Professional Documents
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The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods (Art. 309[3], Revised Penal Code).
That penalty should be imposed in its maximum period because only aggravating
circumstances are present (Art. 64[3], Revised Penal Code).
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents.
They are entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act No. 4103).
As co-principals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six fighting cocks, they are (a)
each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum
and (b) ordered to indemnify solidarily the complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum
of five hundred pesos (P500). Each appellant should pay one-third of the costs.
Ruling: No. Accused Eliseo Martinado, however, shall not be entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law as he had escaped from confinement.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal
maximum.The indemnity for the death of the deceased Juan Matias is hereby
increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
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(3)
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Ruling: Yes. Every court has the power to enforce and compel obedience to its
orders, judgments, and processes in all proceedings pending before it. The Regional
Trial Courts dismissal of petitioners special civil action, therefore, was but a valid
exercise of said power.
Moreover, even assuming that the Regional Trial Court did not order the said
dismissal, petitioners special civil action, questioning the denial of her notice of
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GR
No.
63400,
18
March
1983
of RA.
guilty.
of the
of RA.
Circuit
Ruling: NO. Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon the
discretion of the court. As aptly noted in U.S. vs. Durken, this discretion is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused.
"The conclusion of respondent judge that "probation will depreciate the seriousness
of the offense committed" is based principally on the admission by the petitioner
himself, as reflected in the report of the probation officer, that he [petitioner] was
actually caught in the act of selling marijuana cigarettes. Petitioner did not deny or
dispute the veracity of the fact that he was caught in flagrante delicto of selling
marijuana cigarettes. He merely attempted to justify his criminal act by explaining
in his motion for reconsideration that "he did it only to make some money for the
family during Christmas. Such admission renders a hearing on the application for
probation an unnecessary surplusage and an Idle ceremony.
Proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country has remained a serious threat to the
well-being of the people. It has necessitated an all-out intensified campaign on the
part of the law-enforcers against users as well as pushers thereof. If only to
emphasize the gravity of the drug menace, the Batasan Pambansa has seen fit to
increase the penalty for violation of Section 8, Article II of Rep. Act 6425. Thus, while
under Rep. Act 6425, as amended by P.D. 44, possession or use of marijuana was
punishable by imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months and a
fine ranging from P600.00 to P6,000.00-the penalty imposed upon petitioner hereinpossession and use thereof is now punishable by imprisonment ranging from 6
years and 1 day to 12 years and fine ranging from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 under
B.P. Blg. 179.
13.
Pablo Francisco vs. C.A.,
(Probation in multiple conviction)
GR
No.
108747; 6
April
1995
Facts: Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC
Trans. Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted invectives against the
employees. Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave
oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his
employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four
different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
After 10 years, he was found guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five
(5) cases filed against him. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the
MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. Butbefore he could be
arrested petitioner filed an application for probation which the MeTC denied In the
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After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of
judgment, 2 the petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the respondent
judge in his order dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under
probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions
enumerated therein.
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Probation should have expired on aug 10, 1983, 1 year after it was issued, however,
the order of final discharge could not be issued because the respondent officer had
not yet submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge.
Respondent People of the Phil filed a motion to revoke petitioners probation on the
ground that he had violated the terms thereof. The petitioner opposed and alleged
that he was no longer under probation, as such, no valid reason existed to revoke
the same.
Ruling: yes. Probation is revocable before the final discharge of the probationer by
the court, contrary to the petitioner's submission.
Section 16 of PD 968
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate
probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions
of the probation law. Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first
be issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and
recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such issuance can the case of
the probationer be deemed terminated.
15.
Urbano vs. COMELEC, et.al., GR 168550, 10 August 2006 (Effect
of Final Discharge of Probation)
Facts: Norma L. Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Urbano M. Moreno from running
for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment
on the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was suffered to suffer imprisonment of 4
months and 1 day to 2 yrs and 4 months. Moreno contended that there is no cause
of action because he was already granted probation and the final discharge of the
same shall operate to restore him all civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction,
including the right to vote and to be voted in July 2002 elections.
According to COMELEC, section 40 of the LGC provide that those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude of for an offense punishable by 1
year or more imprisonment, within 2 yrs after serving sentence, are disqualified
from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was released from
probation on December 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end
2 yrs thence. The grant of probation t Moreno merely suspended the execution of
his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local
office.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a)1 of the
Local Government Code (LGC) applies only to those who have served their sentence
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Facts: Michael Manzo, a former houseboy, stole several jewelries and money from
Christine Diokno with the alleged value of P3M. Diokno spoked with Manzo who
admitted the commission of the stealing and that he sold the items to Gabriel Capili
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Ruling: Yes. Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft.
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery
or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or
should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the
part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.
Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D.
1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of
any good, article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed
dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the
station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where that
store, establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the
public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the
police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular
transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have
exercised prudence.
Note: Etong nasa baba lang talaga yung may kinalaman sa topic.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of
fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on P5,075 for
each tire recovered, or in the total amount of P65,975. Records show that Azajar
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20.
People
difference)
vs.
Guzman;
GR
No.
77368
(Robbery-Fencing,
Facts: On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house
of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth
millions of pesos were taken. An information, dated 30 September 1985, was
instituted against the perpetrators in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
101, docketed thereat asCriminal Case No. G.R. No. 42078.
The trial court, acting on the motion to quash filed by the accused, issued the now
questioned order that since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal,
outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, and considering that all criminal
prosecutions must be instituted and tried in the Municipality or Province where the
offense took place, this Court, necessarily, does not have jurisdiction over the
instant case.
Issue: Is the crime of "fencing" a continuing offense that could allow the
filing of an information therefor in the place where the robbery or theft is
committed and not necessarily where the property, unlawfully taken is
found to have later been acquired?
Ruling: NO. A "continuous crime" is a single crime consisting of a series of facts
arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division.
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain,
by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything. "Fencing", upon the other hand, is the act of any person who, with intent
to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to
him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
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21.
Caoili vs. C.A., GR No. 128369; 22
(Presumption of possession; when not applied)
December
1997
Facts: An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
Petitioner, Rodolfo Rudy Caoili, was charged, along with a certain Tony Yip, with
violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1612. Petitioner sought a review by the
Secretary of Justice of the resolution of Assistant Prosecutor Antonio R. Rebagay that
had found a prima facie case against petitioner that served as the basis for the
information.
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to indict Caoili.
Ruling: Yes. As correctly stated by the CA: To be liable for violation of P.D. 1612,
Section 2 thereof requires that the offender buys or otherwise acquires and then
sells or disposes of any object of value which he knows or should be known to him
to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The allegations of Atule and Azuela do not indicate that respondent Caoili acquired
the skiving machines in question knowing that the same were stolen
property. The prima facie presumption of fencing from possession of stolen property
does not apply to Caoili as complainant reacquired the subject skiving machines not
from respondent Caoili but from Yip. It is difficult to give credence to the claim of
Atule and Azuela that respondent Caoili told them that he purchased the stolen
skiving machines which he in turn sold to Yip. It is simply contrary to common
human behavior that a person would intimate to another or others an unlawful act
that he purchased stolen items and then dispose of it at a profit. Evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances.
C. Obstruction of Justice (PD No. 1829)
22.
Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Judge Omar Amin, GR 93335, 13
September 1990 (PD 1829 absorbed in rebellion)
Facts: enrile was charged with violation of Sec. 1 PD No. 1829 for allegedly
entertained Honasan by giving him food and comfort in his house, knowing that
Honosan is a fugitive from justice. Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have
Honasan arrested, and because of such failure, the petitioner prevented Honasans
arrest.
The rebellion charges against him were based from the affidavits executed by 3
employees of the Silahis International Hotel which states that Honasa and some 100
rebel soldiers attended the mass and bday party held at Enriles house. the
Prosecution concluded that Enriles act of talking with Honasan in his own house in
the presence of rebels, can be inferred that they were co-conspirators in the failed
December coup.
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Issue: W/n the petitioner could be separately charged for vilation of pd 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case
Ruling: No. being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring
or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or
resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve
a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.
All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed
in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a
crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the
same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the
application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v.
Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the
crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as
murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The
attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but
also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense.
23.
Roger Posadas v. Ombudsman, GR 131492, 29 September 2000
(No PD 1829 in illegal arrest)
Facts: Petitioner Roger Posadas, then chancellor of UP Diliman asked the director of
NBI Orlando Dizon for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the
death of Dennis Venturina, a member of the Sigma Rho, killed in a rumble between
his fraternity and another fraternity.
NBI agents attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag as
suspects. Petitioners Poadas and Atty Villamor, counsel for the suspects objected on
the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest against them. As a result of
intervention, the suspects were not arrested on that day.
Dizon filed a complaint against Petitioner and Atty Villamor for violation of PD 1829
which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of
criminal offenders.
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The office of the Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the
prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan hence this petition.
Issue: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could
be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for
prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829.
Ruling: The Supreme Court answered the questions in the negative. The attempted
arrest does not fall in any of the exception in a warrantless arrest.
The Court noted that at the time the deceased UP student Dennis Venturina was
killed in a fraternity-related incident, the NBI agents were nowhere near the scene
of the crime. When the NBI agents attempted to arrest UP students Taparan and
Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that
would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the contrary,
Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a
peace talk called to put an end to fraternity-related violence on the campus.
In this case, petitioners objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed
as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, l(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners
had a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their
attempted arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have interfered with the
prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the
NBI for assistance in investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just
because petitioners had asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize
respondent Dizon and his men to disregard constitutional requirements.
Hence, the Court saw no other recourse but to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the
Ombudsman from proceeding with the case against petitioners..
24.
Prudente Soller, et.al., GR 144261-62, 9 May 2001 (PD 1829,
person liable)
Facts: Petitioners were charged with Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution
of Criminal Offenders as defined and penalized under P.D. No. 1829.
It appears that Jerry Macabael a municipal guard, was shot and killed along the
national highway at Oriental Mindoro while driving a motorcycle together with
petitioner Sollers son, Vincent M. Soller. His body was brought to a medical clinic
located in the house of petitioner Dr. Prudente Soller, the Municipal Mayor, and his
wife Dr. Preciosa Soller, who is the Municipal Health Officer. The incident was
reported to and investigated by petitioner SPO4 Mario Matining.
On the basis of the foregoing incident, a complaint was later filed against the
petitioners by the widow of Jerry Macabael with the Office of the Ombudsman
charging them with conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the fatal shootout of
Jerry Macabael by (a) altering his wound (b) concealing his brain; (c) falsely stating
in police report that he had several gunshot wounds when in truth he had only one;
and d) falsely stating in an autopsy report that there was no blackening around his
wound when in truth there was.
The Office of the Ombudsman then recommended the filing of an Information for
Obstruction of Justice , and two (2) Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the principal ground that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. In its assailed Order, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Quash and stated that the accused is
the Mayor of the municipality where the alleged incident took place and, therefore,
any attempt to deviate or to present false evidence in connection with a criminal
offense committed in his municipality for which he is charged would be an offense
also in which the accused Mayor would be probably held accountable before this
Court.
Issue: Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
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Ruling: No. To prove the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution's evidence should establish the following elements: (1) the identity of
the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment. Absent any of these two elements, the prosecutions case must
fail.
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Here, while SI Suega claimed that Yen E offered to sell to him two kilograms of
shabu for P1.2 million and that he agreed to buy the same, the sale was not
consummated. SI Suega admitted that the back-up team immediately arrested the
appellants before he could deliver the buy-bust money to the appellants.
The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the prohibited drug.
Although the plastic bags containing shabu were found solely in the possession of
Chua, it was evident that Yen E had knowledge of its existence. As the records
would show, Yen E negotiated for the sale of dangerous drugs. When Chua arrived in
the vicinity, she approached Yen E before delivering the shabu to Suega. These
acts of the accused indubitably demonstrate a coordinated plan on their part to
actively engage in the illegal business of drugs. When conspiracy is shown, the act
of one is the act of all conspirators. Direct evidence of conspiracy is not necessary
as it can be clearly deduced from the acts of the accused.
Dispositive: The decision of the Court of was MODIFIED. The Court finds the
accused guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs.
29.
People vs. Dante Dumalag GR 180514, 17 April 2013 (Markingchain of custody)
Facts: A female police informant from Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte went to the office of
the Special Operations Group (now Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations
Team or PAID-SOT reported that a certain Dato Dumalag, a known drug personality
of Brgy. 2, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte was at Sexy Beach Resort owned by Bebot Ferrer
selling shabu to customers. Acting upon the report, police officers organized a team
to conduct a buy bust operation against the suspect. PO3 Albano was assigned to
act as poseur buyer while the rest of the team will act as perimeter back up. PO3
Albano was also tasked to mark the two pieces of P100 bills provided by Inspector
Battulayan to be used as buy bust money and placed the letter "R" between the
letters G and P of Republika Ng Pilipinas on the face of the bills. The pre-operation
activity was also recorded in the police blotter. Afterwards, the team proceeded to
the target place.
Upon reaching the place at around 3:00 oclock, the police asked the caretaker of
the beach resort if a person is occupying Room 03 as reported by the asset. The
caretaker who was with another caretaker and both of whom were female gave
them the information that indeed a male person was occupying the said room. After
they prepared for the plan and have surveyed the area for five to seven minutes,
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Ruling: Yes. Under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, the elements of the offense of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug. All of these elements were duly proven. PO1 Soreta properly identified
appellant as the one he transacted with in the buy-bust operation and later arrested
after the sale took place. After being arrested in flagrante delicto, the police officers
found in appellants possession two small transparent plastic sachets each
containing 0.04 gram of shabu, a prohibited drug, which appellant was not
authorized to possess.
32.
People vs. Amadeo Tira, GR 139615, 430 SCRA 134, 28 May
2004 (Illegal Possession, actual v. constructive)
Facts: A criminal complaint was filed by P/Supt. Wilson R. Victorio against Amadeo
Tira and Connie Tira for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. After finding
probable cause, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rufino A. Moreno filed an
Information against the Tira Spouses for illegal possession of shabu and marijuana,
in violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 6425.
The residence of the Tiras were search after conducting a surveillance of the
premises and positively observing that there was sale of illegal drugs in their
residence.
The respondents denied the charge. The RTC found the respondent guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drugs and upheld the validity of the search
warrant. The appellants further assert that the prosecution failed to prove that they
owned the prohibited drugs, and that the same were in their possession and control
when found by the policemen. They insist that it cannot be presumed that they
were in control and possession of the said substances/articles simply because they
owned the house where the same were found, considering that the room was
occupied by Chris Tira and his live-in partner, Gemma Lim.
Hence this present appeal.
Issue: whether the respondents are guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling: Yes. Before the accused may be convicted of violating Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, the prosecution is burdened to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime, viz.: (1) the
actual possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and, (3) the accused freely or consciously
possessed the said drug. The essential elements of the crime of possession of
regulated drugs are the following: (a) the accused is found in possession of a
regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted
authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated
drug. This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to
possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only
actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when
the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the
other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and
dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
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No.
186467,
13
July
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Cedeo communicated with accused-appellant, and the latter agreed that he would
be arriving in Naga City in the morning of July 11, 2002. Accused-appellant would
be carrying 50 grams of shabu, which will be sold to Cedeos financier
for P45,000.00. With the authority of Atty. Jose Doloiras, the immediate superior of
Romano, the NBI special investigators devised a plan to entrap said Arnel. Romano
and Jimenez prepared what they called budol money, counterfeit notes made out
of photocopied P1000 and P500 bills. The counterfeit bills, representing a total
value of P50,000.00, were dusted with fluorescent powder at the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory, Camp Simeon Ola, Legaspi City. On July 10,
2002, Romano was able to confirm with Cedeo that said Arnel was definitely
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arriving the following day at 8:00 a.m. at the Central Business District (CBD)
terminal, Naga City.
Romano, Jimenez, Dizon and Cedeo proceeded to the CBD terminal where they
posted themselves in strategic locations.
Accused-appellant arrived, carrying a small bag. The informant introduced Romano
to accused-appellant. Romano asked for the shabu. When said shabu was handed
to Romano, accused-appellant asked for the money. This was when accusedappellant noticed that the money was fake. Romano then removed his sunglasses to
signal the completion of the transaction to Jimenez and Dizon.
The NBI investigators arrested and handcuffed accused-appellant, and thereafter
brought the latter to the NBI Office in Naga City. Therein, accused-appellant was
booked, fingerprinted and photographed. Accused-appellant was then brought to
the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory at Camp Simeon Ola, Legaspi City. P/Insp.
Clemen examined the dorsal and palmar areas of accused-appellants hands, as well
as the plastic sachets handed by him to Romano. Both hands of accused-appellant
were found positive for the presence of bright orange ultraviolet fluorescent
powder. The plastic sachets, which had a total weight of 45.8712 grams, were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Accused-appellant denied that the buy-bust operation took place. Instead, he
narrated that he was aboard a tricycle at 6:00 a.m. on July 11, 2002, on his way to
the Civic Center, when Romano and Jimenez apprehended him, forced him into their
car and blindfolded him. While still blindfolded, Romano and Jimenez brought him to
a hotel. He was told to contact his employer through a cellular phone and inform
her of his arrest and that the arresting officers needed money to pay for their hotel
bills. The NBI operatives were extorting money equivalent to the value of 50% of
the 100 grams of shabu. After the accused-appellant was able to speak briefly with
his employer, the latter turned off her phone and cannot be contacted again. The
NBI operatives, showing him the marked money, threatened that a drug case would
be filed against him. The NBI operatives told him to hold the marked money, but he
refused and was not able to hold it. Accused-appellant was brought to the NBI Office
in Naga City, then to Camp Ola in Legaspi City, where he was subjected to a paraffin
test. Accused-appellant was later brought back to the NBI Office when someone told
him that his employer was sending money to settle his case. Accused-appellant
admitted that since October 2001, he accompanied his employer around five or six
times to deliver shabu to the aforementioned Ching Lo.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City rendered its Decision finding accusedappellant guilty.
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with modification the RTC
Decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether the accused is engaged in the sale of prohibited drug?
Ruling: Yes. Jurisprudence holds that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of
drugs are the following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.
The testimonies of Romano, corroborated by his fellow NBI investigators Jimenez
and Dizon and informant Cedeo established the sale and delivery by accusedappellant Clarite to Romano of what was initially believed to be 50 grams
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Issue: Whether the police officers act of soliciting drugs from Aileen will exculpate
the latter?
Ruling: No. Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise,
had no intention to commit, in order to prosecute him." It differs from entrapment
which is the employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a
criminal. In instigation, the criminal intent to commit an offense originates from the
inducer and not from the accused who had no intention to commit and would not
have committed it were it not for the prodding of the inducer. In entrapment, the
criminal intent or design originates from the accused and the law enforcers merely
facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by using ruses and schemes. Instigation
results in the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment may lead to prosecution
and conviction.
Here, the evidence clearly established that the police operatives employed
entrapment, not instigation, to capture appellant and her cohorts in the act of
selling shabu. It must be recalled that it was only upon receipt of a report of the
drug trafficking activities of Espiritu from the confidential informant that a buy-bust
team was formed and negotiations for the sale of shabu were made. Also, appellant
testified that she agreed to the transaction of her own free will when she saw the
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Moreover, a police officers act of soliciting drugs from appellant during the buy-bust
operation, or what is known as the "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and
does not invalidate the buy-bust operation. In People v. Legaspi, this Court
pronounced that in a prosecution for sale of illicit drugs, any of the following
will not exculpate the accused: "(1) that facilities for the commission of
the crime were intentionally placed in his way; or (2) that the criminal act
was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer seeking to
expose his criminal act; or (3) that the police authorities feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisted in its
commission." Hence, even assuming that the PAOCTF operatives repeatedly asked
her to sell them shabu, appellants defense of instigation will not prosper. This is
"especially true in that class of cases where the offense is the kind that is habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnished evidence of a course of conduct.
Mere deception by the police officer will not shield the perpetrator, if the offense
was committed by him free from the influence or instigation of the police officer."
Dispositive: AFFIRMED.
38.
People vs. Zheng Bai Hui, GR No. 127580, 22 August 2000
(presentation of Informant)
Facts: In the morning of October 24, 1994, a police informant code-named
Stardust arrived at the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Camp Ricardo Papa,
Bicutan, Taguig, and informed Police Sr. Insp. Franklin Moises Mabanag of two
Chinese nationals who were supposedly big time drug pushers. She claimed to
have regular contact with one of the alleged drug pushers, a certain Carlos Tan Ty.
Stardust, the informant, was a woman who had previously provided the police with
information that led to the confiscation of one (1) kilo of shabu.
Acting on the information furnished by Stardust, the NARCOM agents organized a
buy-bust operation to apprehend the reputed drug pushers
SPO3 Santos and Police Sr. Insp. Mabanag then prepared the boodle money
consisting of seven (7) bundles of newspaper cuttings that was supposed to
represent the P500,000 purchase money. A genuine P500 billwas placed on top of
one of the bundles and another P500 bill at the bottom of the same bundle. SPO3
Santos initialed the red portion of the Philippine flag in each of the bills. Between
the bills were the newspaper cuttings. The bundles, each about three (3) inches
thick, were wrapped with straps from the United Coconut Planters Bank and tied
with a rubber band. The boodle money was then placed in plastic and sealed with
scotch tape. SPO3 Santos rehearsed how he would show the drug pushers the
boodle money.
The team then proceeded to the meeting area for reconnaissance.
The suspects arrived at around 6:00 in the evening. Stardust pointed to SPO3
Santos two (2) Chinese nationals, later identified as the accused, alighting from a
tax. SPO3 Santos stepped out of the store and introduced himself to the two (2)
Chinese nationals as the person whom they talked with over the phone that
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Facts: Alviz aka Peking (Linda) and Elizabeth B. de la Vega aka Beth (Elizabeth)
was charged of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for unlawfully selling,
dispensing, delivering, transporting, distributing or acting as broker in the said
transaction, 0.02 gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
The prosecution narrated that a confidential informant arrived at Police Station 1, La
Loma, Quezon City and talked to the Officer-in-Charge. Thereafter, the Officer-inCharge formed a team to conduct surveillance and buy-bust operations on the
subject place. Upon arrival, PO2 Ibasco and the confidential informant approached
Alviz. The confidential informant told Linda that PO2 Ibasco was deeply in need of
shabu. After a while, Elizabeth came out and handed a plastic sachet to Linda. Linda
gave the P100.00 bill to Elizabeth and the plastic sachet to PO2 Ibasco. PO2 Ibasco
then gave the pre-arranged signal. SPO4 Reb[riano, then rushed to the group,
arrested Elizabeth and recovered from the latter the buy-bust money, while PO2
Ibasco arrested Linda. The police officers brought Linda and Elizabeth to the police
station. A request for laboratory examination of the white crystalline substance was
then made.
The defense, on the hand denied the accusation and argued that the same was
frame-up. Elizabeth insists that there was no buy-bust operation and what actually
took place was an unlawful warrantless arrest. Elizabeth further argues that the
police officers blatantly ignored the mandatory provisions of Section 21, paragraph
1 of Republic Act No. 9165, particularly, the requirements on making an inventory
report and taking photographs of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused or
the latters representative or counsel.
Issue: whether the lower court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165
Ruling: No. The chain of custody of the seized drugs in a buy-bust operation is
sufficiently established when there is proof of the following: first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court. The failure of the police officers to
make an inventory report and to photograph the drugs seized from Linda and
Elizabeth, as required by Article II, section 21, paragraph 1 of R.A. 9165, are not
automatically fatal to the prosecutions case, as it was able to trace and prove the
chain of custody of the same -- after arresting Linda and Elizabeth during the buybust operation, the police officers brought the two women to the police station; at
the police station, PO2 Ibasco, who acted as the poseur-buyer, marked the sachet of
suspected shabu he received from Linda and Elizabeth during the buy-bust with his
initials EV-LA and turned over the same to P/Insp. Villanueva; P/Insp. Villanueva
prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination of the contents of the sachet; PO2
Ibasco delivered the Request for Laboratory Examination and the sachet of
suspected shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory, CPDCLO, Quezon City, where the
Request and specimen were received by PO2 Plau; the contents of the sachet were
examined by Forensic Analyst Jabonillo, who prepared Chemistry Report No. D-1982003, confirming that the specimen tested positive for shabu;28 and lastly, during
the trial, the marked sachet of shabu, as well as the marked money used in
purchasing the same, were presented as evidence and identified by PO2 Ibasco and
SPO4 Reburiano.
43.
Francisco Imson vs. People, G.R. No. 193003, 13 July 2011
(chain of custody, effect)
Facts: A confidential informant advised the police officers that Imson was selling
shabu at Raja Matanda Street, Navotas. The officers formed a team to conduct a
buy bust operation, with Pajares acting as poseur buyer. They arrived at the said
location and saw Imson talking with Dayao. Thereafter, they saw Imson giving
Dayao a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Pajares
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192235,
July
2011
Facts:PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both wearing civilian clothes, were conducting
anti-drug surveillance operations at Lozana Street, Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal.
While the police officers were in front of a sari-sari store, appellant Laylo and his
live-in partner, Ritwal, approached them and asked, Gusto mong umiskor ng
shabu? PO1 Reyes replied, Bakit mayroon ka ba? Laylo then brought out two
plastic bags containing shabu and told the police officers, Dos (P200.00) ang isa.
Upon hearing this, the police officers introduced themselves as cops. PO1 Reyes
immediately arrested Laylo. Ritwal, on the other, tried to get away but PO1 Pastor
caught up with her. PO1 Pastor then frisked Ritwal and found another sachet of
shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was carrying.
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets of shabu recovered
from Laylo and Ritwal and forwarded them to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for forensic testing. The police officers charged Laylo for attempted sale
of illegal drugs and used the two plastic sachets containing shabu as basis while
Ritwal was charged for possession of illegal drugs using as basis the third sachet
containing 0.02 grams of shabu.
The defense, on the other hand, presented different versions of the facts.
Laylo testified that while he and his common-law wife, Ritwal, were walking on the
street, two men grabbed them. The two men, who they later identified as PO1
Reyes and PO1 Pastor, dragged them to their house. Once inside, the police officers
placed two plastic sachets in each of their pockets. Afterwards, they were brought to
the police station where, despite protests and claims that the drugs were planted on
them, they were arrested and charged.
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four (4) sachets of shabu were then brought to the Bulacan Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office.
The resident forensic chemical officer, P/Insp. Nelson Cruz Sta. Maria (P/Insp. Sta.
Maria), conducted a qualitative examination of the specimen submitted. His findings
contained in Chemistry Report No. D-742-2002, showed that the four (4) sachets
with markings AT-FA, Exhibits A-1 to A-4, containing white crystalline substance
yielded a positive result of the presence of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
Arriola, however, has a different version of what happened on the day of the buybust operation. According to her, at around2:00 oclock in the afternoon
of December 13, 2002, she was at home with her child resting when all of a sudden
policemen with firearms kicked the door of her house. She tried to block the door
but she was shoved aside by one of the men. She told them not to push because
she was pregnant but to no avail since one of them simply said, Wala akong
pakialam. She also testified that one of the men asked her if she knew the
whereabouts of a certain Ogie dela Cruz. When she answered that the man they
were looking for was not residing in her house but in the kanto or corner, she was
the one who was brought to the precinct.
Arriola further testified that while at the police station, they entered the office of the
Chief of Police, Col. Makusi, where she was asked her name and her address. Then,
he brought out a plastic sachet which he took from another room. Later, she was
brought outside the office and escorted to a room with a group of men where she
was made to point at the plastic sachet. Afterwards, she was brought back to the
office of Col. Makusi but this time SPO4 Taruc was already inside. It was at this
moment when he asked her, Gusto mong makalaya? Pagbigyan mo lang ako ng
kahit isang gabi. Arriola replied by saying that she would not agree to his proposal
because, to begin with, she did not commit any crime. This reply angered SPO4
Taruc. In sum, she was saying that there was no valid buy-bust operation as
everything was a set-up. The drugs as well as the marked money were all just taken
from the table of Col. Makusi and not from her as claimed by the prosecution.
The RTC rendered the assailed decision convicting Arriola.
CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision based on the testimony of SPO4
Taruc whom the said court considered to be the best witness as he was the poseurbuyer.
Issue: Whether the alibi of Arriola is tenable
Ruling: No. Time and again, this Court has ruled that alibi and frame up are weak
forms of defense usually resorted to in drug-related cases. In this regard, the Court
is careful in appreciating them and giving them probable value because this type of
defense is easy to concoct. This Court is, of course, not unaware of instances when
our law enforcers would utilize means like planting evidence just to extract
information, but then again the Court does realize the disastrous consequences on
the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well-being of society, if the
courts, solely on the basis of the police officers' alleged rotten reputation, accept in
every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely
for this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed exists. Bare denial cannot prevail over the positive identification by SPO4
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In the case at bar, although the prosecution was able to establish that the crime of
illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866 had been committed by the
accused-appellant, R.A. No. 8294 merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm
as a special aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate
offense. Fortunately for the accused-appellant, the use of an unlicensed firearm
in the killing of the victim was not alleged in the information for murder.
Such being the case, the same could not be used as an aggravating
circumstance to warrant the imposition of the death penalty against the
accused-appellant. (Right to be informed)
Self-defense Issue (walang kinalaman to sa topic pero sinama ko lang):
It is highly improbable for the victim to have been shot at the back if the
gun accidentally fired in the course of the struggle for its possession, as
this would assume that the victims hand holding the gun was twisted
abnormally to reach his back with the gun muzzle pointed at his back
when the gun exploded. Accused-appellant did not testify that such an
impossible scenario took place. What is clear is that the nature and location of the
gunshot wounds are physical evidence that demonstrate a determined effort to kill
the victim and not just defend oneself.
A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it is not
only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also
extremely doubtful by itself. Here, accused-appellant was presented as the sole
witness for the defense.
47.
Agote vs. Lorenzo, G.R 142675, 22 July 2005 (Illegal possession
absorbed in other crimes)
Facts: On April 27, 1996, on an election period, Vicente Agote y Matol violates
Illegal Possession of Firearm (P.D. No. 1866), for having in control of a one .38 Cal.
Rev. with four (4) live bullets without first having secured from the proper
authorities the necessary license therefor, and COMELEC Resolution on gun ban for
having carrying the said gun without first securing the written authority from the
COMELEC. Eventually, trial court rendered a judgement of conviction on both case.
Meanwhile, onn June 6, 1997, Republic Act No. 8294 was approved into law. Pointing
out, among others, that the penalty for illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No.
1866 has already been reduced by the subsequent enactment of Rep. Act No. 8294,
hence, the latter law, being favorable to him, should be the one applied in
determining his penalty for illegal possession of firearms, petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the May 18, 1999 decision of the trial court. However, it was
denied for it would be a retroactive application. On appeal, it was dismissed for
improper proceeding and lack of jurisdiction. An MR was filed but the same was
denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Illegal possession is absorbed in another crime.
Ruling: Yes. In the light of the existing rulings and jurisprudence on the matter, the
present case takes center stage presenting, this time, another twist, so to speak.
Petitioner, who was charged of illegal possession of firearms was also charged of
another offense: Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban), but the
unlicensed firearm was not used or discharged in this case. The question then
which appears to be of first impression, is whether or not the unlicensed firearm
should be actually used and discharged in the course of committing the other
crime in order that Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 will apply so that no separate crime of
illegal possession of firearms may be charged.
Let us take a look at the jurisprudence once again. In Cupcupin vs. People,[25] the
accused was charged and convicted for two (2) separate crimes of illegal possession
of firearms, and illegal possession of prohibited drugs. In the more recent case
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15
February
2000
Facts: Julian Castillo y Lumayro was charged with Murder and Illegal Possession of
Firearms. The scene of the crime was in the then on-going construction site of
Gaisano Building in Lapaz, Iloilo City. Accused was a lead man in the construction
site. Witnesses testified that Accused shot Abawag three times despite Abawags
imploration and fled leaving the latter to death. Thereafter, the police and the
brother-in-law of the victim located Castillo on a vessel for Cebu. Castillo tried to
escape at first, when he was confronted he denied the killing but was found in his
possession the .38 caliber. Further inquiry revealed that the accused owned the gun
but had no license to possess it. The police then took the accused into custody and
charged him for the murder of Abawag and for illegal possession of firearm. Accused
was held by the trial court guilty of Homicide, as the prosecution failed to prove
the alleged qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, and
of Illegal Possession of Firearm, aggravated by homicide. He was sentenced
as follows: "1) For the crime of homicide, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; "2) For illegal possession of firearm
which is aggravated by homicide, he is sentenced to a penalty of death; x
x x On automatic review by this Court, appellant impugns solely his conviction for
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v.
People,
GR
190889,
10
January
2011
Facts: Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio charged with violation of
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, before the RTC, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan. When
arraigned, both pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The case arose when members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operations
Group (PISOG) were instructed by Provincial Director Police Superintendent Edgardo
Mendoza (P/Supt. Mendoza) to respond to the complaint of concerned citizens
residing on Ilang-Ilang and Sampaguita Roads, Park Homes III Subdivision, Barangay
Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, that armed men drinking liquor at the residence of
petitioner were indiscriminately firing guns. PISOG along with the members of the
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Facts:
Armed with bladed weapon which they pointed to one Reynaldo Togorio
and used in stabbing him and the accused Amado Izon y Bartulo who helped in
mauling him thereby inflicting upon said Reynaldo Togorio, and then wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away one (1) motorized tricycle, the
petitioners were charged with Robbery with Violence Against Person and were
sentenced to the penalty provided in Republic Act No. 6539 known as Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
The Petitioners alleged that the court a quo erred in imposing the penalty
prescribed in the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 instead of that prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code for simple robbery with violence, because the information did
not allege that the motorized tricycle stolen was using the public highway, so as to
make it a motor vehicle as the term is defined in the carnapping law, and therefore
failed to inform them that they were being charged under the cited statute, in
violation of their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against the petitioners came to this Court with the instant petition for
review.
Issue:
Whether a motorized tricycle is a motor vehicle within the definition
given to the term by the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
Ruling:
Yes. Highways are always public, free for the use of every person.
There is nothing in the law that requires a license to use a public highway to make
the vehicle a "motor vehicle" within the definition given the anti-carnapping law. If a
vehicle uses the streets with or without the required license, same comes within the
protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is not to be measured by what
kind of streets or highway the same is used; but by the very nature of the vehicle
itself and the use to which it is devoted. Otherwise, cars using the streets but still
unlicensed or unregistered as when they have just beet bought from the company,
or only on test runs, may be stolen without the penal sanction of the anticarnapping statute, but only as simple robbery punishable under the provision of
the Revised Penal Code. This obviously, could not have been the intention of the
anti-carnapping law.
Going over the enumerations of excepted vehicle, it would readily be noted that any
vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public, not exclusively for
private use, comes within the concept of motor vehicle. A tricycle which is not
included in the exception, is thus deemed to be that kind of motor vehicle as
defined in the law the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction.
In any event, it is a matter of judicial notice that motorized tricycles are running in
droves along highways admittedly public, as those going to the north like Baguio
City. Those motorized tricycles certainly come within the definition of the law, even
under the restricted construction that petitioners would want given to it. If these
tricycles are "motor vehicles" then, there is no cogent reason to treat the tricycle in
question differently.
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Facts: Artemio Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe were charged with the crime of
Carnapping with Homicide as defined in Republic Act No. 6539.
The accused approached Cortez, a taxicab operator to borrow a car for their trip in
Bicol but the latter refused because it is unavailable. Instead, the approached
Ignacio which agreed to lease the Tamaraw FX for two days. Wilfredo Elis was the
driver of the leased car. Four days have passed but they did not hear from the two
accused so they reported to the police station. The two accused were seen in front
of a store in Nueva Ecija. When they failed to produce documents of ownership over
the Tamaraw FX, they were brought to the Moncada Police Station for investigation.
Garcia and Bernabe admitted to the Moncada Police that they attempted to sell the
Tamaraw FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio. They also admitted the killing of Elis.
The court rendered a decision finding them guilty of the crime charged. The two
accused appealed to the decision holding that the court erred in its decision that the
elements of carnapping was not established. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the accused were guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling. Yes. Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as An Act Preventing and
Penalizing Carnapping, defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of
a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. More
specifically, the elements of the crime are as follows: (1) That there is an actual
taking of the vehicle; (2) That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the
vehicle; (3) That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
and (4) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things.
Unlawful taking is the taking of a vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things;
it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. In the case at bar, it cannot
be denied that the nature of the appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX was
initially lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the purpose of
taking the vehicle radically transformed the character of said possession into an
unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during his first visit to the Moncada
Police Station where appellant and his co-accused were detained, the two
separately admitted to him that they killed the deceased when the latter refused to
join their plan to sell the vehicle. Their confession, having been freely and
voluntarily given to Cortez, a private individual, is admissible against the appellant.
Thus, the duration of the lease of the Tamaraw FX, whether for an indefinite period
as contended by the defense, or only for 4 days, as claimed by the prosecution, has
no bearing on the culpability of the appellant. It does not matter whether the
unlawful taking occurred within the period of the lease. What is decisive here is the
purpose of appellant and his co-accused in killing the victim. Such is the vital point
on which the crime and the nature thereof is to be determined. To reiterate, the
prosecution was able to establish that appellant and his co-accused stabbed the
victim to death because he refused to join them in their plan to appropriate the
vehicle. This undoubtedly satisfied the element of unlawful taking through violence,
rendering appellant liable for the crime charged.
60.
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Facts: Sanchez was a cargador at the Navotas Fishport. He first met accusedappellant, Danilo Lobitania, outside a beerhouse at the fishport. Accused-appellant
offered him a job as a helper in an ice plant in Pangasinan. Sanchez agreed and,
together with accused-appellant and his companions, they boarded a bus bound for
Urdaneta, Pangasinan at around nine o clock in the evening. The group alighted at
Barangay Nancayasen and flagged down a tricycle driven by victim Alexander de
Guzman. Daniel and Jr. Subarin rode at the back of the driver while accusedappellant, Montolo and Sidro were inside the tricycle with Sanchez in the sidecar.
The driver turned left at an alley and after traveling a short distance, the driver was
shot at the right side of his chest below the armpit. Sidro then grabbed the driver
from his seat, tied his hands behind his back and then shoved him out of the
tricycle. Sanchez and Jr. Saburin tried to help the driver but Montolo and accusedappellant poked their guns at them and threatened that the same thing would
happen to them if they did not go with accused-appellants group.
The group took the tricycle, now driven by Daniel and proceeded towards the
direction of Manila. At the fish market, Sanchez and Jr. Saburin were told by
accused-appellant to stay and wait. However, after two hours of waiting, Sanchez
and Jr. Saburin decided to leave and head back for Manila.
After Sanchez arrival at his house, accused-appellants companion, Daniel, arrived
and warned him not to squeal lest something happened to him. Sanchez then went
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Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words IS KILLED, no distinction must be
made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is
committed "in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof makes no
difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.
It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teofilo Landingin -- whether it be
homicide or murder -- cannot be treated as a separate offense, but should only be
considered to qualify the crime of carnapping.
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But do the words "IS KILLED" in the last clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as
amended, include the crime of frustrated murder or homicide? Put a little
differently, does murder or homicide in its frustrated stage also qualify carnapping if
it is committed in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof? The answer must be in the negative in light of the use in said
Section 14 of the words IS KILLED. The unmistakable import thereof is that it
refers only to the consummated felony of either murder or homicide.
64.
People vs. ArnelNocum, GR 179041, 1 April 2013 (Carnapping
with Homicide)
Facts: Mahilac was a member of "FX gang," a syndicate notorious for carjacking
Toyota FX vehicles. Nocum led the syndicates criminal activities in Metro Manila
while Pangandag, who was the head of the Land Transportation Office in Lanao Del
Norte, led the Mindanao operations.Ramos, Posadas and Mallari were members of
the gang. Mallari, Ramos and Posadas arrived on board the Toyota FX taxi that
Mallari flagged down in Muntinlupa City. Mallari told Mahilac not to board the said
vehicle because its back portion reeked of the dried blood of the FX taxi driver, Erico
Medel, who was stabbed to death while resisting the group. Mallari also informed
Mahilac that Medels corpse was dumped somewhere in Atimonan, Quezon. The
gang continued to engage in this nefarious activity until Mahilacs arrest by law
enforcement officers.
In the meantime, a cadaver in advance state of
decomposition was found along Zigzag Road, Barangay Malinao Ilaya, Atimonan,
Quezon. Based on the four extracted teeth and a piece of white "FILA" shoe, the
mother and the wife of the victim positively identified the cadaver to be that of
Medel. Consequently, Mahilac was placed under the Witness Protection Program of
the Department of Justice (DOJ). He confessed the forgoing circumstances. The
accused, herein, were found guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide. Mallari
appealed and argued that the court erred in convicting him despite the lack of
evidence other than the mere allegation by the lone prosecution witness.
Issue: Whether the crime of carnapping with homicide is established?
Ruling: Section 2 of RA 6539 defines carnapping as "the taking, with intent
to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things." The crime of carnapping with homicide is punishable
under Section 14 of the said law, as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659. To prove
the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not
only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Thus, the prosecution in
this case has the burden of proving that: (1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2)
his original criminal design was carnapping; (3) he killed the driver, Medel;
and (4) the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
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Issue: Whether or not the said stipulation of the parties in this case valid?
Ruling: NO. In this case, the cardholder, Manuelita, has complied with what was
required of her under the contract with BECC. She immediately notified BECC of the
loss of her card on the same day it was lost and, the following day, she sent a
written notice of the loss to BECC. That she gave such notices to BECC is admitted
by BECC in the letter sent to Luis by Roberto L. Maniquiz, head of BECCs Collection
Department.
Having thus performed her part of the notification procedure, it was reasonable for
Manuelita -- and Luis, for that matter -- to expect that BECC would perform its part
of the procedure, which is to forthwith notify its member-establishments. It is not
unreasonable to assume that BECC would do this immediately, precisely to avoid
any unauthorized charges.
The cardholder was no longer in control of the procedure after it has notified BECC
of the cards loss or theft. It was already BECCs responsibility to inform its
member-establishments of the loss or theft of the card at the soonest possible time.
We note that BECC is not a neophyte financial institution, unaware of the intricacies
and risks of providing credit privileges to a large number of people. It should have
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Prompt notice by the cardholder to the credit card company of the loss or theft of
his card should be enough to relieve the former of any liability occasioned by the
unauthorized use of his lost or stolen card. The questioned stipulation in this case,
which still requires the cardholder to wait until the credit card company has notified
all its member-establishments, puts the cardholder at the mercy of the credit card
company which may delay indefinitely the notification of its members to minimize if
not to eliminate the possibility of incurring any loss from unauthorized purchases.
Or, as in this case, the credit card company may for some reason fail to promptly
notify its members through absolutely no fault of the cardholder. To require the
cardholder to still pay for unauthorized purchases after he has given prompt notice
of the loss or theft of his card to the credit card company would simply be unfair and
unjust. The Court cannot give its assent to such a stipulation which could clearly
run against public policy.
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Held: No. To establish the existence of the second element, the State should
present the giving of a written notice of the dishonor to the drawer, maker or issuer
of the dishonored check. The notice of dishonor required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
to be given to the drawer, maker or issuer of a check should be written. If the
service of the written notice of dishonor on the maker, drawer or issuer of the
dishonored check is by registered mail, the proof of service consists not only in the
presentation as evidence of the registry return receipt but also of the registry
receipt together with the authenticating affidavit of the person mailing the notice of
dishonor. Without the authenticating affidavit, the proof of giving the notice of
dishonor is insufficient unless the mailer personally testifies in court on the sending
by registered mail. A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the
check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor
may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in
writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a
written notice is fatal for the prosecution
Inasmuch as this element involves a state of mind of the person making, drawing or
issuing the check which is difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a prima
facie presumption of such knowledge. The presumption is brought into existence
only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that
within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as
provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee
bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such
notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning
the crucial 5-day period.
The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity
to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly
enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a
right to demand and the basic postulate of fairness require that the notice of
dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to
avert prosecution under B.P. 22.
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full
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Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the same was dismissed by the CA in its October
15, 1996 Decision wherein it affirmed in toto the RTCs Decision.
In determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem
valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social
order. There, we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed
on them only a fine double the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact
that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P.
No. 22 was committed, "otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment
of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term." We do the same
here. We believe such would best serve the ends of criminal justice.
Consequently, we delete the prison sentences imposed on petitioner. The two fines
imposed for each violation, each amounting to P200,000.00 are appropriate and
sufficient.
82.
Varca vs. CA, GR 131714 (Preference in the imposition of
Penalties, BP 22)
Facts: Petitioner Eduardo R. Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International,
Inc. (Ervine), which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of refrigeration
equipment, while his son-in-law, petitioner Fernando Nieto, is the firm's purchasing
manager. On March 10, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P10,000.00 to the
General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection, and Security, Inc. (GARDS) in partial
payment of the security services rendered by GARDS to Ervine. The check was
drawn on the China Banking Corporation (CBC). When deposited in the Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) branch at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong,
the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. GARDS wrote Ervine a letter
which it demanded payment in cash but petitioners did not pay within the time
given. Subsequently, Petitioners issued another check for P19, 860.16 to GARDS
which was drawn on Associated Bank. In the voucher accompanying it, it was stated
therein that it is for replacement for the dishonored check and remaining was for
outstanding balance. GARD did not return the dishonored check.
Thereafter, GARDS operation manager filed a complaint against petitioners for
violations of BP 22 but it was dismissed on ground that Ervine paid the amount of
check. Subsequently, GARDS filed another complaint for violation of B.P. Bldg. 22
against petitioners. This resulted in the filing of an information against petitioners in
the RTC, Q.C. After trial, petitioners were found guilty of the charge and each was
sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and
the costs. On appeal it affirmed RTCs decision. It subsequently denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Petitioners pray that the case
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Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner violated Sec. 3(d) of RA 3019 for causing
the employment of his brother-in-law?
Held: Yes. The Court notes that petitioner did not deny that CCSI has regular
transactions with his office. Neither did he deny that Ariel Monongdo is his brotherin-law. Under Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, mere acceptance by a
member of his family of employment with a private enterprise which has pending
official business with the official involved is considered a corrupt practice. It is clear,
therefore, that mere acceptance by Ariel Manongdo, a family member, of the
employment with CCSI rendered petitioner liable under the law. The Court,
therefore, agrees with respondent Deputy Ombudsman when he held that:
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95.
Anuncio C. Bustillo, et al. vs. People, G.R. No. 160718, 12 May
2010 (Sec. 3e, RA 3019)
Facts: Congressman Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (Congressman Paredes) used a portion of
his Countryside Development Fund (CDF) to purchase one unit of Toyota Tamaraw
FX and six units of Kawasaki motorcycles. All vehicles were registered in the name
of the Municipality of Bunawan and were turned over to the municipality through its
mayor, herein petitioner Anuncio C. Bustillo (Bustillo).
The Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed Resolution No. 95-274 which
authorized the transfer without cost of the aforesaid vehicles to the San Francisco
Water District (SFWD. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur passed a
Resolution disapproving the Sangguniang Bayans Resolution No. 95-27 for being
violative of Section 3817 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code. On August 17,
1995, it passed Resolution No. 2468 canceling and declaring the Deed of Transfer as
null and void for being highly irregular and grossly violative of Section 381 of RA
7160.
On May 23, 1996, a complaint was filed charging Bustillo, Vice-Mayor Agustin
Billedo, Jr. (Billedo), and Sangguniang Bayan members Teogenes Tortor (Tortor),
Emilio Sumilhig, Jr. (Sumilhig), Ruth C. Orot (Orot), and Ernesto Amador, Jr., with
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of the violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019.
Ruling: No. The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are
public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said
public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official
duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to
any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused
by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5)
that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.25
In this case, only the first element was proven. At the time material to this case, all
the petitioners are public officers, namely, Bustillo as Municipal Mayor, Billedo as
Vice Mayor, and Sumilhig as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
All the other elements were not present. It cannot be denied that the transfer of the
vehicles to SFWD was made in furtherance of the purpose for which the funds were
released which is to help in the planning, monitoring and coordination of the
implementation of the waterworks projects located throughout the Province of
Agusan del Sur. The Deed of Donation expressly provided that the subject vehicles
shall be used for the same purpose for which they were purchased.
96.
Buencamino Cruz v. Sandiganbayan, et.al. citing Mejorada
doctrine, GR 134493, 16 August 2005 (Sec.3e)
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(1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in
conspiracy with them;
(2) that the prohibited act/s were done in the discharge of the public officers
official, administrative or judicial functions;
(3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether Government or a
private person;
(4) that such injury is caused by giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference to such party; and
(5) that the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.
Issue: Whether CA erred in pronouncing that the accused acted in good faith?
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Ruling: No. The elements of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, are as follows: (1) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused
undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party an
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Bad faith is never presumed, while good faith is always presumed; and the chapter
on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to observe
good faith, which springs from the fountain of good conscience.
98.
DelaChica vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 144823, 8 December 2003
(Sec. 3e two way to commit:MP/EBF/GIN)
Facts: Accused, Municipal Mayor Graciano P. Dela Chica and Municipal Engineer
Evan C. Aceveda, of the Municipality of Baco, Oriental Mindoro, while in the
performance of their official functions, and taking advantage of the same, acting in
conspiracy with one another, cause undue injury to the government by making
revisions in the completion of the municipal building without prior approval by the
proper authorities resulting to cost deficiency of P375,682.32, to the damage and
injury of the government, in the amount afore stated. Petitioners were arraigned
and both entered a plea of not guilty.
Petitioners thereafter sought to question the sufficiency of the information praying
that the prosecution be directed to specify the persons referred to in the information
as "proper authorities." This was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners thereafter filed an opposition thereto, on the ground that the information
is invalid as not all the essential elements of the offense charged were alleged
therein, particularly the element of "evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross
inexcusable negligence."
The Sandiganbayan handed down the first assailed resolution ordering petitioners
suspension pendente lite for 90 days. It ruled that in its previous order denying
petitioners motion for bill of particulars, it in effect upheld the sufficiency of the
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19
December
1989
Facts: Accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province
of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the
acquisition of private lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of
the Government at Sitio Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo
G. Fernando, Supervising Engineer who acted as assistant of accused Cresencio D.
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102.
Jovito C. Plameras vs. People, G.R. No. 187268, 4 September
2013 (Mode of commission; Sec 3e)
FACTS: there was a project known as the "Purchase of School Desks Program"
piloted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Central Office,
through the Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) for the purpose of giving assistance to
the most depressed provinces in the country. The Province of Antique was among
the beneficiaries, with a budget allocation of P5,666,667.00. Petitioner Jovito
Plameras at that time was the Governor if said province.He received 2 checks from
DECS-PAF in the total amount of P5,666,667.00drawn against LBP for the purchase
of school desks and armchairs. checks werevdeposited to LBP, San Jose, Antique
branch and was later drawn and deposited to LBP pasig branch. thereafter, he
signed a purchaser-seller agreement for the supply with CKL Enterprises, the same
enterprise which the DECS Central Office had entered into, through a negotiated
contract for the supply of desks, sometime in 1996. consequently, he applied with
the LBP Head Office for the opening of an Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit4 in
behalf of the Provincial School Board of Antique in the amount of P5,666,600.00 in
favor of CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz. Such application was approved by the LBP; thus,
the issuance of Letter of Credit. petitioner demanded from CKL Enterprises/Dela
Cruz, the complete delivery of the purchased items. Unheeded, the petitioner, in a
letter dated 5 March 1998,10 requested the LBP for the copies of pertinent
documents pertaining to the Letter of Credit in favor of CKL Enterprises as well as
debit memos or status of the fund deposited therein. In addition, the petitioner, in a
separate letter dated 26 November 1998,11 asked assistance from the LBP to
compel CKL Enterprises to complete the delivery of the purchased items under the
Letter of Credit and to settle the case amicably, claiming some deception or
misrepresentation in the execution of the sales invoice.
For failure to settle the matter, a case was filed by the Province of Antique,
represented by its new Governor, Exequiel B. Javier before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12 of San Jose, Antique docketed as Civil Case No. 99-5-312112 to
compel CKL Enterprises to refund the amount of P5,666,600.00 with interests at the
legal rate.
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The purchase of 1,356 desks and 5,246 armchairs by the Province of Antique was
made in apparent violation of existing rules and regulations as evident [sic] by the
following facts:
1. Payment was made before the desks and chairs were delivered;
2. Procurement was made without the required authorization from the Provincial
School Board;
3. Proper procedure was disregarded, there being no bidding process.
As a result thereof, delivery of desks and armchairs was delayed and the said desks
and armchairs delivered are defective. Moreover, the remaining 3,468 desks and
chairs amounting to P2,697,168.00 have not been delivered by the supplier despite
demands. Unwarranted benefit was thus given to the supplier and undue injury was
caused to the government.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross in excusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
For the aforecited provision to lie against the petitioner, the following elements
must concur:
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The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be
committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith, "or "gross
inexcusable negligence." this Court explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be
committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or
manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable
negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident
bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently
fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for
some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith "contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill
will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross in excusable negligence" refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons
may be affected.
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103.
People vs. Aristeo Atienza, et.al. GR 171671, 18 June 2012
(Sec. 3e, RA 3019-dolo/culpa)
Facts:
Edmund, the owner of Hondura Beach Resort in Puerto Galera,
Oriental Mindoro, caused the construction of a fence on his resort. The fence was
destroyed, thus he caused another construction for it. However, it was again
destroyed by Engr. Manogong upon the order of the then Mayor Atienza reasoning
that it was not good for Puerto Galera since the place was a tourist destination and
that the land was intended for the fisherman association. Thus, Engr. Manogong
destroyed the fences for lack of permit. A complaint charging them with violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents should be held liable for violating Sec.
3 of RA 3019 for causing the destruction of the fence?
Held: No. This crime has the following essential elements: (1) The accused must be
a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) He must
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan
granted the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to
establish the second element of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
104.
Dr. Roger Posadas and Dr. Rolando Dayco v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 168951& 169000, 17 July 2013 (Sec. 3e-essential elements)
Facts: Dr. Posadas was Chancellor of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman
when he formed a Task Force on Science and Technology Assessment, Management
and Policy. Acting on the Task Forces proposal, UP established the UP Technology
Management Center (UP TMC) the members of which nominated Dr. Posadas for the
post of Center Director. He declined the nomination, however, resulting in the
designation of Professor Jose B. Tabbada as acting UP TMC Director.
Shortly after, Dr. Posadas worked for the funding of the ten new graduate courses of
UP TMC.
On November 7, 1995, his last day as OIC Chancellor, Dr Dayco appointed Dr.
Posadas as Project Director of the TMC Project from September 18, 1995 to
September 17, 1996. In an undated letter, Dr. Dayco also appointed Dr. Posadas
consultant to the project. The appointments were to retroact to September 18, 1995
when the project began.
About a year later, the COA issued a Notice of Suspension to the UP TMC personnel
including Dr. Posadas. Notwithstanding the lifting of the suspension, UP President
Javier constituted an Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal to hear and decide the
administrative complaint that he himself filed against Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco for
grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Sandiganbayan found Dr. Posadas and
Dr. Dayco both guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019. Hence this
petition.
Issue: Whether the two accused were guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling: No. The bad faith that Section 3(e) of Republic 3019 requires, said this
Court, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imputes a dishonest
purpose, some moral obliquity, and a conscious doing of a wrong. Indeed, it
partakes of the nature of fraud. Here, admittedly, Dr. Dayco appears to have taken
advantage of his brief designation as OIC Chancellor to appoint the absent
Chancellor, Dr. Posadas, as Director and consultant of the TMC Project. But it cannot
be said that Dr. Dayco made those appointments and Dr. Posadas accepted them,
fraudulently, knowing fully well that Dr. Dayco did not have that authority as OIC
Chancellor.
The prosecution also failed to prove that Dr. Dayco gave Dr. Posadas unwarranted
advantage as a result of the appointments in question. The honoraria he received
cannot be considered unwarranted since there is no evidence that he did not
discharge the additional responsibilities that such appointments entailed.
109.
Morales vs. People, GR No. 144047, 26 July 2002 (Sec. 3g;
Manifest/gross)
Facts: Accused Eulogio Morales, a public officer, being then the duly appointed
General Manager of the Olongapo City Water District, a government agency,
conspiring and confederating with accused Wilma Hallare, Finance Officer of the
said water district and the formers wife Rosalia Morales, did then and there, wilfully
and unlawfully sell, transfer and convey a 1979 Model Gallant car Sigma with Motor
No. 2M-08206, with an assessed value of P75,000.00 on behalf of the Olongapo City
Water District, to [Petitioner] Wilma Hallare for only P4,000.00, which amount is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Olongapo City Water District and on
During the pendency of the civil case, Goldstar proposed to Duterte for the
cancellation of the computerization contract. The Sanggunian issued Resolution and
ordinance accepting Goldstar's offer to cancel the computerization contract
provided the latter return the advance payment. They mutually rescinded the
contract and the down payment was duly refunded. With the intent on pursuing its
computerization plan, the city government acquired Philips computers following the
recommendation of Special Audit Team of the Commission on Audit and with the
assistance of the National Computer Center . The civil case was eventually
dismissed.
Issue: Whether probable cause is established for charging petitioners for violation
of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019?
Ruling: No. When the contract subject of a complaint for alleged violation
of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 was rescinded before the complaint was filed, the
said contract became in contemplation of law, non-existent, as if not
contract was ever executed and the second element of the crime that the
accused public officers entered into a contract in behalf of the government
is absent.
Under the facts of the case, there is no basis in the law or in fact to charge
petitioners for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. To establish probable cause
against the offender for violation of Sec. 3(g), the following elements must be
present: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or
transaction in behalf of the government; (3) the contract or transaction is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The second element of the
crime that the accused public officers entered into a contract in behalf of the
government is absent. The computerization contract was rescinded on 6 May
1991 before SAR No. 91-05 came out on 31 May 1991 and before the Anti-Graft
League filed its complaint with the Ombudsman on 1 August 1991. Hence, at that
time the Anti-Graft League instituted their complaint and the Ombudsman issued its
Order on 12 November 1991, there was no longer any contract to speak of. The
contract, after 6 May 1991 became in contemplation of the law, non-existent, as if
no contract was ever executed.
112.
Froilan vs. Sandiganbayan, 328 SCRA 351 (2000) (Sec. 3gguranteed contract)
Facts:
Bohol Agricultural College, a government educational institution,
purchased chemicals for its laboratory priced at Php 10 633 from JDS traders. As
required in the procurement of government supplies, an RIV (Requisition and Issue
Voucher) was prepared on May 30, 1984 by Benigno V. Mandin, Supply Officer, and
approved by Mateo M. Limbago, Superintendent of the school. Purchase Order No.
84-61 was approved by accused Mateo M. Limbago. The purchase order, however,
appears to have been received by accused Julius Froilan, the supplier, who signed a
certification stamped on the order, stating that he will refund the difference if the
prices are found to be overpriced. The price turned to be overpriced. Upon demand,
Froilan refunded the full amount of the disallowance of Php 5 323.87. This,
notwithstanding, an information for the violation of Sec 3 (g) of RA 3019 was filed
against all the accused.
Issue:
Held: No.One of the principal reasons for Mr. Limbagos acquittal was the fact that
the government the only entity which the law seeks to protect was amply
protected by virtue of the written undertaking issued by petitioner, as the winning
bidder, to refund whatever amount may be found as the overpriced. Petitioner,
being the one who gave the written guarantee and who saved the government from
any perceived injury, must likewise be acquitted.
Readily, the Court found that the third element is missing. The government was
amptly protected in the subject transaction and consequently the contract was not
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
113.
Caballero et.al. vs. Sandiganbayan,
September 2005 (Sec. 3h, RA 3019)
GR
137355-58,
25
RULING: NO. The qualification of APRI to enter into the MOA with the municipality
having been duly established, private respondents could no longer be held
accountable under Section 3 (j) which punishes the act of public officers of
knowingly granting a license, permit, privilege or advantage to a person not
qualified or legally entitled thereto.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor
of any person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit,
privilege or advantage or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so
qualified or entitled.
120.
Mendiola vs. People, 207 SCRA 85 (1992) (Sec. 3j-defense of
good faith)
Facts:
The case arises from the issued temporary business permits to the
former stall holders of the Public Angono Market to erect and construct temporary
market stalls on the public grounds where the old market used to stand which was
destroyed by fire sometime in 1993. These grounds together with the temporary
public market was called Angono Public Market phase I (hereinafter APM-Phase I).
Among the stallholders of APM-Phase I granted business permits were Zenaida
Ortillada, Marlon Rosales and Ruben Blanco.
On January 20, 1987, the Angono Municipal Council enacted Resolution No. 71987. It authorizes the construction of Angono Public Market Phase II on a property
owned by the Municipality of Angono adjacent to APM Phase I.
The construction of APM-Phase II was to be financed by a novel scheme: a
contract was entered into between (a) a building contractor (Jose Capistrano), (b) a
Construction Committee representing the stall awardees of APM-Phase II
approximately 157 in number selected by some mode not revealed in the record,
and (c) OIC Miranda, Sr., signing on behalf of the Municipality of Angono. Notably, no
public bidding for the construction of the new market building was contemplated or
provided for in the scheme.
A conflict eventually arises on the preference between the existing temporary
stall holders in APM I and APM II awardees. Thus, resulting to civil case filed before
the RTC of Binangonan, Rizal for writ of preliminary injunction on the construction of
the new building. Eventually, the new elected officers of the newly elected Municipal
council of Angono assailed the validity of Resolution N0. 7-1987 which hold in
abeyance by the Rizal Provincial Board.
On 3 May 1988, the contractor of APM-Phase II, with the aid of the military,
demolished the market stalls of Ortillada, Rosales and Blanco, ostensibly under the
authority of Resolution No. 42-1987 of the Angono Municipal Council and the written
instructions of OIC Miranda. Sr. issued ten (10) months earlier directing demolition
of the market stalls of Ortillada and Rosales. The demolition of all three (3) stalls
was carried out without prior hearing or a court order and without a demolition
permit from petitioner building official. The market stall of Blanco which, like the
stalls of Ortillada and Rosales, was physically in the way of the new building, was
demolished without even being mentioned in Resolution No. 42-1987 and the
written instructions of Miranda, Sr.
Issue:
Whether or not Carabeos non-disclosure of assets in his SALNs
constitutes violation of Section 7 of RA 3019 and Section 8(A) of RA 6713?
Significantly, Carabeo failed to show any requirement under RA 3019 that prior
notice of the non-completion of the SALN and its correction precede the filing of
charges for violation of its provisions. Neither are these measures needed for the
charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, which Carabeo presently faces.
122.
Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 134493, 16 August 2005, 467
SCRA 52 (rule on refund of stolen amount)
Facts: The mayor-elect of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Victor Miranda sought
an audit investigation of the municipalitys 1991-1992 financial transactions.
Petitioner Buencamino Cruz served as municipal mayor of the town in 1991 until his
term ended in the middle of 1992.
The special audit team discovered that certain anomalous and irregular transactions
transpired during the covered period, the most serious being the purchase of
vs.
Sandiganbayan;
177
SCRA
354
(preventive
FACTS:
Special Prosecution Officer II, Dionisio A. Caoili, conducted a preliminary
investigation of the charge against the petitioner, Quintin S. Doromal, a former
Commissioner of the PCGG, for- violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president
and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which
submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive,
mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).
Accused Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading
Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company
participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and the National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is
prohibited by law and the constitution. He filed a motion to quah which was then
denied by the Sandiganbayan, and ordered his suspension pendente lite from his
position as PCGG Commissioner and from any other office he may be holding.
ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in suspending the
petitioner from office despite the President's having previously approved his
indefinite leave of absence "until final decision" in this case?
RULING:
NO. But was ordered that his suspension to be lifted. Section 13 of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) provides:
124.
Gov. Antonio M. Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan, GR 110503, 4
August 1994 (maximum period of preventive suspension/purpose)
Facts: The above-named accused ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, PEDRO ASON and
PRUDENCIO MACABENTA, all public officers, duly appointed and qualified as
such, being the OIC Governor, Provincial Treasurer and Property Officer
respectively, all of the Province of Samar, and being members of Bids and
Awards Committee responsible for the purchase of office supplies for the
Provincial Government of Samar and while in the performance of their respective
positions, confederating and mutually helping one another and through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully enter
into a purchase contract with REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for
the purchase of certain office supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of
Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit price of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or
a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit
price for said item was only Fifty-Five Pesos (P55.00) or a total price of Five
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the
government in the total amount of Forty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P49,500.00).
Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he entered a plea of
"not guilty."
On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for
petitioner's suspension, citing sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides in
part:
The Sandiganbayan handed down its Resolution by suspending them for a period of
ninety (90) days. The Sandiganbayan held that the suspension was mandated
under the law upon a finding that a proper preliminary investigation had been
conducted , the information was valid, and the accused were charged with any of
the crimes specified in the law.
Ruling: YES. The firmly entrenched doctrine is that under Section 13 of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory
after a determination has been made of the validity of the information in a presuspension hearing conducted for that purpose.
This Court has ruled that under Section 13 of the anti-graft law, the suspension of a
public officer is mandatory after the validity of the information has been upheld in a
pre-suspension hearing conducted for that purpose. This pre-suspension hearing is
conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the
Court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on
the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismissed the
case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity. That hearing
may be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the validity of the information
by way of a motion to quash (See People vs. Albano, etc., et. al., L-45376-77, July
28, 1988, 163 SCRA 511)
129.
Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112 (1985) (violation of section 4b, RA
3019)
Facts: The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than 500
bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation initially commenced with the
filing of a complaint for overtime with the defunct Court of Industrial Relations.
While the case was before the Court of Industrial Relations, the union of the workers
and the employer executed an agreement whereby Halili Transit bound itself to
deliver a parcel of land and P25k to the Union, as full settlement. So a deed of
conveyance was executed transferring the land to the union, in trust for the
members therein.
The union, through Atty. Pineda filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor
requesting for the authority to sell the land. Motion was granted but the buyer was
hesitant to purchase the land because there was a law that requires an order from a
court as authority to sell properties in trust. So Atty. Pineda filed a motion with the
Held: Yes. Santilliano was indisputably on the receiving end of the overpayments
and even issued receipts for them. He was unable to justify the excessive payment
by showing a written agreements with the municipality pursuant to the
implementing rules and regulations of P.D. 1694
Clearly, under section 9 of RA 3019, the law punishes not only public officers who
committed prohibited acts under section 3, but also those who induce or cause the
public officer to commit those offenses.
131.
People vs. Sandiganbayan and Alas; 16 February 2005, 451
SCRA 413 (Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan)
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to petitioner of
the power to "recommend" the imposition of penalty on erring public officials and
employees; Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty
required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith
The word "recommend" must be taken in conjunction with the phrase "and
ensure compliance therewith." The proper interpretation should be that the
Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of
a public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of
the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed.
137.
Wilfredo Penaflor vs. Ligorio Naval, CA-G.R. SP No. 59574, 29
May 2001 (Sec 5 RA 6713-duty to reply to letters)
FACTS: Respondent Ligorio Naval wrote a letter 2 to the then Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Ernesto Garilao, regarding the Alleged
Fake/Spurious Land Use Conversion Order presented by the Household Development
Corporation . On April 15, 1999, respondent Naval filed a complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman against Ricardo San Andres, Director of the Center for
Land Use, Policy, Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-2) and petitioner Wilfredo
Peaflor, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Planning and Legal Affairs, both of the DAR,
for violation of Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officials and Employees. Naval's allegation therein was that San
Andres and Peaflor failed to answer respondent's letter concerning the forgery of a
DAR conversion order supposedly signed by then Undersecretary Hector D. Soliman
on January 7, 1997. Respondents WILFREDO M. PEAFLOR, and RICARDO SAN
ANDRES both of the Department of Agrarian Reform guilty of violation of Section 5
(a) of Republic Act 6713. , Penaflor filed his Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision on the ground that the Office of the Ombudsman seriously erred in failing
to consider that Naval had already been informed by DAR of its action on the matter
subject of his request. DAR officials, including the petitioner, have substantially
complied with the requirements of Section 5 (a) of RA 6713. The petitioner also
submitted that under the law, the complainant is not entitled as a matter of right to
a status report on the matter that is the subject of an investigation.
ISSUE:
WON the Office of the Ombudsman erred in not finding that the DAR
and the petitioner have substantially complied with the duty imposed under Section
5(a), RA 6713?
RULING: Yes, but still the case is final and executory and not anymore appealable.
The Office of the Ombudsman erred in not finding that the DAR and the petitioner
have substantially complied with the duty imposed under Section 5(a), RA 6713. As
the records show, DAR has not been remiss in its duty to the respondent, since it
had replied and informed the respondent of the action it had taken when it issued
him a copy of the First Indorsement dated July 13, 1998. It had therefore sufficiently
complied with the first duty imposed by RA 6713 by acknowledging complainant's
letter.
The sanction attached to Section 5 (a) of RA 6713 should only be made to
bear on public officials for requests or communications that are legitimate. Without
this condition, the potential for the provision's abuse is endless. Public officials, like
the petitioner, who are already saddled with a multitude of concerns, will be
deluged with all kinds of requests, including frivolous and indulgent ones, which
they must acknowledge under the pain of administrative sanction. The respondent
had already known that the matter was under investigation by the DAR as he was
informed thru a copy of the indorsement that his letter-request had been referred to
the proper channels. His rights under RA 6713 has been satisfied. Since the
investigation was still ongoing, the petitioner should not be penalized
(NOTE: di sya part ng RA6713 pero eto lng ung rayionale bkit dismissed ung case)
However the other arguments of the petitioner as the decision appealed from is
already final and executory. A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation
of law. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or
Issue: Whether the petitioners are guilty of violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act
No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
officials and Employees.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioners are guilty of violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act No.
6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
officials and Employees.
Solicitation or acceptance of gifts.- Public officials and employees shall not solicit or
accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or
anything of monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties or
in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may
be affected by the functions of their office.
The first video tape of the monitoring sortie of October 12, 1999, in V8 format
contained relevant segments of the footage depicting petitioners receiving sums of
money from arriving passengers of the Canadian Airlines flight. The second video
tape, as recorded in VHS format, depicted petitioners receiving sums of money from
arriving passengers, putting the money collected in their pockets while dividing
some of the money received by them. Airport Police Department employee
Luzviminda A. Gabriel, who recorded the video, confirmed that petitioners, while
140.
Mabini vs. Raga, et.al., AM
(Solicitation of gifts, requirements)
P-06-2150,
21
June
2006
The Special Prosecution Panel also filed a Request for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to the authorized representative of
Equitable-PCI Bank to produce statements of account pertaining to certain accounts
in the name of Jose Velarde and to testify thereon.
Issue: Whether the Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9
are excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405.
Ruling: No. The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there
being recognized exceptions thereto, as above-quoted Section 2 provides. In the
present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation. Ejercito contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of
duty, his accounts are not excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405.
Also, the plunder case now pending with the Sandiganbayan necessarily
involves an inquiry into the whereabouts of the amount purportedly acquired
illegally by former President Joseph Estrada. Republic Act No. 1405 allows the
disclosure of bank deposits in cases where the money deposited is the subject
matter of the litigation. Hence, these accounts are no longer protected by the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law, there being two exceptions to the said law applicable
in this case, namely: (1)the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and
(2)the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Exception
(1) applies since the plunder case pending against former President Estrada is
analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while exception (2) applies because the
money deposited in Ejercitos bank accounts is said to form part of the subject
matter of the same plunder case.
149.
Banco Filipino vs. Purisima, 161 SCRA 576 (1988) (Bank inquiry
extended to other persons)
Facts: This case stems when the TANODBAYAN conducted a preliminary
investigation through the accusation of BIR against Customs Special Agent Manuel
Caturla. When the said TANODBAYAN issued a subpoena duces tecum on the bank
records of the herein accused and her immediate family members. Subsequently on
this case, Banco Filipino took over from Caturla in the effort to nullify the said
Subpeona and contend that whether its compliance with the subpoenae duces
tecum would constitute an infringement of the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of R.A.
No. 1405 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. Judge Purisima who is the
assigned judge in this case issued an order denying the case of Banco Filipino.
Hence, Banco Filipino questions the Order of Judge Purisima by filing a petition for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether the subpoena/inquiry to the bank statements may be extended to
other persons?
Ruling: Yes, The inquiry into illegally acquired property or property NOT
"legitimately acquired" extends to cases where such property is concealed by
being held by or recorded in the name of other persons. This proposition is made
clear by R.A. No. 3019 which quite categorically states that the term, "legitimately
acquired property of a public officer or employee shall not include .. property
unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being
recorded in the name of, or held by, respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants,
relatives or any other persons."
150.
Republic vs. Eugenio, GR 174629, 14 February 2008 (Bank
Inquiry Order, Provisional remedies, AMLA)
FACTS: After the Agan v. PIATCO ruling, a series of investigations concerning the
award of the NAIA 3contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by theOmbudsman and
the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC). The OSG wrote AMLC requesting AMLCs assistance in obtaining more
evidence to completely reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA
3 Project, and also noting that the Republic was presently defending itself in two
international arbitration cases. The CIS conducted an intelligence data base search
on the financial transactions of certain individuals involved in the award, including
Alvarez (Chairman of the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Technical Committee).
By this time, Alvarez had already been charged by the Ombudsman with violation of
Section 3(J) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The search revealed that
Alvarez maintained 8 bank accounts with 6 different banks.
Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to
inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson
and Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati. The application was docketed as AMLC
No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy Director of the
AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the
AMLC. Thereafter, the Makati RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order)
granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts
of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that
there existed p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank
accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to
the offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of
criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations.
Pursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and
examine the deposits, investments and related web accounts of the four.
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, wrote a letter
requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several
other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable
cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful
activities that were committed in relation to the criminal cases then pending before
the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the
investigation of the accounts is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal
cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the Special Prosecutor,
the AMLC promulgated Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005, which authorized the
executive director of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the accounts named in
the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other
accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution characterized
the memorandum attached to the Special Prosecutors letter as extensively
justifying the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and
entities mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of
Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.
ISSUE: Whether the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.
RULING: YES. Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be
specifically legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions
whereby these bank accounts may be examined by any person, government official,
bureau or official; namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in
cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4)
the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of
R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by
this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute
confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section
11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in
cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable
cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities as defined
in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof.
Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments
are related to kidnapping for ransom, [certain violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235,
destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court
order before it could inquire into such accounts. It cannot be successfully argued the
proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a
litigation encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is
when money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. The
orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional
relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail
a full-blown trial. Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional
exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that the later law has
dispensed with the general principle established in the older law that all deposits of
whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are
hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature. Indeed, by force of
154.
Digitel Telecom Phils vs. Mariquit Soriano, GR 166039, 26 June
2006 (Proper conduct of victim)
FACTS: Mariquit Soriano (Soriano) was hired as Director of Marketing by Digitel
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel). Soriano worked under Vice President
for Business Division Eric J. Severino (Severino) and Senior Executive Vice President
Johnson Robert L. Go (Go). Following a professional dispute against Severino and
Go, Soriano filed a resignation letter which was accepted by her superiors.
After her resignation, Soriano filed a suit for illegal termination alleging that she was
forced to resign due to professional and sexual harassment. Mariquit alleged that
Go crept his hand under a throw pillow and poked her vagina several times. . She
justified her failure to flee by claiming that she was hemmed in by the arm of the
sofa. ; that Mariquit danced on the same occasion with Go, albeit allegedly thru
force, during which he pressed her close to him and moved his hand across her
back to feel her body; that while dancing, in order to free herself from Gos hold, she
maneuvered to turn to the beat of the music. It was at this time, according to her,
that Go reached out his hand and groped [her] breast, caressed [her] back and
reached inside [her] blouse to rub [her] from up [her] brassieres down to [her]
buttocks.; and as to severino, she often caught him looking at her legs up to the
back of her thighs on several occasions.
She alleged that her superiors are preventing her former colleagues in testifying to
the sexual harassment. She produced an affidavit by one of the persons involved
with Digitel stating that the employees of the company were being forced not to
testify against Go and Severino. In defense, Go and Severino provided witnesses
that testified that the acts alleged by Soriano din not happen.
The Labor Arbiter held that Mariquit voluntarily resigned, thus dismissing the
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The Court
of Appeals reversed the decision of NLRC. Hence,this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged sexual harassment are true and Mariquits conduct was
proper.
RULING: NO. While, as this Court stated in Philippine Aelous,
speaking, no fixed period within which an alleged victim of sexual
file a complaint, it does not mean that she or he is at liberty to file
or he wants to. Surely, any delay in filing a complaint must
reasonable as not to cast doubt on its merits.
At all events, it is settled that the only test of whether an alleged fact or
circumstance is worthy of credence is the common experience, knowledge and
observation of ordinary men.
2011
FACTS:
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accused-appellants for the
crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons. The facts revealed that
Ronnie Aringoy asked Lolita Plando if she wants to work as restaurant entertainer in
Malaysia. Since Lolita is interested, she inquired how she could apply. Ronnie
brought Lolita to Nestor Relampagos and Hadja Lalli. The latter accompanied Lolita
and other women in Malaysia by boat from Zamboanga to Sandakan, Malaysia and
then boarded a van going to Kota Kinabalu. They were forced to work as prostitutes
in Pipen Club in Labuan, Malaysia. Lolita worked as a prostitute from June 14 to July
8, 2005. Every night, a customer used her. She had at least one customer or more a
night, and at most, she had around five customers a night. They all had sexual
intercourse with her. Lolita was saved by her brother-in-law who acted as a
customer. Lolita was advised to file a complaint with the police regarding her ordeal
in Malaysia.
The RTC found the accused guilty of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons,
which the CA affirmed. Aringoy claims that he cannot be convicted of the crime of
Trafficking in Persons because he was not part of the group that transported Lolita
from the Philippines to Malaysia on board the ship M/V Mary Joy. In addition, he
presented his niece, Rachel, as witness to testify that Lolita had been travelling to
Malaysia to work in bars. On the other hand, Lalli denies any involvement in the
recruitment and trafficking of Lolita, claiming she only met Lolita for the first time
on board M/V Mary Joy going to Malaysia.
ISSUE:
Whether Lalli, Relampagos and Aringoy are guilty of syndicated illegal recruitment
and trafficking in persons.
Facts: Jover Matias was charged of raping a minor, it was alleged that AAA (victim)
was was on her way to the vegetable stall (gulayan) of a certain Manuela to buy
something when, all of a sudden, appellant pulled her towards a house that was
under construction. There, he forced her to lie on a bamboo bed (papag),
removed her shorts and underwear, and inserted first, his finger, and then his penis
into her vagina. Appellant threatened to kill her if she should report the incident to
anyone. Upon reporting the incident to the police he was arrested. In his defense,
he claimed in the evening of the incident, he and his uncle, Romeo Matias, were
doing construction work at the house of his aunt, also located at Sto. Nino St.,
Barangay San Antonio, Quezon City.
Issue: Whether the accused should be convicted of rape under RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes, Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; xxx
In the case of People v. Pangilinan,8 which affirmed the doctrines enunciated in the
cases of People v. Dahilig9 and People v. Abay,10 the Court explained:
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of
sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for
sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal
Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12
years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the
Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for
the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person
cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise,
rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section
48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal
Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special
law.
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted appellant for "rape" under
Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, upon a
finding that AAA was a minor below 12 years old at the time of the commission of
the offense on June 6, 2004. However, a punctilious scrutiny of the records shows
that AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old at the time
of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can be
prosecuted and convicted either under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual
abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for rape under paragraph 1(d).11 It
bears pointing out that the penalties under these two laws differ: the penalty for
sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal medium to
reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized with
reclusion perpetua
The RTC convicted hi, of the crime charged. The Ca rendered a decision affirming
the decision of the RTC and finding Ireno guilty of acts of lasciviousness under
Section 5(b) of RA 7610 instead of rape, since the prosecution failed to establish the
act of insertion of finger in to the vagina of AAA.
Issue: WON the decision of the CA is correct
Held:
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, defines
penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a child as follows:
and
2.
The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
sexual abuse.
3.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, all the elements of sexual abuse under
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 are present here.
168.
Salvador Flordeliz v. People, GR 186441, 3 March 2010 (Sec 5b
RA 7610-elements)
Facts:
The case at bar is on the conviction of the accused for 9 counts of rape
and 1 count of acts of lasciviousness.
In April 1995, while the petitioners children, AAA and BBB, were sleeping,
petitioner woke up AAA, then 14 years old, touched her vagina and played with it.
Petitioner told AAA not to tell it to anyone otherwise she would be harmed.
Eventually, petitioner was convicted for homicide and imprisoned in
Muntinlupa City. Afterwards, he was released on parole and would be visited by her
children. After his release, he committed again the same acts on several occasions
from 2002 to 2003 to her then second child BBB, then was 11 years old. She was
also told not to tell it to anyone or else she would be harmed as well but inserted his
fingers inside BBBs vagina.
It defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in its
III,
Section
5,
to
wit:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual
abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall
be
imposed
upon
the
following:
x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with
a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual
abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also
where one -- through coercion, intimidation or influence -- engages in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child.
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be
convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct committed against a minor
below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5
of R.A. No. 7610.
the
(1)
(2)
The crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has
following
elements:
That
the
That
a.
it
offender
is
By
commits
done
under
using
any
act
any
force
of
of
lasciviousness
the
following
or
or
lewdness;
circumstances:
intimidation;
or
When
(3)
That
the
the
offended
offended
party
party
is
is
under
another
12
years
person
of
of
age;
either
and
sex.[46]
In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A.
No.
7610
must
be
proven:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other
sexual
abuse;
and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Based on the foregoing definition, petitioner's act of touching AAA's vagina
and playing with it obviously amounted to lascivious conduct. Considering that the
act was committed on a child less than twelve years old and through intimidation, it
is beyond cavil that petitioner is guilty under the aforesaid laws.
Furthermore, failure to designate the offense by statute or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law
violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite
the facts constituting the crime charged. The character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.
169.
Clement John Ferdinand M. Navarrete v. People, GR 147913, 31
January 2007 (Section 5b, RA 7610 in rel. Art. 336, RPC)
FACTS:
Clement John Ferdinand M. Navarrete was charged with the crime of statutory rape
of BBB. The RTC absolved petitioner of statutory rape as there was no clear and
positive proof of the entry of petitioners penis into the labia of the victims vagina.
However, it convicted petitioner for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 (Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner asserts that he cannot be
convicted of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, a
crime not specifically alleged in the information which charged him with statutory
rape. Otherwise, his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him would be violated. He likewise contends that his guilt for
the said offense was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner insists that
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 refers only to those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution and argues
that this does not apply in this case since the victim is not a child exploited in
prostitution.
ISSUE:
Whether the conviction of petitioner for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 is
proper.
HELD:
YES. The law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit but also
Facts: Alex Candaza was accused of raping his relative Kristine Dorado. That the
incident happen in their house located at Valenzuela City. It was alleged that the
victim was raped and molest not only once but several times by the accused. Upon
discovering of the incident by her father they later go to the police station to report
the incident and thereafter, they filed separate two information of rape and acts of
lasciviousness against the accused. The accused plead not guilty and trial ensued.
Subsequently, the accused herein was found by the court to be guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of Sec 5(b) of RA 7610?
Ruling: Yes, prosecution proved that appellant committed acts of lasciviousness
upon the victim under Article III, Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Kristine, who was 13 years
old when the criminal acts complained of occurred, was sexually abused by
appellant since she was coerced and intimidated by the latter to indulge in
lascivious conduct.[38]
As correctly found by the trial court, the penalty for simple rape through force and
intimidation is reclusion perpetua. Civil indemnity and moral damages in the
Facts: Kristine Joy Mosquera was eight years old on 27 June 1997 , [8] having
celebrated her eighth year the day before. A grade III student, she was walking to
school (which was just a short distance from her house) at around seven oclock in
the morning when she was met by petitioner who emerged from hiding from a
nearby store. Petitioner and Kristine Joy were neighbors. Petitioner approached
Kristine Joy, touched her head, placed his hand on her shoulder where it then
moved down to touch her breast several times. Petitioner thereafter told Kristine
Joy not to report to anybody what he did to her. Petitioner was charged with
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.
Petitioner argues that lewd design cannot be inferred from his conduct firstly
because the alleged act occurred at around seven oclock in the morning, in a street
very near the school where people abound, thus, he could not have been prompted
by lewd design as his hand merely slipped and accidentally touched Kristine Joy's
breast. Furthermore, he could not have been motivated by lewd design as the
breast of an eight year old is still very much undeveloped, which means to say there
was nothing to entice him in the first place. Finally, assuming that he indeed
intentionally touch Kristine Joy's breast, it was merely to satisfy a silly whim.
Petitioner contends that even assuming that the acts imputed to him amount to
lascivious conduct, the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC and not child abuse under Section 5(b) of Rep. Act No. 7610 as the
elements thereof have not been proved.
Issue: WON petitioner liable under RA 7610
Held: Terrifying an eight-year old school girl, taking advantage of her tender age
with his sheer size, invading her privacy and intimidating her into silence, in our
book, can never be in satisfaction of a mere silly whim.
The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin, Section
5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for
profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious conduct through
coercion or intimidation. As case law has it, intimidation need not necessarily be
irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or
subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. This is especially true in
the case of young, innocent and immature girls who could not be expected to act
with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel. Young girls cannot be
expected to act like adults under the same circumstances or to have the courage
and intelligence to disregard the threat.
As to the third element, there is no dispute that Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was
only eight years old at the time of the incident in question.
175.
People vs. Sumingwa, G.R. No. 183619, 13 October 2009
(section 5b)
Facts: Salvino Sumingwa was charged with two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness,
four (4) counts of Rape, three (3) counts of Unjust Vexation, one (1) count of Other
Light Threats, one (1) count of Maltreatment, and one (1) count of Attempted Rape
for acts committed against his minor11 daughter AAA from 1999-2001.
GR
168546,
23
July
2008
Facts: Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal drugs.
Initially in his arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-entered his plea of guilty to
avail the benefits of first time offenders. Subsequently, he applied for probation but
was denied. In his petition for certiorari, the court said that probation and
suspension of sentence are different and provisions in PD 603 or RA 9344 cannot be
invoked to avail probation. It is specifically stated that in drug trafficking,
application for probation should be denied. As aside issue, the court discussed the
availment of suspension of sentence under RA 9344.
ISSUE: Whether suspension of sentence under RA9344 can still be invoked given the
fact that the accused is now 21 years old.
Ruling: No. The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could
no longer be retroactively applied for petitioners benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No.
9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense
charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act
No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or
extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21years of
age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying
RA 9344. Thus, the application of sec. 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far
as his case concerned.
177.
People vs. MelchorCabalquinto, GR 167693, 19 September
2006 (Confidentiality of records-RA 7610 and RA 9262)
Issue: Whether the Court should refrain from posting in its Internet Web Page the
full text of decisions in cases involving child sexual abuse?
Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent enactments which
unequivocally express the intention to maintain the confidentiality of
information in cases involving violence against women and their children,
in this case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real name of the
victim-survivor and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent
her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other
information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well those of
their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed.
DD. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (RA No. 9344)
Exemption from criminal liability; exemption to the exemption
Diversion and intervention programs
Treatment of child in conflict with the law
EE. Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (RA No. 9775)
178.
Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr.et.al. v. Secretary of DOJ, GR 203335,
et.al, 18 February 2014 (Anti-child porn-online; no double jeopardy)
Facts: Petitioner sought to declare several provisions of RA 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. Petitioner contended that it
intrudes in to the area of protected speech and expressions, creating a chilling
effect and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.that it transgress the
freedom of the press, that the grant to law enforecement agencies of the power to
collect or record data in real time as tendin to curtail civil liberties or provide
opportunities for official abuse.
Issue: WON RA 10175 is unconstitutional
Held: the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the
strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system
of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct. It simply punishes
what essentially is a form of vandalism, 8 the act of willfully destroying without right
the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed
freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and
private documents.
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal
code, already punishes it.
The State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for there is a
need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good. 82 To do
this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able to monitor
traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to
"prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection,
investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by
providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation." 105 This
policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered
as sufficient standard.106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid.
FF. Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009 (RA No. 9995)
Elements of violation (taking photo and video)
GG. Prescriptive period of SPL
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES UNDER ACT 3326 (Special laws) 1
2 MONTHS if the crime is violation of Municipal ordinance;
1 YEAR with penalty of Fine or imprisonment of 1-30 days;
4 YEARS imprisonment of 1 month to two (2) years;
8 YEARS imprisonment of two (2) years to six (6) years;
12 YEARS imprisonment of six (6) years or more
20 YEARS if the crime committed is treason.
179.
Republic vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et.al. GR 139930, 26 June
2012 (Prescription)
FACTS: Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta
and Leo J. Palma incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM )[1] with an
authorized capital stock of P100 million divided into one million shares with a par
value of P100 per share. UNICOM had several amendments in its capitalization.
The Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) composed
of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat,
Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M.
Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iaki R. Mendezona, and Danilo
S. Ursua approved Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the Administrator of the
Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest not more than P500 million
from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut farmers.
Thereafter several amendments which increases the capital stock without par value
until on September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors, composed of
respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat,
Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose Concepcion, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Iaki R. Mendezona,
Teodoro D. Regala, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga, approved
another amendment to UNICOMs capitalization.
About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
3019[6] against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors,
before the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged
that UCPBs investment in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government since UNICOM had a capitalization of only P5 million and it had no
track record of operation. In the process of conversion to voting common shares,
the governments P495 million investment was reduced by P95 million which was
credited to UNICOMs incorporators. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint
to the Office of the Ombudsman which disqualified the PCGG from conducting the
preliminary investigation in the case.
About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) issued a Memorandum, [8] stating that although it found sufficient
basis to indict respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action has
already prescribed. Respondents amended UNICOMs capitalization a third time on
On the other hand, the Committee argues that the right of the State to
recover behest loans as ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible under Section 15, Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, assuming that prescription applies, the
period should be counted from the time of discovery of behest loans or sometime in
1992 when the Committee was constituted.
Issues: Whether or not State can still recover behest loans for being imprescriptible
as provided in the Constitution that claims for ill-gotten wealth are imprescriptible.
Ruling:
The State can still recover behest loan although they only found the
said transaction in 1992.
The provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution that "the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired
by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppels," applies only
to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases.
Section 1126 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195, provides that the offenses committed under Republic Act No. 3019 shall
prescribe in fifteen (15) years; However, for crimes committed PRIOR to the
effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16,
1982, (or under the old Republic Act No. 3019), the prescriptive period was only
ten (10) years. The period of prescription for the subject crime committed in 1976
and prior to the amendment of Republic Act No. 3019, is ten (10) years.
The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes
committed under Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by Act No.
3326, Section 2 of which provides that:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the
crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not
prevent the running of the prescriptive period.
An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine,
incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of
limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will
support a cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the
statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means
of knowing the existence of a cause of action." xxx Thus, we held in a catena of
cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of
its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Hence, the prescriptive period for the subject crimes commenced from the
date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation.
When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence,
prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this is that "it was well-high
impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes
committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance
and conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans."
181.
People vs. Arturo Pacificador, GR 139405, 13 March 2001
(applying prescriptive period)
FACTS:
Arturo and co-accused, Jose T. Marcelo, were charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019.
The
information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the Sandiganbayan
on October 27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on matters of
prescription of the offense was the ruling enunciated in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals (May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 538) to the effect that the filing of the complaint
with the fiscals office also interrupts the period of prescription of the offense.
The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to
January 6, 1976. The running of the period of prescription of the offense may have
started on January 6, 1976 but was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with
the appropriate investigating body. Sandiganbayan reconsidered its Resolution of
November 10, 1998 and dismissed the Information in Criminal Case No. 139405
against the respondent on the ground of prescription. For Instead of applying Act
No. 3326, as amended, xxx, SB utilized Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. In this
case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it follows
that in computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision
contained in the Revised Penal Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326.
Petitioner argues on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws is
not applicable to the instant criminal case for the reason that Republic Act No. 3019
provides for its own prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof provides that offenses
committed and punishable under the said law shall prescribe in fifteen (15)
years. However, inasmuch as Republic Act No. 3019 does not state exactly when
the fifteen-year prescriptive period begins to run, Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code should be applied suppletorilyArticle 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which
adopts the discovery rule for the prescription of offenses
ISSUE:
WON the prosecution of the crime charged is time-barred by
prescription as shown by facts and circumstances on record and of judicial notice?
RULING: Yes. It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the
computation of prescription of offenses defined and penalized by special laws. In
the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326
was correctly applied by the anti-graft court in determining the reckoning period for
prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended.
Sec. 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive
period shall commence to run on the day it was committed. The petitioner denies
having any knowledge of the crime at the time it was allegedly committed by the
respondent. This Court takes notice of the fact that the subject Deed of Sale dated
December 29, 1975 relative to the sale of the parcels of land by the National Steel
Corporation to the Philippine Smelters Corporation, was registered shortly thereafter
in the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte. While petitioner may
not have knowledge of the alleged crime at the time of its commission, the
registration of the subject Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds constitutes
constructive notice thereof to the whole world inlcuding the petitioner.