Sows, PQ, Slhatid, Papers. VeATL, Taw York
donion. Qpnloma Publishing , 4980.
The University of Chicago
STUDIES
CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY
VOLUME 1
‘THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
os
EDWARD ARNOLD, OFTo HARRASSOWITZ
9 Denpean 3,6. ‘emerTHE IDEA OF GOOD IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC:
A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF SPECULATIVE ETHICS,
race Son
“ttn te of satet epg
hos Idea of Good bat sco for two thousand year asthe
type of an Inping bot mystal and incompecenste spow.
Intin. “The gout, my master, hat you et rom het Tape:
end esa tan the Good of Pato” extn ave ofthe Midis
Comedy. A somewhat aperypal tealon estes hat a lage
flene acembled to bear Pte lecture on the Goo, but aa
iy rsd sry ou be plunged deeper and deeper tnt tatecen:
dental mathematien, vot Aratole remained the slay auditor
‘The NeoPatoniste followed the mater In stiguing the Good &
place beyond Being in ther hypostatls Mesreen bt varouly
Acted te velaton to the One and ther debumiattony of the
‘bvolites
‘Not less baling has this ebslos eny proved to adem
commentators. German scholshp stil ponderous debate the
‘depo othe dently ofthe Iden of Good withthe Dvty?
‘CxIK, GX, mb tr tg
Pitan bt ul ee
end eter a em po ed tf
ese ae gute bat pn ot (Cay Danan Sl
lo ont ow att ot a Ma nnd nw iy
‘pet en sev Sag es ag a
GEE! Rain opcmqy te woe aces yt
‘Eta ec py Pe gw ea
St thr din ah hw esc oak eg ne
ite ome vase ess ape
ntl ytd an
*
‘THE IDEA OF GOOD IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC 189
doe nis eee die pier of
Si hk rao Sat Sera at
sm ida nue ew Seen Sh Dae et
Te tare Sean agai ya
haga nun a Gl eh ah
ty ube “aarti
Spud eld Ot ln rn ite
stor ete pa S'S
opt sl hoes nay Se
seat eae ote ple og te
era
Tog awning oi, pe hw tte
rome oe Rate tat ae it
igerucr hl yutt pl Sater po
Sipe te nt tis wan Se
aca Gags ofa ee a ea
Fs one met eel Ea
eta tr sel eat ny an
Seay ea Se
Sw men yc al ope ie
‘Serco ing Stale hn Rie
teeth es Wad eee ah
Sone ne ata i pcs
ste ta lh ce oe Saal
ectnnlar a Se oeth Saprt Seine hc
Se
Be pment el ete or ce
aes tol eae at te
Behrens dea oh Srey mt pe
tse buon ctl ae Sach pe
dasa coal wane
sme ain i
Sion seres se mone eee
Senha aes cere
LAldE a aatial STUDIES IN CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY.
Secrates is about to treat of the higher special education of
the men who have been selected froma the dominant military este
tobe the trae rulers and guardians ofthe sate, These men most
not acquiesce in the partial and approximate definitions of the
cardinal virtues which answered the prpore of the previous dt:
fusson, aor in the inadequate dlleetie which produced such def-
nitions’ They must parsie the “longer way,” and. bestow the
retest pains and the minuest accuracy on that knowledge which
of most worth! ‘This isthe knowledge of the Idea of Good by
opiee rtf reergeemen
poe tren ener
at ancien
See Stennett amet
Soegieencmeivaecies Meter
Serco acces mance
Shee ciemcneaeeeernee
igh accmees oenhervongr am
ireyemencae qimelgeter rel
douse Seis aerator
mete Sota etree
Sei See
See
i ny mete cegrtmgee nes
Sciacca te einer
sea caret cients pea,
Sota cma to any es ote
‘egret wee cotancs (Law 65 8 revs de rev titer is,
Hae Rae eae
diesen fitca ot bo paramore
SRSvE Seite une atte
Sie tet etn eisai wens ga
‘Ras of Harnett A ew he
overestimate
EEgugea ecu aye At wap er oh te yey ae ae
THE ABER OF GOOD IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC AQT
tse of which justice and the other virtues are made heipfal and
profitable. For it is a truism, surely, thit no. knowledge or
possession profits anything unless tls accompanied by the
‘Gooat
ow dificult of attainment fg this knowledge sppests from a
glance at current contioversi, ‘There are two hist partes; one
sect maintaining that pleasure, the other that knowlege, fs the
Supreme good. But nether side is able to defend it position con.
tently. ‘The advocates of pleasure are obliged to edt thet
fome pleasures are bad? The advocates of knowielge, when
‘asked fo define and distinguish from the ars, elences, and pro-
fessins the special knowledge of which they speak, fal nto the
Vicious clcle of repylag, the knowledge of the " good”* And
yet it i evident that though men might rest astisfed with the
femblance af the just and bonorsble, when it comes t the good,
they demand the realty
rl wre eat oie Nu oa econ of at he te,
‘eating the dpe eho mp Se et
oe etree tp Dy mle iio otf on
oe he rein Sacto pty ot geo ie
FSC oh Ag Bs bn era mee ge
Eason suey
"Bech eh le 2g: ty apy et 20 Demy
oder tonnes “nia Eca asd "pr Whe ty
ers ey (Du. 942 Cs sew Ht dane ti
intneero) mot be dated foe Fore hes
tian eh Pan ona es Sea a th ns Cove
eg, Gg 9 By Feb 15,48 A, Bet creme pct
‘orn i cot 7 Bs ep
Same 4 ach 1p Bt yt 0
{sii eh tne fen tee ed freee
ee a mance
Re aie of spe am Theat 1 Ce tt te ery wo
tua al ei che tl sy ty Det sets ae od
eta ar Goss ca sige pr vara mal en A
ytBs dbetjr eh ures} rte tl fr cn ob Sle Se-” ee
Of this good then, the goa of all effort, the dimly apprehended
desire of every living soul the rulers of ‘our state mast not be
‘ignorant, “For no man will bea ft custodian ofthe virtues who
does not know just Bow sed why they are goods
Tefore proceeding with the Interpretation of the Republi it
may be well to dvell for a moment on the significance of these
eas for modern ethical theory, signicance deguised bat not
suppressed by the fact that modern ethics ie generally stated in
ferms of right or duty rather than of the good, ‘To the "Good,"
however, as Professor Sidgwick (Methods of Ethics, p 303)
admis, our ethical ideas must utiately be refereed, "In short,
he only socalled virtues which ean be thovght to be essentially
and slays such, and incapable of excess are such qualities ab
‘Wisdom, Univer! Benevolence, and n'a sense) Justice; of
which the motives manifestly involve this notion of Good, supe
posed already determinate. If then we ace asked what it
Good which it Is exelent to know, to bestow on other, to dh
tsibute impartially, it would be obviownly absurd to reply that i
fs just this knowledge, these beneficent purposes this impartial
distibation”
Tt has Become ¢ commonplace of erties to affirm that Pato
cf
contradicts bimuelé with regard to the nature of this postal
timate basis of etleal idea, and that he evades the recone
ion of his contradictory statements by means of poetical met
phor. The inconsistency, however lke mor alleged examples of
hth tie gn ra me
Tei ca
on oft ihe ont he chndvapar cso mt oo
‘ison we, nh a ate netic wah be dened y eign acs oes
site ea busts th go! she pase ee ae
‘Separator hho oe nate (awn 9 Yo
see ped cn ponte
the one fom te ober pice Pica Jout azo ta he aumento
tie progr less Zope ie of Aoi oe Dea at Np
peters siete ey Sesion my wh te ine
‘Ecgsone oo’ sr itn te emma he agg oo
santa
2
THE IDid OF GOOD IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC. 193
Platonsinconstenti, is apparent rather than seal To the Protag
‘ras Socrates mantsns against Prosagoras the hedonistic thers
‘that pleasure gue pleasure i always the goad! while in the Gorse
In eloquently proteste against this way of speech se subverting of
ronatity. Bot the purpose of theee dialogues largely dems,
their arguments make no elim to Boalt? and they mut be later
ted in the light of his matarer constructive writings The
Vhilebos pines out the psychological Imitations tothe principle of
the Protagoras arising from the inevitable implication of pleaure
And pln, and develops the hint of the Gorgias tnt what men
generally take for pleasure isa negative state, the cessation of &
reconditioning uneasiness. “The Republic and Lay
‘ceding that pure pleasures are oud and that mackind will
Inevitably follow the ure of pleasure, enlarge on the roca con-
siderations that forbid our apeaking of individual pleanre or
leven happiness asthe iret aim of private effort or public legie
Into.
‘Modern ulitarians Ike Grote condemn this procedure st
erations, and affirm that the Protagoas contsins the only postive
Aehsition of the Good that Pte as vouchsafed to wat
Dat the attitude of moder evautiot ethice toward this
crude hedonism is precisely that of Plt. ‘The proposition that
pleasure gna plssute is the Good ie unmeaning or teutlogoos ia
abstract generality. dpet Gyr 18 Bdan areusras viv lor
Aveo hvraiy asks Seerater in the Protagorae The question
fale one. Tt ignores the essential limitations of human le,
Pleasure and pain as Socrates observes in the Phaedo (8), are
29 elated that he who pursues and wins the one le almost nevi
‘ably compelled to accept the other alsa, We cannot dlsentangle
pleasure and pain from thelr meteal impliation, and their compli
cated psychical and. socal concomitant, 0 ts to weigh ther
against each other in the sales of the hedonistic ealculs of the
Protagoras® or exchange them a the casrent coin of hapless
epee et nn nes
Sty 08a he dln in Rp Bs oe Nr a
epi ho nrdbas Mh wl Seda
050 doug ta ctr tr_ EE EEE”
and virtue The direct hedonistic callus ie impracticable, and
its attempted abstract verbal aplication constrains us to etsen-
Lally harmful and wnclfying modes of speech, as when the com.
firtent hedoniat avers (Lelie Stephen, Scenes of ties, p. 361)
that fn our estimate we must set of the pleasure of the murderer
against the paln sulfered by bis vsti, cr Phebus, 55 B)ehat a
nan ls better in s far and 20 long ae he experencsspletsute.
‘Dut an indirect hedoniotie calculus is practically the subsite.
tion of snother criterion. The Utiltaian ‘tics difers from the
Evolationist, says Lesie Stephen (. ets p 366), in that “the
fone lays down a8 a criterion the happiness, the ater th health of
the society” ‘This Is prciely the diference between the Ethics
of the Protagoras au interpreted by Grote and the Ethics of the
Gorgias and Republic? “Mr. Stephen adds, “the two are not
really divergent” and this isthe thesls which Plato strains every
nerve to prove throughout the Republic and Laws,
"The Platonic ethic, then, doesnot ceect hodotatieatitarian.
fam In favor of & mystic itutinaliom, Te nesntane only that
the utitaan calculus must be worked out through larger lana
tstablished by the consensus of the highert wisiom of society?
Te is not safe to start with pleasure and evolve the vitues, and
5 pens on to formulte polish and aocal ideals. We mast
deduce the virtues from some higher law ofthe world and man,
fod then prove the coincidence of virtue and happiness. A pas.
tage from ie. Spencers Data of Ethics (§ 21) wil bring out more
‘ently the lose analogy that obtains between the cthice of evel
tion sad the Mstone this, Mr- Spencer complain that ordinary
ilitarians persistently "disregard the fact chat empiccal tft
nism is bata transitional form to be passed through on the way
to mtionalatlitaraniom, .. «Tt is supposed that im foture
‘ow uty is to be determined only by observation of results, and
that there is no ponibity of Knowing by dedietion fromm funda-
‘mental principles what conduct must be detvimental and what
feonduct must be beneficial” And ina foctnote he adds: And
Guin ay By Cy Rep ae Dy By 45 As 89-00
Repay he ot ly trode Pater de
et Sirti
EERE EE IEE IES
Teonceive it to be the businss of moral science to deduce (rom
‘the laws of life and the conditions of ealstence what kinds af
: tend to produce ankappiness. Taving_ done
{hs ite deductions are to be recognized a laws of conduct, ml
fare to be conformed to irespective of a dlieet estimation of
‘apes or misery.
‘With these words we may compare the statement in the
Republic that happiness whether of individuals or clases, i nt
to be the guiding principle of legisation, but rather the right
performance of his specie function by every member of the
‘community, and so much happiness as may conse therewith?
‘Andon the necessity of deducing pleasure and pal from higher
laws rather than af inferring higher lows by tect estimate
‘of pleasures and pain, we may compare a noteworthy passage of
the Laws (733 B, Jowett): "Let us say thatthe temperate hfe le
fone kind of life, and the rational another, and the courageous
nother, andthe healthful aoother; and wo these four let vs oppose
four other lives, —the falc, the cowardly, the intemperate, the
Aiseased. Hee who Knows the temperate life wil describe tain
all things gentle, having. gentle pains and gentle pleasures and
placid desires and loves nt insane; whereas the intemperate life
{s mpetuous inal things, and has violent pine sad pleasures and
vehement and stinging desires, and loves utterly insane and in
the temperate fe the pleasures exceed the pany but inthe inter.
perate life the pains exceed the pleasures in number and frequency
Hence one of the two liver i naturally and necessarily? more
pleasant and the other more prinfl, and he who would live
Pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live intemperstely.”
‘The diference between Mato end the evelatioiet ix that Plato
‘asa practical moral teacher prefers to stare withthe traditional
‘virtues of popular morality and demonstrate that by the lans af
life they necessarily prodace happiness, while the evolationit 2
fa disinterested scout student of life starts with the awe of fe
‘and endeavors to dedice fiom them beth virtte and happines
‘The one atemprs to deine happiness interme of virtue, the ether
hare.
ie afer 82 rh eee srk
oro ee gi
8‘etwe in tems of bappiness, And thus it rents chat the Jae
guage of Plato sometimes appears profoundly ansceatie, the
Tanguage of the evolutionist grosly unethical, In maintaining
the essential identity of their methods ae against empire weiter
anism I would not ignore this ference, No inespu conde of
aletic can ever bridge the gull of feeling that divider such
tuttrances es Mr. Spence’s saying that ‘long with the greater
laberation af fe produced by the pursuit of more mumerons ends
there goes that increase doration of life which constitutes the
supreme end,” from the ndbla wor ef Socrates in the Gorge
“Nay, dear frend, have « care lest the noble and the good be
something lee than survival and being preserved Life i sweet,
‘hey sy.” But the true man will not be concerned fori length
nor eng to the Reting bret, but wil permit this to heaven, nd,
Delioving with the women that no man can escape fate, he wil
‘consider rather how he may best spend his apeinted tara.
Bat it iste to return fom this wnavoiable digression to the
interpretation of the Republi. Socrates Inteloeutors pray hin
te decide the question fr them and pronounce whether knowledge
for pleasure be the Good, But Socrates declares that he fs not
winged for so lft «Might today. In place of the Good elf he
wl revel to them the offspring and analogue of the Good in the
Visible word. There are to worlds, the visible world of things
apprehended by sense, and ebiely by the noblest organ of rene,
the eye, and the invisible world of thoaght seen only bythe mind
Lord ofthe visible word is the un, the cause at once af visbity
{nthe objet and of vision jn the organ of sight, and, more than
this, the wkimate soaree of esstence ile, and. growth fn, both
Hig lghe lathe mecium in which the eye Beholde all thingy and,
‘hough not itself vision, isthe source of the stream of leon that
foes out from the eye to meet him? Hy an exact ansogy the
{ides of) Good, lord ofthe intelligible wot, ig the source Both af
Knowledge and existence there. The realities ofthis world owe
tit both their being and their elng knowa. Yet just as the
fan, though the source af vision, is not vison, so the Ios of
#59, Dy By sf Timoron a5 C, 67 Cand Hepes apse sayings "Dut
sje Shen hoger fe oe
36
OS DE
Sod, though the walspting of knowledge and Belg, is not
Being but someting beyond and above ifn dignity td power
‘The practical etiel outcome ol all thi, ab Pato. hints the
oral fe paves rym rh vob dyebod Esa? is merely hae
feoness fe more precious than any knowledge of ntlecteal
fey —a thought Wh eae «Bae en with Pf hi
er Frid and which he expresses inthe Laws by sverng tat
‘ete is wisdom and that intellectual keconee end ules
Aivored fom goodness i ind snd aeeget fly?
‘But the tsk of eu interpretation ef nd the impled mean
igs of al the alvere banshee of the allegory, and telat them
AE pousible (0 to the minor Matoie dislogue, (to the perma
ent problems of speculative thes. The coven expantion are
rely vert and eerie tore than an eplifcation of Pats
‘own phraseology. The Good sys Fino" pum orem ome
‘io prncipa, actus pres, actos segoetia cnet Wvfcens™
Stalhaum's forid Latin prephrve is 2 type of thew alk The
dea of Good isa “species perfection atqe borate smn
de un ete tae, nm rs genet pro os
faces sunt tam cent vtstemge nanicantr
fre bse on th tea sd esha! imcpetion oe
octrine of ets fom swich the fie rtm of Avstte
fakes is start!” And the erticr of the ore school, down, to
Sallaum and. Me. Archer ind, continue fo paraporese Patos
cic description ofthis able Good, whe thet opponents
dows to Grote and Heber. Spencer, never grow Went of
Siting that no such absolute entity exists” Now, undoubtedly,
by the leter of Patonie dating, the Ties of Good isthe cause
‘ofthe goodness of all god thing, as the idea of three f the
‘oe of the threness ofall tae, the Hea of white the extee
ne
2 me et my dea
set ns rae er
SSSR Sa ashes ae nto
—s
Tee creat op ate pest te
oi R Taare nates me
”198 STUDIES 1 CLASSICAL PUILOLOGY.
of all whiteness. And if we read into Pato the Neo-Ptatonie
for modern fancy that ev i purely negative and that things
‘exist only in 20 far as they are good,’ we may make the Tdea
‘of Good the cause of all existence, Bat cauality though the
Indwelling presence ofthe Idea (as T have elsewhere shown and
shall expin more flly a subsequent paper) ie for Plato a mere
blank check, of universal dialectical application, bt intended to
be filed up whenever possible with concrete ethial and physical
meaning, ‘This simple method, a5 Plato bimselt not obscurely
hints, explains everything formally and noching substantively?
‘Much the same may bo ald of the interpretation that the
{ea of Good in the summum genus of the logical tee, the ute
rate abstraction equivalent to pure being from which all other
feneral and sbetract terme derive thelr esenoes by participa:
ion Any formal trth tht may be contsined in this explanation
eauires t0 be supplemented by observation of the ynamicsl
ovement of ethieal and cosmlcl forcen whereby we pass from
the supreme abstraction to its concrete embodiments, That the
transition cannot really be elfected with absolute consistency
‘when once we have ported the Idea in its transcendental islation
no objection, or rather It isan objection to be made once for all
tothe entire Platonic metaphysics and to any philosophy of the
brolute yet devised by the wit of man. Tt may be imposible to
pass by a continuous bridge of dlalectics fom the Idea of Good as
‘A metapiystal entity to the concrete world of man, but this does
‘not solve erica from the task of detecting the definite re
tos ofthat world tothe general conceptions and ideals af which
the Idea of Good is the symbal. The interpretation here offered
thas been given to my claues several times in recent year, and 1