Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Transpo Cases
Transpo Cases
I.
CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTATION
A. CONCEPT, PARTIES AND PERFECTION
DANGWA TRANSPORTATION vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat as
a result of a vehicular accident which occurred on
March 25, 1985 at Marivic, Sapid, Mankayan, Benguet.
Petitioner Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a
passenger bus belonging to petitioner corporation in a
reckless and imprudent manner and without due
regard to traffic rules and regulations and safety to
persons and property, it ran over its passenger, Pedrito
Cudiamat. Petitioners alleged that they had observed
and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence
and that it was the victim's own carelessness and
negligence which gave rise to the subject incident.
RTC pronounced that Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent,
which negligence was the proximate cause of his
death.
However, Court of Appeals set aside the
decision of the lower court, and ordered petitioners to
pay private respondents damages due to negligence.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in reversing the decision of the trial
court and in finding petitioners negligent and liable for
the damages claimed.
HELD: CA Decision AFFIRMED
The testimonies of the witnesses show that that the
bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same.
They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell
from the platform of the bus when it suddenly
accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right
tires of the vehicle. Under such circumstances, it
cannot be said that the deceased was guilty of
negligence.
It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for
one attempt to board a train or streetcar which is
moving slowly. An ordinarily prudent person would
have made the attempt board the moving conveyance
under the same or similar circumstances. The fact that
passengers board and alight from slowly moving
vehicle is a matter of common experience both the
driver and conductor in this case could not have been
unaware of such an ordinary practice.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers
transported by the according to all the circumstances
of each case. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
It has also been repeatedly held that in an action based
on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the
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ISSUE:
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CA
decision
was
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Issue:
Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier liable for the
damages for failure to observe extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods.
Held:
The contention has no merit. In De Guzman v. Court of
Appeals, the Court dismissed a similar contention and
held the party to be a common carrier, thus The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the
following terms:
"Article 1732. Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or
goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public."
The law makes no distinction between a carrier offering
its services to the general community or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general
population. Note that the transportation of goods holds
an integral part of Calvos business, it cannot indeed
be
doubted
that
it
is
a
common
carrier.
Asia Lighterage and Shipping Inc. v. CA
Gr, No. 147246, August 19, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner was contracted as carrier by a corporation
from Portland, Oregon to deliver a cargo to the
consignee's warehouse at Pasig City. The cargo,
however, never reached the consignee as the barge
that carried the cargo sank completely, resulting in
damage to the cargo. Private respondent, as insurer,
indemnified the consignee for the lost cargo and thus,
as subrogee, sought recovery from petitioner. Both the
trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of
private respondent.
The Court ruled in favor of private respondent.
Whether or not petitioner is a common carrier, the
Court ruled in the affirmative. The principal business of
petitioner is that of lighterage and drayage, offering its
barges to the public, although for limited clientele, for
carrying or transporting goods by water for
compensation. Whether or not petitioner failed to
exercise extraordinary diligence in its care and custody
of the consignee's goods, the Court also ruled in the
affirmative. The barge completely sank after its towing
bits broke, resulting in the loss of the cargo. Petitioner
failed to prove that the typhoon was the proximate and
only cause of the loss and that it has exercised due
diligence before, during and after the occurrence.
HCISED
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the petitioner is a common carrier.
RULING: YES.
Petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of
goods is done on an irregular rather than scheduled
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Is
AF
Sanchez
common
carrier?
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Facts:
NSC hired MV Vlasons I, a private vessel owned by VSI.
They entered into a contract of voyage charter hire
wherein the contract states that NSC hired VSI's vessel
to make one voyage to load steel products at Iligan
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2.
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ISSUE:
Is the Caravan Travel and
reimbursement and damages?
Tours
liable
for
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we
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have
a
complete
contract
of
carriage
the
consummation of which has already begun: the shipper
delivering the cargo to the carrier, and the latter taking
possession thereof by placing it on a lighter manned by
its authorized employees, under which Macleod
became entitled to the privilege secured to him by law
for its safe transportation and delivery, and the carrier
to the full payment of its freight upon completion of the
voyage.
The receipt of goods by the carrier has been said to lie
at the foundation of the contract to carry and deliver,
and if actually no goods are received there can be no
such contract. The liability and responsibility of the
carrier under a contract for the carriage of goods
commence on their actual delivery to, or receipt by,
the carrier or an authorized agent. ... and delivery to a
lighter in charge of a vessel for shipment on the vessel,
where it is the custom to deliver in that way, is a good
delivery and binds the vessel receiving the freight, the
liability commencing at the time of delivery to the
lighter. ... and, similarly, where there is a contract to
carry goods from one port to another, and they cannot
be loaded directly on the vessel and lighters are sent
by the vessel to bring the goods to it, the lighters are
for the time its substitutes, so that the bill of landing is
applicable to the goods as soon as they are placed on
the lighters. (80 C.J.S., p. 901, emphasis supplied)
The liability of the carrier as common carrier begins
with the actual delivery of the goods for transportation,
and not merely with the formal execution of a receipt
or bill of lading; the issuance of a bill of lading is not
necessary to complete delivery and acceptance. Even
where it is provided by statute that liability commences
with the issuance of the bill of lading, actual delivery
and acceptance are sufficient to bind the carrier.
SERVANDO vs. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION
CO.
FACTS:
On November 6, 1963, appellees Clara Uy Bico and
Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's
vessel, FS-176, for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental. In the bills of lading issued for the
cargoes in question, the parties agreed to limit the
responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that
may be caused to the shipment by inserting therein
the following stipulation:
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or
damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such
loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall
carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by
force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other
waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ...
Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, in the
morning of November 18, 1963, the cargoes were
discharged, complete and in good order, unto the
warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. At about 2:00 in
the afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was
razed by a fire of unknown origin, destroying appellees'
cargoes. Before the fire, however, appellee Uy Bico was
able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice 2 Appellees'
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MACAM vs. CA
[G.R. No. 125524. August 25, 1999]
FACTS:
On 4 April 1989 petitioner Macam shipped on board the
vessel Nen Jiang, owned and operated by respondent
China Ocean Shipping Co., through local agent
respondent WALLEM, 3,500 boxes of watermelons and
1,611 boxes of fresh mangoes; the two sets of fruits
were covered by two bills of lading and were exported
through their respective Letters of Credit both issued
by Pakistan Bank. The shipment was bound for
Hongkong with PAKISTAN BANK as consignee and Great
Prospect Company of Kowloon, Hongkong (GPC) as
notify party. On 6 April 1989, per letter of credit
requirement, copies of the bills of lading and
commercial invoices were submitted to petitioner's
depository bank, Consolidated Banking Corporation
(SOLIDBANK), which paid petitioner in advance the
total value of the shipment of US$20,223.46.
Upon arrival in Hongkong, the shipment was (1)
delivered by respondent WALLEM directly to GPC (the
buyer-importer), not to PAKISTAN BANK, (2) and
without the required bill of lading having been
surrendered.
Subsequently, GPC failed to pay
PAKISTAN BANK such that the latter, still in possession
of the original bills of lading, refused to pay petitioner
through SOLIDBANK. Since SOLIDBANK already prepaid petitioner the value of the shipment, it demanded
payment from respondent WALLEM through five (5)
letters but was refused. Petitioner was thus allegedly
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Facts:
ISSUE:
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