CRIMINAL LAW 2ND EXAM CASES

CASE
PEOPLE V
JAURIGUE

U.S. v
AMPAR

ARTICLE/FACTS
ARTICLE 13 (MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE)
-UNDER PRAETER INTENTIONEM (that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed)
-Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel
shortly after the arrival of her father, also for the purpose of
attending religious services, and sat on the bench next to the
last one nearest the door. Amado Capina was seated on the
other side of the chapel. Upon observing the presence of
Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which
Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side, and, without
saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed
his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. On observing this
highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capina,
Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor,
pulled out with her right hand the fan knife marked Exhibit B,
which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of
punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's
right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left
hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of
the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep,
which was necessarily mortal.

RULING
-Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the
deceased but merely wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife, as
shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one single wound. And this is
another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in her favor

ARTICLE 13
VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
-A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy,
municipality of San Carlos, Province of Occidental Negros.
Roast pig was being served. The accused Clemente Ampar, a
man of three score and ten, proceeded to the kitchen and
asked Modesto Patobo for some of the delicacy. Patobo's
answer was; "There is no more. Come here and I will make
roast pig of you." The effect of this on the accused as
explained by him in his confession was, "Why was he doing
like that, I am not a child." With this as the provocation, a little

-The court, however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating circumstance
which on cursory examination would not appear to be justified. This mitigating
circumstance was that the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a
grave offense to the one committing the felony.

-In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death
the deceased Amado Capina, in the manner and form and under the
circumstances above indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the
crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at
least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in
her favor; and, in accordance with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by one or two degrees in the penalty to
be imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the instant case, the
defendant and appellant should be accorded the most liberal consideration
possible under the law (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391; United States vs.
Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950)..
The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide;
and if it should be reduced by two degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the
instant case is that of prision correccional; and pursuant to the provisions of
section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its medium
degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree. Consequently, with the
modification of judgment appealed from, defendant and appellant Avelina
Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two
months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months,
and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the
sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to
exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

-The offense which the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate would to the
average person be considered as a mere trifle. But to this defendant, an old man,
it evidently was a serious matter to be made the butt of a joke in the presence of
so many guests. Hence, it is believed that the lower court very properly gave
defendant the benefit of a mitigating circumstance, and correctly sentenced him
to the minimum degree of the penalty provided for the crime of murder. lawph!

later while the said Modesto Patobo was squatting down, the
accused came up behind him and struck him on the head with
an ax, causing death the following day.
PEOPLE V
IGNAS

PEOPLE V

ARTICLE 13
VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE
On the evening of October 16, 1995, Wilma Grace, Romenda,
and Nemesio went to Manila. Romenda and Nemesio were
sending off Wilma Grace at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport as she was leaving for Taiwan to work as a domestic
helper. Upon arrival in Manila, the trio checked at Dangwa Inn,
with Nemesio and Wilma Grace sharing a room. [12] All three of
them stayed at the inn until October 18, 1995, when Wilma
Grace left for Taiwan.[13]
Thereafter, Romenda received from Taiwan four letters
written by Wilma Grace on various dates. Although all the
letters were addressed to Romenda, two of them were meant
by Wilma Grace to be read by her paramour, Nemesio. [14] In
the other two letters, Wilma Grace instructed Romenda to
reveal to appellant her affair with Nemesio.
It was only sometime late in February 1996 that
Romenda, following her bosom friends written instructions,
informed appellant about the extramarital affair between
Wilma Grace and Nemesio. Romenda informed him that the
two had spent a day and a night together in a room at Dangwa
Inn in Manila.[15] Appellant became furious. He declared There
will be a day for that Nemesio. I will kill that Nemesio
-At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, according to
another prosecution witness, Annie Bayanes, a trader in
vegetables, she was at the Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet.
[24]
The Trading Post is a popular depot where vegetable
growers in the Cordilleras bring their produce late in the
evenings for sale to wholesalers and retailers. Witness
Bayanes said she was at the unloading area (bagsakan),
conversing with another dealer at the latters booth, when
suddenly two gunshots shattered the quiet evening.[25]
Bayanes turned towards the place where the sound of the
gunshots came from. She testified that she saw a person
falling to the ground.[26] Standing behind the fallen individual,
some 16 inches away,[27] was another person who tucked a
handgun into his waistband and casually walked away

The thirty-six year old victim, a certified public accountant,

1.net

We likewise find the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation

inexistent. The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave
offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they
arise from the same facts or motive.[113] In other words, if appellant attacked his
victim in proximate vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the
same breath that passion and obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion
and obfuscation to be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity.[114] To repeat, the period of two
(2) weeks which spanned the discovery of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the
killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.
Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

-The Solicitor General argues that the defamatory remark imputed to Moncayo

BENITO

was the Assistant Chief of the Personnel Transactions Division

and Acting Chief, Administrative Division of the Civil Service
Commission (Exh. E to E-2). The accused was a clerk in the
cash section, Administrative Division of the Commission,
receiving P1,884 per annum (Exh. D). He started working in
the Commission on November 7, 1963.
-Accused shot victim after office hours
-Mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave
offense. Benito contends that Moncayo insulted him when
he (Moncayo) remarked that a thief was loitering in the
premises of the Civil Service Commission. Benito argues that
that remark "was tantamount to kicking a man already down
and to rubbing salt into a raw wound" and that, as it was made
publicly and in a loud voice, he was exposed to ridicule in the
presence of his officemates.

cannot give rise to the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense

because it was not specifically directed at Benito. The prosecution notes that the
remark was uttered by Moncayo at eleven o'clock in the morning. According to
Benito's testimony (not consistent with his confession), he saw Moncayo three
hours later or at two o'clock in the afternoon and inquired from him about his
case and Moncayo said that he had already submitted his report and he could not
do anything more about Benito's case (26 tan). As already stated, the
assassination was perpetrated at around five o'clock in the afternoon of the same
day.
Assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, we see no justification
under the circumstances recited above for changing our prior opinion that the
mitigating circumstance of "haber ejecutado el hecho en vindicacion proxima de
una ofensa grave, causada al autor del delito," cannot be appreciated in Benito's
favor. As aptly stated by the ponente, Justice Esguerra, Benito "had more than
sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it."
-The six-hour interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo
against Benito and the assassination was more than sufficient to enable Benito to
recover his serenity. But instead of using that time to regain his composure, he
evolved the plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito literally
ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes after the victim had left the office. He
acted with treachery and evident premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded
murder.

PEOPLE V
DAVID (60
phil 93)
U.S. V
HICKS

-ART 13
-PASSION AND OBFUSCATION
On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m.,
Augustus Hicks together with a soldier named Lloyd Nickens
called at said house, and from the sala called out to his old
mistress who was in her room with Corporal Current, and after
conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes,
asked the corporal to come out of said room; in response
thereto the corporal appeared at the door of the room, and
after a short conversation, Current approached Hicks and they
shook hands, when Hicks asked him the following question:
"Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which
Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not
want to live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may
quit me, and you can live with her." The accused then replied:
"God damn, I have made up my mind;" and as Corporal
Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a
revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the hand,
but the latter, snatching his hand roughly away, said: "Don't
do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding
himself behind the partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver
and fired at Agustina Sola who was close by in the sala of the

All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately
and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for
another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention with safety,
notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a clean and wellprepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in his
revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed
with his victim, in what appeared to be a proper manner, disguising his intention
and claiming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to
successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had
planed to do beforehand.
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating
circumstances is present, not even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of
the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-control produced by jealousy as
alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the criminal
responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate
feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.

house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she
fell to the ground, and died in a little more than an hour later.
Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the
house, went to render assistance and wrested the weapon
from the hand of the accused. The latter immediately fled from
the house and gave himself up to the chief of police of the
town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail; and, when
a few minutes later a policeman came running in and reported
that Hicks had fired a shot at Agustina, the said chief of police
caused Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail,
threw eight revolver cartridges out of the window; these were
picked up by a policeman who reported the occurrence and
delivered the cartridges to his chief.

SANICO V
CA
U.S. V
DELA
CRUZ

The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not
marked by either aggravating or extenuating circumstances,
and sentenced the convict to fourteen years eight months and
one day of reclusion temporal, the medium degree of the
penalty prescribed by the code. Burt we are of opinion that the
extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9
should have been taken into consideration, and that the
prescribed penalty should have been imposed in its minimum
degree. Subsection 7 of article 9 is as follows:
The following are extenuating circumstances:
xxx
xxx
xxx
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally
to have produced passion and obfuscation.
The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of
passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore been
his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in
flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance. We think that under the circumstances the
convict was entitled to have this fact taken into consideration
in extenuation of his offense under the provisions of the
above-cited article.

It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that the
"causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are
such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious,
unworthy, and immoral passions," and declined to give the benefit of the
provisions of this article to the convict in that case on the ground that the alleged
causes for his loss of self-control did not "originate from legitimate feelings." But
in that case we found as facts that:
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused,
deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who
had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse
intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already
provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded
cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he entered the house,
greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what
appeared to be in a proper manner, disguising his intention and calming
her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to
successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as
he had planned to do beforehand.
In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor
was the convict's vexation, disappointment and deliberate anger engendered by
the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she
had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being merely that he had
elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another man.
In the present case however, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which
naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to
have illicit relations with him, but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to
him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. As said by the
supreme court of Spain in the above-cited decision, this was a "sufficient
impulse" in the ordinary and natural course of things to produce the passion and
obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the extenuating circumstances to

be taken into consideration by the court.

PEOPLE V
RABAO

PEOPLE V
DAWATON

The defendant and the deceased Salvacion Agawa were

married before the justice of the peace of Naga on January 15,
1936 and had since been born to the marriage. Since their
marriage they had made their home in the house of Urbano
Rellora, who lived maritally with the mother of the accused. On
the morning of December 15, 1937, when the defendant was
hardly awake after staying up late the previous night on
account of the elections held in the municipality of Naga, he
noticed that his wife was preparing water with which to give
the child a bath. He told his wife not to bathe the child
because it had a cold, but the wife insisted and a quarrel arose
in the heat of which the accused punched his wife on the
abdomen. She fell seated on a sack of rice nearby and
immediately suffered an attack of which she died in spite of
the aid rendered her by the accused himself and other persons
who had arrived. The following morning Dr. Vicente Roxas
performed an autopsy and found that the spleen of the
deceased had been hypertrophied due to an acute and chronic
malaria from which she had been suffering, and that death
was caused by the hemorrhage of the spleen when it was
ruptured as a consequence of an external blow on the
abdomen which might have been that delivered by the
accused.
ART 13
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
At about 3:30 in the afternoon, twenty (20) minutes after
Leonides had gone to sleep, Edgar stood up and left for his
house. When he returned he brought with him a stainless knife
with a blade 2 to 3 inches long. Without a word, he
approached Leonides who was sleeping and stabbed him near
the base of his neck.[4] Awakened and surprised, Leonides got
up and blurted: "Bakit Pare, bakit?"[5] Instead of answering,
Edgar again stabbed Leonides on the upper part of his neck,
spilling blood on Leonides' arm.
Leonides attempted to flee but Edgar who was much
bigger grabbed the collar of his shirt and thus effectively
prevented him from running away. Edgar then repeatedly
stabbed Leonides who, despite Edgar's firm hold on him, was
still able to move about twenty (20) meters away from the
house of Amado Dawaton before he fell to the ground at the
back of Esmeraldo's house. But even then, Edgar still
continued to stab him. Edgar only stopped stabbing Leonides

After reviewing the facts, we are convinced that the defendant did not really have
the intention of committing so grave a crime as parricide. The quarrel that led to
the aggression had its origin from the natural and justifiable desire of the
defendant, as a father, to prevent his child, which was then ill, from being given a
bath. If, under the circumstances, he transgressed the law by an unjust attack on
his wife, he is, nevertheless, deserving of the mitigating circumstances allowed in
his favor.

While the accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, he
was charged with murder for which he had already entered a plea of not
guilty. We have ruled that an offer to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
cannot be considered as an attenuating circumstance under the provisions of Art.
13 of The Revised Penal Code because to be voluntary the plea of guilty must be
to the offense charged.

Nor can the accused avail of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender as he himself admitted that he was arrested at his uncle's residence.
[18]
The following elements must be present for voluntary surrender to be
appreciated: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority, and, (c) the surrender must be
voluntary.[19]
Resorting to sophistry, the accused argues that he was not arrested
but "fetched" as he voluntarily went with the policemen when they came for
him. This attempt at semantics is futile and absurd. That he did not try to escape
or resist arrest after he was taken into custody by the authorities did not amount
to voluntary surrender. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous,
showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the

when the latter already expired. Edgar then ran away towards
the house of his uncle Carlito Baras situated behind the
cockpit.
Domingo and Esmeraldo were positioned a few meters
away from where Leonides was sleeping when he was initially
assaulted by Edgar. They were shocked by what happened but
other than pleading for Edgar to stop they were unable to help
Leonides.

PEOPLE V
VIERNES

ART 13
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
-Accused had committed a series of rapes against the minor
victim

PEOPLE V
ABOLIDOR

ARTICLE 13
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
-In the early morning of June 14, 1993, a day after Warlito was
buried, the victim, her children namely, Ellyn, Roselyn, Evelyn,
Manilyn, Leopoldo and Lilibeth, and Milagros Huesca, the
younger sister of Warlito Huesca, were awakened by the
forcible opening of the door of their house. Four men entered
the house and declared a hold up. The victim pleaded not to
be harmed. Instead, accused Ronnie Abolidor tied her mouth
with a handkerchief to silence her. Then appellant Claudio
Barcimo, Jr. shot the victim several times causing her
instantaneous death

PEOPLE V
CALISO

ARTICLE 14
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE
-We agree to the conclusions of fact reached by the trial court.
As to the application of the law to the facts of the case, we are
inclined to the proposition advanced by the Attorney-General
that in the commission of the crime the aggravating
circumstance of grave abuse of confidence was present since

authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to

save them the trouble and expense necessarily included in his search and
capture.[20] It is also settled that voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated where
the evidence adduced shows that it was the authorities who came looking for the
accused

Appellant pleads for leniency on account of his alleged voluntary surrender.

We disagree. The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an
acknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save the authorities the trouble and
the expense that search and capture would require. [30] Going to the police station
to clear his name does not show any intent of appellant to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities.[31]

The trial court did not err in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. To benefit an accused, the following requisites must be
proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent
of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and
expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender
presupposes repentance.[22] In People v. Viernes,[23] we held that going to the
police station to clear ones name does not show any intent to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities.
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than
one year had lapsed since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for
the killing of the victim. This neither shows repentance or acknowledgment of the
crime nor intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there
was a pending warrant of arrest against him. [24] Hence, he should not be credited
with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

-The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence being offset by the

extenuating circumstance of defendant's lack of instruction considered by the
lower court, the medium degree of the prescribed penalty should, therefore, be
imposed, which, in this case, is reclusion perpetua.

the appellant was the domestic servant of the family and was
sometimes the deceased child's amah. The circumstance of
the crime having been committed in the dwelling of the
offended party, considered by the lower court as another
aggravating circumstance, should be disregarded as both the
victim and the appellant were living in the same house.
(U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil., 136; U.S. vs. Destrito and De
Ocampo, 23 Phil., 28.) Likewise, threachery cannot be
considered to aggravate the penalty as it is inherent in the
offense of murder by means of poisoning (3 Viada, p. 29).
Similarly the finding of the trial court that the appellant acted
under an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced
passion and obfuscation should be discarded because the
accused, in poisoning the child, was actuated more by a spirit
of lawlessness and revenge than by any sudden impulse of
natural and uncontrollable fury (People vs. Hernandez, 43 Phil.,
104, 111) and because such sudden burst of passion was not
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts of the victim or of
his parents (U.S. vs. Taylor, 6 Phil., 162), since Flora Gonzalez
had the perfect right to reprimand the defendant for
indecently converting the family's bedroom into a rendezvous
of herself and her lover.

PEOPLE V
LORA

ARTICLE 14
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE
- On May 26, 1975, accused Belinda Lora using the name
"Lorena Sumilew", applied as a housemaid in the household of
the spouses Ricardo Yap and Myrna Yap at 373 Ramon
Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City. The spouses had a store on
the ground floor; a mezzanine floor was used as their
residence; while the third floor was used as a bodega for their
stocks. They had two children, Emily and Oliver Yap. Oliver was
3 years and five months old. 1
Belinda Lora was accepted as a housemaid in the residence of
the Yaps and reported for work the following day, May 27,
1975. Her duties were to wash clothes and to look after Oliver
Yap. 2
On May 28, 1975, Mrs. Myrna Yap returned home from the
market to find her mother-in-law and her husband panicky
because their son, Oliver, and the maid, accused Belinda Lora
were missing. The mother-in-law had found a ransom note at
the stairway to the mezzanine floor. The note said that Oliver
was to be sold to a couple and that the writer (defendant

- There is treachery because the victim is only a 3-year old child. 27 The
commission of the offense was attended with the aggravating circumstances of
lack of respect due to the age of the victim, cruelty and abuse of
confidence.chanrobles virtual law library
The circumstance of lack of respect due to age applies in cases where the victim
is of tender age as well as of old age. This circumstance was applied in a case
where one of the victims in a murder case was a 12-year-old boy. 28In the instant
case, the victim was only 3 years old. The gagging of the mouth of a three-yearold child with stockings, dumping him with head downwards into a box, and
covering the box with sacks and other boxes, thereby causing slow suffocation, is
cruelty. There was also abuse of confidence because the victim was entrusted to
the care of the appellant. The appellant's main duty in the household is to take
care of the minor child. There existed a relation of trust and confidence between
the appellant and the one against whom the crime was committed and the
appellant made use of such relation to commit the crime.chanrobles virtual law
library
When the killer of the child is the domestic servant of the family and was
sometimes the deceased child's amah the aggravating circumstance of grave
abuse of confidence is present. 29

herein) needed money for her mother's hospitalization.

- The following morning, May 30, 1975, upon waking up at
around 6 o'clock in his house, Ricardo Yap noticed that blood
was dripping from the ceiling. He went upstairs, which was
being utilized as a bodega, to verify, and found his son placed
inside the carton of Marlboro cigarettes. The head of the child
was inside the carton while his feet protruded outside. 14His
mouth was tied with stockings. 15 The child was already
dead. 16He had died of "asphyxhia due to suffocation.
PEOPLE V
LAGUARDI
A

ART 14
USE OF NIGHTTIME
On September 6, 1979, at about 10:30 oclock in the evening,
Dante Bartulay and Baltazar Beran, the herein accusedappellant, signaled to a stop a truck owned by Fortune Tobacco
Corporation then being driven by Miguel Chua on the zigzag
road in Kilometer 36 inside the Iwahig Penal Colony at Puerto
Princesa in Palawan City. Beran approached one side of the
truck and pretended to borrow a screwdriver and while Chua
looked for the tool Bartulay shouted from the other side of the
truck, "This is a hold-up!" With guns drawn, the two men
ordered Chua and his three companions, Benigno Caca, Frank
Morante, and Eduardo Aniar, to alight. Bartulay forced Chua to
lie face down on the ground about 3 meters away from his
companions. Bartulay was pointing a gun at Chuas head. On
orders of Bartulay, Beran got the wallets and watches of the
four. Bartulay asked about the money they were carrying and
Chua pointed to its location. Beran got it and gave it to
Bartulay. The money amounted to about P100,000.00. Then,
again on orders of Bartulay, Beran herded the three
companions inside the panel where they were locked. It was
while they were still inside the panel that Beran and the others
heard two gunshots. When Beran got off the truck, he saw
Chua still lying on the ground but now bleeding in the head.
Thereafter, Beran drove the truck from the scene of the crime
while Bartulay followed in a motorcycle. Somehow, Caca and
Morante managed to escape by jumping from the truck
through a secret exit of the panel. They subsequently reported
the occurrence to the law-enforcement authorities who,
returning to the scene of the crime the following day, found
Chua already dead. 1 Beran was arrested on September 8,
1979, with the amount of P4,500.00 in his possession and
upon questioning pointed to the place where he had hidden
the pistol he had used during the hold-up. 2 Further
investigation disclosed that the motorcycle and guns used by
Bartulay and Betan were owned by Rosalio Laguardia, who was
identified by Beran as the mastermind of the crime. 3 The

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; DESPOBLADO; MANIFEST IN CASE AT BAR. It is

clear that, as alleged in the amended information, the crime committed by Beran
was aggravated by despoblado and justified the imposition on him of the death
penalty as prescribed by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence
shows that the accused lay in wait for the truck being driven by Chua at an
isolated portion of Highway 36, choosing that particular spot where they could
commit the crime they were planning without disturbance or discovery and with
easy opportunity for escape.
5. ID.; ID.; USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE; APPRECIATED WHEN USED TO FACILITATE
ESCAPE. The use of motor vehicles is also appreciation because the
conspirators drove away from the scene of the crime to facilitate their escape and
also to prevent the other passengers of the truck, whom they took with them,
from reporting the offense to the authorities.
6. ID.; ID.; REJECTED WHEN NOT ESPECIALLY SOUGHT. Nighttime is rejected,
however, because it was not especially sought, as Chuas trip schedule and not
the discretion of the culprits determined the time of its commission.
7. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; INHERENT IN
ROBBERY. Evident premeditation is, of course, inherent in the crime of robbery
and was not proved in the commission of the killing.
8. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; NOT ATTENDANT IN CASE AT BAR. As for treachery,
there is no evidence of its employment as none of the witnesses actually saw the
shooting of Chua, being all inside the panel when they heard the fatal shots.

PEOPLE V
ZETA

PEOPLE V
INOVERA
VINO V
PEOPLE

money stolen was supposed to have been divided in the house

of Raymundo Bartulay, Dantes brother. 4
ART 14
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
On 28 October 1995, at around 12:00 midnight, Edwin, Rey
and a certain Melvin Castillo (Melvin) had a drinking spree
outside the house of Rey located at No. 30-B Tacio Street, La
Loma, Quezon City. At about 2:00 in the morning of the same
date, a car stopped in front of the three. Appellant was driving
the car while Petronilla was seated beside him. Petronilla
opened the cars window and asked Edwin if he knows Ramon
and the latters address at No. 25-C General Tinio Street, La
Loma, Quezon City. Edwin replied that he did not know Ramon
or his address. Thereafter, appellant and Petronilla left on
board the car and proceeded to General Tinio Street, La Loma,
Quezon City.5
At about 2:15 in the morning of the same date, the car
boarded by appellant and Petronilla stopped in front of
Ramons house at No. 25-C General Tinio Street, La Loma,
Quezon City. After parking nearby, appellant and Petronilla
alighted from the car and proceeded to Ramons house.
Petronilla repeatedly called Ramon. Aleine (niece of Cristina
Mercado, Ramons common-law wife) was awakened by the
repeated calls and opened the door. Petronilla requested
Aleine to call Ramon. Aleine told Petronilla that she would
wake up Ramon who was then sleeping with Cristina at the
second floor of the house. Aleine invited appellant and
Petronilla inside the house but the two replied that they would
just wait for Ramon outside. Aleine proceeded to the second
floor of the house and knocked at the door of Ramons room.
Ramon woke up. Subsequently, Aleine went downstairs and
proceeded to the dining table. While Ramon was walking down
the stairs, appellant suddenly entered the house and shot
Ramon several times on different parts of the body with a
caliber .45 Llama pistol. Upon seeing appellant shooting
Ramon, Aleine hid inside the restroom. When the gunshots
ceased, Aleine went out of the restroom and saw Ramon
sprawled and bloodied on the ground floor.
ARTICLE 19
ACCESSORIES
ART 19
ACCESSORIES
-At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985,
Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos Street, Poblacion,
Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to

Evident premeditation qualifies the killing of a person to murder if the following

elements are present: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his resolve; and (3)
a sufficient interval of time between the determination or conception and the
execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act
and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will if he desired to
hearken to its warning.55
The first two elements of evident premeditation are present in the case at bar.
The time manifesting Petronilla and appellants determination to kill Ramon was
when they, at about 2:00 in the morning of 28 October 1995, repeatedly asked
Edwin about Ramon and the latters address, and when they subsequently
proceeded to the house of Ramon.
The fact that appellant and Petronilla waited for Ramon, and appellants
subsequent act of shooting him at around 2:15-2:30 in the morning of 28 October
1995 indicate that they had clung to their determination to kill Ramon.
The third element of evident premeditation, however, is lacking in the instant
case. The span of thirty minutes or half an hour from the time appellant and
Petronilla showed their determination to kill Ramon (2:00 in the morning of 28
October 1995) up to the time appellant shot to death Ramon (2:15-2:30 in the
morning of 28 October 1995) could not have afforded them full opportunity for
meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime they committed. 56 We
have held that the lapse of thirty minutes between the determination to commit a
crime and the execution thereof is insufficient for a full meditation on the
consequences of the act.57
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection on the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. To
justify the inference of deliberate premeditation, there must be a period sufficient
in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and to
allow the conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his will if he
desires to hearken to its warning. Where no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable
from the determination to commit the crime until its execution, evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated.58
Nonetheless, we find that treachery attended the killing of Ramon.

Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder.

Under Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the
persons responsible for the commission of the same offense are the accomplice
and the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder had been

watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the

father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots.
Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying
that he had been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away
so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto
and his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the
house. They went down to meet Roberto who was crying and
they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor
responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and
coming down from their houses. After meeting Roberto,
Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a
bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the
bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching
Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar
pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions.
Thereafter, the two left.

PEOPLE V
ORTEGA

ART 19
ACCESSORIES
A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural
and logical consequences of his wrongful act even where the
resulting crime is more serious than that intended. Hence, an
accused who originally intended to conceal and to bury what
he thought was the lifeless body of the victim can be held
liable as a principal, not simply as an accessory, where it is
proven that the said victim was actually alive but subsequently
died as a direct result of such concealment and
burial.Nonetheless, in the present case, Appellant Garcia can
not be held liable as a principal because the prosecution failed
to allege such death through drowning in the
Information. Neither may said appellant be held liable as an

committed and that the evidence tended to show that Jessie Salazar was the
assailant. That the petitioner was present during its commission or must have
known its commission is the only logical conclusion considering that immediately
thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite, and
they were together when they left shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses,
Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner
actively assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.
In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The
commission of the said crime was established by the evidence. There is no
variance as to the offense committed. The variance is in the participation or
complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a
principal in the information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his
participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily
includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or
accessory under an information charging him as a principal.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory
can proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the
principal. The answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities
of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long
as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the
determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal.
Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the
failure of the prosecution to adduce the quantum of evidence required to
generate a conviction as he was not positively identified as the person who was
seen holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an
unidentified person as passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the
crime immediately after the commission of the crime of murder. The commission
of the crime and the participation of the principal or assailant, although not
identified, was established. In such case, the Court holds that the accessory can
be prosecuted and held liable independently of the assailant.
Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court is based on
mere assumption and conjecture x x x. [28]Allegedly, the medico-legal finding that
the large airway was filled with muddy particles indicating that the victim was
alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles did not necessarily mean that
such muddy particles entered the body of the victim while he was still
alive. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Quitlong stated, Nilubayan lang nang saksak
nang mapatay na si Andrew ni Benjamin Ortega, Jr. Thus, the prosecution
evidence shows Masangkay was already dead when he was lifted and dumped
into the well. Hence, Garcia could be held liable only as an accessory. [29]
We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. The essential requisites for the application of this provision

accessory due to his relationship with the principal killer,

Appellant Ortega, who is his brother-in-law.

DIZONPAMINTUA
NV
PEOPLE

Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that on October 15,

1992 at about 5:30 in the afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar
Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres
were having a drinking spree in the compound near the house
of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal, Dalandanan,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. That while they were drinking,
accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were
[already] drunk arrived and joined them. That victim Andre
Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the
back portion of the house. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
followed him and later they [referring to the participants in the
drinking session] heard the victim Andre Mar shouted, Dont,
help me! (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) That he and Ariel
Caranto ran towards the back portion of the house and [they]
saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of Andre Mar
Masangkay who was lying down in a canal with his face up and
stabbing the latter with a long bladed weapon.That Ariel
Caranto ran and fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father of
accused Benjamin, Jr. That he [Quitlong] went to Romeo
Ortega in the place where they were having the drinking
session [for the latter] to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. That
Romeo Ortega went to the place of the stabbing and together
with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar
Masangkay from the canal and brought Andre Mar to the well
and dropped the latter inside the well.
ARTICLE 19-ANTI-FENCING LAW
- Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public
Works and Highways testified that he has just arrived at his
residence located at Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque at
around 9:45 p.m. of February 12, 1988 coming from the
Airport and immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving
behind his driver and two housemaids outside to pick-up his
personal belongings from his case. It was at this point that five
unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy
portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his
driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house.
That the men pointed a gun at him and was made to lie face
down on the floor. The other occupants, namely his wife, the
maids and his driver were likewise made to lie on the floor.
Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house and took away
jewelries and other personal properties including cash. After
the intruders left the house he reported the matter
immediately to the police. He was then interviewed by the
Paraaque police and was informed that an operation group
would be assigned to the case.

are that (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony;
and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors
wrongful acts. In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to
the well, Appellant Garcia was committing a felony.The offense was that of
concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery, i.e. that of being an
accessory in the crime of homicide. [30] Although Appellant Garcia may have been
unaware that the victim was still alive when he assisted Ortega in throwing the
body into the well, he is still liable for the direct and natural consequence of his
felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse than that intended.

The elements of the crime of fencing are:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in
the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for
himself or for another.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements
were duly established. A robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the
house of the private complainants who afterwards reported the incident to the
Paraaque Police, the Western Police District, the NBI, and the CIS, and submitted
a list of the lost items and sketches of the jewelry taken from them (Exhibits "C"
and "D"). Three of these items stolen, viz., (a) a pair of earrings and ring studded

with diamonds worth P75,000.00 (Exhibit "C-2"); (b) one set of earrings worth
P15,000.00 (Exhibit "C-3"); and (c) a chain with crucifix worth P3,000.00 (Exhibit
"C-4"), were displayed for sale at a stall tended to by the petitioner in Florentino
Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for sale clearly
manifested an intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
The more crucial issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution proved the
existence of the third element: that the accused knew or should have known that
the items recovered from her were the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness
or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the
acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with
certitude and clarity. 16 When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an
element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not
exist. 17 On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a
person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption
that such fact exists. 18 Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a
fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with
certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care
from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of
cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains
the constitutional presumption of innocence. 19
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She
relied solely on the testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome
the presumption, and, on the contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was
engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a
certain Fredo. 23
Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a
licensed dealer or supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 provides that "all
stores, establishments or entitles dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article,
item, object or anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier
thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police
in the town or city where such store, establishment or entity is located."
TAN V
PEOPLE

ARTICLE 19-ANTI-FENCING LAW

Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal
Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos St., Tondo, Manila,
engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare
parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees
working for her. Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito
Mendez left the employ of the company. Complainant Lim
noticed that some of the welding rods, propellers and boat
spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass

In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential

elements of the crime of fencing as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,

screws were missing. She conducted an inventory and

discovered that propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00,
more or less, were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed
Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss.
Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas
and he admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop
stole from the complainants warehouse some boat spare parts
such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws.
Manuelito Mendez asked for complainants forgiveness. He
pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the
stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash
to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one
another. Complainant did not file a case against Manuelito
Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop.
RAMON TAN, the accused, in exculpation, stated that he is a
businessman engaged in selling hardware (marine spare parts)
at 944 Espeleta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
He denied having bought the stolen spare parts
worth P48,000.00 for he never talked nor met Manuelito
Mendez, the confessed thief. That further the two (2) receipts
presented by Mrs. Lim are not under her name and the other
two (2) are under the name of William Tan, the husband, all in
all amounting to P18,000.00. Besides, the incident was not
reported to the police (Exhibits 1 to 1-g).
He likewise denied having talked to Manuelito Mendez over the
phone on the day of the delivery of the stolen items and could
not have accepted the said items personally for everytime
(sic) goods are delivered to his store, the same are being
accepted by his staff. It is not possible for him to be at his
office at about 7:00 to 8:00 oclock in the morning, because he
usually reported to his office at 9:00 oclock.

object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said
crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. [11]
Consequently, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by
establishing the existence of all the elements of the crime charged. [12]
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the
essential elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense. [13] It is
an ancient principle of our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of crime
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt

Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito
Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused.
However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the
unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is
a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private
complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim
reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of
theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property.
True, witness Mendez admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the
boat parts he had pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an admission
or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only
against the person admitting or confessing. [15] Even on this, if given extrajudicially, the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the
admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting.
[16]
Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the
assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither may such
extra-judicial confession be considered evidence against accused. [17] There must
be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt.
[18]
Corpus delicti means the body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary
sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed. [19] The
essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4)
the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking
away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or force

upon things (U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000). [20] In theft, corpus delicti has two
elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was
lost by felonious taking.[21] In this case, the theft was not proved because
complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious
taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez,
who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the
complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to
convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.
What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have
known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to
know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness
thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with
facts, or if he has something within the minds grasp with certitude and clarity.
When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its
existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand,
the words should know denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or
would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge
refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot
penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained
therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that
person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental
awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the
constitutional presumption of innocence.[