Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • Stat Const Chap 1 To 2 PDF

    Uploaded by

    Bai Yade
    12 views29 pages

    Original Title

    Stat Const Chap 1 to 2.pdf

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    12 views29 pages

    Stat Const Chap 1 To 2 PDF

    Uploaded by

    Bai Yade

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 29
    ee II, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 29 OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? encountered, and more particularly, those who have become in- capacitated for work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sus- tained while in the line of duty. A veteran pension law is, there- fore, a governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country, especially during times of war and revolution, by extending to them regular mon- etary aid. For this reason, it is the general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such construc- tional preference is to be considered with other guides to inter- pretation and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular language. On the other hand, if the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application, this would be dependent upon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12 years. The noble and humanitarian purposes for which the law had enacted could zasily be thwarted or defeated. Gasilao’s claim was sustained. 28 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION complete all the necessary papers and the Board thereafter ap- proved his pension, starting from the date of approval. In 1973, Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension which he claims.he is entitled to, from July 1955, when he first filed his application for pension, up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved. CFI Ruling: The trial court granted the amount claimed. The Board filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968. Petitioner’s (P.V.A. Board) Contention: Petitioner cites Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 65 (Veteran’s Bill of Rights) which provides: “Sec. 15. Any person who desires to take advan- tage of the rights and privileges provided for in this act should file his application with the Board x x x.” Petitioner contends that since the foregoing section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension, therefore, an award of pension benefits should com- mence from the date of approval of the application. Held: The stand of the petitioner does not appear to be in conso- nance with the spirit and intent of the law. Considering that R.A. No. 65 is a veteran pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to a ion wee Il. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 27 OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? xXx xXx “Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of a sum of money, the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to insure the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the judgment is rendered, does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot attach the bank deposit of the defendant? “Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to which I replied that outside the very purpose of this law it could be reached by attachment. “Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached? “Mr. RAMOS. That is so.” (Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Repre- sentatives, No. 12, pp. 3839-3940, July 27, 1955). It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two Houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act No. 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed, there is ao real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed, the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution orocess. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the inten- sion of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just lebts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a yank. CASE: Board of Administrators of the P.V.A. vs. 26 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law. “Mr. MARCOS. Yes. It protects the depositor, does it not? “Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor. “Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investi- gation into the existence and the amount of the de- posit, “Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit. “Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary garnishment or attachment of the deposit is not allowed? “Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization- “Mr. MARCOS, I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of procedure as well as the sub- stantive law on the matter is amended. “Mr. RAMOS. Yes, that is the effect. “Mr. MARCOS, I see. Suppose there has been & decision, definitely establishing the liability of an indi- vidual for taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be executed ... in the execution of that judgment, does this bill, or this proposed law, if approved, allow the investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute the judgment? “Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory. Il. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 25 OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? deposit of a judgment debtor cannot be subjected to a garnishment against it in view of the aforequoted provisions of law. The Supreme Court did not find the bank’s position tenable. The lower court did not order an examination of inquiry into the deposit of the defendant. It merely required the bank to inform the court whether or not the defendant had a deposit with the bank only for purposes of garnishment issued by the Court so that the bank will hold the same intact and not allow any with- drawal until further orders. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act No. 1405, shat it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank leposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judg- nent. Thus: “Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an indi- vidual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual is attached by the Bureau of Internal Rev- enue. “Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply af- ter the court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law. “Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or 24 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION China Bank refused, invoking the provisions of RA No. 1405. Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of RA No. 1405 (An Act Prohibiting Disclosure of or Inquiry into, Deposits with any Banking Institution and Providing Penalty therefor). Held: The pertinent provisions of Republic Act 1405 reads: “Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an abso- lutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permis- sion of depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or der- eliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.” “Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.” XXX xxx XXX “Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject of- fender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 23 OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expres- sions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be consid- ered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions wherever possi- ble. The meaning of the law, it must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences, but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and independently. More ‘mportantly, the doctrine of associated words (NOSCITUR A 30CIIS) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and ‘pecific by considering the company in which it is found or with vhich it is associated. Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as ound in par. 2 is also applicable by the agent in par. 1, to receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for violation f par. 1. It must be noted that the information does not allege that 1e negotiation of an insurance contract by Mrs. Aisporna was ne for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having een omitted, a conviction could not be sustained. To warrant a mviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. cquitted. CASE: China Bank vs. Ortega, 49 SCRA 355 22 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sec. 189 consists of three paragraphs. The first paragraph prohibits any person from acting as an insurance agent without first obtaining a certificate of authority from the Insurance Commissioner. It makes no mention that the unauthorized agent must first obtain compensation before being liable under this section. The second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intention of this section. It also defines an agent as a “person, who for compensation, ...” The third paragraph prescribes the penalty for violation of the section. City Court, CFI & Court of Appeals’ decision: Mrs. Aisporna was charged with violating par. 1 of Sec, 189, and said paragraph does not require that the offender receive compensation before she can be convicted. Therefore, Mrs. Aisporna’s allegation that the information does not allege that she received compensation for her services, and that she, in fact, did not receive any compensation, is of no moment. Mrs. Aisporna is guilty as charged. Issue: Whether or not receipt of compensation is an essential ele- ment for violation of Sec. 189. Held: The definition of an agent under par. 2 is intended to define the word “agent” in par. 1. Hence, par. 2 provides that “any person who for compensation x x x shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section x x x.” Patently, the definition of an insurance agent in par. 2 holds truce Byte Weenie 4s aea bine WO, be BO ee a Il. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 21 OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? agent of such company as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insur- ance, or receive for services in obtaining new insur- ance, any commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, which must be renewed annually of the first day of January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued by the Insurance Com- missioner only upon the written application of persons desiring such authority, such application being ap- proved and countersigned by the company such person desires to represent, and shall be upon a form ap- proved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving such information as he may require. The Insurance Com- missioner shall have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such certificate in his discre- tion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in any event after the first day of July of the year following the issuing of such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application of the company. “Any person who for compensation solicits or ob- tains insurance on behalf of any insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself an applica- tion for a policy of insurance to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be an ingurance agent within the in- tent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to which an agent of such company is subject. 20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION rate dissenting opinion, labelled the majority opinion as “unadulterated judicial legislation”. Do you agree? 4, HOW MUST LEGISLATIVE INTENT BE ASCER.- TAINED? CASE: Aisporna vs. C.A. & People 113 SCRA 459 (1982) (de Castro, J., ponente) Facts: Mapalad Aisporna was the wife of Rodolfo Aisporna, who was an authorized insurance agent of Perla Compania de Seguros. Mrs. Aisporna, however, has not procured a certificate of author: ity from the Insurance Commissioner. Acertain Eugenio S. Isidro went to the house of Mr. & Mrs, Aisporna and sought to renew his accident insurance policy. As her husband was away, Mrs. Aisporna issued a new policy her- self. Mrs. Aisporna was later prosecuted before the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Sec. 189 of the Insurance Act. The information charged Mrs. Aisporna with having acted as an in- surance agent without previously obtaining a certificate of au- thority from the Insurance Commissioner as required by Sec, 189 of the Insurance Act. The information did not allege that Mrs, Aisporna received compensation for her service. Mrs. Aisporna, however, maintained that she was not liable because she merely assisted her husband and that she did not receive any compensation therefor. The trial court nonetheless convicted her, said conviction affirmed by both the CFI and the Court of Appeals, eee ee II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 19 OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? Dissenting opinion; Gutierrez, J.: 1. It should be the legislature, not the court, which should remove the exclusionary provision of the WCA. 2. The WCA is a compromise. In return for the near cer- tainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by the law, the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre-determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker and, in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on the compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system, individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of the entire working class. 3. The schedule of compensation, the rates of payment, she compensable injuries and diseases, the premiums paid by 2mployers to the present system, the actuarial stability of the srust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been care- ‘ully studied before the integrated scheme was enacted into law. If the court disregards this totality of the scheme in a spirit »f generosity and recasts some parts of the system without touch- ng the related others, the entire structure is endangered. 4. Tam against the Court assuming the role of legislator na matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. If »mployers already required to contribute to the State Insurance *und will have to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance or that purpose, a major study will be necessary. The issue vefore us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor pede os endl pei ST ot De Si eieeel er OL Ee 18 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION On the Issue of Judicial Legislation: The Minority contends that the Court is guilty of Judicial Legislation, The Majority replied that it was merely giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice and the protec- tion of labor. Article 173 of the Labor Code and Article 1702 of the Civil Code both mandate that any doubt in the construction of labor laws should be construed in favor of labor. It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate. That myth has been exploded by Article 9 of the Civil Code which provides that: “No judge or court shall decline to render judg- ment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insuffi- ciency of the laws.” Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the Court, in the language of Justice Holmes, ‘do and must legislate’ to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all posti> ble cases to which the law may apply. Nor has the human miad the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations, Dissenting Opinion; Melencio-Herrera, J.: ¥ Compensation and damages are synonymous. 2. The WCA remedy is exclusive. 3. The WCA proceedings are a finished transaction, 4. Even assuming that the remedies are selective, the heirs have already made their choice and have accepted the Me ee PLL LL LT T_T Il. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION By OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? 2) EXCLUSIVE — Atty. (now Senator) Angara believes that recovery under the WCA exclusive and therefore pre- cludes an action of damages under fhe Civil Code. 3) SELECTIVE — Atty. Bacungan believes that the rem- edies are selective, i.e., the heirs had the option of choosing between availing of the compensation under the WCA or filing an action for damages arising out of negligence under the provisions of the Civil Code. If the heirs had chosen one remedy and have collected under that remedy, they can no longer avail of the other remedy. The allegations of the complaint indicate that there was a breach of contract which may justify an award for damages under the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. The question aow is whether or not the action for damages will prosper, not- withstanding the fact that the heirs have already received com- gensation under the WCA. The Court agreed with the position of Atty. Bacungan that she two remedies are selective. The WCA is based on a theory of sompensation distinct from existing theories on damages. Recov- »ry under the WCA is not based on any theory on the part of the »mployer. Since the two remedies are distinct and the heirs have the \ption of selecting which remedy to avail of, are the heirs now »recluded from selecting the remedy under the Civil Code, con- idering that they had already availed of (and received compen- ation) under the WCA? The heirs have a choice but they cannot pursue both choices imultaneously. The Court, however, noted that the heirs only learned of the egligence report after they had already availed and received 16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION “Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. — The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and rem- edies accruing to the employee, his personal repre- sentatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.” “Section 46. Jurisdiction. — The Workmen’s Com- pensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdic- tion to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, x x x.” ee Philex further contends that the WCA covers work-con- nected accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that the employer was negligent. The heirs, however, contend that the CFI has jurisdiction as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence. The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court. Issue: Does the CFI have jurisdiction over the complaint? Held: Majority Opinion; Makasiar, J. I, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 15 OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? types of laws involved, and even the idiosyncrasies of different judges and justices. To determine where we are now or where we were at any particular point in time in this judicial-legislative “border war” would require a separate treatise. The reader is, however, given a few representative cases to get a glimpse of this on-going debate. “It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may distinguish it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legis- lative and executive action with mathematical preci- sion and divide the branches into watertight compart- ments, were it even so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution so requires.” (Justice Holmes; Springer vs. Government, 277 U.S. 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 853 cited in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 141, 169). 3. WHEN IS IT CONSTRUCTION AND WHEN IS IT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? CASE: Floresca ys. Philex Mining Corp. 136 SCRA 142 Facts: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporation’s mine sites. The heirs of the miners were ble to recover under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA). Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the ompany failed to provide the miners with adequate safety pro- action. The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before the BT (naw BTC) of Manila 4 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof.” Likewise, Section 16 (3) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitu- tion provides that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. The administrative supervision of its ow? depart- ment is a necessary requisite for judicial and legislative inde- pendence.” While the power to declare what the law is or has been concededly judicial, that function sometimes treads dangerously into legislative domain. We have seen in diagram 1 that one of the areas of functional overlap is that between the legislative and the judicial branches. That portion of diagram 1 is repro- duced here in detail: Diagram 4 Legislative Area 3 above represents the area that is paradoxically both judicial and legislative. It is within the area that Justice Holmes (in Floresca vs. Philex Mining, discussed in detail next page) wae referring to when he said that “judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially, they are confined from molar to molecular.” It is also in this area what Article 9 of the Civil Code was referring to. Said article provides that “No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obseu- rity or insufficiency of law.” Beyond Area 3, or the shaded area on Diagram 4 above, is II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 13 OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? Diagram 3 strative agency o perform quasi-judicial functions. Some of these agencies are he Securities and Exchange Commission, the Public Service Jommission, the Land Transportation Commission, etc. These |uasi-judicial functions are expressly provided for by the Legis- ature and when the agency exceeds the jurisdiction granted by aw, it may be set aside by the judicial branch. (B.P. Blg. 129 srovides for appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Jourt of the decisions of these agencies exercising quasi-judicial unctions.) The second sub-area of the etecutive | 2-B. In certain in- tances, the judiciary allows the e: ecutive branch to interpret cts of the/legislative branch. This is red to as the executive -of- statutes. In most cases, this executive erie ation, although not conclusive upon the-courts, is given substan- ial weight. Of course, there are instances when this executive iterpretation strays beyond the tolerable overlap. Executive onstruction is treated as a separate chapter and cases are dis- ussed where executive construction was allowed or discarded. The third area of overlap, which is of primary concern in our tudy of Statutory Construction, is the overlap between the judi- ial and the legislative branches. This is treated separately in me eet, Adynnd beyord Voyei | mt It may sfrike the reader as rather odd that the executive pee eS ee ae eee ee ee oe 12 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION We have spheres that overlap: Diagrams Legislative Kae. It thus appears from our diagram above, that there are three areas of overlap, Areas 1, 2 and 3. Area 1 is the overlap between the executive and the legisla tive functions. This area has been referred to as to the rule making powers of the executive. This allowable overlap is some: times exceeded: Diagram 2 Legislative Executive | When the executive branch (usually through one of its agen | cies) goes beyond the allowable overlap of Area 1, i.e., delegatet en II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ll OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? out previously, the term ‘powers’ figurative rather than structural, should be replaced by ‘functions’ denoting different areas of state activity. The early concept of a strict and rigid separation of functions used by both the American and contempo- raneous French constitutional theory and practice, ap- pears an artificial product, period-and-environment con- ditioned by the speculative rationalism of the enlight- enment. It was nurtured by the Newtonian mechanis- tic premises into the socio-political realm and inspired by the belief that the equilibrium established between the several power holders will result in the permanent harmony of the state society. The assumption that the power holders in equiposp would voluntarily dedicate ——themselves to coope for the common welfare was psychologically unsound. It neglected to its peril, the demonism of the power dynamism. The co-existence of several power holders in rigid isolation was an un- workable illusion, as clearly demonstrated by the French Constitution of 1791, which attempted to apply Montesquieu’s separation of functions to a practical test.” (Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases, pp. 65-66). The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a pe- numbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. (Justice Holmes; Springer vs, Government, 277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 853; cited in Floresca vs, Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 141, 169). There are, thus, in reality, overlaps in the functions of vernment. Instead of a clear-cut airtight delineation: ~ es ee Chapter Il STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? 1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: WHOSE JOB IS IT? _ “To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been, is judicial.” (Fleete vs. Nickerson, 54 L.R.A., p. 554). 2. OVERLAP OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS; HOW DOES THIS AFFECT THE TASK OF STATUTORY CON- STRUCTION? Under the 1987 Constitution, we have returned to the Presi- dential form of government earlier provided for under the 1935 Constitution. Presidentialism is loosely characterized by a “sepa- ration of powers as the same is understood under the American pattern of government.” In principle, the three branches of government, namely, the Executive branch, the Legislative branch and the Judicial branch, are co-equal branches of government with separate and distinct functions. In reality, however, these functions do not fit into separate airtight compartments, but often overlap. “The American government is commonly spoken 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 9 effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute, An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, de- stroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered in- significant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interprete e Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to “enact a local government code which shall pro- vide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.” Moreover, petitioner’s too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition: “We admonish, against a too literal reading of the law as this is apt’ to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. The intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x.” * The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent, (Note: The issue became moot. The scheduled barangay 2lection was only 7 months away.) 8 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ately preceding a regular election.” Since another Republic Act had set the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections on the first Monday of May 1996, and the Supreme Court in an earlier case ruled that a SK election is a regular election, then no recall election can be held. The Supreme Court issued a TRO. Held: ( The entire Section 74 of the Local Government Code reads: Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local elec- tion.” [There are several statutory construction principles dis- cussed here.] It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general inten of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b), construed together with paragraph (a), merely designates the period when such elective local official may be the subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's inter. pretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 7 ext ax The judge overruled the opposition. The grandchildren raised the matter to the Supreme Court. Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute, clear and unambiguous on its face, need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that, only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statu- tory construction. DISCUSSION POINT: What is the rationale be- hind this Article? Do you think the rationale is achieved with this ruling? 8. READ THE STATUTE AS A WHOLE (CONTEXT). It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in inter- preting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. In fact, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or particular provision alone. (AISA us. NERC, 82 SCAD 800, G.R. No. 111722, May 27, 1997). CASE: Paras vs. COMELEC, 76 SCAD 46, 264 SCRA 49, Nov. 4, 1994 Racte: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION the utmost fidelity to the plain command of the law; it is labor arbiters, not a court, that possess original and exclusive. jurisdic- tion over claims for damages arising from picketing or a strike. Note: The uncertainty here is merely on what is the state of law at this particular point in time. This was easily resolved by simply looking at the history and chronology of all the pertinent rules. There is, as of yet, no statutory ambiguity that warrants an application of statutory construction. CASE: Paat vs. C.A., 77 SCAD 726, 266 SCRA 167, dan. 10, 1997 When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly any room for extended ratiocination or ration- alization of the law. CASE: CASE: CASE: Facts: People vs. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164 (discussed in detail under DURA LEX SED LEX, in Chapter VII) Leveriza vs. 1.A.C., 157 SCRA 282 (discussed in detail under SPECIAL OVER GEN- ERAL) Daoang vs. Mun. Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, 159 SCRA 369 (1988) The Agonoy spouses filed a petition for adoption of two minors before the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. The grandchildren of the Agonoy spouses (children of their de- Dia ance cae aa ce 1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 5 ionpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, ‘eparation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate igreement, except claims for employees’ compensation, social ecurity, medicare and maternity benefits; (and) (5) AH other laims arising from employer-employee relations unless expressly xcluded by this Code.” An equally conclusive manifestation of he lack of jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance then, a tegional Trial Court now, is Batas Pambansa Big. 130, amend- ng Article 217 of the Labor Code. It took effect on August 21, 981. Subparagraph 2, paragraph (a) is now worded thus: “(2) hose that involve wages, hours of work and other terms and onditions of employment.” This is to be compared with the ~ ormer phraseology: “(2) unresolved issue in collective bargain- ag, including those that involve wages, hours of work, and other ». erms and conditions of employment.” It is to be noted that Batas ‘ambansa Blg. 130 made no change with respect to the original nd exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money laims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer- mployee relations. Nothing becomes clearer, therefore, than the meritorious haracter of this petition. Certiorari and prohibition lie, respond- aot Judge being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the matter. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclu- ve original jurisdiction of labor arbiters is therein provided for

    You might also like