A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO OFFSHORE FACILITY DESIGN

K.E. Arnold*

ABSTRACT
The "typical facility1'concept employed by Shell Oil is described
and the guidelines included in the system design are discussed. While the
process concepts of an offshore facility are relatively simple, the space
restrictions of an offshore platform require that consideration be given
to the interdependent nature of the various components to assure safety.
This is best accomplished by establishing procedures and guidelines for
design and analyzing in detail a lltypicalfacility" which is used as the
basis for all new facility designs.

INTRODUCTION
In orfer to minimize the effort involved in assuring an adequate
system analysis which would consider the interaction between the various
components, Shell in 1967 designed a standard oil treating facility. The
same basic detailed flowsheet and system analysis was used for six almost
identical facilities. The basic flow scheme and philosophy of design of
the standard facilities have been proven sound. However, experience indicated
several areas where improvements could be made to the concept of a standard
facility and in 1971 work was begun on developing the typical facility concept described herein.

*Shell Oil Company, New Orleans, Louisiana

D-1

DISCUSSION
PROCESS

now

The f i r s t s t e p i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y is t o design
process flowsheete such a s those shown i n Figures 1 and 2. These port r a y t h e b a s i c interdependence of t h e v a r i o u s equipment components. Spaces
a r e provided f o r t h e p r o j e c t engineer t o f i l l i n t h e design parameters . ( e . g.
flow r a t e s , g r a v i t i e s , temperatures) t h a t a r e needed t o s i z e t h e equipment.
B a s i c a l l y , t h e process flow chosen f o r t h e S h e l l t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y can be
described a s follows:

1. Primary Separation and T e s t

P r o v i s i o n is made f o r one o r two test v e s s e l s which may e i t h e r be ChemE l e c t r i c test t r e a t e r s o r t h r e e phase test s e p a r a t o r s . Two o r t h r e e
s t a g e s of s e p a r a t i o n a r e provided. G a s i s routed from t h e h i g h preeeure
s e p a r a t o r d i r e c t t o dehydration and s a l e s . A low p r e s s u r e system i s
provided t o reduce back p r e s s u r e on t h e wells f o r more e f f i c i e n t recovery,
and an i n t e r m e d i a t e p r e s s u r e s e p a r a t o r is provided i f economically j u s t i f i e d by compressor horsepower savings.
Liquid from each s e p a r a t o r is f l a s h e d through t h e n e x t lowest p r e s s u r e
s e p a r a t o r . The low p r e s s u r e s e p a r a t o r a l s o f u n c t i o n s a s a f r e e water
knockout (FWKO)

2.

O i l Dehydration and S

From t h e FWKO o i l flows through a h e a t exchanger t o a bulk C h d e c t r i c

treater.
(The h e a t medium subsystem is shown on a d i f f e r e n t flowsheet.)
To minimize back p r e s s u r e t h e FWKO o p e r a t e s a s c l o s e as p o s r i b l e t o
compressor s u c t i o n pressure. Flash gas from t h e bulk t r e a t e r must be
f l a r e d . I f t h e bulk t r e a t e r were operated a t compressor s u c t i o n p r e a s u r e ,
t h e back p r e s s u r e a t t h e w e l l s would be increased and gas f l a s h e d below
compressor s u c t i o n p r e s s u r e would s t i l l be vented a t t h e tank. Therefore,
even though i t may n o t appear s o a t f i r s t glance, o p e r a t i n g t h e bulk
t r e a t e r below atmospheric p r e s s u r e does n o t add t o vented gas.
O i l flows from t h e bulk t r e a t e r t o t h e dry o i l tank, through t h e LACT
u n i t and i s pumped t o t h e p i p e l i n e .

3.

Gas Compression and Dehydration

Gas from t h e FWKO flows t o t h e compressor and i s compressed t o p i p e l i n e

p r e s s u r e i n t h r e e s t a g e s w i t h i n t e r s t a g e scrubbing and cooling. I f an
i n t e r m e d i a t e p r e s s u r e scrubber is provided, gas i s sidestreamed i n t o
t h e compreeeor a t one of two p o i n t s . Glycol i s used f o r dehydration
( t h e g l y c o l subsystem is shown i n one of t h e mechanical flowsheets
described below) and gas is routed t o f u e l , gas l i f t and s a l e s .

Water from t h e FWKO i s routed through desanders t o a corrugated p l a t e

i n t e r c e p t o r (C.P.I.) f o r water treatment and a gas f l o t a t i o n c e l l and
skim p i l e f o r f i n a l treatment. I n some l o c a t i o n s t h e f l o t a t i o n c e l l may
n o t be r e q u i r e d .

5.

F l a r e and Vent System

I n a crowded o f f s h o r e f a c i l i t y extreme c a r e must be e x e r c i s e d i n disposing
of gas. This i s one a r e a where i t is e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e complete system
b e designed a s an i n t e g r a t e d u n i t . I n t h e t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y a l l p r e s s u r e
v e s s e l blowdowns, r e l i e f v a l v e s and back p r e s s u r e v a l v e s t o f l a r e a r e
routed through a common header t o a f l a r e scrubber. The d e s i g n of t h i s
header i s complex s i n c e , f o r any combination of r e l i e f v a l v e o p e r a t i o n s ,
t h e p r e s s u r e i n t h e header should n o t exceed one-half t h e maximum working
p r e s s u r e of any v e s s e l connected t o t h e system. The scrubber must be
designed n o t only t o handle t h e maximum f l a r e gas r a t e b u t a l s o s l u g s
of l i q u i d t h a t could c a r r y over through a r e l i e f valve.
A s e p a r a t e v e n t system i s provided f o r atmospheric tanks a s they can withs t a n d only a few ounces of back pressure. A primary and backup p r e s s u r e
vacuum v a l v e i n conjunction w i t h a gas b l a n k e t on t h e tank maintains a
s l i g h t p r e s s u r e i n t h e system t o minimize t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of sucking oxygen i n t o t h e system and c r e a t i n g an e x p l o s i v e mixture.
The v e n t header must be designed t o handle t h e following c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n
t h e allowable back p r e s s u r e on t h e tanks:

6.

a.

Normal f l a s h gas.

b.

Gas generated under p o s s i b l e f i r e c o n d i t i o n s .

c.

F a i l u r e of t h e b l a n k e t gas r e g u l a t o r i n t h e open p o s i t i o n .

d.

F a i l u r e of t h e c r i t i c a l dump v a l v e dumping i n t o one of t h e tanks.

Drain and Sumo Svstem

Drain and sump systems must a l s o be considered as an i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e
process d e s i g n . Care was taken t o minimize t h e use of v e s s e l drains by
using v e r t i c a l v e s s e l s where f e a s i b l e w i t h l i q u i d o u t l e t s i n t h e bottom.
I n o r d e r t o work on a v e s s e l , a l l t h e l i q u i d i s dumped t o t h e next v e s s e l
i n t h e system through t h i s o u t l e t , and t h e v e s s e l i s blown down t o atmosphere through a blowdown valve. Closed p r e s s u r e d r a i n systems c r e a t e
p o s s i b l e s a f e t y hazards by (a) complicating t h e p i p i n g , (b) providing
a p o s s i b l e means t o l o s e a l e v e l i n a v e s s e l and cause a dangerous
p r e s s u r e s u r g e , and (c) by manifolding t o g e t h e r v e s s e l s w i t h d i f f e r e n t

p r e s s u r e r a t i n g s . Drains which must be provided (such as compressor

d i s t a n c e p i e c e d r a i n s ) a r e designed w i t h thesle p o t e n t i a l problems i n
mind.
The l i q u i d s d r a i n e d from t h e s k i d pan w i l l be mostly r a i n w a t e r which may
be contaminated t o some e x t e n t by o i l . This p r e s e n t s a problem because
i f pumped back through t h e system t h i s a e r a t e d f r e s h w a t e r may a c c e l e r a t e
c o r r o s i o n o r b a c t e r i a l a c t i o n , w h i l e i f allmred t o flow d i r e c t l y overboard i t may exceed maximum o i l c o n t e n t c r i t e r i a . Figure 3 i n d i c a t e s
how t h i s problem is minimized. The s k i d s d r a i n t o a water sump which
a c t s a s a FWKO. Water flows o f f t h e bottom f o r f i n a l t r e a t i n g i n t h e
skim p i l e . O i l i s skimmed o f f t h e t o p t o a n o i l sump where i t is combined w i t h t h e hydrocarbon d r a i n s and pumped back t o t h e w e t o i l tank.

Concurrent w i t h t h e development of t h e process flowsheete i t is

necessary t o develop a preliminary l a y o u t as shmm i n Figures 4 - e n d 5. I n
a d d i t i o n t o l a y i n g o u t t h e v e s s e l s f o r most e f f i c i e n t p i p i n g , t h e following
key p o i n t s must be considered:

1. Location of t h e q u a r t e r s f o r personnel s a f e t y and adequate escape r o u t e s .

2.

Location of gas f l a r e s and v e n t s where t h e p r e v a i l i n g winds w i l l c a r r y t h e

gas away from t h e platform.

3.

Location of t h e crane on t h e lee s i d e of t h e p l a t f o r m and p r o v i s i o n f o r

i t t o reach c r i t i c a l items such a s t h e g e n e r a t o r s .

4.

E l e v a t i o n d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e v e n t and r e l i e f headers t o a s s u r e l i q u i d s
(The c o n f i g u r a t i o n and l e n g t h of t h e headers is
needed t o adequately s i z e them).

w i l l n o t accumulate.
5.

E l e v a t i o n d i f f e r e n c e s of atmospheric tanks t o make maximum use of g r a v i t y

flow i n going from one t o another. For e x a m ~ ~ l et,h e CPI1s a r e l o c a t e d
above t h e f l o t a t i o n c e l l and both a r e l o c a t e d above t h e w e t o i l tank.

6.

E l e c t r i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a r e a s must be considered.

MECHANICAL FLOWSHEETS AND DESIGN GUIDELINES

Once t h e process flow and l a y o u t have been determined t h e n e x t s t e p
In t h e l1t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y " conis t o develop d e t a i l e d mechanical f lowsheets
c e p t t h i s i s done by s t a r t i n g w i t h a set of 14 t y p i c a l flowsheets such a s
Figure '6, e l i m i n a t i n g those p a r t s which a r e n o t needed and s i z i n g t h e v a r i o u s
l i n e s , c o n t r o l v a l v e s , e t c . , f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c i l i t y u s i n g t h e design
guidelines.

Table I i s a l i s t i n g of t h e design g u i d e l i n e s which were developed

a s p a r t of t h e t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y concept, and Table I1 shows t h e s u b j e c t s covered
i n a t y p i c a l g u i d e l i n e . As an example of how the system works, Figure 7 i s
one o f t h e methods used i n s i z i n g l i n e s t o a s s u r e t h a t v e l o c i t i e s

a r e low and e r o s i o n is k e p t t o a p r a c t i c a l minimum. Pipe w a l l t h i c k n e s s is

determined from ANSI B31.3 (Refinery Code) and t h e S h e l l c r i t e r i a t h a t a l l
l i n e s under 3 i n c h e s be a t l e a s t Schedule 80.
Taken a s a whole, t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n r a t h e r simple design concepts
which a r e included i n t h e Guidelines and Mechanical Flowsheets t o a s s u r e t h a t
a s a f e system w i l l be c o n s t r u c t e d . Some of t h e more important of t h e s e conc e p t s are:

1. General F a i l u r e of a Control
The most important s i n g l e concept i s t o assume t h a t each back p r e s s u r e
o r dump v a l v e w i l l e i t h e r f a i l open o r c l o s e d , and t o determine t h e
p o s s i b l e consequences. I f an unsafe c o n d i t i o n could p o s s i b l y develop
from such a f a i l u r e , i t i s r e q u i r e d t h a t a t l e a s t one s h u t - i n s e n s o r
(e.g., high l e v e l shutdown, h i g h p r e s s u r e shutdoyn) should b e a c t i v a t e d
and c o n t r o l t h e process. F u r t h e r , i n t h e a n a l y s i s i t is assumed t h a t t h i s
device w i l l a l s o f a i l and a backup device, which is more r e l i a b l e than a
shut-in s e n s o r , such as a r e l i e f v a l v e o r f l a r e s c r u b b e r , w i l l b e capable
of s a f e l y handling t h e f a i l e d c o n d i t i o n . For example, i n Figure 8 assume
t h e dump v a l v e on t h e high p r e s s u r e (HP) s e p a r a t o r f a i l s open. This would
cause t h e l e v e l t o drop and e v e n t u a l l y gas would flow through t h i s l i n e t o
t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e p r e s s u r e (IP) s e p a r a t o r . I f t h i s causes t o o g r e a t a
p r e s s u r e s u r g e i n t h e IP s e p a r a t o r , i t w i l l a c t i v a t e t h e h i g h p r e s s u r e
shutdown (HPSD). F u r t h e r , assume t h e HPSD f a i l s . I n t h i s c a s e t h e
r e l i e f v a l v e must be designed t o handle t h i s flow ( i . e . , HP ao w e l l as
IP g a s ) .

A s a second f a i l u r e mode, assume t h e dump valve f a i l s closed. In t h i s

c a s e t h e l e v e l w i l l b u i l d i n t h e HP s e p a r a t o r u n t i l t h e HLSD is a c t i v a t e d .
I f t h i s f a i l s , l i q u i d w i l l go o u t t h e gas o u t l e t t o t h e i n l e t scrubber
t o t h e g l y c o l u n i t . This I n i t s e l f would n o t be hazardous and could be
considered a n adequate backup. I n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , ifl i q u i d s go o u t
t h e gaa o u t l e t , t h e p r e s s u r e would b u i l d i n t h e HP s e p a r a t o r , t r i p p i n g
t h e HPSD o r a c t i v a t i n g t h e r e l i e f valve.
While t h i s appears t o be a cumbersome procedure t o go through f o r each
c o n t r o l i n t h e f a c i l i t y , an experienced engineer can go about t h e t a s k i n
a s y s t e m a t i c manner because o f t h e r e p e t i t i v e n a t u r e o f t h e way c o n t r o l s
a r e used. The concept is simple. I t does not involve any complex r i s k
determination a s i t i s based on t h e b e l i e f t h a t one backup device i s
r e q u i r e d (and i s s u f f i c i e n t ) f o r adequate p r o t e c t i o n .

2.

Pipe P r e s s u r e R a t i n g
Using t h e above technique, shutdown s e n s o r s , r e l i e f v a l v e s , e t c . , a r e
added t o t h e mechanical flowsheets t o p r o t e c t a g a i n s t c o n t r o l v a l v e
f a i l u r e s . P r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t improper opening o r c l o s i n g of a v a l v e
is obtained by a v i s u a l p r e s s u r e r a t i n g check. That i s , s t a r t i n g w i t h
t h e h i g h e s t p r e s s u r e system, any v a l v e which could i s o l a t e t h e p r e s s u r e

from a r e l i e f v a l v e must be p r e s s u r e r a t e d f o r t h i s p r e s s u r e . I n performi n g t h i s a n a l y s i s i t i s assumed t h a t check and c o n t r o l v a l v e s w i l l l e a k

and allow p r e s s u r e t o b u i l d upstream and t h a t s h u t - i n s e n s o r s do n o t
provide s u f f i c i e n t p r o t e c t i o n . It i s a l s o assumed t h a t , w i t h t h e l a r g e
number of v a l v e s t i e d i n t o t h e w e l l manifold, t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t leakage
t o cause p r e s s u r e communication w i t h time.
The technique i s b e s t i l l u s t r a t e d by an example such a s presented i n
Figure 9.
Assuming no v a l v e i s i n s t a l l e d a t (5), then t h e i s o l a t i o n
v a l v e s (1) and ( 4 ) , t h e c o n t r o l v a l v e (2) and t h e check v a l v e (3) must
be r a t e d t o w i t h s t a n d t h e set p r e s s u r e of t h e H.P. s e p a r a t o r r e l i e f
valve. This i s because v a l v e (4) could be blocked s h u t . I f v a l v e (5)
were i n s t a l l e d , v a l v e s (1) through (4) would have t o be r a t e d f o r maximum
w e l l s h u t - i n p r e s s u r e , "X"
T h i s i s because Lf (5) i s s h u t , and a h i g h
p r e s s u r e s e n s o r on a c r i t i c a l w e l l f a i l s , i t would be p o s s i b l e t o overp r e s s u r e one o r more of t h e s e v a l v e s i f ( a ) b.Lock v a l v e (1) were c l o s e d ,
(b) c o n t r o l v a l v e (2) i s s e a l e d s h u t , (c) check v a l v e (3) holds t h e
p r e s s u r e w i t h zero leakage, o r (d) block v a l v e (4) i s c l o s e d .

While t h i s a l s o appears t o be a cumbersome technique a t f i r s t glance,

t h e r e p e t i t i v e n a t u r e of t h e way c o n t r o l s and o t h e r v a l v e s a r e used
makes t h i s a n a l y s i s a f a i r l y simple one f o r ax1 experienced engineer.
Once one i s exposed t o t h e technique, h e can ;apply i t e a s i l y and c o r r e c t l y without having t o w r i t e o u t h i s thought processes i n d e t a i l f o r each
situation.

3.

Hazard I s o l a t i o n
A review of t h e mechanical flowsheets should trssure t h a t a p o t e n t i a l
hazard can be i s o l a t e d . For t h e most p a r t thjls i s accomplished by t h e
i s o l a t i n g v a l v e s provided around c o n t r o l and check v a l v e s t o allow
proper maintenance. However, t h e flowsheets crnd l a y o u t should be
checked t o a s s u r e t h a t a l l process v e s s e l s car1 indeed be i s o l a t e d and
t h a t t h e d i s t a n c e between t h e v e s s e l and i t s i s o l a t i n g v a l v e s i s n o t
too g r e a t .

4.

Leak Detection
Perhaps t h e most d i f f i c u l t hazard t o d e t e c t a u t o m a t i c a l l y i s a s m a l l
l e a k . P r o t e c t i o n i s provided t o some e x t e n t t ~ ylow p r e s s u r e and low
l e v e l shutdown s e n s o r s on v e s s e l s . Most l e a k s which occur i n a c t u a l
process w i l l be too small t o be d e t e c t e d . The number of l e a k s can be
minimized by using a p p r o p r i a t e p i p i n g and vess:el design codes, s p e c i f y i n g adequate s e a l s f o r pumps, u s i n g t e e s i n s t e a d of e l l s i n p i p i n g where
e r o s i o n may be a problem, e t c . However, i t must s t i l l be assumed t h a t
l e a k s w i l l develop which w i l l n o t be immediate!ly d e t e c t e d .
The process a r e a s of a Gulf of Mexico offshore: p l a t f o r m a r e w e l l v e n t i l a t e d and hydrocarbon vapors a r e r a p i d l y diepersed. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e
following a r e included i n t h e t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y concept ' t o minimize
t h e hazard:

a,

D r i p pans and sump system.

b.

Carefully defined e l e c t r i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s .

Gas d e t e c t o r s i n i n a d e q u a t e l y v e n t i l a t e d a r e a s .

,d.

Adequately i n s u l a t e d e x h a u s t s t a c k s , h e a t medium p i p i n g , e t c .

e.

Fusible plug f i r e d e t e c t o r s .

f.

No open flames a r e p e r m i t t e d on t h e p r o c e s s p l a t f o r m s ,

DETAILED SYSTEM ANALYSIS

The f l o w s h e e t s , l a y o u t and d e s i g n g u i d e l i n e s have been reviewed i n
d e t a i l by numerous e n g i n e e r s and o p e r a t i n g p e r s o n n e l as w e l l a s b e i n g subj e c t e d t o a s t r i c t s a f e t y review by S h e l l ' s S a f e t y and Environmental Cons e r v a t i o n Department.
When a new f a c i l i t y is d e s i g n e d , a s a f e t y review
i s performed. However, s i n c e t h e b a s i c concepts have a l r e a d y been agreed
upon, t h e review can b e r a t h e r r a p i d . Only t h e e f f e c t of minor d e p a r t u r e s
from t h e t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y need b e reviewed i n d e t a i l .
One of t h e most i m p o r t a n t b e n e f i t s of t h e t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y concept
i s i n performing s a f e t y a n a l y s i s . For example, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o c o n s t r u c t
a h a z a r d s m a t r i x such as Table 111. It can b e s e e n from a s t u d y of t h e des i g n concepts and f l o w s h e e t s t h a t a c c e p t a b l e r i s k l e v e l s as d e f i n e d i n t h i s
m a t r i x w i l l b e reached f o r a l l e f f e c t s w i t h one e x c e p t i o n . I f a d i f f e r e n t
o r more d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s i s r e q u i r e d , t h e t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y concept makes
i t p o s s i b l e t o perform t h e d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s once f o r t h e t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y
and t h e n o n l y c o n s i d e r d e v i a t i o n s from t h e t y p i c a l f o r each f a c i l i t y which
is a c t u a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d .
CONCLUSIONS
The S h e l l t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y concept p r o v i d e s a t e c h n i q u e t o a s s u r e
t h a t t h e d e s i g n of any s i z e f a c i l i t y w i l l b e based on a thorough a n a l y s i s
of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e v a r i o u s components. By u s e of t h i s concept
o f f s h o r e f a c i l i t i e s can b e i n s t a l l e d which a r e s a f e and compatible w i t h
t h e environment. F u r t h e r , t h e concept can a s s u r e t h a t a c c e p t a b l e r i s k
l e v e l s w i l l b e a t t a i n e d a s shown by a h a z a r d s m a t r i x . Any o t h e r f o r m a l systems a n a l y s i s would a l s o b e f a c i l i t a t e d by t h e t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y concept.

The author wishes t o express h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n t o t h e many S h e l l

engineers and o p e r a t i n g personnel who have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e development
of t h e t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y concept. I n p a r t i c u l a r , he wishes t o c i t e t h e
following i n d i v i d u a l s : F. E . Gibbs who developed t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s and
g u i d e l i n e s ; N. A . Crawford, H . L. Ruark, and J . F . Davis f o r t h e i r
d e t a i l e d review of t h e mechanical flowsheets; B. J . McConnell who
developed t h e shutdown system; G. W . Olson who developed t h e e l e c t r i c a l
system; and C . W . Wilson and R . L . Howard who recognized t h e need and
provided t h e necessary guidance.

'

TABLE I
FACILITIES ENGINEERING GUIDELINES AND DESIGN PROCEDURES
SHELL OIL COMPANY - SOUTHERN E&P REGION - OFFSHORE DIVISION
I

SUBJECT
" .

COMPRESSION
CORROSION PREVENTION
DRAIN SYSTEMS AND SUMPS
ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION
ELECTRIFICATION

- GENERAL

FLARE GAS AND PRESSURE RELIEVING SYSTEMS

GAS DEHYDRATION
GAS SEPARATION AND SCRUBBING
HEAT RECOVERY, EXCHANGE AND INSULATION
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS
MARINE PIPELINES
MEASUREMENT
OIL DEHYDRATION
PARAFFIN AND SCALE CONTROL
PIPING SYSTEMS

PRIME MOVER SELECTION

ELECTRIC MOTOR
I. C. ENGINES
COMBUSTION GAS TURBINES
PUMPS
SAFETY SYSTEMS
SEWAGE TREATMENT
WATER TREATMENT

TABLE
- I1
-GUIDELINES FOR-IGN
OF PLATFORM
P.IPING SYSTEMS
SCOPE
CODE COMPLIANCE
P I P E SELECTION
SIZING CRITERIA
P I P E WALL THICKNESSES
JOINT CONNECTIONS
VALVE SELECT1 ON
VALVE SIZING
VALVE PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE RATINGS
VALVE MATE RIALS
FITTINGS AND FLANGES
GASKETS, BOLTS AND NUTS

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