and thus held petitioner liable for damages.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent; (2) If yes, whether or not petitioner is
solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the quasi-delict committed by
Capt. Jusep?
2) W/N THE DOCTRINE OF EMERGENCY RULE IS APPICABLE IN THE INSTANST
CASE?

HELD:

1. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was
negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21,
1994. As early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio
head operator in Japan19 that a typhoon was going to hit Manila20 after 8 hours.21 This,
notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he
decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested.
The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have
sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the
speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of negligence
in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the
circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8
hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon
might change direction.22 He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise instead of
moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because of the
difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he
did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very
cloudy23 and there was no weather disturbance yet.24
2. Anent the second issue, we find petitioner vicariously liable for the negligent act of Capt.
Jusep. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily liable for
the negligent act of his employee. Thus
1awphi1.nt

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed in Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.

2.The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the danger in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. 27 Clearly, the emergency rule is not
applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by
his own negligence.

McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS: It was the 8
th
of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between Angeles City and
SanFernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor children,
Christopher, George, andKim, as well as Kims babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in
the direction of Angeles City (northward) in aFord Escort.Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag
and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang, was headed in theopposite direction, from Angeles City to
San Fernando (southward), going to Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as itwas carrying 200
hundred cavans of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons.As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge
from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from the right side ofthe road into the Escorts lane. As the
boys were going back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn.
He was then forced to swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights
on, appliedhis brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. However, he failed to get back into the right lane,
and collided with the cargo truck.The collision occurred on the bridge.The collision resulted in the deaths of
the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap shewas sitting. Loida was
seated in the passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the
Escort,received physical injuries from the collision.An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging
him for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the c
harges in the information. Theconviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved finality after the denial by the
CA of his MR and the denial by the SC of hisPetition for Review.Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by
the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by Araceli and herhusband for the death of Kim and
injuries to Araceli and her other children. The respondents were impleaded against as theemployers of
Ruben Galang Galang was not included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were
eventuallyconsolidated.The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages
and attorneys fees.On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was
based on its finding that it wasGalangs inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident.
However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, theIAC set aside its original decision and upheld that of
the trial court because the fact that Kohs car invaded the lane of the truck andthe collision occurred while
still in Galangs lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was negligent.ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in
reversing their original decision?HELD: NO. The petition has merit.

Procedural (not important): Given the circumstances, the cases (civil and criminal) should have
been consolidated to prevent separate appreciation of the evidence. To be fair, the petitioners did move to
adopt the testimonies of the witnesses in the criminalcase but the motion was denied. The nonconsolidation resulted in two conflicting decisions. In any case, the guilty verdict ofGalang
was deemed by the Court as irrelevant to the case at bar.
On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose
Kohs negligencethat was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted
deduction as the evidence for the petitionersconvincingly shows that the car swerved into the trucks lane
because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boysdarted across the road from the right
sidewalk into the lane of the car.Aracelis testimony was pretty much what was stated in the facts plus the
fact that when Jose swerved to the left, the truckwas immediately noticed. This is why he switched his
headlights on to warn the trucks driver to slow down and let the Escortreturn to its lane. When asked as
to how she could tell that the truck did not slow down, Araceli said that the truck just kept oncoming,
indicating that it didnt reduce its speed. She posited that if it did, there wouldnt have been a collision. Her
testimonyremained intact, even upon cross-examination that Joses entry into Galangs lane was
necessary to avoid what was, in his mindat the time, a greater peril death or injury to the two idiots. This
is hardly negligent behavior.Her testimony was corroborated by one Eugenio Tanhueco
1
, who was an impartial eyewitness. He said that the truck,moving at 50 to 60kph, only stopped upon
collision. Also, when the police investigated the scene of the collision, they foundskidmarks under the truck
instead of behind it. This indicated that Galang only applied the brakes moments before the collision.While
Galang claimed that he had stopped when the Escort was within 10 meters of the truck but this only served
to substantiateTanhuecos statement that he stopped only upon collision, considering the speed at which he
was going
2

V. CAUSATION
A. PROXIMATE CAUSEB. EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE
MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG
211 SCRA 517DAVIDE; July 16, 1992
NATURE:
Appeal from decision of the IAC
FACTS:
- A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck ownedby private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and aFord
Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted inthe deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc,and physical
injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher KohMcKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the FordEscort.- When the
northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters awayfrom the southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenlydarted from the
right side of the road and into the lane of thecar. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left andentered the lane of the
truck; he then switched on theheadlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he
could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of thetruck, which was the opposite lane, on the said
bridge.- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galangwith the crime of
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting in MultipleHomicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" wasfiled with the trial court.
- Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal chargeand ordered him to pay damages. Galang appealed to IAC.IAC
affirmed decision.- Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awardedprivate respondents moral damages and
exemplary damages,and attorneys fee. Petitioners appealed to IAC. In itsconsolidated decision of the civil cases, it reversed the
ruling of the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages. Thedecision is anchored principally on the findings that it
wasGalang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which causedthe accident. The appellate court further said that the
lawpresumes negligence on the part of the defendants, asemployers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of thelatter; it
was further asserted that these defendants did notallege in their Answers the defense of having exercised thediligence of a good
father of a family in selecting andsupervising the said employee.- In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil cases
wasreversed. Hence this petition.
ISSUES

WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolutionare supported by evidence or are based on mere
speculations,conjectures and presumptions.
HELD
YES
Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appealsmay be set aside when such findings are not supported by
theevidence or when the trial court failed to consider the materialfacts which would have led to a conclusion different from
whatwas stated in its judgment.- The respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and
that the collisionoccurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that thedriver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis
of thispresumed negligence, IAC immediately concluded that it wasJose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and
proximatecause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as theevidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the
car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached thesouthern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the roadfrom
the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.- Negligence is the omission to do something which areasonable man, guided by those
considerations whichordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable manwould not do
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence ina particular case: Did the defendant in doing the allegednegligent
act use that reasonable care and caution which anordinarily prudent person would have used in the samesituation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence.- Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have tried toavoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away fromwhere they were even if this would mean
entering the oppositelane.- Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "onewho suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and isrequired to act without time to consider the best means thatmay be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and uponreflection may appear to have been a better method,
unlessthe emergency in which he finds himself is brought about byhis own negligence.- Assuming,
arguendo
that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot besaid that his negligence was the proximate cause of thecollision. Proximate cause has
been defined as: that cause,which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by anyefficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and withoutwhich the result would not have occurred; the proximate legalcause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, allconstituting a natural and continuous chain of events, eachhaving
a close causal connection with its immediatepredecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effectingthe injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause whichfirst acted, under such circumstances that the personresponsible for the first event should,
as an ordinary prudentand intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at themoment of his act or default that an injury to
some personmight probably result therefrom.Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot besaid that
the same caused the eventual injuries and deathsbecause of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, thenegligent act of
the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy.
The entry of the car into the lane of the truckwould not have resulted in the collision had the latter heededthe emergency signals
given by the former to slow down andgive the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane.Instead of slowing down and
swerving to the far right of theroad, which was the proper precautionary measure under thegiven circumstances, the truck driver
continued at full speedtowards the car.- The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. Hehimself said that his truck was
running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed bylaw on a bridge is only 30 kph.
Under Article 2185 of the CivilCode, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at thetime of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation.- Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of lastclear chance finds application here. Last clear
chance is adoctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributorynegligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim fo

ANURAN V. BUNO
FACTS:

January 12, 1958 noon: passenger jeepney owned by Pedro Gahol and Luisa
Alcantara and driven by Pepito Buo overloaded with (14-16 passengers) was
parked on the road to Taal, Batangas when a speeding motor truck owned
by Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Aro driven by Guillermo Razon negligently
bumped it from behind, with such violence that three passengers died and two
others suffered injuries that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for

many days
Jeepney was parked to let a passanger alight in such a way that 1/2 of its
width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other

half, on the right shoulder of the road

suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and of the injured, to
recover consequently damages against the driver and the owners of the truck and

also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney

CFI: absolving the driver of the jeepney and its owners, but it required the truck

driver and the owners to make compensation

CA: Affirmed exoneration of the jeepney

ISSUE: W/N the doctrine of last clear chance can apply so that truck driver guilty of
greater negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision will be solely liable

HELD: NO. The three defendants last mentioned are required to pay solidarily with the
other defendants-respondents the amounts fixed by the appealed decision.

New Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are
"presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they have observed extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756)

principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application in a
suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise
where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney
and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence

BUSTAMANTE V. CA

FACTS:

April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947

model gravel and sand truck driven by Montesiano and owned by Del
Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus driven Susulin along the national road at
Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite
front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck
sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the wall
from the driver's seat to the last rear seat
several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a
result of the injuries they sustained:
1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante
and father of Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, Ericson, and Ederic, all surnamed Bustamante;
2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria Jocson;
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos;
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and

5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion

Bersamina
The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned
and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by Magtibay and Serrado
before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were
approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the

highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus
driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that
the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance
due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin
shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed
to the bus, which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to
overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along
the shoulder of the highway

RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary

CA: owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was
granted
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing
to avoid the collision and his act in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor
was the proximate cause of the collision making him solely liable

HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.

the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's
own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results,
the injured person is entitled to recovery.

a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of

avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent
or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.

since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of
the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased
passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles the
court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from
liability

LADECO vs AngalaG.R. No. 153076June 21, 2007CARPIO, J

.Facts:A Datsun crewcab, driven by Apolonio Deocampo (Deocampo) bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up
owned by Michael Raymond Angala (respondent) and driven by Bernulfo Borres (Borres).
LapandayAgricultural and Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab which was assigned to
itsmanager Manuel Mendez (Mendez). Respondent filed an action for Quasi-Delict, Damages,
andAttorneys Fees against LADECO, its administrative officer Henry Berenguel (Berenguel) and
Deocampo.The trial court ruled that LADECO and De Ocampoy are solidarily liable. CA affirmed trial
courts decision.
Issue:
WON petitioners are liable
Held:
Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies. The doctrineof last
clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one isappreciably later
than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligencecaused the loss, the
one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so ischargeable with the loss. In this
case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. SinceDeocampo was driving the rear
vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position toobserve the vehicle in front of
him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle infront of him. A U-turn is done at a
much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared torunning straight ahead. Deocampo
could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast whilefollowing the pick-up. Deocampo was
not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on thebrakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He
only stepped on the brakes after the collision

Torts And Damages Case Digest: Philippine

Bank Of Commerce V. CA (1997)
G.R. No. 97626

March 14, 1997

Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC
funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the
purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with Philippine Bank

of Commerce (PBC)
They were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to

Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas

Romeo Lipana never checked their monthly statements of account reposing

complete trust and confidence on PBC

Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and

both are always validated and stamped by the teller Azucena Mabayad :
original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current

account number - retained by the bank

duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the
name of the account holder was left blank

After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank

in the duplicate copy and change the account number to RMC's account number
This went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's

knowledge
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of its

money and later on filed in the RTC

RTC: PBC and Azucena Mabayad jointly and severally liable

CA: affirmed with modification deleting awards of exemplary damages and

attorney's fees

ISSUE:
1. W/N applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid the
injury by not exercising the proper validation procedure-YES
2. W/N there was contirbutory negligence by RMC - YES

HELD: 60-40 ratio. only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the PBC

1. YES.

The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in

accepting deposits should not relieve the PBC of responsibility

The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information

(Name of the account holder) should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of

the bank itself in its lack in selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank
and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of
the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total

disregard of the bank's validation procedures until 7 years later

last clear chance/supervening negligence/discovered peril
where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable

with the consequences thereof

antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought
by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

Here, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a

dishonest employee, yet it cannot be denied that PBC bank, thru its teller, had the
last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully

observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of
a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with
their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with
the highest degree of care

2. YES.

it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not
checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would
have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by its
secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if
only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their
financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence which

shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code

When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care,
the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDSG.R. No. 188363, February 27,
2013 FACTS:
On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to "MateoMgt. Group International"
(MMGI) was presented for deposit and accepted atpetitioner's (Allied Bank) Kawit Branch. The check, postdated
"Oct. 9, 2003",
was drawnagainst the account of Marciano Silva, Jr. (Silva) with respondent BPI Bel-Air Branch.Upon
receipt, petitioner sent the check for clearing to respondent through thePhilippine Clearing
House Corporation (PCHC).The check was cleared by respondent and petitioner credited the account of
MMGI withP1,000,000.00. On Oc
tober 22, 2002, MMGIs account was closed and all the funds
therein were withdrawn. A month later, Silva discovered the debit of P1,000,000.00
from his account. In response to Silvas complaint, respondent credited his account with
the aforesaid sum.Petitioner filed a complaint before the Arbitration Committee, asserting thatrespondent
should solely bear the entire face value of the check due to its negligence infailing to return the check to
petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary period asprovided in Section 20.1of the Clearing House Rules
and Regulations (CHRR) 2000. In itsAnswer with Counterclaims, respondent charged petitioner with gross
negligence foraccepting the postdated check in the first place. It contended that petitioners admitted
negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the loss.
ISSUE
: What does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance enunciate?
RULING
: The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of theplaintiff does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of the defendant where itappears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs
negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part of the defendantand contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except uponthat assumption. Stated differently,
the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does notpreclude him from recovering damages caused by the
supervening negligence of thedefendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by
the exerciseof due diligence. Moreover, in situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was

defendants failure to exercise such ordinary care, havi

ng the last clear chance to avoidloss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such
loss or injury.
ISSUE
: Does the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance apply in this case?
RULING
: YES. In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause of theunwarranted encashment of
the subject check was the negligence of respondent whocleared a post-dated check sent to it thru the
PCHC clearing facility without observing its

own verification procedure. As correctly found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, ifonly respondent
exercised ordinary care in the clearing process, it could have easilynoticed the glaring defect upon seeing
the date written on the face of the check "Oct. 9,2003". Respondent could have then promptly returned the
check and with the check
thus dishonored, petitioner would have not credited the amount thereof to the payees
account. Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of the petitioner in acceptingthe post-dated
check for deposit, it can seek reimbursement from respondent the
amount credited to the payees account covering the check.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58681 May 31, 1982
ALFREDO P. MALIT, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON. JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the City Court of Caloocan City, Branch IV, respondents.

RELOVA, J.:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of respondent Judge, dated February 20, 1981,
denying petitioner's motion to quash in Criminal Case No. 126521, entitled: "People of the Philippines vs.
Atty. Alfredo Malit", as well as the order of same respondent, dated May 5, 1981, which denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
It appears on record that herein petitioner was counsel of Miss Ruth Fernandez in an administrative case
filed against her by Dr. Macaspac. At the hearing of the case on January 17, 1980, Dr. Macaspac Identified
certain exhibits on the witness stand. On cross-examination by herein petitioner, Atty. Malit, if she knew the
person who "made" a certain exhibit, Dr. Macaspac evaded the question by saying she did not understand
the word "made." Petitioner tried to explain by saying that it means "prepared." Notwithstanding, Dr.
Macaspac would not answer and, instead, asked petitioner for clarification. This prompted Atty. Malit to say:

"I doubt how did you become a Doctor." As a consequence, Dr. Macaspac instituted a complaint for slander
against herein petitioner with the Fiscal's Office of Caloocan City.
On February 28, 1980, an information for unjust vexation docketed as Criminal Case No. 126521 was filed
by Special Counsel Apolinario A. Exevea which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1980 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused without any justifiable
cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously vex and annoy one Corazon I.
Macaspac, by then and there uttering the following remarks directly addressed to the latter:
I DOUBT HOW DID YOU BECOME A DOCTOR to her great annoyance, vexation and
disgust.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense. "
Respondent Judge denied the motion to quash, as well as the motion for reconsideration raising the ground
that the court has no jurisdiction because the facts charged in the information are privileged
communication.
It is the position of petitioner that the statement "I doubt how did you become a doctor" does not constitute
an offense as it was uttered at the time he was conducting the cross-examination of Dr. Macaspac; that
utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings and motions belong
to the class of communication that are absolutely privileged.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that an order denying a motion to quash cannot be the subject of
certiorari which is a remedy to keep an inferior court within the limits of its jurisdiction; that the delimitation
of the correctness, if at all, should be brought on appeal, after the trial of the raise and not in certiorari; that
petitioner's contention that the act complained of does not constitute an offense because it is protected by
the mantle of privilege is strictly a matter of defense.
Petitioner's contention should be sustained. Well settled is the rule that parties, counsel and witnesses are
exempted from liability in libel or slander cases for words otherwise defamatory, uttered or published in the
course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case.
Where the libelous or slanderous words published in the course of judicial proceedings are
connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in hand or subject of inquiry,
the same may be considered privileged communication and the counsel, parties, or
witnesses therein are exempt from liability. (See 53 C.J.S. 170-171; Tupas vs. Parreo, et
al. G.R. No. L-12545, April 30, 1959, and authorities cited therein). (Tolentino vs. Baylosis,
110 Phil. 1010)

And, as to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matter privileged,
the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably
wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance
and impropriety. (People vs. Andres, 107 Phil. 1046).
In the case at bar, petitioner was prompted to say: "I doubt how did you become a doctor" when Dr.
Macaspac would not answer the question as to who prepared the document presented to her, and when
the witness repeatedly evaded the question by saying that she did not understand the word "made."
Newel in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., uses the following language:
Absolute Privilege.In this class of cases it is considered in the interest of public welfare
that all persons should be allowed to express their sentiments and speak their minds fully
and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects; and all actions for words so spoken are
absolutely forbidden, even if it be alleged and proved that the words were spoken falsely,
knowingly and with express malice. (Section 350, pp. 387-388).
It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings belong to the
class of communications that are absolutely privileged. Stated otherwise, the privilege is granted in aid and
for the advantage of the administration of justice. As this Court observed in Sison vs. David (Supra):
... The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public
service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public
welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors,
lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective
functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of
damages. (33 Am. Jur. 123-124)
Generally, certiorari does not lie to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial court.
Interlocutory orders ordinarily should be reviewed when an appeal is taken from the trial court's judgment.
Not every procedural error or erroneous legal or factual conclusion amounts to grave abuse of discretion.
However, as this Court ruled in Sanchez, et al vs. Hon. Mariano A. Zosa, et al., (L-27043, November 28,
1975), "when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority
and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. "
WHEREFORE, the trial court's orders of February 20, 1981 and May 5, 1981 are reversed and set aside.
Respondent is hereby ordered to desist and refrain from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No.
126521.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.