8/9/2016

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TodayisTuesday,August09,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
THIRDDIVISION
G.R.No.156125August25,2010
FRANCISCOMUOZ,JR.,Petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDARAMIREZandELISEOCARLOS,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION,J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Francisco Muoz, Jr. (petitioner) to
challenge the decision2 and the resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 57126.4 The CA
decision set aside the decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 166, Pasig City, in Civil Case No.
63665.TheCAresolutiondeniedthepetitionerssubsequentmotionforreconsideration.
FACTUALBACKGROUND
Thefactsofthecase,gatheredfromtherecords,arebrieflysummarizedbelow.
Subject of the present case is a seventyseven (77)square meter residential house and lot located at 170 A.
BonifacioStreet,MandaluyongCity(subjectproperty),coveredbyTransferCertificateofTitle(TCT)No.7650of
theRegistryofDeedsofMandaluyongCityinthenameofthepetitioner.6
The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT No. 1427, in the name of Erlinda
Ramirez,marriedtoEliseoCarlos(respondents).7
On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No. 1427, with Erlindas
consent, to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable
withintwenty(20)years,throughmonthlysalarydeductionsofP1,687.66.8Therespondentsthenconstructeda
thirtysix(36)squaremeter,twostoryresidentialhouseonthelot.
OnJuly14,1993,thetitletothesubjectpropertywastransferredtothepetitionerbyvirtueofaDeedofAbsolute
Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorneyinfact of Eliseo, for a stated
considerationofP602,000.00.9
On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of
absolutesale,claimingthattherewasnosalebutonlyamortgagetransaction,andthedocumentstransferring
thetitletothepetitionersnamewerefalsified.
TherespondentsallegedthatinApril1992,thepetitionergrantedthemaP600,000.00loan,tobesecuredbya
first mortgage on TCT No. 1427 the petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.0010 advance to cancel the GSIS
mortgage,andmadehersignadocumentpurportingtobethemortgagecontractthepetitionerpromisedtogive
theP402,000.00balancewhenErlindasurrendersTCTNo.1427withtheGSISmortgagecancelled,andsubmits
an affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject property with the P200,000.00
advance, Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.2711 to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 142712 in May 1992,
Erlinda surrendered to the petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but returned Eliseos affidavit, unsigned since
Eliseos affidavit was unsigned, the petitioner refused to give the P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the
mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda return the P200,000.00 advance since Erlinda could not return the
P200,000.00advancebecauseithadbeenusedtopaytheGSISloan,thepetitionerkeptthetitleandin1993,
they discovered that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioners name, cancelling TCT No.1427 in their
name.
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Thepetitionercounteredthattherewasavalidcontractofsale.Heallegedthattherespondentssoldthesubject
propertytohimafterherefusedtheiroffertomortgagethesubjectpropertybecausetheylackedpayingcapacity
andwereunwillingtopaytheincidentalchargesthesalewaswiththeimpliedpromisetorepurchasewithinone
year,13 during which period (from May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993), the respondents would lease the subject
propertyforamonthlyrentalofP500.0014whentherespondentsfailedtorepurchasethesubjectpropertywithin
the oneyear period despite notice, he caused the transfer of title in his name on July 14, 199315 when the
respondentsfailedtopaythemonthlyrentalsdespitedemand,hefiledanejectmentcase16againstthemwiththe
MetropolitanTrialCourt(MeTC),Branch60,MandaluyongCity,onSeptember8,1993,orsixteendaysbeforethe
filingoftheRTCcaseforannulmentofthedeedofabsolutesale.
DuringthependencyoftheRTCcase,oronMarch29,1995,theMeTCdecidedtheejectmentcase.Itordered
Erlindaandherfamilytovacatethesubjectproperty,tosurrenderitspossessiontothepetitioner,andtopaythe
overduerentals.17
In the RTC, the respondents presented the results of the scientific examination18 conducted by the National
BureauofInvestigationofEliseospurportedsignaturesintheSpecialPowerofAttorney19datedApril29,1992
andtheAffidavitofwaiverofrightsdatedApril29,1992,20showingthattheywereforgeries.
Thepetitioner,ontheotherhand,introducedevidenceontheparaphernalnatureofthesubjectpropertysinceit
wasregisteredinErlindasnametheresidentiallotwaspartofalargeparceloflandownedbyPedroRamirez
andFructuosaUrcla,ErlindasparentsitwasthesubjectofCivilCaseNo.50141,acomplaintforannulmentof
sale, before the RTC, Branch 158, Pasig City, filed by the surviving heirs of Pedro against another heir, Amado
Ramirez,Erlindasbrotherand,asaresultofacompromiseagreement,Amadoagreedtotransfertotheother
compulsoryheirsofPedro,includingErlinda,theirrightfulsharesoftheland.21
THERTCRULING
InaDecisiondatedJanuary23,1997,theRTCdismissedthecomplaint.Itfoundthatthesubjectpropertywas
Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property that was inherited from her father. It also upheld the sale to the
petitioner,evenwithoutEliseosconsentasthedeedofabsolutesaleborethegenuinesignaturesofErlindaand
thepetitionerasvendorandvendee,respectively.ItconcludedthattheNBIfindingthatEliseossignaturesinthe
specialpowerofattorneyandintheaffidavitwereforgerieswasimmaterialbecauseEliseosconsenttothesale
wasnotnecessary.22
TherespondentselevatedthecasetotheCAviaanordinaryappealunderRule41oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
THECARULING
TheCAdecidedtheappealonJune25,2002.ApplyingthesecondparagraphofArticle15823oftheCivilCode
and CalimlimCanullas v. Hon. Fortun,24 the CA held that the subject property, originally Erlindas exclusive
paraphernalproperty,becameconjugalpropertywhenitwasusedascollateralforahousingloanthatwaspaid
through conjugal funds Eliseos monthly salary deductions the subject property, therefore, cannot be validly
soldormortgagedwithoutEliseosconsent,pursuanttoArticle12425oftheFamilyCode.Thus,theCAdeclared
voidthedeedofabsolutesale,andsetasidetheRTCdecision.
When the CA denied26 the subsequent motion for reconsideration,27 the petitioner filed the present petition for
reviewoncertiorariunderRule45oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
THEPETITION
ThepetitionerarguesthattheCAmisappliedthesecondparagraphofArticle158oftheCivilCodeandCalimlim
Canullas28 because the respondents admitted in the complaint that it was the petitioner who gave the money
usedtocanceltheGSISmortgageonTCTNo.1427Article12029oftheFamilyCodeistheapplicablerule,and
since the value of the house is less than the value of the lot, then Erlinda retained ownership of the subject
property.Healsoarguesthatthecontractbetweenthepartieswasasale,notamortgage,because(a)Erlinda
did not deny her signature in the document30 (b) Erlinda agreed to sign a contract of lease over the subject
property31 and, (c) Erlinda executed a letter, dated April 30, 1992, confirming the conversion of the loan
applicationtoadeedofsale.32
THECASEFORTHERESPONDENTS
The respondents submit that it is unnecessary to compare the respective values of the house and of the lot to
determine ownership of the subject property it was acquired during their marriage and, therefore, considered
conjugal property. They also submit that the transaction between the parties was not a sale, but an equitable
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mortgagebecause(a)theyremainedinpossessionofthesubjectpropertyevenaftertheexecutionofthedeed
of absolute sale, (b) they paid the 1993 real property taxes due on the subject property, and (c) they received
P200,000.00onlyofthetotalstatedpriceofP602,000.00.
THEISSUE
Theissuesinthepresentcaseboildownto(1)whetherthesubjectpropertyisparaphernalorconjugaland,(2)
whetherthecontractbetweenthepartieswasasaleoranequitablemortgage.
OURRULING
WedenythepresentPetitionbutforreasonsotherthanthoseadvancedbytheCA.
ThisCourtisnotatrieroffacts.However,iftheinference,drawnbytheCA,fromthefactsismanifestlymistaken,
asinthepresentcase,wecanreviewtheevidencetoallowustoarriveatthecorrectfactualconclusionsbased
ontherecord.33
FirstIssue:
ParaphernalorConjugal?
Asageneralrule,allpropertyacquiredduringthemarriage,whethertheacquisitionappearstohavebeenmade,
contractedorregisteredinthenameofoneorbothspouses,ispresumedtobeconjugalunlessthecontraryis
proved.34
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently
rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership.35 Pursuant to Articles 9236 and 10937 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the
community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse.38 The residential lot, therefore, is Erlindas
exclusiveparaphernalproperty.
The CA, however, held that the residential lot became conjugal when the house was built thereon through
conjugal funds, applying the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and CalimlimCanullas.39 Under
the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, a land that originally belonged to one spouse becomes
conjugal upon the construction of improvements thereon at the expense of the partnership. We applied this
provisioninCalimlimCanullas,40whereweheldthatwhentheconjugalhouseisconstructedonlandbelonging
exclusivelytothehusband,thelandipsofactobecomesconjugal,butthehusbandisentitledtoreimbursementof
thevalueofthelandattheliquidationoftheconjugalpartnership.
TheCAmisappliedArticle158ofthe
CivilCodeandCalimlimCanullas
WecannotsubscribetotheCAsmisplacedrelianceonArticle158oftheCivilCodeandCalimlimCanullas.
AstherespondentsweremarriedduringtheeffectivityoftheCivilCode,itsprovisionsonconjugalpartnershipof
gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the
FamilyCodeonAugust3,1989,theCivilCodeprovisionsonconjugalpartnershipofgains,includingArticle158,
havebeensupersededbythosefoundintheFamilyCode(Articles105to133).Article105oftheFamilyCode
states:
xxxx
TheprovisionsofthisChapter[ontheConjugalPartnershipofGains]shallalsoapplytoconjugalpartnershipsof
gainsalreadyestablishedbetweenspousesbeforetheeffectivityofthisCode,withoutprejudicetovestedrights
alreadyacquiredinaccordancewiththeCivilCodeorotherlaws,asprovidedinArticle256.
Thus,indeterminingthenatureofthesubjectproperty,werefertotheprovisionsoftheFamilyCode,andnotthe
CivilCode,exceptwithrespecttorightsthenalreadyvested.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the
expenseofthepartnershiporthroughtheactsoreffortsofeitherorbothspouses.Underthisprovision,whenthe
costoftheimprovementandanyresultingincreaseinvaluearemorethanthevalueofthepropertyatthetimeof
the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursementofthevalueofthepropertyoftheownerspouseatthetimeoftheimprovementotherwise,said
propertyshallberetainedinownershipbytheownerspouse,likewisesubjecttoreimbursementofthecostofthe
improvement.41
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Inthepresentcase,wefindthatEliseopaidaportiononlyoftheGSISloanthroughmonthlysalarydeductions.
From April 6, 198942 to April 30, 1992,43 Eliseo paid about P60,755.76,44 not the entire amount of the GSIS
housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the P176,445.2745 paid by Erlinda to cancel the
mortgage in 1992. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to
assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo
throughmonthlysalarydeductions.
Thus,thesubjectpropertyremainedtheexclusiveparaphernalpropertyofErlindaatthetimeshecontractedwith
the petitioner the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseos
signaturesinthespecialpowerofattorneyandaffidavitwereforgerieswasimmaterial.
Nonetheless,theRTCandtheCAapparentlyfailedtoconsidertherealnatureofthecontractbetweenthe
parties.
SecondIssue:
SaleorEquitableMortgage?
Jurisprudence has defined an equitable mortgage "as one which although lacking in some formality, or form or
words,orotherrequisitesdemandedbyastatute,neverthelessrevealstheintentionofthepartiestochargereal
propertyassecurityforadebt,therebeingnoimpossibilitynoranythingcontrarytolawinthisintent."46
Article1602oftheCivilCodeenumeratestheinstanceswhenacontract,regardlessofitsnomenclature,maybe
presumed to be an equitable mortgage: (a) when the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually
inadequate(b)whenthevendorremainsinpossessionaslesseeorotherwise(c)whenuponorafterthe
expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new
periodisexecuted(d)whenthepurchaserretainsforhimselfapartofthepurchaseprice(e)when the
vendorbindshimselftopaythetaxesonthethingsoldand,(f)inanyothercasewhereitmaybefairly
inferredthattherealintentionofthepartiesisthatthetransactionshallsecurethepaymentofadebtor
the performance of any other obligation. These instances apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute
sale.47
For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, two (2) requisites
must concur: (a) that the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale and, (b) that their
intentionwastosecureanexistingdebtbywayofamortgage.AnyofthecircumstanceslaidoutinArticle1602of
theCivilCode,nottheconcurrencenoranoverwhelmingnumberoftheenumeratedcircumstances,issufficient
tosupporttheconclusionthatacontractofsaleisinfactanequitablemortgage.48
Contractisanequitablemortgage
Inthepresentcase,therearefour(4)tellingcircumstancespointingtotheexistenceofanequitablemortgage.
First,therespondentsremainedinpossessionaslesseesofthesubjectpropertytheparties,infact,executeda
oneyearcontractoflease,effectiveMay1,1992toApril30,1993.49
Second,thepetitionerretainedpartofthe"purchaseprice,"thepetitionergaveaP200,000.00advancetosettle
theGSIShousingloan,butrefusedtogivetheP402,000.00balancewhenErlindafailedtosubmitEliseossigned
affidavitofwaiverofrights.
Third, respondents paid the real property taxes on July 8, 1993, despite the alleged sale on April 30, 199250
payment of real property taxes is a usual burden attaching to ownership and when, as here, such payment is
coupledwithcontinuouspossessionoftheproperty,itconstitutesevidenceofgreatweightthatthepersonunder
whosenametherealtytaxesweredeclaredhasavalidandrightfulclaimovertheland.51
Fourth, Erlinda secured the payment of the principal debt owed to the petitioner with the subject property. The
records show that the petitioner, in fact, sent Erlinda a Statement of Account showing that as of February 20,
1993, she owed P384,660.00, and the daily interest, starting February 21, 1993, was P641.10.52 Thus, the
partiesclearlyintendedanequitablemortgageandnotacontractofsale.
ThatthepetitioneradvancedthesumofP200,000.00 to Erlinda is undisputed. This advance, in fact, prompted
thelattertotransferthesubjectpropertytothepetitioner.Thus,beforetherespondentscanrecoverthesubject
property,theymustfirstreturntheamountofP200,000.00tothepetitioner,pluslegalinterestof12%perannum,
computedfromApril30,1992.
We cannot sustain the ballooned obligation of P384,660.00, claimed in the Statement of Account sent by the
petitioner,53 sans any evidence of how this amount was arrived at. Additionally, a daily interest of P641.10 or
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P19,233.00permonthforaP200,000.00 loan is patently unconscionable. While parties are free to stipulate on

the interest to be imposed on monetary obligations, we can step in to temper the interest rates if they are
unconscionable.54
InLustanv.CA,55whereweestablishedthereciprocalobligationsofthepartiesunderanequitablemortgage,we
orderedthereconveyanceofthepropertytotherightfulownerthereinuponthepaymentoftheloanwithinninety
(90)daysfromthefinalityofthedecision.56
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby DENY the present petition. The assailed decision and
resolutionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.57126areAFFIRMEDwiththefollowingMODIFICATIONS:
1.TheDeedofAbsoluteSaledatedApril30,1992isherebydeclaredanequitablemortgageand
2. The petitioner is obligated to RECONVEY to the respondents the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 7650 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, UPON THE PAYMENT OF
P200,000.00,with12%legalinterestfromApril30,1992,byrespondentswithinNINETYDAYSFROMTHE
FINALITYOFTHISDECISION.
Costsagainstthepetitioner.
SOORDERED.
ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
CONCHITACARPIOMORALES
AssociateJustice
LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice

MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJustice

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
AssociateJustice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.
CONCHITACARPIOMORALES
AssociateJustice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.
RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
1FiledunderRule45oftheRevisedRulesofCourtrollo,pp.1116.
2 Dated June 25, 2002, penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with the concurrence of

AssociateJusticesEugenioS.LabitoriaandMarianoC.delCastillo(nowamemberofthisCourt)id.at21
28.
3DatedNovember13,2002id.at31.
4Entitled"ErlindaRamirezandEliseoCarlosv.FranciscoE.Muoz,Jr."
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5DatedJanuary23,1997OriginalRecords,pp.296299.
6Id.at7172.
7Id.at6869.
8FolderofPlaintiffsFormalOfferofAdditionalEvidence,pp.68.
9OriginalRecords,pp.7677.
10TSNdatedSeptember19,1994,TestimonyofErlindaRamirez,p.4.
11Id.at8081.
12MemorandumofEncumbrancesofTCTNo.1427id.at69.
13TSNdatedJuly14,1995,TestimonyofFranciscoMuoz,Sr.,pp.78.
14OriginalRecords,p.152.
15Id.at7172.
16 Civil Case No. 14271, entitled Francisco Muoz, Jr., rep. by his attorneyinfact, Francisco Muoz, v.

Sps.Eliseo&ErlindaRamirezid.at153155.
17Id.at156162.
18FolderofPlaintiffsFormalOfferofAdditionalEvidence.
19OriginalRecords,p.70.
20Id.at74.
21Id.at163169and170172.
22Supranote5.
23Art.158.xxx

Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to
oneofthespouses,alsopertaintothepartnership,butthevalueofthelandshallbereimbursedto
thespousewhoownsthesame.
24214Phil.593(1984).
25 Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses

jointly.Incaseofdisagreement,thehusband'sdecisionshallprevail,subjecttorecoursetothecourtbythe
wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementingsuchdecision.
Intheeventthatonespouseisincapacitatedorotherwiseunabletoparticipateintheadministration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbranceshallbevoid.However,thetransactionshallbeconstruedasacontinuingofferonthe
partoftheconsentingspouseandthethirdperson,andmaybeperfectedasabindingcontractupon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
eitherorbothofferors.
26ResolutionofNovember13,2002supranote3.
27Rollo,pp.131136.
28Supranote24.
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29 Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate

property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
spousesshallpertaintotheconjugalpartnership,ortotheoriginalownerspouse,subjecttothefollowing
rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting
increaseinvaluearemorethanthevalueofthepropertyatthetimeoftheimprovement,the
entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the ownerspouse at the time of the
improvementotherwise,saidpropertyshallberetainedinownershipbytheownerspouse,
likewisesubjecttoreimbursementofthecostoftheimprovement.
Ineithercase,theownershipoftheentirepropertyshallbevesteduponthereimbursement,which
shallbemadeatthetimeoftheliquidationoftheconjugalpartnership.
30TSNdatedSeptember19,1994,TestimonyofErlindaRamirez,p.14.
31OriginalRecords,p.152.
32Id.at151.
33HiCement Corporation v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, G.R. Nos. 132403 & 132419, September

28,2007,534SCRA269HeirsofFloresRestarv.HeirsofDoloresR.Cichon,G.R.No.161720,November
22, 2005, 475 SCRA 731, 739 Casol v. Purefoods Corporation, G.R. No. 166550, September 22, 2005,
470SCRA585,589.
34FAMILYCODE,Art.116.
35Supranote21.
36Art.92.Thefollowingshallbeexcludedfromthecommunityproperty:

(1)Propertyacquiredduringthemarriagebygratuitoustitlebyeitherspouse[.]
37Art.109.Thefollowingshallbetheexclusivepropertyofeachspouse:

xxxx
(2)Thatwhicheachacquiresduringthemarriagebygratuitoustitle[.]
38PreviouslyArticles148and201oftheCivilCode.
39Supranote24.
40Ibid.
41Ferrerv.Ferrer,G.R.No.166496,November29,2006,508SCRA570,581.
42DateGSISgrantedtheloansupranote8.
43DateErlindasettledtheloansupranote11.
44P1,687.66x36monthssalarydeductions(May1989toApril1992)=P60,755.76.
45Supranote11.
46Rockville Excel International Exim Corporation v. Culla, G.R. No. 155716, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA

128,136.
47CIVILCODE,Article1604.
48Bacungan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170282, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 642, 648649 Sps.

Salongav.Sps.Concepcion,507Phil.287,303(2005)Sps.Reyesv.CourtofAppeals,393Phil.479,490
(2000).
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49Supranote14.
50OriginalRecords,p.174.
51Lumayag v. Heirs of Jacinto Nemeo, G.R. No. 162112, July 3, 2007, 526 SCRA 315, 327328 Go v.

Bacaron,G.R.No.159048,October11,2005,472SCRA339,352.
52OriginalRecords,p.82.
53Ibid.
54Toringv.GanzonOlan,G.R.No.168782,October10,2008,568SCRA376,383.
55334Phil.609(1997).
56Id.at620.SeealsoBacunganv.CourtofAppeals,supranote47,at650.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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