Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Facts:
1. The parties of this case enterd into a contract of Sale which
stipulated that NAMARCO will import a certain amount of goods
to be paid by the Federation plus 5% mark up.
2. 1st Case: the FEDEATION FILED A COMPLAINT AGAINST
NAMARCO for specific performance for the latters refusal to
deliver the remaining goods based on the contract of sale.
a. In NAMARCOs answer. It alleged alleged that the
contract of sale was not validly entered into and
therefore it is not bound by the obligations thereto.
b. NAMARCo made no counterclaims as to the remaining
unpaid amounts representing the already delivered
goods.
3. NAMARCO was ordered by the CFI to comply with the obligations
of further delivering the other goods under the premise that the
contract was validly entered into by the parties.
4. CASE 2: NAMARCO then instituted an action to collect the
amounts remaining yet to be paid by the Federation.
a. On February 7, 1961, the FEDERATION moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the cause of action
alleged therein is barred forever, pursuant to Section 6 of
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. In support thereof, the
FEDERATION alleged that on March 2, 1960, the
FEDERATION and some of its members instituted Civil
Case No. 42684 against NAMARCO for specific
performance to enforce compliance with the contract of
sale; that said contract, basis of Civil Case No. 42684, is
also the basis of NAMARCO's present complaint in Civil
Case No. 46124; that when NAMARCO filed, on March 19,
1960, its answer to the complaint in Civil Case No.
42684, it did not set up any counterclaim therein
b. NAMARCO interposed its opposition to said motion to
dismiss contending that its claim for the recovery of the
cost of merchandise delivered to the FEDERATION on
January 29 and February 20, 1960 is not necessarily
connected with the suit in Civil Case No. 42684 for
specific performance and, therefore, does not fall under
the category of compulsory counterclaim; that
NAMARCO's failure to set it up as a counterclaim in its
answer in Civil Case No. 42684 does not constitute res
judicata
2.
3.
4.
5.
2. the Court ruled that when the cause of action stated in the
supplemental complaint is different from the causes of
action mentioned in the original complaint, the court
should not admit the supplemental complaint. However, a
broad definition of causes of action should be applied.
3. In the present case, the issue as to whether the petitioner
stopped the payment of rentals and the application
thereof on the perceived loan deficiency of the
respondent, is a new matter that occurred after the filing
of the original complaint. However, the relief for damages,
the collection of the rentals and the application thereof by
the petitioner to the perceived loan deficiency of the
respondent are germane to, and are in fact, intertwined
with the cause of action of nullification of the real estate
mortgage and the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof, as well
as the sale at public auction. It is the respondents
contention that the petitioner remained liable to it for
rentals, and until title to the property had been lawfully
consolidated with the petitioner.
4. The claims of unrealized income by way of rentals from the
AMA Computer College on account of the respondents
insistence that such should be remitted to it, and that the
respondent first drop the criminal complaint for
falsification and perjury filed by it against Mauro Tividad,
the officer of the petitioner, are, likewise, germane and
related to the respondents claim in its original complaint
that it remained the owner of the property despite the sale
at public auction; hence, it is entitled to lease the property
and collect the rentals therefrom. By its supplemental
complaint, the respondent merely enlarged its original
causes of action on account of events that transpired after
the filing of the original complaint and prayed for
additional reliefs. The principal and core issues raised by
the parties in their original pleadings remain the same.
Young vs Sy
1. Genalyn Young filed a Complaint for Nullification of
Second Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement,
Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale, and Tax Declaration
with the RTC alleging that the partition executed by her
mother Lilia Dy Young solely in favour of the Sys
unenforceable, since at the time of the execution, she
(petitioner) was only 15 years old and no court approval
had been procured; that the partition had been registered
with the Register of Deeds; that Lilia Dy obtained a loan
from spouses Manuel Sy and Victoria Sy (respondents) and
mortgaged the subject property; that the property was
foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder, respondent
Manuel Sy; that a Certificate of Sale for this purpose had
been registered with the Register of Deeds; and that,
thereafter, respondents obtained in their name a tax
declaration over the property in question.
2. On July 20, 2000, the petitioner filed with the RTC a
Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint, attaching
the Supplemental Complaint wherein petitioner
invoked her right, as co-owner, to exercise the legal
redemption.
3. The RTC denied the Motion in an Order dated December
28, 2000. The CA promulgated its Decision denying the
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and held that the
cause of action of the petitioner in the Supplemental
Complaint is entirely different from the original complaint;
that the Supplemental Complaint did not merely supply its
deficiencies.
Issue: Should the Supplemental complaint of the petitioner be
admitted?
Ruling: Yes.
1. In this case, the consolidation of title over the subject
property in the name of respondent Manuel Sy and the
issue as to whether it precluded petitioner as alleged coowner from exercising the right of legal redemption, are
new matters that occurred after the filing of the
original complaint. The relief prayed for in the
Supplemental Complaint, which is the exercise of
the right of legal redemption accorded to co-owners
of property, is germane to and intertwined with the
6. BPI filed a motion to set it aside but the motion was denied
by the trial court on 31 March 1987.
Issue: Should the Supplemental complaint be admitted?
Ruling: No.
A. Invalidity as to the Notice
a. The Motion was sent to BPI on March 11, 1987
b. BPI received notice of the motion on March 13,
1987
c. The decision was made on March 12, 1987
B. Matter involved in the supplemental complaint is entirely
different and independent from the cause of action of the
original complaint.
a. the P 500,000.00 three-year term loan is a
transaction independent of the P 800,000.00 credit
facility and BPI's questioned act of threatening to
foreclose the properties securing said loan was the
result of an alleged default by petitioner in the
payment of the amortization due for 9 February
1987 and not because of any circumstance related
to the 1980 amicable settlement.
b. The two causes of action being entirely different,
the latter one could not be successfully pleaded by
supplemental complaint.