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Jardeleza V Sereno September 2014
Jardeleza V Sereno September 2014
5'npreme <!Court
;iflllmtiln
EN BANC
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Petitioner,
SERENO,* CJ..
CARPIO,*
VELASCO, JR., Acting Choirpi!rson.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR.,**
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
REYES,
PERLAS-BERN A 8 E,
LEONEN, JJ.
- versus -
CHIEF
JUSTICE
MARIA
LOURDES P. A. SERENO,
THE JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, .JR.,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
August 19' 2014
x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~
,,)I
~--------x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Once again, the Couii is faced with a controversy involving the acts of
an independent body, which is considered as a constitutional innovation. the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). It is not the first tin1e that the Court is
called upon to settle legal questions surrounding the JBC's exercise of its
No pan.
" On orticial leave.
DITISIOl\
')
rhe present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of
Associate Justice Roberto Abad (Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014.
Before his retirement, on March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules,' the
JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for the said
vacated position.
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter fi:om Dean Danilo
Concepcion of the University of the Philippines nominating petitioner
Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardelezo), incumbent Solicitor General of the
Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination,
Jardeleza was included in the names of candidates, as well as in the schedule
of public interviews. On May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed by the
JBC.
It appears !!om the averments in the petition that on June 16 ancl l 7,
2014, Jardeleza received telephone calls from former Court or Appeals
Associate Justice and incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagman
(Justice Lagman), who informed him that during the meetings held on .lune
l)F~CISION
-,
'
5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno). manifested that she would be
4
invoking Section 2, Rule i 0 of JBC-009 against him. Jardeleza was then
directed to "make himself available" before the JBC on June 30, 2014.
during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition;-'' praying
that the Court, in the exercise of its constitutional power of supervision over
the JBC, issue an order: 1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5)
working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be
summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the
charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting
witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in support of the charges; and
notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the pub! ic record of the
JBC; 2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting
witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in pub! ic, under
the same conditions that attend the public interviews held for all applicants;
3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to
another date; and 4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from
participating in the voting on June 30, 2014 or at any adjournment thereof
where such vote would be taken for the nominees for the position vacated by
Associate Justice Abad.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sans Jardeleza,
incumbent Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio)
appeared as a resource person to shed light on a classified legal
memorandum (legal memorandum) that would clarify the objection to
Jarcleleza's integrity as posed by Chief Justice Sereno. According to the
JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardeleza's ability to discharge the
duties of his office as shown in a confidential legal memorandum over his
hand Iing of an international arbitration case for the government.
Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court's ante-rooms where
Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Secret01y De Linw)
informed him that Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and
disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno,
characterized his integrity as dubious. After the briefing, Jardelezc1 \V8S
summoned by the JBC Cit around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Section 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. -- In every case when the
integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise clisqualifiecl for nomination is raised or challenged. the
affirmative vote of all the members of the Council must be obtained for the favourable considerntion ol'his
nomination.
'Docketed as A.M. No. 14-07-01-SC-JBC. Re: Jardeleza For the Position ol' A5sociate .lust ice V;1cated ll~
.Justice Roberto/\. /\bad. mllo, pp. 7()_ ~rn.
V'
Dl'CISION
;.
In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardeleza' s letterpetition in view of the transmittal of the JBC list of nominees to the Ollice
of the President, "without prejudice to any remedy available in law and the
8
rules that petitioner may still wish to pursue.'' The said resolution vvas
accompanied by an extensive Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate
9
Justice Arturo D. Brion, expressing his respectful disagreement as to the
position taken by the majority.
''Id. at 33-36.
- ld.<1l 37-"l8.
' Id. at lJ:i.
"Id. at 97-106.
DFCISION
The Petition
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution's declaration as to
his availment of a remedy in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel
the .JBC to include him in the list of nominees for Supreme Court Associate
.Justice vice Associate .Justice Abad, on the grounds that the .J BC and Chier
Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number
of votes to qualify for the position.
f'
Dl~CISION
!II
DECISION
Comment
t~f the
JBC
On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending that
Jardeleza's petition lacked procedural and substantive bases that would
warrant favorable action by the Court. For the JBC, certiorari is only
avai !able against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi11
judicial functions. The JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary, does not exercise any of these functions. In a
pending case, 12 Jardeleza himself, as one of the lawyers for the government,
11
1
'
DECISION
argued in this wise: Certiorari cannot issue against the JBC in the
implementation of its policies.
In the same vein, the remedy of mandamus is incorrect. Mandamus
does not lie to compel a discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition ror
mandamus must, among other things, show that the petitioner has a clear
legal right to the act demanded. In Jardeleza's case, there is no legal right to
be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the
constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary
may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list or
candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly
within the discretion of the JBC.
Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza
was deprived of due process. The JBC reiterated that Justice Lagman, on
behalf of the JBC en bane, called Jardeleza and informed him that Chief
Justice Sereno would be invoking Section 2, Rule I 0 of JBC-009 due to a
question on his integrity based on the way he handled a very important case
for the government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman spoke briefly about the
case and his general explanation on how he handled the same. Secretary De
Lima likewise informed him about the content of the impending objection
against his application. On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed to explain
himself. Come the June 30, 2014 meeting, however, Jardeleza refused to
shed light on the allegations against him, as he chose to deliver a statement,
which, in essence, requested that his accuser and her witnesses file sworn
statements so that he would know of the allegations against him, that he be
allowed to cross-examine the witnesses; and that the procedure be done on
record and in pub! ic.
In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard
and to enlighten each member of the JBC on the issues raised against him
prior to the voting process. His request for a sworn statement <rnd
opportunity to cross-examine is not supported by a demandable right. The
JBC is not a fact-finding body. Neither is it a court nor a quasi-judicial
agency. The members are not concerned with the determination of his guilt
or innocence of the accusations against him.
Besides, Sections 3 and 4, Rule I 0, JBC-009 are merely directory <1s
shown by the use of the word "may." Even the conduct of a hearing to
determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary on the JBC.
Ordinarily, if there are other ways of ascertaining the truth or falsity of an
allegation or opposition, the JBC would not call a hearing in order to avoid
undue delay of the selection process. Each member of the JBC relies on his
DECISION
Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his
capacity as Solicitor General. Despite claiming a prefatory appearance in
propria persona, all pleadings filed with the Court were signed in his official
capacity. In effect, he sued the respondents to pursue a purely private
interest while retaining the office of the Solicitor General. By suing the very
parties he was tasked by law to defend, .Jardeleza knowingly placed himself
in a situation where his personal interests collided against his public duties,
in clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of
Professional Ethics. Moreover, the respondents are all public officials being
sued in their official capacity. By retaining his title as Solicitor General, and
suing in the said capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit against his own clients, being
the legal defender of the government and its officers. This runs contrnry to
the fiduciary relationship shared by a lawyer and his client.
"
Dl:CISI( >N
Comment
G.R. No.
I0
r~ltfle
21~181
Executive Secretary
On August 12, 2014, Jarcleleza was given the chance to refute the
allegations or the JBC in its Comment. He submitted his Reply thereto on
August 15, 2014. A few hours thereafter, or barely ten minutes prior to the
closing of business, the Court received the Supplemental Comment-Reply of
~
11
DECISION
the
the
the
his
the
G.R. No.
21~181
JBC, this time with the attached minutes of the proceedings that led to
filing of the petition, and a detailed "Statement of the Chief Justice on
Integrity Objection." 13 Obviously, .Jardeleza's Reply consisted only of
arguments against the JBC's original Comment, as it was filed prior to
filing of the Supplemental Comment-Reply.
At the late stage of the case, two motions to admit comments-inintervention/oppositions-in-intervention were filed. One was by Atty.
Purificacion S. Bartolome-Bernabe, purportedly the President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Bulacan Chapter. This pleading echoed the
14
position of the .JBC.
The other one was filed by Atty. Reynaldo A. Cortes, purportedly a
former President of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter and former Governor
of the IBP-Northern Luzon. It was coupled with a complaint for disbarment
against .Jardeleza primarily for violations of the Code of Professional
15
Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.
Both motions for intervention were denied considering that time was
of the essence and their motions were merely reiterative of the positions of
the .JBC and were perceived to be dilatory. The complaint for disbarment,
however, was re-docketed as a separate administrative case.
The Issues
11
I<
Jci.
at
220-233.
12
DFCISION
I.
WHETHER
OR
NOT
THE
COURT
CAN
ASSUME
.JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE SUB.Jl<:CT
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS (WITH
APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER).
II
I I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS
AVAILABLE IN THI~ COURSE OF .JBC PROCEEDINGS IN
CASl~S WHERE AN OB.JECTION OR OPPOSITION TO AN
APPLICATION IS RAISED.
II I.
r~f Supervi.:iion
DECISION
13
Section 8.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice
as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector. [Emphasis supplied]
Dri/0111. Um. G.R. No. 112497. August4. 1994. 23'i SCRA 135. 142.
f'ulnnw ,. ,\/nrn. 'i07 Phil. 697 (200S).
DECISION
14
Article VIII.
Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
"
\!'
DFCISION
15
G.R.No.2U181
II - Suhstantial Issues
t'
D l'.C' IS I ON
.
. d epen d ence, "'I
''pro lJ1ty
an d 111
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21
condition,"::>::> and "integrity."
16
"soundness
Cl.R. No.
of physical
and
:?.1~181
mental
<1ffid<1vits or reput11lik persons: or speci<ilized prnctice. as proven by. a!llong other docu111e11ts.
L'LTtilic11tions lio111 the IBP ;111d appropri11tc governlllent agencies or prnlessional orga11iz111io1i:;. 11s
well 11s teaching or 11dlllinistrntive e>:pericnce in the academe: and
(c) Othc1c,. such as service in international organizations 01 with f'orcign governlllcnts u1 oihlr
;1gcnc1cs.
SIT 4. l'cr/rmnunce. - (a) The applicant who is in government service shall sublllit his perl.ort11<111cc
r<1tings. which shall include a verified statement as to such performance for the past three years.
(b) For inculllbent Members ol' the Judiciary who seek a promotional or lateral appointment. pc11'orn1ance
lllay be based on la11dmark decisions penned: court records as to status or docket: repurts ul' the Ul'licc ul
the Court Ad!llinistrntor: verilied l'eedback from the lf3P: and a veriticd statemcnt 11s to his pcrforn1<111cc lix
the past three years. which shall include his caseload. his average monthly output in <111 11ctions and
proceedings. the nulllber of cases deelllcd sublllitted and the date they were deemed submitted. and the
number or his decisions du1ing the illlmcdiately preceding two-ye:ir period appe:iled to i1 higher court 1111cl
the percentage ol'artir1rn111ce thcreor.
SEC. .". <Jrlwr ucco1111J/i.1!11ne111.1. - The Council shall likewise consider other accornplisl1111cnts 01 the
applicant. such 11s authorship or law books. treatises. articles and other leg:i\ writings. whether publishecl or
not: and leadership in prnlcssional, civic or other organizations.
' 1Rule 5 SECTION I. r:1ide11ce of pmhi11 and independmce.- Any evidence relevant to the ca11clicl<1tc's
probity and independence such as. but not limited to. decisions he has rendered if he is <lll incumbent
lllC!llbcr o!' the judiciary or reflective ol' the soundness ol' his judgment. courage, rectitude. cold 11eutralit;
and strength ol'charncter shall be considered.
SEC. 2. Tcsti11/(111ial.1 nf /!rohit.1' and indepem/ence. - The Council may likewise consider valicl<l!ecl
testi111onies or the applicant's probity and independence fiom reputable onicials and irnp<irtial
urgani1<1tions.
Rule<> SFCTION I. c,'und heulrh. - Good physical health and sound 111ental1psychologiu1l 1111d cmotil11111\
c0t1clition 01 the applicant play a critical role in his capacity and capability to pcrl'orn1 the de\ic11tL' 111sk 01
ad111i11iste1ing justice. The applicant or the reco111111ending party shall submit together with his 11pplic<1tit1n
or the 1-cco111mench1tion a sworn 111edic~11 ccrtilic<ite or the results of an e\ccutive 111cclicii e\11111in11t1011
issued m conducted. as the case may be. within two months prior to the filing or the applic1tion rn
recolllrnrnclation. At its discretion. the Council may require the applicant to submit himself to another
medical and physical examination ii' it still has ~;0111e doubts on the lindings contained 111 the medic;il
ccrtilicatL' 11r the results of the c>:ecutive mcclica\ e>:amination.
SFC. 2. l\rd/()lugirnl11J.1rchia1ric 1e.11.1. - The applicant shall sub111it to psychologica\.1psychiatric tests ttl be
conducted h) the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by :i psychologist and/or psychi<itriq duly acueclitcd h;
the Council.
'' Rule 4 SECTION I. /:,'1idencL' of inlegrilr. - The Council shall take every possible step to vcrif) the
11pp\ica11t\ rcrnrd ol' and reputation !'or ho11esty. integrity. incorruptibility. i1Teproachab\e conduct. <lllLI
lidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this purpose. the :ipplicant shall submit to the Council
ccrtilications or testimonials thc1col' rro111 reputable government orticials and non-govcrnmrn111I
01g1111izations. and clearances linm the courts. National Bu1T<1t1 or Investigation. police. ;111c\ fru111 q1ch
other agencies as the Council may require.
SEC. 2. nuckgrn1111d check. - The Council may order a discreet backgrouml check 011 the intcgrit;.
reputation and charncter or the applicant, and receive lceclback thereon fro111 the public. which it c,h11ll
check 01 verif) to validate the 111erits thereof.
SEC. 3. Te.1/i/)/(;171 o/1>arlie.1.- The Council 111ay receive written opposition to an applicant on gn1uncl of his
moral fitness ;111c\. at its discretion. the Council may receive the testi111011y 01 the oppositor :it <l l1e;1ring
concluctecl Ii.Jr the purpose. with clue notice to the applicant who shall be <illowcd to cross-011111inc the
oppositor <rnd to olkr countc1vailing cv1clc11ce.
SH.'. cl .. lnonrn1011.1 com1J!ui1111. - ;\nonymous colllplaints against an applic<111t sh;ill not be given due
course. unless there 11ppcms on its l'c1cc a probable cause sufficient to engender belief th<tt the 1tlleg<1tions
may he true In the latter case. the C011nc1l 111ay either direct :i discreet invcstig<1tio11 01 require the ;1pp\1c;111t
to co1111m11t thereon in ll'riting or durin[! the interview
SEC. 5 Oi.1c11whfirn1ion. - The follovving 111-c disqualified fro111 being no111im11ecl for appointment tu 1111y
.1udicial 11ost or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombuds111a11:
I 1lwsL'11ith pending criminal or regular aclmi11istrnt1vc cc1scs:
2 Those with pending crilllincil rnse-; in foreign courts or tribunals: and
.~ I hose 11ho have been convicted in any criminal case: or in an administr<1tivc case. where t.hc pen11l1:
imposed is at kast 11 line o!'!llore than fl\0.000. un!e~,s he has been granted judicial clemency.
s1:c. (J. Orh('/' i/1.\/(1//r.'C.\ nfd1sq11u/ifi,,rfin11.- l11c11>nhu11j11dges. olTicials or personnel ol'the .ludil'lill'V ll'ho
are 1;1eing 11d111ini-,trntivc complaint;; u:1dc' 11!1;1r111<1! p1c\i111inary invcstig8tion t.11>1) h) the Onicc ot the
r'
Dl'.CISION
17
SEC.
Section I. / 'otes f'l.'l/ttired/iJr i11c/11sio11 us 110111inee. - No applicant shall be consicle1ed for nominrnio11 101
appointment to a.judicial position unless he shall obtain the a!Ti1wative vote or at least a majority ul.;1ll tl1c
Members nfthe Council
DECISION
18
Examining
the
"questions
integrity" made against Jardeleza
of
DECISION
19
/'vla1111s 1.
20
DLCISION
Ci.IZ. No.
21~181
have been a collective idea by the legal team which initially sought a
different manner of presenting the country's arguments, and there \.vas no
30
showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part. Even Chief Justice Sereno
was not certain that Jardeleza's acts were urged by politicking or lured by
31
extraneous promises. Besides, the President, who has the final say on the
conduct of the country's advocacy in the case, has given no signs that
Jardeleza's action constituted disloyalty or a betrayal of the country's trust
and interest. While this point does not entail that only the President may
challenge Jardeleza's doubtful integrity, it is commonsensical to assume that
he is in the best position to suspect a treacherous agenda. The records cit-e
bere!l of any informcition that indiccites this suspicion. In fact, the Comment
of the Executive Secretary expressly prayed for Jardeleza's inclusion in the
disputed shortlist.
The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding
international cases, given her participation in the PIA TCO case and the
Belgian Dredging case. Her efforts in the determination of Jardeleza s
professional background, while commendable, have not produced a patent
demonstration of a connection between the act complained of rmd his
integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her invocation
of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation
of the rule. To fall under Section 2, Rule l 0 of JBC-009, there must be a
showing that the act complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral
character or the person and not to his judgment as a professional. What this
disposition perceives, therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule I 0
of J BC-009 to the original ground of its invoccition.
As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of
Jardeleza's alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider-trading f(Jr fh(l
first time 011(1 during the June 30, 20 l 4 meeting of the JBC. As can be
gleaned from the minutes of the June 30, 2014 meeting, the inclusion or
these issues had its origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice
might raise issues of "immorality" against Jardeleza. 32 The Chief Justice
then deduced that the "immorality" issue referred to by the media might
have been the incidents that could have transpired when Jardeleza was still
the General Counsel of San Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as
the JBC had the duty to "take every possible step to verity the qualification
of the applicants,'' it might as well be clarified. 33
1
DECISION
21
Uuernrra1. Au1. Eula. 555 Phil 713 (2007): and Su111uniego v. ilU1 Ferri!/', 578 Phil. I (2008).
" ( ,'ero1 1 !I1m Culdem11. 593 Phil. 585. 597 (2008).
'''.Judge Flure11ciu D. Seulu11u-Ahh11 \'. /)ure::u La11re11ciunu-H11ruiin a11d 1'1111/ee11 5:11hidn. 558 l'hil. 2'1
'
(2007).
17
Tule11ti11n l'. .-1111. Norhertn /\lr!11do::u, A.C. No. 5 I 5 I. October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 519.
CJurridn 1 .. Atty. Garrido. A.C. No. 6593,: http: 'sc.judici:1ry govph _iurisprudcn:c -~111 ()
llhrn~1n::'OIO<i:i 1 l~ htm: last visited ALIL'.US! 15. 2014.
,., 1\/,11i;1 I 'ic1nriu I 'e111111u 1 Au1 Du11Jn Sumsnn. i\.C. No. 9608. November 27. 2012. 686 SCR/\ Ll.10.
18
'
DLCISION
'Y)
-'- L,
111
1.
lntcl"/)()J"/
l?e11,urce1
Cmpo1u1in11. Cl.R. No. 135808. October (1. 2008. 588 Phil. 651 (2008).
11
Sccwiries u17111~\chu11gl' ( 'rm11nissi1111 1 /11/C'lj)(Jr/ i?cso11J"ccs Cm1Jn101inn. Ci.R. No. 135808. (\tnhc't
::'008. citing Colin Chap1rn111. !lrJll"fhe ~11,k ,\f111ke111"111k1(ICJ88 eel.). pp. l.'il-152.
(i.
Dl'.CISION
,,.,
~-'
G.R. No.
21~181
The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due prncess
in JBC proceedings. After a tedious review of the parties' respective
arguments, the Court concludes that the right to due process is available and
thereby demandable as a matter of right.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature or J BC
proceedings. Indeed, they are distinct from criminal proceedings where the
finding of guilt or innocence of the accused is sine qua non. The JBC's
constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to the President cannot
be compared to the duty of the courts of law to determine the commission of
an offense and ascribe the same to an accused, consistent with established
rules on evidence. Even the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases
is far from the discretion accorded to the JBC.
The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the
argument that an applicant's access to the rights afforded under the due
process clause is discretionary on the pa1i of the JBC. While the facets of
.
~
G.R. No.
24
DFC!SJON
21~181
criminal'~ and administrative due process are not strictly applicable to Jl3C
proceedings, their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that clue
process is not demandable.
13
witness. Finally. all are guarnntecd freedom flo111 double _jeopardy and, if convicted. the right to appeal.
1
10 11 !icarim'. \\liich incl11dc-; tliL' rit'.hl nfthL' part\ intcrestL'd nr affrctcd lo p1l".;c11t Iii', (l\ln
' I he
~\1 1 c
1
\:11t !llli\ 1mi:,1 tliL: pi!ril he '"1c11<lll11ppununil) In prc,cnl l11s cC1sc am! to mkluc:<.' c1idrncL' t1'11di1'-'. l<'
c'',l:thli:,ii the' ri:.:h1, 11hich he' 11,:,crt;, h111 the tribunal 11n1sl consickr thL: cvi1kncc prC,L'ntcd
I;)
\\ llrll tlw dut' to dcliL1crc1te d11cc.. llPl 1111posc the d1ligatio11 to decide right. it d1,c:, i1n11ly 11
11l11d1 ,,1111wt he dhrcg!lrdcd. 11C1111\'h. tlrnt 11l !1d1i11,.: ,,11rn:tlling t\1 support ih dccisiu11
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iller1:
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\.'<ll1CiIISiOll.
t 'I
111;: tku,11111 1rn1:,1 he' 1c11dcrcd 111 tl1c n idn1cc 111\''c11tt:d :11 tile llciirin,,: Pr :1t il';1:-l c1rnt:1i111'Li 11 1:1L
l'l'<.111d ;ii;d di.,clncc'd l\> the' p:1rtlc' <lik1:kd.
(IJ)
(\!"
i11ckp1.11dc'!l1 u111,idcr:1fiPn of the !<11.Y <11Hi 1;1ch cd 1J1v contro1ersy. and not ;imply ;icccpt !lie'
'llh()nli11;itc i111ll'ri1111g at <1 ckri-;i(lJl.
1:1
1111: l
1 1 1111
tl!
Iii:, ,l\!1
1 :c11'
,,1 ;i
\\! lnd11,11i;t! f\cl<1ii111, .lwuld. !11 :ill v1lnlro1.c1,i:d q11c:qio11-;. render ii' dec:i-;i1'11 i11 :1l!l:l1 11
1na1111er th:1t the 1x1rties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved. <llld the reasons for ll1e
or
l;11111c
in.
~22l'hil.)12
(2007).
Dl'.CIS!ON
15
G.R. No.1Ul81
Id.
26
DLCJSION
G.R. No.
21~181
a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant
who shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer
countervailing evidence.
4. Anonymous
DFCISION
27
1
"
28
DFCISION
l.-
1
' i'<l1dpii1<1't'd i"nllll lile )[1(" Jl1CCli\le"', ill ()l"cil',.
1 i1
11ph,1:d L(lllilCiclllicJlit).
Dl:CISION
29
CJ.R. No.
21~181
SMC; and 3] alleged insider trading which led to the "show cause" order
from the Philippine Stock Exchange.' 1'>
As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his
side, as he would not want to be "lulled into waiving his rights." Instead, he
manifested that his statement be put on record and informed the Council or
the then pendency of his letter-petition with the Court en bane. When Chief
Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza that the Council would want to hear from
him on the three (3) issues against him, Jardeleza reasoned out that this was
precisely the issue. He found it irregular that he was not being given the
opportunity to be heard per the JBC rules. He asserted that a candidate must
be given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him. He urged the
Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal and translate the objections in
writing. Towards the end of the meeting, the Chief Justice said that both
Jardeleza's written and oral statements would be made part of the record.
After Jardeleza was excused from the conference, Justice Lagman suggested
that the voting be deferred, but the Chief Justice ruled that the Council had
already completed the process required for the voting to proceed.
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the
determination that the application of the "'unanimity rule" on integrity
resulted in Jardeleza's deprivation of his right to due process.
As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept,
does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due
process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
50
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Even as Jardeleza was
verbally informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule I 0 of JBC-009
against him and was later asked to explain himself during the meeting, these
circumstances still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that lingers in the
mind of the Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in .JBC0 I 0 if the same would be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat.
as its wording provides, any complaint or opposition against a candidate
may be filed with the Secretary within ten ( 10) days from the publication of
the notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more
conspicuous to JBC members. Granting ex argumenti, that the I 0-day
51
period
is only applicable to the public, excluding the .I BC members
themselves, this does not discount the fact that the invocation of the first
ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised procedural issues. To
be fair, several members of the Council expressed their concern and desire to
hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-0 I 0 did not form part of the
1
"
'
DLCIS!ON
30
agenda then. It was only during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the
Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be
held on the same day when a resource person would shed light on the matter.
Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the
Council to resort to oral notice instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written
opposition, why did the JBC not take into account its authority to summon
Jardeleza in confidence at an earlier time? Is not the Council empowered to
"take every possible step to verify ,the qualification of the applicants'?"' It
would not be amiss to state, at this point, that the confidential legal
memorandum used in the invocation of the "unanimity rule" was actually
addressed to Jardeleza, in his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume is
his knowledge of the privileged nature thereof and the consequences of its
indiscriminate release to the public. Had he been privately informed of the
al legations against him based on the document and had he been ordered to
respond thereto in the same manner, Jardeleza 's right to be informed <md to
explain himself would have been satisfied.
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the
circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to
instantaneously provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent
defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the
context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was he given a
reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely ask.eel to
appear in a meeting where he would be, right then m1d there, subjected to an
inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his
extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the
June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC
discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should
prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude
the very idea of due process in which the right to explain oneself is given,
not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a reasonable
opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response.
Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise.
Needless to state, Jardeleza's grievance is not an imagined slight but a
real rebuff of his right to be informed of the charges against him and his
right to answer the same with vigorous contention and active participation in
the proceedings which would ultimately decide his aspiration to become a
magistrate of this Court.
_) l
DFCISION
Consequences
To write finis to this controversy and in view of the realistic rn1d
practical fruition of the Court's findings, the Court now declares its position
on whether or not Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist, just in time
when the period to appoint a member of the Court is about to end.
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:
1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to Jardeleza's legal
strategy in handling a case for the government.
1
Dl~C IS ION
32
In the Court's study of the petition, the comments and the applicable
rules of the JBC, the Court is of the view that the rules leave much to be
desired and should be reviewed and revised. It appears that the provision on
the "unanimity rule'' is vague and unfair and, therefore, can be rnis11sed or
ohuscd resulting in the deprivation ofan applicant's right to due process.
Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is
effectively a veto power over the collective will of a majority. This should
be clarilied. Any assertion by a member after voting seems to be unfair
because it effectively gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes
or the other members in view of the unanimous requirement. While an
oppositor-rnember can recuse himself or herself, still the probability ol'
annulling the majority vote of the Council is quite high.
Second. integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial
impression is that it refers to the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it
has been. used to mean other things. In fact, the minutes of the JBC meetings
i\/u11/u1'<1 1 f'o!icc !Jirfftor !?cinu!du !'. 1uri!la c111d ,-!/IL R11fi11n .lcf/icT !. 1\/w;cre. ~lJ:"
l'ilil. 'i07 (2008). citing S111rc f'mserntnn , . .\f11m. l\d111. rvlattn No. RTJ-92-8/(J. I 9 Scptc111bn I 'i'J,.J. 2.~!1
SCR.I\ ~O'i. ~22-~2:0
DECISION
,.,,.,
.) _)
in this case reflect the lack of consensus among the members as to its precise
definition. Not having been defined or described, it is vague, nebulous and
confusing. It must be distinctly specified and delineated.
Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground
against a candidate. Should it be invoked only by an outsider as construed by
the respondent Executive Secretary or also by a member?
Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and need
not be formal or trial type, they must meet the minimum requirements of due
process. As always, an applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity
and time to be heard on the charges against him or her, if there are any.
'
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nu.
34
DH'!Sf( ii'\
:21.~iXI
\VE CONCUR:
(No part)
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
_,
rJ~~
(No part)
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
I~~ ~ ~
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I
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filli
.
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. ~f'"'KJ
4b-
I
Associate Justicc
Co'-..
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(On official le:we)
Associtttc Justice
Associ8te Justice
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~El~t%BERNARE
ESTELA
/\ssoci8te
Ju~ticc
"
t\ssociate Justice
DECISION
35
CERTIFICATION