ACE HAULERS CORP V. CA (GR No.

127934, 23 August 2000)

Civil liability in Criminal Cases
A vehicular mishap occurred involving a truck, a jeepney and a motorcycle. The
motorcycle was bumped by the jeepney and X, the motorcycle rider was run over by the
truck. X
died. Issue is whether or not in an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident, X
may
recover damages against the employer of the accused driver both in the criminal case
(delict)
and the civil case for damages based on culpa aquiliana.
In negligence case, the offended party has the option between an action for enforcement
of civil liability based on culpa criminal under RPC and action for recovery of damages based
on
culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. But he cannot recover damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission.
Consequently, a separate civil action for damages lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the
offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled only
to
the bigger amount of the 2, assuming the awards vary in 2 cases.

EDDIE B. SABANDAL, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIPE S. TONGCO

[G. R. No. 124498. October 5, 2001]
The Facts

On February 18, 1989, Eddie B. Sabandal entered into a memorandum of agreement on

dealership with respondent Philippines Today, Inc. for the distribution of the newspaper
Philippines Today, (now Philippine Star) in Bacolod City and in designated towns in Negros
Occidental.[3]
Under the agreement, petitioner shall pay for an equivalent amount of one month of
deliveries in advance within the first seven days of the succeeding month. Petitioners
allowable percentage of return shall be 10% and be entitled to a rebate of P0.15 per copy
sold.
After execution of the agreement, respondent Philippines Today, Inc. made regular
deliveries of the agreed copies of the newspaper to petitioner.
In order to make partial payments for the deliveries, on December 18, 1990 to April 15,
1991, petitioner issued to respondent several checks amounting to ninety thousand
(P90,000.00) pesos.

When respondent presented petitioners checks to the drawee banks for payment, the
bank dishonored the checks for insufficiency of funds and/or account closed. Consequently,
respondent made oral and written demands for petitioner to make good the
checks. However, petitioner failed to pay despite demands.
In December 1992, on the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Philippines
Today, Inc., assistant city prosecutor of Manila Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr. filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Manila eleven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
against petitioner.[4]
Three years later, or on October 11, 1995, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Negros Occidental at Himamaylan, a complaint against Philippines Today, Inc. for specific
performance, recovery of overpayment and damages.[5]
On October 11, 1995, petitioner also filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch
42, a motion to suspend trial in the criminal cases against him based on a prejudicial
question.[6]
On November 27, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners motion to suspend trial based
on a prejudicial question.[7]
On December 20, 1995, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration
of the denial.[8]
On January 9, 1996, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. [9]
Hence, this petition.[10]
The Issue

Whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the trial of the
criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against petitioner until after the
resolution of the civil action for specific performance, recovery of overpayment, and
damages.
The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. [11]
For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the
suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following
requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues

raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. [13]
In this case, the issue in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is
whether the accused knowingly issued worthless checks. The issue in the civil action for
specific performance, overpayment, and damages is whether complainant Sabandal
overpaid his obligations to Philippines Today, Inc. If, after trial in the civil case, petitioner is
shown to have overpaid respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held liable for the
bouncing checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds to support the checks is itself an offense. [18]
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the
civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil
case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the
civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.
Petitioners claim of overpayment to respondent may be raised as a defense during the
trial of the cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 charged against him. The civil
action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal action.
[19]
Hence, petitioner may invoke all defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal
action.[20]
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.

Omictin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007

FACTS:
The petitioner in this case filed a complaint for two counts of estafa with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati against the private respondent. He alleged that private
respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to return the two company vehicles
entrusted to him when he was still the president of Saag Phils., Inc. The public prosecutor
recommended the indictment of private respondent, and on the same day, respondent was
charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC before the RTC.
Private respondent filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial
question because of a pending petition with the SEC involving the same parties. The said
case under the SEC involved the declaration of nullity of the respective appointments of Alex
Y. Tan and petitioner as President Ad Interim and Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag
Phils., Inc., declaration of dividends, recovery of share in the profits, involuntary dissolution
and the appointment of a receiver, recovery of damages and an application for a TRO and
injunction against Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., Nicholas Ng, Janifer Yeo, Tan and petitioner. In a case for
estafa, a valid demand made by an offended party is one of the essential elements. It

appears from the records that the delay of delivery of the motor vehicles by Lagos to Saag
Corporation is by reason of his contention that the demand made by Omictin and Atty. Tan to
him to return the subject vehicles is not a valid demand. As earlier mentioned, petitioner
filed a case with the SEC questioning therein private respondents appointment. If the SEC
should rule that the dissolution of Saag Phils. is proper, or that the appointments of private
respondents are invalid, the criminal case will eventually be dismissed due to the absence of
one of the essential elements of the crime of estafa. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a
prejudicial question exists which calls for the suspension of the criminal proceedings before
the lower court.
ISSUE: WON A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION EXISTS TO WARRANT THE SUSPENSION OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS PENDING THE RESOLUTION OF THE INTRA-CORPORATE
CONTROVERSY THAT WAS ORIGINALLY FILED WITH THE SEC. HELD: YES
Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine
the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa filed against him by
petitioner before the RTC of Makati. Since the alleged offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the
validity of the demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the
person making such a demand on the companys behalf. Private respondent is challenging
Omictins authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in the corporate case pending before the RTC
of Mandaluyong. Taken in this light, if the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be
defective, it is as if no demand was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot
prosper. By analogy, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied in this case. The
issues raised by petitioner particularly the status of Saag Phils., Inc.
Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as the question regarding the supposed authority of the latter to
make a demand on behalf of the company, are proper subjects for the determination of the
tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case which in this case is the RTC of Mandaluyong.
These issues would have been referred to the expertise of the SEC in accordance with the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction had the case not been transferred to the RTC of
Mandaluyong.

Ocampo v. Buenaventura

Case No. 88
G.R. No. L-32293 (January 24, 1974)

FACTS:
On September 11, 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained
Edgardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 228
which fixed curfew hours. The minors were then convicted for violation of said
ordinance. On appeal, the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated the
ordinance was to attend a birthday, which is considered as a wholesome
assemblage, and therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. Roberto
Ocampo filed a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct, grave
abuse of authority, and commission of a felony. The Mayor issued an ordinance
exonerating the policemen. On March 17, 1969 a complaint was lodged with the
Police Commission for the same grounds.
ISSUE:
W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases involving

police service and personnel.

HELD:
The Respondents argument is devoid of merit. The power of local officials to
investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel
has been transferred to the POLCOM under RA 4864. According to Commission v.
Hon. Bello, Sec. 26 of the Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to
administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time of
the effectivity of the Act (September 8, 1969). Sec. 26 may not be interpreted to
mean that the Board of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally
function to carry into effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of the 100
days.