PEOPLE vs. CONCEPCION, 44 Phil.

126
FACTS:
Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank and a member of t
he Board thereof, authorized an extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepci
on, S. en C. to themanager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine National Bank.
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C."was a co-partnership where Concepcion is a partner.
Subsequently, Concepcion was charged and found guilty in the Court of First Ins
tance of Cagayan with violation of section 35 of Act No.2747. Section 35 of Act
No. 2747 provides that the National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, gran
t loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agent
s of the branch banks. Counsel for the defense argue that the documents of recor
d do not prove that authority to make a loan was given, but only show the conces
sion of a credit. They averred that the granting of a credit to the co-partnersh
ip "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by VenancioConcepcion, President of the Philipp
ine National Bank, is not a "loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2
747.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the co-partnership "Puno
yConcepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine Natio
nal Bank, a"loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The "credit" of an individual means
his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence or trust reposed by a le
nder that he will paywhat he may promise. A "loan" means the delivery by one par
ty and the receipt by the other party of a given sum of money, upon an agreemen
t, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned,with or without interest. The con
cession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans"up to the limi
t of the amount fixed in the "credit,"
REPUBLIC v. BAGTAS, 116 SCRA 262FACTS:
On May 8, 1948, Jose Bagtas borrowed from the Bureau of Animal Industry three bu
llsfor one year for breeding purposes upon payment of a breeding fee of 10% of t
he book value of the bulls. After one year, the contract was renewed but only fo
r one bull. Bagtas offered to buythe bulls at book value less depreciation, but
the Bureau told him that he should either return the bulls or pay for their book
value. Bagtas failed to pay the book value, so the Republic filed anaction with
the CFI Manila to order the return of the bulls or the payment of the book valu
e.Felicidad Bagtas, the surviving spouse and administratrix of the decedent s esta
te, said that thetwo bulls have already been returned in 1952, and that the rema
ining one died of gunshot duringa Huk raid. It was established that the two bull
s were returned, thus, there is no more obligationon the part of Bagtas. With re
gards the bull not returned, Felicidad maintained that the obligationis extingui
shed since the contract is that of a commodatum and that the loss through fortui
tousevent should be borne by the owner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract entered into between Bagtas and the Republic is that
of commodatum making Bagtas not liable for the death of the bull.
HELD:
A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If the breeding fee be consi
deredcompensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under article
1671 of the CivilCode the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a
possessor in bad faith because shehad continued possession of the bull after the
expiry of the contract. Even if the contract be commodatum, still Bagtas is lia

ble because article 1942 of the Civil Code provides that a bailee in a contract
of commodatum is liable for loss of the things even if it should be through afor
tuitous event if he keeps it longer than the period stipulated or if the thing l
oaned has beendelivered with appraisal of its value, unless there is a stipulati
on exempting the bailee fromresponsibility in case of a fortuitous event. The lo
an of one bull was renewed for another periodof one year but Bagtas kept and use
d the bull more than one year where during a Huk raid it waskilled by stray bull
ets. Furthermore, when lent and delivered to the deceased husband of Bagtas,the
bulls had each an appraised book value. It was not stipulated that in case of lo
ss of the bulldue to fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be
exempt from liability.
Mina v. Pascual, 25 Phil 540
Francisco is the owner of land and he allowed his brother, Andres, to erect a wa
rehouse in that lot. Both Francisco and Andres died and their children became th
eir respective heirs: Mina for Francisco and Pascual for Andres. Pascual sold hi
s share of the warehouse and lot. Mina opposed because the lot is hers because h
er predecessor (Francisco) never parted with its ownership when he let Andres co
nstruct a warehouse, hence, it was a contract of commodatum. What is the nature
of the contract between Francisco and Andres?
The Supreme Court held that it was not a commodatum. It is an essential feature
of commodatum that the use of the thing belonging to another shall be for a cert
ain period. The parties never fixed a definite period during which Andres could
use the lot and afterwards return it.
NOTA BENE: It would seem that the Supreme Court failed to consider the possibili
ty of a contract of precardium between Francisco and Andres. Precardium is a kin
d of commodatum wherein the bailor may demand the object at will if the contract
does not stipulate a period or use to which the thing is devoted.
QUINTOS vs. BECK, 69 Phil 108
FACTS:
Beck is a tenant of defendant Margarita Quintos. As such, Beck occupied Quintos ho
use. Quintos granted Beck the use of the furniture found on the leased house, am
ong these were three gas heaters and 4 electric lamps, subject to the condition
that the defendant wouldreturn them to the plaintiff upon the latter's demand. Q
uintos sold the pieces of furniture to MariaLopez and Rosario Lopez and thereaft
er notified Beck of the conveyance. Beck informedQuintos that the latter can get
the furniture at the ground floor of the house, however, at a later date, Beck
told Quintos that he will return only the other furniture but not the gas heater
s and theelectric lamps as he is to return them only after the expiration of the
lease contract. When thelease contract expires, Beck deposited the furniture to
the sheriff s warehouse. Quintos refused toget the furniture in view of the fact
that the defendant had declined to make delivery of all of them. Consequently, Q
uintos brought an action to compel Beck to return her certain furniturewhich she
lent him for his use. The trial court ruled in favour of Beck holding that Quin
tos failedto comply with her obligation to get the furniture when they were offe
red to her. On appeal of the case, the Court of First Instance of Manila affirme
d the lower court s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that Quintos failed to comply wit
h her obligation to get the furniture when they were offered to her.
HELD:
The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum. Under it the

plaintiff gratuitously granted the use of the furniture to the defendant, reser
ving for herself theownership thereof. By this contract the defendant bound hims
elf to return the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the latter s demand. The obliga
tion voluntarily assumed by the defendant to returnthe furniture upon the plaint
iff's demand, means that he should return all of them to the plaintiff at the la
tter's residence or house. The defendant did not comply with this obligation whe
n he merely placed them at the disposal of the plaintiff, retaining for his bene
fit the three gas heatersand the four electric lamps. The trial court, therefore
, erred when it came to the legal conclusionthat the plaintiff failed to comply
with her obligation to get the furniture when they were offeredto her.

Catholic Vicar vs. CA

Wednesday, April 30, 2014
Date: September 31, 1988
Facts:
- 1962: Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (Vicar), petitioner,
filed with the court an application for the registration of title over lots 1, 2
, 3 and 4 situated in Poblacion Central, Benguet, said lots being used as sites
of the Catholic Church, building, convents, high school building, school gymnasi
um, dormitories, social hall and stonewalls.
- 1963: Heirs of Juan Valdez and Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano claimed that they ha
ve ownership over lots 1, 2 and 3. (2 separate civil cases)
- 1965: The land registration court confirmed the registrable title of Vicar to
lots 1 , 2, 3 and 4. Upon appeal by the private respondents (heirs), the decisio
n of the lower court was reversed. Title for lots 2 and 3 were cancelled.
- VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his application for registration of
Lots 2 and 3.
- During trial, the Heirs of Octaviano presented one (1) witness, who testified
on the alleged ownership of the land in question (Lot 3) by their predecessor-in
-interest, Egmidio Octaviano; his written demand to Vicar for the return of the
land to them; and the reasonable rentals for the use of the land at P10,000 per
month. On the other hand, Vicar presented the Register of Deeds for the Province
of Benguet, Atty. Sison, who testified that the land in question is not covered
by any title in the name of Egmidio Octaviano or any of the heirs. Vicar dispen
sed with the testimony of Mons. Brasseur when the heirs admitted that the witnes
s if called to the witness stand, would testify that Vicar has been in possessio
n of Lot 3, for 75 years continuously and peacefully and has constructed permane
nt structures thereon.
Issue: WON Vicar had been in possession of lots 2 and 3 merely as bailee borrowe
r in commodatum, a gratuitous loan for use.
Held: YES.
Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrow
ed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. They nev
er asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they b
ecame bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee.
The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor di
d not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in tr
ust the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner c
ame only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of
petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordi
nary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.

The Court of Appeals found that petitioner Vicar did not meet the requirement of
30 years possession for acquisitive prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did
it satisfy the requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive pres
cription because of the absence of just title. The appellate court did not belie
ve the findings of the trial court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by p
urchase and Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio Octaviano by petiti
oner Vicar because there was absolutely no documentary evidence to support the s
ame and the alleged purchases were never mentioned in the application for regist
ration.