Definition and Classification of Property Property connotes many things and it is therefore difficult to define.! “The law of property”, according to Lawson, “attempts to answer a number of questions about the relations of persons to things". It governs the relations of persons with respect to things. An adventurer, who finds himself on an uninhabitec island, like Robinson Crusoe, does not think in terms of property. But when his ‘enjoyment of the things on the island is being contested by other adventurers, it becomes meaningful to talk about property “Property” is used 10 signify things which are the subject matter of ownership, ¢.g., tables, books, cars - {hese are Classified.as mavable things, or personal property. Landon the other hand, is called seal property, Other “things” which are valuable, but which exist as concepts and objects capable of being reduced into physical possession, such as corporate stocks, bonds, patents and copyrights, are referred to as jntangible personal propecty or_choses in action. A cont on the other hand, involves a rel; between persons sespecting-athing, but its principal role lies in the enforcement of promises. ‘Many other relations between persons affecting things do not have anything to do with promises. Contract primarily gives rise to a relationship which is in personam, i.e., a relation between two persons; only the parties to the contract can sue and be sued on it. Ail other persons are not affected and are, therefore, excluded. _Propesty, on the other hand, denotes arightin rem. This means thatitgives are enforceable not only against the parties to the transaction, but against the whole world. ‘The distinction between contractual and property rights becomes blurred _ ee a contract creates a-right-which can or assigned. Sucha —« & “Dh. right becomes an asset, which can be expressed ‘of monetary value and = is therefore protected against i by all other persons. Invasion of one's person is protected by law against the whole world, just as any right in rem, but the right to be free from tortious (negligent or " inthe view of Philtrick, "the concept of property never hasbeen, is not and never can be of definite ‘coment. The paradigm of sanskirt verb ofa thousand forms could not approach in diversities the phases ‘ofthat concept in any singe ime and place. No scholar has ever dealt m more than 2 rudimentary with ‘its mutation § trom age to age. Even a tyro in knowledge must exhaust te vocabulary of change in describing them. Changing cultures cause the law to speak with new imperatives invigorates some concepts deviaizes ad brings to obsolescence eters: “Changing Conceptions of Property in Law" (1938) Pa LRev. 691,696 * Intoduction to Property, Oxford, 1958, pLintentional) injury is nota proprictaryright. Thi simply because we do not segard our own-bodies.as objects of property. <- + am fens Cneceats ‘ On the other hand, th It to be free of one's things isa right in rem and falls under the classification of property. When any object of ownership is interfered with, a cause of action arises against the tortfeasor. Property thus may connote (a) ownership as distinct from an_object of ‘ownership. This is the sense in which the concept “property” is used in the law of sale of goods, when it is provided that the property in ascertained goods passes when there is a sale.’ . Property can also mean (b) a right less than ‘ownership, as in the case of a bailee, when it said that a bailee has a special property in the goods bailed. Property, in the sense of objects of ownership, ‘comprises (c) corporal things capable of physical control as well.as(d) valuable rights which may not be capable of physical possession. ./.. ye Hed ter: oes vel ie flat J&A CLASSIFICATION se (a) Corporeal/Incorporeal - Corporeal property comprises physical objects which can be touched, felt and are visible, e.g. land, clothes, tables, potatoes. This is described in the Civil Law-as res corporales, ie., physical things, and it is distinguished from “jncorporeal property (or res incorporates). Res incorporales is an abstract concept used to describe rights available ‘against persons generally. Incorporeal property has no physical existence; cannot be touched or felt; ifexisis only inthe eyes af the law. Res inco _are notional things and are therefore intangible, e.g., patents, copyrights, trade- ‘marks, rights over land, such as easements and profits d prendre (or servitudes), and securities, leases and usufruct, Incorporeal things may include legal o . Teta ann: BP PAKS oy inion, A Rng HE GO ‘Under the civil law, ownership is described as dominium, which is ‘S35 88a classified as_res corporales. But the common law classification defines ‘ownership, which is an abstract concept, as incorporeal property, (ren Smeeaporr) > See Sale of Goods Act, 1893(b) Movable /Immovable The classification of movable and immovable property is rendered in the civil Agw aszes immobiles, also referred to as zes.sali immovable), as distinct from ‘res mobiles, (movables). Immovable property refers to land and things underneath and attached to it. It comprises: the heir on intestacy, or to the devisee where the property was willed, Rersonalty, on the other hand, vested in the first instance in the personsl representative (administrator or executor) of the deceased. But after the Land Transfer Act, 1897, both realt and) } /{ personaliy vested directly inthe personal representative. (2) Personalty could be willed but it was not until the enactment of the. Wills ‘Act, 1540 (U.K.) and the Tenures Abolition Act, 1660, thatrealsy-could_ i be:the subject-matter of testamentary disposition. - 12." cwlher aubgpet ville 9 (3) Personalty can Be an object of absolute ownership, but realty unter the_-+ Zommon Taw is subject to the incidents of tenure and therefore cannot be. ‘an abject of absolute ownership. An fual may only have estates in fant (4)TTe igmedies for the recovery of realty and personalty differed. Where a person was dispossessed of realty he could, by means of the actio realis, be restored to the very object of which he was dispossessed. ‘Where an owner of a realty. was dispossessed, he could by this action, action realis, obtain the King’s.writ commanding the sheriff to put him into possession of the very thing from which he was wrongfully evicted. This remedy_availed him-not only against the person who wrongfully "© Re Hoyles (19111 Ch, 179,185 pe 5 Ae cae uly have of bikvert f‘sjected him, but also against any person. suho was found in possession of the property. The execution process issued in rem, against the “thing”. On the other hand, the remedy for the loss of personalty-was in personam, ie. agains {wrong or the breach complained Of. The plaintiff did not get back the dispossessed property as a maitet of right. The defendant had the option of returning the item or paying damages. It was therefore expedient for the plaintiff to state the price or he might lose the action. Realty ‘The actio realis was a remedy available only to the person who had a freehold. land. Ereehold interests comprise the estates of fee simple-fee tail and life estate, After the Norman Conquest, those who had opposed William the Conqueror forfeited their lands, which were seized and granted. back-to. those who had been loyal to him. The English who were loyal to the king, redeemed their lands by surrendering them to the King and getting them back From him. These grants and regrants of land were not cofstrued as absolute gifts or out-and-out grants. They were bestowed-on-them subject to well defined conditions which were the basis of what is known as the feudal system of landhoTding. Under this system the grantees did not own the and: they were merely holding, (teneo) them of the King on the obligation of fidelity and and forfeited them on default, in which case the King resumed them as-his-own. The services were varied, ie., military, socage, spiritual, unfree and miscellaneous. ‘The fenants in capite, tenants-in-chief, ie., tenants who received their grants from and rendered fealty and services directly to the King, could also subinfeudate, i.., they could in turn grant parts of their lands to other persons as tenants, exacting from them lesser continuous services. These tenants who were referred to as mesne, (ie. intermediate) lords o tenants, could also make ‘were demesne tenants, i¢., those at the base of the pyramid of which the King ‘was at the apex. Thus every patcel of land was an object of tenure; it was held could not be owned. It was therefore known as a/fenemenp )!~ But land, the subject of tenure, could be granted to an occupier on terms ‘other shan feudal. There were three holdings of land: (1) liberum tenementum - freehold, (2) villeinagum - villeinage and the person, The defendant was obliged to personally remedy the") >*(3) leasehold aterm of years ly the Freeholder who held on feudal terms, ie. spiritual, socage oF military. A freeholder could impose servile services on a grant to the ‘occupier of the land, Such villein services might include ploughing, sowing, Teaping_and mowing, They involved_mainly menial work, and were of peer nau ie the ein had odo whatever his lord reauited ahi 3 thecommon. tower i dispose sed holding by m in time, the leascholder gained the right to recover po’ means of a writ of trespass, It was not until 1439, ‘Villeinage received the prot ancery Courts, and bytheend ofthe 15th century a tenant in villeinage who was sjected contrary to the custom of nanor could be put back into possession of his villeinage by the common. is therefore defined as the possession of a freeholder of land, the actual ‘Possession of which is enjoyed either by him directly, or by a Jeascholder or copyholder who holds of him."* i) Seisin was the possession on which one could found a writ of righeby which & dispossessed freehold tenant could recover his lost property /Seisin. involved actual possession even if it was acquired weopatuly ‘A trespasser could therefore have seisin, But the actual owner who had been dispossessed cquid be restored to.his possession, if he asserted histitle within the limited period prescribed by statute for the prosecution of claims relating to land by proving @ better seisin, ic., an éailier possession, which was usurped or an ~ earlier possession of a third party, from whom his title was derived. But otherwise the trespasser's seisin was good against the world except the d tenant. ‘According to Lord MeNaghten, “The Law of Real Property, London, 1984 5th ed. p 4. ve“ttcannot be disputed thal person in posession of land in the assumed character of ner and NC -exsein pen te) omnes pnd lease) world but the ight over." Where one is thus disseised (dispossessed) he_loses the usual rights of “4 _ ownership to the disseisor and he is left with only aright of entry, aright which “many respects is equivalent to seisin, although “he is not actually seised, for . 7} 7) if one person is seised, another person cannot be s0”."* The lost seisin can be “¢ “Regained only by means of an action instituted within the limitation period f ? the recovery of the property. Where no such action is prosecuted against the i: trespasser (disseisor), the owner (the disseisee) loses the seisin (i.e., the ~ property) by virtue of the limitation statute. Leach v. Joy" Upon the death of R. Robert his estate devolved on Anne Roberts his daugher and heres Jave- But Mary Rober, under the colour f a pretended will of her deceased husband, entered and retained possession ofthe estate until her death. After the death of Mary Roberts, her ‘devise, the defendant entered into possession ofthe estate. Anne Robert ded in 1871 having ‘devised to Leach “all real estate (it any) of which [may de seised.” "As there was nothing inthe will indicating that Anne Roberts didnot use the word “seisin” {na technical sens, the court gave it its technical meaning. By he technical meaning Anne Roberts did not have seisin and therefore the estate Jid not pass under her will In the circumstances, the “rightful owner inthe meantime has but aright of ent” JAMES, 3: dot think we can differ from the Master ofthe Rolls in his case. Tis lady, for some reason or motive of he so for no reason, chose sean ofthe ost ech al words ta Slaw. The word has acquired no other meaning than seca meaning, ithas never pt nt “ndinary uses therefore we arent a bento tbe to any other mesning merely Because sre suppose tat he eat did not hrow the te mening ofthe wed hasbeen argued in Favourat the Appellant that sein aoe has fost ts stint meaning. thal is consequences haven ceased to exis, a threore that you cannot predicate of anything that stator died Scie of tin any ee ons han tha twas pat of i el esate am of opinion that ere fresich things af seisin and dissin til. Mr-loshua Willams says inhi te book on Sein “fa person wrongfully ges possesion of the land of another he becomes wrongfully ead esa ono es esate nha lands hus, i Squat only encloses of waste la sulla a But om it aid Tves here, he acquires an esate in fee simple by his ow wrong in he land which he has enclosed. He sised, andthe ower ofthe west is yy oy 7. gp isseised. is true that, yntiLby-length of time the Statute of dmiasions shall have confimed_) sean ° ‘histitle, he may be turned out by legal process. But as long as he remains he is pot a at : 0, geal ciety ba oe oe arb belasgnetae ioe ogee cna y “he feed io him and his eis The igh osmerhrtne meme has Da right of entry, oe pent in’ many reepects ‘equivalent to seisin; but he is not actually seised, Tor If ohe person 1s er pemon cannot B50” Upon he allegations in his statement of lai, appears to me tat May Roberts was inthe postion ofthe squater in Me Wilions book, that she Squated on heand, and that she ad her heirs aegfed an eva in fe by wong ubich nim ° Penny». Clissold, [1907] A.C. 73,79. Leach v. Joy 1878) 9Ch, 42, at p45 (per James LJ.) quoting Joshua Wiliam, Sesin, 7 (1878) 9H, 2, Joshua William, Selsn 7.might cvenually hetumed into arighfl estate, Shes ised ‘issesed atthe sme time, the teva was Dot atthe tine a (question. The appeal must therefore be dismsod wins It was not until 1837" and 1845” that the right of entry of a disseisee could be devised and be disposed of inter vivos respectively. On the other hand, the disseisor has virtually all the rights of ownership. He can even de property. Ilustrative of this is the case of Asher ». Whitlock" Asher v. Whitlock 11 1842, Williamson enclosed an area of waste and, which he occupied until he died in 1860. Williamson devised he and this wife “or an during so much only of ee atu Iifeas she might remain his widow and unmarved, wit remainder o his davghter. Mary ‘Aan Williamson, fee simple. Thedaugher andthe widowed mother continvedo reside ‘on the propery. The widow got married to the defendant. The defendant went to reside ‘withthe widow and hee daughter an he survived hoth of them. An action of ejectment ‘was brought aginst th dfendent ty the he-at-law of his step-daughter The contention OF the counsel Tor the defendant was that his possession was not under the will of ofthe widow her interest inthe estate eateed as an adverse possessor and not unde the wll ough the widow. the devsce. Being the lst possessor. the defendant has a better right to heep the Jand vat the person having te jected him. twas also argued thatthe fst possessor, Williamson, beingarespasserinpossession had no devisabeestate The court ejected these contentions. COCKBURN, C4 “Te defendant, on the facts. isin his hier ets is possession vas adverse or itwas not Fit was not adverse tothe devisee othe person who nose the Ta, and ipa) be {tested ara continunes ofthe posession which the widow had and the widow had nd ‘uighttohave givenup. on her marrage withthe defendant, then 8s she ad he defendant amen unde the wl Ph wuld be estopped fo denying the ie te der ad bherhet-atJav. But assuming the defendants possession to have been adverse. we have then to consider how far itopeated to cestoy the right of the devise aa he heir-at-law Me Morewethr was obliged to contend that possession aguied this wa, against 9 "ghol owner vould not be sfficen to ep out every other person but the rightful fvrer. But I tae is clearly established ha possession s good against all he word ‘except the person who can show a god ite: and would be mischievous to change this {stabished dotine. In Doe » Dyebal one eas posession bythe pail was eld {pod aginst person who came andre hin out; there ere ober authorities othe Same elect. Suppose the person who originally inclosed the land had been expelled by the (1788) 2 Tem Rep. 376. © Act. 333, of St, Lucia Chil Code, Ch 242, 1957 Rev 4(by) its destination (c) by reason ofthe object to which itis attached, and (d) by determination of law." Immovable by nature Immovables are things which are stationary. The Civil Code defines things which are immovable by nature as consisting of 335, Lands, steam-mills, water-mills, wind-mill and buildings are immoveahle hy their 336, Growingtres, crops and truis are also immoveable, but become moveable when severed fromthe se This definition of the concept of things immovable by nature does not admit of inclusion of any things other than those specified. It therefore appears that only specifically stipulated by Arts. 335 and 336 can be considered as immovable by nature. Its, however, submitted that things which are closely growths which have been severed. The exclusionary provision is similar to the Jaw on industrial crops (fructus industriales) and emblements (fructus naturales) under the common lasv. Where. movables, such as crops, are due. to be harvested, they are considered as “movables by anticipation”. This includes crops ready to be harvested, growing wood which is earmarked to be cut, and stone in a quarry, when sold for removal Immovable by destination Immovables by destination are objects which would normally be movables but which are considered to be immovable by reason of their attachment to immovable property. It is provided by Art. 337: -stveable tgs hich a proprietor has placed on hs real propery fora permanency or which t iat incorporated therewith are mmoveable by thei destinations Tong as they remain there. rovable to be so classified, it has to meet these three requirements:- requirement that the movable shauld belong to the owner. ind (immovable), Where, however, the affixafion has been by the owner of the land with materials which do not belong _to him, he incurs liability to pay for the materials. The materials 50 affixed become immavables. The obligation to pay for such materials is provided by Article 371 of the Civil Code: 371. The owner of the soil who has constructed buildings. or works with materials which do tango him, mst pay the valu of he mats ama alae onenne 0 pay damages, if these ie any: bul owner of the materials has no right to ake them away. "An. 334 ofthe Civil Code See the text 19.026 5‘The immovable ta sshich the movable is attached should belong to the owner of the-land, This requirement is evident in Art. 337, which ‘applies when the movable has been placed by the “proprietor .... on his veal property”. Thus a chattel or movable property belonging to a \ tenant. or lessee cannot become immovable if the chattel or th £ movable is.affixed to the land of the landlord by the tenant. The chattel or movable so affixed by the tenant on the property of his tandlord retains its character as a chattel or movable and belongs to the tenant. ‘This creates a distinction between the civil law and the common law. on fixtures,” which uses the relationship between the owner of the chattel and the land to which the chattel is attached only to determine the intention with which the affixation is made. Thus under the \_ : common law movable property ofatenantean become immovableand |] MIF. .0,2..r hus become the property ‘of the landlord, unless the circumstances ‘Show that there was no tention to make it part of the landlord’ Tand. (b) Destination Foramovable property to be so immobilized it must have been affixed 0 or placed on or in the immovable property for the purpose of the tion of the immovable property. This brings under the classification of immovable property by destination the following which have been itemized under Art. 337 of the Civil Code of St. Luci 1 Presses, boilers, stil, vats and tun: 2 Al utensils necessary for working orgs, mils and other manuactries, ‘Manure, andthe straw and other substances intended for manure, ar likewise immovable by destination 3. All catle and all cans, cranks and other implements employed in the working of an state (©) Intention to immobilize the movable It is further required that the owner of the land should have intended ‘the chattel to be or remain part of the land permanently, or it should} have been incorporated with the land. The movable, according to Art. 337, should have been placed on the land “for permanency or incorporated therewith”. » See 3 ante for common law definition of land and Chapter Ion fixtures generallyne. Immovable by attachment The controlling factorjn the determination of the status of a chattel affixed to land is the intention to incorporate the chattel permanently into the land. The inference of such an intention from an object which is merely placed on the land is not easy. to make under the common law, For there is the presumption that ifthe object rests on its own weight it will be held under the common law to be a chattel unless the contrary is proved.” Thus cattle, carts and other farming equipment } / placed on a farm cannot be classified as immovable or real proper {under the common law. But under this civil law classification of things “immovable by destination”, the determining factor is whether it was intended by the ) ~( owner of the land for the service or exploitation of the land. ‘The intention to place it in or on the land permanently appears to be of secondary importance and will normally be inferred from the fact that, it was placed on the land for the service and exploitation of the land, ‘Where the movable is incorporated with the land, it is immobilized if itis annexed to the land for the service or exploitation of she Land. Again, this consideration differs from the way degree of annexation is used under the common law. Under the common law, where a chattel is affixed to the land, be it however slightly, it would be presumed to be realty. Thus attachment or incorporation under the. common law, unlike the civil aw, is not 2 condition, but gives rise to. (a presumption which can be rebutted.** ‘The Code provides for another classification of immovable. 338, Those things are considered as being attached fora permanency which ae placed by the [roprictor and fastened with ion and nis, imbedded in laser. lie or cement, or which cane be removed without breakage o without destroying gr deteriorating that part of he property to ‘which they ae attached. -Miszors, pictures and other omamens are considered to have Been pceminendy when wthouthem hepato teium heyeorseuldenai inmate )- ‘The scope of this provision is not clear. It either provides a category different from that which has been discussed above, "immovable by destination”, or it serves as an explanation or illustration of what is meant by placing a movable for permanency under Art. 337. The objects itemized under Art, 338 are more of a domestic than an industrial or agricuttural nature. See Wooding CJ. in Michel». Cowie (1968) 7 WAR. 118, a 124, See Chapter I on Fixturesuh Art. 338 seems to be devoid of meaning when considered in isolation. Taken in conjunction with Art. 334, it governs “immovable [property .... by reason of the object to which it is attached”. 1. Objects attached to immovables Movable property which is deemed to be immovable by attachment has the following characteristics (a) The attachment should have been effected by the owner ofthe land. Itis presumed that the movable which is attached should belong to the owner of the Jand, But where the movable does not belong ta the owner of the immovable to which itis attached, Art 370 can be invoked to enable the owner of the land to retain it as an.immovable property. (b) ‘The attachment should have been effected “for permanency”. Implicit in this is the requirement of intention to make it permanent, Thus it may be necessary to show that the person attaching the movable to the immovable property intends to have it permanently attached 0 the \ immovable property. (©) The movable should have been fastened, nailed, embedded, cemented or affixed to the land; or (@) The movable should have been so attached that its removal from the land ‘would result in destruction or deterioration of the property to which it is affixed; or (©) In the case of things of an ornamental nature, they should be such that their removal would render the room they cover “incomplete or imperfect”. : 2. Rights over immovables Rights arising under emphyteusis (long leases), usufruct, use and habitation, servitudes(easements), and right or action for the recovery of immovable property are immovable. According to the Civil Code, Article 33 Righs of emphyteusis. of sufrct of immoveable thing, of use and habitation servitude or actions ‘which tendo obtain possession ofan immoveable, are tmmaveable by eason of te objects to which they ae attached. _, Emphyteusis is a lease for a term of more-than nine years and which does not exceed ninety-nine years,” % Art $14 provides: “The duration of emphyteusis cannot exceed ninety-nine years and must efor more than nine_ Emphyteusis itself is not expressly classified as immovable. But it is provided by Arts. 346° and 345" that leases. and-the-rents of immovable property other than emphyteutic leases-aremovable, Emphyteusis which is ‘of more “than_nine_years_and_rents_ from it_are therefork?-presumably | immovable. This contrasts with the common law classification Which does, ) not accept leases of any duration as realty Servitudes, which by definition would be considered as easements under the commondaw, are classified as immovable under the St. Lucia Civil Code. This corresponds to the.common law classification of easements as incorporeal hereditaments Immovable by determination of the law _ “Movable property becomes immovable under this head in this category where a statute so declares-or by operation of law. The Civil Code enacts by Art. 340 as Follows: 540, All moveable propery of which the law odains or authorises the conversion into immoveable ‘property becomes immeveably determination flaw ither absolutely r for certain purpses. AIO {hermmeys pradaced hy the redemption of constuted rents which belong to minors areimmoveable. ‘Sus accruing fo a minor from the sae of his immoveables during his minor, remain immoveable so long asthe minor lass The law declares (oe also immoveable all sums given by ascendants to their children, in contemplation of marrage, tobe used inthe purchase of realestate ‘At common law, by the operation of law, movable property can notionally become immovable and vice versa. Under the equitable doctrine af conversion, for example, ‘money drete to by employed in the purchase flan, and Jand dst to be sold and tuned into tmneycae to be considered as that spies of propery into which they are dete be converted NaH in whatever manne he dvecton [sven whether by will by way of contrat mating Src, setlement or otherwise. and wheihe the money is actually deposited, or only covenanted tobe pad, whether te Tand is actually conseve-o aly agreed tobe cqnveyed. The owner of the fd orth contracting parties may make land money, of money Tan ‘This equitable d ‘of conversion is not different from the civil law principle as enacted hy.Art-340 which impresses. any movable which i directed {0 be used to acquire land with the character of immovable property even if the acquisition has not yet been made. But the-Civil Code carries this urthee thaf’ the common law: rents, the produce of the sale of immovable property recs’ ed on account of a minor, and monies given to children in contemplation of their marriage by their progenitors are considered immovable. 1 ofimmoveable property oer than emphyteutc leases are moveable ted and ie rents, and whether derived rom real or personal property are moveable sessing rom emphyteusis Per Sit Thomas Sewell MR. in Fletcher» Ashbumer4(1779) | Bro.C.C. 487 a 499; LW, & TLC. 29h at 295, 19Under the common law these circumstances will lead to conversion of the money into immovable (or real) property only where there is.a trust to use the monies, ie., the rents, produce of the sale of immovable property and nuptial gifts of money for a minor, to acquire an immovable property. Rents received _from immovable (or real) property do not become realty or immovable in_ equity. Neither do the sums of money received on the sale fealty inthe absence of circumstances showing that the monies so received on ‘account of the minor are held on trust for the purchase of an immovable Property. Movable Objects are movables either by nature or by determination of law,” Movable by na 1. Physical objects ‘As noted under the common law classification, they are visible, tafigible and can be physically controlled. Excluded from this category are tangible things which are annexed to a building, wall or fence or those which are temporarily separated from a building or wall or fence, so long as they are destined to be replaced Seg i carne a ort Torming part of building, wall or fence, aid which are only temporarily separated from it, do not ‘cease 19 be immoveable s long as they ate destined tobe replace. * Aan 34 Bid, An 342. © hid, Ant 3432. Incorporeal rights appertaining to movables Leases which are not emphyteusis" and rents therefrom, as well as rights! ‘telating movables gre movables, "The doctrine of conversion also operates with respect to movables under Ar. ‘mmovables authorised to be converted as well as obligations and ‘Shares in.a-os.partnership.or company are considered as movables so tong a¥ the partnership or the company exists. This is the effect of Article 344, which pro. 344, Those immovcables are moveable by determination of las of which te aw for coain inuposes auhoraes the gontenion ilo movable 50 areal ohigations, ltough seuted. ‘borin an ACs respec moveable cfs, inclaing gebls ete or guaantead ye ony or by coportions. gol shares of ines nancial, comercial er manufac Smpanics. although uch companics, forthe purposes of heir usines, shoul own immoveahles ‘These mmovener ave ropa to be moveable with regard Wo each parte, only 30 Tong sb the company ass GUYANA ‘The Statute Law Commitiee in the then British Guiana recommended the adoption of the English law governing personally to govern land in British ‘Guiana. It rejected the English Taw of realty. The aim was to have a system of, Jandaw which would osu absolute ownerahipof land, The common mon 8) eae way /fecommendation of the Statute Law Committee, Roman-Dutch-law-was- { replaced by the English law of personalty to govern land in the territory. The Civi Law of Guyana provides: © An. 346, Did, An 345, ant as Ibid e