Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • Mackie - Hume's Moral Theory

    Uploaded by

    Ikarius
    17 views87 pages
    Hume

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document
    Hume

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    17 views87 pages

    Mackie - Hume's Moral Theory

    Uploaded by

    Ikarius
    Hume

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 87
    Hume’s Moral Theory JL. Mackie R London snd New York Firs published 1980 ty Routledge 1 New Fee Lane, London ECAP AEE. ‘Simutaseously pulsed nthe USA and Canada by Routledge 29 Wet 35 Sire, Nee York, NY 10001 Tey 19 8s 71981. vase cr 2 puTines by Compaen (La far Wii, Satan ited and bound in Great Brit by ‘U1 Press (Padstow) Li, Paton Comal All ps reserved No pr of this book maybe repiued or reprodace or lizd in an fom by ay ‘lecone, mechanical oer means, tom known rhrefet invented nloing photocopying and recording rn any Infomation storage orev stem, whoa permission in wring rom he poles Brah Library Cataloguing in Publication Data _Acatlogue record for ti bok is vale fos the Brits Libary Library of Cons Ctalogung in Publication Data ‘catalogs record fortis Seok s valle fom he rary af Congres ISBN 0-15-1066 vu vi 1 CONTENTS Preface Ievroduction:Outine of Hume's Theory Some Prodcessos: Hobbes, Shaesbury. Clarke ‘Wollaston, Mandel, utcheson, Butler Hume's Pryeholony of Action Treas i 3) Morality nt Based on Reason Treatise 111) Variants of Sentimentasn (Treatise 142) The Artifical Viwes 1 Justice and Property (Treatise Ht I~) 2 TheOblianton of Promises reais IS) 53 The Artic of fstice reuse I i) {§ The Origin of Government and the Limits of Pla tliat reas 7-10) 5 International Juste (Trearse Wit 11) {6 Chanity and Modesty (Treatise I 12) “Tae Natural Virtues (Treatise I 1-8) Sone Success; Smith, Pris Reid Conclusions Notes Ines “ si 6 16 6 104 106 3 ue 120 a0 us 1st 63 PREFACE ‘Hume's moral theory hasbeen relatively neglected, as compared with Some other arts of his philosophy, Indeed. al that many reasonably ‘wel-nformed stents of philosophy know about it is that he si (or, alternatively, that be didnot say that you cannot derive an ‘ought from fans, But Hume Law, as ths bas been called, isnot the whol, oF ‘ven the most important part of his moral theory Its compatble with {an objetvst or intutonist view which Hume would cerainly have rejected, and i contains n0 Bin of is fascinating account of What he ‘alld the aifical virtues, or of his antiptions of utiariaism, to ‘which Bentham ascribed his wn conversion to that doce. Also, Hume's theory is best seen inthe context of, and a. contribution oan ‘extended debate on moral palosophy which we can take as begining ‘with Hobbes, being continued by members ofboth the “ational” and he ‘moral sense’ of “sentimental schools, and concluding with the ‘writing of two of Hume'serites, Richa Price and Thomas Rest. Some ‘of the main ives inthis dete are whether there are, oF ae 20, ‘objective moral values, whether men are by nature completely slish or remade for society”, whether morality depends in any way ugon God land religion, and how and by what faculty we discern the dierence ‘between vice and vetue The Work in Which this debate was carried On| ‘were addressed an educated general public rather than to specie in Dhhlosphy, and they ate writen in a svaightforward, forthright way, ‘without technicalities or obfuscation or evasion. They ae pt fee fom errors and fallacies, but where they g0 wrong they 4050 openly and thei mistakes are often pointed ou by oer participant in the deat. think. therefore, that attention fo this debate is a very good method of| Preface tearing at leat part of the core of moral philsopty ~ for example, learning t disaguish moral phenomenology. the description of our ordinary moral experience and concepts ahd bles, from quesions about the status of moral judgments andthe explanation at deeper level of moral thinking as a whole. Moreover. adequate selections fom the ‘works of these writers ae readily avaliable in D, D. Raphael's Brisk Morals 1650-1800 (nocd 1969, where mos ofthe passages I quote oc fefer to can te found ope that ny book will encourage readers 0 further im the wring’ not only of Hume hime, but leo of bis Predersors and successors ‘An important exception tothe general neglect of Hume's moral theory ' the thorough examination of one part of i by Jonathan Harrison i Hume's Moral Epsiemoiogy Oxford. 1976) My own discussion OWES & 00d deal otis, and also to another, not yet published, work in Which arson examines with the Same thoroughnes the otber main pars of| Hume's tery. But thee ae, naturally enough, some points on which I ‘disagree with Harrson. An earlier book which deals Very clearly with ‘ne theme inthe deka among the British moralits, and relates i t0| what G. . Moore calle the matualiste flay’ is Arthur Prioe’s Logie and the Bass of Ethics (Oxfors, 949) An amiable account of the theory ofthe passions on which Hume's moral theory based is sven in Pal 8, Ardal's Pason and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh, 1966). “This book has another purpose as well Inthe Notes and References in iy Exhcs: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin, 1977) I emaked that the bet istration and support for the view of ethics which I had presented inthe fist chapter of hat book are provide bythe works of Some of the eghientcentry Brtsh morals. | am now developing ‘hat hint: hope that my examination of the argument of Hume at hit predecessors and successors will serve, indirecy, as a further explanation and defence of several theses of my ov, [am very grateful to Michael Lockwood, Gene Mason, Roy ark, and Gerhard Steminger al of whom read an eater version ofthis Book and whone comments hae, | belive, elped me improve aM INTRODUCTION: OUTLINE OF HUME'S THEORY Hume's ethical views are preened in his Treatise, the Braulry concerning the Prinsples of Morals, and 3 numberof essays: tis inthe Treas that we tnd the mos interesing ad provocative Satement of them It occupies the whole of Book Il, ut the section in Book It entitled “OF the infuensing motives ofthe wil i also very important i States his psychology af action, on which some ofthe main arguments at the begining of Book Ul aebased. We have, then, these divisions is 3: Prychology of Action Ti 1-2; Moral Epstemology UL I-12: The Ari Viewes UL 1-5: The Natural Viewes Li 6 Conetusion me's pychology of action is summed up in his deta that reason 's,and ought only tote, the slave ofthe ptsone. Lek dramatically. is view i that all Knowledge, whether of @ prior wuths or of empiial ‘acts al bel, and al rational calculation ar by themselves ine. By themselves none ofthese things, Which he includes under the heading of| ‘eaon” in abroad sense, provides a motive for action, ofr ination ‘iter, None ofthese iems, nor any calection of ems from this list lone, can mativate anyone either to do anything oF to refrain trom ‘boing anything. Motivation fr or agaist any acon requires someting ‘eb, wat he would cll passion or sentiment, and more particularly 2 dese In conjunction with desires, of course, belies, owledge, and falculation can teip to determine what one des. Hume is not sing 1 Imroduton: Oulne of Hume's Theory (orn would be most implausible) that reason’ has no bearing at on ction, Inded inthe Enquiry he puts what is essentially the same view es provocatively by saying that 'eason and Sentiment concur i almost ll moral determinations and concusions'~ that is, they co-operate determine the judgments which ise in choice and action, In the Treatise he express it aifrenl since the original drive t action comes from some desire or pasion or sentiment, he ser this as the foverning clement, with bel or knowledge or calculation playing fubordinate role, mertybelping the deste vo achieve sntisacton. He argues furtber that a reason canaot by itself supply any motive {© ction, equally it cannot by ise oppose any motive to action. No pasion is, sre speaking contrary to reason. A pasion can, however, |f we speak ls strc, be called unreasonable in eter of two senses pasion may be based onthe supposition ofthe exstene of some abet and eason may discover that no suc object ent, or reaton may point fut that a means chosen to scure the object of some passion is insutiient fr tht end In part of Book Ill Hume argues that mora distinctions are not derived from reason and thatthe are derived from & moral sense, Hume's postive doctrine is open to several diferent imerpretons in eval, and we shall have to consider (in chapter V) exactly how to understand tBu the broad outline ois vew is that we ell someting virtuous if and because it produces in us a partcular kind of pleasure, and we call something evil or vicious if and beause i produces ‘articular kind of pain the vituousnest or vciusnes is tin the ‘objets themselves, apart fom the sentiments they provoke in us. We ‘hl aso find in chapter IV) some indeterminacy in the negative pat of| Hume's doctrine, that moral distinctions are not derived frm reason, Buton the whole we can tak him o be using “eason’ heen he broad sense whch covers all knowledge, empirical at well as pry, and all valid inference or calculation; if 50, his doctrine meane tht moral

    You might also like