Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cadaveric spasm.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident
post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding
from its sockets and tongue slightly
protrudes out of the mouth.
appellant
Fracture,
open,
depressed,
circular
located at the occipital bone of the head,
resulting [in] laceration of the brain,
spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels
on the posterior surface of the brain,
laceration of the dura and meningeal
vessels producing severe intracranial
hemorrhage.
with
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
summarizes the prosecutions version of the
facts in this wise:
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in
marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City.
Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in
their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Bens
younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with
them too. Sometime in 1995, however,
appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a
house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where
they lived with their two children, namely: John
Marben and Earl Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo
Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their
salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer
before heading home. Arturo would pass Bens
house before reaching his. When they arrived at
the house of Ben, he found out that appellant
had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben
went inside his house, while Arturo went to a
store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening
for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did
not see appellant arrive but on his way home
passing the side of the Genosas rented house,
but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got
a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet.
She however, smashed the arm of Ben with a
pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his
wallet. Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape
with the pipe as he was about to pick up the
blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside
the bedroom.
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11
some
defense
12
by
the
husband; and finally, to allow a partial reopening of the case a quo to take the testimony
of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was
a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only
qualified forensic pathologist in the country,
who opined that the description of the death
wound (as culled from the post-mortem
findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a gunshot
wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September
2000, the Honorable Court partly granted
Marivics URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and
remanded the case to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the battered woman
syndrome plea, within ninety (90) days from
notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to
this Court the proceedings taken, together with
the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary
evidence, if any, submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A.
Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc
City.
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to
admit
the
experts
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xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that you saw a doctor in
relation to your injuries?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
A Of course my husband.
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
[Court] /to the witness
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty
that you said?
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q No, from the time that you said the
cruelty or the infliction of injury
inflicted on your occurred, after your
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A I did.
A Yes, sir.
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A As a doctor-patient relationship, we
need to know the cause of these
injuries. And she told me that it was
done to her by her husband.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to
physical examine the accused
sometime in the month of November,
1995 when this incident happened?
A As per record, yes.
Q What was the date?
A It was on November 6, 1995.
Q So, did you actually see the accused
physically?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
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29
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ATTY. TABUCANON:
A Yes, sir.
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back
in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in
your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin
Ecel whom I requested to sleep with
me at that time because I had fears
that he was again drunk and I was
worried that he would again beat me
so I requested my cousin to sleep with
me, but she resisted because she had
31
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there
already in his usual behavior.
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A 1 1/2 feet.
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34
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that
time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
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the average person confronted with the socalled battered wife syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly,
however, ones viewpoint should not be drawn
from that of an ordinary, reasonable person.
What goes on in the mind of a person who has
been subjected to repeated, severe beatings
may
not
be
consistent
with
-nay,
comprehensible to -- those who have not been
through a similar experience. Expert opinion is
essential to clarify and refute common myths
and misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore
Walker, as well as her research on domestic
violence, has had a significant impact in the
United States and the United Kingdom on the
treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a
battered woman is charged with the killing of
her violent partner. The psychologist explains
that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted
upon the battered woman immobilizes the
latters ability to act decisively in her own
interests, making her feel trapped in the
relationship with no means of escape. [46] In her
years of research, Dr. Walker found that the
abuse often escalates at the point of separation
and battered women are in greater danger of
dying then.[47]
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41
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44
45
46
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48
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it
sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when
he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his
grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the
blade, I pick-up the pipe and I
smashed him and I ran to the other
room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the
same thing like what happened before
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50
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article
246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance
have been found to have attended the
commission of the offense, the penalty shall be
lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article
64 of paragraph 5[88] of the same Code.[89] The
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period is imposable, considering that two
mitigating circumstances are to be taken into
account in reducing the penalty by one degree,
and no other modifying circumstances were
shown to have attended the commission of the
offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum of the penalty shall be within
the range of that which is next lower in degree
-- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be
within the range of the medium period
of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the
instant case, we deem it just and proper to
impose the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1)
day in prison as minimum; to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8
months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that
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52
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
ROGER
P.
TULIN,
VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O.
CHANGCO,
ANDRES
C.
INFANTE,
CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN
DOES, accused-appellants.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which
unfortunately has remained in docket of the
Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together
with
other
similar
cases,
to
undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No.
00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, M/T
Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with
2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of
regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel
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54
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56
57
58
also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accusedappellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that
the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was
thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered
convicting accused-appellants of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of said decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by
this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin,
Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio
Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine
Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential
Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San
Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under
Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the
principals of said crime is mandatory death.
However, considering that, under the 1987
Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death
penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
Andres Infante, ]r., and Cecilio Changco are
hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION
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60
61
executed
territory?
outside
Philippine
waters
and
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63
64
65
xxx
xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on
their defense, the three (3) Accused admitted
to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said
vessel in the evening of March 2 1991 and
remained on board when the vessel sailed to
its, destination, which turned out to be off the
port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding
that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not
supported by any hard evidence but their bare
testimony. Greater weight is given to the
categorical identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than to the accused's
plain denial of participation in the commission
of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296
[1998]). Instead,
accused-appellants
Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently
desperate tale that they were hired by three
complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto
Liboon, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and
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67
As
for
accused-appellant
Hiong,
he
ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted
of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and
penalized
in
Sections
2[d]
and
3[a],
respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532
because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective
January 1, 1994) which amended Article 122 of
the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly
superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He
reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532
has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous"
because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No.
532 punish piracy committed in Philippine
waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile
the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned
in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532
must be omitted such that Presidential Decree
No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are
members of the complement or to passengers
of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659
shall apply to offenders who are neither
members of the complement or passengers of
the vessel, hence, excluding him from the
coverage of the law.
68
(Unders
coring ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall
mean and be understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any
vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part
thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of its complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, committed by any person.
including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters,
shall be considered as piracy. The offenders
shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided (underscoring supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised
Penal Code, before its amendment, provided
that piracy must be committed on the high seas
by any person not a member of its complement
nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment
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70
there
was
71
contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accusedappellant Hiong had failed to overcome the
legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or
aided in the commission of piracy, received
property taken by such pirates and derived
benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant
Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the
stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer
from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He
profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo
for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3,
1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality
and verified the quantity of the petroleum
products, connived with Navi Marine Services
personnel in falsifying the General Declarations
and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer
went through, undetected by Singapore Port
Authorities, and supplied the pirates with food,
beer, and other provisions for their maintenance
while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the
General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and
Crew List was accomplished and utilized by
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76
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S.
Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full,
hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby
the declared policy of the City Government to
protect the best interest, health and welfare,
and the morality of its constituents in general
and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as
"An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission
in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time
admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other
similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited
in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila.
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86
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88
89
90
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92
93
94
EN BANC
ALEJANDRO
ESTRADA, complainant, vs.
SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The case at bar takes us to a most difficult
area of constitutional law where man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the
state. To be held on balance are the states
interest and the respondents religious freedom.
In this highly sensitive area of law, the task of
balancing between authority and liberty is most
delicate because to the person invoking
religious freedom, the consequences of the case
are not only temporal. The task is not made
easier by the American origin of our religion
clauses and the wealth of U.S. jurisprudence on
these clauses for in the United States, there is
probably no more intensely controverted area of
constitutional interpretation than the religion
clauses.[1] The U.S. Supreme Court itself has
acknowledged that in this constitutional area,
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103
104
105
106
107
108
prestige,
and
eventually,
exclusive
power. Religion became an engine of state
policy as Constantine considered Christianity a
means of unifying his complex empire. Within
seven years after the Edict of Milan, under the
emperors command, great Christian edifices
were erected, the clergy were freed from public
burdens others had to bear, and private
heathen sacrifices were forbidden.
The favors granted to Christianity came
at a price: state interference in religious
affairs. Constantine and his successors called
and dismissed church councils, and enforced
unity of belief and practice. Until recently the
church had been the victim of persecution and
repression, but this time it welcomed the states
persecution and repression of the nonconformist
and the orthodox on the belief that it was better
for heretics to be purged of their error than to
die unsaved.
Both in theory as in practice, the partnership
between church and state was not easy. It was
a constant struggle of one claiming dominance
over the other. In time, however, after the
collapse and disintegration of the Roman
Empire, and while monarchical states were
gradually being consolidated among the
numerous feudal holdings, the church
stood as the one permanent, stable and
109
universal
power. Not
surprisingly,
therefore, it claimed not merely equality
but superiority over the secular states. This
claim, symbolized by Pope Leos crowning of
Charlemagne, became the churchs accepted
principle of its relationship to the state in the
Middle Ages. As viewed by the church, the
union of church and state was now a union of
the state in the church. The rulers of the states
did
not
concede
to
this
claim
of
supremacy. Thus, while Charlemagne received
his crown from the Pope, he himself crowned
his own son as successor to nullify the inference
of supremacy.[45] The whole history of
medieval Europe was a struggle for
supremacy between prince and Pope and
the
resulting
religious
wars
and
persecution
of
heretics
and
nonconformists. At about the second quarter
of the 13th century, the Inquisition was
established, the purpose of which was the
discovery and extermination of heresy. Accused
heretics were tortured with the approval of the
church in the bull Ad extirpanda issued by Pope
Innocent IV in 1252.
The corruption and abuses of the Catholic
Church spurred the Reformation aimed at
reforming the Catholic Church and resulting in
the establishment of Protestant churches. While
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111
Calvins
theocratic
Geneva. In
England,
perhaps more than in any other country,
Erastianism was at its height. To illustrate, a
statute was enacted by Parliament in 1678,
which, to encourage woolen trade, imposed on
all clergymen the duty of seeing to it that no
person was buried in a shroud made of any
substance other than wool.[56] Under Elizabeth,
supremacy of the crown over the church was
complete: ecclesiastical offices were regulated
by her proclamations, recusants were fined and
imprisoned, Jesuits and proselytizing priests
were put to death for high treason, the thirtynine Articles of the Church of England were
adopted and English Protestantism attained its
present doctrinal status.[57] Elizabeth was to be
recognized as the only Supreme Governor of
this realm . . . as well in all spiritual or
ecclesiastical things or causes as temporal. She
and her successors were vested, in their
dominions, with all manner of jurisdictions,
privileges, and preeminences, in any wise
touching or concerning any spiritual or
ecclesiastical jurisdiction.[58] Later, however,
Cromwell
established
theconstitution
in
1647 which
granted full
liberty
to
all
Protestant sects, but denied toleration to
Catholics.[59] In 1689, William III issued
the Act of Toleration which established a de
facto toleration for all except Catholics.The
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117
and
institutionalized
religion. Jefferson,
Paine, John Adams, Washington, Franklin,
Madison, among others were reckoned to be
among the Unitarians or Deists. Unitarianism
and Deism contributed to the emphasis on
secular interests and the relegation of historic
theology to the background.[87] For these men
of the enlightenment, religion should be allowed
to rise and fall on its own, and the state must
be protected from the clutches of the church
whose entanglements has caused intolerance
and corruption as witnessed throughout history.
[88]
Not only the leaders but also the masses
embraced rationalism at the end of the
eighteenth
century,
accounting
for
the
[89]
popularity of Paines Age of Reason.
Finally, the events leading to religious
freedom and separation in Virginia contributed
significantly to the American experiment of the
First Amendment. Virginia was the first state
in the history of the world to proclaim the
decree of absolute divorce between church
and state.[90] Many factors contributed to this,
among which were that half to two-thirds of the
population were organized dissenting sects, the
Great Awakening had won many converts, the
established Anglican Church of Virginia found
themselves on the losing side of the Revolution
and had alienated many influential laymen with
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120
121
122
123
124
125
126
Clause directly
articulates
the
common
objective
of
the
two
clauses
and
the Establishment
Clause specifically
addresses a form of interference with religious
liberty with which the Framers were most
familiar and for which government historically
had demonstrated a propensity.[135] In other
words, free exercise is the end, proscribing
establishment is a necessary means to this end
to protect the rights of those who might dissent
from whatever religion is established.[136] It has
even been suggested that the sense of the First
Amendment is captured if it were to read as
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment
of
religion
or otherwise prohibiting
the
free
exercise
thereof because the fundamental and single
purpose of the two religious clauses is to avoid
any infringement on the free exercise of
religions[137] Thus, the Establishment Clause
mandates separation of church and state to
protect each from the other, in service of the
larger goal of preserving religious liberty. The
effect of the separation is to limit the
opportunities for any religious group to capture
the state apparatus to the disadvantage of
those of other faiths, or of no faith at
all[138] because history has shown that religious
fervor conjoined with state power is likely to
tolerate far less religious disagreement and
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131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
the
doctrine
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159
situation
where
the
Court
upheld
the
constitutionality of tax exemption given by New
York to church properties, but did not rule that
the state was required to provide tax
exemptions. The Court declared that (t)he limits
of permissible state accommodation to religion
are by no means co-extensive with the
noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause.[281] The Court held that New York could
have an interest in encouraging religious values
and avoiding threats to those values through
the burden of property taxes. Other examples
are the Zorach case allowing released time in
public schools and Marsh allowing payment of
legislative chaplains from public funds. Finally,
in
the
situation
where
accommodation
is prohibited, establishment concerns prevail
over potential accommodation interests. To say
that there are valid exemptions buttressed by
the Free Exercise Clause does not mean that all
claims for free exercise exemptions are valid.
[282]
An example where accommodation was
prohibited is McCollum where the Court ruled
against optional religious instruction in the
public school premises.[283] In effect, the last
situation would arrive at a strict neutrality
conclusion.
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161
162
A. History
Before our country fell under American rule,
the blanket of Catholicism covered the
archipelago. There was a union of church and
state and Catholicism was the state religion
under the Spanish Constitution of 1876. Civil
authorities exercised religious functions and the
friars exercised civil powers.[294] Catholics alone
enjoyed the right of engaging in public
ceremonies
of
worship.[295] Although
the
Spanish Constitution itself was not extended to
the Philippines, Catholicism was also the
established church in our country under the
Spanish rule. Catholicism was in fact protected
by the Spanish Penal Code of 1884 which was in
effect in the Philippines. Some of the offenses in
chapter six of the Penal Code entitled Crimes
against Religion and Worship referred to crimes
against the state religion.[296] The coming of the
Americans to our country, however, changed
this state-church scheme for with the advent of
this regime, the unique American experiment of
separation of church and state was transported
to Philippine soil.
Even as early as the conclusion of
the Treaty of Paris between the United States
and Spain on December 10, 1898, the American
guarantee of religious freedom had been
extended to the Philippines. The Treaty provided
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164
This
was
followed
by
the Philippine
Independence Law or Tydings-McDuffie
Law of 1934 which guaranteed independence
to the Philippines and authorized the drafting of
a Philippine constitution. It enjoined Filipinos to
include freedom of religion in drafting their
constitution preparatory to the grant of
independence. The
law
prescribed
that
(a)bsolute toleration of religious sentiment shall
165
Without
discussion
by
the
1986
Constitutional Commission, the 1973 religious
clauses
were
reproduced
in
the 1987
Constitution under the Bill of Rights in Article
III, Section 5.[307] Likewise, the provision on
separation of church and state was included
verbatim in the 1987 Constitution, but this time
as a principle in Section 6, Article II entitled
Declaration of Principles and State Policies.
Considering the American origin of the
Philippine religion clauses and the intent to
adopt the historical background, nature, extent
and limitations of the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution when it was included in the
1935 Bill of Rights, it is not surprising that
nearly all the major Philippine cases involving
the religion clauses turn to U.S. jurisprudence in
explaining the nature, extent and limitations of
these clauses. However, a close scrutiny of
these cases would also reveal that while U.S.
jurisprudence on religion clauses flows into two
main streams of interpretation - separation
and benevolent neutrality - the well-spring
of Philippine jurisprudence on this subject
is for the most part, benevolent neutrality
which gives room for accommodation.
B. Jurisprudence
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167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
provides
such
an
exemption. In
sum,
although Victoriano involved a religious belief
and conduct, it did not involve a free exercise
issue where the Free Exercise Clause is invoked
to exempt him from the burden imposed by a
law on his religious freedom.
Victoriano was reiterated in several cases
involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, namely Basa, et
al. v. Federacion Obrera de la Industria
Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de
Filipinas,[334] Anucension v. National Labor
Union, et al.,[335] and Gonzales, et al. v.
Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union.
[336]
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176
177
found
its
way
to
the
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179
180
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182
183
Almost
forty-five
years
after Aglipay came Garces
v.
Estenzo.
[361]
Although the Court found that the
separation of church and state was not at issue
as the controversy was over who should have
custody of a saints image, it nevertheless made
pronouncements on the separation of church
and state along the same line as the Aglipay
ruling. The Court held that there was nothing
unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and
having a patron saint for the barrio. It adhered
to
the barrio resolutions
of
the barangay involved in the case stating that
the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair, the
celebration of which is an ingrained tradition in
rural communities that relieves the monotony
and
drudgery
of
the
lives
of
the
masses. Corollarily, the Court found nothing
illegal about any activity intended to facilitate
the worship of the patron saint such as the
acquisition and display of his image bought with
funds obtained through solicitation from
the barrio residents. The Court pointed out that
the image of the patron saint was purchased in
connection with the celebration of the barrio
fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente
Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any
religion nor interfering with religious matters or
the
religious
beliefs
of
the
barrio
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inconsistent
with
the
religious
freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution. Citing Torcaso
v. Watkins,[363] the ponencia held, viz:
Torcaso v. Watkins, an American Supreme Court
decision, has persuasive weight. What was
there involved was the validity of a provision in
the Maryland Constitution prescribing that no
religious test ought ever to be required as a
disqualification for any office or profit or trust in
this State, other than a declaration of belief in
the existence of God ***. Such a constitutional
requirement was assailed as contrary to the
First Amendment of the United States
Constitution by an appointee to the office of
notary public in Maryland, who was refused a
commission as he would not declare a belief in
God. He failed in the Maryland Court of Appeals
but prevailed in the United States Supreme
Court, which reversed the state court
decision. It could not have been otherwise. As
emphatically declared by Justice Black: this
Maryland religious test for public office
unconstitutionally invades the appellants
freedom of belief and religion and therefore
cannot be enforced against him.
The analogy appears to be obvious. In that
case, it was lack of belief in God that was a
disqualification. Here being an ecclesiastic and
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188
appearance
of
establishment.[375] In
our
jurisdiction, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. asserts that
a literal interpretation of the religion clauses
does
not
suffice. Modern
society
is
characterized by the expanding regulatory arm
of government that reaches a variety of areas
of human conduct and an expanding concept of
religion. To adequately meet the demands of
this modern society, the societal values the
religion clauses are intended to protect must be
considered in their interpretation and resolution
of the tension. This, in fact, has been the
approach followed by the Philippine Court.[376]
IX. Philippine Religion Clauses: Nature,
Purpose, Tests
Based on Philippine and American Religion
Clause History,
Law and Jurisprudence
The history of the religion clauses in the
1987 Constitution shows that these clauses
were largely adopted from the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. The religion clauses in
the First Amendment were contained in every
organic Act of the Philippines under the
American regime. When the delegates of the
1934 Constitutional Convention adopted a Bill of
Rights in the 1935 Constitution, they purposely
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199
of
society
and
law. The Victoriano
case mentioned the immediate and grave
danger test as well as the doctrine that a law of
general applicability may burden religious
exercise provided the law is the least restrictive
means to accomplish the goal of the law. The
case also used, albeit inappropriately, the
compelling state interest test. After Victoriano,
German went
back
to
the
Gerona
rule. Ebralinag then employed the grave and
immediate
danger
test
and
overruled
the Gerona test. The
fairly
recent
case
of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the clear and
present danger test in the maiden case
of American Bible Society. Not surprisingly,
all the cases which employed the clear and
present danger or grave and immediate
danger test involved, in one form or
another, religious speech as this test is
often used in cases on freedom of
expression. On
the
other
hand,
the Gerona and German cases set the rule
that religious freedom will not prevail over
established
institutions
of
society
and
law. Gerona, however, which was the authority
cited
by German has
been
overruled
by Ebralinag which employed the grave and
immediate danger test. Victoriano was the
only case that employed the compelling state
interest test, but as explained previously, the
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PER CURIAM:p
Amidst the endless debates on whether or not
the reimposition of the death penalty is indeed
a deterrent as far as the commission of heinous
crimes is concerned and while the attendant
details pertaining to the execution of a death
sentence remain as yet another burning issue,
we are tasked with providing a clear-cut
resolution of whether or not the herein accusedappellant deserves to forfeit his place in human
society for the infliction of the primitive and
bestial act of incestuous lust on his own blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment
of conviction, dated September 7, 1994, for the
crime of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing
by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused LEO
ECHEGARAY Y PILO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
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227
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232
under Article 315, paragraph (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and
petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private
complainant was then engaged in the business
of lending money to casino players and, upon
hearing that the former had some pieces of
jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on
May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to
sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission
basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a
consequence, he turned over to petitioner the
following items: an 18k diamond ring for men;
a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace
and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate
value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt
of even date. They both agreed that petitioner
shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if
unsold, to return the same items, within a
period of 60 days. The period expired without
petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
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234
235
SO ORDERED.
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237
238
239
a Yes, sir.
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May
1991, and this transaction could have been
finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what
happens (sic) when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
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243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
JUSTICE PERALTA:
DEAN DIOKNO:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
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261
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR: ... has no power to utilize
the power of judicial review to in order to
adjust, to make the adjustment that is a power
that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA: Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR: Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that
the role of the Court is not merely to dispense
justice, but also the active duty to prevent
injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in
the present controversy, the Court should not
impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three
years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of
1:100 as simply compensating for inflation.
Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken
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263
264
265
266
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
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277
278
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282
283
284
Membership in an organization
renders aid and encouragement to
the organization; and when
membership is acceptedor retained
with knowledge that the organization
is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the
one accepting or retaining
membershipwith such knowledge
makes himself a party to the
unlawfulenterprise in which it is
engaged. 44
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288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Martin Atienza and Romana Silvestre appeal to
this court from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan convicting them upon
the information of the crime of arson as follows:
The former as principal by direct participation,
sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and
one day of cadena temporal, in accordance with
306
307
308
309
xxx
xxx
xxx
310
311
PER CURIAM:
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of
murder and the sentence of life imprisonment,
with indemnity to the offended party, the heirs
of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the
amount of P12,000, rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No.
686, of all the accused the namely, Nemesio
Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusta Berras,
Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, the last
being the supposed wife of the deceased, who,
because no certificate nor any other proof of
their marriage could be presented by the
prosecution, could not be charged with
parricide.
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313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
SECOND DIVISION
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is
whether accused-appellants committed the
felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article
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331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
xxx
xxx
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347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint, dated
August 6, 1987, filed by the then Commissioner
of Customs, Alexander Padilla, against
respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge,
Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a
manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very
least, to gross incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case No. 8610126-P, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the
369
Y 32,800,000.00
370
Swiss Franc
SW. FR
6,9000.00
Australian
Dollar
A$ 17,425.00
371
Singapore
Dollar
S$ 9,945.00
Deutsche
Marck
DM 18,595.00
372
Canadian Dollar
CS 13,330.00
Australian
Dollar
A$ 7,750.00
Hongkong
Dollar
HK$ 15,630.00
British Pound
700.00
HFL Guilder
HFL 430.00
US Dollar
US$ 17,630.00
French Franc
F/6,860.00
Canadian Dollar
C$ 990.00
US Dollar
US$ 73,950.00
English Pound
5,318.00
Malaysian
Dollar
(in checks)
M$. 14,760.00
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision*
of the respondent Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding
the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on
appeal to the respondent appellate Court under
CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the
four (4) counts of the offense charged, have
been clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the
Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel
for the public respondent, thus:
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381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal
assigning the following as errors of the
appellate court:
IV
II
393
394
395
396
397
SO ORDERED.
398
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate,
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN
SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the
crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82
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400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
November 17,
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411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City
with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an
automobile in a fast and reckless manner ...
thereby causing an accident. After the accused
had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed
in that court for failure of the Government to
prosecute. But some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, charging the same
accused with damage to property thru reckless
imprudence. The amount of the damage was
alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double
jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on
appeal by the Government we affirmed the
ruling. Among other things we there said
through Mr. Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation
between the first offense of violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay
City Municipal Court and the offense of damage
to property thru reckless imprudence charged in
the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the
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425
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427
428
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430
SO ORDERED.
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432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
FIRST DIVISION
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
V
The court a quo erred in not finding that the
evidence of the prosecution has not overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused.
VI
The court a quo erred in not acquitting the
accused on ground of reasonable doubt.
In a Manifestation dated December 20, 1995,
Appellant Beronga, through counsel, adopted as
his own the Brief of Sabalones.[13]
The foregoing assignment of errors shall be
reformulated by the Court into these three
issues or topics: (1) credibility of the witnesses
and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2)
defense of denial and alibi, and (3)
characterization of the crimes committed and
the penalty therefor.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
467
468
jeep
arrived,
the
car
was
COURT:
A 3 to 4 meters.
Q While the car was following the jeep at that
distance of 3 to 4 meters, what happened?
469
A Alfredo Nardo.
A Yes, sir.
A Roling Sabalones.
470
[Counsel
for
Appellant
471
A Yes, sir.
Q So, you never saw who fired the successive
shots to the car as you said you stooped
down inside the car?
A The bursts of gunfire stopped for a while
and that was the time I reared of [sic] my
head.
Q And that was the first time you saw them?
A Yes, sir.[22]
The records clearly show that two vehicles
proceeded to the house of Stephen Lim on that
fateful day. The first was the jeep where Alfredo
Nardo, Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo were
riding. About three to four meters behind was
the second car carrying Nelson Tiempo,
Guillermo Viloria, Rogelio Oliveros and the two
prosecution witnesses -- Edwin Santos and
Rogelio Presores.[23] As stated earlier, said
witnesses attested to the fact that after the first
volley of shots directed at the jeep, they both
looked at the direction where the shots were
coming from, and they saw their friends in the
jeep falling to the ground, as well as the faces
of the perpetrators.[24] It was only then that a
rapid succession of gunshots were directed at
them, upon which they started crouching to
avoid being hit.
472
473
inadmissible
against
Sabalones.Specifically,
they challenge the trial courts reliance on the
following portions of Berongas statement:
Q After Roling knew that Na[b]ing Velez was
killed, have you observed [if] Roling and
his companions prepared themselves for
any eventuality?
A It did not take long after we knew that
Na[b]ing was killed, somebody called up
by telephone looking for Roling, and this
was answered by Roling but we did not
know what they were conversing about
and then Roling went back to the house of
Junior after answering the phone. And
after more than two hours, we heard the
sound of engines of vehicles arriving, and
then Meo, the man who was told by Roling
to guard, shouted saying: They are
already here[;] after that, Roling came out
carrying a carbine accompanied by Tsupe,
and not long after we heard gunshots and
because of that we ran towards the house
where the wake was. But before the gunshots, I heard Pedring Sabalones father of
Roling saying:You clarify, [t]hat you watch
out for mistake[n] in identity, and after
that shout, gunshots followed. [sic] Then
after the gun-shots Roling went back
inside still carrying the carbine and
474
475
xxxxxxxxx
Q On that same date, time and place, at
about 10:00 [i]n the evening, can you
remember if there was unusual incident
that took place?
A I heard over the radio at the Sabalones
Family that a certain Nabing Velez was
shot.
Q That [a] certain Nabing Velez
shot? What else xxx transpired?
was
A Two (2).
476
Alleged Inconsistencies
Q Who shouted?
A The voice was very familiar to me.
Q Whose voice?
A The voice of Roling Sabalones.
Q What else have you noticed during the
commotion [when] wives were advising
their husbands to go home?
A They were really in chaos.[44]
A careful reading of her testimony buttresses
the finding of the trial court that Rolusape
Sabalones and his friends were gathered at one
table, conversing in whispers with each other,
that there were two rifles on top of the table,
and that they became panicky after hearing of
the death of Nabing Velez on the radio. Hence,
the observation of the trial court that they went
to their grisly destination amidst the dark and
positioned themselves in defense of his turf
against the invasion of a revengeful gang of
supporters of the recently slain Nabing Velez.[45]
477
Atty. Kintanar:
Q: Upon being informed by these occupants
who were ambushed and [you] were able
to return the car, what did you do?
Major Tiempo:
A: I immediately got soldiers and we
immediately proceeded to the area or to
the place where my fallen son was located
and when we reached x x x the place, I
saw my fallen son [in] a kneeling position
where both knees [were] touching the
ground and the toes also and the forehead
was touching towards the ground. (TSN,
Feb. 12, 1988, p. 6)
In such position, the second bullet necessarily
traveled upwards in relation to the body, and
thus the entry wound should be lower than the
exit wound. There is no showing that both
wounds were inflicted at the same time.[47]
In any event, the witnesses saw that the
appellants were the gunmen who were standing
side by side firing at them. They could have
been in a different position and in another
hiding place when they first fired, but this is not
important. They were present at the crime
scene, and they were shooting their rifles at the
victims.
478
Aberratio Ictus
Appellants likewise accuse the trial court of
engaging in conjecture in ruling that there
was aberratio ictus in this case. This allegation
does not advance the cause of the appellants. It
must be stressed that the trial court relied on
the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why
the appellants staged the ambush, not
to prove that appellants did in fact commit the
crimes. Even assuming that the trial court did
err in explaining the motive of the appellants,
this does not detract from its findings, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and sustained
by this Court in the discussion above, that the
guilt of the appellants was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
In any event, the trial court was not
engaging in conjecture in so ruling. The
conclusion of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong
persons was based on the extrajudicial
statement of Appellant Beronga and the
testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of
evidence sufficiently show that appellants
believed that they were suspected of having
killed the recently slain Nabing Velez, and that
they expected his group to retaliate against
them. Hence, upon the arrival of the victims
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 137481-83 & 138455. March 7,
2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. CONRADO SALADINO Y
DINGLE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
CONRADO SALADINO y Dingle was convicted
of three (3) counts of rape and one (1)
attempted rape and sentenced to death.[1] He is
now with us on automatic review.
Lourdes Relevo is the niece of accusedappellant Conrado Saladino. Her mother and
Conrado's wife Rosita are sisters. Lourdes calls
him Kuya Conrad. The parents of Lourdes live in
Balayan, Batangas.
Sometime in 1995 Lourdes, then thirteen
(13) years old, was sent by her parents to
Manila to live with Conrado and Rosita Saladino
496
the
497
498
499
credence,
is
the
crux
of
this
controversy. Indeed, this matter involves the
assessment of credibility, a task best left to the
trial court, which had the advantage of
observing the witnesses directly, picking up on
the subtle nuances of human behavior, and the
emphasis, gesture and inflection of voice; and,
of testing their credibility by their demeanor on
the stand.[6] We have often said that we will not
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses, unless
there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has
been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misinterpreted.
In giving credence to the testimony of the
private complainant, the lower court said The testimony of the Private Complainant,
Lourdes Relevo, was candid, straightforward
and firm. She testified with spontaneity, only
interrupted when she was overcome with
emotion. She cried when asked to recall details
of the incidents when the Accused assaulted her
virtue. She remained steadfast and firm in her
500
501
502
503
504
assertion
that
she
was
raped. Errorless
testimonies cannot be expected especially when
a witness is recounting details of a harrowing
experience.[18] A witness who is telling the truth
is not always expected to give a perfectly
concise testimony, considering the lapse of time
and the treachery of human memory. Thus, we
have followed the rule in accord with human
nature
and
experience
that
honest
inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters
serve to strengthen, rather than destroy, the
credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses
to crimes shocking to the conscience and
numbing to the senses.[19]
However, the lower court erred in imposing
the death penalty. In People v. Ramos[20] the
concurrence of the minority of the victim and
her relationship to the offender, being special
qualifying circumstances should be alleged in
the information, otherwise, the death penalty
cannot be imposed. In the case at bar, although
the prosecution did prove complainants minority
and relationship to accused-appellant, it failed
to implead both minority and relationship in the
four (4) Informations filed against accused-
505