3 Aula - Texto para Discussão - Richard Munch. Talcott Parsons and The Theory of Action

University of Chicago Press
Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action. I. The Structure of the Kantian Core
Author(s): Richard Munch
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 86, No. 4 (Jan., 1981), pp. 709-739
Published by: University of Chicago Press
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Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action. I.

The Structure of the Kantian Core'
RichardMunch
Universityof Dusseldorf
ofTalcott
This essaypresentsthethesisthata correctunderstanding
Parsons'swritings
mustbeginfromtheassumptionof a fundamental
of basic structure
and methodbetweenthe theoryof accongruence
tion and Kant's criticalphilosophy.It is alreadygenerallyunderstoodthatthiscongruence
holdstrueon themetalevelofepistemological assumptions.
It is less understood
thattheKantianformof argumentpenetratesdownto thelevelof theobjecttheoryof thegeneral
theoryof action.The coreofactiontheoryis thenotionthatconcrete
actionis to be explainedas a resultof the innerlaws and the characteristicinterrelations
of analyticallydistinctsubsystems
of action.
Thus the Parsoniansolutionto the centralproblemof social order
is not "utilitarian";nor,however,is it in any simplesense"normative," as it is oftentaken to be. Parsons'ssolutionlies insteadin
the notionof the "interpenetration"
of distinctsubsystems
of action.
This notionof interpenetration
is a derivativeof Kantian transcendental philosophy.In this sense, a Kantian "core" structuresthe
theoretical
framework
of thegeneraltheoryof action,and Parsons's
theoretical
development
mustbe understood
as a progressive
elaborationand refinement
of thiscentralcore.
A normativeorientationis fundamental
to the schemaof actionin thesame sensethatspace is fundamental
to thatof the
classical mechanics;in termsof the given conceptualscheme
thereis no such thingas action except as effortto conform
withnormsjust as thereis no such thingas motionexceptas
changeoflocation
inspace.[PARSONS (1937) 1968,pp. 76-77]
This positionof Kant's is clearlyof centralimportanceto the
generaltheoryof action.We hold that it is the locus of the
mostfundamental
underlying
premisesor assumptionsof social
orderingat thehumanlevel. It shouldexplicitlybe definednot
as thedata of moralproblemsbutas thetranscendental
normative conditionsof the orderingof such data. This Kantian
1 A German versionof this essay was publishedin the Fall
1979 issue of Soziale Welt.
I am very gratefulto Paul J. Gudel of the Departmentof ComparativeStudies in the
Humanities,Ohio State University,for providinga competentand carefultranslation.
The English versionincludes a few additions,most of them minor,for clarificationof
the argument.This essay is the firstpart of a two-partstudy of Parsons (see Munch
1980a).
English translation ?
0001$01.50
1981 by The University of Chicago. 0002-9602/81/8604-
AJS Volume86 Number4
709
AmericanJournalof Sociology
philosophical
positionclearlyunderlies
bothDurkheim's
and
of themoralcomponent
Weber'streatment
of societies,
especiallymodern
societies.
[PARSONS 1978,pp. 370-71]
For the past fourdecades,no sociologisthas been able to escape the influenceof the workof Talcott Parsons.This work,awesomein its scope,
depth,and continuity,
began withParsons'sdissertation
at Heidelbergon
the conceptof capitalismin the writingsof Max Weber and Werner
Sombart.2Several essays on AlfredMarshall (Parsons 1931, 1932) and
VilfredoPareto (Parsons 1936, [1933] 1968) extendedtheseearlystudies.
A firstculmination
pointin his theoretical
development
was reachedwith
The Structureof Social Action([19371 1968), a book whichhas become
a classic in its own rightthroughits constructive
interpretation
of the
classicauthors.The remaining
stagesof Parsons'sdevelopment
are likewise
markedby majorpublications,the last of whichis the collectionAction
Theoryand the Human Condition(1978a). It has becomean obligation
foreverysociologist,not only thoseworkingdirectlyon theoretical
questionsbut also all thoseengagedin the variousfieldsof practicalapplication, to take into considerationParsons's work-howevercompleteor
incomplete,
corrector incorrect,
it may turnout to be.
AlthoughParsons'ssociologyhas become in this sense an institution,
it is equally truethat the conventional
attitudetowardhis theoryis one
of criticalaloofness.Sociologistsdo not like to be identified
withhis optimisticjudgmentson modernAmericansociety,or withthelabel of "conservatism"which Dahrendorf(1955, 1958), C. WrightMills (1959),
Gouldner(1971), and manyothercriticshave affixedto his sociology.3
In addition,the complicatedmodelbuildingin Parsons'ssociologycauses
many sociologiststo keep theirdistancefromit.4 Certainlyonly a few
2 The dissertation,
writtenin German,has never been published.However, two essays
on the same topic appeared in the Journal of Political Economy (Parsons 1928, 1929).
3 Elsewhere,I have tried to lay the groundworkfor a more positive interpretation
of
Parsons, as opposed to these ritualized criticisms(cf. Munch 1976a, 1976b, 1978a,
1978b). For important constructivecontributionsto Parsonian action theory, see
Loubser et al. 1976.
4 F. N. House, in his review of The Structureof Social Action, ranked the potential
importance of the work for social theory very high. Although he confirmedthis
assessmentwhen the second edition appeared, he had already deplored the fact that
the work "is so long and abstruse in style; many American students of sociology
who would profitby it will be deterredfrom reading it" (House 1939, p. 130; see
also House 1950). Similar difficulties
were stated by E. Faris in his review of The
Social System: "It would be difficultto contend that the book is well written.Even
his loyal disciples will often confess that there are parts that are very difficultto
understand" (Faris 1953, p. 105). Today we can hardly say that Parsons took the
implicit advice of his older friend to heart. The later writings,instead, display at
times an even greater complexityin both language and content. House's fear that
only a few might force themselvesto read The Structure of Social Action at all
thoroughlyhas been realized for all of Parsons's writings.This is not so much the
710
Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

sociologistshave takenthe troubleto followParsons'selaboratetechnical
manipulations
of his theorythrough
his numerous
works.Outsidea narrow
circleof disciples,the potentialof his workhas barelybeen tapped.Frequently,the argumentthat his theoreticalapparatus can only produce
reifications
and so blocks any access to realityhas been used to avoid
havingto undertakethe difficult
task of testingsystematically
the adequacy of the theory'sapplicationto theworld.One can use such systematic and thoroughtestingto exhibitthe range and limitsof a theory,
but onlyif one is willingto go beyondwholesalecriticisms.
The questionhow muchexplanatorypowera theoryas elaboratedas
Parsons'spossessesis not one whichcan be decidedby generalarguments
morethan
or global judgments.Afterall, Parsonshimselfdemonstrated
how rewarding
such a testingof the explanatory
sufficiently
powerof his
is the veryrange
theorycan be. Not the least part of thisdemonstration
of his work,fromgeneraltheoryconstruction
down to the analyses,frequently in occasional pieces, of concreteempirical-practical
problems.
What one comesto realizeis thatit is exactlythisjoiningof opposites-of
generaltheorydevelopment
withempirical-practical
analysis-whichmakes
Parsons's sociologyso fruitful.It makes possible that interpenetration
of theoryand experience,of logic and practice,whichis such a crucial
prerequisitefor the developmentof everymodernscience.In an autobiographicalarticle,Parsonspointsout this twofoldcharacterof his sociologicalworkand emphasizesthathis kindof theorybuildingis neither
logicallydeductivenor sheerlyinductive,but ratherresemblesthe continualprocessof the systematization
of the law whichone findsin CommonLaw jurisdictions:
In thisprocess[i.e., Parsons'stheoretical
development]
. . . , I have
stimuliof the
indeedreactedto quitea number
of externally
presented
sortthatI havecharacterized,
especially
requeststo writeon topicssugof suchcases,I hopeI have
gestedby others.In a sufficient
proportion
reactedsomewhat
in the mannerof a competent
common-law
appellate
thesubmitted
judge:namely,
thatI haveconsidered
topicsandproblems
in relation
to a theoretical
its premises
werenot
scheme,
which-though
defined
withcompleteprecision
and henceforth
assumedas fullygiven
in a logicallycompletesense-has had considerable
clarity,
consistency,
particularfault of a particularauthor, however,as it is that of the entirediscipline.
The interpretationand understandingof every significantcontributionin sociology
takes, above all, time. It is impossibleto arrive at a full comprehensionof Marx or
Weber or Durkheim or Parsons by just dippinginto excerpts,as seems unfortunately
to have become the usual procedure in universitycourses in sociology. In the field
of philosophy,a similar method would be regarded as a waste of time. Sociology,
however,has been increasinglyaffectedby a large growthin demand from external
practical fieldsand has had to keep adapting continuallyto a more hectic timetable.
The result has been to leave it no time to take adequate theoreticalstock of itself
and to consolidateits scientificcore.
711
In a sufficient
of cases,it seemsto me that
and continuity.
proportion
insightand rounding
out,
thiskindof procedure
has yieldedempirical
of the theoretical
scheme.At
and revisionand generalization
extension,
defined
concernwithformally
certainpointsthishas meantintensive
withmuchmore
concern
theoretical
butat otherpointsprimary
problems,
whatI havemeantby the
issues.In anycase thisis essentially
empirical
as usedin thetitleof thisessay.
socialsystemtheory"
phrase"building
[Parsons1970,p. 868]
We could describethisprocedureas a specificformof theinterpenetrationof two subsystemsof the productionof knowledgewhichare themselves subject to theirown laws: the subsystemof theoreticalresearch
and the subsystemof practicalproblemsolving.In sayingthiswe apply
the centralconceptof Parsons'stheoryto his ownsociologicalwork.Only
is it possibleto synthesize
by developingsuch zones of interpenetration
into a unifiedwholewhichwould
the resultsof differentiated
subsystems
possess its own specificcharacterand whichwould have morepower to
unityor the sum of
illuminatethe worldthaneitheran undifferentiated
the particularsubsystems
Here it is theorywithoutintuitions
themselves.
whichremainsempty,whileintuitions
withouttheoryare blind.
of conceptand intuition,of
of this interpenetration
The significance
as a conditionof modernscienceis nowheremade
theoryand experience,
clearerthanin ImmanuelKant's CritiqueofPure Reason ([1781] 1956b).
it is Kant above all who articulatesthe specific
Amongphilosophers,
and TalcottParof modernscientific
knowledge,
structure
epistemological
of thephilossons's sociologyis everywhere
permeatedwiththe structure
of theory
interpenetration
ophyof Kant. It is notonlytheaforementioned
construction
and empiricalanalysisin Parsons'sconcretesociologicalwork
whichleads us to this conclusion.His generaltheoryof action and his
Kantian. If we look
theoryof social systemsare themselvesthoroughly
at Parsons'sbiographywiththisconnectionin mind,we noticethatParwhilestudyingat Heisons began to read Kant's philosophyintensively
essay of 1970, Parsonsdedelbergin 1925-26. In his autobiographical
scribeshis experience:
it seemsto me thatthisexperience
In retrospect
was,evenapartfrom
of Kantformyproblems,
thesubstantive
important
especially
importance
andoralexam
formylaterwork.It was reinforced
by a seminar
training
in 1926.The imon the samebook underKarl Jaspersat Heidelberg
thedetailedand repeated
study
portance
lay in thefactthatI undertook
a
of a greatbook,theproductof a greatmind,to a pointof reaching
and not
certainlevel of appreciation
of the natureof its contribution,
rathersuperficial
comments
withthe myriadof current
beingsatisfied
withtheconaboutit. Thisexperience
stoodmein goodsteadin working
of my ownauthorsand comingto whatI feltto be a high
tributions
levelof understanding
of themin thefaceof manydistorted
interpreta712

tions currentin the secondaryliterature,some of whichwere widelyaccepted. [Parsons 1970,p. 876]
Althougheven a superficialstudy of Parsons reveals the influenceof

Kant's epistemological
conceptions,
my largerclaimhereis thatParsons's
generaltheoryof actionand theoryof social systemsare exactlyparallel,
in structure
and method,to Kant's criticalphilosophy.I believethat this
hypothesis
gives us a way of readingParsonswhichhas heretofore
been
almostwhollyneglectedand that this neglectconstitutesa crucial deficiencyin the receptionaccorded Parsons's work.5Parsons's sociology
cannotbe understood
of Kant's criticalproject.
apartfroma consideration
In thispaper,I will use thephilosophicalperspective
providedby Kant's
for the interpretation
critiquesas a framework
of Parsons'swork as a
of
whole. My hope is that by doing so I can initiatea reconsideration
and that this
Parsons'stheoryof action and its variousconcretizations
reconsideration
will open up perspectives
on Parsons'sworkwhichwill be
freeof the clichesthat up to now have provedto be mostlyobstaclesto
our understanding
of it.
My firsttask is to establishmy thesiswithregardto the structureof
5 Studies on this topic exist,but they remainpreliminary
and fail to constructa complete interpretiveframework.A direct connectionbetween the cognitive theoriesof
Kant and Parsons has been asserted by H. J. Bershady (1973), who in my view,
however, fails to grasp the essential nature of the correspondence.Bershady draws
a parallel between Parsons's "action frame of reference"of 1937-conditions, means,
ends, and norms as a priori categoriesof every social science-and Kant's categories
of the understanding,
and he concentrateson the criticalassessmentof the claim that
causal explanationaccordingto the coveringlaw model is possible only if it is based
upon this frame of reference.Bershady does not see any continuousdevelopmentof
content in Parsons's elaborations of his theoryafter 1937; he sees them instead as
related attempts to satisfy the conditions of generalizationand causal explanation
with one theoreticalframeworkafter another. In this, he is hampered by an overly
narrow,purely functionalistinterpretationof the action frame of reference,reducing
Parsonian theory to an attempt to formulatenecessaryconditionsfor the existence
or evolutionarydevelopmentof social systems,an attempt which is forced to settle
for functionalist
explanationsas a second-bestsolution,strictcausal explanationalways
seeming to be out of reach. Also unsatisfactoryis the quasi-teleologicalsolution to
the dilemma of causal explanation vs. ideography which Bershady, following V.
Wright,puts forth.This is nothing but a relapse into historicismwhich sacrifices
Parsons's greatestachievement,namely, the constitutionof sociology as a discipline
which is not forcedto understanditselfin termsof eitherthe models of strictcausal
explanationof the natural sciences or the pure ideographicmethods of the study of
the arts and other cultural products.In order to understandParsons's basic perspective, we must draw a parallel, not between the action frame of referenceand the
categoriesof the understanding,but between the action frame of referenceand the
structureand purpose of Kant's critical project as a whole, concentratingon the
interpenetration
between the categoriesof the understandingand sense data, between
the categoricalimperativeand hypotheticalimperatives,between the teleologicalprinciple and concrete judgments. Only thus will we illuminate the interpenetration
of
the normativeand the conditionalin the theoryof action. On this topic,see Schwanenberg 1970, 1971.
713
the theoryof actionas it is presentedin The Structureof Social Action
of his classical sources(Durkand in Parsons'sconstructive
integration
heim,Weber,and Freud), in orderto isolate that core of the theoryof
action which is systematically
expanded,withoutmajor changes,in all
of Parsons'sfurther
writings.
THE INTERPRETIVE
PERSPECTIVE:
KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY
In his last theoretical

publication,"A Paradigmof theHumanCondition,"
Parsons,freshfroma renewed,intensivestudyof Kant, enlargeson the
of Kant's transcendental
significance
argumentsfor his own theoryof
action.6Parsons shows special interestin Kant's dualisticconstrualof
the natureof reality:
ofunderstandKantclearlythought
in termsofduallevels:thecategories
the"categorical
ingand thesensedata of empirical
knowledge;
imperative"and the"problems"
and
of practical
ethics;thecanonsof judgment
Thereseemsto be a striking
esthetic"experience."
parallelbetweenhis
versionof dualityand thelinguist's
"deepstructures"
and "surfacestructhe cybemeticist's
and "phenotypes,"
tures,"the biologist's
"genotypes"
"highon information"
and "highon energy,"
and indeedthesociologist's
"values,"or institutional
patterns,
and "interests."
We therefore
suggest
thatthefirsttermin eachof thesepairsbe usedto designate
a metastructure,whichis not as sucha property
of the phenomena
(also Kant's
term)underconsideration
butis rather
an a priorisetof conditions
withoutwhichthephenomena
in an orderly
in questioncouldnotbe conceived
manner.
[1978c,pp. 355-56]7
Kant's Critiqueof Pure Reason is best understood
as a replyto Hume's
([1748] 1902, [1739-40] 1973) empiricism
and to the skepticismwhich
resultsfromthat empiricism.Proceedingaccordingto the tenetsof a
rigorousempiricism,
Hume concludedthattheknowledgeexpressedin the
propositionsof the naturalsciencesreducedultimatelyto nothingmore
than collectionsof sense perceptions([1748] 1902, pp. 11-17). These
sense perceptions,
occur singlyand, contraryto the claimsof
moreover,
the causal laws of naturalscience,have no intrinsicconnection
witheach
other.There is no bridgefromatomizedsingularperceptionsto the general laws of science.Accordingto Hume, habit alone leads us to believe
in the necessityof the causal connectionbetweentwo eventswhichare
in thesame temporalorder.Hume's point
as occurring
alwaysexperienced
6 Parsons was inspiredto undertakethis restudyby a series of discussionswhich took
place at the Universityof Pennsylvaniabetween 1974 and 1976.
7 In the firstsentenceof this quotation,I have modifiedParsons by reversingthe pairs
of terms.I have done this so that the firsttermin each pair will be the "transcendental" termand the second the "empirical" term.This makes the pairs of termsin the
firstsentenceformallyidentical with those in the second sentence.
714

is preciselythatthisis merebelief,not knowledge([1748] 1902,pp. 2045).
The attemptto constructa completelyconsistentempiricism

had led
Hume to doubtthe possibilityof scientific
knowledge.Kant, on the other
hand,began froma completelydifferent
conceptionof the natureof science. For him, the validityof scientificknowledgewas a given,a fact.
His questionwas, How can we explainhow such knowledgeis possible?8
His explanationtook the formof a "transcendental
argument,"
by means
of which he demonstratedthat the possibilityof scientificknowledge
havinguniversalvalidityforall mendependson the existenceof certain
preconditions.
An importantcomponentof Kant's argumenthere is the
distinctionbetweenthe specificcapacitiesof a prioricategoriesand of
empiricalsenseexperience.It is impossiblefullyto understand
the nature
of scientificknowledgeby reference
eitherto the orderembodiedin its
abstractprinciplesor to its empiricalcontentalone. For Kant, modern
scientificknowledgeis explainableneitheras a habitual generalization
fromempiricalexperience,as in Hume's empiricism,
nor as a series of
deductionsfromthe firstprinciplesof reason,as in the rationalismof
someonelike Descartes,but onlyas the mutualinteraction
of theoryand
experience.Experiencethat can becomethe touchstoneof universallaws
is itselfonly made possibleby a table of categoriesand a set of general
theoretical
principles,
whichanalyticallyorderour senseperceptions.
And
it is only insofaras we constantlyrefersense perceptionsto thesecategoriesand principlesthatwe are entitledto say of themthattheyexpress
empiricaland not merelylogicalregularities.
This connectionof opposites-the abstractand the empirical-is a specifichistoricaloccurrencewhoseproductis modernWesternscience.The
prototypeof thisinterpenetration
of theoryand experienceis the rational
experiment,
developedin a historicalsituationin whichconditionswere
especiallyfavorableto the interpenetration
of spheresnormallykept separate. These conditionswereprovidedprimarily
associaby the scientific
tionsof the Italian Renaissanceof the 15thand 16thcenturiesand the
Englishscientistic
movement
of the 17thcentury.
These associationsunited
intellectuals
withpracticalmenof varyingbackgrounds-artists,
engineers,
artisans,merchants,
politicians.Their collaborationproducedwhat is by
us todayconsidereda matterof course: theinterpenetration
of theoryand
experience,of logic and practice,in modernscience. Thus therewere
8 See the "TranscendentalAesthetic" and "TranscendentalLogic" in Kant ([1781]
1956b). Elsewhere, I have tried to use this Kantian perspectiveto elucidate some
aspects of the controversybetween critical rationalism,Marxism, and critical theory
(Munch 1973).
715
unitedforthefirsttimefunctions
performed
previously
by whollyseparate
intellectualclasses.9
in
Justas the Critiqueof Pure Reason is directedagainstempiricism
epistemology,
Kant's Critiqueof Judgment
is an attack on all attempts
to constructa theoryof aestheticjudgmentby generalization
fromthe
collectionof givenindividualjudgments.A theoryof judgmentcan claim
universalvalidityonly if it establishesa connectionbetweena priori
categoriesof judgment(such as the categoryof "purposiveness
as such")
and the sensationsof pleasureexperiencedby individualsas they contemplateworksof art or the processesof nature ([1799] 1968, pp. 22,
61-68). And the same logic, the logic of the transcendental
argument,
structuresKant's Critiqueof PracticalReason. The latterworkis parforus, becausein it we can discernthe mainoutlines
ticularlysignificant
of Parsons'stheoryof action.
In theCritiqueof PracticalReason ([1797] 1967), Kant arguesagainst
of
any attemptto foundmoralprincipleson the subjectiveconsiderations
utilityof individualactors.That is, he rejectsall utilitarian
moraltheories.
Justas we cannotaccountfor the objectivenecessityof causal laws by
reference
solelyto the contentof sense perceptions,
so we cannotderive
thenecessityof a morallaw valid forall menat all timesfromthedesires
-or the calculationsof utility-of individuals.Private calculationsof
utilitymayyielddifferent
resultsfordifferent
individuals,or forthesame
individualat different
times.The criterionof a moral law, however,is
thatit is bindingforall menat all times.We cannotexplaintheobligatory
forceof the morallaw as the sum of all calculationsof utility,because
these calculationswould yield extremelyvariable results,and we would
have madeno progresstowarda conceptof trueobligation:"The principle
of happinesscan indeedgive maxims,but nevermaximswhichare competentto be laws of the will,even if universalhappinessweremade the
object. For, since the knowledgeof thisrestson meredata of experience,
as each judgmentconcerning
it dependsverymuchon theverychangeable
opinionof each person,it can givegeneralbut neveruniversalrules; that
is, the rulesit giveswill on the averagebe mostoftenthe rightones for
thepurpose,but theywill notbe ruleswhichmusthold alwaysand necessarily. Consequently,no practicallaws can be based on this principle"
(Kant 1956a,p. 37).
The characteristic
of moralnormsis that theylay claim to a validity
whichis independent
of subjectiveconsiderations
of utility.Our obedience
to themis not based on inclination,
whichis variable,but on duty,which
9 This is already a centralidea in Weber's work (see Weber [1922] 1973, pp. 596-97;
[1920] 1972, 1:1, 10, 414-16, 435-43, 481-84 and 2:143-47, 162-69). The significance
of this interpenetrationfor the developmentof modern science will have to be examined more fullyin anotherplace.
716

is unchanging.As a philosopher,Kant makes no attemptto providea
in men.
sociologicalanalysisof how thissenseof dutyarises,empirically,
His inquiryis directedtowardthe question,What are the conditionsof
possibilityof a universally
bindingmorallaw? Once again, Kant demonin questionis possibleonlythroughthelinkstratesthatthephenomenon
ing of abstractcategoriesand empiricalethicalproblems.Any particular
rule of action can be adjudged valid to the extentthat it enablesus to
attain a givenend, but thereis no directpath fromthis "hypothetical"
validityto a universal,unconditionalvalidity,since our firstparticular
rulemightbe called intoquestionby otherparticularruleswhichfunction
as meansto othergivenends.To bringorderto themultitude
ofparticular
rules and to answerthe questionof theiruniversalvalidity,we cannot
begin frombelow, but must apply a schemeof categoriesfromabove.
For Kant, orderis producedby a "categoricalimperative":"So act that
the maximof yourwill could alwayshold at the same timeas a principle
universallaw" (Kant 1956a,p. 30).
establishing
Insofaras moral theorytakes the categoricalimperativeas "the supremeprincipleof morality,"it can imposeon the multiplicity
of particularrules a unifyingorder which allows us to judge the universal
validityof theserules.In thisway, the development
of a universalmoral
orderis a consequenceof theinterpenetration
of the twoparameters
along
whichhumanactioncan be judged: (1) the laws of abstractionand of
logicalconsistency
and (2) therulesof mutualaccommodation
and of the
satisfactionof needs and desires.A moralordermustbe in some way a
reconciliation
of the demandsof abstractionand of logic and the needs
of practicalaction. If these are kept separate,the formerwill generate
onlyemptyconceptualsystems,whilethe latterwill leave us witha multiplicityof particularizedrules of action,each pertainingto a narrowly
delimitedsphereof human activity,containingno potentialfor a comprehensivemorality.
We knowfromthe comparativestudiesof Max Weberthatit is not a
foregoneconclusionfor any givenculturethat this interpenetration
will
occur. A systematicconceptionof naturallaw has been developedonly
in theOccident;in China,as well as in India, theconditionsof interpenetrationof abstractmoraltheoryand practicalregulationessentialto such
a development
werelacking.In bothplaces thetwosphereshave remained
separateand isolatedfromone another.10
Accordingly,
Kant's philosophyarticulatesthe presuppositions
of modern Westernsocietyin both the theoryof knowledgeand the theoryof
morality.And it is preciselybecauseit has thischaracteristic
that Kant's
10 The dependenceof modernnormativeorder on this interpenetration
will have to be
discussedin anotherplace (for preliminaryinformationsee Weber [1920] 1972, 1:43538, 2:143-46).
717
philosophyprovidesus witha meansforunderstanding
Talcott Parsons's
sociology,fromits beginningsin Parsons'srereadingsof Durkheimand
of Freud, to the systematized
fullness
Weber,throughits incorporation
of the maturetheory.
THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF THE THEORY OF ACTION AS A THEORY
OF INTERPENETRATION:
THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION
The significance
of Kant's transcendental
arguments
as a key to the unof his own actiontheory,fromits inceptionin The Structure
derstanding
of Social Action([1937] 1968), was openlyacknowledged
by Parsonsat
the otherend of his career,in "A Paradigmof the Human Condition"
(1978c). There ParsonsregardsKant as providingthehingeforthe turn
froma "positivistic"to a "voluntaristic"
theoryof action.Kant is thereforea forerunner
of Durkheimand Weber,who are read by Parsonsin
The Structureof Social Actionas the founders,along with Pareto and
voluntaristic
Marshall,of a nonutilitarian,
theoryof action."This position
of Kant's is clearlyof centralimportanceto thegeneraltheoryof action.
We hold thatit is thelocus of themostfundamental
underlying
premises.
or assumptions
of social orderingat the humanlevel. It shouldexplicitly
be definednot as the data of moralproblemsbut as the transcendental
normativeconditionsof the orderingof such data. This Kantian philosophicalpositionclearlyunderliesbothDurkheim'sand Weber'streatment
of themoralcomponent
of societies,especiallymodernsocieties"(Parsons
1978c,pp. 370-71).11
we have
In orderfullyto appreciatethe thrustof Parsons'sargument,
to read The Structureof Social Actionas the sociologicalequivalentof
Kant's moralphilosophy.Only in thisway will we be able to understand
how thisfirstmajor workopens out into the theoryof actionin general
and the theoryof social systemsin particular.Just as Kant developed
Parhis theoryof actionas an alternativeto philosophicalutilitarianism,
sonsdevelopedhis theoryof actionas an alternative
to sociologicalutilitarianism.This alternativeParsonsterms"voluntaristic
action theory,"the
basic principlesof whichhe findsadumbratedin thewritings
of Marshall,
Pareto,Durkheim,and Weber.
A centralreference
pointhere is Hobbes's ([1651] 1966) formulation
of theproblemof social order.A "social order"can be said to existto the
extentthatindividualactorsare connectedby a systemof sharedbehavior
about
patternson the basis of whichtheycan formrationalexpectations
11 The misunderstanding
due to the failure to see this Kantian characterof the core
of Parsons's theory of action is extremelywidespread. Schutz's critique of Parsons
from a subjectivist-idealiststandpointalready makes this mistake. See the recently
publishedexchangeof letters(Schutz and Parsons 1977).
718

each other'sactions.For example,if someonewants to make use of a
pasture,he mustbe able to determine
whether
thereare anyotherpotential
usersof thispasturewhomightclaimthesamerightto use it. If he cannot
determinethis,his use of the pastureis in principlenot secure.At any
time,a shortageof pasturagemightcause othersto disputehis rightto
use thispasture.He can successfully
realizein actionhis aims and intentionsonly if he is able to defendhimselfagainstthe attacksof others,
and he can do the latteronlyif he has sufficient
power.So it mustbe the
goal of everyactorto gain poweroverhis fellows.The war of all against
all is the inevitableconsequence.But this state of war, in whichevery
man mustfeareveryotherman,is an intolerablelifeformen.As Hobbes
shows,in thissituation-as in the so-calledprisoner'sdilemma-themost
rationalactionsthat men can performon the basis of theirindividual,
subjectivecalculationsof utilityresultin theirbeing far worseoffthan
if all had acceptedsome appropriatedistribution
of rights.12
As Parsonspointsout ([1937] 1968, pp. 89-94), Hobbes expressesin
paradigmaticformthe dilemmaof utilitariansocial theories.If the aims
of actionsare completely
arbitrary
and if rationality
is the onlycriterion
for the selectionof the means to those ends, thenwithina systemin
whichresourcesare limitedand actorsact whollyindependently
of each
other,subjectiverationalityin fact producesirrationalconsequencesfor
everyactor.Lookingat this systemfromthe outside,we can easily conclude that all the actorswould obtain moresatisfactory
resultsif there
were a distribution
of rightsand dutiesand if everyonecould counton
everyoneelse's observanceof these rightsand duties. In otherwords,
thereoughtto be a normativeorderwithinthe system.The utilitarian
dilemmaconsistsin the factthatwithinthe systemthereis no motivation
for the actors to try to alter theirself-destructive
situation.The most
rationalstrategyis stillthe acquisitionof superiorpower; the acceptance
of a normativeorderrequiresthe confidencethat otherstoo will stick
to the norms.This in turnrequiresthat everyonetreatadherenceto the
normsnot as one end amongothers,but as a higherend whichis never
submittedto the conditionsof utilitycalculation.Thus we mustgive up
the utilitarianpremisethat thereare no necessarilypermanent
ends; the
free calculationof utilityrequirespreciselythat the rank orderingof
ends be allowedto changeas the consequenceswe expectto followfrom
theirrealizationchange.(And thismeansthat utilitariancalculationcan
choose amongends only by evaluatingthemas if theywere means.) If
12 Cf. Buchanan 1975, esp. p. 27. Buchanan, in strict conformitywith utilitarian
theory,attemptsto explain "how 'law,' 'the rules of property,''rules for behavior,'
might emerge from the non-idealistic,self-interested
behavior of men" (Buchanan
1975, p. 43), and he ends up, as mightbe expected,rightin the snares of the Hobbesian dilemma: where "private sanctioning" no longer guarantees order, centralized
sanctioninghas to take over.
719
the adherenceto a normis to functionas a permanent
highpriorityend,
it mustconstitutethe limitof the processof the calculationof utility;
in otherwords,it mustbe rankedso high that it is neversubjectedto
competitionfromotherends. So long as this conditionis not satisfied,
everyoneis more likely to trustto his own resourcesof strengththan
he is to counton the adherenceof othersto the normswhichdefineindividualrights.
If we stay withinthe framework
there
of a consistentutilitarianism,
is no way out of thisdilemma.Hobbes's own solutionpostulatesthatthe
actors,takingthepositionof observers
of theirownsituation,
wouldrealize
that it is moreusefulforthemto adhereto a commonorder.When the
need forsecuritybecomesan end witha highenoughpriority,
the actors
will supposedlybe readyto come to an agreement
withone anotherand
to transfer
all of theirpowerto a sovereignruler(Hobbes [1651] 1966,
chap. 17). But Hobbes's solutionis inconsistent;it is not at all rational
fortheindividualactorto makesuch an agreement:"This solutionreally
involvesstretching,
at a criticalpoint,theconception
of rationality
beyond
its scope in the restof the theory,to a pointwherethe actorscome to
realizethesituationas a wholeinsteadofpursuingtheirownendsin terms
of theirimmediatesituation,and thentake the actionnecessaryto eliminate forceand fraudand,purchasing[sic] securityat the sacrificeof the
advantagesto be gained by theirfutureemployment"(Parsons [1937]
1968,p. 93).
of others
on thefidelity
As longas theindividualcannotrelycompletely
to theirmutualcontract,it is not rationalforhim to enterinto such a
contract.And he can never trustin the fidelityof othersunless such
is no longerthe object of utilitycalculations.This requires,howfidelity
ever, a normativelimitationof the principleof utilitybindingfor all
it will be saferto relyon "forceand fraud"as a means
actors; otherwise
of protectionagainstthe predationsof others.Such a normativelimitation on the principleof utilitywould have to precedethe agreementof
the actorsin the systemto resignpowerresources;it could neverbe the
resultof such an agreement.
Hobbes of courserealizedthis,whichis why
he withholdsfromthe citizensthe rightto cancel theircontractso long
as thesovereign
can guaranteeorder.
Thus it is not calculationof utilitywhichmotivatesthe citizens'adherenceto the contract,sincein regardto the contractwe have the same
else in the state of nature (Hobbes [1651] 1966,
distrustas everywhere
chaps. 14 and 15). Accordingto Hobbes,onlythethreatof externalsanctionscan assurethe citizens'conformity
to social norms.Ordercomesnot
froma contractspontaneously
arrivedat, but froma centralized
authority.
Hobbes thus providesa solutionto the utilitariandilemmawhichhas
720

becomethe traditionalutilitarianresponseto the fact that a freeplay of
individualinterests
does not spontaneously
yieldsocial order.The solution
turnson the idea of the centralization
of decision-making
powerand the
in the
powerto enforcesanctions.Essentiallythesame solutionis offered
model of "collectiveresources"whichJames Coleman (1974a; see also
1971, 1974b) has advancedas a way of dealingwithcases in whichsocial
exchangeby itselfprovesunable to generatesocial order.The same can
be said for the workof ViktorVanberg(1978), who like Colemanis a
modernutilitarian.
The onlyalternative
Vanbergis able to imagineto the
formation
of orderout of a processof freeexchangeis the centralization
of decision-making
power.Collectiveobedienceto a normis simplystipulated by a centralauthorityand imposedthroughthe threatof force.
The tensionsinherentwithinthe utilitariansolutioncan be seen in the
fact that we are no longertalkingabout "norms,"but only about centralizedor decentralized"decisions."In fact,Vanbergtends to use the
terms"centraldecision,""commondecision,"and "social decision"as at
least functional
equivalents(Vanberg1978,p. 671).
What does motivateindividualsto accept a centralization
of decisionmakingpower?In the variousutilitarianmodels,the motivation
can only
be the fearof a superiorabilityto imposesanctions,since thepossibility
of a spontaneousacceptancegeneratedby a freeplay of interestshas
alreadybeen ruled out. This impliesthat a rationalagent shouldwant
to obtain this superiorpower to imposesanctionshimself.So we have
landed back wherewe started,with Hobbes's war of all againstall. A
societycan be expectedto possess a stable orderonly if it containsa
sufficiently
pronounced
hierarchy
of power.But even thiswouldbe'a very
fragileorder,endangeredby everychangein the availabilityof the resourcesof power.Thus the appeal to centralization
of poweris in the
end no solutionto the utilitariandilemma,because it fails to touchthe
core of the problem:the need to limitthe possibleends and meansthat
individualactorsmay choose."A purelyutilitariansocietyis chaoticand
unstable,because in the absenceof limitations
on the use of means,particularlyforceand fraud,it must,in the natureof the case, resolveitself
into an unlimitedstruggleforpower" (Parsons [1937] 1968,pp. 93-94).
of powerwill be nothingmorethan a stage in the
Simplecentralization
for
struggle powerunless it can founditselfon some limitationon the
usage of powerotherthanthemereexistenceof a sufficiently
hierarchized
distribution
of powerwithinthesociety.
This is the argumenton the basis of whichParsons maintainsthat
withinthe systemof utilitarianthoughtno solutionto the Hobbesian
problemof orderis possible.If thehumanconditioncontainedonlythose
721
elementsrecognized
by utilitarianism,
therewouldbe no social order.Like
Kant in his criticism
of skepticism,
Parsonsbeginshis own argument
with
the claim that social orderdoes exist,even if in an always incompletely
realizedform,and that our task shouldbe to tryto explainhow thisis
possible.Parsons'ssolutionto the problemof social orderis oftencalled
a "normativesolution."The use of this phrase containsthe assumption
that Parsons explainsthe existenceof orderby referenceto a common
in this
systemof normsor values. Once Parsonshas been oversimplified
way,it is easy to takethenextstepand accusehimof notreallyexplaining
And thusthe
the existenceof orderat all, but onlyoffering
a definition.
utilitariansfeeljustifiedin presenting
again theirold solutions-exchange
or constraint
or somecombination
thereof-whileignoringParsons'sdemonstration
thatthesesolutionsare inherently
inadequate.13
If we do not want to missthe pointof Parsons'ssolutionto the problem,we have to read him fromthe perspectiveof Kant, and thatmeans
firstof all recognizing
that Parsons'ssolutioncan be neithernormative
norutilitarian.Parsonspresentsa voluntaristic
solutionto theproblemof
social order.The term"voluntaristic"
indicatesthatsocial orderneednot
be a completely
causallydetermined
factualorder.As soonas a centralized
forcedoes notprovidea factualorderby causallydetermined
compliance,
social orderis onlypossibleas longas the actorsvoluntarily
consentand
bind themselves
to a commonnormativeframeof reference.
A normative
orderof thiskind,as opposedto a merelyfactualorder,thusdemandsrationaljustification
of particularnormsby subsumingthemto universally
acceptedvalues.In fact,Parsons'sexpositionof thevoluntaristic
theoryof
actionrequiresthat he fighton two fronts.We have seen thathe defines
his own positionin oppositionto the positivistic-utilitarian
theoryof acno criterion
fortheselectionof humanactionsother
tion,whichrecognizes
than the rationality
whichweighsactionsas meansto ends. But he must
also definehis own positionin oppositionto idealistictheoriesof actionforexample,thatof Germanidealism,whichunderstands
all humanaction
as an objectification
of Geist. In oppositionto both of these extremes,
the voluntaristic
theoryof action maintainsthat humanaction mustbe
understoodas the resultof an interpenetration
of means-endrationality
and a normativelimitationon the freeplay of such rationality.Parsons
refersto thisrelationas one of "interdependence"
or "interaction":"The
voluntaristic
systemdoes not in the least denyan importantrole to conditionaland othernon-normative
elements,but considersthemas inter13 This type of argument,characteristic
of a numberof critiques,is flawedat its very
foundations.For examples,see Ellis 1971; Vanberg 1975, pp. 161-94, 1978; Schutte
1977. For a more recentformof critique of Parsons's theoryof social order,see also
the debate betweenParsons and Burger (Parsons 1977a; Burger 1977).
722
Parsonsand the Theoryof Action.I.

dependentwith the normative"(Parsons [1937] 1968,p. 82).14 Already
at thisstage in the development
of his theory,Parsonshas in mindthat
whichhe will later,in
relationbetweenanalyticallyseparatesubsystems
the fifties,
referto as "interpenetration."15
What preciselyis meantby interpenetration
betweenthe "conditional"
and the "normative"?It does not mean that actionis always,in every
particularcase, determinedby both components.It means ratherthat
between
social orderis possibleonly if thereis such an interpenetration
whichsets the
self-interested,
rationalizedactionand a frameof reference
limitsof the processof the calculationof utilityby rulingcertainends
and means out of bounds altogetherand by givingto 'othersa stable
priorityindependentof factualconditionsand means-endconsiderations.
Ordercan exist only if the actorsare not freeto shed theiragreements
starched
withone anotheras easilyas theymightshed an uncomfortably
shirt.The decisivequestionof transcendental
logic is, then,Given that
social orderexists,whatconditionsconstitutethe framework
withinwhich
social action necessarilytakes place? Kant asks, If thereis objective
scientific
knowledgeand if sense experienceby itselfcan provideus with
only an unordered"sensuousmanifold,"thenwhencethe orderand universal validitywhichare the definingcharacteristics
of scientific
knowledge? Kant's questionand Parsons'squestionhave the same form.And
just as forKant the answerto the questionturnedon the discoveryof
the limitsset on the arbitrariness
so forParsonsthe
of sense experience,
answerto his questionturnson the discoveryof a limiton the arbitrariof utility.
ness of action determinedsolely by subjectiveconsiderations
A social ordercannotbe establishedby utilityconsiderations
alone; there
mustbe somethingelse whichprovidesthe structurewithinwhichalone
such considerations
his problem
are possible.Parsonsdoes not formulate
in termsof a given activityof pure utilitarianaction whichthenmust
somehowbe limitedby norms.Rather,the limitationitselfprovidesthe
conditionof possibilityfor that whichit limits.This reversalof logical
priorityis a characteristically
Kantianmaneuver.
The Kantian criticalproject is a comprehensive
examinationof the
14 An interpretationwhich falls just short of giving a formulationof this core of
Parsonian theory can be found in Alexander (1978). However, Alexander fails to
emphasize "interpenetration"
as the central idea and instead argues within the limits
of the traditionaltheoryof differentiation.
15 On this topic, see Luhmann 1977a, 1978b; Jensen 1978. According to Luhmann,
the concept of interpenetration
occurs "only late" in Parsons's writings,while Jensen
assertsthat it is introducedin the mid-fifties.
Both authors fail to see that already in
The Structureof Social Action Parsons is puttingfortha theoryof interpenetration.
Nor are they aware of the basic affinityof this conceptionwith Kant's philosophy.
Luhmann veers away fromParsons's theoreticalprogrambeforehe really understands
it, and his attempt at a new conceptualizationof the program does not even reach
the point at which Parsons left off,much less go beyond it.
723
specificcapacitiesof the humanfacultiesof knowledge-senseperception,
whichgovernsthe
whichsuppliesempiricaldata, and the understanding,
formation
of conceptsand judgments.Kant's conclusionis that the orderednessof our experience,as it manifestsitselfin the fact that the
and thelaws
canonsof universalvalidity,the rulesof logicalconsistency,
which
is
merely
perceived,
but
of causalityapply to it, is not something
of thepossibilities
ofperception,
occursonlythrough
thea priorilimitation
the drawingof "the boundsof sense,"by the rulesof conceptformation
and the modesof unityin judgment.In the same way, Parsonsconducts
an examination
of the variouselementsof a sysof the specificfunctions
of (a) availablemeans
temof action: (1) ends; (2) a situationconsisting
and (b) givenconditions;and (3) a selectiveprincipleaccordingto which
means and conditionscan be relatedto ends (Parsons [1937] 1968, pp.
77-82). If theselectiveprincipleis a puremeans-endrationality(Weber's
Zweckrationalitdt)-for
example,the calculationof utility-no social ordercan arise.A social orderis possibleonlyif thereis a selectiveprinciple
and
whichexemptscertainmeansand ends fromutilitarianconsiderations
Withinthe limitsthusestablished,
assignsto thema permanent
priority.
actionis motivatedby considerations
of utilityand is as variableas empiricalknowledgecan be withintherulesof theunderstanding.
As Kant shows,thereare onlytwo kindsof selectiveprinciples:hypotheticaland categorical.Only categoricalprinciplescan producea conof situationsof action.
stancyof choiceof actionsthroughthevariableness
in orderto understandParsons's
We can make use of Kant's distinction
argumentthatsocial orderis possibleonlyif actionis guided,not solely
by conditionalselectiveprinciples,but also by normativeselectiveprinhypocipleswhichdetermine
the scope of the validityof the conditional,
theticalselectiveprinciples.These normativeselectiveprincipleshave the
same functional
forthe theoryof action that the pure intuisignificance
have for
tionsof space and timeand the categoriesof the understanding
oriclassicalmechanicsin Kant's Critiqueof Pure Reason: "A normative
entationis fundamental
to the schemaof action in the same sense that
to that of the classical mechanics;in termsof the
space is fundamental
givenconceptualschemethereis no such thingas actionexceptas effort
to conformwith normsjust as thereis no such thingas motionexcept
are definias changeof locationin space. In both cases the propositions
tionsor logicalcorollaries
of definitions.
But it is notnecessaryforpresent
purposeseven to raise the questionwhetherhumanbehavioris 'really'
normatively
oriented"(Parsons [1937] 1968,pp. 76-77).
A normative
selectiveprincipleis a categoricalrulein Kant's sense.Its
validityis not dependenton the characterof the individualsituationsin
whichit is applied.Concretely,
thismeansthat,if thereis to be a social
order,a rule such as, for example,that excludingthe use of forceand
724

fraudmustnot have merelya hypothetical
validitycontingent
upon the
actors'expectationsof profiting
fromit. If the validityof the rulewere
merelyhypothetical,
it wouldoftenturnout to be moreadvantageousfor
actors to employmeans whichsubvertthe rule. This would prove the
impossibility
of mutualtrust,and Hobbes's state of naturewouldbe unavoidable. Further,the motivationto restrictoneselfto peacefulmeans
of exchangeundera threatof sanctionsimposedby an externalauthority
wouldalso be hypothetical,
since the individualwouldaccept thisrestrictiononlyas longas he himselfwas notstrongenoughto seize theposition
of centralizedauthorityand turnit againsthis fellows.In thiscase there
would be no selectiveprincipleguaranteeinga constancyof motivesfor
action and determining
the use of peaceful means of exchangeas the
limitof social interaction.
The firstthingwe get out of Parsons'sanswerto the questionof the
possibilityof social order is the realizationthat the selectiveprinciple
settingthe limitsof self-interested
actionmustbe categorically
valid for
all actors.That means that the actorsobey the rule because it is their
obligationto do so, and not because theythinkit will be usefulforthem
to do so. The paramountquestionfora sociologicaltheoryof social order
mustbe, How is thiscategoricalobligationpossible?Onlyby understanding the functionof the normativerulesin Parsons'svoluntaristic
theory
of actionfromthisKantianperspective
can we graspthe fullsignificance
of Parsons'stheory.From the standpointof this Kantian perspective,
it
makesno sense to criticizeParsonsforoffering
as an explanationof the
existenceof social orderthe very fact he is supposedto be explaining,
that is, the existenceof commonnorms.It is equallybeside the pointto
counterParsonsby proposingagain the solutionsof traditionalutilitarian
thought-socialexchangeand, where this fails, a centralizedauthority
withthe abilityto imposesanctions(see Ellis 1971; Coleman1971; Vanberg 1978). Parsonshas shownthese solutionsto be fundamentally
inadequate,and it was in uncoveringthe sourcesof theirinadequacythat
he firstarrivedat a formulation
of the criteriona theoryof social order
must meet in regardto the functionof normativerules in a systemof
social action.It is not enoughsimplyto explain"how normscome into
existence."One mustexplainpreciselyhowa categoricalobligationtoward
commonnormscomesaboutwithina socialsystem.Normsexistonlywhen
everyactorin the social systemcan take generaladherenceto the norms
to be a matterof course.This is possibleonlyif adherenceto the norms
restsnot upon merelyhypothetical
imperatives,
but upon a categorical
obligationwhichsetsa limitto theprocessof utilitarian
calculation.Every
explanationof "the existenceof norms"mustsimultaneously
be an explanationof the sourceof the obligatoryforceof thosenorms.We will
not be able to give thislatterexplanationif we continueto resortto free
725
exchangeor centralization
of authority,
or any otherexplanatoryfactor
whichremainswhollywithinthe utilitarianframework.16
Parsons'sanalysisof the systemof social action allows him to pose,
in its correctformfor the firsttime,the problemwhichthe theoryof
social ordermustsolve. It pointsout the directionin whicha solution
is impossibleand the directionin whichwe mustsearchif we are to find
a solution.But Parsonsdoes not simplyreplacethe utilitariantheoryof
the genesisof normswith a normativetheorywhichviews social action
solelyas it is determined
by categoricalobligation.Accordingto the voluntaristictheoryof action, normscan be generatedonly throughthe
interpenetration
of actionorientedtowarda means-endrationalityand a
categoricalnormativeobligation.Neitherthe one nor the otherby itself
yields a concretesocial order.Wherepure means-endrationalityreigns,
no social orderis possible.But if thereis nothingbut the categoricalobligationto obey norms,withno interpenetration
withthe variousspheres
of ordinaryself-interested
action,theresultwillbe nothingbut a "sacred"
orderwhichwill remainso remotefromeverydaybehaviorthat it will
be incapableof imposinga concreteorder.17
An orderpermeating
all areas
of social life can be expectedonly when the spheresof self-interested
action and categoricalobligationinterpenetrate.
This interpenetration
is
not somethingwhichcan be taken forgranted.The degreeof such inin a given societydepends on specificconditionswhich
terpenetration
help or hinderit, conditionswhichit is the task of any theoryof the
development
of normsto articulate.18
A theoryof the development
be a theoryof
of normsmusttherefore
the interpenetration
of opposed subsystems-inthis case, the subsystem
of action directedby means-endrationalityand the subsystemof categoricalduty. Nowhereelse in the disciplineof sociologyhas this basic
idea, so essentialfor any theoryof the developmentof normsand for
everytheoryof social change,been elaboratedas lucidlyas in thewritings
of TalcottParsons.It is all the moreironic,then,thatamongsociologists
it has becomealmosta ritualto deploreParsons'sfailureto providean
of normsand of social change; explaining
explanationof the development
This indispensablepreconditionof the explanation of the generationof norms as
the core of social change has been ignored by all those critics who have declared
Parsons's theory unable to explain change. Consequently, all alternative theories
exhibit an overly narrow conceptionof the problem in question and are doomed to
failurefrom the start. This holds true of all contributionsin this contextfromDahrendorfvia Mills rightup to Gouldner and others.
17 If Weber had been able to finishhis study of Islam, he would most likely have
made this point the centerof his argument:"The holy rightcould not be abolished,
nor,in spite of all adaptation, could it be realized" (Weber [1922] 1976, p. 475).
18 Only from this general perspectivecan we understandWeber's explanation of the
developmentof modernOccidentalsociety.This in itselfgoes to prove the explanatory
potentialof a theoryof interpenetration.
16
726

social changemeans,afterall, nothingotherthan explainingthe institutionalizationof a newlyarisenorder.The chargehas been repeatedso
oftenthat many now believe it purelyon hearsay.One mightconclude
fromthis that sociologistsin generalare but littlepreparedto treat a
trulycomplextheoryadequately.
THE SOURCES OF THE THEORY OF ACTION: WHITEHEAD,
WEBER, FREUD
DURKHEIM,
The mostimportant
influences
on thedevelopment
of thetheoryof action
as a Kantian theoryare Whitehead'sepistemology
and Durkheim'sand
Weber'ssociology.These figuresassumedin thecourseof Parsons'sdevelopmentgreatersignificancethan Marshall or Pareto, with whom they
are bracketedin The Structure
of voluntaristic
ofSocial Actionas founders
action theory.Anotherveryimportantfigurein the development
of the
theoryis Freud, whose work Parsons studied in depth only afterthe
appearanceof The Structureof Social Action.
Parsons's"analyticalrealism,"19
as an epistemological
concept,has its
rootsin the workof A. N. Whitehead([1925] 1967). Analyticalrealism
claims that empiricalphenomenaacquiresignificance
fora scientific
disin termsof the theoreticalframe
ciplineonly when theyare formulated
of referencespecificto that discipline.This means that any discipline
can consideronly certainaspectsof reality,neverrealityin its fullconcreterichness:"Descriptiveframesof reference
in this sense are fundamentalto all science.But by no means do they exhaustscientificconceptualization.Facts cannot be describedexceptwithinsuch a schema.
But theirdescriptionwithinit has, in the firstinstance,the functionof
whichis to be explained.That is, of the great
defininga 'phenomenon'
mass of possibleempiricalobservations
we select thosewhichare at the
same timemeaningful
withinsuch a schemaand 'belongtogether.'They
thus serve togetherto characterizethe essentialaspects of a concrete
phenomenon,
whichthenbecomesthe object of scientific
interest"(Parsons [1937] 1968, p. 30). We recognizethis conceptionas a derivative
of Kant's epistemology.
The particularobjects of a scientificdiscipline
are themselvesconstitutedthroughthe interpenetration
of empiricalobservationand a theoreticalframeof reference.
The firstfunctionof the
theoretical
frameof reference
is to differentiate
as sharplyas possiblethe
in
variousaspects of reality, orderto enable examinationof the causal
relationsthat mightsubsistamongthese aspects.Its second functionis
to open up the possibilityof abstraction,
whichmakespossiblethe transferenceof knowledgefromone field of phenomenato other fieldsof
19 See the interestingstudy by Bershady (1973), as well as Parsons's positive review
(Parsons 1977b) and Bershady's commenton it (Bershady 1977).
727
by a structureof catephenomena.These functionsare best performed
greaterspecificity
and analytical
gorieswhichcan be given increasingly
of a fewbasic conceptsand
precisionthroughthe internaldifferentiation
newconceptsto handle
whichdoes notconstantly
have to keepintroducing
its empiricalinput.Thus the theoreticalframeof referenceshouldmake
possiblethe abstractionfromparticulars,on the one hand, and the particularization
of abstractions,
on the other.
It is impossibleto understandthe mechanicsof Parsons'stheoryapart
fromthisbackground.The theoryis designedto performthesetwo basic
schemacan be
functions,
and the later development
of the four-function
understoodas the logical consequenceof this fundamental
commitment.
It is supposedto make possiblebothabstractionand analyticdifferentiation,in orderto providethe mostpreciseassessmentpossibleof the contributionsof variousaspects of realityin the causationof certainphemustbe keptin mind
nomena.This functionof analyticalschematization
when one tries to understandthe developmentof the theoryof action.
Certainlythis basic epistemological
principleaccountsfor the emphasis,
in all of Parsons'swritings,
as conon the processof conceptformation
stitutiveof the "objects" of sociology.Yet, contraryto the frequent
criticismsleveledagainstit, the theoryof action consistsof muchmore
than mere "taxonomies."Those who findin Parsons'sworknothingbut
a taxonomyhave failedto read himcarefully.
Whiteheadhad a mostlyformalinfluenceon Parsons; the influenceof
Durkheim,Weber, and Freud was substantive.Accordingto Parsons,
Durkheim,Weber,and Freud all share a dualisticconceptionof action.
All threemanagedto avoid the pitfallsof reductionism
whichlay in both
directions.Durkheimwas not a sociologicalreductionist,
Weberwas not
an idealisticreductionist,
and Freud was not a biologicalreductionistalthoughthesechargesare frequenteven today.
of Spencerin his studyof the divisionof
Reviewingthe utilitarianism
labor, Durkheim([1893] 1964) pointsout that social exchangealways
binding.These
presupposesthe existenceof ruleswhichare categorically
rules mustbe categoricallybindingif theyare to serveas the "frame"
forthe freeassociationof individualsguidedby considerations
of utility.
If theserulesthemselves
of utility,
open to considerations
wereconstantly
no one could have any confidencethat thosewithwhomhe had entered
Durkheimholds,
into social agreements
wouldabide by thoseagreements.
in Kantian fashion,that a stable limiton the freecalculationof utility
of norms.Durkcan onlybe theproductof themoral-categorical
authority
concernis with the conditionswhichallow the generaheim'soverriding
tion of such categoricalobligationsand the moral criseswhichare engenderedin societiesby the absenceof such conditions.
of obligation,however.
Durkheimdoes morethanstressthe importance
728

The normativeordermustalso be relatedto the needs and dispositions
of individuals.Durkheimgoes beyond Kant in his recognition
that individualsmustabide by normsnotsimplybecause theymust,but because
theydesireto do so. Hence the crucialpointof a theoryof moralorder
mustbe the connectionof social obligationwith individualdesire.This
insightis fundamental
to the theoryof the interpenetration
of the social
systemand thepersonality
system.
Durkheim'stheoreticalconcernsbegin with these basic questionsand
branchout in thedirectionof a theoryof theinstitutionalization
of norms
in social systemsand a theoryof the internalization
of normswithinthe
individualpersonality(Durkheim 1973a, 1973b; Parsons 1967, [1937]
1968, pp. 324-408). Particularlyimportanthere is Durkheim'stheorem
thatit is only insofaras the individualis part of a groupon whoseapproval he is dependentthat normsvalid withinthe group can become
categoricallyobligatoryforthe individual.For Durkheim,it is the lack
of thisbondbetweenindividualand groupwhichexplainsthephenomenon
of suicide-not only egoisticsuicidebut also anomicsuicide (Durkheim
[1897] 1972). But since such bondsexistonlywithingroupswhichhave
both intensiveand extensivecontactamong theirmembers,the crucial
questionis, How can a societyavoid particularization
of thesenormatively
governedbonds? Durkheimsoughtthe solutionto this problemin the
of occupationalgroupsas a basic elementof social organizastrengthening
tionsand in the institutionalization
in common
of commonresponsibilities
assemblieswhichwould enforcecompromise
decisionmaking(Durkheim
[1893] 1964,pp. 1-31).
Durkheimalso shows that the process of bindingthe individualto
normsand the development
of personality
are not submitted
in everycase
to zero-sumconditions.Division of labor has to be accompaniedby the
looseningof ties betweenan individualand a group; otherwise,the individualwouldbe unable to participatein social lifeoutsidehis primary
reference
group.The individualmustbe boundin successionto thenormative demandsof different
groups; this is prerequisitenot only for the
development
of a comprehensive
normative
orderbut forindividualization
as well.20The "cult of the individual"is in this sense a formof social
orderin whichinstitutionalization
of a normative
orderand theindividuationof thepersonality
do notexcludeeach other,but reinforce
each other.
This discoveryof Durkheim'sis of decisive importancefor Parsons's
theoryof institutionalization
and internalization,
because here Durkheim
sets fortha theoryof theinterpenetration
of social systemand personality.
We findsuch a theoryof interpenetration
in Weber'swork,too, particularlyin his comparativestudiesin the sociologyof religion([1920]
20See Durkheim (1893) 1964, pp. 228-29; see also pp. 172-73, 198-99.
729
1972).21 At the heartof Weber'saccountof the originand development
of Westernsocietyis a conception
of theinterpenetration
of sphereswhich
outsidethe West have remainedseparateor even opposedto one another.
An especiallyimportantrole is played here by the tensionbetweenreligiousethicsand the world,a tensionwhichcan be found,in the sense
of a processof analyticaldifferentiation,
almosteverywhere.
This tension
can be eased by any of fourmethods:accommodation
to theworld,escape
fromthe world,reconciliation,
or mutualpenetration.22
Accommodation
to the worldis the solutionof Confucianism(Weber
in societies
[1920] 1972, 1:276-536). This solutionis foundpredominantly
in whichreligiousethicsare articulatedand expoundedby a class which
is involvedin practicallifeand has its own statusinterests:forexample,
the Chineseliterati.The consequenceof thisdominanceof the sphereof
means-endrationality
over the sphereof religiousethicsis the lack of an
ethicalorderwhichcould permeatethe wholesociety.There can thusbe
onlya limitedethicalcontrolof practical,utilitarianaction.
The paradigmaticexampleof reconciliation
is Hinduism(Weber [1920]
of this solutionto the problemof the
1972, vol. 2). The characteristic
tensionbetweenreligiousethicsand the worldis the separationof differentsphereshavingtheirown internalorder (the castes). These minisocietiesare integratedon the theoreticallevel by the ideologyof the
causalityof karmaand the transmigration
of souls.Thereis no possibility
here for a generalreligiousethicsthat would cover all of the different
social spheres.Therecan onlybe particularized
ethicsforeach sphere.
The paradigmaticexampleof escape fromthe worldas a solutionto
our problemis Buddhism(Weber [1920] 1972, vol. 2). This solution
tendsto arise in situationsin whichreligiousethicsis primarilythe concernof a class of intellectuals
who are isolatedfromtheconcernsof practical life.The resultis a sharpdistinction
betweentheethicsof thepriests
and the ethicsof the laymenand the absence of a generalethicalcode
whichcould regulatethe actionsin the spheresof everydaylife.
A mutualpenetration
of religiousethicsand theworldis foundonlyin
the Occident,and withinthe Occidentits most-completerealizationis
ascetic Protestantism
(Weber [1920] 1972, 1:17-237). Here alone have
the practicalspheresof economicsand politicsbeen ethicallyregulated,
ratherthan consignedsimplyto the realmsof utilitarianaction and the
manipulationof power.The typicalPuritanbusinessethic is neithera
mere appendage of economicacquisitivenessnor a pure emanationof
21 I have elaborated the significanceof Weber's comparative studies elsewhere (see
Munch 1980b).
22 In this connection,see not only Parsons's interpretation
of Weber in The Structure
of Social Action, but also especially his introductionto the English translationof
Weber's systematicwork in the sociology of religion (Parsons 1963).
730

religiousethics. It is instead the qualitativelynew productof the inof twobasicallyopposedspheres.Nothingcomparableexists
terpenetration
outsidetheOccident.This penetration
of ethicsintothedomainof business
is forWeberthe specificmarkof moderncapitalism,in comparisonwith
all non-Western
and premodernformsof economicbehavior.It could
have occurredonly wheretwo institutionally
independentspherescame
together
whileretainingtheirownessentialcharacter.
Althoughthe institutional
independenceof the Christianreligionresultedveryearlyfromthe institutionalization
of the customof educating
priests at universities,the penetrationof the economicand political
spheresby religionoccurredonly graduallyand by steps. A giant step
in this directionwas the developmentof the medievalcity,because in
it, unlike the non-Western
city, the religiouscommunity,
the political
community,
and the marketeconomyall were broughttogether(Weber
[1922] 1976,pt. 2, chap. 9, sec. 7). But stilltherewas a largegap between
priestlyethicsand lay ethics,and the bureaucraticorganizationof the
institutionalized
churchtendedto substitutecontrolof externalbehavior
for the internalization
of norms.Yet religionand the worldwere close
enoughto createever more extremetensionsbetweenthemas economic
activityincreased.These tensionswere released by the Reformation,
througha strongerethicalpenetrationof the world.The traditionalism
of the GermanReformation
caused thisprocessto be coupledtherewith
a strengthening
of absolutism.As a result,only in Calvinismand in the
Puritansects and denominations
of England,the Netherlands,and the
UnitedStates was therea trulyreciprocalpenetrationof religiousethics
and the world.Importantelementsof this development
were the radical
eliminationof any distinctionbetweenan ethics for the priestsand an
ethics for the laymenand the importancegiven to internalcontrolof
behavior,an importance
conferred
firstby Calvin'sdoctrineof predestination.23Of paramountimportance,
however,was the tightbindingof the
individualto the groupby its approvalwhichwas achievedwithinthe
freereligiouscommunities
of Puritanism.24
We cannotunderstandthe emergenceof the modernnormativeorder,
whichmanagesto be bothuniversaland individualistic,
and bothrational
and activistic,apart fromthisinterpenetration
of religiousethicsand the
world.The characteristic
of thismodernorderis that it is able to maintain a commonidentitywhile encompassinga rangeof social activities
that includeseverything
fromphilosophicaltheoriesof moralityto prac23 This is the explanatorytack taken by Weber in his essay on the Protestantethic
and the spiritof capitalism (see Weber [1920] 1972, 1:17-206).
24 This aspect is emphasized in Weber's study of the Protestantdenominationsand
the spirit of capitalism (see Weber [1920] 1972, 1:207-36).
731
tical problemsof economicand politicalaction. Only the Occidentrecognizesthe philosophicalconceptof naturallaw, and the reciprocalpenetrationof "sacred" and "profane"codes is peculiarto the Occident.Outside the Occident,thesetwo realmshave remainedalien to one another,
or one has dominatedthe other.In orderto explain the genesisof the
unique social order of the Occident,Weber has implicitrecourseto a
theoryof interpenetration.
Apart fromthis theoreticalperspective,we
will fail to understand
Weber'sexplanationof theoriginand development
of Westernsociety.It is the meritof Talcott Parsons to have distilled
thistheoretical
perspectivefromWeber'ssociologicalwritings
and to have
made it the centralidea of his own theoryof action.
As thethirdsourceof thetheoryof action,SigmundFreudis considered
by Parsonsto have made the same contribution
to a theoryof the interof social systemand personality,
fromthe perspectiveof the
penetration
as Durkheimmade fromthe perspectiveof the social system.
personality,
For Parsons,thisconvergence
is of fundamental
significance
forthefuture
fromtwo quite
developmentof the social sciences: "This convergence,
distinctand independent
startingpoints,deservesto be rankedas one of
the trulyfundamentallandmarksof the developmentof modernsocial
science" (Parsons 1953,p. 15).
Throughhis analyticdifferentiation
of the personalityinto an id, an
ego, and a superego,Freud developsa perspectiveon personalitywhich
allows him to view it as a zone of interpenetration
of the structureof
drives,externalreality,and culturalnorms(Freud 1972). In connection
withthisFreudianschema,Parsonsemphasizesthatalreadyin theearliest
(oral) phase in thepsychicdevelopment
of the child,the realityprinciple
of the ego, as well as the affectivemotivationof the id, is shaped by
interaction
withsocial objects,primarilythe mother,and so is the result
of symbolicprocesses.This means that the ego and the id are no less
culturalproductsthan the superego,an assertionwhichParsons claims
that Freud foundhimselfincreasingly
drawnto.
Freud's analyses of the formsof identification
betweenmotherand
of the objectcathexesin theoedipalstage
child,and of the differentiation
and in thelaterstagesof latencyand adolescence,are of greatimportance
forthe understanding
of the processof socialization(see Parsons 1956a,
is theresult
1956b,1964a, 1964b; Parsonsand Bales 1956). Identification
of the fact that the childin the oral phase is dependenton othersforthe
satisfaction
of his needs and desires; its basic mechanismis the cathexis
of the libidinalobject. This object cathexisprogressesfroma moreparticularizeddependenceon pleasureto a moregeneralizedand symbolically
formeddependenceon love. Identification
is the basis forthe internalization of culturalnorms,whichare psychicallyrepresented
by the object
of identification.
In the oedipal phase, however,thereis a loss of early
732

of object cathexes
objects of identification,
along with a differentiation
and a corresponding
growthof as manyidentifications
as thereare dyadic
relationsfor the child withinthe different
roles withinthe familyand,
subsequently,
outsidethe family,in peer groupsand classrooms.Simultaneously,a differentiation
occursbetweenthe child's identification
with
individualrole-partners
in the groupand his identification
withthe group
as a whole.In this processof differentiation
of object cathexesand the
loss of infantileidentifications,
the internalizedculturalnormsare generalizedand detachedfromparticularidentifications.
The superegowhich
is theresultof thisprocessis thusnot a replication
of theinstitutionalized
normsof a concretegroupbut rathera generalization
fromvarioussystems of normswhichenables the individualto take part in social life
outsidehis originalreferencegroup and to attain a steadilyincreasing
autonomy.What Parsonsprimarilytakes fromFreud is this conception
of the simultaneous,
mutuallyreinforcing
expansionsof the scope of the
social systemand the personalautonomyof the individualas part of
one complexprocess,a processdependentupon a specificformof interpenetration.
FURTHER
PROSPECTS
of a theoryof inSo far,we have seen that Parsonslays the cornerstone

in The Structureof Social Actionand thatwe cannotadeterpenetration
it in the lightof Kant's
quatelygrasp this theoryif we do not interpret
critiques.This Kantian perspectiveis also of the greatestimportancefor
the understanding
of Parsons'sconstructive
integration
of Durkheim,Weof these
ber,and Freudintohis theoryof action.Throughtheintegration
classic authors,Parsonsis able to exceed by far the theoreticalrangeof
the interpretations
of themwhichare usuallyoffered.25
Moreover,without
25 Among the attempts at interpretationof these classic authors which have been
developed at least in part in opposition to Parsons, not one has made possible a
theoreticaldevelopmentas fruitfulas Parsons's. Withoutexceptionthese attemptslose
themselvesin certainaspects of the discussionand are unable to open up a perspective
fromwhich a generaltheorycan be constructed.This is true of Bendix, who reduces
the Weberian perspectiveto the single aspect of the strugglefor power between differentsocial groups,and who, in changingWeber froma sociologistinto a historian,
sacrificessociology as a theoreticaldiscipline (Bendix 1971; in this context see Parsons's [1972] review). Nor can Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg offeran interpretationof
Weber and Durkheim which is as constructiveas Parsons's. They reduce Durkheim
to a "sociological realist" and Weber to a "theoristof conflictand interests"and, in
the same context,charge Parsons with approachingthe classics with a predetermined
interpretivescheme. But this is exactly the reason Parsons has been able to integrate
both authors within an extendable theoreticalframework,while the effortsof Pope,
Cohen, and Hazelrigg remain mere patchwork. (See Pope 1973; Pope, Cohen, and
Hazelrigg 1975; see also the discussion between Pope et al. and Parsons in ASR
733
an understanding
of thisKantiancore,it is impossibleto followthefurther
of the theoryof action.In fact,all of Parsons'sfurther
thedevelopment
oreticaldevelopmentis a seriesof refinements
of this theoreticalinstrument for the analysisof relationsof interpenetration.
Beforeanything
else, one neededan instrument
withwhichone could analyticallydetach
subsystems
whichpossessedtheirown rule-governed
orderfromthe concretemanifoldof reality.Once thiswas accomplished,
one wouldbe able
to analyze these subsystemsas pure "ideal types" while also studying
the natureand extentof theirinterpenetration.
The fundamental
theorem
hereis not the old doctrineof differentiation,
accordingto whichsystems
can increasetheircapacitiesthrougha processof functional
differentiation,
but the theoremof interpenetration,
accordingto whichonly a process
whichallows both the greatestunfoldingof the internallaws of a subsystemand thegreatestamountof interpenetration
withothersubsystems
can producea newlevelof development
forthesubsystems
and thesystem
as a whole.This new level of developmentis as muchthe resultof the
tensionbetweenthe subsystemsas it is the resultof theirunity.The
interpenetration
of subsystemsunifiesoppositesand raises the threshold
level of tensionwhichthe systemscan accommodatewhilestill retaining
theiridentityand unity.26
Ethics and business,for example,are here not isolated sphereswith
rulesand laws whollyunique to each. Yet theyare relativelyindependent
of one another.They are shaped by different
social groups,and so they
remainclearlyseparable fromone another.Their mutual interpenetration,in which,for example,membersof the same congregation
become
businesspartners,opens the possibilityof the ethicalregulationof business and forcesethicsto be relevantto businesslife.
formedthus betweenbusinessand ethicsa
We can call a relationship
dialecticalone, as long as we understandthat we accept the biases of
neitherthe idealisticnor the materialistic
dialectics(in fact,thesebiases
[Cohen 1975; Parsons 1975, 1976; Pope 1975; Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg 19771.
See also Warner 1978 and the subsequentcommentsby Parsons [1978b] and by Pope
and Cohen [1978] in AJS.) The German interpretationof Weber's work deliberately
talks around Parsons, partly by renouncingsociological theory altogetherand constructingan ideal type of the inner developmentof ideas independentof the instructions of a "sociological perspective"(as does Tenbruck [1975]), partly by maintaining
that one can bypass Parsons with a Weberian dialectics of ideas and interests(as
Schluchter[1976, 1978, 1979] proposes). Both interpretationsare interestingand informative,but neitheris able to produce a systematicstartingpoint for theoretical
developmentsbeyond Weber. They also lack any access to Weber as a theoristof
interpenetration.
See my criticaldiscussionof these problems (Miinch 1980a).
26 This has been explicitlypointed out as a theoreticalproblem by Luhmann (1977a,
1977b, 1978a, 1978b) in his most recentwork. Luhmann, however,does not actually
make systematicuse of Parsons's achievements(cf. also Jensen 1978.)
734

preventthe idealisticand materialistic
"dialectics"frombeing truedialectics at all).27 In the zone of interpenetration
betweenbusinessand
ethicsthereappearsa new phenomenon:businessethics,whichis neither
pure businessnor pure ethics,but something
in between.It bringspreviously separatespherestogetherwithoutincorporating
one into the other,
and it raises the level of each subsystem'stoleranceforwhat had previouslybeen incompatible
withit, althoughthisincompatibility
can in principle neverbe totallyeliminated.In such a systemthe possibilitiesof
both economicaction and ethical action are expanded.Interpenetration
increasesthe scope and powerof bothspheres.28
Parsons'stheoreticaldevelopment
afterThe Structureof Social Action
moves clearlyin the directionof refining
his theoreticalinstrument
for
the analyticaldifferentiation
of subsystemsand the analysisof the relationsof interpenetration
amongthem.The major landmarksin this developmentare: (1) the differentiation
of culturalsystem,social system,
and personality,
and the analysisof institutionalization
and internalization
in The Social System(1951) and Toward a General Theoryof Action
(Parsonsand Shils 1951); (2) thedifferentiation
of levelsof systemsand
the macroscopic-microscopic
applicationof the four-function
paradigmin
WorkingPapersin theTheoryof Action(Parsons,Bales, and Shils 1953);
(3) the introduction
of the hierarchyof cyberneticcontroland of the
mediaofinterchange
(a) on thelevelof thesocialsystem(money,political
power,influence,
value commitments)
in Economyand Societyand after
(Parsons and Smelser1956; Parsons 1969a, 1969b, 1969c); (b) on the
level of the systemof action (intelligence,
performance
capacity,affect,
definition
of situation),whichdates fromThe AmericanUniversity
(Parsons and Platt 1973; Parsons 1977c); and (c) on thelevel of thehuman
conditionas a wholein "A Paradigmof the Human Condition"(1978c).
In all of theseworks,TalcottParsonshas createda theorywhichmight
be comparedwith Kant's criticalphilosophy.The task of examiningthe
substantiveand methodological
issuesin his workin orderto reacha just
determination
of Parsons'scontribution
to the social scienceswill occupy
social scientistsfora long timeto come.29
27
The materialistposition has, at least in many of its versions,become a crude functionalism,which is satisfiedthat it has explained a phenomenonas soon as any kind
of positive functionalrelation,no matterhow abstract,with the systemof capitalism
is discovered.It mightbe said, therefore,that authors like van den Bergheare directing theirargumentsin the wrong direction (see van den Berghe 1963).
28 This is the true meaning,e.g., of Benjamin Nelson's conceptionof the development
"from tribal brotherhoodto universalotherhood"as the main line of developmentof
the process of civilization itself (see Nelson 1969). Weber worked within a similar
conception.
29 The furtherdevelopmentof Parsons's theory from The Social System to Action
Theory and the Human Condition has been elaborated elsewhere(see Miinch 1980a).
735
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739

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University of Chicago Press

Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action. I.

1981 by The University of Chicago. 0002-9602/81/8604-

AJS Volume86 Number4

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

Althougheven a superficialstudy of Parsons reveals the influenceof

KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

In his last theoretical

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

The attemptto constructa completelyconsistentempiricism

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

Parsonsand the Theoryof Action.I.

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

Parsonsand the Theoryof Action.I.

(Parsons 1977b) and Bershady's commenton it (Bershady 1977).

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

Parsonsand the Theoryof Action.I.

of a theoryof inSo far,we have seen that Parsonslays the cornerstone

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

(1781) 1956b. Kritik der reinenVernunft.Hamburg: Meiner.

Parsonsand theTheoryof Action.I.

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