David v.

Arroyo
Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she
declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head
Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was
raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded
on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be
validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law.
Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The SolGen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021.
The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative
because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar.
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled
in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was
also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA
and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that
the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases.
The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not
primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims,
if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly
subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The
SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of
graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such
criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president
declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power
to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power
that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out
of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any
authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities
but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her
exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority
from Congress must be based on the following:
1 There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of
the president by the president

Ramon Gonzales vs Rufino Hechanova

9 SCRA 230 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaty vs Executive Agreements Statutes Can Repeal Executive
Agreements
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the
importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that
there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000
tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one
which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the

contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous
legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are
fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction
to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
executive order or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,
Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato
Coronas departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and independent body to
recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of
the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of
the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th)
member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby
allocating a representative of the National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the
change to bicameralism which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if
the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would
have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a
member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC does not render
JBCs purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most likely provide balance as
against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial
post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the
1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution that in the phrase, a representative of Congress, the use of the singular letter a preceding representative of
Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional
Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more
than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded
or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of
the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be
modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in
Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit
in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids
such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into the minds of the
members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2),
between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and House of Representatives, the
Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that Congress, in the context of JBC
representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an
inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the
same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC.
No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers.
Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of government would have an active
role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative
influence in the JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would negate the
principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of
another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is
explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the
highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It
cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the
government and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless
valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified.

Imbong v Comelec September 11, 1970

RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention
Petitioner: Imbong
Respondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)
Petitioner: Gonzales
Respondent: Comelec
Ponente: Makasiar
RELATED LAWS:
Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each representative district who shall
be elected in November, 1970.
RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a proportioned among
existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.
RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacy
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any appointive
office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.
Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to the convention.
FACTS:
This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong:
Par 1 Sec 8
ISSUE:
Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.
HOLDING:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions
assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.
RATIO:
- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes
and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4
- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable.
Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice
versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.
- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only
temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to
the Constituional Convention.
- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must
now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards
any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

Pablito Sanidad vs Commission on Elections

73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Amendment to the Constitution
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
(barangays) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. Twenty days
after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD
No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos
issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree
recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their
desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which
will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991
and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the
Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16,
1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has
no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance
of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where
the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the
legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution
resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the
regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular
National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than
calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal
of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to
be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to
have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one,
within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty,
executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .. The Supreme
Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all
other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with
that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those
proposals to the people in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.

TELENGTAN BROTHERS(LA SUERTE CIGAR) V. COURT OF APPEALS

Transportation Laws
FACTS:
Private respondent K-Line is a foreign shipping company doing biz in PH, its shipping agent is respondent Smith, Bell & Co., Inc. It is
a member of the Far East Conference, the body which fixes rates by agreement of its member-shipowners. The conference is
registered with the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission.
Van Reekum Paper, Inc. entered into a contract of affreightment with the K-Line for the shipment of 468 rolls of container board liners
from Georgia to Manila, consigned to herein petitioner La Suerte Cigar. The contract of affreightment was embodied in Bill of Lading

issued by the carrier to the shipper. The expenses of loading and unloading were for the account of the consignee (La Suerte). The
shipment was packed in 12 container vans. At Tokyo, the cargo was transhipped on two vessels of the K-Line. Ten (10) container vans
were loaded on the 1st vessel, while two (2) were loaded on another vessel.
On June 11, the first vessel arrived at the port of Manila. La Suerte was notified in writing of the ship's arrival, together with
information that container demurrage would be charged unless the consignee took delivery of the cargo within ten (10) days.
On June 21, the other vessel arrived and was discharged of its contents the next day. On the same day the shipping agent Smith, Bell &
Co. released the Delivery Permit for twelve (12) containers to the broker upon payment of freight charges on the bill of lading. On
June 22, La Suertes broker presented the shipping documents to the Bureau of Customs. But the latter refused to act on them because
the manifest of the 1st vessel covered only 10 containers, whereas the bill of lading covered 12 containers.
The broker therefore sent back the manifest to Smith, Bell & Co with the request that the manifest be amended. Smith, Bell & Co.
refused on the ground that an amendment would violate the Tariff and Customs Code relating to unmanifested cargo.
Later however, it agreed to add a footnote reading "Two container vans carried by other vessel to complete the shipment of twelve
containers under the bill of lading."
The manifest was approved for release only on July 3. On July 11, when the broker tried to secure the release of the cargo, it was
informed by Smith, Belle, & Co. that the free time for removing the containers from the container yard had expired on June 26 for the
first vessel, and on July 9, in the case of the 2nd vessel, and that demurrage charges had begun to run a day after the free time,
respectively.
On July 13, La Suerte paid P47,680 representing the total demurrage charges on all the containers, but it was not able to obtain its
goods. It was able to obtain only a partial release of the cargo because of the breakdown of the arrastre's equipment at the container
yard. On July 16, La Suerte sent a letter to Smith, Bell & Co. requesting reconsideration of the demurrage charges, but was refused.
Subsequently, La Suerte refused to pay any more demurrage charges on the ground that the delay in the release of the cargo was not
due to its fault but to the breakdown of the equipment at the container yard.
La Suerte filed this suit in the RTC for specific performance to compel respondents to release 7 container vans consigned to it free of
charge.
In their answer, private respondents claimed that they were not free to waive these charges because under the United States Shipping
Act of 1916 it was unlawful for any common carrier engaged in transportation involving the foreign commerce to charge or collect a
greater or lesser compensation that the rates and charges specified in its tariffs on file with the Federal Maritime Commission.
RTC dismissed petitioner's complaint. It cited the bill of lading which provided:
23. The ocean carrier shall have a lien on the goods, which shall survive delivery, for all freight, dead freight, demurrage, damages,
loss, charges, expenses and any other sums whatsoever payable or chargeable to or for the account of the Merchant under this bill of
lading . . . . RTC likewise invoked clause 29 of the bill of lading which provided:
29. . . .The terms of the ocean carrier's applicable tariff, including tariffs covering intermodal transportation on file with the Federal
Maritime Commission and the Interstate Commission or any other regulatory body which governs a portion of the carriage of goods,
are incorporated herein.
18. The RTC held that the bill of lading was the contract between the parties and, therefore, petitioner was liable for demurrage
charges. It rejected petitioner's claim of force majeure in such a way that the delay in the delivery of the containers was caused by the
breaking down of the equipment of the arrastre operator. The Court reasoned that still plaintiff has to pay the corresponding demurrage
charges. The possibility that the equipment would break down was not only foreseeable, but actually, foreseen, and was not caso
fortuito. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not La Suerte is liable for demurrage for delay in removing its cargo from the containers - YES but only for the
period July 3 - 13, 1979 with respect to ten containers and from July 10 - July 13, 1979, in respect of two other containers
HELD:

Payment of demurrage
La Suerte's contention is that the bill of lading does not provide for the payment of container demurrage, as Clause 23 of the bill of
lading only says "demurrage," i.e., damages for the detention of vessels. Here there is no detention of vessels. It invokes a case where
SC defined "demurrage" as follows:
Demurrage, in its strict sense, is the compensation provided for in the contract of affreightment for the detention of the vessel beyond
the time agreed on for loading and unloading. Essentially, demurrage is the claim for damages for failure to accept delivery
Whatever may be the merit of petitioner's contention, the fact is that clause 29(a) also of the bill of lading, in relation to Rule 21 of the
Far East Conference Tariff , specifically provides for the payment by the consignee of demurrage for the detention of containers and
other equipment after the so-called "free time."
A bill of lading is both a receipt and a contract. As a contract, its terms and conditions are conclusive on the parties, including the
consignee. The enforcement of the rules of the Far East Conference and the Federal Maritime Commission is in accordance with R.A.
1407 which declares that the Philippines, in common with other maritime nations, recognizes the international character of shipping in
foreign trade and existing international practices in maritime transportation and that it is
part of the national policy to cooperate with other friendly nations in the maintenance and improvement of such practices. Period of
Demurrage With respect to the period of La Suertes liability, La Suerte cannot be held liable for demurrage starting June 27 on the 10
containers because the delay in obtaining release of the goods was not due to its fault.
The evidence shows that the Bureau of Customs refused to give an entry permit to petitioner because the manifest issued by K-Line
stated only 10 containers whereas the bill of lading also issued by the K-Line showed there were 12 containers. For this reason,
petitioner's broker had to see Smith, Bell & Co. on June 22, but the latter did not immediately do something to correct the manifest.
Smith, Bell & Co. was asked to "amend" the manifest, but it refused to do so on the ground that this would violate the law. It was only
on June 29 that it thought of adding instead a footnote, by which time the "free time" had already expired. Now June 29 was a Friday.
Again it is probable the correct manifest was presented to the Bureau of Customs only on Monday, July 2, and therefore it was only on
July 3 that it was approved.
It was therefore only from July 3 that La Suerte could have claimed its cargo and charged for any delay With respect to the other two
containers, demurrage was properly considered to have accrued on July 10 since the "free time" expired on July 9. The period of delay,
however, for all the 12 containers must be deemed to have stopped on July 13, because on this date petitioner paid P47,680.00. If it
was not able to get its cargo from the container vans, it was because of the breakdown of the shifter or cranes of the arrastre service
operation. It would be unjust to charge demurrage after July 13, since the delay in emptying the containers was not due to the fault of
La suerte In sum, we hold that petitioner can be held liable for demurrage only for the period July 3-13, 1979 and that in accordance
with the stipulation in its bill of lading.
Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT Amendment by
Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT)
Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section
24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same
did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter
Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by
striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just
becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the
said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of
the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means,
according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where
Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no
showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

Garcillano vs HR Committees on Public Information

Inquiry in Aid of Legislation Senate Rules of Procedure
In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said
conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor GMA. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted
separately by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the
Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the
wiretapped conversation emerged. Lacsons motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the Committee on National Defense and
Security headed by Biazon. Garci subsequently filed to petitions. One to prevent the playing of the tapes in the each house for they are
alleged to be inadmi8ssible and the other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci.
HELD: Garcis petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already played in Congress and those tapes
were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second
petition must be granted however. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it
will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines.
The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of
the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
In re: Albino Cunanan, G.R. No. L-6784. March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN
Resolution March 18, 1954
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law,
the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75
percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while
other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for
admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether
or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Issue:
WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid?
Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law
in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that
in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in
the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that
the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the

Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is
and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the
government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license.
Greco Belgica vs Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa
710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lumpsum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to
the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like
roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment
of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two
sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential
Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur
Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had
been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations) which would
make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit was
then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other
hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but
under the pork barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as
to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the
principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as
CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but
only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by
Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war
or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is
a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the
two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that
the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be
inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by
the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the
LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the
members of the house of representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC
and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles
with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its
good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of
legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29
(1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD
1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a
special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which
the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the
Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated
therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
ABAKADA Guro Party List v PurisimaG.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
FACTS:
1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335
(Attrition Act of 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards
and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status
2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of
such rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE: WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of oversight embraces all activities
undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
Implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per
se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic
and related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial
power.
And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures"
specified under the Constitution including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment
congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be
confined to the following:
scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation and

investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this
class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed implementing
rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to
approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight
committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and
investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
League of Cities v. Comelec
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act
on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality
into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to
exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the
11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it
to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on
various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve
of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1.
Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2.
Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application,
because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality
into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent
and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law
passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Datu Kida, et al. v. Senate of the Philippines, et al.
G.R. No. 196271 : February 28, 2012
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, AND IN REPRESENTATION OF MAGUINDANAO
FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L.
LIM, JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE
ABDIL, AND BASSAM ALUH SAUPI,Petitioners, v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THRU SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, THRU ITS CHAIRMAN, SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., SECRETARY OF BUDGET, AND ROBERTO TAN, TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October 18, 2011, where it upheld the constitutionality
of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional
elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of
August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to
temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local elections?
2. Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements?
3. Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
4. Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?
5. Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative
and executive offices?
6. Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President's supervisory powers over autonomous regions?
HELD: The constitutionality of RA No. 10153 is upheld.

POLITICAL LAW: synchronization of ARMM

1. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for
all elective officials from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily
lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional
mandate. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization
cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. The ARMM
had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a
constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it
remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing
instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a
constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended
to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static.
2. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections; it does not provide the date
for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of
the ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, it is well-settled that the supermajority vote requirement set forth
in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
Similarly, the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement applies to all amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an
unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution is incorrect. Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution provides that the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. This means that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which
Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite.
3. The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional
officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should
be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution
which prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity.
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set
a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. Since elective ARMM officials are also
local officials, they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that
the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution,
Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of
three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
4.The Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election.Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the
COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided
for in the law. Both Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but
do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and
other analogous circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate
of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by
Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.
5. The President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of
presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment
power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.
6. There is no incompatibility between the President's power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the
power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. The power of supervision is defined as
the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished

from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.
The petitioners apprehension regarding the President's alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the
President's appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the
appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people. This is incorrect.
Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections.
Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the
petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
MR DENIED.