Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Hamid Dabashi
0
Transaction Publishers
New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London (U.K.)
2008045362
Contents
Introduction: Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror
ix
1. On Exilic Intellectuals
17
123
155
185
209
229
271
Index
283
Introduction
Knowledge and Power in Time of Terror
"The Mechanism of the exception is different While the example
is excluded from the set insofar as it belongs to it, the exception is
included in the normal case precisely because it does not belong to
it."Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer (1995)
At the writing of this introduction, Muslim and Iranian communities around the United States are exceedingly angry with
an editorial cartoon printed in the 4 September 2007 issue of the
Columbus Post-Dispatch in which Iranians are depicted as cockroaches spewing out of a sewer.
Post-Orientalism
Introduction
xi
initiate and accept such cartoons, generate and sustain such semiotics of extermination about an entire people. "By what authority,
and who gave thee this authority"one might wonder in a very
simple, albeit Biblical, question. There is, as always, a relation of
reciprocity between the knowledge (public perception) that such
cartoons generate and sustain and the military power that is able
to go and exterminate those cockroaches.
The book you are about to read is a sustained record of my reflections over many years on precisely the question of this presumed
authority and evident power to represent. Who gets to represent
whom and by what authority? When initiated in the most militarily powerful country in the world, the United States of America,
already deeply engaged in military interventions in Afghanistan
and Iraq (and through Israel in Palestine and Lebanon), such acts
of racist representation speak voluminously of a far more deeply
rooted claim to normative and moral agency, a phenomenon that
must be unearthed and examined. In his groundbreaking book,
Orientalism (1978), Edward Said traced the origin of this power
of representation and the normative agency that it entailed to the
colonial hubris that carried a militant band of mercenary merchants,
military officers, Christian missionaries, and European Orientalists around the globe, enabling them to write and represent the
people they thus sought to rule. The insights of Edward Said in
Orientalism went a long way toward explaining the conditions of
domination and representation from the classical colonial period
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries down to the time that
he wrote his landmark study in the mid-1970s. Though many of
his insights still remain valid and operative, Edward Said's observations will have to be updated and mapped out for the iconic
events that have led to the post-9/11 syndrome. I have written this
book in partial response to this need, in order to think through
Edward Said's insights and reflect on our contemporary conditions. I have done so, however, not just by way of a diagnosis of
how and through what mechanisms "the Orient" continues to be
represented and sought to be dominated, but, more to the point,
how (in what particular terms) a resistance to that will to dominate
xii
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Introduction
xiii
xiv
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Introduction
xv
between Said's insistence on retrieving and contrapuntally liberating a critical and democratic humanism and Spivak's institutional
detour around the impossibility of an intellectual representation of
the subaltern a thirdmuch widerpath. On this path, I contend,
we can wed Edward Said's unabashed political engagement to
Gayatri Spivak's paralyzing critique of the European dismantling
of the sovereign subject, without partaking in Said's "residual humanism" or Spivak's prolonging even further the (European) crisis
of the subject. The straight path towards that objective, learning
and then going beyond Said, Spivak, and Guha, is to put an end
to the idea of "Europe," or a fortiori "the West," as the principle
interlocutor of the world. It is not.
In my next chapter, "The Creative Crisis of the Subject," I continue to facilitate the conversation I have initiated between Edward
Said and Gayatri Spivak in order to reach for a mode of creative
agency, particularly in aesthetic domains, an area that has remained
relatively neglected in both their cases, perhaps in Spivak more
than in Said. This argument will enable me to follow the central
question of agency in Said and Spivak in creative and artistic domains, places where the subaltern artist is ipso facto outside the
purview of the colonial de-subjection. My argument here begins
with a reading of Said's so-called "residual humanism" and then
expands to find a way out of the cul de sac of the sovereign subject
by dwelling on the aesthetic moment of subaltern creativity. In
between Said's critical humanism and Spivak's strategic essentialism, I wish to demonstrate in this chapter, that there already dwells
a defiant subject that they have left theoretically under-theorized,
and which I wish here to encounter. My contention is that this
defiance is best articulated in revolutionary aesthetics rather than
in an exclusively political opposition.
In the next chapter, "Pilgrims' Progress," I have sought to look
at the presumed crisis of the (European) subject from a different and complementary angle. Here I wish to argue that for the
postcolonial person the crisis of the subject is resolved not only
creatively in the aesthetic domain, but also critically in the domain
of revolutionary praxis of a particular provenance. Here I wish to
xvi
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Introduction
xvii
1
On Exilic Intellectuals1
"It is part of morality not to be at home in one's home."
Theodore W. Adorno
"[I am] the outlander, not only regionally, but down bone deep and
for good...my Texas grandfather has something to do with that."
C. Wright Mills
Edward Said's Representations of the Intellectual must be
considered a landmark in radically reawakening the crucial consciousness of that critical community of counter-interpreters we
have habitually called "The Intellectuals."
It appears that the problem of intellectuals in the United States
is reformulated periodically as a crucial barometer of issues and
concerns centered around, but much beyond, the immediate conception of this social category. It was in Democracy in America
that Tocqueville opened his second, theoretically more significant,
volume with the startling pronouncement that:
I think that in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to
philosophy than in the United States. The Americans have no philosophical school of their own, and they care but little for all the schools into
which Europe is divided, the very names of which are scarcely known
to them.2
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On Exilic Intellectuals
Post-Orientalism
thus identified as the leading cause of the decline and fall of the
intellectuals as a community of counter-interpreters.
Edward Said's book on intellectuals came at the end of a long
history of institutional concern with the fate and function of the
intellectuals, particularly at the concluding dead-end of Jacoby's
diagnosis which Robbins' collection had sought to balance. Although Said's lectures were delivered in London as the 1993 Reith
Lectures, the brunt of his argument is in fact directed domestically
to the United States which was not only home to his moral and
intellectual concerns but in fact with the demise of the Soviet
Union and the obvious dangers of a single, domineering, world
superpower the question of American intellectuals' social responsibility has assumed an added momentum. Whereas Robbins' edited
volume had rather successfully re-historicized the position of the
intellectuals, the institutional dilemma of professionalization had
remained paramount. The contributors to Robbins' volume were
in fact more engaged in an advocative and emancipatory act of
inaugurating a new role for the intellectuals rather than providing institutional bases for a way out of Jacoby's highly accurate
diagnosis.
Said's text, however, begins to provide a crucial, and institutionally viable way out of the Jacobian paradox. To be sure, Said's
argument, as I shall note shortly, is equally innovating, advocative,
and emancipatory, rather than clinical and diagnostic in its assessments. Moreover, I believe he had, in effect, detected a crucial
way out of the Jacobian cul-de-sac, which under the changing
conditions of the U.S. imperial polity, to paraphrase Tocqueville's
assessment, may indeed lead to a renaissance in the social function
of the intellectuals.
The first thing that Said does is that he expands the spectrum
of compromising forces that endanger the autonomous judgment
of the intellectual. Here we observe that much more than professionalism is present and active in compromising the role of a
potential intellectual class. As Said sees them, the intellectuals,
as such, are principally compromised by a number of compelling
centers of fatal attractions: nations and nationalism (in parts of
On Exilic Intellectuals
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On Exilic Intellectuals
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On Exilic Intellectuals
10
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On Exilic Intellectuals
11
12
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On Exilic Intellectuals
13
own pattern, as various interests seize your attention, and as the particular
goal you set yourself dictates: that is a unique pleasure.18
There is, however, a profound element of sectarian ghettoization
that seriously challenges the possibilities of Said's cosmopolitan
liberation of the so-called third-world intellectual. As early as
Gramsci's Prison Notebooks (his Quaderni del Carcere which
he wrote between 1929 and 1935), we have been warned of this
danger. Here is what Gramsci observed:
One can note, in the case of the United States, the absence to a considerable degree of traditional intellectuals, and consequently a different
equilibrium among the intellectuals in general.... The necessity of an
equilibrium is determined, not by the need to fuse together the organic
intellectuals with the traditional, but the need to fuse together in a single
national crucible with a unitary culture the different forms of culture
imported by immigrants of differing national origins. The lack of a vast
sedimentation of traditional intellectuals such as onefindsin countries
of ancient civilisations explains, at least in part, both the existence of
only two major political parties, which could in fact easily be reduced
to one only.... and at the opposite extreme the enormous proliferation
of religious sects.19
That condition is still present. Against it, Said's resuscitation of
an active exilic intellectual, precisely in his moving last chapter,
provides what E. M. Cioran once observed as the best condition for
an intellectual: anationality. The exilic condition, as Said defines it,
supersedes ethnic and religious sectarianism only through a flexing
of historical memories through an essentially ironic mode of being. Resistance to theory, which is at the root of resistance to the
intellectuals as the counter-interpreters of a culture, is, as Paul De
Man once observed, resistance to the rhetorical and tropological, to
which one might add "ironic," dimensions of language, and through
language, of being. That ironic mode of being is constitutional to
the working act of the intellectual, irony in the senses stretched
from the counter-metaphysics of Soren Kierkegaard to the engage
pragmatism of Richard Rorty. It is in that ironic mode that the
intellectual can take to task much more than the relations of power
in a political culture and reach down for what Rorty, paraphrasing
14
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Heidegger, has called the "Plato-Kant canon." In fact, the intellectual is nothing but the social manifestation of what Rorty has
typified, if that is the right word to use in this case, as "the ironist
theorist."20 "The ironist theorist," Rorty has suggested, "distrusts
the metaphysician's metaphor of a vertical view downward. He
substitutes the historicist metaphor of looking back on the past
along a horizontal axis."21 The horizontality of that historicist
irony is precisely what spells out the counter-theorizing urge of
the intellectual. "The last thing the ironist theorist wants or needs
is a theory of ironism": It is precisely in that apparent paradox
that the social function of the intellectual may be assayed. The
intellectual, too, can only be real if not idealized, who can only be
historically relevant if under-theorized, institutionally consequential only if not institutionalized. "This means," for intellectuals
as self-creating ironists in Rorty's terms, "that their criterion for
resolving doubts, their criterion of private perfection, is autonomy
rather than affiliation to a power other than themselves."22 In that
autonomyfree from nationalism, traditionalism, professionalism, and neo-prophetic millenarianismEdward Said stipulates
the criteria and conditions of the intellectual.
It is to that ironic mode of being, the exile as the corrective force
in a country to which he or she only marginally belongs, that Said
repeatedly leads our attention. In that attention rests the possibility
of a community of counter-interpreters, permanently in an ironic
mode, that belong only to the degree that they depart, morally
strengthen only to the degree that they politically challenge. As
counter-interpreters, intellectuals are, in the very elegant and true
words of Gianni Vattimo, chiefly responsible for weakening the
terror of metaphysical categories. The politics of "Truth" is only
one such category.
Notes
1.
On Exilic Intellectuals
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
15
2
Ignaz Goldziher and the Question
Concerning Orientalism1
"Ich lebte mich denjn auch wdhrend dieser Wochen so sehr in den
mohammedanischen Geist ein, dass ich zuletzt innerlich uberzeugt
wurde, ich sei selbst Mohammedaner und klug herausfand, dass dies
die einzige Religion seit welche selbst in ihrer doktrinar-offiziellen Gestaltung und Formulirung philosophische Kopfe befriedigen
konne, Mein Ideal war es, das Judenthum zu dhnlicher rationeller
Stufe zu erheben, Der Islam, so lehrte mich meine Erfahrung, sei die
einzige Religion, in welcher Aberglaube und heidnische Rudimente
nicht durch den Rationalismust sondern durch die orthodoxe Lehre
verpont werden,"
[I truly entered in those weeks into the spirit of Islam to such an
extent that ultimately I became inwardly convinced that I myself was
a Muslim and judiciously discovered that this was the only religion
which, even in it doctrinal and official formulation, can satisfy philosophical minds. My ideal was to elevate Judaism to a similar rational
level Islam, my experience taught me, was the only religion in which
superstition and pagan elements were proscribed, not by rationalism
but by the Orthodox doctrine,]
Ignaz Goldziher, Tagebuch2
17
18
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19
Goldziher represents Orientalism at its highest and most productive stage, a moment in its emerging history, when Orientalists
thought themselves sitting on top of a heap of untapped knowledge
about a universe of which they and the European world they represented knew nothingand yet they must. Before anything else,
it is imperative to have an understanding of Goldziher's range and
depth of knowledge about Islam, for at the heart of that sweeping
knowledge also dwelled its fatal weakness.
In May 1906, Ignaz Goldziher (1850-1921) received an invitation to deliver a series of six lectures in various universities in the
United States"Honorarium," he noted in his Tagebuch, "$2,500."3
It is something more than an indication of the rate of inflation to
take that figure today as an index of the esteem in which he was
held at the high point of his scholarly reputation. His declining
health, however, combined with his frustration with the inadequacy
of the English translation of his lectures prevented him from coining to the United States and delivering those lectures. Goldziher
subsequently published the original German of his lectures, Vorlesungen iiber den Islam, in 1910. Translations of these lectures
soon appeared in many languagesincluding the notorious English
translation (1917) that had discouraged Goldziher's U. S. visit.4
Despite that inauspicious beginning, the prominent Hungarian
Orientalist finally made it into the English-speaking world when
his most ambitious scholarly work, Muhammedanische Studien
(1889-1890) was competently translated into English as Muslim
Studies and published in 1966 (volume I) and 1971 (volume II).
If in 1906, a group of American scholars went through the
trouble of raising a rather handsome honorarium to invite and
listen to one of the most distinguished Islamists alive, a century
later, the world at large, now perhaps globally far more in jeopardy
20
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21
the end of The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, when
comparing what is written today on Islam with Goldziher's essays,
"sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained
a level of civilization never before achieved."6
More than anything else, it is the range of these essaysfor
Ignaz Goldziher's Muslim Studies and most of his other writings
are essentially a collection of interrelated essaysthat today strikes
us as quite rare and extraordinary. Ours is an age of professedly
competent but publicly irrelevant specialists, on one side, and
dangerously incompetent public experts, on the other. As the
systematic and perhaps inevitable fragmentation of various disciplinesranging from social sciences to the humanitieshave
fragmented the academic world into the domains and fiefdoms of
publicly irrelevant specialists, the public at large is at the mercy of
overnight experts opining on matters of vital global significance
without so much as an elementary knowledge of a language necessary to venture an opinion about a matter. "Islam" in particular,
as a floating signifier, has today (more than ever) emerged as a
perilous field of terrifying frivolity, with the U.S. and European
airwaves, print media, and the Internet inundated with dangerous
disinformation. Between academic specialists knowing more
and more about less and less relevant issues and public experts
shooting from the hip, stands a bewildered public that today could
have, but alas is not, much benefited from a gifted and erudite essayist like Ignaz Goldziher. What is most remarkable about these
essays is the ease of their diction, the fluidity of their scholarly
competence communicated with an almost deceptive simplicity.
Goldziher's essays could very well be published in a newspaper
or a magazine todaya world religion much politically maligned
(by its adherents and detractors alike) and rarely explained to the
world at large.
Like most other gifted essayists, Goldziher is well informed in
his scholarship, highly competent in his delivery, and unabashedly
opinionated. In the six essays collected in the first volume of Muslims Studies (1889/1966), Goldziher begins with a general treatment of Islam and its rise from pre-Islamic Arab context through
22
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23
24
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investigations, it is Muslim scholars who were his actual (at alAzhar, where he studied) and imaginative (transhistorical) peers,
with whom he most immediately identified, and into their debates
he brought along a comparatist perspective (particularly with his
insights into the Talmudicboth Halakha and Haggadainfluences on both Islamic law and Qur'anic exegesis). Goldziher, in
a very peculiar way, saw himself as a "Muslim scholar," though
to his dying day (and against extraordinary odds in the horrid
days of European anti-Semitism) he remained a proud, pious, and
observant Jew.10
The second volume of Muslim Studies, otherwise exclusively
devoted to the study of the legalistic and formal aspects of the faith,
includes a pioneering study of "Veneration of Saints in Islam."
Here, Goldziher demonstrates the process by which the Prophet
of Islam was gradually endowed with miraculous attributes despite doctrinal and his own personal testimonies to the contrary.
Goldziher characterizes this as the necessity of filling "the gap
between the divine and the human."11 The dialectical disposition
of Goldziher's scholarship had always necessitated a multifaceted
conception of Islam, never allowing his particular attention to one
crucial dimension of the faith (particularly its jurisprudence, with
which Goldziher was primarily concerned) totally color his general
conception of it. Here, Goldziher's attention to the development
of the figure of wali is a pioneering reflection on the doctrinal development of the more mystical dimension of Islam, with specific
attention to the role of women saints in Sufism. The detail with
which Goldziher examined the more popular dimensions of Islam
would not be repeated until much later with the rise of interest on
the part of anthropologists in Islamic fields.
The six essays that Goldziher wrote when he was invited to
travel to the United States demonstrate a similar range of interest
and complexity. What he had intended to teach his American audience shows Goldziher's particular penchant for the multifaceted
realities of a civilization to which he had devoted his scholarly life.
First, he wanted to speak about "Muhammad and Islam." In this
essay, Goldziher gives a rather detailed account of the prophetic
25
26
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27
28
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29
30
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such covering their invisible blind spots) into Islam was fundamentally rooted in the fact that at their best they were not invested
in it, while the worst of them were heavily invested in producing
a particular knowledge of Islam and Muslims compatible with
European colonial interests. At their best, such European Orientalists as Goldziher had nothing at stake in the historical outcome of
Islamic history, nor did they, in any shape or form, share the fate
of Muslims. The reason that Goldziher could place a discussion of
Islamic law next to one of Islamic mysticism and then compare the
result to Islamic philosophy, followed by a discussion of Islamic
sects, and thus come up with significantly crucial insights about
all of them, is that he was neither a Muslim jurist, nor a mystic,
nor a philosopher, nor did he (except for an emotive affinity with
the Sunni Orthodoxy) have anything but a scholarly interest in
varied sectarian divisions within Islam. The knowledge that he
thus produced was in its very epistemic foundations different
from the one produced by Muslims themselvesjurists, mystics,
theologians, philosophers, historians of ideas, etc., scholars who
would put their neck on the line for what they wrote. Goldziher
had no such stake in the matter, and as such his ability to take a
surgeon's point of view over what amounts to the unconscious body
of a patient demonstrates the characteristic insights and blindness
of Orientalism that Goldziher best represented.
Many of these basic issues at the epistemic roots of Orientalism
as a system of knowledge production have today become overshadowed by a succession of entirely adhominem assumptions and
accusations about Orientalists and Orientalismone specifically
targeted at Goldziher, and the other extended to Orientalism in general. It is imperative to depersonalize any discussion of Goldziher
and Orientalism and take the argument back to its discursive and
institutional points of origin. What we face today in any attempt
to have an historically balanced conception of Goldziher and the
body of scholarship that he has produced is (1) an entirely inappropriate and ad hominem attack on Ignaz Goldziher, and (2) an
equally twisted view of Edward Said's principled critique of Orientalism into a personal dispute between him and his nemeses. If
Raphael Patai, a recent biographer of Ignaz Goldziher, is chiefly
31
responsible for the former, Bernard Lewis, for years the principle
academic nemesis of Edward Said, is equally responsible for the
latter. The matter, however, is far more institutionally grounded,
and theoretically robust, for these ad hominem distortions of principled issues to cloud our historical assessment of Orientalism as
a mode of knowledge production in general, and of Goldziher in
particular.
*
32
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including his failure to secure a proper teaching position and being forced, against his will and in order to provide for his family,
acceptance of a secretarial position at the Israelite Congregation
of Pest, a job he bitterly resented until his dying day. Beginning
in 1890, when he began writing his memoir, Goldziher's notes
become contemporaneous with his life and rather consistent until
1919 (1 September 1919 is his last entry), namely just two years
before his death on 13 November 1921.
When in 1955, Ignaz Goldziher's son, Karoly Goldziher, died in
Budapest, the Goldziher family handed over to Alexander Scheiber,
the director of the Budapest Rabbinical Seminary, the manuscript
of Goldziher's Tagebuch, which he in turn edited, annotated, and
published in its original German in Leiden in 1978. On this occasion, Goldziher's family also delivered to Alexander Scheiber
another manuscriptthis one a detailed travelogue that Goldziher
had kept during 1873-1874 (between 15 September 1873 and 14
January 1874), while on his memorable journey to Syria, Palestine,
and Egypt. Alexander Scheiber subsequently gave this manuscript
to Raphael Patai, an anthropologist and biblical scholar, the founder
and director of the Palestine Institute of Folklore and Ethnology,
and the editor of Herzl Press, who at the time was living in New
York and teaching at various universities. Raphael Patai subsequently translated Goldziher's travelogue to Syria, Palestine, and
Egypt, called it Goldziher's "Oriental Diary," wrote an extensive
introduction to it, in effect summarizing Goldziher's other, more
extensive, memoir in German, the Tagebuch, and then used the occasion to produce what Patai calls a "psychological portrait." This
English translation of Goldziher's original German by Raphael
Patai is the only published version of this travelogue.24
Goldziher's travelogue to Syria, Palestine, and Egypt ends
abruptly on 14 January 1874. But he remained in Cairo until
mid-April of that year, returning to Budapest a few days before
the death of his father on 4 May 1874. Between mid-January and
mid-April, Goldziher continued to write in his travelogue, including a detailed description of his attending a Friday prayer in Cairo.
But according to Raphael Patai that part of the Travelogue has been
lost. Patai's theory about this loss, which seems plausible, is that
33
34
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text of the Hebrew Bible by the time he was five years old: "At
seven he and his friends organized religious services every Sunday, at which Naci preached the sermons. At eight he was started
on the Talmud."27 At eight, his mother told him later, he would
go to bed embracing and kissing, "like beloved beings," his own
voluminous copies of the Talmud. At twelve, he had started reading such major Jewish philosophers as Bahya ibn Paquda, Yehuda
Halevi, and Maimonides. He was still twelve when he wrote and
published a treatise on the origin and development of the Jewish
prayers. Later he recalled, "this opus was the first cornerstone of
my bad reputation as a 'freethinker.'"28 The following year, he
persuaded his father to arrange for him to deliver his bar mitzvah
speech from the pulpit of the synagogue. The speech had a lasting
influence on the young Goldziher, who considered it "the beacon
of my life."29 By the time he was fifteen, and before he even had
his high school diploma he entered University of Budapest, where
he began a course of studies in "classical languages, philosophy,
German literature and Turcology."30 He was barely sixteen when
he published his first translations from Turkish literature, and by
time he was nineteen he earned his Ph.D. in Leipzig, followed by
yet another year of studies in Leiden. By then, "he had no less than
thirty published items to his credit."31 After all these achievements,
the prevalent European anti-Semitism still prevented him from securing a paid teaching position at a university, unless he converted
(like his own teacher Armenius Vambery had) to Christianity,
something he refused to do. Failing to secure a solid teaching
position, Goldziher was engaged to teach as a Privatdozent (an
unpaid lecturer) at the University of Budapest, while subsisting
on a meager stipend from the Ministry of Culture.
Rescuing Goldziher from this disconcerting conditionbeing
one of the most prominent Islamist of his generation, and yet prevented from assuming his rightful place at a universitya timely
governmental grant enabled him to travel to the Islamic world.
Between September 1873 and April 1874, Goldziher spent what
he later considered the happiest months of his life in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, enrolling at al-Azhar as a student, a feat rarely
35
In order to understand the meaning and significance of this statement, it is crucial to remember that Goldziher never converted to
Islam and to his dying day (and against all odds) remained committed to his own ancestral faith. The statement, instead, must
be understood as a simple confession of affinity with a person's
subject of lifetime scholarly devotion. The other aspect of this
statement is its comparative disposition. Goldziher detested Christianity with a vengeance, traced the horrid roots of European anti-
36
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37
38
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39
40
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customs; he grasps the little kernel of spirit which hides in this mud; he
identifies his own self with the day of renunciation and disembodiment;
he cries honestly, bitterly; he loves with the noble ones of the time; he
feels unhappy in the flesh; he cries about it; he trembles as he speaks,
"Father-King, we have sinned before you;" he shakes as he grasps the
power of the word "Sins"and this synagogue of the Sephardim, which
he had held higher than it deserved, laughs at him! Away, away from the
impure! Here you can no longer stand it.45
These cannot be the words of a person who is suffering "from an
acute anti-Jewish complex"? Avicenna has a quatrain in Persian
(among the few things that he wrote in his own mother tongue),
in which he says:
Kofr-e cho mani gazaf-o asan nabovad,
Mohkam tar az iman-e man iman nabovad;
Dar dahr cho man yeki-o ou ham kafer,
Pas dar hameh dahr yek Mosalman nabovad.
[The infidelity of someone like me is no simple matter,
For there is no faith stronger than my faith;
All around the universe there is no one like me, and I am an infidel,
Then throughout the universe there is not a single Muslim.]46
People like Goldziher and Avicenna are the measure of their faith,
not an abstract notion of faith the measure of their experiences.
They were, in their persons, mobile synagogues and itinerant
mosques, living and breathing temples to the truth of their respective religions.
There is a universal ecumenicalism about Goldziher's religiosity that seems to have escaped the author of his "psychological
portrait." A Muslim public prayer was not the only non-Jewish
service that Goldziher attended while on this journey. During his
short visit to Jerusalem, on 2 December 1873, he also attended
a mass in the Church of Holy Sepulcher, of which Patai is fully
aware and yet on which remains curiously silent, seeming to
have no moral "compunctions" such as those he expresses about
Goldziher's attending a Friday prayer in a mosque in Cairo.47 This
attendance at the Church of Holy Sepulcher was despite the fact
that Goldziher was severely critical of Christianity.
41
42
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43
superior knowledge of his own faith, for Judaism, and not at its
expense. Goldziher saw Islam as an intellectual outgrowth of Judaism (he called Islam "the Judaized Meccan cult" and he meant
it in an exceedingly positive and affirmative sense towards both
Judaism and Islam). The result is an emotive affinity with Islam
on both a confessional and a scholarly plane, and thus far from a
"youthful infatuation."
That Goldziher later became exceedingly angry and bitter that
he had to work as a secretary for the Israelite Congregation of Pest
upon his return from Egypt, or that on occasions he made some
rather harsh remarks about this job, is no indication that he had
any troubled relationship with his own faith. He refused to betray
his faith and convert to Christianity at the heavy cost of endangering and damaging his academic career. He had no problem with
being a perfectly proud and confident Jew. Speaking of his friend
Wilhelm Bacher (1850-1913), whom he greatly loved and admired
as a Talmudic scholar (and with whom, incidentally, he studied
Persian and read Sa'di), Goldziher said, "for him Judaism was a
literary fact; for me, in 1867, it was already the pulse of my life."55
Defending his dignity while at the service of a secretarial job that
took him away from his scholarship, he insisted, "my house was
now Jewish in a higher sense, and I brought up my two children
religiously, with prophets and Psalms; all lies were banished and
left out of their education. And while I in this manner erected a
temple in my home for truly God-believing and Messianic Judaism, the pious men from Bohemia never ceased slandering me and
charging me with heresy on ever-broader grounds."56 Goldziher
never forgave his own teacher, the prominent Turcologist Armenius Vambery (1832-1913), for having converted to Christianity
(after having already converted to Islam), while deriding Goldziher for remaining true to Judaism against all odds.57 Goldziher's
frustration with his secretarial job was the just and perfectly
understandable anger of a superior intellect being forced to do a
mind-numbing administrative task (while being constantly humiliated by his employers), and had nothing to do with this job being
at a Jewish organization. Goldziher was equally contemptuous of
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the nature of that dialectic that has completely escaped the author
of his "psychological portrait," busy as he is portraying him as
"an evil man."
There were other obstacles Goldziher had to overcome before
he was finally admitted to study al-Azhar. With every witty, intelligent, and appropriate answer he provided he further endeared
himself to his colleagues and teachers and was welcomed with
open arms, especially by a certain Shaykh Mahfuz al-Maghribi
who as soon as laid eyes on Goldziher told him he had had a
dream that he was coming to study with him, referring to him as
"a descendent of the old prophets"65yet another indication that
neither Goldziher nor his friends and colleagues hid his identity and
ancestral faith. Al-Azhar professors and students alike welcomed,
loved, and admired Goldziher like one of their own. He visited
them at their residences and they came to pay Goldziher visits in
turn. He spent his mornings studying at the library and attending
lectures and seminars, and his evenings socializing with his friends
and colleagues. He was "led from paradise to paradise,"66 as he
later recalled fondly what to the end of his life he considered the
most blissful time of his life. Riyad Pasha, totally vindicated in
his recommendation of Goldziher continued to meet with him and
repeat his offer for him to stay in Egypt and pursue a career far
more lucrative than what was offered or was expected of him in
Hungary. Goldziher politely refused Riyad Pasha's offers.
Neither his preoccupation with his studies nor his acquaintance
with high-ranking officials like the minister of education prevented
Goldziher from becoming deeply involved with the anti-colonial
sentiments current in Egypt at the time. "During the celebrations
of the marriage of the daughter of the Viceroy," as Patai characterizes Goldziher's politics, "Goldziher agitated in the bazaars against
the advantages enjoyed by the Europeans in Egypt."67 What Patai
calls "agitation" others may call something else, like anti-colonial
protest. Goldziher frequented the circles of Egyptian nationalists,
prepared historical accounts of a reconstruction of Egyptian culture
in opposition to European colonialism.68 He joined anti-colonial
demonstrations in the streets of Cairo, spoke and wrote on behalf
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highest achievement of this decade, as we saw, was the publication of his two-volume masterpiece, Muhammedanische Studien
(1889-1890). While his public lectures on Judaism were not very
well received"his presentation was far above the heads of the
audience"95his two-volume opus on Islam established him as
the undisputed master of the discipline. In his oscillation between
two exaggerated extremes, either accusing Goldziher of malevolent
character traits or showering him with exaggerated superlatives,
and thus projecting the image of a tormented genius,96 Patai considers the publication of the two volumes of Muhammedanische
Studien as an indication that "until Goldziher all of this was terra
incognita, not only for European scholars but also for the Muslim
'ulama and intelligentsia. With the publication of this work the
scholarly world agreed that Goldziher had created the intellectual
history of Islam "97 This absurdity, later repeated by other latterday Orientalists, simply defies reason. How could Muslims create
their own intellectual history, the material that Goldziher studiously
examined as the body of his scholarship, and yet not be aware of
what it is they had produced? It was Goldziher's supreme joy to
have (however briefly) lived and studied among those who had
created this intellectual history. He felt himself honored to have
been accepted by them as a student and as an equal. How could
he have "created the intellectual history of Islam"? Goldziher did
no such thing. He was a scholar of uncommon erudition. But he
did not "create" the intellectual history of an entire civilization.
He was no tormented geniusnor was he an evil man.
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As a Zionist, Patai does not hide the fact that his anger against
Goldziher is rooted in why he refused to endorse the Zionist project.
"After the issuance of the Balfour Declaration," Patai notes,
in which the British government undertook to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, Zionist leaders approached
Goldziher to ask him to help them establish contacts with Arab notables
and scholars with whom he had excellent connections and who had great
respect for him, but he refused.113
Even this frustration of a committed Zionist as to why a man
of Goldziher's status refused to have endorsed his ideology is
perfectly understandable. But to turn around and accuse him
of "superpatriotism, chauvinism, and xenophobia" is not only
anachronistic, but blatantly politically motivated, vindictive, and
as such predicated on an entirely flawed line of argument. One
could not possibly accuse Goldziher, and hundreds of thousands
of other Hungarian Jews, of not caring about their own collective
fate, their own well-being. From a Zionist perspective, and from
the hindsight of post-Holocaust history, one can even accuse them
of poor judgment and lack of farsightedness. But imputing superpatriotism and xenophobia not just to Goldziher and hundreds of
thousands of other Hungarian but to millions of European Jewry
for their perfectly legitimate claims to their homeland is not just
affectedly conceited but also logically flawed.
There are, in fact, no indications that Goldziher opposed the
peaceful coexistence of Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Palestine. Patai reports an eyewitness account in which Goldziher
purportedly told the Syrian reverend 'Abdul-Ahad Dominique
Bashar Mishkuni, a former student:
I havefirmlyhoped in my whole life that the time will come when Arabs
and Jews making peace with each other, will cooperate in the resurrection of Israel and the Arab people. If you return to your native country,
tell your brethren that I have worked all my life for your people and for
my people.114
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From his own pen in his Travelogue we also read how upon his
visit to Jerusalem he thought
of the calumniated, persecuted prophetism of the Hebrew Past, of the
prophetism of the future, of the new Jerusalem that, "liberated" and
rebuilt by spirit and thought, will become the place of pilgrimage of all
those who, with free mind, erect a new Zion for the Jehovah of freedom
that embraces the whole mankind.115
This is in November 1873, from the pen of the twenty-three-yearold Goldziher, decades before the Dreyfus Affair (1894) gave
momentum to the rise of political Zionism, twenty-three years,
to be exact, before Theodor Herzl (1860-1904) published his Der
Judenstaat {The Jewish State, 1896), and almost thirty-years before Herzl published his novel, Altneuland {Old-New Land, 1902),
giving his vision of a socialist Utopia in Palestine. Long before
Herzl, Goldziher too had his own Utopian vision. "He wanted the
persecuted Jews," recalls Bernard Heller, "to find a home in the
Holy Land, that Jews, Christians, and Muslims might live there in
brotherhood together."116 He too called that Utopia "Israel," and
invoked the name of Zion to mark it, but Goldziher's was a "Zion
for the Jehovah of freedom that embraces the whole mankind."
There is a serious difference between Goldziher's "Zionism" and
Herzl's.
Patai, much to his credit, seriously discounts the later efforts of
people like Louis Massignon who tried posthumously to turn Goldziher into a "spiritual" or a "cultural" Zionist, and characterizes
them as "to say the least, tenuous."117 But more than tenuous are
his own issues with millions of European Jews who simply refused
to take Herzl's colonial adventurism (if they were not Zionists)
or prophetic visions (if they were) too seriously. That they paid
for their decisions dearly and with their own lives and the lives of
their loved one's cannot be subjected to Monday-morning quarterbacking nor can their natural and perfectly legitimate love for their
homelands branded as superpatriotic, chauvinist, and xenophobic.
Bernard Heller believes, in exact contradiction to Raphael Patai,
that Goldziher's "profound religion was not mixed with any kind
of nationalist element. On this point he made a fundamental state-
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65
to consult) his Travelogue and thus did not care even to consult
it for exact dates, locations, or the chronology of events, and as a
result he makes a few minor mistakes about dates and locations
(which Patai is of course quick to catch). These facts indicate that
the function of Tagebuch and Travelogue was entirely momentary,
private, and a simple way of unloading the burden of the day that
had passed. "I have nobody to whom I could confide the mortifications and humiliations that are my daily bread," Goldziher
writes in his Tagebuch on the day that his son Max dies, "except
to these pages."122 Neither the Tagebuch nor the Travelogue was
certainly meant to be abusively read by a politically antagonistic
anthropologist with a penchant for pop-psychology and scandalous sexual innuendos.
There are other aspects of the Tagebuch and the Travelogue
that come together to define their mutual function in providing
Goldziher with an emotional outlet and underscore the sense of
purpose in his life. Patai notes how on one day Goldziher goes on
a rampage against people who have irritated him, and only a few
days later he forgets what he had said earlier and writes: "I have
become apathetic to all marks of honor just as I have, with a will,
become apathetic to all humiliation."123 Patai takes such occasions
as an indication of Goldziher's lack of stability. But these remarks
point to something entirely different, that the Tagebuch (and by
extension the Travelogue) is really an instantaneous occasion for
Goldziher to let off steam, building up inside him during the day,
an immediate function even beyond his original purpose of telling
his family and close friends his life story. The Tagebuch certainly
began as a life story to be shared with Goldziher's immediate family and friends, but as soon as he summarizes the early part of his
life (with an obvious and perhaps inevitable sense of nostalgia),
and continues to write about his current life from 1890 forward
the function of the diary almost completely changes and becomes
a manner of talking to a friend, a close confidentand even that
not in a regular, systematic way. There are days, weeks, and even
months that go by in which Goldziher does not write anything
in his Tagebuch. The entire year of 1905, for example, has only
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at all, for the European public at large more or less knows about these
languages. So because they might be exposed in public, those who know
these languages never dare to make such claims, not-even one tenth of
such claims. They only speak of their ownfieldof specialization in a
very small branch of those two languages, and would not dare to utter a
word beyond their area of competence.141
As to Qazvini's recommendation:
My point is that my dear fellow countrymen should not be fooled by
such authoritative-sounding titles as "Professor of Oriental Languages,"
or "Member of Such-and Such Society or Academy," and should not
accept blindly any nonsense that comes from Europe, signed by such
non-entities, without first subjecting it to critical judgment. Their assessments should not be considered as divine revelation, and you must
use your divinely endowed reason, which is the sole measure of distinguishing between truth from falsehood, along with the knowledge you
have acquired, in everything. Gauge everything with that measure, so
that you can distinguish between the right and the wrong path, between
the learned guide and the misguided fool.142
Qazvini wrote these words on Friday 14 November 1924, based
on his experiences accumulated over the preceding two decades in
Europe and with European Orientalists. These are the words of a
scholar who admires, and considers it his honor to have even met,
prominent European Orientalists. He has no political axe to grind.
He is not Palestinian. The state of Israel is not yet established. He
is neither a Zionist nor an anti-Zionist. Postmodernism, poststructuralism, and deconstruction are terms yet to be invented decades
after Qazvini made these observations. None of the crowded
and crowding issues that subsequently coagulated to confuse the
principled questions raised by Edward Said in Orientalism are
anywhere in sight, nor does Qazvini present his case against these
"charlatans," as he calls them, in any theoretically sophisticated
language near the points and ambitions of Edward Said. He simply
provides an eyewitness account as a legendary scholar about what
he thought of Orientalism as practiced by all its representatives except a handful he mentions specifically by name and do not all add
up even to two dozens in entire Europe (exactly sixteen scholars
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indeed, "many of these works did not have much else to offer."
Then Iranshahr writes:
But later, when European countries expanded the domain of their colonial possessions and conquered much of Oriental lands, the significance
and influence of these sorts of [Orientalist] writings became far more
powerful. European governments who needed to know about the habits,
ethics, as well as the political, economic, and social conditions and organizations of the Orientals began to pay closer attention to these travelers
and their works. For this reason, they began also to establish in their
capitals Orientalist schools and societies, encouraging the Orientalists
and promoting Orientalist journals and periodicals.145
Thus about half a century before Edward Said, Kazem Zadeh Iranshahr clearly and concisely sees and articulates the link between
colonialism and Orientalism. To be sure, he does not have Edward
Said's theoretical sophistication to argue the organic link between
the epistemic foregrounding of Orientalist knowledge production
and the colonial power that engendered it, for in fact Michel Foucault was not even born yet (the first issue of Iranshahr in which
this article appears is dated 26 June 1926; Michel Foucault was
born a few months later on 15 October 1926) to spend a lifetime
of his scholarship discovering and articulating that link, from
which then Edward Said borrowed and proceeded with his own
version of the idea. But the essence of the idea, the connection
between colonialism and Orientalism, following on the footsteps
of European travelers and adventurers and their Oriental fantasies
they created, foretells Edward Said's very table of contents in
Orientalism almost chapter by chapterfifty years before Edward
Said put pen to paper and wrote Orientalism,
Upon this premise, Iranshahr then proceeds to tell his readers
how by his time the domain of Orientalism had vastly expanded
and there were now Orientalists specializing in various fields as
Egyptologists, Arabists, Iranists, Sinologists, Armenialogists, etc.
Despite his acute political alertness, Iranshahr is not an anti-Orientalist and like Qazvini acknowledges the service that European
Orientalists have in fact provided the world of scholarship. So in
order to be fair, he reminds his readers that the beneficiaries of the
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work of these Orientalists have not been just the "political interests," as he puts it, of the Orientalists' respective countries. The
Orientalists have indeed, Iranshahr believes, done a wonderful job
of discovering the most detailed aspects of these countries, so much
so that "for centuries the Orientals themselves need to benefit and
follow the Orientalists and learn their methodology as the exemplary model of scholarship."146 It is imperative to place Iranshahr's
insight into the link between colonialism and Orientalism, outlined
half a century before this became the common staple of Edward
Said theories and scholarship, in the context of his appreciation of
Orientalism so he too cannot be dismissed as an "anti-Western,"
"pro-Islamic fundamentalist," "Palestinian activist," "Professor of
terror," who just did not appreciate the finer points of Orientalist
scholarship. If anything, Iranshahr and his colleagues in Berlin,
particularly their patron Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh (1878-1969),
were the staunchest supporters of the so-called "Westernization"
in Iran. Taqizadeh, the principal benefactor of Kazemzadeh and
scores of other expatriate Iranian intellectuals whom he gathered
in Berlin during World War I to publish Kaveh, another extraordinary journal advocating the cause of "modernization" in Iran,
is famous in modern Iranian history for having said, "From the
top of the head to the tip of the toe, Iranians must become European."147 So none of these people can be accused of any ill will
towards "the West," or even of having a strong political position
on colonialism. They have simply recorded what they thought of
Orientalists and Orientalism.
Iranshahr's concluding remark in this short essay is to suggest
(echoing in this respect too Edward Said's repeated insistence)
that people in the East should also start creating a discipline of
"Occidentalism," in which they will study "the social, political,
literary, economic, industrial, and technical aspects of Western
nations."148
The combined effect of Qazvini and Iranshahr's critique of Orientalism, both in scholarly and political terms (representative of
a wider constituency of Iranian scholars and coming from people
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Beyond this expansion and clarification of Edward Said's argument in Orientalism of any issues that cloud its principal thesis,
we need also to know what Said specifically has to say about Ignaz
Goldziher. In Orientalism, Edward Said makes three specific references to Goldziher, and they are as follows: The first reference is
when Said effectively admits his own shortcomings in not having
covered German Orientalism. "Any work that seeks to provide
an understanding of academic Orientalism," he writes, "and pays
little attention to scholars like Steinthal, Miiller, Becker, Goldziher,
Brockelmann, Noldeketo mention only a handfulneeds to be
reproached, and I freely reproach myself. I particularly regret not
taking more account of the great scientific prestige that accrued to
German scholarship by the middle of the nineteenth century, whose
neglect was made into a denunciation of insular British scholars by
George Eliot."151 Said then proceeded to provide a perfectly persuasive explanation for this neglectfirst because Germany never
had a national interest in the Orient, and second because despite
this absence of colonial concerns (like French and British Orientalism), the German Orientalism did project "a kind of intellectual
authority over the Orient within Western cultures,"152 namely the
exclusion of German Orientalism was theoretically explainable
without exempting it from Said's more general critic of European
Orientalism, which is to say he implicated German Orientalism,
and quite rightly so, in his general critique of the discipline, while
providing something of an explanation as to why he had excluded
it, and yet still confessing that there is lacunae in his coverage. Be
that as it may, what Said is saying specifically about Goldziher is a
confession of the limitation of his coverage, but phrased in a way
that does not altogether discredit his observationsand he is (as
I will soon explain) perfectly correct in that suggestion.
The second time Said refers to Goldziher in Orientalism is in
the context of his discussion of the objectification of "the Orient,"
the "Orientals," and thus the systematic ignorance, for example,
of national liberation movements in the former colonies, a theme
that Said picks up from Anwar Abdel Malek and expands upon.
Here Said says,
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The Orientalistsfrom Renan to Goldziher to Macdonald to von Grunebaum, Gibb, and Bernard Lewissaw Islam, for example, as "cultural
synthesis" ... that could be studied apart from the economics, sociology,
and politics of the Islamic peoples. For Orientalism, Islam had a meaning which, if one were to look for its most succinct formulation, could
be found in Renan'sfirsttreatise: in order best to be understood Islam
had to be reduced to "tents and tribe."153
Whatever the accuracy of this assertion might be about the other
Orientalists (and it certainly is accurate about Bernard Lewis), it is
not entirely applicable to Goldziher. The distinguishing factor of
Goldziher as an Islamist was in fact his particular attention to social
and political factors in the course of the historical developments of
Islam, not only as evident in the pages of his Muslim Studies, but
throughout the rest of his work, particularly his Qur'anic, Tafsir
(Qur'anic exegesis), and legal scholarship. Ironically, Goldziher is
in fact severely criticized by Muslim scholars, especially by Muslim Hadith scholars, for having too much historicizedsubjected
to social and political factorsthe development of their sacred
lore.154 In addition, Goldziher was acutely aware of the most recent
developments in the Islamic world, had traveled there, and wrote
about such revolutionary movements as Wahabism and Babism
with a combination of critical appreciation and extensive analytical detail. As evidenced in the pages of his travelogue to Syria,
Palestine, and Egypt, he in fact participated in street demonstrations
against European colonialism and refused to have anything to do
(and in fact opposed) Zionismso he certainly cannot be accused
of either ignoring social and political issues or reducing Islam
to "tents and tribes." But to be fair to Said, neither Goldziher's
Tagebuch (1978) nor his Travelogue (1987) was available to him
when he was writing Orientalism (1978)though the two volumes
of Goldziher's Muslim Studies (1966 and 1970) and other works,
evidence of Goldziher's detailed attention to social and political
factors in the development of Islam, were indeed available, as was
his Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung (1920), another
major indication of Goldziher's attention to social and political
factors in the historical developments of Qur'anic hermeneutics
(the tafasir).
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Be that as it may, there is an element of truth to what Said observes even about Goldziher, namely the disciplinary and epistemic
self-sufficiency of Orientalism as a mode of knowledge production,
in which Orientalists rarely paid any attention to adjacent disciplines or learned from their methodologies and discoveries. The
one work in which Goldziher did pay attention to the theories of
myth advanced by Max Miiller is his study of the Hebrew Bible,
Der Mythos bei den Hebrdern (Mythology among the Hebrews),
cost him dearly in the course of his academic career. As we noted
earlier, his contemporaries were utterly scandalized by it, in effect
costing him a prominent position that had opened in the Rabbinical Seminary of Budapest, for it had offended the religious
sensibility of powerful men in positions to deny him that job.155
Even earlier in his life, when as a precocious adolescent (merely
twelve years old) Goldziher published his Sihat Yitzhaq ("Isaac's
Discourse")Yitzhaq being his Hebrew nameon the historical
origin and gradual development of Jewish prayers, people began to
call him, by way of an insult and accusation, that he was a "freethinker" and a "Spinozist."156 So both in epistemic terms domestic
to the discipline of Orientalism and in terms of the social conditions
that prevented an Islamist or a scholar of Judaism to venture into
uncharted theoretical and methodological domains, Goldziher was
very much a creature of his own timethough being a European
and writing about Islam gave him a freer hand in applying a vigorous historical analysis to Islamic intellectual history, a freedom
denied him when it came to Judaic studies because of severe and
immediate professional consequences.
One has to also consider that much of the disciplinary formations
of sociology, anthropology, political science, or economics were
in their nascent stages as Goldziher was writing. Said's expectation that Goldziher should have paid attention to "the economics,
sociology, and politics of the Islamic peoples" must be balanced by
what was available to him from an intellectual history perspective,
for by the time that Goldziher was writing, say between his first
publication, the very same Sihat Yitzhaq, in 1862 and his death in
1921, the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, economics, and
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having an affinity with those who believed in the "latent inferiority" of Islam? Goldziher was so profoundly pro-Islamic (without
losing his scholarly perspective on it, of course), that his own coreligionists consider him of having been "infatuated with Islam"
and "suffered from an acute anti-Jewish complex." The facts of
Goldziher's thoughts, ideas, and scholarship do not corroborate
Waardenburg/Said's specific assertions on him. Goldziher is first
accused of being "infatuated by Islam" and then of believing in
Islam's "latent inferiority." He could not have been both, for
he was neither. He was neither infatuated with Islam nor did he
believe it to be an inferior religion. He thought it one of the greatest religions and civilizations the world had experienced, without
either converting to it or else losing his scholarly distance from
itand yet none of these false attributions to Goldziher clear
him from the principle criticism of Edward Said in Orientalism,
which survive these minor mistakes and remains solidly valid.
The question is how.
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out naming him but including him among the five Orientalists that
Waardenburg had studied) in having "shaped a coherent vision of
Islam that had a wide influence on government circles throughout
the Western world," and that as such they were bringing to completion the earlier Orientalist practices beyond a "literary problem"
and towards "un ferme propos d'assimiler adequatement la valeur
des langues pour penetrer les moeurs et les pensees, pour forcer
meme des secrets de l'histoire "166 To the degree that Goldziher
was an Orientalist he did in fact contribute to the production of a
system of knowledge that was subject to political abuse. But would
that earn Goldziher the same criticism that he applied to his friend
Wilhelm Bacher, that "without being dishonorable, he could adapt
his spirit to the dominant trends, of which in the course of time he
became a factor?"167 The answer is certainly not, for Goldziher
adapted his spirit to no dominant trendfor he was breathing in it,
too close to it to see it, and that is where the more principled criticisms of Edward Said in Orientalism, beyond specific examples
and ad hominem errata, remains thoroughly valid.
The principle reason that Orientalism's main thesis is not compromised by any specific examples that he may have provided is
not merely the ample alternative examples that do support it, nor
is it merely due to the internal cohesion and consistency of the
argument that he persuasively formulates, but above all because it
is deeply rooted in a mighty intellectual tradition from which it has
emergednamely the extended body of literature in sociology of
knowledge. Here, Orientalism has suffered much not only from its
opponents but also from some of its strongest supporters, both of
which have left this powerful intellectual tradition by and large out
of their responses to Said. Here it is important to keep in mind that
the theoretical pedigree from which Edward Said himself worked
out his argument in Orientalism is rather eclecticborrowing
from a diverse group of theorists, ranging from Michel Foucault
(the relation between knowledge and power in the formation of a
discourse), to Antonio Gramsci (the relation between power and
ideology in the formation of hegemony), and then to Fredrich Nietzsche (the relation between metaphor and representation in the
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wasted so many precious pages on Bernard Lewis and his ilk, for
it is precisely the immediate contemporaneity of the third chapter
of Orientalism, "Orientalism Now," that made it so universally
appealing, however it may have made it also theoretically wanting
in more support.
There is another line of argument that canquite independent
of Marx, Engels, Scheler, and Mannheimlink the rise of the
sociology of knowledge as a critical discipline of thought to the
American social pragmatist George Herbert Mead (1863-1931).190
There is yet another persuasive argument, linking Scheler's notion
of "the powerlessness of the mind," to Mannheim's "homelessness of the mind," and connecting both to Georg Lukacs' central
concept of "reification of consciousness," and thus demonstrating
the rise of the sociology of knowledge in Weimar Germany, between 1918 and 1933, and connecting it to the cultural and political crisis of Germany at the time.191 Even longer traditions have
been put forward articulating the relationship between modes of
human existence and manners of thought and knowledge production, tracing it back to Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and the French
Enlightenment philosophers, or in Saint-Simonian (1760-1825)
philosophy of history.192 Once we come to Edward Said's Orientalism from this extraordinary body of critical literature, we see
that there is really nothing particularly new or even radical about
his theoretical proposition that there is a structural link between
the Orientalist manner of knowledge production and colonialism.
This rather theoretically innocuous propositionfar less radical in its implications than, say, Mannheim's suggestion that all
forms of knowledge and institutionalized beliefs are politically
modulatedcan indeed be linked not only to a major branch of
the sociology of knowledge that through Max Scheler and Karl
Mannheim is rooted in the works of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim,
and Max Weber,193 but may in fact completely bypass Michel
Foucault and trace its origin to Quentin Skinner's philosophical
hermeneutics on political theory and the link that he proposes
between social meaning and social action.194 A similar argument
can be made linking the argument of Edward Said's Orientalism
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gibberish nonsense of people they seek to fight but in fact necessitate-Osama bin Laden and Company. What we are witnessing
today is an imperil aspiration with no idea, ideal, or imagination
to match or mastermind itthe result is a fake empire running
on empty and operating on sheer brute force that as evident from
New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to Baghdad
and Kandahar in the aftermath of Hurricane ("Shock and Awe")
Rumsfeld is as administratively incompetent as it is ideologically
vacuousimperially self-delusional.
*
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Post-Orientalism
An earlier version of this chapter appeared as an introduction to a new edition of Ignaz Goldziher's Muslim Studies (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2006). I am grateful to Irving Horowitz for having asked me
to write that introduction and his kind permission to reprint it here.
2. Ignaz Goldziher, Tagebuch. Herausgegeben von Alexander Scheiber.
Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978, 59. The English translation is Raphael Patai's
in Raphael Patai, Ignaz Goldziher and His Oriental Diary: A Translation
and Psychological Portrait (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1987),
20.
3. Goldziher, Tagebuch, 251. The invitation had come from an organization
he calls, "Gesellschaft der Religionsgeschichte" ("Society for the Study
of History of Religion").
4. Decades later a competent and scholarly translation of Goldziher's Vorlesungen uber den Islam (Heidelberg, 1910) appeared in English. See
Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law. Translated
by Andras and Ruth Hamori. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1981).
5. "The feeling intellect" is Philip Rieff's phrase, which he selected as the
apt title of a selection of his essays, collected and edited by Jonathan B.
Imber. See Philip Rieff, The Feeling Intellect: Selected Writings (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991).
6. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated
by Talcott Parsons. Introduction by Anthony Giddens. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1958): 182.
7. Ignaz Goldziher's study of the Shu'ubiyya movement in Muslim Studies,
edited by S. M. Stern, translated by C. R. Barber and S. M. Stern (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company, 1966: 137-198) needs to be augmented by
the equally important essay of Sir Hamilton Gibb, "The Social Significance
of the Shu'ubiyya," in his Studies on the Civilization of Islam. Edited by
Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1962: 62-73; as well as by Roy Mottahedeh's "The Shu'ubiyya
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
109
110
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Post-Orientalism
Publishers, 1992). It is noteworthy that after a critical examination of some
of the exceedingly illiberal aspects of Shi'i law, Goldziher feels obligated
to make the following observation: "The Shi'i community has suffered the
hardship of an ecclesia oppressa, having from the outset struggled against
persecution and repression. It has on the whole lacked the freedom to
make open profession of its beliefs, and could disclose and practice them
only in the conspiratorial secrecy of its members. Its mood therefore tends
towards rage against the adversaries who prevailed" etc. (ibid: 217). While
his scholarly criticism leads him to pinpoint certain xenophobic aspects of
Shi'i law, his historical imagination leads him to place them in their proper
social context.
See Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, op. cit.: 241254. Goldziher also pays close attention to the Constitutional Revolution
in Iran (ibid: 196-202), as well as reformist movements in India (ibid:
254-267).
Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, op. cit.: 244.
"During the writing of these pages," writes Goldziher towards the end of his
observations about the Baha'ism, "I have had occasion to hear such Biblical
proofs [that Abbas Efendi, the leader of the Baha'is, has been promised
in the Bible, and that Isaiah 9:6, "unto us a child is born, unto us a son is
given; and the government shall be upon his shoulder," foretells him] from
the mouth of a Baha'i zealot. This man, originally a doctor from Tehran,
has been staying for the last two years or so in the city where I live, in
an effort to gain converts to his religion. He feels that he has a particular
mission in my country: one more proof that it is not only American soil
that the extra-Islamic propaganda of the new Baha'is has in view" (Ibid:
254).
See Ignaz Goldziher, Mythology among the Hebrews and its historical
development. Translated from the German, with additions by the author, by
Russell Martineau. London: Longmans, Green, 1877. See also Goldziher's
On the History of Grammar among the Arabs: An Essay in Literary History.
Translated and edited by Kinga Devenyi, Tamas Ivanyi. Amsterdam: J.
Benjamins, 1994; A Short History ofClassical Arabic Literature. Translated
by Joseph de Somogyi. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1966. Goldziher's classical
study of Qur'anic hermeneutics, Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung (Leiden: Brill, 1920) was a pioneer study in the comparative discourse
analysis of varied forms of Qur'anic interpretationsranging from juridical
to mystical.
Goldziher, Tagebuch, 22-23.
Goldziher, Tagebuch, 55.
Goldziher, Tagebuch, 65-74.
111
24. Patai, Psychological Portrait: 9-11. Patai reports that the original German
of Goldziher's travelogue to Syria, Palestine, and Egypt is at the Jewish
Theological Seminary of America in New York.
25. Patai, Psychological Portrait: 26.
26. This according to Raphael Patai, who studied with Carl Brockelmann during academic year 1930-1931. See Patai, Psychological Portrait, 13.
27. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 15.
28. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 15.
29. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 16.
30. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 16.
31. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 18.
32. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 21, and again "infatuated with Islam" (Ibid,
27).
33. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 63.
34. Goldziher, Tagebuch, 59, as translated by Patai in Patai, Psychological
Portrait, 20.
35. Goldziher, Tagebuch, 60-61, as translated by Patai in Patai, Psychological
Portrait, 21.
36. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 60.
37. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 60.
38. Goldziher, Tagebuch, 15.
39. Holy Bible, King James Text, Modern Phrased Version (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979), 1249.
40. The full text of the verse is: "And they came with false blood on his shirt.
He said, Nay, but your minds have beguiled you into something. (My
course is) comely patience. And Allah it is whose help is to be sought in
that (predicament) which ye describe" {The Meaning of the Glorious Koran:
An Explanatory Translation by Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall. New
York: A Mentor Book, no date). Arberry's "sweet patience" {The Koran
Interpreted. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1955, 255) and
T B. Irving's "patience is beautiful" {The Qur'an. Translation and Commentary by T. B. Irving/al-Hajj Ta'lim 'AH. Brattleboro, Vermont, 1985,
120) are perhaps better translations of the original "fa-sabrun jamilun."
41. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 61 -62.
42. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 62.
43. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 62.
44. Patai, Psychological Portrait, 62.
45. Goldziher's Travelogue in Patai, Psychological Portrait, 99-100 (entry of
1 October 1873). Goldziher has similarly moving passages when he visits
Jerusalem for the first (and last time). See Goldziher's Travelogue in Patai,
Psychological Portrait, 132-133 (entry of 29 November 1873).
46. As quoted by Zabihollah Safa in his magisterial history of Persian literature,
Tarikh-e Adabiyat dar Iran. Six Volumes (Tehran: Ibn Sina Publications,
112
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
Post-Orientalism
1959-1990), Volume One, 308. Such self-deprecating poems abound in
Persian literature. Perhaps the most famous is the Eighteenth century
poet Hatif al-Isfahani's celebrated Tarji'-band, in which he describes his
metaphoric journeys through all religious beliefs and practices finds them
all identical. The most famous passage is when he goes to a Zoroastrian
temple and becomes ashamed of being a Muslim: "Man-e Sharmandeh
az Mosalmani/Shodam anja beh gusheh'i penhan ("I, ashamed of being
a Muslim/Hid myself there in a corer"). See the original Persian and an
English translation in E. G. Browne's A Literary History of Persia. Four
Volumes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), Volume IV,
184-297.
See Goldziher, Tagebuch, 65; and Patai, Psychological Portrait, 66.
Goldziher's Travelogue in Patai, Psychological Portrait, 119 (entry of 29
October 1873).
On "culture industry" See Theodore Adorno, Culture Industry (London:
Brunner-Routledge, 2001).
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 67.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 67.
Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, op. cit, 186.
Goldziher's Travelogue in Patai, Psychological Portrait, 93-97, et passim
(entries of 26 and 29 September 1873 and an undated entry as well).
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 21, and again "infatuated with Islam" (Ibid,
27).
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 46.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 36.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 39.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 55.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 73.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 22.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 23.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 20.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 24. Footnote 12.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 27.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 25.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 27.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 27.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 27.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 27.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 27.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 28.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 29.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 29.
Patai, Psychological Portrait, 30.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
113
114
Post-Orientalism
115
116
Post-Orientalism
117
118
Post-Orientalism
119
168.By far the most significant of these three for Said is Foucault. "I have
found it useful here," Said says early in his Orientalism, "to employ Michel
Foucault's notion of a discourse, as described by him in Archeology of
Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish, to identify Orientalism" (Said,
Orientalism, 3, et passim).
169.Said, Orientalism, 202-203.
170.Edward Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003), 48-49.
171.Said, Orientalism, 258-259.
172. Said, Orientalism, 260.
173.See Edward Said, The World, the Text, the Critic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1983/2004), 31-53.
174. Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism, 48-49.
175.Said, Orientalism, 322.
176.Said, Orientalism, 203.
177. See James Clifford, "On Orientalism," op. cit.
178. See Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism, 8-10.
179. Said, Orientalism, 340.
180. This is the principal project of his first posthumously published book,
Humanism and Democratic Criticism, op. cit.
181. Said, Orientalism, 322.
182. Said, Orientalism, 259.
183. It was in the best interest of not just Bernard Lewis (the Armenius Vambery
of his time) and his ilk but of an entire lucrative industry of knowledge
production about "Islam" (and soon "Islamic terrorism") to pretend that
they had no idea what this problem of representation was, that it was some
sort of French mumbo-jumbo, and that they were "experts" on Islam and
could tell the U.S. and European governments what to do in their dealing
with Muslims. While the academic world went on the wild goose chase of
solving the essentially insoluble problem of the soverign subject, "Islamic
experts" made a very lucrative living telling the world (powerful people in
particular) what to think of Islam and what do to Muslims. "Persian and
Turkish poetry are entirely Muslim," Bernard Lewis tells his readers in The
Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years (New York: Simon and
Shuster, 1995, 258), as an example of his exquisite command of primary
sources and what they represent. Ayatollah Khomeini could not have
thought and said it better, nor could Moustapha Kamal disagreed more. The
astounding illiteracy at the very root of a sentence like that is prototypical
of every single sentence that Bernard Lewis utters in his writingsmaking
the Persian and Turkish poets of the last one thousand year (particularly
of the last two hundred years) turn in their graves. Bernard Lewis and the
industry he represents need not have worried about the problem of representation. They knew everything there was to know about Arabic, Persian,
120
Post-Orientalism
and Turkish languages and literatures and cultures. Allamah Qazvini knew
these "charlatans," as he called them quite well: "The instruction of these
languages, and in fact the teaching of a few other languages as well, and
all at the same timesuch as Persian, Arabic, Turkish, and all the arts and
sciences that have been written in those languages, as well as all the various
and innumerable dialects of those languagesall and all are entrusted to
these Orientalists. These people then proceed, without the slightest sense
of shame or fear of being scandalized, for there is no one to tell, to claim
knowledge and authority in all these languages and the arts and sciences
written in them, teaching them, publishing books and articles about them,
and even coming out with their own new and specific ideas about them."
(Qazvini, Bist Maqalah-ye Qazvini, 23). His prophetic soul!
184.For an English translation, see Max Scheler, Problems of Sociology of
Knowledge. Translated by Manfred S.Frings. Edited and with an Introduction by Kenneth W. Stikkers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).
185.For an English translation of both these sources see Karl Manheim, Ideology
and Utopia. Translated from the German by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1936). See also Karl Mannheim,
Structures of Thinking. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro and Shierry Weber
Nicholson. Edited and Introduced by David Kettler, Volker Meja and Nico
Stehr (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982).
186. Max Scheler, Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Manfred S. Frings. Edited and with an Introduction by Kenneth W. Stikkers.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, 67. Emphasis in the original.
187. Scheler 1980, 70. Emphasis in the original.
188. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1936, 267-271.
189. See Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, The German Ideology. Edited and
with an Introduction by C. J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers,
1947), 47.
190. See for example Tom W. Goff, Marx and Mead: Contributions to a Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).
191. See David Frisby, The Alienated Mind: The Sociology of Knowledge in
Germany, 1918-1933 (London and New York: Routledge, 1983). A similar
attempt at providing a sociology of knowledge for the rise of the sociology
of knowledge, as it were, that corroborates Frisby's observations is provided
by Pierre Bourdieu for the emergence of Martin Heidegger's philosophy in
Pierre Bourdieu's The Political Ontology ofMartin Heidegger. Translated
by Peter Collier. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 7-39.
192. See Gunter W. Remmling (Ed), Towards the Sociology of Knowledge:
Origin and development of a sociological Thought Style (New York: Humanities Press, 1973).
121
122
Post-Orientalism
200.Hans-GeorgGadamer, Truth and Method. Second, Revised Edition. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshal (New York: Crossroad,
1989), 277-285.
201. For a discussion of the epistemic impact of Copernican revolution on
a range of moral and intellectual developments see Hans Blumenberg's
The Genesis of the Copernican World (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
1989).
202. In Said's Orientalism all these varied forms of Orientalism are coagulated,
while they need to be separated and periodized. For Said's observations on
Greek Orientalism on the basis of Aeschylus' The Persians see Orientalism, 55-56; and on that of Europe towards the Ottomans on the basis of
Mozart's Magic Flute and Abduction from the Seraglio see Orientalism,
118.
203.For a more elaborate argument for this point see my "For the Last Time:
Civilizations," International Sociology. September 2001. Volume 16(3),
361-368.
204.No other propagandist alive is more responsible for sustaining this delusional opposition between "Islam and the West" than Bernard Lewis. He
even forgets the books he himself has already written on the subject and
writes new ones. In 1993, Lewis forgot that he had already written a book
called The Middle East and the West (New York: Harper, 1964) in 1964 and
wrote yet another one on Islam and the West (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994)essentially the same ideas, almost verbatim similarities, not
just in these two books but in practically everything that he writes"the
West" got it right; "Islam" and Muslims did not; there were some accidentally intelligent Muslim reformists who did, but the ignoramus masses and
fanatics did not, and thus we are in the mess that we are. This is Bernard
Lewis in a nutshell.
3
I Am Not a Subalternist1
"The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the "state of emergency" in which we live is not the exception but the rule"
Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History" (1955)
It will certainly amuse future historians of postcolonial theories that by far the most celebrated essay in its current canon has
received its extraordinary title by serendipitythat the original
title of Gayatri Spivak's "Can the Subaltern Speak?" by her
own account in the very first sentence of the essay, was in fact
"Power, Desire, Interest." It is hard to believe that this hallmark
event in our counter-canonical community would have fared so
spectacularly well had Spivak kept its original, nondescript title.
"Names are a great mystery " says Samuel Hamilton to Adam
Trask in John Steinbeck's East of Eden, as they get together with
Lee, Mr. Trask's Chinese servant-savant, to decide what to call
the twin sons of Adam and his estranged wife Cathy Ames. "I
have never known whether the name is molded by the child or the
child changed to fit the name. But you can be sure of thiswhenever a human has a nickname it is a proof that the name given him
was wrong."2
It is hard to imagine "Can the Subaltern Speak?" with any other
(given or nick-) name than the one it now proudly bears. There
seems to have been a divinity "shaping the ends" of this essay,
rough hew them how its very author may have willed. The ques123
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Post-Orientalism
tion though still remains: why would an author begin her essay
by noting a title that it no longer bears? "The original title of this
paper was 'Power, Desire, Interest.'"3 It is like my saying in this
very paragraph that the original title of this chapter was "I am a
Subaltern." Why then did I not give it that titleor having changed
it, why register its abandoned name? There is more power and
desire in a nickname than old Samuel Hamilton and his friend
Lee could have imagined in their respective Irish and Chinese
immigrant minds and peripatetic philosophy.
Much of the enduring power of "Can the Subaltern Speak?"
is in fact contingent on this very opening gambit wherein Spivak
playfully posits her speaking voice somewhere within her own
"Power, Desire, [and] Interest." This is as much the intended title
of that essay as its circular conclusion, its alpha and its omega at
one and the same timethe title anticipating the entitlement, the
promise and delivery, with the triumvirate of "power, desire, and
interest" retorting the triple disenfranchisement of the "poor, black,
and female" that comes at the very end of the essay: "if you are
poor, black, and female you get it in three ways."4 In three ways,
Spivak anticipates and responds, announces and plays back, in the
inaugural paragraph of the grenade she is throwing into the midst
of "the few white boys" who had convinced themselves of having
dismantled what they liked to call "the sovereign subject." "Indeed, whatever power these meditations command may have been
earned by a politically interested refusal to push to the limit the
founding presuppositions of my desire, as far as they are within my
grasp."5 Spivak is here turning the self-conscious postmodernity
of the author shooting herself in the foot against itselffiring the
gun, dodging the bullet, and then dashing, prancing to get away
with murder. Her first cry of freedom will now echo (for pages
to come) throughout the essay: "I have invoked my positionality
in this awkward way so as to accentuate the fact that calling the
place of the investigator into question remains a meaningless piety
in many recent critiques of the sovereign subject." Coming from
left field, and fielding his own "positionality," Spivak is about to
teach that self-serving presumption of "a critique of the sovereign
subject" a lasting lesson.
I Am Not a Subalternist
125
126
Post-Orientalism
I Am Not a Subalternist
127
the sovereign subject not back to our colonial site where we are
on home territory, our own turf, and thus know how to fight our
colonizers. Inside her bellyful of ideas, we have learned how to
ambush the enemy on his own terms and turf.
As a Trojan Horse, Spivak extended the battle-line into the
enemy's backyard and showed, chapter and verse, how in fact a far
more radical critique of the European sovereign subject was both
possible and evident in Marx and Derridathe two iconic referents
at the two opposing ends of the Cartesian cogito, pulling it apart,
giving it epistemic tonality and texture. A quarter of a century after
the publication of "Can the Subaltern Speak?" we can now tell how
Spivak was in fact far more accommodating in her reading of both
Marx and Derrida in projecting that liberation as evident in them.
Without Spivak, the fact remains, not just the subaltern but Marx
and Derrida could not speak a more planetary emancipation of the
de-subjected postcolonial personas a person. It was Spivak who
caught what she generously calls "the Western intellectual production" with both hands in the cookie jar of "Western international
economic interests." That radical positioning of the postcolonial
critic was the conditio sine qua rton for Spivak to be able to turn
the most debilitating ritual practice of widow sacrifice and sublate
it into a liberating moment for the thrice-silenced conjugation of
being poor, black, and female.
"Some of the most radical criticism coming out of the West
today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of
the West, or the West as Subject."6 With that one sentence, Spivak
let a flood loose on poststructuralist ants all too happily thinking
they had turned the hill of the Cartesian cogito upside down. "The
much-publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually
inaugurates a Subject." This, as I read it, is reading Foucault and
Deleuze from the perspective of their mutual blind spotwhere
neither of them could see Spivakas power, desire, and interestcoming their way. From that angle, Spivak can see how both
Foucault and Deleuze are suspending not just the thematic operation of ideology in their critique but in fact the instrumentality of
two white European male intellectuals in the effective operation
of that ideology. Thereshe can also catch the transcontinental
128
Post-Orientalism
I Am Not a Subalternist
129
very moment of her critical pause, Spivak exposes her own blind
spots: places and paradoxes that her hidden soldiershaving just
come out of her bellycan see but she cannot.
The problem ultimately resides in a para-geographical metaphor.
The location of Spivak's postcolonial intellectual is so metaphorically fixated in a peripheral "East" that she cannot but authenticate
the white European intellectuals and the sovereign subject they
think they have dismantled to its "West." This binary is no longer
merely geographical. It is thematic, epistemic, theoretical. It binds
the postcolonial critic to an imaginary location that whether we
call it "East" or "the Periphery," ipso facto, corroborates a "West"
and/or a "Center" that cannot ever be seen as a mere figment of an
ideological imagination, created and crafted to (dull the wit and
thus) divide in order to rule the world.
The paramount problem with this binary ruling supreme over
Spivak's critical geography becomes evident when she reaches
the most compelling and the most problematic part of "Can the
Subaltern Speak?"her discussion of sati. Once as a postcolonial
critic Spivak finds herself trapped in the East-West binary tunnel,
she cannot but jar the banality of a nativist reading of sati ("the
women actually wanted to die") with the sarcastic jab of "white
men are saving brown women from brown men."10 No appeal
to a "productive catachresis" can save this jab from being read as
"the brown woman critic is scoring with white intellectual men."
Spivak's dangerous identification of the "nativist argument" with
nothing (no alternative) other than "a parody of the nostalgia for
lost origins"and thus with a single stroke of "the women actually wanted to die"ipso facto mutates her into a spokesman (or
yes-man) for the gratitude (absolution) of brown women thanking white men for having saved them from brown men. This is
obviously not a position that Spivak would voluntarily choose to
occupyand yet her dichotomous construction continues to keep
her trapped in it.
Why should Spivak remain limited to Foucault's critique of the
"scientific episteme," where she has no choice but to place sati in
between the untenable dichotomy of "ritual as opposed to crime,
the one fixed by superstition, the other by legal science?"11 What
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Post-Orientalism
Spivak's tunnel vision between the colony and the empire conceals
is the fact that the colonial criminalization of sati by the British
imperial power ipso facto also ritualizes it. Sati was not a ritual
until the British made it a crime. Once criminalized by the British
colonial officers, sati loses whatever range of pre-colonial markers
it may or may not have signified and is immediately mutated into
a fixed signifier, a ritual, but not of widow-burning as Spivak is
forced to speculate, but of resistance to colonial demarcation of a
colonized culture. But why should Spivak get this obvious dialectic
wrong, or to turn the rhetorical question she puts to Foucault back
to her: "Why this conflation of language and discourse from the
master of discourse analysis?"12
The epistemic predicate of missing this evident dialectic is a
false hermeneutics. By virtue of trekking along a wrong route
to a right destination, Spivak is drawn into a trap and forced into
the corner of engaging in a hermeneutic encounter with Manava
Dharrn-sasastra, or "The Laws of Manu," for which she is neither
juridically qualified nor theoretically prepared. She is, in effect,
forced to become a native informer, re-reading the sacred text of her
cultural ancestrythe metrical Sanskrit compendium of ancient
sacred laws and customsin order to revise a colonial reading of
dtmaghata and atmadana. Making native informers out of radical
critics is the oldest trick in the outdated Orientalist arsenal. We
always lose on that scoreand thus we should by all means refuse
to engage with it. This of course does not mean that in the course
of a false hermeneutics Spivak does not pull off a quite critical
class analysis of sati, helped out by P. V. Kane's crucial discovery
that widow sacrifice had an economic condition anchored to the
fact that the widow could have inherited her diseased husband's
property.13 But the dichotomous bifurcation of "tradition and modernity" remains solidly constant in Spivak (how strange indeed
for a postcolonial theorist who comes to her poststructuralism
through her overriding feminism!) and yields even more limiting insights: "The gravity of sati was that it was ideologically
cathected as 'reward,' just as the gravity of imperialism was that
it was ideologically cathected as 'social mission.'"14
I Am Not a Subalternist
131
Only once in the course of her analysis does Spivak come close
to reading sati in the contextual immediacy of its own cultural
and political neighborhood but she quickly abandons it for (the
misplaced) fear of incongruity:
There is no itinerary we can retrace here. Since the other sanctioned
suicides did not involve the scene of this constitution, they entered neither
the ideological battleground at the archaic originthe tradition of the
Dharmasastranor the scene of the inscription of ritual as crimethe
British abolition. The only related transformation was Mahatma Gandhi's
reinscription of the notion of satyagraha, or hunger strike, as resistance.
But this is not the place to discuss the details of that sea-change. I would
merely invite the reader to compare the auras of widow sacrifice and
Gandhian resistance. The root in thefirstpart of satyagraha and sati
are the same.15
Here, Spivak comes close to positing hunger-strike and widowburning together, but she quickly abandons the idea because in
the mind of her white male intellectual interlocutor either of the
two acts invoke two different auraswhereas precisely because
their roots are the same, though their auras differ, they should
have been read together, in their political reconfiguration of
power, as would their mutual reading against the current spate of
suicidal violence in the course of the Afghan, Iraqi, or Palestinian resistance (muqawamah). The colonial context ought to be
made integral to a reading of adjacent texts together, rather than
separately, forcing them into a binary opposition against their
colonial mis/readings.
Spivak's falseabstract, ahistorical, extra-juridicalhermeneutics is simply astonishing coming from a postcolonial critic
who is chiefly responsible for having applied post-structuralism
and deconstruction to a whole continent of ideas and practices.
"I have written.. .a constructed counternarrative of women's consciousness, thus women's being, thus women's being good, thus the
good women's desire, thus woman's desire."16 Fine. This is quite
self-evident. But by what authority? And for what constituency of
purposes? Hindu law, as any other, has a history, a hermeneutics,
a jurisprudence, a constellation of divergent localities of readings
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save brown women from brown men, impose upon those women
a greater ideological constriction by absolutely identifying, within
discursive practice, good-wifehood with self-immolation on the
husband's pyre."18 This, however, is but a momentary Saidian
move on the part of Spivak because she has not (could not) work
out her (progressive) politics from her (retrograde) hermeneutics.
That hermeneutics, in effect, cannot but lead Spivak to abandon
completely the crucial opening part of "Can the Subaltern Speak?"
and by the end of the essay collapse into a "poli-sci" lingo that
informs her readers that "between patriarchy and imperialism,
subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the woman
disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration of the 'third-world woman'
caught between tradition and modernization."19 By the end of the
text, her argument has dissipated into the most banal oscillation
between "tradition and modernization." It is ultimately not the
force of Spivak's argument but the jarring power of her example,
Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri's suicide, that saves the essay.
*
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my own political and social activism has assured me, people all over the
world can be and are moved by ideals of justice and equalitythe South
African victory in the liberation struggle is a perfect case in pointand
the affiliated notion that humanistic of ideals of liberty and learning still
supply most disadvantaged people with the energy to resist unjust war
and military occupation, for instance, and to try to overturn despotism
and tyranny, both strike me as ideas that are alive and well. And despite
the (in my opinion) shallow but influential ideas of a certain facile type
of radical antifoundationalism, with its insistence that real events are at
most linguistic effects, and its close relative, the end-of-history thesis,
these are so contradicted by the historical impact of human agency and
labor as to make a detailed refutation of them here unnecessary. Change
in human history, and human history as made by human action and understood accordingly is the very ground of the humanities.28
Predicated on that solid political commitment (but divergent
theoretical encounter with the persistent problem of European
humanism, which was instrumental in the making of European
Romanticism and Orientalism alike), Said proceeds to argue that
"it is possible to be critical of humanism in the name of humanism
and that, schooled in its abuses by the experience of Eurocentricism and empire, one could fashion a different kind of humanism
that was cosmopolitan and text-and-language bound in ways that
absorbed the great lessons of the past...and still remain attuned
to the emergent voices and currents of the present, many of them
exilic, extraterritorial, and unhoused, as well as uniquely American."29 To be sure, Said's attempt at salvaging (European) humanism via a democratic criticism, in effect trying to de-Europeanize
its power-basing provenance, is a far superior proposition than
Jurgen Habermas' attempt to posit what he calls a "communicative" versus a "subject-centered" reason30an entirely useless
stand from where we stand on the (post) colonial site, because
it is simply blind, deaf, and dumb to the structural violence that
has silenced us at the very outset, so that "communication" (as in
"speaking," as Spivak would say) is simply impossible for us. But
still there is a structural similarity between what Habermas calls
"the unfinished project of modernity" and what Said proposes to
do with humanism, namely to liberate it from its European provenancethey both bracket and disregard the persistent relation of
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Cyrus the Great, the Shah did not want to know that, generations
of European and American archeologists notwithstanding, nobody
slept in that decrepit tomb except his own perturbed imagination,
and he certainly did not want translated into any lucid Persian
prose the following Hegelian pronouncement:
. . . the historical transition takes place when the Persian world comes
in contact with the Greek. Here, for the first time, an historical transition meets us, viz. in the fall of an empire. China and India, as already
mentioned, have remainedPersia has not. The transition to Greece is,
indeed, internal; but here it shows itself also externally, as a transmission of sovereigntyan occurrence which from this time forward is ever
and anon repeated. For the Greeks surrender the scepter of dominion
and of civilization to the Romans, and the Romans are subdued by the
Germans.33
Conscious of his compatriot Goethe's love and admiration for the
Persian Rose, Hegel then adds this little minuet:
If we examine this fact of transition more closely, the question suggests
itselffor example, in thisfirstcase of the kind, viz. Persiawhy it sank,
while China and India remain. In thefirstplace we must here banish from
our minds the prejudice in favor of duration, as if it had any advantage as
compared with transience: the imperishable mountains are not superior
to the quickly dismantled rose exhaling its life in fragrance. In Persia
begins the Principle of Free Spirit as contrasted with imprisonment in
nature; mere natural existence, therefore, loses its bloom, and fades away.
The principle of separation from Nature is found in the Persian Empire,
which therefore, occupies a higher grade than those worlds immersed
in the Natural.34
In other words, Hegel nurtures this plump Persian lamb until it
is really fat and voluptuous only in order to offer it as a worthy
sacrifice upon the altar of his historical teleology. Persia serves
its historical task and disappears, thus also serving Hegel with his
McDonald arches, rise-and-shine theory of history whereby the
sun rises in the East only to shine on the West. We begin with the
sun rising in China and then India in the Farther and then move
Hither to Persia only, and here is the rub, to come home to shine
on the Parthenon. Persia is "somewhat at home" only for Ancient
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the real threat to Hegel and all his progenies in Alan Bloom and
Francis Fukuyama.
Both strategically and as a matter of once and for all decolonizing our analytical apparatus, the conversation can no longer be
conducted between a living Bengali and a dead German. A far
more critical conversation needs to be retrieved between our literal
and our oral, our visual, and our performative, our historical and
our contemporary registers. Whether we call them India, Iran, and
the Arab world, or South Asia, West Asia, and North Africa, we are
neighbors, kin to a common history, a collective living memory
that cannot be colonially divided or paradigmatically paralleled
because it is historically common.
The critique of the binary banality between "the East and the
West" is not to go for the non-committal, apolitical gray. Quite
the contrary. The critique of a singular binary is to retrieve and
underline the multiplicity of many binaries, their thematic topography and historical choreography, the vicissitudes of their
alterations, the performance of their alterity. It is in going from a
bifocal lens to a polyfocal vision, thereby retrieving the multiple
sites of resistance to power in the local immediacy of that power.
In the political culture I call home, the nomocentricity of its law
is challenged by the logocentricity of its philosophy, [and] both
by the homocentricity of its mysticism, and by the time the medieval institutions of Caliphate and Vizierate want to corner that
poly vocality in the mosque, madrasa, Khaneqah, or the palace, you
suddenly see arisen the magnificent replacement, the epistemic
shift, of the verbal by the visual, of the literary by the oral, of the
prosaic by the poetic. We seek refuge from the sacred Arabic in
the profane Persian, as we do from Persian Monarchy in Islamic
insurrectionary movements. We always dodge power, subvert
authorities. But not by a massive head-on collision. Ours is a
guerilla tactic. Hit and run. The Palestinian Intifada is no spontaneous combustion. There is a method to it. Escaping from one
language into another, moving from the prosaic into the poetic,
from the verbal to visual, from the literary to the oral, from the
truthful to the performative, from the real to the Active. Throwing
an analytical stone here, kidnapping a conceptual general there,
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his time put together), translated into a glorious Arabic, and then
from the Arabic of Ibn al-Muqaffa' into the Persian of Iskandar
Beik Monshi as Kalilah wa Dimnah to become the master model
of generation of prose stylists from the Deccan to Baghdad. When
the most beautiful architectural monuments of the subcontinent,
its manuscripts and paintings, prose and poetry, philosophy and
mysticism, are as familiar to any Iranian as their own face, how
could we believe in "parallel paradigms" that presumes an element
of untouchability among the Hindu and Muslim components of
the South Asian experience?
Forget about art and architecture. If I were to take a Gramscian
inventory of myself, I am the walking defiance of all "parallel
paradigmatics." It is impossible for someone to believe in parallel
paradigmatics when his first name is Arabic, his second name of
Sanskrit origin, was born to a light-skinned Iranian mother and a
dark-skinned tropical father, raised on the beautiful voice of Umm
Kulthum, Abd al-Halim Hafiz, and Fairuz in the neighborhood of
the late Saddam Hussein and the Shahanshah of Iran, at the bank
of a river that carries the memory of all the ancient Mesopotamian
civilizations into a Persian Gulf, an Arabian Sea, and an Indian
Ocean. So I must really excuse myself, my living memory, and
the very manner and mood of assigning meanings to the world,
cannot possibly accommodate for a "parallel paradigmatics "
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that white male interlocutor in order to free their vision and look
around and away to alternative sites of conversation, conversion,
rebellion. For Said (theflawsof) the European literary humanism,
for Spivak (the blind spots of) the European critique of the sovereign subject, and for Guha (the shortcomings of) the European
prose of historyand thus for all of them a Active white European
male intellectualremains central to their persuasive arguments,
trapping them ever so deeper into the hole they sought to climb and
cover. This critical demarcation of a white male interlocutor can no
longer be dismissed by Spivak's proverbial "indigenous theorists
[consider me] too committed to Western Theory." There are no
"indigenous theorists" left anymore, nor are there any "Western
theorists" left to rest in peace.
I believe the site of our contestations ought to move away from
any head on collision with the idea of Europe because the more we
oppose it the more we strengthen and breathe life into its ghostly
illusion. Guha, Spivak, and Said strike back at Europe with a
vengeanceand that makes them all quintessential^ Europeanists. No matter how strongly they oppose it, they in fact re-invent
it with that very opposition. They tend to protest too much. They
have, collectively, facilitated an inroad into the working of the
European ideological hegemony otherwise closed to the rest of the
world. The only way to resist and overcome the normative power
of that hegemony is to cultivate regional sites of cross-cultural
conversation removed from presumed centers of cosmopolitan
power. The geopolitics of that power, as the globalized capital
it seeks to serve and the international relation of labor it seeks to
dominate, has no center or periphery, knows neither an East nor a
West. It has devised an electronic capitalism with a twenty-fourhour working clock on whose handles the sun never sets. "The
West" is thus long since dead. It will have to cease to function as
an interlocutor for the world, for only in that Active but powerful
capacity it has secured a vicarious life for itself.
As we seek polyfocal sites of resistance to the amorphous
power thus formed, I also believe we should not put all our combative eggs in one ideological or theoretical basket and join any
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
An earlier and much shorter version of this essay was delivered in a conference called "Subaltern Studies at Large," which Gayatri Spivak and I
organized at Columbia University on November 10-11th, 2000. A Spanish
translation of that shorter version has appeared as "No Soy Subalternista"
in Convergencia de Tiempos: Estudios Subalternos/Contextos LatinoAmericanos Estado Cultura Subalternidad, edited by Ileana Rodriguez,
Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 2001: 49-59. Ranajit Guha's presentation at that conference was subsequently published as History at the Limit
of World-History, Italian Academy Lecture Series, New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002.
John Steinbeck, East of Eden. New York: Viking, 1952: 261.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in Cary Nelson
and Lawrence Grossberg (Eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture.
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988: 271.
Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" 294.
Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" 271.
Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" 271.
"'The ordering of space' that is ... constitutive of the sovereign nomos
is therefore not only a 'taking of land' (Landesnahme) ... but above all
a 'taking of the outside' (Ausnahme)." (Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer:
Soverign Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen
I Am Not a Subalternist
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Post-Orientalism
30. See Jiirgen Habermas, "An Alternative Way out of the Philosophy of the
Subject: Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason," in his The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
1990, 294-326.
31. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" 272.
32. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History. New York:
Dover Publications, 1956, 173
33. Hegel 1956, 221.
34. Hegel 1956,221.
35. Hegel 1956, 223.
4
The Creative Crisis of the Subject
"The Poet gave them faces, gestures, and garments, actualizing them
completely, because for him they belonged to reality and not to schemata of thought"Benedetto Croce, "Note sulla poesia italiana e
straniera del secolo decimonono: Ibsen" (1921)
For about a decade in the 1990s I was fascinated by the cinema
of Mohsen Makhmalbaf, an Iranian revolutionary activist who finally opted to drop his gun and pick a camera, quite the opposite of
Che Guevara who decided to drop his medicine bag and pick up a
gunthough nevertheless in the same spirit. Throughout the course
of my intimate engagements with Mohsen Makhmalbaf's cinema,
and ultimately in the book I wrote on him,1 my primary concern
was to come to grips with his varied attempts at an aesthetic articulation of moral and normative agency beyond the inherited
limitation of a colonial subject. In my reading of Makhmalbaf's
cinema, I tried to see how his creative imagination defies the critical condition of the post/colonial subject by breaking through its
epistemic and narrative limitations. The source and purpose of
my entering the site of Makhmalbaf's cinema from this particular
angle were of course entirely connected to the question of subject
and the presumed crisis that it faced.
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Here is one way of looking at the (creative) crisis of the colonial subject. Some two hundred years into the active history of
the field of Orientalism performing its discursive services as the
principal intelligence arm of colonialism, Edward Said dismantled
the nefarious edifice with one stroke of creative genius. With his
magisterial achievement in Orientalism (1978), Said ushered in
a generation of critical inquiry into the discursive constitution
of the colonial subject, and the manners in which that project
remained integral to the imperial imagining of the globe.2 About
two decades after the publication of Orientalism, Said published
his magnum opus, Culture and Imperialism (1994), as a sequel
to the principal arguments he had put forward in his most famous
book.3 While expanding massively on implicating the European
literary imagination in imperial designs upon the globe, in Culture
and Imperialism Said also navigated the manners and modes of
ideological and literary resistances to that will to planetary domination. The combined effect of these two books has been global
in dimension and cross-disciplinary in consequencenamely,
the universal implication of the moral imaginary of "the West"
(as it called itself and was thus designated by all its Others) in a
predatory will to rule and dominate the world by systematically
manufacturing and denying other (and Othered) cultures at one and
the same time. When in April 2003, Edward Said's colleagues at
Columbia University celebrated the Silver Jubilee of the publication of Orientalism, major scholars and public intellectuals from
around the world came to New York to mark their debt to his
path-breaking achievements. At the time of his untimely death on
25 September 2003, Edward Said had single-handedly redefined
the field of literary criticism and established the field of cultural
studieswith his Orientalism and its persuasive argument on the
colonial fabrication of a subservient non-European subject at the
heart of that movement.
As had all other great and timely texts, Orientalism created all
sorts of intended and unintended ripples, positive and negative
reactions, to which Edward Said himself responded either at the
157
time or else in subsequent editions of his book. There were obvious hostile reactions from professional Orientalists like Bernard
Lewis that were entirely predictable (theoretically mute) and uselessdespite the fact that Said himself spent an inordinate amount
of time responding to them. Among the more cogent (theoretically
consequential) criticism of Orientalism soon after its publication,
however, was one by the distinguished American historian James
Clifford who in his 1980 review of the book took Said's principal
manner (if not the matter) of argument to task. In his review,4
James Clifford pointed out a central paradox in Said's criticism of
"Orientalism"namely its "relapse into the essentializing modes
it attacks," and for its being "ambivalently enmeshed in the totalizing habits of Western humanism."5 Here Clifford faults Said
for using Michel Foucault to dismantle the edifice of Orientalism,
and yet neglecting him when it came to his own adamant (though
implicit in Orientalism) insistence on the centrality of a knowing
and sovereign subjectthe proverbial Cartesian cogito. Said, in
other words, was being representational precisely at a time that he
was criticizing representation. The problem was not, as it was later
misunderstood, just limited to the assumption that Said had crossessentialized both the Orient and the Occident by totalizing them
into two eternal camps. The more serious challenge was that he, the
critic, had assumed the position of a sovereign, knowing subject,
which was at the epistemic root of the Enlightenment predicates
of the colonial manufacturing of an Orient. His vision, in other
words, was blinded by his own insight.6 To be sure, Clifford himself in his review occasionally lapsed into expecting Said to say
what exactly "Orient" was if it were not what the Orientalists had
said it waswhich effectively contradicted his own point. But the
more serious challenge he had put to Said, namely his humanistic
assumption of a sovereign, knowing subject, remained valid and
survived any misreadings of Orientalism,
James Clifford's cogent point notwithstanding, and the misplaced criticism of latter-day Orientalists equally noted, Edward
Said's Orientalism proceeded to have a lasting influence on a wide
range of academic disciplines and critical movementsperhaps
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the most significant of which was the rise of what is now called
Postcolonial Studies, particularly in the domain of Subaltern
Studies. Partially under the influence of Edward Said but equally
attentive to a resurgent interest in one of Said's major sources of
inspiration Antonio Gramsci, beginning in the early 1980s, a collective of distinguished historians of South Asia, led by Ranajit
Guha and including such eminent scholars of the field as Partha
Chatterjee, Shahid Amin, David Arnold, Gyanendra Pandey, Ajit
K. Chaudhury, and Gyan Prakash (among others) revolutionized
the field of historiography by taking on the task of systematically
narrating the repressed history of the masses seriously.7 The theoretical and historiographical implications of the Subaltern Studies
soon spread far beyond its originary geography of South Asia. As
I noted in the previous chapter, in a conference called "Subaltern
Studies at Large" held at Columbia University on November 10,
2000, Ranajit Guha's colleagues took advantage of his residency at
Casa Italiana and brought together historians from Latin America,
Asia, and Africa discussing the manners in which the idea had
spread far beyond its South Asian domain.8 The principal task of
this collective was to generate a South Asian history from bellow,
speaking the unspoken truth of the denied and denigrated. Having
been silenced for a long time by and through imperial domination
and colonial de-subjection, the subalterns had started, as it were,
talking.
Beyond Orientalism proper, Edward Said himself pushed forward with his eloquent defense of the right of Palestinian people
not just for self-determination but more immediately for self-representationthat they need not be represented (to paraphrase his
ironic citation of Karl Marx's famous phrase at the beginning of
Orientalism), that they can represent themselves. Beginning with
the war of 1967 until his untimely death in 2003, Edward Said
was the most powerful voice speaking on behalf of the plight of
Palestinians. His critic of the colonial fabrication of the Orientalmapping a subject in order to conquer and subjugate it-did
not remain limited to a mere academic exercise in analytic dismantling of a discursive constitution of overpowered subject. His next
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anything at all. A certain presumptuous sovereignty of the knowing subject is detected in the figure of the postcolonial critic that
Spivak wishes to take to task and show that he (and the masculinist assumptions of that sovereign subject is itself a principal issue
for Spivak) is in fact complicit in de-subjecting the subalterns by
virtue of a constitutional denial of their heterogeneityin effect
perpetrating against them a severe epistemic violence. The subaltern is not a collective individualthe subaltern is heterogeneous,
gendered, classed, cultured. The subaltern cannot be represented
without being ipso facto violated. Representing them perpetrates
an epistemic violence perpetrated on the fact of their heterogeneity, unrepresentability. There is a constitutional problem in such
a logocentric representation of the subaltern, Spivak contends,
because in effect it ossifies the relation of power operative in the
very formation of the denied and denigrated colonial subject. So
as much as Spivak supports and applauds the project of Subaltern
Studies collective, of which she is in fact a member, she believes
that it is wrong of them to assume that they have given voice to
"the Subaltern" because by assuming so they have in fact extended
the cultural domain of the European sovereign subjectuncriticallyall around the globe. Spivak goes to the source of that
presumed sovereignty and takes to task even the so-called "critic
of the sovereign subject" in the heart of Europe by showing how
from Derrida to Foucault (less the former than the latter), they
have in fact fallen much short of any critical dismantling of the
sovereign subject that is globalinclusive of the colonial fact of
de-subjection. She is just as critical of what she calls the "internationalist" Marxism for equally essentializing the subaltern. She
concludes that Subaltern Studies, Internationalist Marxism, and
European criticism of the sovereign subject are united in the assumption that there is a pure form of consciousness. On the French
scene, there is a shuffling of signifiers: "the unconscious" or "the
subject-in-oppression" clandestinely fills the space of "the pure
form of consciousness." In orthodox "internationalist" intellectual
Marxism, whether in the First World or the Third, the pure form of
consciousness remains an idealistic bedrock which, dismissed as a
second-order problem, often earns it the reputation of racism and
161
sexism. In the Subaltern Studies group it needs development according to the unacknowledged terms of its own articulation."13
By raising the disquieting question "can the subaltern speak,"
Spivak throws a monkey wrench at the whole question of representation, targeting both the Orientalists and the Orientals, as it
were, disallowing them both to speak on behalf of what George
Herbert Mead a couple of generations before these issues were
raised would have called a generalized Other14because by virtue of this essentializing of that generalized Other as "Subaltern,"
the postcolonial critics are in fact confirming it in its subordinate
relation of power to neo/colonialism. Although in her essay,
Spivak is far gentler with the postcolonial Subalternists than she
is with the European poststructuralists, she has nevertheless told
them very firmly that they are both in effect doing the contrary of
what they say they wish to dothat their vision is indeed blinded
by their own insight, their purposeful deed defeated by the force
of their own argument. So the Subalternists are damned if they
do (represent the subaltern) and damned if they don'tbecause
in one case they are essentializing them and in the other they are
remaining silent in sight of unconscionable atrocities.
If Spivak were to be read on face value, even she could be (and
she has been)15 accused of essentialism of her own, of recasting
the world precisely in its colonial bifurcation between the First
and the Restfailing to see the structural similarities between the
two sides of the colonial divide that in fact under the code-name
globalization now shows the clear signs of its collapse. The power
of Spivak's question, however, is not in its presumed binary that it
perpetuates, but in the transcendental nature of the issue she raises,
namely can the subaltern speak a subaltern language constitutional
to a liberation lexicon domestic to the condition of subalternity
that does not further trap him/her in that condition? The question is not as much a matter of if and when the subaltern speaks
as whether she can be heard. Quite to the contrary. The question
is that when she does speak she is heard and understood all too
easily because she speaks a familiar languagethe language of
her oppressors. The question is the dialectic of interlocution in
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which the subaltern is caught, that her oppressor has always already
established the language of the conversationthat even when the
subaltern activists, scholars, and critics come to speak on her behalf
they speak the language of the oppressor, share the metaphors of
his imagination, invoke the sovereignty of his subjectby virtue
of the hegemony he has already consolidated in the universe of
meaning within which a speecheven the colonial's anti-colonial
speechis understood.16
The danger that threatens Spivak's position is to turn the question
of the subaltern (as the signifier for the economically disenfranchised, politically oppressed, discursively silenced, and culturally
denied) into a purely discursive proposition. In the real world, the
subalternas all of thoserevolts, commits acts of transgressive
violence, kills its oppressors and occupiers and is killed in return
(Palestine is the principal and Afghanistan and Iraq the most recent
sites of such actions). The question of representation (both speech
and phenomenon) is very much limited to the matter of the intellectualsacademic or otherwisereflecting on such matters very
much as bystanders (not as militant participants). Despite the fact
that this tendency remains a serious limitation of Spivak's essay, it
does not mean that the question that she raises is inconsequential
on the ground, where the subaltern revolts.
The implications of Spivak's argument were not limited to
discursive representations. There were obvious political consequences to her theoretical speculations. If she were to be taken at
face value, how would any activist raise her voice and say anything
on behalf of anything? The rampant charges of political impotence
systematically brought against the deconstructivists was here in
full view. Because she is a committed activist herself, Spivak
soon realized the impossibility of the situation in which she had
theoretically cornered her own colleagues and comrades. In the
subsequent concept of "strategic essentialism," Spivak sought to
redress this limitation and posit specific positions where essentialism can be effectively (politically) used as a strategy against itself:
"A strategic use of positivist essentialism," she now declared, is
perfectly viable "in a scrupulously visible political interest."17
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succinct theoretical articulation in his first posthumous book, Humanism and Democratic Criticism (2004), in which he provides a
detailed re-articulation of his unflinching conviction in humanism
by way of resuming a dialogue with James Clifford's detection of
the central paradox of the sovereign subject and essentialism in
Orientalism. Early in Humanism and Democratic Criticism, Said
begins by agreeing with Clifford's criticism and conceding that
in many ways Clifford was right, since during the 1960's and 1970's the
advent of the French theory in the humanistic departments of American
and English universities had brought about a severe if not crippling
defeat of what was considered traditional humanism by the forces of
structuralism and post-structuralism, both of which professed the death
of man-the-author and asserted the preeminence of antihumanist systems
such as those found in the work of Levi-Strauss, Foucault himself, and
Roland Barthes. The sovereignty of the subjectto use the technical
phrase for what Enlightenment thought did with Descartes' notion of
the cogito, which was to make it the center of all human knowledge
and hence capable of essentializing thought in itselfwas challenged
by what Foucault and Levi-Strauss carried forward from the work of
thinkers such as Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, and the linguist Ferdinand de
Saussure. This group of pioneers showed, in effect, that the existence of
systems of thinking and perceiving transcended the power of individual
subjects, individual humans who were inside those systems (systems
such as Freud's "unconscious" or Marx's "capital") and therefore had no
power over them, only the choice either to use or be used by them. This
of course flatly contradicts the core of humanistic thought, and hence
the individual cogito was displaced, or demoted, to the status of illusory
autonomy or fiction.21
Upon this admission, Said then proceeds to articulate his vision
of humanism, which is vastly different from "the kind of totalizing
and essentializing trends that Clifford identified," adding further
that he did not agree with "the argument put forward in the wake
of structuralist antihumanism by postmodernism or by its dismissive attitudes to what Jean-Francois Lyotard famously called the
grand narratives of enlightenment and emancipation." 22 Instead,
Said insists that there is a kind of non-totalizing, non-essentializing
humanism that he advocates and describes as being
165
166
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167
168
Post-Orientalism
169
not prevent the far more serious point that Kant here is not merely
dismissing one human being or even a succession of cultures as
being constitutionally incapable of the superior (European) conceptions of the beautiful and the sublime. As is evident in his third
critique, The Critique of Judgment, the realm of the aesthetics for
Kant is where he puts his first two critiquesthe knowing subject
and the knowable worldto test, that his constituted European
subject is capable of navigating the indecisive subjectivity of the
beautiful. Far more than being racially inferior to the European
subject in matters of aesthetic, the non-European (the Oriental) is
part and parcel of the objectified (knowable) world, at the mercy
of the European knowable subject.31
While both Said and Spivak are trapped in the thorny predicament of European subject, in two fundamentally different but ultimately related ways, the subject of their concern, the post/colonial
subjectwhether in post-Independence India or in yet to be liberated Palestineneeds to be free and liberated. And that liberation is impossible except in the militant disposition of a defiant
subject whose agency is in opposing its historical fate. In between
Said's critical humanism and Spivak's strategic essentialism there
already dwells a defiant subject that they have left theoretically
under-theorized, at the very same time that they themselves have
politically personified it.
*
170
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171
172
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*
173
that even when revolutions are launched on the ground they still
speak their defiance in the ideological language of the sovereign
subject they politically opposeat the very moment they epistemically adopt it. The experience of anticolonial movements over the
last two hundred years demonstrates very well the futility of any
political or ideological resistances to colonial modernity. In my
Theology of Discontent I sought to document how the presumed
political and ideological resistances to colonial modernity (the
Shah of Iran aggressively "modernizing" at the behest of and with
full military support of the Americans) have in fact acted as a trap
in which colonial subjects mimic its particular parameters, that
they are indeed dialectically predetermined in their revolutionary
resistance to colonial modernity to replicate its internal logic,
ossify its underlying metaphysical supposition of singular inevitability.35 People on the colonial edges of European modernity
are trapped, I had argued and demonstrated in that book, whether
they are enamored of its promises or if they oppose it through
a whole constellation of revolutionary uprisings. Revolutionary
resistances to colonialism may assume nativist (Islamist), nationalist, or socialist modes of resistancebut the result in all cases is
the same. All these modes of resistance to colonialism (through
which colonials have received European modernity) could not but
replicate the absence of historical agency assigned to the colonial
subject by way of writing it out of Hegelian history.
The emerging conception of "multiple modernities,"36 or anticolonial re/modulations of nationalism,37 do not make a particularly
persuasive case either, nor indeed does the native naturalization of
Soviet Socialism has historically done the colonized any good in
its aspirations towards an emancipatory conception of economic
growth, social justice, or political democracy (Soviet Socialism
in fact inaugurated a manner of colonialism of its ownboth
in economic and in cultural and ideological terms). The idea of
"alternative modernities" categorically disregards the aggressive
globalization of the operative forces of the capital long before the
term "globalization" assumed its current currency. By virtue of
the organizing forces of the capital, there was only one politically
dominant modernityand that was the European-based capitalist
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175
176
Post-Orientalism
177
may come away from a critical encounter with colonial modernitysince the more its political consequences were opposed,
the stronger its metaphysical underpinnings became, dragging the
colonized people and all the radical revolutions they launched into
its epistemic and emotive quagmireand on towards a creative
reconstitution of reality in a way that wrested the arrested light of
emancipation from the heart of blinding darkness.
Thus reflecting and writing a book on Makhmalbaf, I had hoped
to have given a glimpse of what has happened in post-revolutionary Iran once its Islamic Revolution failed to liberate it from the
colonial disposition of its ideological imagination. I had also tried
to link this structural failure at the presumed periphery of global
capitalism to its privileged center. There is a structural similarity
between the crisis of the subject (and with that the material conditions that occasion and sustain that crisis) endemic to the colonial
edges of capitalist modernity and a similar crisis specific to the
moments of anxiety at its presumed centers. Such European theorists of this crisis as Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault, and Jean
Baudrillard are of central significance in what I had to say in this
respectnot because I have a blind trust in their insights, or else
wish to provide an inconsequential gloss on their work. No. To
the degree that they have spoken from the heart of a European (or
what they call "Western") crisis (of the subject), then their reflections are crucial in any attempt in understanding what is happening
at the colonial and imperial edges of that proposition.
My single ambition in that book on Makhmalbaf was to detect
and articulate the evident aesthetics at the heart of his cinema.
My objective was to navigate through Makhmalbaf s cinema
and get closer to its revolutionary aesthetics, articulated by the
artist himself almost unconsciously. The aesthetic mutation of
violence into an assertive reconstitution of a defiant subject, as
I tried to show in this book, is evident throughout Makhmalbaf
cinema, but perhaps most visibly in "A Moment of Innocence"
(1996). In the final scene, where Makhmalbaf brings the police
officer and the would-be assassin together, one with a gun and the
other with a knife, imaginatively re-narrating a critical moment in
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
179
180
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Once in Israel he effectively reversed himself and said that Israel did not
mean to do what it did! In his essay, "Watching the Evening News: The
Chancellor Incident" (Raritan 2:2; Fall 1982), Pokier noted how "Chancellor unwittingly exposed the degree to which the structure of the evening
news depends on ideas of reality determined by the political and social
discourse already empowered outside the newsroom" (8). For an elaboration of Poirier's point see Edward Said's "Permission to Narrate," op. cit.,
255-256.
17. See Gayatri Spivak, The Spivak Reader: Selected Works ofGayatri Chakravorty Spivak (New York: Routledge, 1995), 214. For further references
to Spivak's notion of "strategic essentialism" see her interview with Ellen
Rooney in Outside in the Teaching Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993),
1-23. In addition to Gayatri Spivak's theorization of it, the term "strategic
essentialism" has been in circulation among such other feminist theorists as
Diana Fusssee her Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference (New York: Routledge, 1989); and Elizabeth Groszsee her Volatile
Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Theories of Representation & Difference) (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1994); see also Elizabeth
Grosz's "Sexual Difference and the Problem of Essentialism," in Traveling
Theories, Traveling Theorists, Inscriptions 5, Edited by James Clifford and
Vivek Dhareshwar (Santa Cruz, CA: Center for Cultural Studies, 1989).
http://humwww.ucsc.edu/CultStudies/PUBS/Inscriptions/vol_5/v5_top.
html. For an examination of the nuances of Spivak's use of "strategic essentialism" see Caryl Flinn, "The Body in the (Virgin) Machine." Arachne
(1996), 3(2): 50 and 66. In her most recent book, A Critique of Postcolonial
Reason, Spivak suggests that "the stringent binary opposition between positivism/essentialism .. .and "theory".. .may in fact be spurious. Apart from
repressing the ambiguous complicity between essentialism and criticism
of positivism.. .it also errs by implying that positivism is not a theory.. .yet
I remain generally sympathetic to aligning feminism with the critique of
positivism and the defatishization of the concrete." (See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the
Vanishing Present [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999],
282-283).
18. For Homi Bhabha's diatribe against Edward Said after his untimely death,
disguised as a tribute, in which he effectively accuses Said of allowing
his Oriental passion to overcome his rational faculties and thus condone
suicidal violence, see "Untimely Ends: Homi K. Bhabha on Edward Said."
Art Forum, February 2004. For a cogent critique of Homi Bhabha's attack
on Edward Said see Joseph Massad's "Intellectual Life of Edward Said," in
Journal of Palestine Studies (Special Issue in Honor of Edward Said) 131:
Volume XXXIE: Number 3, Spring 2004: 7-22. To see how Homi Bhabha's
characterization of Edward Said matches and reflects that of Said's Zionist
181
182
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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The same centrality of the Christian God is evident in Kant's Critique
of Practical Reason translated and edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge:
Cambridge.University Press, 1997). See for example his discussion of God
as "supreme perfection in substance" (p. 37), or his "postulate of existence
of God" (pp. 104-105). These are not mere signs of Kant's evident Christianity. They are central to his conception of "pure Reason," and thus by
extension the Christian disposition of his sovereign subject. For more on
the centrality of Christianity in Kant's philosophical project see Theodore
M. Greene's excellent essay, "The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Religion" as the Introduction to his and Hoyt H. Hudson's
translation of Immanuel Kant's Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), ix-cxxxiv.
See Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1960), 113.
In view of the Christian and European disposition of the Enlightenment sovereign subject, it is particularly troubling to see the astonishingly retrograde
turn that Postcolonial and Subaltern Studies has assumed in the work of
Homi Bhabha and Dipesh Chakrabarty, one "coding passing as resistance"
(as some have put it) in mimicry and hybridity, as it were; while the other
unabashedly pronouncing that "this heritage [namely Enlightenment humanism] is now global." See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe,
op. cit.: 4. Evidence of this globality has recently been demonstrated in
the U.S. and Israeli torture chambers and killing fields spread evenly from
Asadabad in the Northeastern Kunar Province of Afghanistan, to the Rafah
Refugee Camps in Palestine, to Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq, to Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base in Cuba.
See Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in
the Age of Reason, translated from the French by Richard Howard (New
York: Vintage Books, 1965), x-xi.
See Sorel, Reflections on Violence, op. cit., 122-123.
See Frantz Fanon, "Concerning Violence," op. cit., 37.
See my Theology of Discontent, op. cit.
For the emerging positions on the issue of "multiple modernities" see
S. N. Eisenstadt, Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities
(Leiden: Brill, 2003); Sachsenmaier Dominic (Ed.), Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese and Other Interpretations (Leiden:
Brill, 2002); Luis Roniger and Carlos H. Waisman, Globality and Multiple
Modernities: Comparative North American and Latin American Perspectives (International Specialized Book Service, 2002); and on cinema and
the idea of multiple modernities see Jenny Kwok Wah Lau (Ed.), Multiple
Modernities: Cinemas and Popular Media in Transcultural East Asia
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2003).
183
37. The most cogent case for the categorical difference of anti-colonial nationalism is made by Partha Chatterjee in The Nation and Its Fragments
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). The emergence of
anticolonial nationalism and the postcolonial state, Chatterjee argues, is
markedly different from the European primogeniture of such categories as
nation-state and modernity. I disagree. I believe anticolonial nationalism
throughout the world have in fact aggravated and ossified the epistemic
and political predicates of European nationalism. For the case I make for
an "anticolonial modernity" see the postscript to my Iran: A People Interrupted (op. cit.).
38. I have developed these ideas in some details in my Masters and Masterpieces of Iranian Cinema (Washington, DC: Mage Publications, 2007).
5
Pilgrims' Progress:
On Revolutionary Border-Crossing
"Now what effect does [the struggle over Africa] have on us? Why
should the black man in America concern himself since he's been
away from African continent for three or four hundred years? Why
should we concern ourselves? What impact does what happens to
them have upon us? Number one, you have to realize that up until
1959 Africa was dominated by the colonial powers. Having complete
control over Africa, the colonial powers of Europe projected the image
ofAfrica negatively. They always project Africa in a negative light:
jungle savages, cannibals, nothing civilized. What then naturally it
was so negative that it was negative to you and me, and you and I
began to hate it We didn yt want anybody telling us anything about
Africa, much less calling us Africans. In hating Africa and in hating the Africans, we ended up hating ourselves, without even realizing it. Because you can't hate the roots of a tree, and not hate the
tree."Malcolm X (1965)
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here is that the presumed crisis of the subject is checked and balanced by the factual crisis of the dominant ideology, which (in
my estimation) categorically fails to convince, control, or sustain
the credulity and servitude of its targeted population. The ideological crisis of U.S. imperialism, I will thus argue, is matched by
an extraordinary evidence of revolutionary border-crossing by a
number of leading world revolutionaries in the twentieth century. I
will try to find a common thread among a number of revolutionary
thinkers and activistsChe Guevara, Malcolm X, Frantz Fanon,
and Ali Shari'atiwho managed to cross their respective borders
in order to reach for a global conception of liberation. My objective here is to articulate the question of normative and moral (ipso
facto political) agency in a specifically revolutionary context and to
demonstrate that a truly authentic revolutionary character is always
and paradoxically predicated on revolutionary inauthenticitybeing fixed on the revolutionary cause but mobile in one's discursive
articulation of it. Here, upon this premise, is where I will look at
Edward Said as one such revolutionary thinker who in the realm
of ideas and aspirations did precisely what Che Guevara, Frantz
Fanon, Malcolm X, and Ali Shari'ati had done in the battlefields
of history: translated the native and nativist boundaries of a particular cause, for Said Palestine, into the vernacular grammar of
a far more global struggle.
My principal point of departure in making this argument is
that the Hegemon is in trouble, for in its call to spread freedom
and democracy it protests too much. To understand the subjective limits of hegemony, we need to have a realistic assessment of
its power and legitimacy and never take its claims on face value.
The fact that the propaganda machinery seeks to generate and
sustain consent does not mean that it is successful in securing its
domination or persuasive in articulating its ideology. There is a
real world outside CNN and Fox News that neither Wolf Blitzer
nor Brit Hume know or represent. The phantasmagoric size of
the U.S. military and propaganda machineries are in fact the best
testimonies to their hollow promises, empty messages, and above
all unconvincing protestations. Opposing both the U.S. military
Pilgrims' Progress
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"If one were to reduce U.S. foreign policy under John Kerryshould he defeat President George W. Bush in the November
electionsto a four-word motto," so speculates an observer of the
U.S. Presidential election of 2004 in an article, "it would probably
be, 'Hegemony Yes, Empire No.'"3 So if the presidency of George
W. Bush has been geared toward the military manufacturing of an
Empire with no Hegemony, then was the world looking forward to
Senator Kerry's possible victory with the prospect of a Hegemony
with no Empire? The answer lies in the nature and disposition
of the current U.S. imperial self-projection, and the underlying
propaganda machinery that seeks to define and justify it.
In an article published at the wake of the Republican National
Convention in August 2004 in New York, Lewis Lapham gave a
synoptic history of the phantasmagoric propaganda machinery that
has been at the service of the current turn to U.S. Empire-building project.4 Trying to give an answer to Richard Hofstadter's
riddle"When, in all our history, has anyone with ideas so bizarre,
so archaic, so self-confounding, so remote from the basic American
consensus, ever got so far?"Lapham mobilizes a troubling army
of facts and figures documenting the systematic appropriation of
the public space by a small band of billionaires who, beginning
with the Civil Rights movements of the 1960s, were frightened
out of their wits, saw the proverbial writing on the wall, and then
went on a rampage of establishing multi-million dollar conservative foundations (like The Bradley Foundation, Smith Richardson
Foundation, and Scaife Family Foundation), founding reactionary
think-tanks (like the Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise
Institute, and the Hoover Institution), spending some 300 million
dollars on television programs (like Pat Robertson's 700 Club
and Fox News Channel), radio shows (like the Rush Limbaugh
show, the Cal Thomas Commentary), publishing houses (like
Eagle Publishing, Inc), newspapers (like the Washington Times
and the Wall Street Journal), and websites (like Townhall.com
and AnnCoulter.com); funding students and scholars at major
U.S. universities (ranging from Harvard and Yale to Stanford and
Chicago), and paying lucrative subventions for the publication
of such books as Dinesh D'Souza's Illiberal Education (funded
Pilgrims' Progress
189
by the Olin Foundation), Samuel Huntington's Class of Civilization (funded by both Bradley Foundation and Smith Richardson
Foundation), and Milton Friedman's Free to Choose (funded by
both the Scaife Foundation and the Olin Foundation).
To what degree Richard Hofstadter's assumption, and Lewis
Lapham's tacit concurrence, that what has happened in the U.S.
from the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1980-1988) to that of
George W. Bush (2000-2008) is "remote from the basic American
consensus," or in fact (as I believe) constitutional to it, is a matter
of speculative and rather useless conjecture here. What remains
solid is Marx's simple formula that the ruling ideas are always
the ideas of the ruling class. If the military budget of the United
States, a self-proclaimed democracy with every single eligible voter
entitled to vote, between the years 2000 and 2008 is estimated to
be the number 3,200,000,000,000, and there is no congressional
call for presidential impeachment for having cheated and lied, or
no criminal charges brought against the neoconservatives calling
to increase that number, then to what degree is the U.S. imperial
nightmare accidental to the historical experience of the United
States from its very inception is a serious matter of debate.
To understand the nature and function of this propaganda
machinery and the hegemony that its imperial imaginary wishes
to generate and sustain, we can look at one of its most recent
products. Consider, for example, the recent publication of the
runaway New York Times bestseller, Azar Nafisi's Reading Lolita
in Tehran. At a stroke, the new inductee in the neocon's hall of
shame (an employee of Paul Wolfowitz and a protege of Bernard
Lewis) manages to do all the following in one grand tour of service: (1) excite the Oriental fantasies of the Empire by posing
as a Scheherazade storyteller who collects seven Oriental virgins
in a corner of her harem to tell them stories; (2) posit an overtly
Orientalized pedophilia (Professor Humbert Humbert and Lolita
metaphorically modulated into an Islamic Republic) catering to
the post-9/11 fear of imperial castration associated with the collapse of the two totemic phallic symbols of the U.S. empire (the
twin towers of the World Trade Center); (3) convey a not so subtle
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message that Iranian women at large are waiting for Azar Nafisi's
boss, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and
his boss George W. Bush, to come and liberate them the way they
have liberated their Iraqi sisters and brothers in the U.S. torture
chambers of Abu Ghraib prison; (4) dismiss and denigrate all local cultures of resistance to imperial hubris and then divest them
of their innate moral imagination and political agency poised to
liberate themselves from both domestic tyranny and globalized
empires, by suggesting that if Iranians were left to their own
devices and not rescued by the masterpieces of Western literature
they would have been clueless as to how to articulate their hopes
and speculate on their aspirations; and finally (5) reassert the globalized significance of the "masterpieces of Western literature" a
half a century into a historic battle to rescue the curricula of the
U.S. colleges and universities from endemic domination by a white
supremacist project. With the appearance of a single volume, facilitated by Paul Wolfowitz and Bernard Lewis, all it takes is one
Oriental storyteller to do all these services in one shot.5
The massive propaganda machinery that Lewis Lapham clinically identifies and Azar Nafisi's Reading Lolita in Tehran best
represents is constitutional to the imperial imaginary at the root
of the "The Project for the New American Century" (expanding
the imperial hubris of the U.S. empire far beyond space and topography and well into time and eternity), which in the words of
William C. Kristol, its chairman, is predicated on the principle that
"American leadership is good both for America and for the world;
that such leadership requires military strength, diplomatic energy
and commitment to moral principle." Based on this premise, "The
Project for the New American Century" asserts that:
(1) We need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry
out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces
for the future; (2) we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies
and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values; (3) we need
to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; (4) we
need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and
extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity,
and our principles.6
Pilgrims' Progress
191
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prolonged air raids. Right before the March 2003 invasion, the
chief UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix, was dispatched effectively
to dismantle all the Iraqi defense mechanism. And half a decade
into its illegal colonial occupation of Iraq, the US army has still
not been able to control or contain massive popular and armed
uprisings against its colonial occupation. Similarly in Israel, one
of the deadliest military extensions of the U.S. imperial power in
the region, has failed to pacify the Palestinian national liberation
uprising, sustained by pebbles, homemade bombs, and the iron
will of an indomitable people. The resounding defeat of the Israeli
army by the Hezbollah in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 is the
further indication of the factual ineptitude of a military machinery
otherwise sustained on self-delusional propaganda.
Culturally, the combined forces of Hollywood and CNN/Fox are
the singular source of joke and ridicule (and thus entertainment)
in the world. Manners and modes of resistance to Hollywood
globalization is narrated and navigated by a panoply of national
cinemas; as it would be wrong to assume that the success of Azar
Nafisi's Reading Lolita in Tehran in the U.S. means anything in
Iran, where the masterpieces of modern Persian literature are the
staple of a moral imaginary that has resisted domestic tyranny and
imperial hubris alike.
Ideologically, the two most widely read imperial tracts of the
last two decades, Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilization
and Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man
are the evidence of their authors' historical and philosophical
illiteracyconfounded by an imperial hubris that can actually
print and publish them. The ideas of the dominant class are the
dominant ideas not by virtue of their innate logic, consistency, or
correspondence to truthbut by virtue of the powerful gun that
fires them across the globe and into the people's faces, minds, and
against their analytic faculties.
Either an Empire without hegemony or else a hegemony without
an empire, paramount in our historic fate today is the globalized
operation of a predatory capital that makes and breaks cultures and
civilizations at the command of the inner logic of its own madness.
Pilgrims'Progress
193
The so-called crisis of the subject can and has been resolved
creatively in various artistic adventures (such as in Iranian, Cuban,
or now Palestinian cinemas). It can and has also been resolved
critically and in political terms via revolutionary border-crossing,
where bourgeois nationalism means absolutely nothing and all
manners of national identities, characters, and commitments have
in theory and practice been transmuted into a global conception of
a far more universal struggle. The significance of such revolutionary border-crossing is even more acute under the circumstances
when American attempts at hegemonic consensus building is in
fact in deep trouble and can achieve nothing but its own undoing.
The platitudinous fatuity of American attempts at hegemony effectively invites multiple sites of resistance via a succession of
revolutionary border-crossing. This, in effect, amounts to a mode
of revolutionary inauthenticity in specifically national bourgeois
terms and in the interest of a far superior objective of global resistance to imperialism of one sort or another. Such revolutionary
inauthenticity and border-crossing, in turn, results in altogether
bypassing the so-called crisis of the subject, for the revolutionary
activist at the moment of that activism represents absolutely nothing and nobody and as such the entire question of representation
is effectively overcome.
Who might be some of the best examples of such revolutionary border-crossing? In the central two decades of the twentieth
century four exemplary visionaries put their emancipatory ideas
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Pilgrims' Progress
195
196
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Pilgrims' Progress
197
198
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Pilgrims' Progress
199
200
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Pilgrims'Progress
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202
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Pilgrims' Progress
203
204
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Pilgrims' Progress
205
206
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See "The State of Food Insecurity in the World," FAO Corporate Document
Repository, Economic and Social Department, available at http://www.
fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/006/j0083e/j0083e02.
htm.
2. Center for Defense Information reports that in the fiscal year 2004 the US
military budget is 399.1 billion dollars, more than the combined military
budgets of Russia, China, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Saudi
Arabia, Italy, India, South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, Israel, Spain, Australia,
Canada, Netherlands, Turkey, Mexico, Kuwait, Ukraine, Iran, and Singapore. The military budget of Israel, meanwhile, is bigger than all the
countries that come after it in that list. For more details see the Website
of the Center for Defense Information at http://www.cdi.org/budget/2004/
world-military-spending.cfm, where you will see the following statement:
"For 45 years of the Cold War we were in an arms race with the Soviet
Union. Now it appears we're in an arms race with ourselves"is attributed
to Admiral Eugene Carroll, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.), Vice President Emeritus,
Center for Defense Information.
3. See Jim Lobe, "Hegemony Yes, Empire No in a Kerry Foreign Policy."
Inter Press Service, 29 July 2004; published in Common Dreams News
Center at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0729-04.htm.
4. See Lewis Lapham, "Tentacles of Rage: The Republican Propaganda Mill,
A Brief History." Harper's Magazine, September 2004: 31-41.
5. For more on my take on Azar Nafisi's Reading Lolita in Tehran see my
"Native informers and the making of the American empire" (al-Ahram,
1-7 June 2006).
6. As stated on the Website of "The Project for the New American Century"
at http://www.newamericancentury.org.
Pilgrims' Progress
7.
207
6
End osmosis: Knowledge without Agency,
Empire without Hegemony1
"The subjection of women in Muslim societiesespecially in Arab
nations and in Iranis today very much in the public eye. Accounts
of lashings, stonings, and honor killings are regularly in the news,
and searing memoirs byAyaan HirsiAli andAzarNafisi have become
major best-sellers. One might expect that by now American feminist
groups would be organizing protests against such glaring injustices,
joining forces with the valiant Muslim women who are working to
change their societies. This is not happening"Christina HojfSommers, "The Subjection of Islamic Women: And the Fecklessness of
American Feminism" {Weekly Standard, May 21, 2007)
"To speak is to fight.... It is now dissension that must be emphasized.
Consensus is a horizon that is never reached. Research that takes
place under the aegis of a paradigm tends to stabilize; it is like the exploitation ofa technological, economic, or artistic 'idea/ It cannot be
discounted. But what is striking is that someone always comes along
to disturb the order of 'reason.' It is necessary to posit the existence
of a power that destabilizes the capacity for explanation...."JeanFrangois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge
(1979/1984)2
After one of his early visits to Iraq soon after the U.S.-led invasion of March 2003, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, at the time the U.S.
Deputy Secretary of Defense, told Charlie Rose in an interview
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how positively grateful and appreciative Iraqis were that Americans had gone there to liberate them. 'As we would drive by," he
said, "little kids would run up to the road and give us a thumbs up
sign." Commenting on Mr. Wolfowitz's observation, the New York
Times columnist Maureen Dowd jabbed at the deputy secretary
and quipped, "at least he thought it was the thumb"suggesting
that it may have been some other finger, the middle finger to be
precise.3
The trouble with both Mr. Wolfowitz and Ms. Dowd is that Mr.
Wolfowitz may have had absolutely no problem with his eyesight
and he must indeed have seen Iraqi youngster giving him the
thumbs up; but, and here is the rubrubbing both Mr. Wolfowitz
and Ms. Dowd the wrong wayin the streets of Baghdad the
thumbs up means what the middle finger means in Washington,
DC.
It is fair to say that as things go in the United States, Paul
Wolfowitz and Maureen Dowd are on the opposite sides of the
political divideand yet what unites them both is a sort of semiotic imperialism in which they cannot see a thumb or a raised
middle finger in any other way but the American wayno local
knowledge, as the late Clifford Geertz (1926-2006) would say, no
thick description of any other kind than the kind operating on both
sides of the Dowd-Wolfowitz divide, informs the analytics of this
particular empirefor or against it.
It is one of the most enduring paradoxes of all imperial projects that precisely at the moment that they feign universality of
purpose they sport the most provincial, parochial, tribal, and even
outright dyslexic utterances in the idiomatic prosody of their
claim to rule the world. We cannot begin to address the current
state of so-called "Middle East studies," and its adjacent supplement, "Knowledge Production in an Age of Empire," without first
keeping this paradox in mind. The more the United States spreads
its imperial wings, just like the emblem of the bald eagle it so
celebrates, the more myopic, self-delusional, mendacious, and
even banal becomes its predatory claims to a worldly knowledge
befitting that imperialism. Paramount in the state of knowledge
that friends and foes of this empire share is a narrow lexicogra-
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Endosmosis
213
of it, so that today we might have a better grasp of the varied and
amorphous modes of knowledge production about Islam and "the
middle East," and in fact see it, as I propose, as a case of epistemic endosmosis, in which the aggressive formation of a field of
public knowledge about Islam and "the Middle East" is no longer
conducive to the reversed formation of a sovereign (European
or American) and all-knowing (Kantian) subject. My ultimate
proposal here is that today in fact we are witnessing a mode of
knowledge that is devoid of agential subjectness, which is the
modus operandi of an empire without hegemony. This epistemic
endosmosisinterested knowledge manufactured in think tanks
and percolating into the public domainI propose is conducive
to various manners of disposable knowledge productionpredicated on no enduring or legitimate episteme, but in fact modeled
on non-refundable commodities that provide instant gratification
and are then disposed of after one use only. This is fast-knowledge produced on the model of fast food, with plastic cups, plastic
knives, plastic forks, and hopefully biodegradable paper that can
be recycled for environmental purposes.
The origin and function of this mode of knowledge are compatible with the imperial imaginary they serve, for the problem of
knowledge production in an age of empire will have to begin with
the political provenance of that empire, the U.S. empire, and the
postmodern predicament of its illusion of sovereignty, legitimacy,
and authority. The power at the military roots of the conception of
empire that enables any mode of knowledge production will have
to be broken down, in the idiomaticity of its American English,
into the distance between potenza and potere, when Agamben
begins to speak Italian to it, between puissance andpouvoir, when
Foucault begins to speak French, or Macht and Vermogen when
Heidegger begins to speak German to it. The Latin root of the distance between potentia mdpotestas, between power in a diffused
and amorphous state, and power as centralized, authenticated, and
legitimized, is what is perhaps deliberately lost to "power" when
George W. Bush claims it in his American English.
My contention here is that as much as power as potere, pouvoir, Vermogen, andpotestas was conducive to the formation of a
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knowing and sovereign European subject, power as potenza, puissance, Macht, and potentia entirely lacks and perhaps has forever
lost the ability to constitute agential autonomy for the knowing
and sovereign subject (European or otherwise) who thus seeks to
claim it. Immanuel Kant, in other words, was the very last metaphysician of the (European) sovereign subjectthe omnipotent,
omnipresent, and omniscient narrator of history. The classical
period of Orientalism, namely Orientalism as the intelligence arm
of colonialism, corresponded to that absolute sovereignty of the
European knowing subject, as mercenary armies of Orientalists
went around the world and defined it in the form of a knowledge
that can be known, owned, and governed at one and the same time.
That mode of knowledge production along with the sovereign
subject that produced it have long since ceased to exist, and upon
us is the age of homo sacer, nuda vita (naked life), state of exception, dispersion of refugees between mere humans and would-be
citizens, language as hypertrophy, and gestures as pure means with
no end. The knowledge that corresponds to this state of exception
as imperial rule is the knowledge by endosmosis, the knowledge
of nothing, knowledge without agency, at the service of an empire
with no hegemony.
To work my way towards this final argument, I will first have to
demonstrate the mutation of these varied modes of Orientalisms
(in plural) into Area Studies specializations in the course of the
Cold War. Here I propose a fundamental difference between the
dominant mode of Orientalist knowledge production, commensurate with the heights of European colonialism, and the rise of
Area Studies programs in various U.S. and European universities,
with direct or indirect connections to the U.S. State Department or
the U.S. intelligence communities, at a time that such knowledge
was useful in the immediate aftermath of World War II and the
beginning of the Cold War.
That mode of knowledge, compatible with American strategic
interests in areas on the periphery of the Soviet Unionall the way
from Eastern Europe down to the Middle and Far Eastwas active
and operative for almost half a century until it came to an abrupt end
with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union,
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Endosmosis
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Endosmosis
219
of Islam and "the Middle East" and only to the degree that they
pertain to the larger ideological project of American neo-conservatism. Lewis Lapham begins his essay with a quotation from
Richard Hofstadter, asking rhetorically, "When, in all our history,
has anyone with ideas so bizarre, so archaic, so self-confounding,
so remote from the basic American consensus, ever got so far."6
Lewis Lapham's response to this question is to go back to the Civil
Rights Movement in the 1960s and map out carefully the process
by which multi-billion-dollar conservative foundationssuch as
the Bradley Foundation, Smith Richardson Foundation, Scaife
Family Foundation, or John M. Olin Foundationwere established precisely to counter progressive and radical thinking in the
American counter-culture.
Lewis Lapham is equally attentive to the formation of major
think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Hoover Institution, in which scholars
are exempted from the time-honored practice of peer review and
a responsible teaching and credible scholarly career and instead
given lucrative salaries to sit down and do nothing but write up
strategies of domination for American economic interests and thus
seek to safeguard presumed American national security concerns.
Lapham also carefully documents what he calls a "300 Million
dollar Conservative Message Machine," in which a wide spectrum
of television and radio stations, publishing houses, newspapers,
and websites have been incorporated into a massive propaganda
machinery. His argument extends well into a widespread body of
students and scholars in major American universitiesincluding
Harvard, Chicago, and Stanfordwho have been the recipients of
scholarships from these institutions. Most significantly, Lapham
creates a chart in which the most influential books in the neoconservative genre and cross-references them with the foundations
that have sponsored thembooks that include Francis Fukuyama's
The End of History (1992) and Samuel Huntington's The Clash of
Civilizations (1993/1996)funded by the John M. Olin Foundation, the Bradley Foundation, and Smith Richardson Foundation,
respectively. The Olin Foundation, co-founded by Alan Bloom
and co-directed by John Cropsey and Leon Kass, includes among
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its illustrious roster none other than Ms. Azar Nafisi. As to what
exactly holds all these distinguished people together, all one needs
to read is Anne Norton's extraordinary book, Leo Strauss and
the Politics of American Empire (2004), or at the very least Earl
Shorris' equally revealing "Ignoble Liars: Leo Strauss, George
Bush, and the Philosophy of Mass Deception" (Harper's Magazine, June 2004).
I believe that despite the elegance and thoroughness of his argument, Lewis Lapham's essay falls far too short of answering Richard Hofstadter's question"When, in all our history, has anyone
with ideas so bizarre, so archaic, so self-confounding, so remote
from the basic American consensus, ever got so far." I believe that
we need to link the sorts of historicization that Lewis Lapham does
in his fine essay to the larger frame of pre- and post-Orientalist
knowledge production in order to reach for a clearer understanding of our present condition. Two sorts of mutually contradictory
approaches in this respect are in my judgment counter-productive
and will have to be surpassed: One is Douglas Little's fine study
American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East
since 1945 (2004), and the other is Robert Irwin's retrograde,
missing-the-point Dangerous Knowledge: Orientalism and Its Discontents [aka For Lust of Knowing] (2006). While Douglas Little's
fine historical overview is weakened by a noticeable absence of
theoretical precision on the nature of knowledge and power and
thus lumps together and confuses the European Orientalist and the
American post-Orientalist phases of Area Studies, Robert Irwin's
retrograde piece of memorabilia completely misses the boat and
thinks exhuming the graves of some perfectly decent Orientalists
who were not spies or were in fact pacifists is going to solve and
absolve his predicament.7
Predicated on these studies, my argument is that in the most
recent development in the evolving modes of knowledge production about Islam and "the Middle East" we have in fact entered a
new epistemic, or counter-epistemic to be more exact, juncture.
To ascertain the particulars of that counter-epistemic, we need to
begin in the domain of the social construction of reality, and the
coterminous creation of security studies departments as fifth col-
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Endosmosis
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224
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Endosmosis
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Eisenstein, Susan Willis, and Susan Buck-Morss who have successfully crossed the psychological barrier and begun valiantly to
write about matters Islamic and "Middle Eastern" without being
Islamist in their disciplinary training. The fact that all these thinkers
as authors or auteurs in one way or another address the questions
of women's rights within the shifting epistemics of critical thinking
in pre- and post- 9/11 wars of terror and terrorism at once roots
them in the immediate materiality of their time and yet points to
manners of emancipatory thinking yet beyond our horizons.
Notes
1. The first draft of this chapter was delivered at a symposium, "The State
of Middle East Studies: Knowledge Production in an Age of Empire,"
organized by a group of graduate students at the Department of Cultural
and Social Anthropology at Stanford University on 17 May 2007. I am
grateful to the organizers of the symposiumElif Babul, Chiara De Cesari,
Aisha Ghani, Sima Shakhsari, and Rania Sweisfor having included me
in this gathering.
2. Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: University Of Minnesota Press, 1984 [1979]),
10 and 61.
3. For Maureen Dowd's column on this point see her "Neocon Coup at the
Department d'Etat" {New York Times, 6 August 2003).
4. Alfred Thayer Mahan used the term "the Middle East" first in an article,
"The Persian Gulf and International Relations," which he published in
September 1902 in National Review in London. See C.R. Koppes, "Captain
Mahan, General Gordon and the origin of the term "Middle East."" Middle
East Studies 1976: 12: p. 95-98. See also Roger Adelson, London and the
Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, and War, 1902-1922. (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).
5. Jonathan Cole, "Academic Freedom under Fire" {Daedalus, Vol. 134, Issue
2On Imperialism, Spring 2005): 5-17.
6. See Lewis H. Lapham, "Tentacles of Rage: The Republican Propaganda
MillA Brief History," in Harper's Magazine (September 2004): 31.
7. For my argument that they do not, see the details of my case study of Ignaz
Goldziher in chapter 2.
8. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Reality. (London: The Penguin Press, 1967).
9. For more details see Jeff Gerth and Scott Shane, "U.S. Is Said to Pay to
Plant Articles in Iraq Papers," {New York Times, 1 December 2005) "But far
from being the heartfelt opinion of an Iraqi writer, as its language implied,"
Endosmosis
227
this report indicates about one such article, "the article was prepared by
the United States military as part of a multimillion-dollar covert campaign
to plant paid propaganda in the Iraqi news media and pay friendly Iraqi
journalists monthly stipends, military contractors and officials said. The
article was one of several in a storyboard, the military's term for a list of
articles, that was delivered Tuesday to the Lincoln Group, a Washingtonbased public relations firm paid by the Pentagon, documents from the Pentagon show. The contractor's job is to translate the articles into Arabic and
submit them to Iraqi newspapers or advertising agencies without revealing
the Pentagon's role. Documents show that the intended target of the article
on a democratic Iraq was Azzaman, a leading independent newspaper, but
it is not known whether it was published there or anywhere else."
10. Jean Baudrillard, The Perfect Crime. Translated by Chris Turner (London
and New York: verso, 1996): 25.
11. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (op. cit.): 60-67.
7
Towards a New Organicity
"Exile is also...a metaphorical condition."Edward Said
Halfway through his 1993 Reith Lectures on "Representations
of the Intellectuals," Edward Said proposes his principal argument
in revising the Gramscian idea of the organic intellectual:
While it is an actual condition, exile is also for my purposes a metaphorical condition.... Even intellectuals who are lifelong members of a society
can, in a manner of speaking, be divided into insiders and outsiders:
those on the one hand who belong fully to the society as it is, who flourish in it without an overwhelming sense of dissonance or dissent, those
who can be called yea-sayers; and on the other hand, the nay-sayers, the
individuals at odds with their society and therefore outsiders and exiles
so far as privileges, power, and honors are concerned.1
In this piece of self-theorization, Said proposes a certain necessary
distance between the intellectual and the society at large, a distance
that should enable the intellectual to keep an angular perspective
on power and thus be able to speak the truth to it. On many other
occasions and conversations, I have heard Edward Said talk about
the revolutionary potential of an amphibian intellectual, someone
who fluently traverses two or more interlacing environments. I
have always thought that the idea of an "amphibian intellectual,"
as Edward Said understood it, is a far more effective and liberating
ideal-type than the notion of "dual marginality" with which social
scientists tend to categorize the so-called "exilic" conditiona
condition I find entirely useless for it is self-disenfranchising,
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231
First let us consider American nativism: Eurocentric Americanism has become the most ferocious force of conservative energy
in the United States over the last few decades. At the very heart
of global capitalism, Samuel Huntington's thesis of the "Clash of
Civilizations" is only the most widely noted example of a much
wider range of conservative reaction that has now reached as far left
as Richard Rorty. Under the entirely bogus and outdated concept
of "Civilization," and totally innocent of the most radical modifications of such grandiloquent claims on our credulity that kept
nineteenth century sociologists like Emile Durkheim and Marcel
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233
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Democracy" come from the resentful Muslims building "Empires of Resentment," and the paternalistic Japanese (Asians in
general) who are combining "Western Capitalism" with "Eastern
patrimonialism" in their construction of "Empires of Deference."9
Muslims have lost the game, so they are resentful. Asians have
joined the game, and they may steal the show. The pathology of
Fukuyama's diagnosis does not rest in his shameless identification of "the failure of Muslim societies generally to maintain their
dignity vis-a-vis the non-Muslim West,"10 but in the extension of
his diagnosis to include the disenfranchised communities inside
the capitalist metropolis:
Even in the United States, it is possible to see the beginning of new
illiberal ideologies emerging as the distant result of different cultural
attitudes towards economic activity. In the heyday of the civilrightsmovement, most American blacks aspired to complete integration into white
society, implying a full acceptance of the dominant cultural values of
American society.... Despite the abolition of legally sanctioned barriers
to equality in the 1960's, however, and the rise of a variety of affirmative action programs giving preference to blacks, a certain sector of the
American black population not only failed to advance economically, but
actually lost ground. One political result of persistent economic failure,
however, is the now more frequently heard assertion that the traditional
measures of economic success, such as work, education, and employment, represent not universal but "white" values. Rather than seeking
integration in a color-blind society, some black leaders stress instead the
need to take pride in distant Afro-American culture with its own history,
traditions, heroes, and values, equal to but separate from the culture of
white society.11
Here, Fukuyama is caught red-handed, with his blatant racism
in full view, and here is where we can see the paralyzing anxiety
of American conservative "nativism." What Fukuyama tries to
conceal under the inside-the-Beltway bureaucratic euphemism
of "different cultural attitudes towards economic activity" is his
conviction that African-Americans are constitutionally lazy, and
that their problem is not historical disenfranchisement in the rise
of American capitalist modernity but their "culture." If African
Americans are jobless, or lack education and training, it is not
because of a constitutional racism at the very core of the American
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of the few things that they used to come to college with that had
something to do with their lives. Nothing has taken its place except a smattering of facts learned about other nations or cultures
and a few social science formulas."13 The students we face in
our classes today have either fortunately lost the innocence of
considering Christopher Columbus and his murderous treatment
of native Americans a hero, or else have a far more busy schedule even to care about who "discovered" America. What neither
Allan Bloom nor, alas, Saul Bellow who has written a laudatory
foreword to Bloom's volume, recognize is that the children of new
immigrants face the fact of witnessing both their parents working
sometimes eighteen hour a day to make it possible for them to go
to college. They have to become productive in the shortest amount
of time possible. They lack the luxury of caring for Bloom's
list of "American heroes." Their parents are far more heroic to
them, and rightly so, than any dead figment of white Americans'
imagination. This culture is rightly suspicious of all those heroes
that Mr. Bloom celebrates. As for the "smattering of facts" they
do know about other cultures and nations, this should have given
Professor Bloom a hint as to the changing composition of his
students but it alas did not. Whatever "smattering of facts" these
students might know is infinitely superior to the Orientalist bag of
treachery that Bloom's own generation of American students were
taught by the likes of Bernard Lewis and Co. about these "other
cultures." What we witness here is a fundamental inability to see
what is glaringly standing in front of us as the radically changing
configuration of a national reality by the sheer force of economic
necessity. The inability is rooted both in a constitutional lack of
historicity in one's intellectual disposition and an equally flawed
conception of intellectual history.
The case of the Civil Rights Movement is a crucial test. Like Fukuyama, Mr. Bloom finds fault with the Civil Rights movement:
The civil rights movement provides a good example of this change in
thought. In its early days almost all the significant leaders, in spite of
tactical and temperamental differences, relied on the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.... This stance implied afirmconviction
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243
The significance of Denby's contribution to the chorus of conservative nativism is in something entirely different. What we
read here is wonderful bedtime reading for the Columbia Alumnae
who have now succeeded in the business world and have a nostalgic recollection of their experiences with the Core and now by
reading Denby's memorabilia are reminded of their own youthful
days. Great psychological salesmanship on the part of Simon and
Schuster, but alas very little substance otherwise. What Adorno
scornfully called "the Culture Industry" is taken here to its logical
conclusion. A little bit of a cultural booster shot will ensure that
the dose our Alumnae received in their youthful days is still fully
operative. But the booster shot that Denby administers here to the
top executives of the industry is not totally innocent. It reinforces
the fear of the foreigners, it consolidates the presumed reality and
continued validity of "Western Civilization," and it ultimately
helps to sustain the shopping cart theory of world history in which
through a Hegelian isle we walk and pick and choose the best that
the world has produced and call it "Western." Plato is plucked
out of his Greek context, Augustine out of his North African
milieu, Machiavelli from his Mediterranean, and Rousseau from
his Enlightenment, and then all are strung together by a fictitious
thread that Oswald Spengler wove and Francis Fukuyama took it
ad absurdum.
David Denby's escapade and its lucrative consequences points
to a constitutional fallacy in the assumption of the university
as a reality sui generis that was already embedded in Cardinal
Newman's The Idea of a University. A critical awareness of the
sociology of contemporary academic intellectuals requires a realistic assessment of their institutional limitations. The critical
intelligence that today is required to cultivate historical agency
can no longer harbor such illusions. Newman, as a committed
Christian, was after carefully defining what he considered to be
the "Universal," that is to say, non-denominational, purpose of the
institution. He, as a result, considered the university to be primarily an "intellectual" proposition and not a "moral" one.18 From
a devoutly Christian perspective he considered the Church to be
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constitutional to the "integrity" of university, and yet fully commanded by the catholicity of his learning and the liberality of his
mind, Newman was one of the greatest defenders of the autonomy
of the university as an institution of higher learning. The same
liberality that Newman articulated in 1852. when he delivered in
Dublin, as rector-elect of the new Catholic University, the series
of lectures that gradually emerged as The Idea of a University,
translates today into the constitution of a site for the cultivation of
critical judgmentas we the teachers are morally responsible to
help cultivate that critical intelligence for responsible citizenship
among our students.
Such critical judgment today radically questions the very assumption that a university can be considered autonomous of the
social forces that embrace it. The active corporatization of the very
idea of the university over the last century and a half, since Newman
articulated his position, has left no room for the illusion that we
teach in an autonomous institution. Governmental agencies, corporations, and private sectors with specific and clearly articulated
agendas now besiege the institution of higher learning. Lucrative
grants come into universities and high-ranking administrations
accept them without the slightest concern or even a momentary
pause for critical conversation with faculty and students. Domestic
and foreign governmental agencies, corporations, "philanthropists," and foundation directors fully recognize that universities
are starved for money. The result is the full incorporation of the
university into the globalizing spirit of capitalism. Today into the
belly of the "Distant Learning" Trojan Horse, electronic capitalism is spreading like a cancer into the very vertebrae of academic
integrity. The enduring wisdom of Newman beyond his specific
Catholic and elitist overtones is the very supposition of the university as an autonomous site of liberal education which today is
a goal to be fought for and not an idea to be taken for granted.
The same wisdom that carries its own flaw is equally evident
in the judicious reflections of Jaroslav Pelikan in his Idea of
the University: A Reexamination, in which he updates Cardinal
Newman's call for the idea of the autonomy of the site of liberal
education, but carries over the same sociological flaw of isolating
245
the university from its constitutionally compromising societal location. Whereas in Cardinal Newman's case more than a century
and a half ago the active corporatization of the university had not
yet reached full throttle, in Pelikan's case we are reading a piece
of antiquarian nostalgia for the autonomy of the university. When
Pelikan quotes the proverbial encounter in which a patriotic Englishwoman asks a don at Oxford "And what are you doing to save
Western civilization, young man?" to which the don responds,
"Madam, I am Western civilization!"19 we get a glimpse of the
self-delusional hubris at the core of the academic presumptions
to autonomy and integrity.
The conservative attack on the university and the naive liberal
assumption of its autonomy are both the indices of the national
seismography getting the correct signal of constitutional changes
in the American demography. The emerging organicity of the
public intellectual is the critical cause of this anxiety. As sites
of professional training for global capitalism, universities are the
critical barometers of the labor (both intellectual and physical)
migration. The nativist tribalism that informs all such nervous
reactions ultimately derive from statistically demonstrable demographic changes in the United Sates. By the mid-1990s the racist
anxiety of nativist tribalism had reached such proportions that the
publication of Peter Brimelow's Alien Nation could only testify to
much deeper resentments. Based on an earlier essay that he wrote
for National Review, this book puts between two covers the most
frightful evidence of the genocidal tendencies lurking under the
thin veneer of British imperialist proclivities that Peter Brimelow
has brought with him to the United States when he himself immigrated to "the former colony." "There is a sense in which
current immigration policy is Adolf Hitler's posthumous revenge
on America."20 This is the first sentence of this by far the lowest
depth of tribalism that today afflicts American neo-conservatism.
The rest of the book follows suit.
It is not just people like Brimelow whose anxiety at the rise of the
new intellectual organicity in the United States is underlined by a
remarkable historical ignorance of the circumstances that instigate
global migration of capital and labor. Academic intellectuals of
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The potential rise of a new organicity among postcolonial/postnational intellectuals is equally resisted by ethnic tribalism of the
opposite sort. Matching the tribal Americanism exemplified at
worst by Brimelow and at its most philosophically anchored by
Rorty is the equally retrograde ethnic tribalism of the identity
politics of the so-called "ethnic minorities." Evident among African-American, Latino, and Asian "minorities," this reactionary
ethnic isolationism has now reached the new wave of immigrants
including Iranians. The rampant tribalism of the "ethnic minorities" is equally nativist in its pathological resistance to Eurocentric
Americanism, which in effect results in the active consolidation
of both. Collapsing in response to the tribal Americanism of this
presumed "center" are the equally tribal ethnicities at the presumed
"periphery." The scattered reality of our location, however, is not
and cannot be divided into this presumed "center" and "periphery."
What we are witnessing at the cosmopolitan centers of capitalist
power is a quilt-like patchwork of false and falsifying consciousness successfully disguising the fact that the whole world, regardless of gender and ethnicity, is reduced to raw material and cheap
labor actively engaged in an economic production of reality. It
is precisely this reality that necessitates the constitution of a new
organicity for the public intellectual.
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 produced two unrelated but,
as fate would have it, convergent by-products: A significant body
of Iranian nativist intellectuals moving abroad and then a global
cinema that came out to meet them on the festival haymarkets of
global capitalism. Where these two meet is the site of a crucial
reconsideration of the very place and function of the intellectual
in late globalizing capitalism.
The "Iranian-Americans," as the phrase has emerged now, are
the latest addition to the roster of tribes in the United States. The
best study of this particular pathology is Hamid Naficy's The
Making of an Exile Culture, a study so rich and representative of
this pathology that itself is one of its most significant symptoms.
In this book, Naficy gives a full, panoramic, and detailed picture
of "the exilic condition" of Iranians in Los Angeles, as seen
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249
Separation from you [Naficy 's introduction is cast in the rhetorical device
of a letter addressed to his parents in Iran. The device is effective, though
at times breaching the limits of credulity] is in fact a series of separation, like links in a chain: separation from the earththat dry, cruel, and
yet nurturing earth of the homeland; separation from the fragrances of
spices in bazaars and from the smell of urine on the mud walls outside
mosques; separation from the native language and the control one has
in using ita control that is gradually diminishing; separation from
childhood and from the places of childhood, separation from father,
brothers, and sistersstrands that become thinner and more fragile from
this position of exile, causing the tapestry of your faces to grow stark,
faint, and threadbare.24
What jeremiad denials of life are these "narratives of exile"? No
vision, no courage, no imagination of a life-affirming encounter
with one's material life (wherever it might be) is evident in these
sad, sorrowful pages of misery. Collapsing into the abyss of such
sorry sentiments degenerates into a metaphysics of identity crisis
that is simply pre-modern in its underlying assumptions. For all
the presumptuous postmodernity of their rhetorical devices, these
so-called "narratives of exile" are positively medieval in their
sentimental celebrations of an outdated crisis of identity, of such
gross, historically untenable, binary oppositions presumed between
"home" and "exile."
What exactly could be the purpose of such sentimental selfindulgence? Are we supposed to generate or expect sympathy in
the world for missing some pissing ground of our hometown when
in the years of civil war in the former Yugoslavia millions of Bosnians and now Kosovars have fled their homeland, many of them
the brutalized victims of rape, mayhem, carnage, torture, and of
barbaric Serbian concentration camps? What could be the relative
significance of an "exilic narrative" whose most memorable trope
is being homesick for the smell of turmeric and saffron in a bazaar
in Isfahan or Tehran when on a daily basis we witness the plight
of thousands of Haitian refugees robbed of their most elementary
human rights, on our television screens, escaping the brutal social
and economic consequences of one military coup after another?
More than a million Rwandans, in an unimaginable state of des-
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251
252
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reach of the Islamic Republic has done Iranians any good in learning and assimilating into their operative political culture the very
elementary principles of democratic institution-building, or the
very alphabetical conceptions of civil society. Constitutionally
and as a matter of a stubbornly enduring political culture, there is
no difference between the state absolutism of the Islamic Republic
and the political culture operatives among the communities abroad,
and if Naficy's study is to be taken as a reliable barometer of the
evolving disposition of these communities, there is a long, useless,
and utterly aimless road stretching ahead of them. Instead of being a jubilant feast of freedom and possibilities otherwise denied
at "home," the Los Angeles carnival, representing all others, is a
miserable mourning procession of an emigre sub-culture impotent
to deliver itself from the mortifying memories of a past that never
was, unable to face a present which could potentially be theirs,
and incapable of imagining a future, visualizing a horizon, that
just might be their children's.
In the case of the Iranian intellectuals abroad in particular, the
pathology represents a constitutionally nativist disposition that at
some earlier point in its composition was the site of creative resistance to colonialism but now in its outdated endurance remains
constant even in "exile." If the nativist disposition continues to be
operative inside Iran for perhaps obvious but not legitimate reasons,
its endurance among the exilic communities outside Iran is scandalous. After two hundred years, that nativist disposition has totally
exhausted all its revolutionary potential and now its debilitating
disposition has come totally to dominate it. The world, deeply
entrenched in planetary capitalism and extraterrestrial colonization,
no longer has a room for intellectual nativism.
Nowhere is this state of moral self-mortification of nativist intellectuals in exile more evident than in the sorry case of the Iranian
filmmakers living abroad. After the revolution of 1979, a number
of leading Iranian filmmakers left their country. It is ludicrous to
assume that those who remained supported the Islamization of the
revolution, or those who left were in any shape or form more in
danger, or waged a more effective critical campaign against the
Islamic Republic, than those who remained. Some of those who
253
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255
256
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into a compelling universal. But among this group, by far the most
prolific Iranian filmmaker since his departure from Iran has been
Amir Naderi, one of the most remarkable artists who has arisen
from his own ashes like a phoenix. After a long and illustrious
career in his homeland, Naderi left Iran permanently and has resided in the United States. His last two masterpieces made inside
Iran, The Runner (1985) and Water, Wind, Dust (1991) established
his status as one of the most brilliant Iranian filmmakers. While
in the United States, Naderi shifted gear and began to make films
native to his adopted land. Manhattan by Numbers (1993), ABC
Manhattan (1997), Marathon (2001), and Sound Barrier (2005)
are the four feature films that Naderi has made in the United States,
all of which are testimonials to his attempts at breaking loose from
the limitations of being an Iranian filmmaker living abroad. In
his recent cinema palpitates the raw and effervescent energy of a
New Yorker, the fresh look, the empowering bewilderment, of a
newcomer who has come to claim, to appropriate, to own. Amir
Naderi is exactly on the opposite pole of Parviz Sayyad. Sayyad's
vision is claustrophobic and bitter, Naderi's rambunctious, openhearted, devouring life, madly magnificent.
Amir Naderi also stands in sharp contrast to another tragic figure in Iranian cinema, Sohrab Shahid-Sales. A pioneering figure
in the contemporary renaissance in Iranian realism, Shahid-Sales
life came to a miserable end, virtually drinking himself to death
in Chicago in 1998. Shahid-Sales tried to lead a productive life
in Germany. But compared to his glorious achievements like One
Simple Incident (1973), Still Life (1974), and In Exile (1975) he
never recovered from the trauma of exile and his serious impact on
German New Cinema is yet to be fully assayed and recognized.28
Equally an idle life in exile has been led by another pioneering
figure in Iranian film and fiction, Ebrahim Golestan. While in the
case of the majority of Iranian filmmakers abroad lack of resources
and cultural dislocation may very well account for their abysmal
productivity, this cannot at all explain Golestan's predicament.
Independently wealthy, multilingual, and very well connected to
all major European festivals, Ebrahim Golestan could not take
advantage of any of these resources to make any major or minor
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259
260
Post-Orientalism
261
There is, as Said implies here, a direct and catastrophic link between Al-e Ahmad's formulation of the concept of "Westoxication"
and the pathology that Huntington represents under the rubric of
"the Clash of Civilization" and Fukuyama articulates as "the End
of History." "Islam" and "The West" were in effect constituted
as two a/historical enemies. Bernard Lewis, the chief patron of
the Orientalist concoction of the binary opposition between "Islam and the West," has provided much historical fantasy to these
terms,38 and thus a dangerous liaison was daydreamed between
two diametrically active illusions. Much of the isolationism of
Iranian intellectuals abroad, their historical affliction with being
unable to formulate a place of dignity and a position of agency
for themselves outside their self-ghettoized limitations is directly
traceable to this nativist conception of "Westoxication."
Matching and complementing the nativism of Al-e Ahmad's
conception of "Westoxication" is the equally distorted Westernism
of Daryush Shayegan, chief among a number of other Iranians particularly enamored of the achievements of "The West" and critical
of "the East" for having been lazy and stupid enough to lose the
historical game. Al-e Ahmad's principal project in publishing his
Westoxication in the early 1960s was to de-colonize the Iranian
mind, and yet, having failed in that objective while adding a further
entrapment to the Iranian political culture, by the late 1980s we had
the most frightful expression of precisely such a deeply colonized
imagination manifested in the publication of Daryush Shayegan's
Le Regard Mutile.39 In the esteemed judgment of Shayegan, we,
in what he calls "pays traditionelles," suffer from the catastrophic
consequences of having been "on Holiday from History."40
Let us try to be rational for once! [Shayegan admonishes us, the unruly,
irrational Orientals on leave from "History," and publishes his admonition precisely in 1989, the year that his kindred soul, Francis Fukuyama,
published "The End of History" in Washington!] What exactly has
been happening over the last four centuries? What has happened since
the discovery of the great laws of astronomy? The last phases of the
construction of our cathedrals of thought coincide oddly with the rise
of Cartesian subjectivity. One is tempted to agree with Hegel that the
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World-Spirit was deserting the areas where culture had been perfected
and was seeking asylum in the West. Why? I have no idea.41
263
264
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265
266
Post-Orientalism
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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Post-Orientalism
23. Hamid Naficy, The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian television in Los
Angeles (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), xiii.
24. Naficy 1993, xiii.
25. See Parviz Sayyad, Cinema-ye dar Tab'id (Los Angeles, CA: Persian,
1996), 91-101.
26. Sayyad 1996, 57-66.
27. See Reza Allamehzadeh's Lalla and My Stepfather (Los Angeles, CA:
Nashr-e Ketab Publishers, 1998). Allamehzadeh's Sarab-e Cinema-ye
Islami-ye Iran (Utrecht: Nawid Verlag, 1991) is a bitter condemnation of
the political abuses of cinema by the officials of the Islamic Republic.
28. The list of Shahid-Sales' film while in Germany include Tagebuch eines
Liebenden (1976), Reifezeit (1976), Die Langen Ferien der Lotte H Eisner (1979), Ordnung (1980), Anton P Cechov: Ein Leben (for TV, 1981),
Empfanger unbekannt (1983), Utopia (1983), Der Weidenbaum (1984),
Hans: Ein Junge in Deutschland (for TV, 1985), Wechselbalg (for TV,
1987), and Rosen fur Afrika (for TV, 1991)
29. The illusion of "homeland" can lead to theoretical miscalculations. Matching Said's conception of the "exilic intellectual" and Bhabha's "hybridity,"
is Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's "native informant," as theorized in her
A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing
Presence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999): et passim.
Though Spivak is particular in her constitution of the "native informant"
as "revolutionary vanguard" (71), the term is still too colonially bound
to be post/colonially emancipatory. Her actual theorization of the term,
I believe, is far more engaging and liberating than this unfortunate term
suggests. I understand the rhetorical logic of re/claiming these colonial
terms. But I believe we are too late in the game for such old gestures.
Spivak has a monumentally ambitious project to turn this term on its head.
In the following pages I will have reasons to converse with and celebrate
that project. But still I insist, while celebrating in that emancipation, that
the term smells too much of its origin. For my take on the notion of the
"native informer" see my "Native informers and the making of the American
empire" (Al-Ahram Weekly, 1-7 June 2006).
30. Edward Said, "Yeats and Decolonization," in Terry Eagleton, Fredric
Jameson, and Edward Said, Natidnalism, Colonialism, and Literature,
introduction by Seamus Deane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1990), 82.
31. Which Said, incidentally, rightly singles out as a case in ressentiment. See
Said 1990, 82.
32. See Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Gharbzadegi ("Westoxication"). Tehran: Ravaq
Publishers, 1962. For an English translation see Jalal Al-i Ahmad, Occidentosis: A Plague From the West, translated by R. Campbell. Hamid
Algar, Editor (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1984).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
269
Conclusion
Changing the Interlocutor
"You talkin' to me? You talkin' to me ? You talkin' to me ? The who the
hell else are you talking to? "Travis Bickle (Robert De Niro) in
Martin Scorsese's "Taxi Driver" (1976)
The central narrative device in Atom Egoyan's Ararat (2002) is
a conversation between a young Armenian, Raffi (David Alpay),
who is entering Canada with the rushes of a film on the Armenian
genocide, and a Canadian customs officer, David (Christopher
Plummer), who is trying to ascertain that Raffi is not smuggling
drugs into Canada, hidden in the film cans. The conversation
ultimately turns into a futile attempt by the young Armenian to
convince the aging Canadian customs officer that the Armenian
Genocide indeed took place. The prolonged conversation amounts
to a traumatic recognition that unless and until this white male
Canadian official is convinced that the Armenian genocide actually
took place, then it is as if it did not happen at all.
Suppose Atom Egoyan, or his alter ego Raffi, or any other
Armenian for that matter, did not have to convince any Canadian
customs officer, or any other fictive White Male Interlocutor, that
the Armenian Genocide actually happened. Suppose they were so
sure and convinced that it did indeed happen that it did not matter
at all if their fictive interlocutor, at the center of all their futile and
pointless attempts to convince, believe it or not. Suppose instead
of trying to convince a Canadian customs officer, Raffi and other
Armenians were to wed the horrors and historical fact of the Armenian Genocide to other more contemporary atrocities happening
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Conclusion
273
274
Post-Orientalism
Conclusion
275
276
Post-Orientalism
Tehran puts it, the best guide for "experts and analysts on Iran,"
(namely, her friends and colleagues in the intelligence, military,
and think tank communities in Washington, DC) to understand
her homeland. This is how Azar Nafisi transforms a masterpiece
of modern Persian social satire into a pamphlet for "experts and
analysts" at the service of U.S. imperialism:
Let us imagine we are in the processes of crating a much-needed mandatory reading list for experts and analysts on Iran. I would put My Uncle
Napoleon in a cherished place very near the top. One seemingly irrelevant
reason for this choice is that it is a great read. More pragmatically, I believe
this novel provides its readersin a delightful and deliciously politically
incorrect mannerwith many important insights into Iran, its culture and
traditions, its present conflicts and past history, as well as its paradoxical
relation to the West.4
Conclusion
277
278
Post-Orientalism
Conclusion
279
280
Post-Orientalism
Fanon, Malcolm X, and Ali Shari'ati shows how they have succeeded in crossing a number of confounding borders in order to
reach for a global conception of emancipation. Creative agency
in a specifically revolutionary context marks the making of a truly
authentic revolutionary character as paradoxically predicated on
revolutionary inauthenticity, constantly making and remaking
the globality of the community they address. Translating the native and nativist boundaries of a particular cause, as Palestine for
Edward Said for example, into the vernacular grammar of a far
more global struggle. The resultfrom praxis to theoryis a
manner of revolutionary border-crossing in order to dodge power
and speak a language of revolt.
The active reconstruction of normative and moral agency for
the postcolonial critic will have to be predicated on what is now
evidently a post-Orientalist moment. The varied and failed manners of knowledge production in the aftermath of 9/11 point to
a degenerative meltdown where the Hegemon cannot produce a
single legitimizing idea that in fact sustains its claim to any authority beyond what brute and vile power can generate and sustain. A
postcolonial critic who is in tune with this chaotic post-Orientalist
mode of knowledge production and knows how it desperately and
categorically fails to convince in turn becomes like a mobile guerrilla tactician unfettered by fixated discursive analytics, systematically dodging power and altering the direction in which he and she
speakaway from addressing the powers that be and towards the
brutalized subjects of such powers. We are currently in a phase
of capital and its failing cultures when useful knowledge is no
longer predicated on a particular manner of subject formation for
disposable knowledge is predicated on no particular paradigmatic
or epistemic foregrounding, and as such amounts to an implosion of
the "Western" sovereign and knowing subject, at a moment when
the globalized capital has effectively metastasized and knows no
center or periphery to its illusions of sovereignty.
Changing the interlocutor is ultimately geared towards a renewed
commitment to a moral voice that does not remain silent in face of
globalized atrocities for fear of authenticating an inauthentic act of
representation. This strategically altered voice speaks clearly and
Conclusion
281
authoritatively without any fear of false and faltering representation. The rapidly endangered globe, from its environment to its
inhabitants cannot afford such outdated philosophical doubts, and
is in dire need of clear, concise, confident, and defiant voices.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
For my take on Azar Nafisi's Reading Lolita in Tehran see my essay, "Native
informers and the making of the American empire" (Al-Ahram Weekly, 1-7 June
2006). For the full frontal attack of Christopher Hitchens against me on account
of my essay see his "East Is East" (Atlantic, March 2007), 109-111.
One of course cannot abuse one's close proximity to a great man for over a decade
towards the end of his life and attribute to him thoughts and sentiments that he
is no longer around to corroborate. Nor am I the only one among Edward Said's
close friends, colleagues, and comrades who knows perfectly well what he thought
of Christopher Hitchens and his politics, certainly since the events of 9/11 and his
criminal endorsement of the Bush and Wolfowitz doctrine, responsible for the death
of hundreds of thousands of a people that Edward Said always referred to as "my
people."
For the fuller account of this argument see chapter 2 in this volume. It should be
kept in mind that I initially published this chapter as an introductory essay to a new
edition of Ignaz Goldziher's Muslim Studies (See Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies
[New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Publishers, 2006]) shortly before Irwin's book
was published.
See Azar Nafisi's Introduction to Iraj Pezeshkzad's My Uncle Napoleon, translated
by Dick Davis, (New York: The Modern Library, 2006).
Index
Adorno, Theodore W., 10-11, 243
Allamah, see Qazvini, Mohammad
Allamehzadeh, Reza, 254-255
Auerbach, Erich, 91
Bacher, Wilhelm, 41,43, 55, 90
Bato, Ludwig, 33
Bhabha, Homi, 195
Bloom, Allan, 9, 237-242
Bloom, Harold, 246
Bove,Paul, 134
Brimelow, Peter, 245-247
"Can the Subaltern Speak?", see Spivak,
Gayatri
characteristic humanism, 134-136
Civil Rights movement, 188, 200, 219,
236-238, 240-241
Clifford, James, 93-94, 134, 136, 138,
157-158, 164-165, 170
Deleuze, Gilles, 128
Denby, David, 242-243
Derrida, Jacques, 135-136
Disraeli, Benjamin, 87
Dowd, Maureen, 210
284
Post-Orientalism
intellectuals,
amphibian, 230
"culture of idleness," 7
exilic condition, 5-6, 9-14, 251-263
in the United States, 1-3, 4, 6
Jewish, 6-7
organic, 13,229-231
professionalization, 3-4, 7-8
social function, 11-12
Iranian-Americans, 247-249
Iranshahr, Hossein Kazemzadeh, 77-80
Iraq War, 191-193,210-211
Islamic mysticism, see Sufism
Islamic Revolution, 174-178
Islamic Studies,
anthropomorphism, 87-89
Goldziher's influence, 20-31
historical view, 234-235
intellectual history, 28-29, 35-36,
57, 83, 86-95, 99, 100
revolutionaries, 185-206
Robbins, Bruce, 3-4
Rorty, Richard, 13-14, 246
Said, Edward,
death, 156
Orientalism,
book's influence, 102-104
goal, 163-165
on Ignaz Goldziher, 81-89
reactions, 70-73, 92-96, 156-160
Representations of the Intellectuals,
1,4-7,229-231
subaltern voice, 125, 133-134
theories of exilic intellectuals, 9-14
sati, 129-133
Sayyad, Parviz, 254
Scheiber, Alexander, 32-33
Scheler, Max, 95-98
Shari'ati,Ali, 201-204
sociology of knowledge, 96-102
Somogyi, Joseph de, 68
Sorel, George, 166-167
"sovereign subject," 124-127, 134-135,
138-139
Soviet Union,
collapse, 215
Index
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty,
"Can the Subaltern Speak?", 124128, 159
criticism on Said, 134-135, 170-172
"worker's struggle" 128
Stardom Syndrome, 7-9
subaltern voice (studies), 124-133, 135,
139, 143-144, 149-152, 159-165
Sufism, 25
Taqizadeh, Seyyed Hassan, 77
terrorism, 187-188, 224-226
think tanks, 188-189, 219, 222-223
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 1-3
285
tribalism, 247
universities, 243-246
Vambery, Armenius, 43, 51-57, 68-79
violence, 165-166
Waardenburg, Jacques, 85-87
Wahrmann, Moritz, 50-51
Weber, Max, 6-7
Weizmann, Chaim, 33
Western subject, 127-128, 235-237
Wolffsohn, David, 56
Wolfowitz, Paul, 209-210