Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 03-2076
Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Beezer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Widener and Judge Williams joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Peter Charles Cohen, CHARLSON BREDEHOFT, P.C.,
Reston, Virginia, for Appellant. Everett Clifford Johnson, Jr.,
LATHAM & WATKINS, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON
OPINION
BEEZER, Senior Circuit Judge:
Appellee Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. ("Booz Allen") employed
appellant John C. Honor, Jr. as its Director of Human Resources,
Worldwide Technology Business ("WTB"), in September 2000. During the course of his employment, Honors compensation increased
from $235,000 per year to $250,000 per year. On January 15, 2002,
Honor accepted an offer for a position with US Airways. He submitted a letter of resignation to Booz Allen on January 31, 2002.
We consider the circumstances of Honors employment and departure from Booz Allen, including whether Honors departure was voluntary.
I
Booz Allen employed a Director of Recruiting and a Director of
Diversity. Honor claims that Booz Allen directed him, in part, to
increase diversity at Booz Allen, particularly the number of AfricanAmericans in senior level positions. Honor alleges that Booz Allen
did not support his efforts to accomplish these goals and that colleagues actively undermined these efforts.
Jean Callahan, the Senior Director of Recruiting, was allegedly one
such colleague. Callahan and Honor were in separate departments;
neither had any supervisory or managerial power over the other.
Honor alleges that Callahans bias against African-Americans
resulted in the disparate treatment of African-American employees
and recruits and created a hostile work environment for Honor.
Honor claims that he complained about Callahans discriminatory
behavior to a number of partners and principals to no avail.
concluded that it is appropriate for me to sever my relationship with the firm entirely.
[J.A. 189.]
On January 14, 2002, US Airways offered Honor the position of
Vice President-Human Resources and Development. [J.A. 185.] The
next day, Honor faxed the Senior Vice President of Human Resources
at US Airways, accepted the companys offer and stated, "I will notify
my current employer, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. . . . of my decision to resign my employment." [J.A. 184.] On January 16, 2002,
Honor informed Strickland via voice mail and e-mail of his decision
to resign effective January 31, 2002. [J.A. 183.] On January 31, 2003,
Honor tendered a self-titled "Letter of Resignation." [J.A. 192.]
Honor filed an action against Booz Allen in the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County on December 12, 2002. Booz Allen removed the
action to United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on January 13, 2003. Following the district courts dismissal of
certain of Honors claims, Honor filed an Amended Complaint on
March 11, 2003, alleging claims of wrongful termination, retaliation,
failure to promote and hostile work environment. On August 26,
2003, the district court granted Booz Allens motion for summary
judgment on all claims.
II
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291, and review a
district courts grant of summary judgment de novo. See United States
v. Kanasco, Ltd., 123 F.3d 209, 210 (4th Cir.1997). The moving party
must demonstrate the absence of an essential element of the nonmoving partys case and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-26 (1986). Once the moving party discharges its burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
partys case, the nonmoving party then must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87
(1986). We consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
11, 2001 makes clear the deliberate and voluntary nature of Honors
resignation:
About six to eight weeks ago, after consultation with a number of trusted friends and associates, my wife and I decided
we would move on with our lives wiyh [sic] my putting the
Booz-Allen work experience behind me. Accordingly, I initiated a confidential job search that is beginning to bear
fruit.
...
I am committed to stay with Booz-Allen until September 5,
and intend to keep my commitment despite the unfortunate
circumstances that have led to my decision.
...
I have a definite interest in joining your team.
[J.A. 190.]1
Honor concedes that he at one time considered leaving Booz Allen,
but claims he later changed his mind. He relies on an October 17,
2001 letter to Strickland detailing Honors lack of satisfaction with
his situation at Booz Allen for support:
As early, [sic] as January 2001, I predicted these issues
would somehow be shifted to become my responsibility.
After weighing this possibility, and consulting with numerous people, I was persuaded to remain with the Firm and
continue to do my best. I continue to be committed to giving
the Firm all that I have . . . .
[J.A. 244.] To the extent Honor offers this letter as evidence of his
commitment to Booz Allen as of January 2001, his position is under1
in this case, Honor must allege and prove two elements: (1) the deliberateness of Booz Allens actions, motivated by racial bias, and (2)
the objective intolerability of the working conditions.2 Matvia v. Bald
Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir.2001); Brown v.
Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 663 F.2d 1268, 1272 (4th Cir. 1981), judgment
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
"Because the claim of constructive discharge is so open to abuse
by those who leave employment of their own accord, this Circuit has
insisted that it be carefully cabined." Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879
F.2d 100, 114 (4th Cir. 1989). Although demotion can in some cases
constitute a constructive discharge, we hold that "dissatisfaction with
work assignments, a feeling of being unfairly criticized, or difficult
or unpleasant working conditions are not so intolerable as to compel
a reasonable person to resign." Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d
423, 434 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 459 (4th
Cir. 1994).
As an initial matter, Honors working conditions cannot reasonably
be described as intolerable. Honors complaints revolve around disagreements with Callahan and others about the mission and functioning of Booz Allens HR department. Honor states that the work
environment at Booz Allen was the "most miserable [ ] and professionally unfulfilling of his life." [J.A. 236.]
There is no question that Honors workplace was filled with professional and, in some cases, personal tensions. The HR department did
not operate in a manner Honor considered acceptable and he viewed
2
As we explained in Goldsmith v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 987 F.2d 1064, 1072 (4th Cir. 1993):
An employee may not be unreasonably sensitive to his working
environment. Thus, the law does not permit an employees subjective perceptions to govern a claim of constructive discharge.
Every job has its frustrations, challenges and disappointments;
these inhere in the nature of work. An employee is protected
from a calculated effort to pressure him into resignation through
the imposition of unreasonably harsh conditions, in excess of
those faced by his co-workers. He is not, however, guaranteed a
working environment free of stress.
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find that he was forced to resign. His search for other employment
and his resignation announcement, email, phone call and letter foreclose any contrary conclusion. See Taylor, 93 F.3d at 238.
We conclude that a reasonable jury could not find that Honor was
constructively discharged.
We now turn to Honors individual causes of action.
IV
The district court properly rejected Honors claim that Booz Allen
wrongfully terminated him on the basis of race in violation of 42
U.S.C. 1981.
To establish a prima facie case Honor must show that: (1) he is a
member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his job and his
job performance was satisfactory; (3) he was fired; and (4) other
employees who are not members of the protected class were retained
under apparently similar circumstances. Bryant v. Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 133, 133 n.7 (4th Cir. 2002); Karpel v. Inova
Health Sys. Serv., 134 F.3d 1222, 1228 (4th Cir. 1998).
Honor was not terminated. A reasonable jury could not conclude
that Honor established a prima facie case of wrongful termination.
V
The district court properly rejected Honors claim that Booz Allen
retaliated against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981.
To establish a prima facie retaliation claim, Honor must produce
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find (1) that he engaged
in a protected activity; (2) that his employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) that a causal connection existed
between the protected activity and the asserted adverse action.
Mackey v. Shalala, 360 F.3d 463, 469 (4th Cir. 2004). Adverse
employment actions include any retaliatory act or harassment if that
act or harassment results in an adverse effect on the terms, conditions,
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VII
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Honors
hostile environment claim.
To demonstrate a racially-hostile work environment, Honor must
show that he was the subject of conduct that was (1) unwelcome; (2)
based on race; (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and that (4)
there is some basis for imposing liability on the employer. Spriggs v.
Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183-84 (4th Cir. 2001). The district court found that the conduct about which Honor complained was
not motivated by Honors race and, in any case, was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter his condition employment or create an
abusive atmosphere.
Honors hostile work environment claim is based largely on his
assertions that Callahan is biased against African-Americans and
sought to undermine the careers of other African-Americans at Booz
Allen as well as Honors efforts to recruit additional AfricanAmerican employees. Honor also cites the general culture at Booz
Allen as one that tolerates discrimination, contains a glass ceiling for
African-Americans and refuses to implement change.
However, there is no evidence in the record, nor does Honor allege,
that Callahan or anyone else directed any racially-offensive conduct
at Honor himself. Honor makes much of the treatment of other Booz
Allen employees, but we focus on Honors personal experience. See
Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 761 (4th Cir. 1998)
("[A]n individual plaintiff in a private, non-class action alleging
employment discrimination is not litigating common questions of
fact, but the discrete question of whether the employer discriminated
against the plaintiff in a specific instance."), vacated on other
grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Childress v. City of Richmond, 907
F. Supp. 934, 940 (E.D.Va. 1995), affd in part, 134 F.3d 1205 (4th
Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 927 (1998); see also Schrand v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988)
(citing Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1984)
(holding that testimony by other employees regarding their terminations was irrelevant and prejudicial).
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