Lessons from Camelot

Ted Sorensens seminal biography of JFK, written by the presidents

closest and most trusted advisor only a few years after the grim
events in Dallas in November 1963, offers a rare and unique insight
into the workings of the presidency that came to be known as
Camelot.
Of particular interest is a chapter devoted to the period of transition
between Kennedys election victory in November 1960 and his
inauguration and formal assumption of office in January 1961.
During these three frenetic months, Sorenson describes how over a
thousand government posts were filled, ranging from key cabinet
positions through to junior advisors.
Each post needed to be balanced against the oft-competing
demands of politics and the effective administration of the executive
branch, requiring the recruitment team to know when to
compromise and when to expend political capital and remain
steadfast in the face of opposition. Despite the many challenges
US politics was no less partisan back in the 1960s than it is now
there is a clear sense throughout that Sorenson and his team were
recruiting against a mission underpinned by a successful election
campaign, subsequently set out so eloquently in Kennedys
inaugural address.
Each appointment, be it political or administrative, was governed by
an unambiguous credo. Even appointments that were intensely
political in nature were still ultimately made to contribute to this
overall purpose. There was also a palpable sense that the
assembling of a new administration was in preparation for the work
to come and not an end in itself, given that nothing was real until
the formal handover in late January.
Contrast this with the nature of Organisational Development
frequently observed in so many modern-day organisations. Too
often, the ubiquitous organisational restructure is undertaken in a
ritualistic manner based on the arrival of a new chief executive or in
response to a crisis or opportunity rather than in response to a clear
mission and to do list.
Indeed, restructures themselves are too often seen as the central
tenet of an OD exercise rather than as the preliminary stage in a
much longer journey. Strategic ambiguity, insufficiently defined
skill, behaviour and value requirements, and arcane recruitment
practices all contribute to the practically audible groan of cynicism
that so often accompanies the announcement of another top team
restructure. What else did you expect? Theyve heard it all before,

seen it all before and can point to precious few tangible examples of
unqualified success.
While the circumstances of assembling a new governing
administration in 90 days are certainly unusual, many parallels are
apparent and there are lessons that are still relevant today:
1. The necessity for assembling a new team must be explicit
and, if not widely understood, then communicated in the
clearest of terms. The mission should translate clearly into
what we need to do and this in turn underlines the organising
principle of the need for a restructure.
2. A restructure is an enabler of the main event, not an end in
itself. Again, the clarity of this should be apparent and widely
communicated.
3. A distillation of the demands of the mission should produce a
series of clear requirements (skills, behaviours etc.), which in
turn determine the recruitment materials, and tone of the
restructure, ensuring that there is a clear link between the
mission and the nature of the new team.
4. Those charged with assembling the team MUST be familiar
with the wider purpose. Clarity between the project sponsor
(director or chief executive), HR, specialist recruitment
support and any non-executives* involved in making the final
decision must be watertight. All too often, these links are
tenuous at best.
5. The process must be effectively project-managed from the
centre throughout. HR have a key role in this but the link to
mission demands that assembling the new team should be coordinated around the sponsor. This is, again, frequently not
the case.
Tragically, we did not get to see the full extent of how successful
this approach was for Kennedy, or indeed Sorensen. Nonetheless, as
a president who frequently drew on historical learning to inform his
own leadership, the lessons of JFKs assembling of Camelot has
much to contribute to contemporary organisational thinking.
* In UK local government terms, elected members are often
statutorily required to make senior appointments having had little or
nothing to do with the preceding elements of the process.
At LKS Quaero, we help clients with effective restructuring and
change management. If youd like to know more, visit us at
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