Professional Documents
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Civil Law Review (Atty. Ruben Balane) : Union Bank v. Santibanez
Civil Law Review (Atty. Ruben Balane) : Union Bank v. Santibanez
RUBEN BALANE)
ARTICLES 774/776
Union Bank v. Santibanez
452 SCRA 228 | Abu
FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and
Efraim Santibaez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00.
The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural
Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in
favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On
Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment
of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and
Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the
later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings
commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement,
wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to
assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank,
wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused
to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money
against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of
Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence filed
her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not
a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she
was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code;
and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and
that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of her
husband.
2. W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife have
successional rights.
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case.
There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a common-law
wife with whom she had four illegitimate children with the deceased. It
likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the
effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the
time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria
Uson (Art 777 NCC).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs
at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor
had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death".
From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right
over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any
future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the
deed of separation, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future
inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
2.
No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though the
event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation
only if no vested rights are impaired. Hence, since the right of ownership of
Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death
of her late husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of
the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the
impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
Bonilla v. Barcena
71 SCRA 491 | Angliongto
FACTS:
FACTS:
Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who
died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal. He was appointed executor and
administrator, until he died; his son Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco
nd
had taken a 2 wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with
the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special administatrix. Jose
and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed the
approval of the compromise agreement. She argues that it was no valid, because
the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will
of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being
probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE:
W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet
been probated.
HELD:
YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full
payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco
de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of
the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco
de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant,
creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in
interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor
(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
ISSUE:
W/N the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint.
HELD:
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can
be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of
this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while
the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint
was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the
court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his
attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and
residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives."
This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he
manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9,
1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent
Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on
the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error.
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of
the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property,
subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived
of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of
death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that
Abada knew the Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must
result in the disallowance of the will.
ISSUE:
Should it be expressly stated in the will that it (the will) was in a language known by
the testator?
HELD:
YES. Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written
in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have
readily perceived that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was
stated that English was a language understood and known to the testatrix. But in
its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix and
translated into Filipino language. That could only mean that the will was written in
a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of
the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and
notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred
to as the testator instead of testatrix. Had respondent judge been careful and
observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will
but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter
as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by the deputy clerk of court, respondent
judge could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness. In spite of
the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted
the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether
the will was validly executed.
HELD:
No. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the
testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.[25] This is a matter that a
party may establish by proof aliunde. In this case, Alipio testified that Abada used to
gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his
companions would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada
speaks the Spanish language.
ARTICLES 805-806
Matias v. Salud
L-10751, 23 June 1958 | Canilao
Garcia v. Lacuesta
90:489 | Castillo
FACTS:
FACTS:
This case involves the will of Antero Mercado, which among other defects
was signed by the testator through a cross mark (an X). The will was signed by
Atty. Javier who wrote the name of Mercado as testator and the latter allegedly
wrote a cross mark after his name. The CFI allowed the will but the CA disallowed it
because its attestation clause was defective for failing to certify 1) that the will was
signed by Atty. Javier at the express direction of the testator, 2) that the testator
wrote a cross at the end of his name after Atty. Javier signed for him, and 3) that
the 3 witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The case is about the probate of the will of Alipio Abada (Not respondent
Abaja). Petitioner Belinda Noble is the administratrix of the estate of Abada.
Respondent Alipio Abaja filed a petition for the probate of Abadas will. Petitioner
Noble moved for dismissal of the petition for probate.
ISSUE:
Whether the will should be allowed despite the defect of the attestation clause
since the testator had placed a cross mark himself as his signature.
Noble v. Abaja
450 SCRA 265 | Bautista
presence of 3 witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence
and in the presence of each other. It may be wise that the one who signs the
testators name signs also his own; but that is not essential to the validity of the
will.
The court also held that the 3 cases cited by the lower court was not
applicable. In those cases, the person who signed the will for the testator wrote his
own name instead of the testators, so that the testators name nowhere appeared
in the will, and were thus wills not duly executed.
Barut v. Cabacungan
21:461 | Casuela
Nera v. Rimando
18:450 | Cukingnan
FACTS:
FACTS:
Barut applied for the probate of the will of deceased, Maria Salomon. The
testatrix stated in the will that being unable to read or write, the will was read to
her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that she had instructed Severo
Agayan to sign her name to it as testatrix. The probate was contested by a number
of the relatives of the deceased on various grounds.
The probate court found that the will was not entitled to probate because
the handwriting of the person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix to
the will for and on her behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of the other
witnesses to the will than to the person whose handwriting it was alleged to be
(i.e. The probate court denied probate because the signature seemed to not have
been by Severo Agayan but by another witness).
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due
execution of the instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether
one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was
executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses
attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or
ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway,
across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside
room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching
their signatures to the instrument.
ISSUE:
Was the dissimilarity in handwriting sufficient to deny probate of the will?
HELD:
No. The SC found that the mere dissimilarity in writing is sufficient to
overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses that the signature of
the testatrix was written by Severo Agayan. It is also immaterial who writes the
name of the testatrix provided it is written at her request and in her presence and
in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will.
Based on Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that with
respect to the validity of the will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes
the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly
appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the
HELD:
Citing Jaboneta v. Gustilo, the court held that The true test of presence of
the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually
saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had
they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position
with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation
to each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such
that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so.
The question is whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an
alleged will signed the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend
upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the
moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing
conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely
casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To
(Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court and in Sirs
book) Is the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will fatal to its
validity?
HELD:
Icasiano v. Icasiano
11 SCRA 422 | Dela Cuesta
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will and its
duplicate are valid in all respects.
FACTS:
Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to probate
of the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, and for his appointment as executor thereof.
Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their
opposition thereto. During the course of the trial, on 19 March 1959, Celso, started
to present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then filed an amended and
supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent had left a will executed in
duplicate and with all the legal requirements, and that he was submitting the
duplicate to the court, which he found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and Enrique
filed their opposition, but the will and its duplicate was admitted to probate by the
trial court. Hence, this appeal by the oppositors.
Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced expert
testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not
genuine, nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original, and
further aver that granting that the documents were genuine, they were executed
through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the testatrix was
deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who will
stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts
and circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and
dispositions thereof, whereby proponents- appellees stand to profit from
properties held by them as attorneys- in-fact of the deceased and not enumerated
or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for
other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on
penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to probate given
the allegations of forgery of the testators signature, or that the will was executed
under circumstances constituting fraud and undue influence and pressure?
of the original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned
that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and
invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate, and
the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the
objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and
irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one
signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not
intentional.
Cagro v. Cagro
92:1032 | Dina
FACTS:
Vicente Cagro died on Feb. 14, 1949 in Samar. Since the decedent allegedly
made a will prior to his death, the will was probated before the CFI of Samar.
However, the oppositors-appellant objected the probate proceeding alleging that
the will is fatally defective because its attestation clause is not signed by the
attesting witnesses. It is undisputed that the signatures of the three witnesses to
the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page
containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
ISSUE:
W/N the will may be probated even if the signatures of the witnesses do not appear
at the bottom of the attestation clause, and instead, they were placed on the lefthand margin of the page containing the same.
HELD:
No. The position taken by the oppositor-appellant is correct. The
attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the
will' required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily
bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act
of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
negatives their participation.
The petitioner-appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on
the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their
signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are
in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand
margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at
Cruz v. Villasor
54 SCRA 752 | Dizon
FACTS:
The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z. Cruzs last will and
testament. His surviving spouse, Agapita Cruz, opposed the allowance of the will
alleging it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue
influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator having been
fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was
disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in
accordance with law. Agapita appealed the allowance of the will by certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly Articles 805 and 806
of the NCC, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and
subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to
acknowledge the will before a notary public.).
HELD:
NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them (Atty.
Teves) is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to
have been acknowledged. The notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he
cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge
before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to own as genuine,
to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of.
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to
avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be
done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before
the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such
a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the
function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That function would defeated if the notary public
were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. It would place him in inconsistent
position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud,
would be thwarted.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may,
in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document he has notarized.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the
will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds
of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their location.
As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified
his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not
affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution,
intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
2.
FACTS:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age
of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years
of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament
written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983but
acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of this will was
opposed by Leticia, Placidos sister. According to the notary public who notarized
the testators will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions
he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983
to give him time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the
appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by
his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9
August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June
1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioners argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years
old and was no longer of sound mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in
deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates
of the execution and the attestation of the will.
NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled
or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes,
or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception
regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for fraud,
he would not have made.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of
fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.
Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a
notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. The
variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation
was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and
instrumental witnesses.
Guerrero v. Bihis
521 SCRA 394 | Estorninos
ISSUE:
Was the will spurious?
Garcia v. Vasquez
32 SCRA 489 | Grapilon
HELD:
Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal
profession.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the
execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments
and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
FACTS:
This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to probate
the will of Gliceria Avelino del Rosario (Gliceria) executed in 1960. Likewise, this is
also an appeal to remove the current administrator, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla(
Consuelo) as special administratrix of the estate on the ground of Consuelo
possesses interest adverse to the estate and to order the RD of Manila to annotate
on the registered lands a notice of Lis Pendens.
ISSUE:
Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed?
Roxas v. De Jesus
134 SCRA 245 | Lantion
HELD:
FACTS:
NO. Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents and
purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was like a blind testator, and the due
execution of her will would have required observance of Article 808. The rationale
behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable
of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in
accordance with his wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will was done in Tagalog which the
deceased is not well versed but in Spanish. This creates doubt as to the due
execution of the will and as well as the typographical errors contain therein which
show the haste in preparing the 1 page will as compared to the 12 page will created
in 1956 written in Spanish. ALSO, as to the blindness, there was proof given by the
testimony of the doctor that the deceased could not read at near distances because
of cataracts. (Testatrixs vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for
reading print.) Since there is no proof that it was read to the deceased twice, the
will was NOT duly executed.
Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for
partition of the estate of the deceased and also delivered the holographic will of the
deceased. Simeon stated that he found a notebook belonging to deceased, which
contained a letter-will entirely written and signed in deceaseds handwriting. The
will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected
although it is not written by a lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the
same is a holographic will of deceased, identifying her handwriting and signature.
Respondent opposed probate on the ground that it such does not comply with
Article 810 of the CC because the date contained in a holographic will must signify
the year, month, and day.
Alvarado v. Gaviola
226 SCRA 347 | Gregorio
ARTICLE 809
Caneda v. CA
222 SCRA 781 | Gregorio
Azuela v. CA
487 SCRA 119 | Jalipa
ARTICLE 810
ISSUE:
W/N the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.
appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.
Labrador v. CA
184 SCRA 170 | Lo
ARTICLE 811
Gan v. Yap
104:509 | Lugtu
FACTS:
Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan,
and in Manila.
Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI
with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the
deceased.
The will was not presented because Felicidads husband, Ildefonso,
supposedly took it. What was presented were witness accounts of relatives who
knew of her intention to make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to the
witnesses, Felicidad did not want her husband to know about it, but she had made
known to her other relatives that she made a will.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that
the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused
to probate the alleged will on account of the discrepancies arising from the facts.
For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made her will known to so many of her
relatives when she wanted to keep it a secret and she would not have carried it in
her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have access to it. There
was also no evidence presented that her niece was her confidant.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the
oppositors evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such
holographic will.
ISSUE:
1. May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
HELD:
1. No. The will must be presented.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts.
810-814. "A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to
no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed."
This is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills
under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be
subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in each and every page;
such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used and to the fact that the
testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the
testator and of each other. Authenticity and due execution is the dominant
requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for
allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses
would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the
three must testify, if available. From the testimony of such witnesses (and of
other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the
genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due
execution.
With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity
are demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however,
that they are "entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself."
In the probate of a holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature
of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such
witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with
decedent's handwriting) and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony
may be resorted to."
The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will,
but they must be familiar with the decedents handwriting. Obviously, when
the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the
evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity the
testator's handwriting has disappeared.
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate)
of a lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony of witnesses,
in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated
holographic wills which could not then be validly made here. Could Rule 77 be
extended, by analogy, to holographic wills? (NO)
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the
holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen an implied admission that
such loss or theft renders it useless.
As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the
testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its
execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of
simply permitting such relatives to state whether they know of the will, but
whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote it.
Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is presented to the Court and
to them.
This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo,
admittedly the basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the
matter.(According to the Fuero, the will itself must be compared with
specimens of the testators handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of
the deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are shown his
handwriting and signature.
Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that
the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not
be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such
will.
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain
why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial
evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills.
In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the
second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the
notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only
medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are
available to authenticate.
In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses
(four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked
and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood
that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with the testator, etc.
No. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost
holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so
tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to
that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.
Rodelas v. Aranza
119 SCRA 16 | Nieves
FACTS:
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the
holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
1. Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to
produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by
Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
2. the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and
therefore it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the management
and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the decedent;
3. the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced,
otherwise it would produce no effect because lost or destroyed holographic
wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills
4. the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and
attested as required by law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the
will stating that in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court
held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose,
regards the document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.
And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962
while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than 14 years
from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact
that the original of the will could not be located shows to that the decedent had
discarded the alleged holographic will before his death.
Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza
et al. moved to forward the case to the SC as it involves a question of law not of
fact.
ISSUE:
W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means
of a photostatic copy.
5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the
will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil
Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will
and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested;
and because the lone witness presented "did not prove sufficiently that the body of
the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."
Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more
than one witness because the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second,
that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity
should be denied by the adverse party.
ISSUE:
W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.
HELD:
Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity
of the will was not contested, petitioner was not required to produce more than
one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested,
Article 811 can not be interpreted to require the compulsory presentation of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the
probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a
holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes
obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a
matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of
finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the
handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of
course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the signature are in
the handwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness of the testator's
1
ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of
such witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the
court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (691a)
accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness
upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide
whether to believe or not to believe his testimony."
Gonzales v. CA
90 SCRA 183 | Reyes
2.
FACTS:
Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda Santiago
(respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of Isabel's will designating
her as the principal beneficiary and executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog
and was executed 2 months prior to death of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of
Isabel, on the following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed
and attested as required by law, 3. the decedent at the time of the making of the
will did not have testamentary capacity due to her age and sickness, and 4. the will
was procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals
Reversed the said decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for
review with SC claiming that the CA erred in holding that the will of the decedent
was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof
that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE:
1. 1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be
considered credible as
required by Art. 805?
2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will
has good standing in his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?
HELD:
1. Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires
something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in
addition to being competent under Articles 820-821 must also be credible
under Art. 805. The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a
will is determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility
depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and
conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda.
de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3,
1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one
thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must
Gago v. Mamuyac
49:902| Saranillo
FACTS:
Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. It appears from the record that
Miguel executed a last will and testament on July 27, 1918. Gago presented such
will for probate which was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac et. al. Said petition for
probate was denied on the ground that the deceased executed another will on April
16, 1919. Gago presented the April 16 will for probate which was again opposed by
Cornelio et. al. alleging that the will presented by Gago is a carbon copy of the
original April 16 will; such will was cancelled during the lifetime of the deceased;
and that said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased. The RTC
found that the deceased executed another will on December 30, 1920.
ISSUE:
W/N the April 16 will was cancelled.
Casiano v. CA
158 SCRA 451 | Sia
FACTS:
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and
nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the
private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased
did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on
November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate
in the CFI of Iloilo. While the case was still pending the parties Aldina,
Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino executed an agreement of extrajudicial
settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of the
estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the
extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court
did on March 21, 1964.
3 years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late
Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the
last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the
testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the
cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted to the
clerk of court of the Iloilo CFI. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named
as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and
more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of
the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise
gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo
de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in
the will, filed in the same court which approved the EJ settelement a motion for
reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of
the will which was denied by the CFI. Upon petition to the SC for certiorari and
mandamus, the SC dismissed that petition and advised that a separate proceeding
for the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out
the matters raised by the petitioners. The CFI and CA found that the will to be
probated had been revoked by the burning thereof by the housemaid upon
instruction of the testatrix.
ARTICLE 838
Gallanosa v. Arcangel
83 SCRA 676 | Silva
Dela Cerna v. Potot
12 SCRA 576 | Sta. Maria
Roberts v. Leonidas
129 SCRA 754 | Suarez
FACTS:
Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by
his second wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two
children by a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce.
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23, 1959.
One will disposed of his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself
and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine on March
1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in
Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court admitted the two wills and codicil
to probate on April 1978 and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation
between the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel.
Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the
estate.
As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was instituted by
Ethel. On March 1978, Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate proceedings.
She submitted to the court a copy of Grimms will. However, pursuant to the
compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and the motion to
dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record.The estate was partitioned.
In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills
(already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set
aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix
and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received by them and return the
same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations
of Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding
First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court
declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null
and void.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying Ethels motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.
HELD:
HELD:
We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two
wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a
person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore,
the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring
the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will
and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is
that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not
inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1)
Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing
marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will
invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties
to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
Nepomuceno v. CA
139 SCRA 206 | Sumagaysay
FACTS:
Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament
before he died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will
that he was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were married despite the subsisting first
marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner. On
August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975,
Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will,
the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the
testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed
to CA. On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of
Reyes v. CA
281 SCRA 277 | Tan
FACTS:
This case involves a 383 sq.m. parcel of land owned by pettitioners and
respondents father. Petitioner alleges that a Deed of Exrajudicial Partition (Deed)
was entered into between him and the respondents. Petitioner managed to register
2.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Deed was forged.
2. Whether petitioner(s) had become absolute owners of the subject property by
virtue of acquisitive prescription.
FACTS:
RULING:
1. YES. Petitioner(s) cast doubt on the findings of the lower court as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals regarding the existence of forgery. Factual findings of the
trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Petitioners' ludicrous claim that
private respondents imputed no deception on his part but only forgery of the
subject Deed and the simulation of their signatures is nothing short of being
oxymoronic. For what is forgery and simulation of signatures if not arrant
deception! The allegation made by petitioner that the execution of a public
document ratified before a notary public cannot be impugned by the mere
denial of the signatory is baseless. It should be noted that there was a finding
that the subject Deed was notarized by one Atty. Villena who at that time was
not commissioned as a notary in Pasay City.
NO. Petitioners cannot justify their ownership and possession of the subject
parcel of land since they could not ave been possessors in good faith of the
subject parcel of land considering the finding that at the very inception they
forged the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement which they claim to
be the basis for their just title. Having forged the Deed and simulated the
signatures of private respondents, petitioners, in fact, are in bad faith. The
forged Deed containing private respondents' simulated signatures is a nullity
and cannot serve as a just title. There can be no acquisitive prescription
considering that the parcel of land in dispute is titled property, i.e., titled in the
name of the late Bernardino Reyes, the father of both petitioner Florentino and
the private respondents.
Dorotheo v. CA
320 SCRA 12 | Tuazon
Camaya v. Patulandong
423 SCRA 480 | Valdez
value and enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful. Petitioners
argument does not persuade. Though the judgment in the partition case had
become final and executory as it was not appealed, it specifically provided in its
dispositive portion that the decision was "without prejudice [to] ... the probate
of the codicil." The rights of the prevailing parties in said case were thus subject
to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of
petitioners titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the merits of
petitioners Camayas claim that they are innocent purchasers for value and
enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.
The petition is granted in part. The decision of the probate court allowing
the codicil is affirmed. But, the declaration of the aforesaid Deed of Sale, and
the order to reissue corresponding certificates of titles to the four children of
the testratrix, and her grandson Mangulabnan are set aside, without prejudice
to the respondents ventilation of their right in an appropriate action.
ARTICLE 850
Austria v. Reyes
31 SCRA 754 | Vargas
FACTS:
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for
probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by
the present petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was
subsequently allowed with the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of
whom were Basilias legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the
nearest of kin of Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted
by the decedent in accordance with law, thereby making them mere strangers to
the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this
circumstance should have left the whole estate of Basilia open to intestacy with
petitioners being the compulsory heirs.
It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was
deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her
entire estate to the respondents as the latter's legitime, with the inference that
respondents would not have instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of
spurious adoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from the use of
the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana"
ARTICLE 854
Reyes v. Barretto-Datu
19 SCRA 85 | Ventura
FACTS:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto
died he left his share in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a
small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his
nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria
Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of partition. It was
approved and the estate was distributed and the shares delivered.
Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she
executed two wills, in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed
Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her
properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the
first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the
children of Salud Barretto, the LC held that Salud was not the daughter of the
decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed
to the SC, which affirmed the same.
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a
legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the
estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow
Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership,
not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and
delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share
in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of
the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.
ISSUE:
W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and
Salud did not acquire valid title to it.
HELD:
NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano
Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the
partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was
could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the
legitime be completed.
Aznar v. Duncan
17 SCRA 590 | Villarica
FACTS:
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court
declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First
Instance equally divided the properties of the estate of Christensen between Lucy
Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen
Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in the will thus,
the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and the properties passed to
both of them as if the deceased died intestate.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or
whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the
extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to of the entire
estate.
HELD:
The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of
Helen Garcia.
Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter
and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced
heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an
heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir