Planters Development Bank v Chandumal

GR No. 195619, September 5, 2012

FACTS:
BF Homes, Inc. and Chandumal entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land. BF Homes
then sold to PDB all its rights and interests over the contract. On June 18, 1999, an action
for judicial confirmation of notarial rescission and delivery of possession was filed by PDP
against Chandumal.
Consequently, summons was issued. According to the Sheriff's return, Sheriff Galing
attempted to personally serve the summons upon Chandumal on three dates but it was
unavailing as she was always out of the house on said dates. Hence, the sheriff caused
substituted service of summons by serving the same through Chandumal's mother who
acknowledged receipt thereof.
For her failure to file within the prescribed period, PDB filed an ex parte motion to declare
Chandumal in default which was granted by the RTC. On February 23, 2001, Chandumal
filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default maintaining that she did not receive
the summons and/or was not notified of the same. RTC denied Chandumal's motion
which was reversed by the Court of Appeals due to invalid and ineffective substituted
service of summons.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether there was valid substituted service of summons
(2) Whether Chandumal voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court
(3) Whether there was proper rescission by notarial act of the contract to sell
HELD:
(1) There was no valid substitute service of summons.
The Return of Summons does not specifically show or indicate in detail the actual
exertion of efforts or any positive step taken by the officer or process server in
attempting to serve the summons personally to the defendant. The return merely states
the alleged whereabouts of the defendant without indicating that such information was
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof.
(2) Respondent voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states "The defendant's voluntary appearance
in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons"
(3) There is no valid rescission of the contract to sell by notarial act.
The allegation that Chandumal made herself unavailable for payment is not an excuse as
the twin requirements for a valid and effective cancellation under the law, i.e. notice of
cancellation or demand for rescission by a notarial act and the full payment of the cash
surrender value, is mandatory.

palma vs Galvez
Facts:

On July 28, 2003, petitioner Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against
the Philippine Heart Center (PHC) and Drs Giron and Cruz, alleging that the defendants
committed professional fault, negligence and omission for having removed her right
ovary against her will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her during the
surgery; and that although the specimens were subsequently found, petitioner was
doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the label therein pertained that of
somebody else. Defendants filed their respective Answers. Petitioner subsequently filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional
defendants who were all nurses at the PHC, namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and
herein private respondent Agudo. Thus, summons were subsequently issued to them.
feb 17, 04RTC's process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias
summons, together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served
upon private respondent thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the
same as private respondent was out of the country March 01, 04 private respondents
counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer
stating that he was just engaged by private respondent's husband as she was out of the
country and the Answer was already due. on March 15,04 Motion for Another Extension
of Time to File Answer was filed March 30,04 an MTD was filed on grounds of no
jurisdiction over agudo as she was temp out of the country and summons on hr shud
abide by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court: RTC ruling(may 7,04) MTD was
granted It found that while the summons was served at private respondent's house and
received by respondent's husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service of
summons on her as she was out of the country at the time the summons was served,
thus, she was not personally served a summons; and even granting that she knew that a
complaint was filed against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person as she was not validly served with summons; that substituted service could
not be resorted to since it was established that private respondent was out of the
country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14 provides for the service of summons on her by
publication. MR by petitioner was filed.and denied. Issue: Petitioner is now before us
alleging that the public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that: I. Substituted service of summons upon
private respondent, a defendant residing in the Philippines but temporarily outside the
country is invalid; set forth in section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal
service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with
leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
In Montalban v. Maximo,
we held that substituted service of summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court in a suit in personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily
absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer
jurisdiction on the court over such defendant. In the same case, we expounded on the
rationale in providing for substituted service as the normal mode of service for residents
temporarily out of the Philippines. Considering that private respondent was temporarily
out of the country, the summons and complaint may be validly served on her through
substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which reads: SEC. 7.
Substituted service.

If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effecte
d (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof. We have held that a dwelling, house or residence

refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when
the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.
It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with
the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant.
Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue
of due process as that of jurisdiction.
Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be left. The
rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with
whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will
deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof .
In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the country;
thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with her husband, Alfredo P.
Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and
discretion, who was residing in that place and, therefore, was competent to receive the
summons on private respondent's behalf.
ROBINSON v. MIRALLES
(510 SCRA 678, 2006)

FACTS:
Respondent Celita Miralles filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against
petitioner Remelita Robinson, alleging that $20,054 was borrowed by Robinson, as shown
in the MOA they both executed.

Summons was served on Robinson at her given address. However, per return of
service of the Sheriif, petitioner no longer resides there. Thus, the trial court issued an
alias summons to be served at Muntinlupa City, petitioners new address.

Again, the Sheriff reported twice thereafter that the summons could not be served
on petitioner. Sheriff Pontente, who was to serve the summons interposed that he was
stopped by the Security Guard of Alabang Hills Village because they were allegedly
told by Robinson not to let anyone proceed to her house if she is not around.
Despite the explanations of the Sheriff, the guards didnt let him in. Thereafter, the
Sheriff just left a copy of the complaint to a guard, who refused to affix his signature on
the original copy, so he will be the one to give the summons to petitioner Robinson.
Eventually, petitioner Robinson was declared in default for her failure to file an
answer seasonably despite service of summons. The trial court rendered its decision in
favor of Miralles ordering Robinson to pay her obligations plus cost of damages. A copy
of the court Order was sent to petitioner by registered mail at her new address and a writ
of execution was also issued.
Robinson filed a petition for relief from the judgment by default. She claimed that
summons was improperly served upon her, thus, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings are void. Petitioner Robinson
contends that the service of the summons upon the subdivision guard is not in
compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her or staying at
her residence, as required by the rule.

ISSUE: Whether the substituted service of summons effected is valid.

RULING:
YES. Although the SC have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted
service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other
than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective, the Court frowns upon an
overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the
procedural rules, that governs.
Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service
of summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriffs
declaration. Nor did she deny having received the summons through the security guard.
Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences.
Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons has been properly served upon
petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.

Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the
service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in the manner
provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended.

Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over substituted
service, the latter mode of service being a method extraordinary in character. For
substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be clearly
established:
(a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was impossible;
(b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and
(c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at
the partys residence or upon a competent person in charge of the partys office or place
of business.
Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.

JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS

G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, SECOND DIVISION (Nachura, J.)
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of
sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made
before a court may order a compulsory blood test.
Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse narrated

his mothers account of her history with Jesus S. Lucas (Jesus) and attached several copies
of his personal documents.
Though Jesus was not summoned and was not served a copy of the petition, he
nevertheless learned of it and obtained for himself a copy. He then filed a Special
Appearance and Comment manifesting among others that the petition was adversarial in
nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent.
Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he filed his Comment, Jesse filed a Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and
hence set the case for hearing.
After learning of the RTCs order, Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing
that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses
father.
Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held
that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity
action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration of his own which the RTC
granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds
relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown
trial has not yet taken place.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favor of Jesus, it
noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity
action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner
has failed to establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in
a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during
trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in
the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the
introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the prescribed
parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures,
protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available
objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of
DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of
DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused
and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and
protects, rather than prejudice the public.
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing.
Section 4 states: The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on

application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing
of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological
sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii)
was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good
reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has
the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution
of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not
preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party,
including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of
right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
Court order for blood testing equivalent to search under the Constitution.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a
show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of
the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which,
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained; Although a paternity action is
civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a
compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory
blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the
court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which
paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test,
a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for
DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.

Busuego vs. CA [304 SCRA 473 (March 11 1999)]

Power of Monetory Board
Facts: The 16th regular examination of the books and records of PAL Employees Savings
and Loan Association (PESALA) was conducted by a team of CB Examiners. Several
irregularities were found to have been committed by the PESALA officers. Hence, CB
sent a letter to petitioners for them to be present at a meeting specifically for the
purpose of investigating said anomalies. Petitioners did not respond. Hence, the
Monetary Board adopted a resolution including the names of the officers of PESALA in
the watchlist to prevent them from holding responsible positions in any institution under
CB supervision.
Petitioners filed a petition for injunction against the MB in order to prevent their names
from being added in the said watchlist. RTC issued the TRO. The MB appealed to the CA
which reversed RTC. Hence, this petition for certiorari with the SC.
Petitioners contend that the MB resolution was null and void for being violative of their
right to due process by imposing administrative sanctions where the MB is not vested

with authority to disqualify persons from occupying positions in institutions under the
supervision of CB.
Issue: Whether or not the MB resolution was null and void.
Held: NO. The CB, through the MB, is the government agency charged with the
responsibility of administering the monetary, banking and credit system of the country
and is granted the power of supervision and examination over banks and non-bank
financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions of which savings and loan
associations, such as PESALA, form part of.
The special law governing savings and loan associations is R.A. 3779, the Savings and
Loan Association Act. Said law authorizes the MB to conduct regular yearly examinations
of the books and records of savings and loan associations, to suspend a savings and loan
association for violation of law, to decide any controversy over the obligations and duties
of directors and officers, and to take remedial measures. Hence, the CB, through the MB,
is empowered to conduct investigations and examine the records of savings and loan
associations. If any irregularity is discovered in the process, the MB may impose
appropriate sanctions, such as suspending the offender from holding office or from being
employed with the CB, or placing the names of the offenders in a watchlist.

.R. No. 171092.March 15, 2010.

EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, petitioner, vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS , respondent.

FACTS: On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages
against respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
The tortuous conduct by the flight attendants of said Airways, which prompted petitioner
to file a case for damages, allegedly transpired when petitioner boarded respondents
flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. On May 30, 2005, respondent, by
way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack
of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged
that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the
complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1) of which
provides:
An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the
court of domicile of the carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place
of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court of the place
of destination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippines, a signatory to the Warsaw Convention, should adhere
to the provision of the Warsaw Convention in the determination of its jurisdiction with
respect to a case for damages involving a tortuous conduct committed by an airline
personnel while in an international carrier against a Filipino citizen.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this
country.
In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 (1992), we held that: The
Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw
Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the
Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of
accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was
deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became
applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President

Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto,
to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and
fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof.
The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine
government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.