CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE MORAL CONCEPT

1.1 The definition of moral, ethics, akhlak and norms
1.1.1 Morality
What is morality? Most people pay only cursory attention to the
somewhat intimidating philosophical concept called Morality. They
erroneously presume that a precise examination of morality is the
domain of philosophers. Most people acquire a somewhat vague sense
of morality, a sense of how we should or should not behave, from their
parents, their social group, their political environment or their religious
affiliation. They believe that they have a sufficiently clear
understanding of morality to meet their needs and they do not try to
analyze a subject that is seemingly fraught with contradictions.
Why should we analyze the concept of morality if every human
being knows that it is immoral to kill other people or to steal the
property of other people, except under special circumstances. As
adults, we act intuitively with regard to morality. We absorbed
fundamental aspects of morality during the early days of our youth. Do
we really need to know more about morality? Most persons have
acquired the basic tenets of their morality from others and have
accepted them as true and valid, without further questioning. However,
how will we know if an unexamined idea, imposed on us by others, is
actually true and beneficial to our well-being? Can we improve our
lifestyle, including our interactions with others, if we enhance our
understanding of the nature of morality? Knowledge is power and the
extent of our knowledge of Objective Reality directly determines our
standard of living and our happiness. Our happiness is determined by
our degree of alignment with Objective Reality, with truth, The more
facts we have at our disposition, the more closely we can align
ourselves with reality, the fewer conflicts we will have in dealing with
reality and thus, the more happiness we will reap. How does morality
really work?
The term Morality covers the vast arena of human conduct that
examines our interaction with other human beings. Morality touches
every aspect of our life, every moment of our life. Our morality governs
all of our contacts with members of our family, with our co-workers,
with our church, and with all aspects of our government. Morality
determines our attitude to politics, to war and peace, to our children,
to our parents and to spiritual questions such as life after death.
Morality (from the Latin moralitas "manner, character, proper
behavior") has three principal meanings. In its first descriptive usage,
morality means a code of conduct held to be authoritative in matters of

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right and wrong, morals are created by and define society, philosophy,
religion, or individual conscience. In its second, normative and
universal sense, morality refers to an ideal code of conduct, one which
would be espoused in preference to alternatives by all rational people,
under specified conditions. To deny 'morality' in this sense is a position
known as moral skepticism. In its third usage, 'morality' is synonymous
with ethics, the systematic philosophical study of the moral domain.
1.1.2 Moral Code
Codified morality (moral code) is generally distinguished from custom,
another way for a community to define appropriate activity, by the
former's derivation from natural or universal principles. In certain
religious communities, the Divine is said to provide these principles
through revelation, sometimes in great detail. Such codes may be
called laws, as in the Law of Moses, or community morality may be
defined through commentary on the texts of revelation, as in Islamic
law. Such codes are distinguished from legal or judicial right, including
civil rights, which are based on the accumulated traditions, decrees
and legislation of a political authority, though these latter often invoke
the authority of the moral law.
Morality can also be seen as the collection of beliefs as to what
constitutes a good life. Since throughout most of human history,
religions have provided both visions and regulations for an ideal life,
morality is often confused with religious precepts. In secular
communities, lifestyle choices, which represent an individual's
conception of the good life, are often discussed in terms of "morality".
Individuals sometimes feel that making an appropriate lifestyle choice
invokes a true morality, and that accepted codes of conduct within
their chosen community are fundamentally moral, even when such
codes deviate from more general social principles.
Moral codes are often complex definitions of right and wrong that
are based upon well-defined value systems. Although some people
might think that a moral code is simple, rarely is there anything simple
about one's values, ethics, etc. or, for that matter, the judgment of
those of others. The difficulty lies in the fact that morals are often part
of a religion and more often than not about culture codes. Sometimes,
moral codes give way to legal codes, which couple penalties or
corrective actions with particular practices. Note that while many legal
codes are merely built on a foundation of religious and/or cultural
moral codes, ofttimes they are one and the same.
Examples of moral codes include the Golden Rule; the Noble
Eightfold Path of Buddhism; the ancient Egyptian code of Ma'at ;the ten
commandments of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; the yamas and
niyama of the Hindu scriptures; the ten Indian commandments; and
the principle of the Dessek. Another related concept is the moral core
which is assumed to be innate in each individual, to those who accept
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that differences between individuals are more important than posited

Creators or their rules. This, in some religious systems and beliefs (e.g.
Taoism, Moralism and Gnosticism), is assumed to be the basis of all
aesthetics and thus moral choice. Moral codes as such are therefore
seen as coercive part of human politics.
1.1.3 Ethics
Ethics is a major branch of philosophy, encompassing right conduct
and good life. It is significantly broader than the common conception of
analyzing right and wrong. A central aspect of ethics is "the good life",
the life worth living or life that is simply not satisfying, which is held by
many philosophers to be more important than moral conduct. Ethics
seeks to address questions such as how a moral outcome can be
achieved in a specific situation (applied ethics), how moral values
should be determined (normative ethics), what morals people actually
abide by (descriptive ethics), what the fundamental nature of ethics or
morality is, including whether it has any objective justification (metaethics), and how moral capacity or moral agency develops and what its
nature is (moral psychology). In applied ethics, for example, the
prohibition against taking human life is controversial with respect to
capital punishment, abortion and wars of invasion. In normative ethics,
a typical question might be whether a lie told for the sake of protecting
someone from harm is justified. In meta-ethics, a key issue is the
meaning of the terms "right" or "wrong". Moral realism would hold that
there are true moral statements which report objective moral facts,
whereas moral anti-realism would hold that morality is derived from
any one of the norms prevalent in society (cultural relativism); the
edicts of a god (divine command theory); is merely an expression of
the speakers' sentiments (emotivism); an implied imperative
(prescriptive); falsely presupposes that there are objective moral facts
(error theory). Some thinkers hold that there is no correct definition of
right behavior, that morality can only be judged with respect to
particular situations, within the standards of particular belief systems
and socio-historical contexts. This position, known as moral relativism,
often cites empirical evidence from anthropology as evidence to
support its claims. The opposite view, that there are universal, eternal
moral truths is known as moral absolutism. Moral absolutists might
concede that forces of social conformity significantly shape moral
decisions, but deny that cultural norms and customs define morally
right behavior.
1.1.4 Islamic Ethics (Akhlak)
Islamic ethics (akhlq), defined as "good character," historically took
shape gradually from the 7th century and was finally established by
the 11th century. It was eventually shaped as a successful
amalgamation of the Qur'anic teachings, the teachings of the Sunnah
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of Muhammad, the precedents of Islamic jurists (Sharia and Fiqh), the

pre-Islamic Arabian tradition, and non-Arabic elements (including
Persian and Greek ideas) embedded in or integrated with a generally
Islamic structure. Although Muhammad's preaching produced a "radical
change in moral values based on the sanctions of the new religion and
the present religion, and fear of God and of the Last Judgment", the
tribal practice of Arabs did not completely die out. Later Muslim
scholars expanded the religious ethic of the Qur'an and Hadith in
immense detail. The difference between Islamic akhlak and Greek
ethics is the very source by which they are derived from. Islamic akhlak
comes from divine sources (the Qur'an and the Sunnah) whereas Greek
ethics rely only on the human intellect which is subject to error and
change.
Akhlak in Islam is classified into primarily 5 categories: (1) Akhlak
towards Allah, (2) Akhlak towards self, (3) Akhlak towards others, (4)
Akhlak towards the environment and , (5) Akhlak towards time.
Displaying good akhlak towards Allah can be done through the
following ways:
a. Believing strongly in the existence and the monotheistic nature of
Allah
b. Total submission to His orders and shunning away everything that
He dislikes
c. Carrying out His orders without hoping for anything in return, except
His grace
d. Khusyuk, that is, putting in full concentration when carrying out our
ibadah
e. Thinking positively of Allah's actions and the fate that has been
ordained for us
f. Tawakkal or having faith in Allah such that He knows best in all that
we do
g. Syukur or displaying gratitude in all the bounties that He has given
to us
h. Tasbih, that is, saying out the words "Subhanallah" means Glorious
is Allah
i. Istighfar, that is, seeking for His forgiveness for our sins and salvation
from hellfire
j. Takbir, that is, saying out the words "Allahuakbar" Allah is Great
and glorifying His name and attributes
k. Never failing to raise our hands in doa', because such an act proves
of our weakness and our dependence in Allah s.w.t
Good akhlak towards self can be carried out through displaying
these various attributes:
a. Amanah, that is, carrying out duties responsibly
b. Siddiq, that is, being true to our words
c. Adl, that is, being just in our daily dealings
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d. Al-Ifafah, that is, purifying our thoughts and hearts from mazmumah
e. Al-Haya, that is, displaying a sense of shame and regret for our sins
to Allah
f. As-Syajaah, that is, displaying courage in our actions and against
any form of injustice
g. Al-Quwwah, that is, displaying physical, mental and emotional
strength against adversities
h. As-Sabar, that is, displaying patience when faced with difficulties
i. Ar-Rahman, that is, displaying love and affection towards all and
having a sense of community spirit
j. Al-Iqtisad, that is, being in a state of saving money, time and energy
for more useful purposes
Good akhlak towards others can be displayed via the following:
a. Displaying good akhlak towards parents: Submissive to their orders,
displaying ihsan or goodness throughout their lives, being humble
before them, always in a state of gratitude for their love towards us
and pray for them as well as ask for their prayers.
b. Displaying good akhlak towards spouse
c. Displaying good akhlak towards sons and daughters
d. Displaying good akhlak towards our neighbours, relatives and friends
Good akhlak towards the environment is inherent in the
teachings of our Prophet S.A.W. Having a sense of responsibility
towards the environment is in line with the encouraged state of
rahmatan lil alamin (love towards the environment and its contents)
just as the Qur'an says (meaning): (O people! Worship your Lord, Who
hath created you and those before you, so that you may ward of
(evil). Who hath appointed the earth a resting-place for you, and the
sky a canopy; and causeth water to pour down from the sky, thereby
producing fruits as food for you. And do not set up rivals to Allah when
ye know (better).) (Al-Baqarah 2: 21-22)
Good akhlak towards time, meaning to say, is our attitude
towards time. Are we conscious about the fact that every second that
passes by every now and then, we cannot get back that very second?
And when time passes us by, are we prepared for our final destination?
Which is why time is very important, such that even Allah s.w.t
proclaims its importance in the Qur'an (meaning): By (the Token of)
Time (through the ages), Verily Man is in loss, Except such as have
Faith, and do righteous deeds, and (join together) in the mutual
teaching of Truth, and of Patience and Constancy. (Al-Asr: 1-3).
1.1.5 Norms
Norms are sentences or sentence meanings with practical, i. e. actionoriented (rather than descriptive, explanatory, or expressive) import,
the most common of which are commands, permissions, and
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prohibitions. Another popular account of norms describes them as

reasons to act, believe or feel.
a. Some kinds of norms;
Orders and permissions express norms. Such norm sentences do not
describe how the world is, they rather prescribe how the world should
be. Imperative sentences are the most obvious way to express norms,
but declarative sentences also do it very often, as is the case with
many laws. Generally, whether an expression is a norm does not
depend on its form, on the type of sentence it is expressed with, but
only on the meaning of the expression. Those norms purporting to
create obligations (or duties) and permissions are called deontic norms
(see also deontic logic). The concept of deontic norm is already an
extension of a previous concept of norm, which would only include
imperatives, that is, norms purporting to create duties. The
understanding that permissions are norms in the same way was an
important step in ethics and philosophy of law.
In addition to deontic norms, many other varieties have been
identified. For instance, some constitutions establish the national
anthem. These norms do not directly create any duty or permission.
They create a "national symbol". Other norms create nations
themselves or political and administrative regions within a nation. The
action orientation of such norms is less obvious than in the case of a
command or permission, but is essential for understanding the
relevance of issuing such norms: When a folk song becomes a
"national anthem" the meaning of singing one and the same song
changes; likewise, when a piece of land becomes an administrative
region, this has legal consequences for many activities taking place on
that territory; and without these consequences concerning action, the
norms would be irrelevant. A more obviously action-oriented variety of
such constitutive norms (as opposed to deontic or regulatory norms)
establishes social institutions which give rise to new, previously
inexistent types of actions or activities (a standard example is the
institution of marriage without which "getting married" would not be a
feasible action; another is the rules constituting a game: without the
norms of soccer, there would not exist such an action as executing an
indirect free kick).
Any convention can create a norm, although the relation
between both is not settled. There is a significant discussion about
(legal) norms that give someone the power to create other norms.
They are called power-conferring norms or norms of competence.
Some authors argue that they are still deontic norms, while others
argue for a close connection between them and institutional facts (see
Raz 1975, Ruiter 1993). Linguistic conventions, for example, the
convention in English that "cat" means cat or the convention in
Portuguese that "gato" means cat, are among the most important
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norms. Games completely depend on norms. The fundamental norm of

many games is the norm establishing who wins and loses. In other
games, it is the norm establishing how to score points.
b. Major characteristics of Norms;
One major characteristic of norms is that, unlike propositions, they are
not descriptively true or false, since norms do not purport to describe
anything, but to prescribe, create or change something. Some people
say they are "prescriptively true" or false. Whereas the truth of a
descriptive statement is purportedly based on its correspondence to
reality, some philosophers, beginning with Aristotle, assert that the
(prescriptive) truth of a prescriptive statement is based on its
correspondence to right desire. Other philosophers maintain that
norms are ultimately neither true or false, but only successful or
unsuccessful (valid or invalid), as their propositional content obtains or
not (see also John Searle and speech act).
There is an important difference between norms and normative
propositions, although they are often expressed by identical sentences.
"You may go out." usually expresses a norm if it is uttered by the
teacher to one of the students, but it usually expresses a normative
proposition if it is uttered to one of the students by one of his or her
classmates. Some ethical theories reject that there can be normative
propositions, but these are accepted by cognitivism. One can also think
of propositional norms; assertions and questions arguably express
propositional norms (they set a proposition as asserted or questioned).
Another purported feature of norms, it is often argued, is that
they never regard only natural properties or entities. Norms always
bring something artificial, conventional, institutional or "unworldly".
This might be related to Hume's assertion that it is not possible to
derive ought from is and to G.E. Moore's claim that there is a
naturalistic fallacy when one tries to analyse "good" and "bad" in terms
of a natural concept. In aesthetics, it has also been argued that it is
impossible to derive an aesthetical predicate from a non-aesthetical
one. The acceptability of non-natural properties, however, is strongly
debated in present day philosophy. Some authors deny their existence,
some others try to reduce them to natural ones, on which the former
supervene.
Other thinkers (Adler, 1986) assert that norms can be natural in a
different sense than that of "corresponding to something proceeding
from the object of the prescription as a strictly internal source of
action". Rather, those who assert the existence of natural prescriptions
say norms can suit a natural need on the part of the prescribed entity.
More to the point, however, is the putting forward of the notion that
just as descriptive statements being considered true are conditioned
upon certain self-evident descriptive truths suiting the nature of reality
(such as: it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the
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same time and in the same manner), a prescriptive truth can suit the
nature of the will through the authority of it being based upon selfevident prescriptive truths (such as: one ought to desire what is really
good for one and nothing else). Recent works maintain that normativity
has an important role in several different philosophical subjects, not
only in ethics and philosophy of law (see Dancy, 2000).

1.2 The concept of personal, universal and absolute

morality

Personal morality has to do with narrating values that would best help
each of us make sense of our lives, to be good persons, realise a
valuable selfhood and/or live a good life. The values at stake in
personal morality need not be strictly moral. The goodness of our lives
could be measured in terms of our being happy, worthwhile or
successful as well as the traditional, moral, sense of the word. Defining
what it is to be a good person, and to live a good life, is one of the
questions that personal morality must address. The function of
personal morality is to help each of us realise the meaning of our life in
the world through being a person and living the personal life of a self in
the world. All persons can do and must input values just in the process
of being persons. Meaning is an output value 'pointed at' by input
values. So persons realise a meaning from those values. That is why
there are values in this and any other world containing persons. And
that is why what persons do in a world just is the whole and only
meaning of that world. Because we do and must live by values, our
lives do and must have meaning. And, because our personal morality
just is the sum of our input values, the meaning of our lives just is a
function of our personal morality in our personal circumstances.
Moral universalism (also called universal morality) is the metaethical position that some system of ethics, or a universal ethic,
applies universally, that is, for "all similarly situated individuals",
regardless of culture, race, sex, religion, nationality, sexuality, or other
distinguishing feature. Moral universalism is opposed to moral nihilism
and moral relativism. However, not all forms of moral universalism are
absolutist, nor are they necessarily value monist; many forms of
universalism, such as utilitarianism, are non-absolutist, and some
forms, such as that of Isaiah Berlin, may be value pluralist. Noam
Chomsky states that, ... if we adopt the principle of universality : if an
action is right (or wrong) for others, it is right (or wrong) for us. Those
who do not rise to the minimal moral level of applying to themselves
the standards they apply to others -- more stringent ones, in fact -plainly cannot be taken seriously when they speak of appropriateness
of response; or of right and wrong, good and evil In fact, one of the,
maybe the most, elementary of moral principles is that of universality,
that is, If something's right for me, it's right for you; if it's wrong for

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you, it's wrong for me. Any moral code that is even worth looking at
has that at its core somehow.
The source or justification of a universal ethic may be thought to
be, for instance, human nature, shared vulnerability to suffering, the
demands of universal reason, what is common among existing moral
codes, or the common mandates of religion (although it can be said
that the latter is not in fact moral universalism because it may
distinguish between gods and mortals). As such, models of moral
universalism may be atheistic or agnostic, deistic (in the case of
several Enlightenment philosophers), monotheistic (in the case of the
Abrahamic religions), or polytheistic (in the case of Hinduism). Various
systems of moral universalism may differ in various ways on the metaethical question of the nature of the morality, as well as in their
substantial normative content, but all agree on its universality.
Moral absolutism is the meta-ethical view that certain actions are
absolutely right or wrong, devoid of the context of the act. Thus lying,
for instance, might be considered to be always immoral, even if done
to promote some other good (e.g., saving a life). Moral absolutism
stands in contrast to categories of ethical theories such as
consequentialism and situational ethics, which holds that the morality
of an act depends on the consequences or the context of the act.
Ethical theories which place strong emphasis on rights, such as the
deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant, are often forms of moral
absolutism, as are many religious moral codes, particularly those of the
Abrahamic religions.
Moral absolutism should not be confused with moral universalism
(also variously called moral objectivism, moderate moral realism, or
minimalist moral realism), which holds that the same things are right
and wrong for all similarly-situated people, regardless of anyone's
opinions, though not necessarily regardless of context. Moral
universalism is in turn opposed to moral relativism (which holds that
moral truths are relative to social, cultural, historical or personal
preferences), and to moral nihilism (which holds that nothing is right or
wrong in any sense at all). L.P. Pojman gives the following definitions to
distinguish the two positions: (1) "Moral absolutism: There is at least
one principle that ought never to be violated." (2) "Moral objectivism:
There is a fact of the matter as to whether any given action is morally
permissible or impermissible: a fact of the matter that does not depend
solely on social custom or individual acceptance."
Moral absolutism may be understood in a strictly secular context,
as in many forms of deontological moral rationalism. However, many
religions have morally absolutist positions as well, regarding their
system of morality as deriving from the commands of deity. Therefore,
they regard such a moral system as absolute, (usually) perfect, and
unchangeable. Many secular philosophies also take a morally absolutist
stance, arguing that absolute laws of morality are inherent in the
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nature of human beings, the nature of life in general, or the universe

itself. For example, someone who believes absolutely in nonviolence
considers it wrong to use violence even in self-defense. For another
example, under some religious moral absolutist beliefs, homosexual
behavior is considered fundamentally wrong, even in a consensual
relationship.
The historical character of religious belief is seen by some as
grounds for criticism of religious moral absolutism. In Deuteronomy
15:12-15; Ephesians 6:9; Colossians 4:1; & I Timothy 6:1-2 the Bible
recognizes and regulates the practice of keeping slaves. These
passages have been historically interpreted as providing an
endorsement of slavery. For example Jefferson Davis, president of the
Confederate States of America remarked in a speech before the U.S.
Senate that: "[Slavery] was established by decree of Almighty God...it
is sanctioned in the Bible, in both Testaments, from Genesis to
Revelation...it has existed in all ages, has been found among the
people of the highest civilization, and in nations of the highest
proficiency in the arts."

1.3 Factors for developing good morality

Whilst much work on moral reasoning has sought to identify the
relatively abstract conceptual structures which underpin moral
judgements, relatively little has sought to examine the ways in which
moral judgements and decisions are made in real life. There are,
however, good reasons for examining the ways in which these more
everyday judgements are made. Not only is it important to learn
something more of the social and cultural context in which moral
thought is embedded. It is also crucial to explore moral decisionmaking in real life to understand better the links between more
hypothetical moral reasoning and moral action. The discussion
presents research that seeks to identify factors that influence the
decisions that individuals make in response to real life moral dilemmas.
Its empirical focus will form two, inter-related strands. An initial strand
considers how social contextual factors (internalised notions of gender
role and more externalised notions of gender) relate to moral
orientation. A second strand explores how different types of dilemmas
may entail different consequences for individuals that, in turn, relate to
the sorts of justifications and explanations they give for particular
courses of action.
1.3.1 Moral decision-making in real life
A famous example of the difference between hypothetical reasoning
and justification of experienced behaviour is given by Milgrams (1963)
study of obedience. When participants are faced with a hypothetical
dilemma of either harming an innocent stranger or disobeying an
authority figure they frequently choose the latter. However, the study
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showed that whilst more than sixty five percent of those who were
faced with the dilemma in reality chose to harm an innocent stranger,
few felt such behaviour would be morally acceptable when asked about
an imaginary scenario. Moreover when Milgrams adult participants
were asked about their actions they justified their behaviour with
reasons equivalent to stage one on Kohlbergs (1969, 1984) model for
example, the status of the experimenter. It would seem unlikely that all
of Milgrams participants were stage one reasoners. Rather, something
about the experimental situation and their perceived roles within it
influenced their moral decisions, judgements and ultimately their
behaviour.
Dominant models of moral development (e.g. Kohlberg, 1969)
have focused theoretical attention on age-related shifts in moral
reasoning. Kohlbergs methodology involved presenting individuals
with various hypothetical moral dilemmas which were either discussed
with the participants by means of an interview or reflected upon using
a questionnaire. Responses are then scored according to a specific
manual devised by Kohlberg and his colleagues. Yet although the value
and influence of this work on moral development is clear, a consistent
criticism of, for instance, Kohlbergs theory has been that he failed
adequately to consider what we might term real life moral decisionmaking (Krebs, Denton & Wark, 1997; Leman, 2001). Research on real
life dilemmas (Krebs, Denton, Vermeulen, Carpendale & Bush, 1991;
Carpendale & Krebs 1995; Wark & Krebs 1996, 1997) found that once
participants are asked to judge moral conflicts that they have
experienced in their life, moral stage tends to be lower, and stage
consistency of judgements diminishes across different types of moral
dilemmas. A further point of criticism highlighted the difference
between moral judgement competency and moral judgement in
practice.
Studies that compare moral behaviour (action) and moral
reasoning have highlighted the problem of how stages of reasoning
(derived from hypothetical problems) are related to real life moral
behaviour. Denton and Krebs (1990) found that despite peoples
acknowledgement of the wrongfulness of impaired driving they still
drove home while having high blood alcohol level; Carpendale and
Krebs (1995) showed that a monetary incentive also affected moral
choices. And Walker (1984) has claimed that Kohlbergs stage theory
has a self-limiting scope in that it does not deal directly with the issues
of moral emotions and behaviour rather, it deals with the adequacy
of justifications for solutions to moral conflicts. Wark and Krebs (1996)
summarise a position common to many in arguing that whilst there are
numerous studies on moral judgement only a few have investigated
the important and socially pertinent question of how people make
moral decisions in their everyday lives.

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1.3.2 Gender and moral orientation

Another critic of Kohlbergs emphasis on abstract aspects of moral
thought was Carol Gilligan. Gilligan (1982) argued that Kohlbergs
theory is insensitive to the way females view morality and that there
are sex related (but not sex-specific) differences in an individuals
orientation to life. These differences become particularly visible in
terms of moral reasoning. On one hand, men have a justice orientation
which involves an emphasis on autonomy, separateness and
noninterference with abstract rights. On the other women hold a care
orientation involving more emphasis on a concern for the well being of
others and a view of the self as connected and interdependent with
others in concrete situations (Walker, de Vries & Trevethan, 1987).
Gilligans evaluation of responses to real life dilemmas by men
and women revealed that although the majority of people used both
care and justice orientations, the majority of women (75%) used a
predominantly care orientation whereas the majority of men (79%)
used a predominantly justice orientation. Also, 36% of women did not
involve any consideration of justice in their report and 36% of men did
not present any consideration of care. These findings led Gilligan to
conclude that individuals use one predominating orientation related to
their gender when discussing real life moral conflicts. Gilligan claimed
that males gain higher moral maturity scores on Kohlbergs test
because they tend to make justice oriented judgments which are
captured at higher stages (4-5). Females, on the other hand, tend to
make care oriented judgments which are captured at a lower stage (3).
Although some studies supported this assumption (e.g. Bussey &
Maughan, 1982) a large number of studies refuted the claim for
significant sex differences in moral maturity (see Walker, 1984 for a
review of the literature). Moreover, research on moral orientation
revealed that studies that found that women use higher percentage of
care oriented terms in real life dilemmas than men were
methodologically flawed by not controlling for type of dilemma (e.g.
Ford & Lowery 1986; Walker et al. 1987; Gilligan & Attanucci 1988;
Pratt, Golding, Hunter, & Sampson 1988; Wark & Krebs 1996).
1.3.3 Moral reasoning: considering the consequences of action
Following many studies that compared Kohlbergs philosophical
dilemmas with real life dilemmas, Krebs and his colleagues have
argued that the highest stages of moral reasoning rarely exist outside
the Western academic context (within which Kohlbergs philosophical
dilemmas were typically tested). In attempting to explore factors that
may explain the variance between judgments (measured by stages in
Kohlbergs model) of philosophical dilemmas and judgments of real life
dilemmas they found an interaction between moral judgment
competency and various performance factors (detailed in Krebs et.al.,
1997). Individuals ability to retain lower stages of moral judgment and
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use them in response to real life dilemmas does not follow Kohlbergs
theoretical assumption regarding stage replacement, but is more in
line with other models of moral judgment such as Rests layer-cake
model and Levines additive inclusive model. Both these models
suggest that new stages are built on old stages, which are retained and
may be used in various circumstances.
Despite this important outcome of recent research, the
remaining question is why there is such discrepancy between judgment
of philosophical dilemmas and judgment of real life dilemmas. Krebs et
al. (1997) attempted to explain some aspects in real life decision
making, which may serve future research in clarifying how people
make moral decisions in their everyday lives. Two elements are central
to the position. One is the distinction between a third person
perspective (which is implied in philosophical dilemmas) and a first
person perspective (which is implied in personal, real life dilemmas).
When people come across moral conflicts in their life the question they
are faced with is: what should I do? which is different to what
should one do?. Reasoning in real life situations involves decisions,
which are much more practical, self serving, and less rational than
reasoning of hypothetical characters. The second aspect relates to the
first in suggesting that factors that people consider when they make
decisions in real life are influenced by functional concerns such as
advancing self-interest or social harmony, and by motivational and
affective processes.
One of the most important pragmatic concerns is the
consequences of moral decisions. Krebs et al. (1997) provide a detailed
account of the various types of consequences people consider, which
will not be repeated here. However, their explanation of the distinction
between consequences to others and consequences to the self is a
central focus of this study. Although people believe hypothetical
characters should act in a certain way and although they provide
reasoning to support that belief, they themselves would have not made
that decision in real life due to the consequences of their decision. For
example, despite peoples belief that Heinz should steal the drug (cf.
Kohlberg, 1984, p.640), they themselves would not steal it as they
would not be willing to suffer the consequences (Krebs, Vermeulen,
Denton & Carpendale, 1994). It seems possible that an inconsistency
between what one should and would do in these situations leads to a
dissonance that can be partly resolved by changing ones mind about a
particular course of action (Krebs et al. 1997). Krebs et al. (1997) not
only provide a potential explanation for the inconsistency between
reasoning of hypothetical dilemmas and reasoning of real life moral
conflicts. They also point to a direction for future research into the
underlying mechanisms involved in moral judgment, decision, and
action.

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The present study explored two aspects in relation to moral

decision-making. The first part (moral orientation) examined Gilligans
theory of moral orientation and its relationship to dilemma type,
gender and gender role. The second part (moral reasoning) explored a
new aspect in recent research: consideration of consequences,
focusing on whether consequences to the self differ from
consequences to other people in the influence they have on decision
making.
1.3.4 Moral Orientation
The results of this study are not consistent with Gilligans hypothesis
about moral orientation. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) acknowledged
that individuals can employ both justice and care orientations but they
also claim that only one (either justice or care) prevails across an
individuals thinking. This study however, failed to find a prevailing
orientation across all four dilemmas. Not only do participants include
both care and justice judgements in their dilemmas, but the majority
(all but three) were inconsistent with the orientation they presented to
address each dilemma. This outcome supports Wark and Krebss
(1997) study, in which they claim to have found poor consistency of
moral orientation across four personel dilemmas.
Gilligan (1982) also proposed that the type of orientation is
related to gender, assuming that males tend to focus on the justice
orientation whereas females tend to focus on the care orientation. Like
previous research (e.g. Walker et al.. 1987) this study fails to support
this claim. On average, females focused on care-based judgements
more than males did but this did not result in a statistically significant
difference between the two gender groups. However, the overall mean
(57%) for orientation suggests that all participants (regardless of
gender) expressed slightly more care judgements than justice
judgements. Furthermore, the consistency measure did not yield
gender differences, which suggests that males were as inconsistent in
their moral orientation as females were. In a similar vein gender did
not produce a significant main effect or significant interactions, which
leaves one to conclude that as far as this study was able to show moral
orientation was not related to gender.
This study, nevertheless, produced significant results regarding
type of dilemma and gender role. A main effect for dilemma type
qualified by an interaction between dilemma and gender role was
found. A post-hoc analysis revealed the exact location of these
significant differences: between the (a) prosocial and the antisocial
dilemmas and (b) the prosocial and impersonal dilemmas at the
femininity level and at the androgyny level. Similar to previous studies
which included gender role as a factor (Sochting, Skoe, & Marcia, 1994)
this study supports the claim that gender role may serve as a better
predictor of moral orientation than gender alone. Moreover Ford and
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Lowery (1986) found the significant results to be at the femininity

level, which has been replicated by this study.
Unlike Ford and Lowery (1986), this finding was not related to
gender and extends to generalise gender role as an important factor
by finding significant comparisons at the androgyny level as well. Both
androgyny and femininity gender roles were defined by a high score on
the feminine scale (Spence & Helmreich, 1978). The fact that dilemma
type reached significance at these levels only (only for the
androgynous and feminine people) may provide the answer for the
distinction between the significant results of those scales and the nonsignificant results of the masculine and the undifferentiated scales,
which were both low at femininity. In other words, one may need to
have high level of femininity in order to show significant differences
between some types of moral dilemma (e.g. prosocial-antisocial &
prosocial-impersonal).
The overall pattern of results regarding type of dilemma is similar
to earlier findings by Wark and Krebs (1997). Wark and Krebs (1997)
compared three types of dilemma (2 Kohlbergian, 2 real life-prosocial,
& 2 real life- antisocial). They reported that the Kohlbergian dilemmas
pulled for justice orientation, the prosocial tended towards care
orientation, and the antisocial towards justice orientation. In the
present study, results were in a similar direction. There is, however, a
marked difference between the means of the Kohlbergian dilemmas
(Wark & Krebs, 1997) and the impersonal dilemmas (the present
study). The notion that Kohlbergs (philosophical) dilemmas evoke
justice-based judgements is not new. Indeed, it was one of the main
criticisms against Kohlbergs model (Gilligan 1982). However, the use
of impersonal dilemmas in the past has led to some interesting
outcomes. Wark and Krebs (1996) reported that the philosophical
impersonal dilemmas evoked a similar level of justice to that evoked
by Kohlbergs dilemmas, and that they evoked a significantly lower
level of care than the antisocial impersonal dilemmas. These findings
appear inconsistent with the outcomes of the present study but this
inconsistency may reflect different tendencies in the scoring
procedure. The means of the prosocial impersonal dilemmas and the
antisocial impersonal dilemmas are fairly similar to the means of the
personal prosocial and antisocial dilemmas, and share similar locations
on the moral orientation scale (antisocial towards justice and prosocial
towards care). The overall mean of the impersonal dilemmas seems to
reflect the grouping of the various types of impersonal dilemmas
(prosocial, antisocial, & philosophical). However, the statistical
analyses suggest that there was no particular influence from any type
of dilemma on the overall mean of the impersonal dilemmas. There
was no significant difference between the impersonal dilemmas on
moral orientation scores.

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Methodologically, the need to control types of moral dilemma

(for both personal & impersonal dilemmas) cannot be over
emphasised. Wark and Krebs (1996) found that females tend to report
more prosocial dilemmas whereas males tend to report more antisocial
dilemmas. These tendencies affect moral orientation scores the
present study demonstrated that prosocial dilemmas evoke more care
judgements whereas antisocial dilemmas evoke more justice
judgements. These gender-related patterns of reporting have not been
demonstrated by this study, yet they may explain the outcome of
Gilligan and Attanuccis (1988) study in which type of dilemma was not
held constant. Moreover, Wark and Krebs (2000) found that women
report more prosocial real life dilemmas, perhaps because women
consider prosocial dilemmas to be more significant as these dilemmas
elicit most guilt (Wark, 1998), whereas men experience more antisocial
(transgression) types of conflict in real life. Thus, Gilligans notion of
moral orientation may be embedded in life experience rather than to
any particular gender group per se.
1.3.5 Moral Reasoning consideration of consequences
The results concerning the second part of this study support to some
extent some theoretical assumptions based on research by Krebs and
his colleagues (in particular Krebs et.al., 1997). The statistical analysis
revealed a significant difference between consideration of
consequences to the self and consideration of consequences to others
but only as far as antisocial dilemmas were concerned. When type of
dilemma was held constant for both the personal and the impersonal
dilemmas, the prosocial dilemmas did not yield a significant difference.
In fact both impersonal-prosocial and personal-prosocial dilemmas had
identical means, which suggests that people tend to consider the
outcome of their decisions and actions as important with regard to
themselves and others equally when discussing moral dilemmas
concerning prosocial issues.
The difference in the results between the prosocial dilemmas and
the antisocial dilemmas implies that people tend to regard
consequences to themselves as highly important compared to
consequences to others when discussing antisocial issues. By way of a
contrast, consequences of prosocial dilemmas are regarded as
important whether they relate to the self or to others. Perhaps this is
not such a great surprise bearing in mind that antisocial issues are
closely related to law and punishment whereas prosocial issues are to
a large extent related to ones willingness to help another. Krebs et al.
(1997) provide a constructive distinction between moral conflicts in
terms of their anticipated consequences: (a) approach approach
conflicts (should I spend more time with my boyfriend or my
friends?), (b) approach avoidance conflicts (should I lend money to
my friend or avoid taking responsibility for him?), and (c) avoidance
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avoidance conflicts (should I lie to my landlord or face eviction from

my flat?). The conflicts discussed in our antisocial dilemmas involved
at least one avoidance aspect (e.g. underage drinking versus getting
caught, facing condemnation versus feeling guilty, etc). It would be
valid to assume that decisions, which involve consequences to the self
that one is trying to avoid, will have more effect on ones moral
decision than decisions entailing consequences that others may try to
avoid. This last point brings us back to potential dissonance between
should and would that was described by Krebs et al. (1997). In the
same way that this distinction explains the inconsistency between
reasoning of hypothetical dilemmas and reasoning of real life
dilemmas, it may explain the inconsistency between justification of
others reasoning (when one is an observer) and the justification of
ones own reasoning. The outcomes of antisocial conflicts (e.g. law
breaking, being unfair or unjust) often contrast ones own morality
standard. Denton and Krebs (1990) found that people tend to consider
themselves to be more moral than other people, a phenomenon they
named the self-righteous bias. This phenomenon ties in with the
current findings. According to Krebs et al. (1997) people invest in their
moral identities, which in return affect their moral decisions. In
situations where people behave inconsistently with their moral
identities (e.g. antisocial type situation) they are faced with negative
outcome (physical or mental) and negative reputation, which motivate
them to reduce the inconsistency between their belief about their own
moral identity and how they have been perceived by society (judicial
system, family relatives, friends, etc). This attempt to reduce negative
reputation of ones moral identity is manifested in moral dilemmas in
the form of justification of behaviour, which as research showed,
involves low stage moral structures (Denton & Krebs 1990; Krebs et al,
1991; Wark & Krebs 1997; Krebs et al. 1997).
This is a crucial observation for research on moral decisionmaking as it can only be explored by real life personal dilemmas where
participants are asked to justify their own experiences. It follows then
that in the present study participants may have felt the need to justify
their own behaviour and reduce the inconsistency of their own moral
identity, which led them to consider the consequences of their
decisions/actions in a way that affected their decisions. In other words,
participants regretted acting in a certain way and therefore justified
their behaviour by considering the consequences of their actions in
order to avoid similar outcomes in the future. However, when asked to
discuss others moral decisions in antisocial situations the need to
justify others behaviour in terms of its consequences was less
important3. On the contrary, prosocial behaviour educes a positive
moral reputation that is more consistent with peoples moral identity
(the self righteous bias), and may validate or even improve ones
perception of oneself (Krebs et al. 1997).
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These findings do not corroborate Gilligans theory of moral

orientation. Participants rarely held one orientation across all
dilemmas. Moreover gender was related to neither justice nor care
orientations. Significant comparisons were found between the prosocial
and the impersonal dilemmas and between the prosocial and the
antisocial dilemmas for both feminine and androgynous gender role
groups. This outcome suggests that although people, in general, do not
hold a particular moral orientation, feminine and androgynous
people score 3 Although it must be remembered that our definition of
personal dilemmas were those which directly involved an individual
and made that individual take some form of action. Thus it may be true
that when an individual makes a decision not to act prosocially
(although not necessarily antisocially) there may be some justification
in terms of the potential consequences for the self. Significantly higher
percentages of care-based responses when discussing prosocial
dilemmas compared with impersonal or antisocial dilemmas. The latter
focuses the attention on the effect of external sources (e.g. type of
dilemma) on moral decision-making. The acknowledgement of such
interaction between external and internal (e.g. gender role) sources of
variation on moral decision-making is crucial to the understanding of
how people judge real life moral conflicts. Results also indicate, as
might have been anticipated, that people consider the consequences
of their decisions when they discuss moral conflicts. Furthermore, the
consequences of moral decisions seem to have more influence when
people discuss personal antisocial conflicts rather than impersonalantisocial conflicts. This difference was not evident between the
prosocial-personal/impersonal dilemmas. It may be that when people
discuss personal-antisocial (e.g. violations of rules, laws, or fairness)
dilemmas they seek to resist adopting a negative reputation. The
therefore justify their own behaviour with a higher percentage of
consideration of consequences in their attempt to view themselves
more positively (and enhance their moral identity). This pressure
disappears when people discuss impersonal-antisocial dilemmas
because the need to justify other peoples behaviour in a positive way
is less strong and has less influence on judgements and reasoning.
More so, it is not apparent in prosocial dilemmas because this type of
behaviour has a positive reputation and entails a positive moral
identity. Consequently, the outcomes of peoples prosocial behaviour
have less influence on their reasoning.
It is also possible to see some ways in which the current findings
might inform work in moral education. For instance, we see in the
results of the current study a link between internal (gender role) and
external (dilemma type) factors in making moral judgements. There is
also now strong evidence to suggest that the underlying motivations
for moral judgements differ according to the type of dilemma under
consideration. In view of this, educators need to consider whether it
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might be appropriate to employ different strategies for encouraging

mature moral reasoning with respect to pro- and antisocial behaviour.
Moreover, the influence of internal factors such as gender role points to
a need to gear any educational interventions to the needs of specific
individuals.
As the current study has demonstrated, another important factor
in making moral decisions is a consideration of the consequences of
actions. Such consideration appears at its most influential when
reasoning about ones own response to antisocial dilemmas (having
done or doing something wrong). As has already been indicated, the
motivation to maintain a reputation or positive moral identity not least,
one might imagine, amongst ones peers, could explain findings here.
However, it was not the case that participants in this study were
motivated to gain a positive (prosocial) self-identity but rather that
they were motivated to defend themselves against acquiring a
negative (antisocial) one. This is an issue that is less to do with moral
education and more to do with the values we encourage as a society;
behaving morally is less about prosocial behaviour and more about
not committing antisocial behaviour. But a greater emphasis, in the
schoolroom and beyond, on the social merits of prosocial behaviour
might just encourage more of it.
Finally, when considering antisocial dilemmas from an abstract,
impersonal perspective people imagine the consequences of an action
as less important than when they consider a similar event from a first
personal perspective. There is, it would seem, a separation of the
actual from the theoretical here (at least in the reports of our
participants). Further studies from an educational perspective could
help to identify whether encouraging a child or adult to reflect on their
own experiences and past, real-life moral decisions might trigger forms
of reasoning that are better suited to helping individuals make more
mature decisions in future, real-life moral dilemmas.
Altogether this study overcomes methodological problems in
earlier studies and confirms previous findings in terms of the effect of
dilemma type and gender role on moral orientation. It also points to
the importance of individuals consideration of consequences of their
actions in judging real life moral dilemmas. Further investigations are
needed to clarify the role of this new aspect of moral reasoning that
appears to be important in moral decision making. Such investigations
could help in the development of interactional models of moral
reasoning that account for the interplay between internal (e.g. gender
role) and external (e.g. dilemma type) influences on everyday moral
reasoning.

1.4 Religious Morality, Environmental Morality,

Individual and Social Morality.

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1.4.1 Religious Morality

In the scientific literature, the degree of religiosity is generally found to
be associated with higher ethical attitudes. Although a recent study by
Paul Pierce published in the Journal of Religion and Society argues for a
positive correlation between the degree of public religiosity in a society
and certain measures of dysfunction, an analysis published later in the
same journal contends that a number of methodological problems
undermine any findings or conclusions to be taken from the research.
In a response to the study by Paul, Pierce. Jensen builds on and refines
Paul's study. His conclusion, after carrying out elaborate multivariate
statistical studies, is that there is a correlation (and perhaps a causal
relationship) of higher homicide rates, not with Christianity, but with
dualism in Christianity, that is to say with the proportion of the
population who believe the devil and hell exist. Excerpt: "A multiple
regression analysis reveals a complex relationship with some
dimensions of religiosity encouraging homicide and other dimensions
discouraging it." Meanwhile, other studies seem to show positive links
in the relationship between religiosity and moral behavior - for
example, surveys suggesting a positive connection between faith and
altruism. Modern research in criminology also acknowledges an inverse
relationship between religion and crime, with many studies establishing
this beneficial connection (though some claim it is a modest one).
Indeed, a meta-analysis of 60 studies on religion and crime concluded,
religious behaviors and beliefs exert a moderate deterrent effect on
individuals criminal behavior. Religious belief systems usually include
the idea of divine will and divine judgment and usually correspond to a
moral code of conduct.
Religious persons try to find the answer to moral right or wrong,
evil and goodness, in the bible or other religious texts. Where do these
scriptures come from? In reviewing the origins of many different
religions, it appears that scholars attribute religious texts to mysterious
or mystical writers in the distant past. The element of time has
shrouded all such scriptures in extreme mystery or factual haziness.
There is never any clear, objective, historical chain that might clarify
and establish the authenticity of the authorship of religious texts.
These writings have been copied innumerable times and have become
less and less focused with each copying process. As a result, religious
writings have become so ambiguous and nebulous that it is often
necessary to substantially re-interpret or re-phrase their meaning. The
translation of these texts from archaic languages provides ample room
for misconstructions or misinterpretations. Such translations and
interpretations will vary with each translator and interpreter,
depending on their personal beliefs, opinions, preconceived notions
and their comprehension of the original language. As the result of this
multi-faceted, compounded obfuscation, there are many conflicting
interpretations dealing with the concept of good and evil in the Bible,
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the Koran, the Torah or any of the multitudes of other scriptures. All of
these texts proclaim to be the only definitive arbiter of morality. Each
religious authority implies that a person acts moral if he follows its
prescriptions or its dogma. Christians have no moral problem eating
pork; Muslims and Jews have strict moral prohibitions against eating
pork. It is moral for Jews and Christians to drink alcoholic beverages,
Muslims can get their heads chopped off if they imbibe alcohol.
How can we determine which of the many contradictory
revelations described in different religious writings are correct so that
we may all act in a moral manner? Since all of these scriptures
contradict each other, how can we know which one is really the true
one and which ones are false? Is the Torah correct or is the New
Testament more truthful? How can we reconcile the Bible with the
Koran? Do all of the one billion Muslims follow an erroneous doctrine or
does the Koran more truthfully reflect the nature of true morality than
the Bible? Religious person face the difficult task of selecting a suitable
morality because their search is made more complicated by the large
number of religious sects, cults, churches and denominations from
which he can choose. He faces constant contradictions because each
of these belief systems claims to be the only true and authoritative
source of morality. These contradictory claims appear to be absurd
because they can obviously not all be correct
One of the universal contradictions in the theological approach to
morality involves a dilemma posed by all religions. What is the
relationship of good and evil to a benevolent and omnipotent god?
Regardless of the ambivalent and unreliable nature of religious texts
setting forth the moral teachings of a particular religion, the ultimate
source for the moral code imbedded in a religion always rests in a god
or gods. A god is the central, authoritative and controlling power that is
the backbone of all religions. By definition, all religions must have an
omnipotent god, a supreme being and creator of the universe. This god
must be specific to a particular religion. Different religions cannot have
the same god. Thus, all religions derive their morality from the
authority of the god they worship, usually through an intermediary in
the nature of a messenger or affiliate, such as Jesus or Mohammed or
Joseph Smith.
A system of morality that relies on the existence of gods or
godlike beings is irrational because no god or godlike beings have ever
manifested themselves in an objective manner to human beings. There
is no evidence whatsoever that a god exists or has ever existed,
anywhere, at any time. In fact, all objective evidence available to man
precludes and contradicts the existence of a god or gods. Thus, an
attempt to seek morality as a derivative of non-existing gods is difficult
to justify. In all religions, faith and fairytales replace and supersede
factual evidence. The faith-based acceptance of a theological doctrine
of morality reflects merely illusions or delusions: Faith is necessary only
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for the acceptance as true of a statement that objective evidence has

already proven false. Faith is only necessary if religious dogma is in
direct conflict with Objective Reality.
No matter which one of the many religious text we might adapt
as the basis for our own morality, we are making such choice based on
our individual preferences and convictions. We are choosing our own
morality from a variety of religious moralities. Again, we choose our
own morality. We are not considering if we should follow an absolute,
universal, objective religious morality, but we are considering which
one of many relative, subjective morality systems we should select
from a smorgasbord of religious morality systems. Thus, by making a
personal choice from many contradictory religious morality systems,
we end up with a personal, relative morality, rather than an absolute,
objective, universal morality.
1.4.2 Enviromental Ethics and Morality
Environmental ethics is the part of environmental philosophy which
considers extending the traditional boundaries of ethics from solely
including humans to including the non-human world. It exerts influence
on a large range of disciplines including law, sociology, theology,
economics, ecology and geography. There are many ethical decisions
that human beings make with respect to the environment. For
example: Should we continue to clear cut forests for the sake of human
consumption? Should we continue to propagate? Should we continue to
make gasoline powered vehicles? What environmental obligations do
we need to keep for future generations? Is it right for humans to
knowingly cause the extinction of a species for the convenience of
humanity?
The academic field of environmental ethics grew up in response
to the work of scientists such as Rachel Carson and events such as the
first Earth Day in 1970, when environmentalists started urging
philosophers to consider the philosophical aspects of environmental
problems. Two papers published in Science had a crucial impact: Lynn
White's "The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis" (March 1967) and
Garrett Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" (December 1968). Also
influential was Garett Hardin's later essay called "Exploring New Ethics
for Survival", as well as an essay by Aldo Leopold in his A Sand County
Almanac, called "The Land Ethic," in which Leopold explicitly claimed
that the roots of the ecological crisis were philosophical (1949).
The first international academic journals in this field emerged
from North America in the late 1970s and early 1980s the US-based
journal, Environmental Ethics in 1979 and the Canadian based journal
The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy in 1983. The first British based
journal of this kind, Environmental Values, was launched in 1992.

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Suppose that putting out natural fires, culling feral animals or

destroying some individual members of overpopulated indigenous
species is necessary for the protection of the integrity of a certain
ecosystem. Will these actions be morally permissible or even required?
Is it morally acceptable for farmers in non-industrial countries to
practise slash and burn techniques to clear areas for agriculture?
Consider a mining company which has performed open pit mining in
some previously unspoiled area. Does the company have a moral
obligation to restore the landform and surface ecology? And what is the
value of a humanly restored environment compared with the originally
natural environment? It is often said to be morally wrong for human
beings to pollute and destroy parts of the natural environment and to
consume a huge proportion of the planet's natural resources. If that is
wrong, is it simply because a sustainable environment is essential to
(present and future) human well-being? Or is such behaviour also
wrong because the natural environment and/or its various contents
have certain values in their own right so that these values ought to be
respected and protected in any case? These are among the questions
investigated by environmental ethics. Some of them are specific
questions faced by individuals in particular circumstances, while others
are more global questions faced by groups and communities. Yet
others are more abstract questions concerning the value and moral
standing of the natural environment and its nonhuman components.
In the literature on environmental ethics the distinction between
instrumental value and intrinsic value (meaning non-instrumental
value) has been of considerable importance. The former is the value
of things as means to further some other ends, whereas the latter is
the value of things as ends in themselves regardless of whether they
are also useful as means to other ends. For instance, certain fruits
have instrumental value for bats who feed on them, since feeding on
the fruits is a means to survival for the bats. However, it is not widely
agreed that fruits have value as ends in themselves. We can likewise
think of a person who teaches others as having instrumental value for
those who want to acquire knowledge. Yet, in addition to any such
value, it is normally said that a person, as a person, has intrinsic value,
i.e., value in his or her own right independently of his or her prospects
for serving the ends of others. For another example, a certain wild
plant may have instrumental value because it provides the ingredients
for some medicine or as an aesthetic object for human observers. But
if the plant also has some value in itself independently of its prospects
for furthering some other ends such as human health, or the pleasure
from aesthetic experience, then the plant also has intrinsic value.
Because the intrinsically valuable is that which is good as an end in
itself, it is commonly agreed that something's possession of intrinsic
value generates a prima facie direct moral duty on the part of moral

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agents to protect it or at least refrain from damaging it (see O'Neil

1992 and Jameson 2002 for detailed accounts of intrinsic value).
Many traditional western ethical perspectives, however, are
anthropocentric or human-centered in that either they assign intrinsic
value to human beings alone (i.e., what we might call anthropocentric
in a strong sense) or they assign a significantly greater amount of
intrinsic value to human beings than to any nonhuman things such that
the protection or promotion of human interests or well-being at the
expense of nonhuman things turns out to be nearly always justified
(i.e., what we might call anthropocentric in a weak sense). For
example, Aristotle (Politics, Bk. 1, Ch. 8) maintains that nature has
made all things specifically for the sake of man and that the value of
nonhuman things in nature is merely instrumental. Generally,
anthropocentric positions find it problematic to articulate what is wrong
with the cruel treatment of nonhuman animals, except to the extent
that such treatment may lead to bad consequences for human beings.
Immanuel Kant (Duties to Animals and Spirits, in Lectures on Ethics),
for instance, suggests that cruelty towards a dog might encourage a
person to develop a character which would be desensitized to cruelty
towards humans. From this standpoint, cruelty towards nonhuman
animals would be instrumentally, rather than intrinsically, wrong.
Likewise, anthropocentrism often recognizes some non-intrinsic
wrongness of anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) environmental
devastation. Such destruction might damage the well-being of human
beings now and in the future, since our well-being is essentially
dependent on a sustainable environment (see Passmore 1974,
Bookchin 1990, Norton, Hutchins, Stevens, and Maple (eds.) 1995).
When environmental ethics emerged as a new sub-discipline of
philosophy in the early 1970s, it did so by posing a challenge to
traditional anthropocentrism. In the first place, it questioned the
assumed moral superiority of human beings to members of other
species on earth. In the second place, it investigated the possibility of
rational arguments for assigning intrinsic value to the natural
environment and its nonhuman contents.
It should be noted, however, that some theorists working in the
field see no need to develop new, non-anthropocentric theories.
Instead, they advocate what may be called
enlightened
anthropocentrism (or, perhaps more appropriately called, prudential
anthropocentrism). Briefly, this is the view that all the moral duties we
have towards the environment are derived from our direct duties to its
human inhabitants. The practical purpose of environmental ethics, they
maintain, is to provide moral grounds for social policies aimed at
protecting the earth's environment and remedying environmental
degradation. Enlightened anthropocentrism, they argue, is sufficient
for that practical purpose, and perhaps even more effective in
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anthropocentric theories given the theoretical burden on the latter to

provide sound arguments for its more radical view that the nonhuman
environment has intrinsic value (cf. Norton 1991, de Shalit 1994, Light
and Katz 1996). Furthermore, some prudential anthropocentrists may
hold what might be called cynical anthropocentrism, which says that
we have a higher-level anthropocentric reason to be nonanthropocentric in our day-to-day thinking. Suppose that a day-to-day
non-anthropocentrist tends to act more benignly towards the
nonhuman environment on which human well-being depends. This
would provide reason for encouraging non-anthropocentric thinking,
even to those who find the idea of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value
hard to swallow. In order for such a strategy to be effective one may
need to hide one's cynical anthropocentrism from others and even
from oneself.
1.4.3 Individual Morality (Individualism)
Individualism is the moral stance, political philosophy, or social outlook
that stresses independence and self-reliance. Individualists promote
the exercise of one's goals and desires, while opposing most external
interference upon one's choices, whether by society, or any other
group or institution. Individualism is opposed to collectivism, which
stress that communal, community, group, societal, or national goals
should take priority over individual goals. Individualism is also opposed
to any tradition or other form of external moral standard being used to
limit an individual's choice of actions.
The concept of "individualism" was first used by the French SaintSimonian socialists (the opposite of individualism), to describe what
they believed was the cause of the disintegration of French society
after the 1789 Revolution. The term was however already used
(pejoratively) by reactionary thinkers of the French Theocratic School,
such as Joseph de Maistre, in their opposition to political liberalism. The
Saint-Simonians did not see political liberalism as the problem though,
but saw in "individualism" a form of "egoism" or "anarchy," the
"ruthless exploitation of man by man in modern industry." While the
conservative anti-individualists attacked the political egalitarianism
brought about by the Revolution, the Saint-Simonians criticized laissezfaire (economic liberalism), for its perceived failure to cope with the
increasing inequality between rich and poor. Socialism, a word
introduced by the Saint-Simonians, was to bring about "social
harmony."
In the English language, the word "individualism" was first
introduced, as a pejorative, by the Owenites in the 1830s, although it is
unclear if they were influenced by Saint-Simonianism or came up with
it independently. A more positive use of the term in Britain came to be
used with the writings of James Elishama Smith, who was a millenarian
and a Christian Israelite. Although an early Owenite socialist, he
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eventually rejected its collective idea of property, and found in

individualism a "universalism" that allowed for the development of the
"original genius." Without individualism, Smith argued, individuals
cannot amass property to increase one's happiness. William Maccall,
another Unitarian preacher, and probably an acquaintance of Smith,
came somewhat later, although influenced by John Stuart Mill, Thomas
Carlyle, and German Romanticism, to the same positive conclusions, in
his 1847 work "Elements of Individualism".
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "social contract" maintains that each
individual is under implicit contract to submit his or her own will to the
"general will." This advocacy of subordinating the individual will to a
collective will is in fundamental opposition to the individualist
philosophy. An individualist enters into society to further his or her own
interests, or at least demands the right to serve his or her own
interests, without taking the interests of society into consideration (an
individualist need not be an egoist). The individualist does not lend
credence to any philosophy that requires the sacrifice of the selfinterest of the individual for any higher social causes. Rousseau would
argue, however, that his concept of "general will" is not the simple
collection of individual wills and precisely furthers the interests of the
individual (the constraint of law itself would be beneficial for the
individual, as the lack of respect for the law necessarily entails, in
Rousseau's eyes, a form of ignorance and submission to one's passions
instead of the preferred autonomy of reason).
Societies and groups can differ, in the extent to which they are
based upon predominantly "self-regarding" (individualistic, and
arguably self-interested) rather than "other-regarding" (group-oriented,
and group, or society-minded) behaviour. Ruth Benedict argued that
there is also a distinction, relevant in this context, between "guilt"
societies (e.g., medieval Europe) with an "internal reference standard",
and "shame" societies (e.g., Japan, "bringing shame upon one's
ancestors") with an "external reference standard", where people look
to their peers for feedback on whether an action is "acceptable" or not
(also known as "group-think").
The extent to which society, or groups are "individualistic" can
vary from time to time, and from country to country. For example,
Japanese society is more group-oriented (e.g., decisions tend to be
taken by consensus among groups, rather than by individuals), and it
has been argued that "personalities are less developed" (than is usual
in the West). The USA is usually thought of as being at the
individualistic (its detractors would say "atomistic") end of the
spectrum (the term "Rugged Individualism" is a cultural imprint of
being the essence of Americanism), whereas European societies are
more inclined to believe in "public-spiritedness", state "socialistic"
spending, and in "public" initiatives.

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John Kenneth Galbraith made a classic distinction between

"private affluence and public squalor" in the USA, and private squalor
and public affluence in, for example, Europe, and there is a correlation
between individualism and degrees of public sector intervention and
taxation.
Individualism is often contrasted with either totalitarianism or
collectivism, but in fact there is a spectrum of behaviors ranging at the
societal level from highly individualistic societies (e.g., the USA)
through mixed societies (a term the UK has used in the post-World War
II period) to collectivist. Also, many collectivists (particularly supporters
of collectivist anarchism or libertarian socialism) point to the enormous
differences between liberty-minded collectivism and totalitarian
practices.
Individualism, sometimes closely associated with certain variants
of individualist anarchism, libertarianism or classical liberalism,
typically takes it for granted that individuals know best and that public
authority or society has the right to interfere in the person's decisionmaking process only when a very compelling need to do so arises (and
maybe not even in those circumstances). This type of argument is
often observed in relation to policy debates regarding regulation of
industries, as well as in relation to personal choice of lifestyle.
1.4.4 Social Morality
Social morality is more concerned with how we would collectively do
well to live as citizens of a society. It has to do with narrating sets of
shared/mutual rules and values that would best enable folk to rub
along with each other, to be reasonably safe in each other's company,
to have enough freedom and power to live as we want to live, and
generally enjoy the kind of society that we variously find congenial and
valuable. A derivative function of social morality is to narrate valuable
relations between persons and other species and/or impersonal
integrities such as eco-systems, works of art and so on.
Morality does not apply to individual human beings when they
are alone. A shipwrecked survivor on an island need not concern
himself with morality because it does not apply to him in his isolation.
This illustration emphasizes the fact that gods or extraterrestrials did
not imbed the concept of morality in individual human beings but that
morality is applicable to an individual only when he interacts with other
persons. Morality is a societal phenomenon and, since man creates
societies, all morality is a concept created by man. It follows, that
morality is relative to our environment and does not apply to all
persons at all times. Morality can only be relative and subjective;
instead of objective, universal and absolute.
A general problem, facing any moral or political narrative, is that
all persons do and must live by values but that no human person
actually knows what, if any, values really are valuable. This matters
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especially for social morality because; (1) persons can neither enjoy
nor endure any kind of social integrity, co-operation or connectedness
(any society, fellowship, communication or relationship) without some
kind of shared morality. (2) Any shared morality, like any language or
other ethic, simply will and must impose values on those who might
not otherwise freely adopt them. We mightn't like the rules of
language, for example, but we cannot profit from language without
allowing it to impose its rules on us (after all, if we don't follow the
rules then we won't be understood when we speak) - the same goes for
mathematics, politics, self-realisation, or any other ethic. (3) None of us
have a morally justified authority to impose our values on others if we
cannot justify that our values are those that others ought to follow. And
none of us have a right to impose our values on others if we cannot
justify imposing on others the costs involved in either accepting or
dissenting from those values.
These conditions seem impossible to meet so, just in order to
have any kind of interpersonal relationship or society at all, we have to
do what we have no right to do. This problem is aggravated by the fact
that (a) human persons are chronically irresponsible about our
imposition of values, to the extent that some of us even deny that we
do impose our values on others, (b) imposing values violates the
evaluating integrity of those on whom the values are imposed, and the
imposition of values is god-playing [parentocentric], but (c) the only
forms of social morality we know are parento-like defences against
disvalue that assume a god-like superiority on our part.
Contrary to parentocentric mythology, our social, moral, political
and aesthetic 'parents' are not better informed about values than are
those they treat as moral children. And that so many of us think that
we know what is right is evidence only that we haven't thought about it
carefully enough to be aware that we don't know what is not knowable.
Moral uncertainty logically justifies no more than a degree of humility
(especially on the part of government). But, to the extent that we are
morally insecure, we are generally fearful enough of our own
uncertainty only to violate others in an effort to secure our own need
for significance. The cost of this kind of logic is evident in the history of
Communism, Islamic fundamentalism or 20th Century Germany. In
each case, assumptions of moral superiority have given rise to an
appalling history of vast and costly violence.
The dilemma, of having to do right by doing what we cannot
know is right, cannot be escaped because, the attractions of pseudoinnocence notwithstanding, we simply cannot avoid imposing some
values on others, and/or avoid responsibility for imposing our values on
society, just because we have no moral authority to do so. To live is to
impose one value on society, to not live is to impose another. To join in
imposes our presence, to opt out imposes our absence. To vote or not
vote, to speak or not speak, to mind our own business or interfere, are
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all values-imposing. Our choice is not to impose no values but only,

and always, to choose which values we will impose, how and why.
Being responsible about the values we input into the world is,
however, a behaviour which humans are generally scrupulous to avoid.
We normally translate any responsibility that we have for others as
according us the privilege of parent-like power over them. We protest
that no one has a right to impose her or his values on us while, of
necessity and in fact, vigorously imposing our values on others with a
viciousness made worse [more violent] by: (1) our refusal to recognise
and take responsibility for what we are doing - we deceive ourselves
that it is not us who impose moral violence on others, we are just the
agents of deities or forces of one kind or another, society/women/the
workers, convention/tradition, fate, karma or 'historical necessity',
justice and so on and on and on. And (2) our confusion of moral values
with political [preference] values - we impose our preferences on
others under (a) a compulsive need to confirm that we matter and (b)
the assumption that our tastes and preferences are morally good
because, if they are not, then there are doubts about our value as
persons.
We cannot make these problems go away, but neither can we
elect to have no social morality; even the denial of morality inputs a
morality, and those who follow what others call 'evil' do so only
because they believe it to be valuable [good]. We each and all have
the power of persons, whether we want it or not, and we all use our
personhood power whether we want to or not. Any use or non-use of
personhood power necessarily inputs values to the world and, thereby,
onto others in the world. So the only possibility, for using our power in
any way that is valuable, is to follow the rules (the 'oughts') of a
genuinely valuable morality.
We cannot know that any moral values are genuinely valuable
but, as with all beliefs, we can know which moral beliefs are more or
less justified. So what we can do (and the best that we can do) is
'shorten the odds' - we can strive for those values which are best
justified by the evidence and reasoning that is available to us.
Integrity-respecting values are necessary for any relationship or
society. To not impose such values on each other is to impose the
values of social dis-integration. We do and must, in fact, impose
integrity-respecting moral values on each other. And, if any kind of
relationship is valuable then we are justified in imposing such values
just as the price of our connectedness with others and theirs with us.
This does not prove that an integrity-respecting morality is 'right', but
it gives us better reasons for acting as if it was right than we have for
acting as if integrity-violating values were justified. And, this being the
case, we are better justified in imposing these values on each other,
than we are in imposing other values, just as we are better justified in

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personally living by a respect for integrity (including an integrity of

personal and social morality).
We are not similarly justified in imposing preference values on
each other because preferences are pegged to subjects, and that any
person or persons prefers something tells us nothing at all about
whether or not it should or can be valued by any other person or
persons. I can, for instance, compel others to hear the sounds I like, or
to say what I want them to say, but I cannot make them like the
sounds or believe the saying.
Some social rules are a necessity of relationship, just as linguistic
rules [grammar] are a necessity of communication. And, given that
some rules are inevitable, moral rules (which impartially empower
everyone, and without which a society could not function) are much
easier to justify than are political rules (which empower some at the
expense of others and/or compel us all to realise only the values that
some parentocentric elite prefers).

1.5 The importance of practicing good values in daily

life
Live by your personal code of values to get the most out
of life. Life is fulfilling and free of stress when we live in
accordance to our own personal values
Your personal code of values are what's important to you; not
something you want or would like to have, but something you literally
need in your life to be happy. A value is a principle or quality
intrinsically valuable or desirable to you. Values are personal. They are
your convictions, your beliefs, and your ethics rolled into one. Your
personal code of values may be identical to your family's values. Or
they may be dramatically different. Living in agreement with one's
values is fulfilling. Living in conflict with one's values is stressful and
dissatisfying. That's why it is so important to clearly understand your
own personal code of values; your happiness depends upon not only
knowing your values, but living in accordance with them. Stress does
not result from hard work, long hours, or multiple roles in life. Stress
results from values conflicts. When put in a situation where you are
unable to honor a value, you will feel stressed out. No amount of
relaxation, meditation, or exercise will eliminate the stress until the
values conflict is resolved.
It's important that we separate what society, culture, and family
values from our individual set of values. Values are not about right and
wrong as a broad, cultural construct, but about what's right and wrong
for you as an individual, given who you are and what you want in your
life. What you truly value is--by definition--right for you. What you

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value may not be right for those close to you and may be a source of
disagreement and dissatisfaction if others attempt to enforce their
code of values on you.
Determining your own personal code of values can take either of
two directions. You can: (1) Start with a long list of general values, and
pick those important to you, or (2) Build your list from scratch based on
your life experiences. The first method, picking values from a list, may
subconsciously encourage you to select values you think you should
have, rather than those really important to you. The second method,
though more difficult initially, will be more accurate and more
rewarding. Try both and see which works best for you. To build your
own list from personal experiences follow this process: (1) Think of a
brief moment in your experience when life was especially satisfying
and rewarding. (2) What were you doing? (3) Who was present? (4)
What qualities or values were you displaying?
You respond to a frantic knock on the door and see a young girl,
perhaps eight years old, with a boy about four. The boy is choking and
the girl, obviously his sister, is frightened. Without thinking you pick up
the boy, turn him upside down, and firmly rap him several times on the
back with the palm of your hand. A whole piece of hard candy that was
blocking the boy's airway pops out and the boy takes several deep,
grateful breaths. In that rewarding moment you display the values of
bravery, helpfulness, responsibility, and problem-solving action.
Why is it important to understand your own personal values?
Values are linked to purpose in life. You might say that your purpose is
to live your values. When you do, life is good.

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