3

An Aesthetics of Existence
The theorist who put forth the now classical post
modern topos on the death of man in the 7960s
reveals here a certain nostalgia for the subiect.
Redefining in part the scope of his intellectual
activity in the 7980s as constituting a new
genealogy of morals, Foucault now centers his
research on a subiect who turns his life into an
exemplary work of art. The question of truth in
politics is one which must be addressed by an
intellectual whose parrhesia (free speech) functions
in the name of knowledge and experience.
Originally given on April 25, 7984 to Alessandro
Fontana (a collaborator with Foucault on I, Pierre
Riviere) for the Italian weekly Panorama this
discussion subsequently reappeared in Le Monde
on July 75-76, 7984. The translation is by Alan
Sheridan.

AF. Several years have gone by since La Volante de savoir.

I know that your latest books have presented you with a
number of problems and difficulties. I would like you to talk
to me about those difficulties and about this voyage into the
Greco-Roman world, which was, though not unknown to
you, at least unfamiliar.
FOUCAULT The difficulties derived from the project itself,
which was intended precisely to avoid them. By programming
my work over several volumes according to a plan laid down
in advance, I was telling myself that the time had now come
when I could write them without difficulty, and simply
unwind what was in my head, confirming it by empirical
research.
I very nearly died of boredom writing those books: they
were too much like the earlier ones. For some people, writing

48 Self-Portraits

a book is always a risk - the risk, for instance, of not pulling

it off. When you know in advance where you're going to end
up there's a whole dimension of experience lacking, namely,
the risk attached to writing a book that may not come off. So I
changed the general plan: instead of studying sexuality on the
borders of knowledge and power, I have tried to go further
back, to find out how, for the subject himself, the experience
of his sexuality as desire had been constituted. In trying to
disentangle this problematic, I was led to examine certain very
ancient Latin and Greek texts. This required a lot of
preparation, a lot of effort, and left me right up to the end
with a lot of uncertainties and hesitations.
A.F. There is always a certain "intentionality" in your
works that often eludes the reader. His toire de la folie was
really the history of the constitution of that branch of
knowledge known as psychology; Les Mots et les choses was the
archaeology of the human sciences; Surveiller et punir was
about the installation of the disciplines of the body and soul.
It would seem that what is at the center of your recent works
is what you call "truth games."
FOUCAULT I don't think there is a great difference
between these books and the earlier ones. When you write
books like these, you want very much to change what you
think entirely and to find yourself at the end of it quite
different from what you were at the beginning. Then you
come to see that really you've changed relatively little. You
may have changed your point of view, you've gone round
and round the problem, which is still the same, namely, the
relations between the subject, truth, and the constitution of
experience. I have tried to analyze how areas such as
madness, sexuality, and delinquency may enter into a certain
play of the truth, and also how, through this insertion of
human practice, of behavior, in the play of truth, the subject
himself is affected. That was the problem of the history of
madness, of sexuality.
AF. Doesn't this really amount to a new genealogy of
morals?
FOUCAULT Not withstanding the solemnity of the title
and the grandiose mark that Nietzsche has left on it, I'd say
yes.

In a piece that appE

1983, you speak, in relation to
towards ethics and of moralitiE
the same distinction as that be
and those that emerge with C
FOUCAULT With Christial
gradual shift in relation to the
were essentially a practice, a s;
had also been certain norms c
individual's behavior. But the
the search for an ethics of exist
an attempt to affirm one's libel
a certain form in which om
recognized by others, and whi
an example.
This elaboration of one's _
art, even if it obeyed certain
centre, it seems to me, of m
morality in Antiquity, where
religion of the text, the idea of .
obedience, morality took on in_
rules (only certain ascetic pracl
the exercise of personal liberty
From Antiquity to Christie
that was essentially the sean
morality as obedience to a s:
interested in Antiquity it was
reasons, the idea of a morality
is now disappearing, has alre
absence of morality correspond
for an aesthetics of existence.
AF. Has all the knowledg
about the body, sexuality, t
relationship with others, our b
FOUCAULT I can't help but
whole series of things, eve
choices, around certain forms I
AF.

1. "Usage des plaisirs et techniques de

[L.D.K.].

An Aesthetics of Existence 49

AF. In a piece that appeared in Le Debat in November

1983, you speak, in relation to Antiquity, of moralities turned
towards ethics and of moralities turned towards codes. 1 Is this
the same distinction as that between Greco-Roman moralities
and those that emerge with Christianity?
FOUCAULT With Christianity, there occurred a slow,
gradual shift in relation to the moralities of Antiquity, which
were essentially a practice, a style of liberty. Of course, there
had also been certain norms of behavior that governed each
individual's behavior. But the will to be a moral subject and
the search for an ethics of existence were, in Antiquity, mainly
an attempt to affirm one's liberty and to give to one's own life
a certain form in which one could recognize oneself, be
recognized by others, and which even posterity might take as
an example.
This elaboration of one's own life as a personal work of
art, even if it obeyed certain collective canons, was at the
centre, it seems to me, of moral experience, of the will to
morality in Antiquity, whereas in Christianity, with the
religion of the text, the idea of the will of God, the principle of
obedience, morality took on increaSingly the form of a code of
rules (only certain ascetic practices were more bound up with
the exercise of personal liberty).
From Antiquity to Christianity, we pass from a morality
that was essentially the search for a personal ethics to a
morality as obedience to a system of rules. And if I was
interested in Antiquity it was because, for a whole series of
reasons, the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of rules
is now disappearing, has already disappeared. And to this
absence of morality corresponds, must correspond, the search
for an aesthetics of existence.
AF. Has all the knowledge accumulated in recent years
about the body, sexuality, the disciplines improved our
relationship with others, our being in the world?
FOUCAULT I can't help but think that discussion around a
whole series of things, even independently of political
choices, around certain forms of existence, rules of behavior,
1. "Usage des plaisirs et techniques de soi," Le Debat 27 (November 1983), 46--72
[L.DX].

50 Self-Portraits

etc., has been profoundly beneficial - the relation with the

body, between man and woman, with sexuality.
AF. SO this knowledge has helped us to live better.
FOUCAULT The change hasn't just been in what people
thought about and talked about, but also in philosophical
discourse, in theory and critique: indeed, in most of these
analyses, people are not told what they ought to be, what
they ought to do, what they ought to believe and think. What
they do rather is to bring out how up till now social
mechanisms had been able to operate, how the forms of
repression and constraint had acted, and then, it seems to me,
people were left to make up their own minds, to choose, in
the light of all this, their own existence.
AF. Five years ago, in your seminar at the College de
France, we started to read Hayek and Von Mises. 2 People
then said: Through a reflection on liberalism, Foucault is
going to give us a book on politics. Liberalism also seemed to
be a detour in order to rediscover the individual beyond the
mechanisms of power. Your opposition to the phenomeno
logical subject and the psychological subject is well known. At
that time, people began to talk about a subject of practices,
and the rereading of liberalism took place to some extent with
that in view. It will come as a surprise to nobody that people
said several times: there is no subject in Foucault's work. The
subjects are always subjected, they are the point of application
of normative techniques and disciplines, but they are never
sovereign subjects.
FOUCAULT A distinction must be made here. In the first
place, I do indeed believe that there is no sovereign, founding
subject, a universal form of subject to be found everywhere. I
am very sceptical of this view of the subject and very hostile
to it. I believe, on the contrary, that the subject is constituted
through practices of subjection, or, in a more autonomous
way, through practices of liberation, of liberty, as in Antiquity,

2. Friedrich August von Hayek (1899- ). Austrian political economist who

examined the relationship between individual values and economic controls.
Richard von Mises (1883-1953). German mathematician and philosopher.
Specialist in aerodynamics and hydrodynamics who set out to develop a frequency of
probability theory based on an empirical method [L.D.K.].

on the basis, of course, of

inventions to be found in the
AF. This brings us to cOl
hard: on the international plan
of Yalta and the confrontatiOt
home, we have the specter of
to all this, little remains betwel
difference of style. So how, gh
is one to decide whether there
FOUCAULT It seems to me
and somewhat narrow. It sho
kinds of question: in the first :
not accept? secondly, if we do
For the first question, one mt:
we must not accept, either the
prolongation of a certain stratE
fact that half of Europe is ensl
Then we ask the other I
against a power like that of tl
our own government and wi
sides of the Iron Curtain, ar
division as it has been establiE
Union, there is not a great dea
effectively as possible those w:
for the other two tasks, we ha
AF. SO we must not as~
Hegelian attitude and accept TI
to us. But there is still anothe
politics?"
FOUCAULT I believe too ml
there are different truths and
truth. Of course, one can't ex]
truth, the whole truth, and I
other hand, we can demand oj
truth as to their ultimate aim
tactics, and a number of parti
this is the parrhesia (free speech
must question those who gO\i
knowledge, the experience t]
citizens, of what those who go'
I

An Aesthetics of Existence 51

on the basis, of course, of a number of rules, styles,

inventions to be found in the cultural environment.
AF. This brings us to contemporary politics. Times are
hard: on the international plane, we are seeing the blackmail
of Yalta and the confrontation of the two power blocs. At
home, we have the specter of the economic crisis. In relation
to all this, little remains between the Left and the Right but a
difference of style. So how, given this reality and its dictates,
is one to decide whether there is any possible alternative?
FOUCAULT It seems to me that your question is both right
and somewhat narrow. It should be broken down into two
kinds of question: in the first place, do we have to accept or
not accept? secondly, if we do not accept, what can be done?
For the first question, one must reply quite unambiguously:
we must not accept, either the after-effects of the war, or the
prolongation of a certain strategic situation in Europe, or the
fact that half of Europe is enslaved.
Then we ask the other question: "What can be done
against a power like that of the Soviet Union, in relation to
our own government and with the peoples who, on both
sides of the Iron Curtain, are determined to question the
division as it has been established?" In relation to the Soviet
Union, there is not a great deal to be done, except to assist as
effectively as possible those who are struggling out there. As
for the other two tasks, we have a lot to accomplish.
AF. SO we must not assume what might be called a
Hegelian attitude and accept reality as it is, as it is presented
to us. But there is still another question: "Is there a truth in
politics?"
FOUCAULT I believe too much in truth not to suppose that
there are different truths and different ways of speaking the
truth. Of course, one can't expect the government to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. On the
other hand, we can demand of those who govern us a certain
truth as to their ultimate aims, the general choices of their
tactics, and a number of particular points in their programs:
this is the parrhesia (free speech) of the governed, who can and
must question those who govern them, in the name of the
knowledge, the experience they have, by virtue of being
citizens, of what those who govern do, of the meaning of their

52 Self-Portraits

action, of the decisions they have taken.

However, one must avoid a trap in which those who
govern try to catch intellectuals and into which they often fall:
"Put yourselves in our place and tell us what you would do."
It is not a question one has to answer. To make a decision on
some question implies a knowledge of evidence that is refused
us, an analysis of the situation that we have not been able to
make. This is a trap. Nevertheless, as governed, we have a
perfect right to ask questions about the truth: "What are you
doing, for example, when you are hostile to Euromissiles, or
when, on the contrary, you support them, when you
restructure the Lorraine steel industry, when you open up the
question of private education."
AF. In that descent into hell that a long meditation, a
long search represents - a descent in which one sets off in a
sense in search of a truth - what type of reader would you
like to meet and tell this truth to? It is a fact that, although
there may still be good authors, there are fewer and fewer
good readers.
FOUCAULT Never mind "good" readers - I'd say fewer
and fewer readers. And it's true one isn't read anymore.
One's first book is read, because one isn't known, because
people don't know who one is, and it is read in disorder and
confusion, which suits me fine. There is no reason why one
should write not only the book, but also lay down the law as
to how it should be read. The only such law is that of all
possible readings. It doesn't bother me particularly if a book,
given that it is read, is read in different ways. What is serious
is that, as one goes on writing books, one is no longer read at
all, and from distortion to distortion, reading out of others'
readings, one ends up with an absolutely grotesque image of
the book.
This does indeed pose a problem: is one to involve
oneself in polemics and reply to each of these distortions and,
consequently, lay down the law to readers, which I find
repugnant, or leave the book to be distorted to the point at
which it becomes a caricature of itself, which I find equally
repugnant?
There is a solution, however: the only law on the press,
the only law on books, that I would like to see brought in,

would be a prohibition to
together with a right to anon'
each book might be read for i
knowledge of the author is a
from a few great authors, thi
of the others, serves absolut.
barrier. For someone like me
only someone who writes b(
books were read for themsl:
qualities they may have.

An Aesthetics of Existence

53

would be a prohibition to use an author's name twice,

together with a right to anonymity and to pseudonyms so that
each book might be read for itself. There are books for which a
knowledge of the author is a key to its intelligibility. But apart
from a few great authors, this knowledge, in the case of most
of the others, serves absolutely no purpose. It acts only as a
barrier. For someone like me - I am not a great author, but
only someone who writes books - it would be better if my
books were read for themselves, with whatever faults and
qualities they may have.