Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135385

December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN,
BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO
WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS,
NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO,
BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNGANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO
SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD,
DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY
MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU
SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON,
BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S.
REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAWCRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS,
GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S.
ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO
CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTESVIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY

ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,

MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI,
PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T.
SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY
MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB,
MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO
A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S.
LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S.
SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM
MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO
DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P.
BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P.
GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG,
SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE
S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID,
represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M.
LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA,
JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID,
ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY
BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO,
OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and
GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS,intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON
FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required
respondents to comment.1 In compliance, respondents
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created
under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13,
1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through
the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor
General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on
the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of
Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano
Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous
peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene.
They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and
praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the

principle of parens patriae and that the State has the

responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are
at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this
reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan
Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the
Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a
motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They
agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent
with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and
mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and
organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the
parties and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which
they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings
and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions
of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied
in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of
ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that
ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral

domains are private but community property of the indigenous

peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines
the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous
peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration
of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed
to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into
agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral
lands" which might even include private lands found within said
areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA
defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making

customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving

ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and
which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by
the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain
and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National Development
Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area
terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law,
traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land
disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction
over all claims and disputes involving rights of the
indigenous peoples."5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1
of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which
provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the
Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the
Presidents power of control over executive departments under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58,
59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A.
8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease
and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of
R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to cease and desist from implementing
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and
desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation
of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to
comply with his duty of carrying out the States
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the

exploration, development, utilization and conservation of

Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court
voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an
opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo,
Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the
challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law
with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read
in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition
solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable
controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which
he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also
filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7,
and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate
opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary

majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate
opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and
Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14213

described in the plan and technical description attached to the

complaint and made a part thereof.
The only opposition which was presented was on the part of the
Director of Lands. The oppositor [objector] alleged that the land in
question was the property of the Government of the United States
under the control and administration of the Government of the
Philippine Islands.
During the trial of the cause two witnesses only were presented
by the petitioner. No proof whatever was offered by the oppositor.
After hearing and considering the evidence, the Honorable
Francisco Soriano, judge, reached the following conclusions of
fact:
1. That the land sought to be registered consists of one parcel of
land as marked and indicated on the plan and technical
description presented;

August 23, 1919

J. H. ANKRON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, objectorappellant.
Assistant Attorney-General Lacson for appellant.
P. J. Moore for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Its
purpose was to have registered, under the Torrens system, a
certain piece or parcel of land situated, bounded and particularly

2. That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at the
north, the exact description and extension of which does not
appear, has been cultivated and planted for more than forty-four
years prior to the date of this decision;
3. That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted
by Moros, Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership, and
that they lived thereon and had their houses thereon, and that
portion of the land which was not planted or cultivated was used
as pasture land whereon they pastured their carabaos, cattle, and
horses;
4. That all of said Moros and Mansacas sold, transferred and
conveyed all their right, title and interest in said land to the
applicant, J. H. Ankron, some eleven years past, at which time all

of the said former owners moved o n to adjoining lands where

they now reside;
5. That the possession under claim of ownership of the applicant
and his predecessors in interest was shown to have been open,
notorious, actual, public and continuous for more than forty-four
years past, and that their claim was exclusive of any other right
adverse to all other claims;
6. That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills
of hemp, some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a dwelling
house, various laborers' quarters, store-building,
large camarin (storehouse of wood, a galvanized iron and other
buildings and improvements on said land.
Upon the foregoing facts the lower court ordered and decreed
that said parcel of land be registered in the name of the said
applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject, however, to the right of the
Government of the Philippine Islands to open a road thereon in
the manner and conditions mentioned in said decision. The
conditions mentioned with reference to the opening of the road,
as found in said decision, are that the applicant give his consent,
which he has already done, to the opening of said road which
should be fifteen (15) meters wide and should follow
approximately the line of the road as it now exists subject to the
subsequent survey to be made by the engineer of the province of
Davao.

built of cement. Theoppositor neither presented the question of

the failure of proper identification of the land in the lower court nor
presented any proof whatever to show that said cement
monuments did not exist.
The appellant, in his second assignment of error, contends that
the appellant failed to prove his possession and occupation in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of
Act No. 926. The important prerequisites for registration of land
imposed by said section 54, paragraph 6, are (a) that the land
shall beagricultural public land as defined by the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902; (b) that the petitioner, by himself or his
predecessors in interest, shall have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten years
next preceding the taking effect of said Act.
In the present case the applicant proved, and there was no effort
to dispute said proof, that the land in question was agricultural
land and that he and his predecessors in interest had occupied
the same as owners in good faith for a period of more than forty
years prior to the commencement of the present action. No
question is raised nor discussed by the appellant with reference
to the right of the Moros to acquire the absolute ownership and
dominion of the land which they have occupied openly,
notoriously, peacefully and adversely for a long period of years.
(Cario vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. Rep., 132 [212 U. S.,
449].)

From that decree the Director of Lands appealed to this court.

The appellant argues, first, that the applicant did not sufficiently
identify the land in question. In reply to that argument, the record
shows that a detained and technical description of the land was
made a part of the record. The evidence shows that the
boundaries of the land in question were marked by monuments

Accepting the undisputed proof, we are of the opinion that said

paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 has been fully complied
with and that the petitioner, so far as the second assignment of
error is concerned, is entitled to have his land registered under
the Torrens system.

Under the third assignment of error the appellant contends that

portions of said land cannot be registered in accordance with the
existing Land Registration Law for the reason that they are
manglares. That question is not discussed in the present brief.
The appellant, however., refers the court to his discussion of that
question in the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (39 Phil.
Rep., 560). By reference to the argument in the brief in the case,
it is found that the appellant relied upon the provisions of section
3 of Act No. 1148 in relation with section 1820 of Act No. 2711
(second Administrative Code). Section 3 of Act No. 1148 provides
that "the public forests shall include all unreserved
lands covered with trees of whatever age." Said section 1820 (Act
No. 2711) provides that "for the purpose of this chapter 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all
unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps,
and all forest reserves of whatever character."
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175),
which decision has been follows in numerous other decision, the
phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902, was held to mean "those public lands acquired
from Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands" (forestry
lands).
Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the
registration, under the conditions therein mentioned, of "public
agricultural lands." It must follow, therefore, that the moment that
it appears that the land is not agricultural, the petition for
registration must be denied. If the evidence shows that it is public
forestry land or public mineral land, the petition for registration
must be denied. Many definitions have been given for
"agricultural," "forestry," and "mineral" lands. These definitions are
valuable so far as they establish general rules. In this relation we
think the executive department of the Government, through the
Bureau of Forestry, may, and should, in view especially of the

provisions of section 4, 8, and 20 of Act No. 1148, define what

shall be considered forestry lands, to the end that the people of
the Philippine Islands shall be guaranteed in "the future a
continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products."
(Sec. 8, Act No. 1148.) If the Bureau of Forestry should accurately
and definitely define what lands are forestry, occupants in the
future would be greatly assisted in their proof and the courts
would be greatly aided in determining the question whether the
particular land is forestry or other class of lands.
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the
Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular
land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of
fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has
mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is
forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some
proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and
of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions
have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands,
and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to
say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must
show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which
it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No.
1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees
upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be
classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the
exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural
land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of
timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as
agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each
case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case,
having regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a
matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the
Philippine Islands are agricultural lands, that the courts have a

right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that

in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is
a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is
not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the
other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first
instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened
before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the
land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof.
Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue
of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what
portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as
forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil.
Rep., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra.)
In view of the foregoing we are of the opinion, and so order and
decree, that the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby affirmed, with the condition that before the final certificate
is issued, an accurate survey be made of the lands to be
occupied by the road above mentioned and that a plan of the
same be attached to the original plan upon which the petition
herein is based. It is so ordered, with costs.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Moir,
JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF

FORESTRY, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]
ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v.
ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF MELQUIADES BORRE,
EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI
and THE CAPIZ COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; FOREST LAND;
CLASSIFICATION NOT LOST EVEN IF IT HAS BEEN
STRIPPED OF FOREST COVER; UNLESS RELEASED IN AN
OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION AS DISPOSABLE LANDS, RULES
ON CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE DO NOT APPLY.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers
may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified
as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tress
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
2. ID.; ID.; FOREST LANDS; ACQUISITIVE OWNERSHIP NOT
ACQUIRED. This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of
Forestry v. Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest

lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the
petition on the ground that the ares covered by the patent and
title was not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest
zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab initio. It bears
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to
declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
3. ID.; ID.; CONFIRMATION, OF IMPERFECT TITLE CASES;
BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
LAW HAVE BEEN MET, RESTS ON THE APPLICANT. In
confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the
burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old
Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership
for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.

Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be

registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square
meters.cralawnad
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades
Borre, filed the application for registration. In due time, the heirs
of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an
opposition to the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At
the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No.
885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be
confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose
Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz,
also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title
claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still
classified as forest land and part of the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar
as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters
was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed
and registered in his name.
During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre
sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to
Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that
he is entitled to have said lot registered in his name.

DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the
decision of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed
property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private
persons.
These two petitions have their genesis in an application for
confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated

117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the
land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the
proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to
Melquiades Borre.
Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry
filed their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals, The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private
litigants that have been shown to have a better right over Lot 885
are, as to the northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956
square meters, it was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of
527,747 square meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but
the last question that must have to be considered is whether after
all, the title that these two (2) private litigants have shown did not
amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and
evidence of the Director of Forestry; . . .
". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the
application was filed which would place it at 1925, the fact must
have to be accepted that during that period, the land was a
classified forest land so much so that timber licenses had to be
issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even
Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to
cut timber within the area; and this can only mean that the Bureau
of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a
forest land as indeed the testimonial evidence referred to above
persuasively indicates, and the only time when the property was
converted into a fishpond was sometime after 1950; or a bare five
(5) years before the filing of the application; but only after there
had been a previous warning by the District Forester that that
could not be done because it was classified as a public forest; so
that having these in mind and remembering that even under
Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years
after this case had already been filed in the lower Court, in order
for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must
have shown.
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30)
years, preceding the filing of the application;

the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one
of the applicants or oppositors had shown that during the required
period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in
order for him to have shown a registerable title for the entire
period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he had
been in
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim
all throughout that period of thirty (30) years and even before and
applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition
of that; the result must be to deny all these applications; this
Court stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just the
same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants
among themselves as to who of them had demonstrated a better
right to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will
go all the way to the Supreme Court and it is always better that
the findings be as complete as possible to enable the Highest
Court to pass final judgment;
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is
hereby reversed; the application as well as all the oppositions
with the exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is
hereby sustained are dismissed; no more pronouncement as to
costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui contending that the disputed lot had been in the
possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore
in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be
the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name of
a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the
Land Registration Act. On the other hand, another petition for
review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion
Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose

Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the

deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of
the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the
basis of the Court of Appeals decision that the disputed lot is part
of the public domain. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the
parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to
declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest
land.chanrobles law library : red

not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy

areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and
Encarnacion Delfin in their petition depends on the issue raised
by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No.
885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names
of the private applicants.

This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v.

Muoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of forest lands, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v.
Animas (56 SCRA 499), we granted the petition on the ground
that the area covered by the patent and title was not disposable
public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and
title to said area is void ab initio. It bears emphasizing that a
positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot
be classified as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is
a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove
swamp" is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section
1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups are found on
the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885,
even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property had been in actual possession
of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was
already "private land" better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers
may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified
as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do

The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly wellgrounded in the instant petition.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest
such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land
of the public domain. The appellate court found that in 1912, the
land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio
Berebers witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926,
it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime
Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was
strengthened by the appellate courts finding that timber licenses
had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui
himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within
the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was
converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the
District Forester that the same could not be done because it was

classified as "public forest." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders
the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section
48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is
applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name
because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old
Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership
for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.
The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the
presumptions implicit in Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended.
The records show that Lot No. 88S never ceased to be classified
as forest land of the public domain.
In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an
occupant and of his predecessors in-interests since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does
not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No. 885 had always
been public land classified as forest.
Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The possession of public land however long the period

thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public
land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can
prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant
from the State. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177,
195)."cralaw virtua1aw library
We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No.
885 is part of the public domain, classified as public forest land.
There is no need for us to pass upon the other issues raised by
petitioners Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues
are rendered moot by this finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No.
L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112526

October 12, 2001

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN B. AMANTE, FRANCISCO L.
ANDAL, LUCIA ANDAL, ANDREA P. AYENDE, LETICIA P.
BALAT, FILOMENA B. BATINO, ANICETO A. BURGOS, JAIME
A. BURGOS, FLORENCIA CANUBAS, LORETO A. CANUBAS,
MAXIMO A. CANUBAS, REYNALDO CARINGAL, QUIRINO C.

CASALME, BENIGNO A. CRUZAT, ELINO A. CRUZAT,

GREGORIO F. CRUZAT, RUFINO C. CRUZAT, SERGIO
CRUZAT, SEVERINO F. CRUZAT, VICTORIA DE SAGUN,
SEVERINO DE SAGUN, FELICISIMO A. GONZALES,
FRANCISCO A. GONZALES, GREGORIO GONZALES,
LEODEGARIO N. GONZALES, PASCUAL P. GONZALES,
ROLANDO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO A. JUANGCO,
GERVACIO A. JUANGCO, LOURDES U. LUNA, ANSELMO M.
MANDANAS, CRISANTO MANDANAS, EMILIO M.
MANDANAS, GREGORIO A. MANDANAS, MARIO G.
MANDANAS, TEODORO MANDANAS, CONSTANCIO B.
MARQUEZ, EUGENIO B. MARQUEZ, ARMANDO P.
MATIENZO, DANIEL D. MATIENZO, MAXIMINO MATIENZO,
PACENCIA P. MATIENZO, DOROTEA L. PANGANIBAN,
JUANITO T. PEREZ, MARIANITO T. PEREZ, SEVERO M.
PEREZ, INOCENCIA S. PASQUIZA, BIENVENIDO F. PETATE,
IGNACIO F. PETATE, JUANITO PETATE, PABLO A. PLATON,
PRECILLO V. PLATON, AQUILINO B. SUBOL, CASIANO T.
VILLA, DOMINGO VILLA, JUAN T. VILLA, MARIO C. VILLA,
NATIVIDAD A. VILLA, JACINTA S. ALVARADO, RODOLFO
ANGELES, DOMINGO A. CANUBAS, EDGARDO L. CASALME,
QUIRINO DE LEON, LEONILO M. ENRIQUEZ, CLAUDIA P.
GONZALES, FELISA R. LANGUE, QUINTILLANO LANGUE,
REYNALDO LANGUE, ROMEO S. LANGUE, BONIFACIO
VILLA, ROGELIO AYENDE, ANTONIO B. FERNANDEZ,
ZACARIAS HERRERA, ZACARIAS HERRERA, REYNARIO U.
LAZO, AGAPITO MATIENZO, DIONISIO F. PETATE, LITO G.
REYES, JOSE M. SUBOL, CELESTINO G. TOPI NO, ROSA C.
AMANTE, SOTERA CASALME, REMIGIO M. SILVERIO, THE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR

REGION IV, and REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER

FOR REGION IV, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of
the decision of the Court of Appeals1 affirming the decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board2 (hereafter
DARAB) ordering the compulsory acquisition of petitioner's
property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter,
SRRDC) was the registered owner of two parcels of land, situated
at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by TCT Nos.
81949 and 84891, with a total area of 254.6 hectares. According
to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide
clean potable water to the Canlubang community, and that ninety
(90) light industries are now located in the area. 3
Petitioner alleged that respondents usurped its rights over the
property, thereby destroying the ecosystem. Sometime in
December 1985, respondents filed a civil case4 with the Regional
Trial Court, Laguna, seeking an easement of a right of way to and
from Barangay Casile. By way of counterclaim, however,
petitioner sought the ejectment of private respondents.
In October 1986 to August 1987, petitioner filed with the Municipal
Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna separate complaints for forcible
entry against respondents.5
After the filing of the ejectment cases, respondents petitioned the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the compulsory
acquisition of the SRRDC property under the CARP.

On August 11, 1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer

(MARO) of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of coverage to
petitioner and invited its officials or representatives to a
conference on August 18, 1989.6 During the meeting, the
following were present: representatives of petitioner, the Land
Bank of the Philippines, PARCCOM, PARO of Laguna, MARO of
Laguna, the BARC Chairman of Barangay Casile and some
potential farmer beneficiaries, who are residents of Barangay
Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was the consensus and
recommendation of the assembly that the landholding of SRRDC
be placed under compulsory acquisition.
On August 17, 1989, petitioner filed with the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO), Cabuyao, Laguna a "Protest and
Objection" to the compulsory acquisition of the property on the
ground that the area was not appropriate for agricultural
purposes. The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and
above and that the occupants of the land were squatters, who
were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries.7
On August 29, 1989, the farmer beneficiaries together with the
BARC chairman answered the protest and objection stating that
the slope of the land is not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land
is suitable and economically viable for agricultural purposes, as
evidenced by the Certification of the Department of Agriculture,
municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna.8
On September 8, 1989, MARO Belen dela Torre made a
summary investigation report and forwarded the Compulsory
Acquisition Folder Indorsement (CAFI) to the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (hereafter, PARO).9
On September 21, 1989, PARO Durante Ubeda forwarded his
endorsement of the compulsory acquisition to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform.

On November 23, 1989, Acting Director Eduardo C. Visperas of

the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Development, DAR forwarded
two (2) Compulsory Acquisition Claim Folders covering the
landholding of SRRDC, covered by TCT Nos. T-81949 and T84891 to the President, Land Bank of the Philippines for further
review and evaluation.10
On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam
Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition11 to
petitioner, stating that petitioner's landholdings covered by TCT
Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and
58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93,
respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.
On February 6, 1990, petitioner SRRDC in two
letters12 separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad and
the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its
formal protest, protesting not only the amount of compensation
offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2) notices of
acquisition.
On March 17, 1990, Secretary Abad referred the case to the
DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just
compensation under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16.
On March 23, 1990, the LBP returned the two (2) claim folders
previously referred for review and evaluation to the Director of
BLAD mentioning its inability to value the SRRDC landholding
due to some deficiencies.
On March 28, 1990, Executive Director Emmanuel S. Galvez
wrote Land Bank President Deogracias Vistan to forward the two
(2) claim folders involving the property of SRRDC to the DARAB

for it to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just

compensation for the land.
On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the
Philippines stating that its property under the aforesaid land titles
were exempt from CARP coverage because they had been
classified as watershed area and were the subject of a pending
petition for land conversion.
On May 10, 1990, Director Narciso Villapando of BLAD turned
over the two (2) claim folders (CACF's) to the Executive Director
of the DAR Adjudication Board for proper administrative valuation.
Acting on the CACF's, on September 10, 1990, the Board
promulgated a resolution asking the office of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to first resolve two (2) issues before it
proceeds with the summary land valuation proceedings.13
The issues that need to be threshed out were as follows: (1)
whether the subject parcels of land fall within the coverage of the
Compulsory Acquisition Program of the CARP; and (2) whether
the petition for land conversion of the parcels of land may be
granted.
On December 7, 1990, the Office of the Secretary, DAR, through
the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant Secretary for Luzon
Operations) and the Regional Director of Region IV, submitted a
report answering the two issues raised. According to them, firstly,
by virtue of the issuance of the notice of coverage on August 11,
1989, and notice of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the
property is covered under compulsory acquisition. Secondly,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also
supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said property.
During the consideration of the case by the Board, there was no
pending petition for land conversion specifically concerning the
parcels of land in question.

On February 19, 1991, the Board sent a notice of hearing to all

the parties interested, setting the hearing for the administrative
valuation of the subject parcels of land on March 6, 1991.
However, on February 22, 1991, Atty. Ma. Elena P. HernandezCueva, counsel for SRRDC, wrote the Board requesting for its
assistance in the reconstruction of the records of the case
because the records could not be found as her co-counsel, Atty.
Ricardo Blancaflor, who originally handled the case for SRRDC
and had possession of all the records of the case was on
indefinite leave and could not be contacted. The Board granted
counsel's request and moved the hearing to April 4, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board for
the latter to resolve SRRDC's petition for exemption from CARP
coverage before any administrative valuation of their landholding
could be had by the Board.
On April 4, 1991, the initial DARAB hearing of the case was held
and subsequently, different dates of hearing were set without
objection from counsel of SRRDC. During the April 15, 1991
hearing, the subdivision plan of subject property at Casile,
Cabuyao, Laguna was submitted and marked as Exhibit "5" for
SRRDC. At the hearing on April 23, 1991, the Land Bank asked
for a period of one month to value the land in dispute.
At the hearing on April 23, 1991, certification from Deputy Zoning
Administrator Generoso B. Opina was presented. The certification
issued on September 8, 1989, stated that the parcels of land
subject of the case were classified as "industrial Park" per
Sanguniang Bayan Resolution No. 45-89 dated March 29, 1989. 14
To avert any opportunity that the DARAB might distribute the
lands to the farmer beneficiaries, on April 30, 1991, petitioner filed
a petition15 with DARAB to disqualify private respondents as

beneficiaries. However, DARAB refused to address the issue of

beneficiaries.

in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development

Corporation;

In the meantime, on January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court,

Laguna, Branch 24, rendered a decision,16finding that private
respondents illegally entered the SRRDC property, and ordered
them evicted.

"3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna to

cancel with dispatch Transfer certificate of Title Nos.
84891 and 81949 and new one be issued in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, free from liens and
encumbrances;

On July 11, 1991, DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong issued a

memorandum directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to open
a trust account in favor of SRRDC, for P5,637,965.55, as
valuation for the SRRDC property.
On December 19, 1991, DARAB promulgated a decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the
Board hereby orders:
"1. The dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against
the compulsory coverage of the landholdings of Sta. Rosa
Realty Development Corporation (Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 81949 and 84891 with an area of 254.766
hectares) in Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao,
Province of Laguna under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program is hereby affirmed;
"2. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta.
Rosa Realty Development Corporation the amount of
Seven Million Eight Hundred Forty-One Thousand, Nine
Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Sixty-Four centavos
(P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the two
(2) Transfer Certificates of Title mentioned above. Should
there be a rejection of the payment tendered, to open, if
none has yet been made, a trust account for said amount

"4 The Department of Environment and Natural

Resources either through its Provincial Office in Laguna
or the Regional Office, Region IV, to conduct a final
segregation survey on the lands covered by Transfer
certificate of Title Nos. 84891 and 81949 so the same can
be transferred by the Register of Deeds to the name of
the Republic of the Philippines;
"5. The Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian
Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian
Reform Office to take immediate possession on the said
landholding after Title shall have been transferred to the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the
same to the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents
to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna." 17
On January 20, 1992, the Regional Trial Court, Laguna, Branch
24, rendered a decision in Civil Case No. B-233318 ruling that
respondents were builders in bad faith.
On February 6, 1992, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review of the DARAB decision.19 On November 5,
1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the
decision of DARAB. The decretal portion of the Court of Appeals
decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB

decision dated September 19, 1991 is AFFIRMED,
without prejudice to petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation ventilating its case with the
Special Agrarian Court on the issue of just
compensation."20Hence, this petition.21
On December 15, 1993, the Court issued a Resolution which
reads:
"G. R. Nos. 112526 (Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.) Considering
the compliance, dated December 13, 1993, filed by
counsel for petitioner, with the resolution of December 8,
1993 which required petitioner to post a cash bond or
surety bond in the amount of P1,500,000.00 Pesos before
issuing a temporary restraining order prayed for,
manifesting that it has posted a CASH BOND in the same
amount with the Cashier of the Court as evidenced by the
attached official receipt no. 315519, the Court resolved to
ISSUE the Temporary Retraining Order prayed for.
"The Court therefore, resolved to restrain: (a) the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board from
enforcing its decision dated December 19, 1991 in
DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001, which was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated November 5,
1993, and which ordered, among others, the Regional
Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its
Municipal and Provincial Reform Office to take immediate
possession of the landholding in dispute after title shall
have been transferred to the name of the Republic of the
Philippines and to distribute the same through the
immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the
farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal

Agrarian Officer of Cabuyao, Laguna, (b) The Department

of Agrarian Reform and/or the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, and all persons acting for and
in their behalf and under their authority from entering the
properties involved in this case and from introducing
permanent infrastructures thereon; and (c) the private
respondents from further clearing the said properties of
their green cover by the cutting or burning of trees and
other vegetation, effective today until further orders from
this Court."22
The main issue raised is whether the property in question is
covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed
part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657.
Under Republic Act No. 6657, there are two modes of acquisition
of private land: compulsory and voluntary. In the case at bar, the
Department of Agrarian Reform sought the compulsory
acquisition of subject property under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16,
to wit:
"Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.
For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following
procedures shall be followed:
a.) After having identified the land, the landowners
and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its
notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof,
by personal delivery or registered mail, and post
the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal
building and barangay hall of the place where the
property is located. Said notice shall contain the
offer of the DAR to pay corresponding value in
accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections
17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.

b.) Within thirty (30) days from the date of the

receipt of written notice by personal delivery or
registered mail, the landowner, his administrator
or representative shall inform the DAR of his
acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c.) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR,
the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase
price of the land within thirty (30) days after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor
of the government and other muniments of title.
d.) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR
shall conduct summary administrative
proceedings to determine the compensation for
the land requiring the landowner, the LBP and
other interested parties to submit fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the notice. After the expiration of
the above period, the matter is deemed submitted
for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within
thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
e.) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or
no response from the landowner, upon the deposit
with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this act, the DAR shall make
immediate possession of the land and shall
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue
Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the
land to the qualified beneficiaries.

f.) Any party who disagrees with the decision may

bring the matter to the court23 of proper jurisdiction
for final determination of just compensation.
In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the
landowners and farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After
identification, the DAR shall send a notice of acquisition to the
landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of
the place where the property is located.
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice of acquisition, the
landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the
DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate
of title. Within thirty (30) days from the execution of the deed of
transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner
the purchase price. If the landowner accepts, he executes and
delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and
surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the
execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the
landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the
DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine
just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP
representative and other interested parties may submit evidence
on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty
days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform
the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation.
Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in
case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall
deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an

accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of

the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then
be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may
question the decision of the DAR in the special agrarian courts
(provisionally the Supreme Court designated branches of the
regional trial court as special agrarian courts) for final
determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of
land acquisition to hasten the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Sec.
16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the
identification of the land, the landowners and the farmer
beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification
process shall be made. To fill this gap, on July 26, 1989, the DAR
issued Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989, which set the
operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The
procedure is as follows:
A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), with
the assistance of the pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC), shall:
1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered
under the CARP in his area of responsibility; the
masterlist should include such information as required
under the attached CARP masterlist form which shall
include the name of the landowner, landholding area,
TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.
2. Prepare the Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder
(CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered
under Phase I and II of the CARP except those for which
the landowners have already filed applications to avail of

other modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall

contain the following duly accomplished forms:
a) CARP CA Form 1MARO investigation report
b) CARP CA Form No 2 Summary investigation
report findings and evaluation
c) CARP CA Form 3Applicant's Information
sheet
d) CARP CA Form 4 Beneficiaries undertaking
e) CARP CA Form 5 Transmittal report to the
PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information
contained in the above-mentioned forms have been
examined and verified by him and that the same are true
and correct.
3. Send notice of coverage and a letter of invitation to a
conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the
Compulsory Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the
said conference meeting shall also be sent to the
prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC
representatives, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
representative, and the other interested parties to discuss
the inputs to the valuation of the property.
He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report
and solicit the views, objection, agreements or
suggestions of the participants thereon. The landowner
shall also ask to indicate his retention area. The minutes

of the meeting shall be signed by all participants in the

conference and shall form an integral part of the CACF.
4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO).

1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from

the PARO, review, evaluate and determine the final land
valuation of the property covered by the case folder. A
summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared
and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel
directly participating in the review and final valuation.

B. The PARO shall:

1. Ensure the individual case folders are forwarded to him
by his MAROs.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the
valuation of the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, series
of 1988. The valuation worksheet and the related CACF
valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the
PARO and all the personnel who participated in the
accomplishment of these forms.
3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the
MARO through ocular inspection and verification of the
property. This ocular inspection and verification shall be
mandatory when the computed value exceeds P500,000
per estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case
folder, together with the duly accomplished valuation
forms and his recommendations, to the Central Office.
The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall
be furnished a copy each of his report.
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of
Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall:

2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly

authorized representative, a notice of acquisition (CARP
Form 8) for the subject property. Serve the notice to the
landowner personally or through registered mail within
three days from its approval. The notice shall include
among others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition,
and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value,
the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for
approval the order of acquisition. However, in case of
rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) shall conduct a summary administrative hearing
to determine just compensation, in accordance with the
procedures provided under Administrative Order No. 13,
series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARAB's
decision on just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare
and submit to the Secretary for approval the required
order of acquisition.
4. Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of
acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the designated
bank, in case of rejection or non-response, the Secretary
shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of Deeds to
issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the
property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall

take possession of the land for redistribution to qualified

beneficiaries."
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated
master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of
responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO
prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each
title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a
"Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of invitation" to a "conference/
meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He also sends
invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the
representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other
interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the
property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements
of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate
his retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall complete the valuation
of the land. Ocular inspection and verification of the property by
the PARO shall be mandatory when the computed value of the
estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the
valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together with his
recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR
Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution (BLAD) shall prepare, on the signature of the
Secretary or his duly authorized representative, a notice of
acquisition of the subject property. From this point, the provisions
of R. A. No. 6657, Section 16 shall apply.
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two notices are
required: (1) the notice of coverage and letter of invitation to a
preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representative

of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested

parties pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the
notice of acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of
the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of coverage
and the letter of invitation to a conference, and its actual conduct
cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with
the requirements of administrative due process. The
implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police
power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the
CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an
exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess
of the maximum area allowed, there is also a taking under the
power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender
of the title to and physical possession of the excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer
beneficiary.
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in
question. However, payment of just compensation was not in
accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required
payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done
by DAR.
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that "The CARP Law, for
its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government on receipt of the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.

Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright

change of ownership is contemplated either."24

at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land is now

classified as agricultural land.

Consequently, petitioner questioned before the Court of Appeals

DARAB's decision ordering the compulsory acquisition of
petitioner's property.25 Here, petitioner pressed the question of
whether the property was a watershed, not covered by CARP.

The authority of the municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue

zoning classification is an exercise of its police power, not the
power of eminent domain. "A zoning ordinance is defined as a
local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges,
prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision
into specific land uses as present and future projection of
needs."27

Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067)

provides:
"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to
any surface water or overlying any ground water may be
declared by the Department of Natural resources as a
protected area. Rules and Regulations may be
promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control
such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within
the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or
interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection,
management or administration of such waters."
Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its
tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates
it from adjacent watersheds." Watersheds generally are outside
the commerce of man, so why was the Casile property titled in
the name of SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time of the
titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had
not declared the property as watershed area. The parcels of land
in Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning
Ordinance adopted by the municipality of Cabuyao in 1979, as
certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. On
January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna
issued a Resolution26 voiding the zoning classification of the land

In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform28 we held

that lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of
the CARL may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution to
farmer beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as
PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that
the parcels of land in question form a vital part of a watershed
area.29
Now, petitioner has offered to prove that the land in dispute is a
"watershed or part of the protected area for watershed purposes."
Ecological balances and environmental disasters in our day and
age seem to be interconnected. Property developers and tillers of
the land must be aware of this deadly combination. In the case at
bar, DAR included the disputed parcels of land for compulsory
acquisition simply because the land was allegedly devoted to
agriculture and was titled to SRRDC, hence, private and alienable
land that may be subject to CARP.
However, the scenario has changed, after an in-depth study,
survey and reassessment. We cannot ignore the fact that the
disputed parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to
be protected for watershed purposes. In a report of the

Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a

research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental
assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds, they
concluded that:
"The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is
situated in the heartland of both watersheds. Considering
the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks,
the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with
proper soil and water conservation practices jeopardize
and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the
land would have double edge detrimental effects. On the
Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the
Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding
reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would
mean destruction of forest covers which acts as
recharged areas of the Matang Tubig springs.
Considering that the people have little if no direct interest
in the protection of the Matang Tubig structures they
couldn't care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be
considered a most vital life support system to thousands
of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From
these watersheds come the natural God-given precious
resource water. x x x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent
with sound watershed management. More so, the
introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building
and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the
pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers are
immediately stopped, it would not be long before these
watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of
watershed degredation threatens the livelihood of

thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we

hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed
development policy and program be immediately
formulated and implemented before the irreversible
damage finally happens.
Hence, the following are recommended:
7.2 The Casile farmers should be relocated and
given financial assistance.
7.3 Declaration of the two watersheds as critical
and in need of immediate rehabilitation.
7.4 A comprehensive and detailed watershed
management plan and program be formulated
and implemented by the Canlubang Estate in
coordination with pertinent government
agencies."30
The ERDB report was prepared by a composite team headed by
Dr. Emilio Rosario, the ERDB Director, who holds a doctorate
degree in water resources from U.P. Los Banos in 1987; Dr.
Medel Limsuan, who obtained his doctorate degree in watershed
management from Colorado University (US) in 1989; and Dr.
Antonio M. Dano, who obtained his doctorate degree in Soil and
Water management Conservation from U.P. Los Banos in 1993.
Also, DENR Secretary Angel Alcala submitted a Memorandum for
the President dated September 7, 1993 (Subject: PFVR HWI
Ref.: 933103 Presidential Instructions on the Protection of
Watersheds of the Canlubang Estates at Barrio Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna) which reads:

"It is the opinion of this office that the area in question

must be maintained for watershed purposes for ecological
and environmental considerations, among others.
Although the 88 families who are the proposed CARP
beneficiaries will be affected, it is important that a larger
view of the situation be taken as one should also consider
the adverse effect on thousands of residents downstream
if the watershed will not be protected and maintained for
watershed purposes.
"The foregoing considered, it is recommended that if
possible, an alternate area be allocated for the affected
farmers, and that the Canlubang Estates be mandated to
protect and maintain the area in question as a permanent
watershed reserved."31
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a
watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water
which is one of the most important human necessity. The
protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for
future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only
damage property but cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an "intergenerational responsibility" that needs to
be answered now.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during
the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile
property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land
from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No. 6657, Section 10, provides:
"Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. Lands
actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves,
reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds,
watersheds and mangroves, national defense, school

sites and campuses including experimental farm stations

operated by public or private schools for educational
purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot
production centers, church sites and convents
appurtenent thereto, communal burial grounds and
cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually
worked by the inmates, government and private research
and quarantine centers, and all lands with eighteen
percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed shall be exempt from coverage of this Act."
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing
that the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the
compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP because of its very
high slopes.
To resolve the issue as to the true nature of the parcels of land
involved in the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to
conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for
re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels of
land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the
Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to
supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the
temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which
shall remain in effect until final decision on the case.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

This Petition[1] seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of

Appeals,[2] dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which
declared null and void the Decision [3] dated January 30, 1991 of
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No.
269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179, confirming the imperfect title of
petitioners over a parcel of land.

[G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002]

The Facts
EDNA

COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C.

TORRES, JOSE AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE,
VICENTE C. TORRES, JOSEPH L. NUEZ, GLORIA
SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS, FERNANDO T.
TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T.
TUTANA,
JOSE
C.
TORRES,
JR.,
IMELDA
CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS,
MYRNA M. LANCION, NORBERTO CAMILOTE,
CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS
BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T.
GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO
ECO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of
Lands, respondents,

BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA

MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ
and CALOMA MOISES,respondents/intervernors.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the

land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of
land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or
120.0766 hectares (Lot for brevity). The Lot is situated in
Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo,
Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the
application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of
the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, [t]his
survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. On March 24,
1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to
include additional co-applicants.[4] Subsequently, more applicants
joined (collectively referred to as petitioners for brevity). [5]
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal
Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to
petitioners application. In due course, the land registration court
issued an order of general default against the whole world with
the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since
time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public,
notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in
the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-ininterest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners declared the Lot
for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real estate
taxes. According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in

pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the hearings,

petitioners submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine
transfers of rights among them and their predecessors-in-interest,
as follows:
1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known
predecessor-in-interest of the Applicants who was in
actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of
the property in the concept of owner. He had
the property surveyed in his name on 22 March
1902 (Exhibit W and W-1 testimonies of J. Torres on
16 December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29
December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva,
who inherited the property. He had the property
resurveyed in his name on May 21-28, 1928 (Exhibit
X and X-1; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of
Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from
Diosdado Leyva before the Japanese Occupation of
the Philippines during World War II. He owned
and possessed the property until 1958.He declared
the property for tax purposes, the latest of which
was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3
February 1957 (Exhibit I and testimony of Mariano
Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from
Gregorio Camantique by virtue of a Deed of
Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit H). During the
ownership
of
the
property
by
Angelina
Reynoso,Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando
Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the
farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra). Angelina
Reynoso declared the property in her name
under Tax Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February
1958, under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3 August
1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15

December 1975, and under Tax Declaration No.

03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina
Reynoso on 16 October 1982 through a Deed of
Sale (Exhibit G).
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna
Torres in a Deed of Sale dated 28 April
1984 (Exhibit P-1 to P-3).
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO
TORRES,
JOSE
AMO,
VICENTE
TORRES and SERGIO
MONTEALEGRE who
bought portions of the property from Edna Collado
through
a Deed
of
Sale on 6
November
1985 (Exhibit Q to Q-3).
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ,
DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO FABREGAS,
FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA,
CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO
TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS,
MYRNA LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA
MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS
BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO
TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD
bought portions of the property in a Deed of
Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit S to S-3).
9. Co-owners
DIOSDADO ARENOS,
RODRIGO
TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and AMELIA
MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new OWNERS
GLORIA R. SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD,
NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO
through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January 1987
(Exhibit T to T-9).[6]
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant
provincial prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For
failure of the oppositors to present their evidence, the land

registration court issued an order considering the case submitted

for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners. The court
later set aside the order and reset the hearing to January 14,
1991 for the presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On
this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite
due notice. Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the
case for decision based on the evidence of the petitioners.

The Trial Courts Ruling

After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the
land registration court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient
evidence to establish their registrable rights over the
Lot.Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming the
imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions of
the courts decision, as follows:
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the
testimony of the witnesses presented by the Applicants, the
property applied for is in actual, open, public and notorious
possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest
since time immemorial and said possession had been testified to
by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre,
Jose Amo and one Chona who were all cross-examined by
Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared
for taxation purposes in the names of the previous owners and
the corresponding taxes were paid by the Applicants and the
previous owners and said property was planted to fruit bearing
trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient
evidence to establish registrable title over said property applied
for by them.

On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina
Watershed, the Court can only add that all Presidential
Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed are subject to private rights.
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120
SCRA 734, 1983 private rights is proof of acquisition through (sic)
among means of acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by
private rights means that applicant should show clear and
convincing evidence that the property in question was acquired
by applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from
the Spanish government or by Possessory Information title,
or any other means for the acquisition of public
lands xxx (underscoring supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above
stated, Applicants have acquired private rights to which the
Presidential Proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed
should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the
applicants that as per Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development dated March 18, 1980, the area applied for was
verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of the
Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26,
1904 per Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974
which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation,
amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known
as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit K).[7]
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor
General on April 6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the decision
dated January 30, 1991 confirming their title had become final
after the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on
February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration

court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary

decree in their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court
had already rendered a decision and if so, whether the Provincial
Prosecutor would recommend an appeal. However, the Provincial
Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23,
1991 a copy of the land registration courts decision dated
January 30, 1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as alleged by
petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court
issued an order directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue
the corresponding decree of registration in favor of the
petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to
Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there had been no
clear showing that the Lot had been previously classified as
alienable and disposable making it subject to private
appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees
Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates of
stewardship issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR for brevity) under its Integrated Social
Forestry Program (ISF for brevity), filed with the Court of Appeals
a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-InIntervention. They likewise opposed the registration and asserted
that the Lot, which is situated inside the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that they are the actual
occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of stewardship
issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene
verbally during the preliminary conference held on April 6,
1992. During the preliminary conference, all the parties as

represented by their respective counsels agreed that the only

issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of the
public domain.[8]

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals
granted the petition and declared null and void the decision dated
January 30, 1991 of the land registration court. The Court of
Appeals explained thus:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art.
XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art.
XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain belong to the State. An
applicant, like the private respondents herein, for registration of a
parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land
and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any
evidence whatsoever that the land applied for as described in
Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the public
domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and
disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-162620
signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey
Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application
of private respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is
inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed
Reservation is confirmed by the Administrator of the National

Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March 2, 1988,

submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-A. These
documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in
private respondent Collados application that said parcel of land
known as Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any
public land application and are not within any government
reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis supplied). The
respondent court could not have missed the import of these vital
documents which are binding upon the courts inasmuch as it is
the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to classify
public lands. They should have forewarned the respondent judge
from assuming jurisdiction over the case.
x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners
are part of the public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has
jurisdiction in the disposition of the same (subject to the approval
of the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and not
the courts. x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have the said
properties surveyed even before the same was declared to be
part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was
so converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason
that this action must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and
possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same
into private property. And courts are without jurisdiction to
adjudicate lands within the forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs.
Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Emphasissupplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs.
Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time
(Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339).[9]
Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:

I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE
PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE
REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
INTERVENORS PETITION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS
FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the
Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33 for
brevity) dated July 26, 1904[10] established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation (MWR for brevity) situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede that the

Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical, literal

description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners
claim over the Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like the
proclamation setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation
are subject to private rights. They point out that EO 33 contains a
saving clause that the reservations are subject to existing private
rights, if any there be. Petitioners contend that their claim of
ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known
predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and
ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law
then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land
Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed by
individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore
alienable and disposable. They conclude that private rights were
vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33, thus
excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.[11] The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine
to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias[12] which laid the foundation
that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. [13] Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands,
territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.[14]
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage
Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as
well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the
Maura Law partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law
of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law
promulgated in the Philippines. It required the adjustment or

registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would

revert to the state.[15]
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the
United States all rights, interests and claims over the national
territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial
government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No.
926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance
of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed
the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules
and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of
portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect
their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In
short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the governments title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent
treaties between Spain and the United States. The term public
land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands.[16]
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No.
926 in 1919. After the passage of the 1935 Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141 for brevity) amended Act

2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this day as the

existing general law governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands.[17]
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration
by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and
imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known
as the Land Registration Act, which took effect on February 1,
1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in the Philippines under
the Torrens system.[18] The Torrens system requires the
government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person
named in the title is the owner of the property described therein,
subject to liens and encumbrances annotated on the title or
reserved by law. The certificate of title is indefeasible and
imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted
upon issuance of the certificate. [19] PD 1529, known as the
Property Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978,
[20]
amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the
Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the
King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain.
[21]
Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz vs.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[22] explained
thus:
One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935
Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was
an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the
principle of state ownership of natural resources and the
adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure
recognition of the states power to control their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of
State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by

the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was

continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts,
the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution
affirming the Regalian doctrine.
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII [23] of the 1935 Constitution, on
Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources barred the
alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands,
which were the only natural resources the State could alienate.
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section
8, Article XIV[24] on the National Economy and the Patrimony of
the Nation. The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian
doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII[25] on National Economy and
Patrimony.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the
alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the
public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this
policy.Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural
resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the
State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil
coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features
which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare,
and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being
thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and
recreational purposes.[26]
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,[27] the Court had occasion to discourse on
watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether the
parcel of land which the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is exempt from
the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL for brevity). [28] The Court defined watershed
as an area drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a

boundary or divide which separates it from

watersheds. However, the Court also recognized that:

adjacent

The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a

watershed. The most important product of a watershed is water
which is one of the most important human necessit(ies). The
protection of watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for
future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only
damage property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067)
provides:

waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge

detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct
siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to the water
impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would
mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas
of the Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have little
if no direct interest in the protection of the Matangtubig structures
they couldnt care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a
most vital life support system to thousands of inhabitants directly
and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the
natural God-given precious resource water. x x x

Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any

surface water or overlying any ground water may be declared by
the Department of Natural Resources as a protected area. Rules
and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to
prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants
thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the
deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with
the investigation, use, control, protection, management or
administration of such waters.

Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound
watershed management. More so, the introduction of earth
disturbing activities like road building and erection of permanent
infrastructures.Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the
Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long
before these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact
of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of
people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an
acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and
program be immediately formulated and implemented before the
irreversible damage finally happens.

The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to

protect watershed areas and took note of the report of the
Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a
research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental
assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:

The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture

and Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and determine
the nature of the parcels of land involved in order to resolve the
issue of its coverage by the CARL.

The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in

the heartland of both watersheds. Considering the barangays
proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the activities of the
farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water
conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital

Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed

by the misuse of natural resources such as watershed
reservations which are akin to forest zones. Population growth
and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the
environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human
activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future

generations.Hence, by constitutional fiat, natural resources

remain to this day inalienable properties of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners
acquire, as they vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of
land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a
watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears
the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of Section
48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the presumption
that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and
that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in
his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect title may
have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or
royal
grant,
a concession
especial or
special
grant,
a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de
compra or title through purchase.[29] Or, that he has had
continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his
application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26,
1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an
applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The same,
however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at
the time petitioners application for registration was filed on April
25, 1985.[30] As amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the

application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by

wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that
the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the
following:
(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set
by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation
of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued.[31]
Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the
Lot. Their right to register the Lot is predicated mainly upon
continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and
enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete the
required period of possession, whether under the original Section
48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the
amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904,
petitioners had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by
deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the State, as for
instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva
had only been in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners
have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the
number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect
title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable
land prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the

Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable

and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their
application on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a
watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of
petitioners application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904
could no longer be counted because as a watershed reservation,
the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy, disposition,
conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended,
applies exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural
land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are
excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or
other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private
ownership. In Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of
Appeals,[32] the Court declared that inalienable public lands x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription,
both acquisitive and extinctive, does not run against the State.
The possession of public land, however long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because
the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.
Third, Gordula
vs.
Court
of
Appeals[33] is
in
point. In Gordula, petitioners did not contest the nature of the
land. They admitted that the land lies in the heart of the CalirayaLumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573
classified as inalienable. The petitioners in Gordula contended,
however, that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private
rights of landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have
established their private rights to the subject land. The Court
ruled:

We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private

persons without any grant, express or implied from the
government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title
from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did not
acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under
Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only
in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of
Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as
part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer
open to private ownership as it has been classified as public
forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, private rights, in
Proclamation No. 573, should not be interpreted as requiring a
title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant had occupied and
cultivated the property for so many number of years, declared the
land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate
taxes [which are] accepted by the government, and [his]
occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested
and recognized by the government. Prescinding from this
premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year possession by
petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of
the 30-year possession required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.)
No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula
the private rights recognized and respected in Proclamation No.
573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of
Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection of
private rights to exclude his land from a military or forest
reservation must show x x x by clear and convincing evidence
that the property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means
for the acquisition of public lands.
In fine, one claiming private rights must prove that he has
complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the
procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law

requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive

and notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for free
patent. The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the
presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and
that the occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein
only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and
notorious possession.
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had
attached to the Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the
Philippines had subsequently segregated the Lot from the public
domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable when he
issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974. Petitioners
contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an area
of 3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the
Boso-boso Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu162620 is a small part of this excluded town site area.Petitioners
further contend that town sites are considered alienable and
disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE
ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED
IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL,
ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE LAND
EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME,
TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do
hereby, exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33
dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14
and 16, both series of 1915, which established the Watershed
Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein
and reserve the same, together with the adjacent parcel of land of
the public domain, for townsite purposes under the provisions of
Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any
there be, and to future subdivision survey in accordance with the
development plan to be prepared and approved by the
Department of Local Government and Community Development,
which parcels are more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a
portion of the Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the
municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon,
beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan, being N-74-30 E,
8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal;
thence N 33 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40 26 W
1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N 30 50W 503.17 m. to point 4;
thence N 75 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5; thence N 14 18 W
1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to point 7;
thence N 71 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W
1025.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North 490.38 m. to point 10;
thence Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 13;
thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 16;
thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East
1075.00 m. to point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19;
thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 22;
thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South

1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25;

thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of
beginning.Containing an area of three thousand seven
hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a
portion of alienable and disposable portion of public domain)
situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of
Luzon.Beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan being N 74
30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal;
thence Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West 1000.00
m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due
West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point
6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9;
thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point 12;
thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71 38 E
458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15;
thence S 14 18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E
704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30 50 E 503.17 m. to point 18;
thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33 23 e
1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an area of
one thousand two hundred twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or
less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on
future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President
Republic of the Philippines
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by
Proclamation No. 1637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation
No. 1637 revised the area and location of the proposed
townsite.According to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos,
Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed
by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to
MWR coverage.[34] Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21,
1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION
IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY INCREASING
THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION
OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING
PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT
RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT
SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources
and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND
E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby amend
Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974 which established
the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San
Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area
and revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced
therein, subject to private rights, if any there be, which parcel of
land is more particularly described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)

st

Done in the City of Manila, this 21 day of June, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.

A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan

Townsite Reservation amending the area under SWO-41762

establishing the Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation) situated

in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines
1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23
by the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along
lines 23-24-25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines
25-26-27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities of Montalban, San
Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-3839-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed
Reservation. Beginning at a point marked 1 on the Topographic
Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38
IN-12, Marikina Watershed Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on
future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered
areas entirely within the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is
hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of
Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive
Department is needed to declassify land which had been earlier
classified as a watershed reservation and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
[35]
Unless and until the land classified as such is released in an
official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable

agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation

of imperfect title do not apply.[36]
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the
private character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of
Forest Development dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is
excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The Certification
reads:
Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, containing an area of 1,269,766 square
meters, as shown and described on the reverse side hereof,
surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading for Angelina
C. Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded from the
operation of Marikina Watershed Reservation established under
Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No.
1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the
Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation, amended by proclamation No.
1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as Lungsod Silangan Townsite
Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site
under P.D. 1396 dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Human Settlements, to the exclusion of any other
government agencies.

This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal

Staff, R-4 as contained in his internal memorandum dated March
18, 1986.

1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620

situated in the Barrio of San Isidro, Municipality of
Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for registration
of title in the case at bar.

Verified by:

2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index

Map it was found that a portion of the SW, described
as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the
subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N9578, LRC Record No. N-55948 and was issued
Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of
Apolonia Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and
Order for Issuance of the Decree dated February 8,
1984 and March 6, 1984, respectively, and the
remaining portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12,
Marikina Watershed. x x x

(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO

Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:

WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully

submitted to the Honorable Court for its information
and guidance with the recommendation that the
application in the instant proceedings be dismissed,
after due hearing (Underlining supplied).

(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY

Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a
reclassification had occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the
reclassification, is contradicted by several documents submitted
by the Solicitor General before the land registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court
a Report[37] dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro
G. Bonifacio of the then National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration, confirming that the Lot described in
Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He thus recommended the
dismissal of the application for registration. The Report states:
COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Commission and to this Honorable Court
respectfully reports that:

Likewise, in a letter[38] dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy

Land Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that
the Lot is within the MWR. The letter states:
That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro
(Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766)
hectares, more particularly described in Psu-162620, which is
within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established the Marikina
Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
xxx

That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of

the Registration Applicant but part of the public domain, not
subjected to disposition and is covered by Proclamation No. 585
for Integrated Social Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is
recommended for rejection (Underlining supplied). Copy of the
letter is attached herewith as Annex 3 and made an integral part
hereof.
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to
petitioner Edna T. Collados [as original applicant] application is
the technical description[39] of the Lot signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the
Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated
that the Lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and
insufficient to show clearly and positively that the Lot had been
officially released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation to
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included within a
watershed reservation duly established by Executive
Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that
the land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and
convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither
petitioners nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted
sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded from the MWR
upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21, 1974,
petitioners possession as of the filing of their application on April
25, 1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the
issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result will not change
even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly
possessed the Lot from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in
1904. Petitioners case falters even more because of the issuance
of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then

DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted

Lot A or the townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is
supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now
fairly populated and vibrant communities as claimed by
petitioners. The following ruling may be applied to this case by
analogy:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers
may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified
as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy
areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.[40]

Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of

judgment
should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to
the Republics petition for annulment of judgment which was filed
long after the decision of the land registration court had allegedly
become final and executory. The land registration court rendered
its decision on January 30, 1991 and the Solicitor General
received a copy of the decision on April 23, 1991. [41]Petitioners
point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals
the petition for annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP

Blg. 129[42] only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had

supposedly become final and executory. Moreover, petitioners
further point out that the Solicitor General filed the petition for
annulment after the land registration court issued its order of May
6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision
on the ground that the land registration court had no jurisdiction
over the case, specifically, over the Lot which was not alienable
and disposable. The Solicitor General maintained that the
decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment
is no longer available because it is barred by the principle of res
judicata. They insist that the land registration court had
jurisdiction over the case which involves private land. They also
argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning the land
registration courts jurisdiction considering that the Republic
participated in the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed
reservation, is not alienable and disposable public land. The
evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show
that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a portion
of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the public
domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the
alleged procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for
annulment of judgment are immaterial since the land registration
court never acquired jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of
the land registration court involving the Lot are therefore null and
void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals, [43] as
follows:
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over nonregistrable properties, such as public navigable rivers which are
parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the
registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the

judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards

the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of
petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive
period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case
override concerns over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,[44] which involved the
registration of public lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court
rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to silence the
Republics claim over public lands. The Court said:
It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches
does not apply when the Government sues as a sovereign or
asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or laches validate
an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata
is to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of
justice to technicality.
The Court further held that the right of reversion or reconveyance
to the State of the public properties registered and which are not
capable of private appropriation or private acquisition does not
prescribe.
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is
proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the
DENR under its Integrated Social Forestry Program, filed with the
Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of
the Lot which petitioners sought to register. Aware that the
parcels of land which their forefathers had occupied, developed
and tilled belong to the Government, they filed a petition with then

President Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR Secretary

Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest
Management Bureau to take steps for the segregation of the
aforementioned area from the MWR for development under the
DENRsISF Programs. Subsequently, then President Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430
hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under
the DENRs Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No.
585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED
JULY 26, 1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA
WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY
EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED
THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN,
VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN,
MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND
OF LUZON.

beginning at point 1 on plan, being identical to corner 1 of

Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty
(1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No.
33 as amended, not otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall
remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C.
AQUINO
President of the
Philippines

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and

Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by
law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do
hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33,
which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain
parcel of land of the public domain embraced therein situated in
Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph
and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and
place the same under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations, which parcel
of land is more particularly described as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation
situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal,

Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit,

acting through the Regional Executive Director of the DENR
(Region IV), issued sometime between the years 1989 to 1991
certificates of stewardship contracts to bona fide residents of the
barangays mentioned in the proclamation as qualified recipients
of
the ISF programs. Among those awarded were
intervenors. The certificates of stewardship are actually contracts
of lease granted by the DENR to actual occupants of parcels of
land under its ISF programs for a period of twenty-five (25) years,
renewable for another twenty-five (25) years. [45] The DENR
awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in Barangay
San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on the
Inventory of Forest Occupants the DENR had conducted.[46]

According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991

about the pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Opposition in
Intervention before the land registration court to assert their rights
and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition,
intervenors learned that the land registration court had already
rendered a decision on January 30, 1991 confirming petitioners
imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a copy of the
decision on August 9, 1991.

the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and

served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed before rendition of judgment
by the trial court, as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly
provides. However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this
rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of
Appeals[48] reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court
of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention
even when the case had already reached this Court. Thus,
in Mago the Court held that:

On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate

judgment and for new trial before the land registration court.
According to intervenors, the land registration court could not act
on its motions due to the restraining order issued by the Court of
Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land registration court
from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor General
in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were
thus constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court
of Appeals which allowed the same.

It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed
by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial had
already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for
certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for
decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly
late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12
of the rules of Court.

Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [47] provides in

pertinent parts:

But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein
promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose
and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and
completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not
to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not
to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself
which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other
words, it is a means to an end.

Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest

in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties,
or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of court,
be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or
not the inertvenors rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at
any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of

To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual
status of intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in
issue. Neither was the validity of the certificates of stewardship
contracts which intervenors allegedly possessed inquired into
considering this too was not in issue. In fact, intervenors did not

specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that the Lot in
question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We
cannot fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if
only to provide the rival groups a peaceful venue for ventilating
their sides. This case has already claimed at least five lives due
to the raging dispute between the rival camps of the petitioners
on one side and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It also
spawned a number of criminal cases between the two rival
groups including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict
application of the rules would blur this bigger, far more important
picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the
Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of
mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly known.
If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable
under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural
lands, they may be acquired under private ownership. The private
respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by
these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove
swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto
Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several
persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court
of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in
dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the
private respondent agree that the land is mangrove land. There is
no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties
is the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The
petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and
the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land.
The issue before us is legal, not factual.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for

respondents.

For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the

Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American organic acts in

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.

the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the

Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to
wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This
classification was maintained in the Constitution of the
Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by
the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the
classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted
the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This provision has
been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the
present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in
force when this case arose, only agricultural lands were allowed
to be alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A.
No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to
private ownership unless they were first reclassified as
agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular
Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps
or manglares were defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by
the tide, in which grows various kindred plants
which will not live except when watered by the
sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and
casting their seeds, which also germinate there.
These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics,
which exist naturally, but which are also, to some
extent cultivated by man for the sake of the
combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees
as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated
thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal
lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot

be so regarded in the sense in which that term is

used in the cases cited or in general American
jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are
not available for purpose of navigation, and they
may be disposed of without impairment of the
public interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory
condition of the law, the custom had grown of
converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries
which became a common feature of settlement
along the coast and at the same time of the
change of sovereignty constituted one of the most
productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested
interests and prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and
so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared,
despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps form part of
the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative
Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year,
thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For
the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes,
except as otherwise specially indicated, all
unreserved public land, including nipa and
mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of
whatever character.

It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the

Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case when two
years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in
the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of
Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there
is an error in this translation and that a better
translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber
land in English means land with trees growing on
it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree
in English but a bush, and land which has only
bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it
cannot be called 'timber land.

or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are

not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as
nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary
farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares
found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot
affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral
lands, the trial court should have considered them
agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands,
then the rights of appellants are fully established
by Act No. 926.

xxx xxx xxx

The fact that there are a few trees growing in
a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the
general character of the land from manglare to
timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted
Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10
Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase
agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are
not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term
'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of
Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public
lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral

The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de

Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than
fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of
1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition
that the land covered by the application there are
mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh.
1, but we think this opposition of the Director of
Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been
definitely decided that mangrove lands are not
forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is
used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely
based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977, the
above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of
Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove

lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even quoted

with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of
mangrove species grow, where the trees are
small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes
and the trees growing are not of commercial value
as lumber do not convert the land into public land.
Such lands are not forest in character. They do
not form part of the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa
case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are
necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as
nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also
a line of decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the
Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands
or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry, 13 the Court was more positive when it held, again
through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot
No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land
because it is not thickly forested but is a
'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that
'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification

of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of

the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821
of the said Code as first, second and third groups
are found on the land in question. Furthermore,
they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove
swamp, is still subject to land registration
proceedings because the property had been in
actual possession of private persons for many
years, and therefore, said land was already
'private land' better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not
required by the public interests to be kept under
forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the
public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered
with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do
not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is
released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable

agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules

on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 14 where this Court agreed with the Solicitor General's
submission that the land in dispute, which he described as
"swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties
and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve days
after the De Porkan case.

Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation

of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,

Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is

a need for a categorical pronouncement that should resolve once
and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are
agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging
to the legislature, which has the authority to implement the
constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain
(and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of
public lands). The legislature having made such implementation,
the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own
role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional
duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in
accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts
will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature
are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they
are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the
three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and
achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and
utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the
President of the Philippines the function of making periodic
classifications of public lands, thus:

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer

such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and
disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the
same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and
disposition, the lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition shall be classified,
according to the use or purposes to which such
lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for
similar productive purposes;

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar

purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and
quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time make the classifications
provided for in this section, and may, at any time
and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one
class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code
states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest
reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon there
commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the
approval of the Department Head, the President
of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves
from the public lands and he shall by proclamation
declare the establishment of such reserves and
the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest
reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise
disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest
uses, and shall be administered in the same
manner as public forest.

The President of the Philippines may in like

manner by proclamation alter or modify the
boundaries of any forest reserve from time to
time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon
such revocation such forest reserve shall be and
become part of the public lands as though such
proclamation had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for
agricultural purposes. - Lands in public forest, not
including forest reserves, upon the certification of
the Director of Forestry that said lands are better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than
for forest purposes and not required by the public
interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared
by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as
comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in
the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917.
The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to
ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise
of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged
to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the
executive department. More importantly, the said provision has
not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional
assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial
intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so
must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui
case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands
is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination
having been made and no cogent argument having been raised

to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we

shall.

agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration

as agricultural land and release for private ownership.

Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to

our agricultural lands should be understood as covering only
those lands over which ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could
not be retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would
be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due
process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where the
possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909,
before it was much later classified as timberland.

Thus we held in the Yngson case:

It follows from all this that the land under contention being
admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and for
which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the
Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered
forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse
possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private
respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so,
it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of
Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove
swamps approved by the Director of Lands, 16to prove that the
land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere
existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting
the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such
approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The
Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises.
Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the
authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for

It is elementary in the law governing the

disposition of lands of the public domain that until
timber or forest lands are released as disposable
and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the
Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant,
sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or
other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes
of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to
administer and dispose of swamp lands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public domain
while such lands are still classified as forest land
or timber land and not released for fishery or other
purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse
possession which can be the basis of a grant of
title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been
declared alienable and disposable. Possession of
forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it
into private property.'

We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in

nature, the proof the private respondent offers of prescriptive
possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of
the existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by
the original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that the
conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied.
Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion posesoria has
been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that
the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of
the private respondent for twenty years as required by the
Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but
must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in this
case.

It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative

definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove
swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the
Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution
and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless
they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable
agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET
ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private
respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent

were practically the only basis used by the appellate court in
sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and
much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have
held in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established
his right to the registration of the subject land in his name.
Accordingly, the petition must be granted.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.