Heirs of ESTELITA BURGOS-LIPAT, namely: ALAN B. LIPAT and ALFREDO B.

LIPAT, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
Heirs of EUGENIO D. TRINIDAD, namely: ASUNCION R. TRINIDAD, VICTOR R.
TRINIDAD, IMACULADA T. ALFONSO, CELESTINA T. NAGUIAT, FERNANDO R.
TRINIDAD, MICHAEL R. TRINIDAD and JOSEFINA T. NAGUIAT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185644 March 2, 2010
CORONA, J.:
Facts
Estelita and Alfredo Lipat obtained a loan from Pacific Banking Corporation,
secured by a real estate mortgage. Due to petitioners failure to pay their loans, the
PBC foreclosed the subject property with Eugenio D. Trinidad as the highest bidder.
He was issued a certificate of sale which was registered on April 12, 1989.
The petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage, extra-judicial
foreclosure and certificate of sale. The RTC dismissed the complaint but granted
petitioners five months and 17 days from the finality of the decision to exercise their
right of redemption, a decision which was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme
Court. Meanwhile, petitioners assigned their rights over the contested property to
Partas Transporation Co., Inc. (PTCI). Within the given period left for redemption,
PTCI exercised the right of redemption. However, the heirs of Trinidad refused to
claim the redemption money and surrender the certificate of title.
Issue
WON the right to redemption should have been exercised within one year
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.
Ruling
The one-year redemption period is the rule that generally applies to
foreclosure of mortgage by a bank. The period of redemption is not tolled by the
filing of a complaint or petition for annulment of the mortgage and the foreclosure
sale conducted pursuant to the said mortgage. However, in Lipat, the Supreme
Court upheld the RTC decision giving petitioners five months and 17 days from the
finality of the trial courts decision to redeem their foreclosed property. Lipat,
already final and executory, has therefore become the law of the case between the
parties, even though the said period was beyond one year from the date of
registration of the sale. The CA had no power to reverse the Courts final and
executory judgment.
-0THE PARENTS-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (PTA) OF ST. MATHEW CHRISTIAN
ACADEMY, GREGORIO INALVEZ, JR., ROWENA LAYUG, MALOU MALVAR,
MARILOU BARAQUIO, GARY SINLAO, LUZVIMINDA OCAMPO,MARIFE
FERNANDEZ, FERNANDO VICTORIO, ERNESTO AGANON and RIZALINO
MANGLICMOT, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, GREGORIO INALVEZ,
JR.,
Petitioners,

vs.
THE METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST CO., Respondent.
G.R. No. 176518

March 2, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts
Denivin and Josefina Ilagan were granted a loan by the Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Co. secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over parcels of land. Upon default, an
extrajudicial foreclosure was conducted with Metropolitan Bank being the highest
bidder and for which a Certificate of Sale was issued.
During the period of redemption, a Writ of Possession was approved in favor
of the Bank. On June 30, 2005, the St. Mathew Christian Academy of Tarlac, Inc.,
owned by the mortgagors and therefore included in one of the foreclosed lands,
filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Restraining Order.
Issue
WON St. Mathew Christian Academy of Tarlac, Inc. is really a third person
which cannot be bound by the writ of possession issued by the Court.
Ruling
Petitioners are not "Third Parties" against whom the writ of possession cannot
be issued and implemented. As a rule, it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ
of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. Section
7 of Act No. 3135 explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply
for a writ of possession. It is settled that the issuance of a writ of possession is a
ministerial duty of the court. The purchaser of the foreclosed property, upon ex
parte application and the posting of the required bond, has the right to acquire
possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month redemption period.
Since petitioners possession of the subject school premises stemmed from
their employment or enrollment contracts with the school, their right to possess the
subject school premises cannot be adverse to that of the school and of its owners.
As such, the petitioners cannot be deemed "third parties". The proper remedy for
the petitioners is a separate, distinct and independent suit, provided for under Act
No. 3135.
-0CARMEN DEL PRADO, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ANTONIO L. CABALLERO and LEONARDA CABALLERO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 148225

March 3, 2010

NACHURA, J.:
Facts
Several parcels of land, including Cadastral Lot No. 11909, were adjudicated
in favor of Spouses Antonio and Leonarda Caballero in 1985; hence, the court

ordered for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding titles of
the lots in favor of the Caballeros.
On June 11, 1990, Spouses Caballero sold to Carmen del Prado, Cadastral Lot
No. 11909 on the basis of the tax declaration covering the property. On March 20,
1991, petitioner filed in the same cadastral proceedings a "Petition for Registration
of Document Under PD 1529" in order that a certificate of title be issued in her
name, covering the whole Lot No. 11909, which is in excess of the allotted area to
be sold. In the petition, she alleged that the tenor of the instrument of sale
indicated that the sale was for a lump sum, in which case, the vendor was bound to
deliver all that was included within said boundaries even when it exceeded the area
specified in the contract.
Issue
WON the petitioners recourse, by filing the petition for registration in the
same cadastral case, was proper.
Ruling
Petitioners recourse, by filing the petition for registration in the same
cadastral case, was improper. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Such
indefeasibility commences after one year from the date of entry of the decree of
registration. Inasmuch as the petition for registration of document did not interrupt
the running of the period to file the appropriate petition for review and considering
that the prescribed one-year period had long since expired, the decree of
registration, as well as the certificate of title issued in favor of respondents, had
become incontrovertible.
In addition, what really defines a piece of ground is not the area, calculated
with more or less certainty, mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein
laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. However, numerical data
are not the sole gauge of unreasonableness of the excess or deficiency in area. In
the instant case, the parties agreed on the purchase price of P40,000.00 for a
predetermined area of 4,000 sq m, with the specified boundaries. Clearly, the
discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be considered a slight difference in quantity. It is
not a reasonable excess or deficiency that should be deemed included in the deed
of sale.
-0SPOUSES NORMAN K. CERTEZA, JR. and MA. ROSANILA V. CERTEZA, AND
AMADA P. VILLAMAYOR and HERMINIO VILLAMAYOR, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, Respondent.
G.R. No. 190078
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts

March 5, 2010

Petitioners obtained a loan from Philippine Savings Bank. Due to petitioners

failure to pay their obligation, an Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate
Mortgage was instituted. During the auction sale, PS Bank emerged as the sole and
highest bidder. A corresponding Certificate of Sale was then issued in its favor and
was later registered. A Writ of Possession was then subsequently granted. On
January 20, 2005, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Stay Issuance or Implementation of Writ of Possession. They further sought the
nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale for allegedly having been conducted
in contravention of the procedural requirements prescribed in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0
(Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages).
Issue
WON the auction sale conducted by virtue of the extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage should be declared null and void for failure to comply with the twobidder rule.
Ruling
The law governing cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is Act No.
3135. It is impractical and burdensome to require the two-bidder rule considering
that not all auction sales are commercially attractive to prospective bidders. The
two-bidder rule is provided under P.D. No. 1594 with respect to contracts for
government infrastructure projects because of the public interest involved. In
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages however, the private interest is predominant.
Therefore, the requirement that there must be at least two bidders is not as exigent
as in the case of contracts for government infrastructure projects. Circular No. 72002 Section 5(a) further states that:
Sec. 5. Conduct of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale

a. The bidding shall be made through sealed bids which must be submitted to
the Sheriff who shall conduct the sale between the hours of 9 a.m. and 4 p.m.
of the date of the auction (Act 3135, Sec. 4). xxx
The use of the word "bids" (in plural form) does not make it a mandatory
requirement to have more than one bidder for an auction sale to be valid. Therefore,
the extra-judicial foreclosure sale conducted in this case is regular and valid.
Consequently, the subsequent issuance of the writ of possession is likewise regular
and valid.
-0SULTAN YAHYA "JERRY" M. TOMAWIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMNA A. PUMBAYA, JALILAH A. MANGOMPIA,
and RAMLA A. MUSOR,Respondents.
G.R. No. 182434
VELASCO, JR., J.:

March 5, 2010

Facts
Amna A. Pumbaya, Jalilah A. Mangompia, and Ramla A. Musor are the
daughters of the late Acraman Radia. On February 21, 1997, private respondents
filed with the Sharia Court District (SDC) an action for quieting of title of a parcel of
land, docketed as Civil Case No. 102-97, located in Marawi City, against Sultan Jerry
Tomawis and Mangoda Radia. The respondents alleged that: (1) They were the
absolute owners of the lot subject of the complaint, being the legal heirs of Acraman
Radia, who had always been in peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the
property; (2) Tomawis assumed ownership of the said property on the claim that he
bought the same from Mangoda Radia, who, in turn, claimed that he inherited it
from his late father; (3) in 1996, they "were informed that their land [was] leveled
and the small houses [built] thereon with their permission were removed" upon the
orders of Tomawis; and (4) they had been unlawfully deprived of their possession of
the land, and Tomawis actions had cast a cloud of doubt on their title.
Issue
WON the SDC can validly take cognizance of Civil Case No. 102-97.
Ruling
The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the
elimination of the "cloud of doubts on the title of ownership" on the subject land,
are within the SDCs jurisdiction to grant. SDC had, by virtue of PD 1083, original
jurisdiction, concurrently with the RTCs and MTCs, over all personal and real actions
outside the purview of Art. 143(1)(d) of PD 1083, in which the parties involved were
Muslims, except those for ejectment. PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to
Sharia courts. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. In the instant
case, private respondents petition in Civil Case No. 102-97 sufficiently alleged the
concurrent original jurisdiction of the SDC. On the other hand, BP 129 was enacted
to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the
judiciary.
While the Court recognizes the concurrent jurisdiction of the SDCs and the
RTCs with respect to cases involving only Muslims, the SDC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary to Muslims to the
exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception under PD 1083, while both courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal actions. Said jurisdictional
conferment, found in Art. 143 of PD 1083, is applicable solely when both parties are
Muslims and shall not be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim, who
may be the opposing party against a Muslim.
-0PIO DELOS REYES (Deceased), represented by heirs FIDEL DELOS REYES,
MAURO DELOS REYES and IRENE BONGCO (Deceased), represented by
surviving spouse RODOLFO BONGCO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, HONORABLE RENE C. VILLA, in his

capacity as Secretary of the Department of Land Reform (formerly

Department of Agrarian Reform), THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
OFFICER (PARO) OF DINALUPIHAN BATAAN, THE MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN
REFORM OFFICER (MARO) OF HERMOSA AND ORANI, BATAAN, and
FORTUNATO QUIAMBAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168726

March 5, 2010

CARPIO, J.:
Facts
Pio delos Reyes applied for exclusion from the coverage of operation land
transfer, under P.D. No. 27 and LOI No. 474, some parcels of land, which was later
recommended by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer for approval. Specifically,
the recommendation included retention of not more than seven hectares of his
tenanted land planted to rice and corn, exclusion of his childrens properties from
the coverage of operation land transfer, cancellation of certificates of land transfer
covering the properties of his children issued in favor of farmer beneficiaries, and
cancellation of certificates of land transfer covering his retention area.
Fortunato Quiambao, however, appealed to the DAR Secretary claiming that
Pio resorted to fraud in not stating the totality of his landholdings, which was in
excess of 7 hectares. He further alleged that during the pendency of the petition for
exclusion or retention, Pio converted portions of their landholdings into residential
lands. The DAR Secretary found that Pio and his children owned lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes from which they derived
adequate income to support themselves and their families; hence, he concluded
that the subject landholdings fell under the governments operation land transfer
program. Pio and his children moved for reconsideration, which the DAR Secretary
dismissed. The Office of the President likewise dismissed the petitioners motion
upon appeal.
Issue
WON the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioners is proper.
Ruling
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts
must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.
Petitioners should have first filed a motion for reconsideration of the 30 September
2004 order of the Office of the President. The parties are presumed to know the
hornbook rule that judgments become final and executory only upon the lapse of
the reglementary period to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration without
any appeal or motion for reconsideration having been made.

As this case involves the application of P.D. No. 27 and LOI No. 474, the DAR
Secretary, owing to his agrarian expertise, is in a better position to make a final
determination whether petitioners landholdings may be subject of exclusion from
operation land transfer or retention.
-0ATTY. RESTITUTO G. CUDIAMAT, ERLINDA P. CUDIAMAT and CORAZON D.
CUDIAMAT, Petitioners,
vs.
BATANGAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC., and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS,
NASUGBU, BATANGAS,Respondents.
G.R. No. 182403

March 9, 2010

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Facts
Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto were the registered coowners of a 320 square meter parcel of land in Balayan, Batangas, which was
registered in Nasugbu, Batangas. Restituto, who resided in Ozamiz City with his
wife, entrusted the custody of the title to who Perfecto. In 1979, Perfecto, without
the knowledge and consent of Restituto, obtained a loan from Batangas Savings and
Loan Bank, Inc with the said property as a security. On June 19, 1991 the bank
foreclosed the property. In 1998, as Perfectos widow Corazon was being evicted
from the property, she and spouses Restituto and Erlinda filed on August 9, 1999
before the RTC of Balayan a complaint "for quieting of title with damages" against
the bank and the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, assailing the mortgage as being
null and void as they did not authorize the encumbrance of the property.
Issue
WON the RTC of Balayan had no jurisdiction over the petitioners complaint.
Ruling
Estoppel bars the bank from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the
Balayan RTC. The Balayan RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting of
title. The present case is an exception to the rule that lack of jurisdiction on the
subject matter can be raised at any time and is not lost by estoppel by laches. To
compel petitioners to re-file and relitigate their claims before the Nasugbu RTC when
the parties had already been given the opportunity to present their respective
evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC which had, in fact, decided
petitioners complaint (for about two years) would be an exercise in futility and
would unjustly burden petitioners.
The Court, in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, held that as a general rule, if
there is a judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank, all claims against the bank should

be filed in the liquidation proceeding. The Court in Valenzuela, however, after

considering the circumstances attendant to the case, held that the general rule
should not be applied if to order the aggrieved party to refile or relitigate its case
before the litigation court would be "an exercise in futility." In the present case, the
Court finds that analogous considerations exist to warrant the application of
Valenzuela. Petitioner Restituto was 78 years old at the time the petition was filed in
this Court, and his co-petitioner-wife Erlinda died during the pendency of the case.
And, except for co-petitioner Corazon, Restituto is a resident of Ozamis City. To
compel him to appear and relitigate the case in the liquidation court-Nasugbu RTC
when the issues to be raised before it are the same as those already exhaustively
passed upon and decided by the Balayan RTC would be superfluous.
-0TEOFISTO OO, PRECY O. NAMBATAC, VICTORIA O. MANUGAS and POLOR
O. CONSOLACION, Petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE N. LIM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154270

March 9, 2010

BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts
Vicente Lim filed a petition for the reconstitution of the owners duplicate
copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), alleging that said OCT had been lost during
World War II by his mother, Luisa and that the lot covered by said OCT had been
sold to Luisa by Spouses Oo. This, however, was opposed by Zosimo Oo and
Teofisto Oo contending that they had the certificate of title in their possession as
the successors-in-interest of Spouses Oo. They further claimed that Spouses Oo
never sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa. Lim, on the other hand, converted the petition for
reconstitution into a complaint for quieting of title, averring additionally that he and
his predecessor-in-interest had been in actual possession of the property since
1937, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its fruits, and paying the taxes
corresponding to it. He prayed that the Oos be ordered to surrender the
reconstituted owners duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), and that said
OCT be cancelled and a new certificate of title be issued in the name of Luisa in lieu
of said OCT.
Issue
1. Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through an
ordinary civil action to quiet title;
2. Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by prescription,
laches, or adverse possession.
Ruling

The action was neither a direct nor a collateral attack on OCT No. RO-9969(O-20449), for Lim was asserting only that the existing title registered in the name
of the petitioners predecessors had become inoperative due to the conveyance in
favor of Lims mother, and resultantly should be cancelled. The action only sought
the removal of a cloud from Lims title, and the confirmation of Lims ownership
over the disputed property as the successor-in-interest of Luisa.
Prescription was not relevant to the determination of the dispute herein,
considering that Lim did not base his right of ownership on an adverse possession
over a certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had been
voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to Luisa, his
predecessor-in-interest. Lim showed that his mother had derived a just title to the
property by virtue of sale and that in view of the delivery of the property, coupled
with Luisas actual occupation of it, all that remained to be done was the issuance of
a new transfer certificate of title in her name.
-0DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by SECRETARY HERNANI
A. BRAGANZA, Petitioner,
vs.
PABLO BERENGUER, BELINDA BERENGUER, CARLO BERENGUER, ROSARIO
BERENGUER-LANDERS, and REMEDIOS BERENGUER-LINTAG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 154094

March 9, 2010

BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts
The respondents were the registered owners of several residential and
industrial lands located in Barangay Bibincahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. They filed in
the office of DAR Regional their application for exclusion of their landholdings from
CARP coverage. The respondents claimed that the lands were originally devoted to
pasture and livestock raising, and later being already classified as residential and
industrial lands; that as early as 1981, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
had classified their landholdings as residential and industrial lands. The DAR
Secretary, however, cancelled their titles and issued certificates of land ownership
awards, covering their landholdings, to the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Development Cooperative.
Issue
WON the DAR Secretary had jurisdiction over the respondents landholdings,
which were outside the coverage of the CARL.
Ruling

The DAR Administrative Order No. 9, s. 1993 required that properties should
be considered excluded from the coverage of the CARL only if it was established
that there existed the minimum ratio of one head of cattle to one hectare of land,
and one head of cattle to 1.7815 hectares of infrastructure. Having found only 15
cattle within the 58 hectares land during the semestral survey did not automatically
mean that the landholdings were not devoted to the raising of livestock. Several
reasons including pestilence, cattle rustling, or sale of the cattle may explain the
insufficiency. Also, in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform:
xxx it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock
and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian
reform program of the Government.
More importantly, the DAR failed to establish that the landholdings were
agricultural. Resolution No. 5 by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
showed that the limits of the poblacion area of the municipality included Barangay
Bibincahan, where the respondents landholdings were situated. Thereby, the
respondents landholdings were presumed to be industrial and residential lands.
In Hilario v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court said: A lot inside the poblacion
should be presumed residential, or commercial, or non-agricultural unless there is a
clearly preponderant evidence to show that it is agricultural. There is no dispute
that as early as 1981, the respondents landholdings have been part of the
poblacion of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. In fact, the excerpt from the Comprehensive
Development Plan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon showed that Barangay Bibincahan was
within the Central Business District of the municipality.
-0FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner,
vs.
The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 142549

March 9, 2010

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The property involved in this case is covered by OCT No. 994, which
encompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate. On May 3, 1965, petitioner and
some individuals, claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal,
and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of
land located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon,
Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for partition and accounting of
the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly
registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
The court granted the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs.
However, the Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to
comply with the RTC Order based on the indorsements issued by the DOJ and the

LRA for it was found that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the
Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919) pursuant to
Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429.
Issue
WON the LRA may refuse to issue the decree of registration, even though
ordered by the court.
Ruling
In Laburada v. Land Registration Authority: That the LRA hesitates in issuing a
decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or
nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of
land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby
destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
The issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely
ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to the double titling
of the same parcel of land. The Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by
mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer
certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to
question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. There was
sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given
the finding that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her coplaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist. The same was
reiterated in the 2007 and 2009 Manotok case.
-0SPOUSES FERNANDO TORRES and IRMA TORRES, Petitioners,
vs.
AMPARO MEDINA and the EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF of the RTC of Quezon
City, Respondents.
G.R. No. 166730

March 10, 2010

PERALTA, J.:
Facts
On July 28, 1994, Amparo Medina applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage of the property of spouses Fernando and Irma Torres which was covered
by TCT RT-61056 (354973) and which is subject of a Deed of Mortgage dated
December 20, 1993. On June 30, 1997, the Sheriff sold at public auction the subject
property to Medina being the highest bidder thereof. A Certificate of Sale was
thereafter issued. On September 21, 1999, the Spouses Torres filed a Complaint for

the declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage conducted by

the Ex-Officio Sheriff.
Issue
WON res judicata lies in the complaint.
Ruling
Res judicata bars the filing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38781. As borne from the
records of the case, the Spouses Torres first instituted Civil Case No. Q-94-18962,
which, among others, prayed for the nullity of the real estate mortgage. The validity
of the real estate mortgage can no longer be attacked, more so because the
decision in Civil Case No. Q-94-18962 has become final and Entry of Judgment has
already been entered in the books. As succinctly put in FELS Energy, Inc. v.
Province of Batangas, res judicata, as a ground for dismissal, is based on two
grounds, namely: 1.public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation --- republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the
hardship on the individual of being vexed twice for the same cause --- nemo debet
bis vexari et eadem causa. A conflicting doctrine would subject the public peace and
quiet to the will and dereliction of individuals and prefer the regalement of the
litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility
and happiness.
Moreso, the Spouses Torres only filed their complaint in Civil Case No. Q-9938781 after more than two years had already lapsed from the time the ex-officio
sheriff sold the property in question at public auction. The foreclosure proceeding
was an action in rem, and therefore, the Spouses Torres cannot feign knowledge
thereof. More importantly, Spouses Torres were not completely left without any
remedy as they still had the right of redemption, which expired one year from and
after the date of the registration of the Certificate of Sale. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, this Court must assume that no attempt to redeem the
property was undertaken by the Spouses Torres and that they simply allowed their
right and remedy to lapse by their inaction.
-0G.R. No. 183612
POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
GOLDEN HORIZON REALTY CORPORATION, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 184260

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
GOLDEN HORIZON REALTY CORPORATION, Respondent.
March 15, 2010
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The National Development Corporation (NDC) entered into a Contract of
Lease with Golden Horizon Realty Corporation (GHRC). GHRC as lessee was granted
the "option to purchase the area leased, the price to be negotiated and determined
at the time the option to purchase is exercised." However, the GHRCs right of first
refusal under the lease contract was violated by the sale of the property to PUP
without NDC having first offered to sell the same to GHRC despite the latters
request for the renewal of the lease and/or to purchase the leased premises prior to
the expiration of the second lease contract.
Issue
WON the reconveyance of the leased portion of petitioner NDCs property is
proper.
Ruling
Not even the avowed public welfare or the constitutional priority accorded to
education, invoked by petitioner PUP in the Firestone case, would serve as license to
destroy the sanctity of binding obligations. While education may be prioritized for
legislative and budgetary purposes, it is doubtful if such importance can be used to
confiscate private property such as the right of first refusal granted to a lessee of
petitioner NDC. Clearly, no reversible error was committed in sustaining
respondents contractual right of first refusal and ordering the reconveyance of the
leased portion of petitioner NDCs property in its favor.
When a lease contract contains a right of first refusal, the lessor has the legal
duty to the lessee not to sell the leased property to anyone at any price until after
the lessor has made an offer to sell the property to the lessee and the lessee has
failed to accept it. Only after the lessee has failed to exercise his right of first
priority could the lessor sell the property to other buyers under the same terms and
conditions offered to the lessee, or under terms and conditions more favorable to
the lessor.
-0TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and MARTHA S. DAVID, Respondents.
G.R. No. 169548

March 15, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts
The spouses Manuel A. David, Sr. and Martha S. David acquired a 602 square
meter lot which was registered in the name of "MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Manuel A. David" and covered by TCT No. 156043. In 1976, the
spouses separated de facto. Martha, however, sold the property to Titan
Construction Corporation where a TCT was issued in favor of Titan. Thus Manuel
filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Recovenyance against Titan
alleging that the sale executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his
knowledge and consent, and therefore void. He prayed that the property be
reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be issued in their names.
Issue
WON there is sufficient ground to reconvey the property to spouses David.
Ruling
In the absence of Manuels consent, the Deed of Sale is void. Since the
property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to Titan
required the consent of both spouses. Article 124 of the Family Code requires that
any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent
of the other spouse; otherwise, such disposition is void.
In consonance with the Courts ruling in Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel was
not required to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership.
Rather, the presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear. Here, the Titan failed to overturn the presumption that
the property, purchased during the spouses marriage, was part of the conjugal
partnership.
-0LYDIA L. ROA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SANTIAGO EBORA: JOSEFA EBORA PACARDO, PACITA EBORA
PACARDO, BARTOLOME EBORA, RAYMUNDA EBORA, BERNARDINO DEJULO
EBORA, MERCEDES EBORA PABUSLAN, ALEJANDRO EBORA, SABINA EBORA
GALASINO and POLICARPIO EBORA, WILSON GAW (CHIN CHIONG), SAMUEL
SONNIE LIM, ALFONSO GOKING, ELEAZAR ED. ESPINO, D'ORO LAND REALTY
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
CONSTANCIO S. MANZANO, PRESCO C. KWONG and ORO CAM
ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 161137
CORONA, J.:

March 15, 2010

Facts

During the pendency of the case against Chacon Enterprises, the heirs of Ebora sold the
entire lot covered by OCT No. P-47, which was mistakenly included by Chacon
Enterprises in its application for original registration, to their co-heir Josefa Ebora
Pacardo and her husband Rosalio. On the same day, spouses Pacardo assigned the
property to Digno Roa, married to Lydia Roa. The corresponding deeds of absolute
sale and assignment were inscribed on OCT No. P-47. Thereafter, TCT No. T-24488,
which was annotated in OCT P-47, was issued in the name of Digno Roa.
Subsequently, the heirs of Ebora, including Josefa recognized the conveyance of Lot
18026-A to Josefa and eventually to Digno Roa.
On September 29, 1983, the case was resolved against Chacon Enterprises
and in favor of the heirs of Ebora. By reason of this decision, TCT No. T-48097 was
issued in the name of the heirs of Ebora. Without Roas knowledge and consent, the
heirs of Ebora again adjudicated Lot 18026-A among themselves which was
inscribed in TCT No. T-48097. Other forms of encumbrances were likewise inscribed
in the same TCT and the lots were thereafter sold to various respondents which
resulted in the issuance of the following new TCTs in the names of the respective
vendees. Therefore, Roa filed a petition for annulment and cancellation of TCT No.
48097 and its derivative titles against respondents but the RTC declared
respondents as innocent purchasers for value whose titles to their respective lots
should be respected, and ordered the cancellation of petitioners title, TCT No. T24488.
Issue
WON the transferees of the heirs of Ebora acquired better right of ownership
than that of the transferors.
Ruling
Respondents are innocent purchasers for value. Nonetheless, without
undermining the reason behind this doctrine (of protecting innocent purchasers for
value), the petitioner is entitled to the property following Sanchez v. Quinio. As in
Sanchez, petitioners title was validly issued and had been undisturbed for 10 years
before the title of the Ebora heirs was issued. Petitioner never relinquished her title
to respondents or to anybody else. She therefore possessed a superior right over
those of respondents, notwithstanding the fact that respondents were innocent
purchasers for value. Moreover, the heirs of Ebora sold and conveyed their rights to
and interests in Lot 18026-A to the spouses Pacardo who assigned the property to
the husband of petitioner as early as June 3, 1977. From then on, the heirs of Ebora
lost all their rights and interest over the property. Indeed, the heirs of Ebora even
confirmed the sale to Josefa and the assignment and waiver of rights in favor of
petitioners husband in an instrument dated January 31, 1983.
Thus, the heirs of Ebora had nothing to adjudicate among themselves.
Neither did they have anything to transfer to the vendees or successors-in-interest.

As such, the transferees of the heirs of Ebora acquired no better right than that of
the transferors. The spring cannot rise higher than its source.
-0HONORIO BERNARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF EUSEBIO VILLEGAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183357

March 15, 2010

PEREZ, J.:
A complaint for accion publiciana was filed by the Heirs of Eusebio Villegas
against Honorio Bernardo, Romeo Gaza and Monina Francisco. Respondents had
earlier filed an ejectment case against the three which case was dismissed.
The trial court held that the suit, being an accion publiciana, falls within its
jurisdiction. The trial court noted that petitioner failed to present any title or tax
declaration to prove ownership or possessory right. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. In his appeal, petitioner questioned the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and argued that in their
complaint, the respondents failed to state the assessed value of the property in
dispute. The appellate court ruled that petitioner is estopped from raising the issue
of jurisdiction because he failed to file a motion to dismiss on such ground and,
instead, actively participated in the proceedings before the trial court.
Issue
Whether or not estoppel bars petitioner from raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction.
Ruling
Under the law as modified, jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of
the property.
A reading of the complaint shows that respondents failed to state the
assessed value of the disputed land. Although appellant indeed raised the issue of
jurisdiction in his answer, he had not filed a motion to dismiss on this ground nor
reiterated the matter thereafter but actively participated in the proceedings.
Indeed, appellant is now estopped to question the trial courts jurisdiction over the
subject matter and nature of the case having actively pursued throughout the trial,
by filing various pleadings and presenting all relevant documentary and testimonial
evidence. Estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a case before
challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court.
The MTC dismissed the ejectment case upon its ruling that the case is for
accion publiciana. It did not assert jurisdiction over the case even if it could have

done so based on the assessed value of the property subject of the accion
publiciana. And there was no showing, indeed, not even an allegation, that the MTC
was not aware of its jurisdictional authority over an accion publiciana involving
property in the amount stated in the law. Moreover, petitioner did not bring up the
issue of jurisdictional amount that would have led the MTC to proceed with the trial
of the case. Petitioner obviously considered the dismissal to be in his favor. When,
as a result of such dismissal, respondents brought the case as accion publiciana
before the RTC, petitioner never brought up the issue of jurisdictional amount. What
petitioner mentioned in his Answer before the RTC was the generally phrased
allegation that "the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the nature of the action in the above-entitled case." This general assertion, which
lacks any basis, is not sufficient. Clearly, petitioner failed to point out the omission
of the assessed value in the complaint.
-0G.R. No. 169900
MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO GOZON, WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL
REALTY, INC., and ELVIRA GOZON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 169977
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, ALFREDO GOZON, and WINIFRED GOZON,
Respondents.
March 18, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
A parcel of land covered by TCT No. 5357 was registered in the name of
"Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Gozon." On 23 December 1991, Elvira filed a
petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. After a month, Elvira filed
a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357. While the legal
separation case was still pending, Alfredo and Mario Siochi entered into an
Agreement to Buy and Sell, which was annotated on TCT 5357, involving the
property. Mario then took possession of the property.
After granting the decree of legal separation, Alfredo executed a Deed of
Donation over the property in favor of their daughter, Winifred Gozon. The Register
of Deeds of Malabon, cancelled TCT No. 5357 and issued TCT No. M-10508 in the
name of Winifred, without annotating the Agreement and the notice of lis pendens
on TCT No. M-10508. On 26 October 1994, Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of

Attorney executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to Inter-Dimensional

Realty, Inc. Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of Malabon cancelled TCT No. M10508 and issued TCT No. M-10976 to IDRI. Mario then filed a complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and Sale, with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
Issue
WON Mario has a better right over the subject land.
Ruling
This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. In this case,
Alfredo was the sole administrator of the property because Elvira, with whom
Alfredo was separated in fact, was unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo still
cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the
court. Without such consent or authority, the sale is void. Thus, the Agreement is
entirely void for it was entered without the written consent of Elvira.
With regard to IDRI, IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. IDRI had actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious
person to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the property. Besides,
had IDRI been more prudent before buying the property, it would have discovered
that Alfredos donation of the property to Winifred was without the consent of Elvira.
Under Article 125 of the Family Code, a conjugal property cannot be donated by one
spouse without the consent of the other spouse. Clearly, IDRI was not a buyer in
good faith.
Under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the notice of lis pendens
may be cancelled (a) upon order of the court, or (b) by the Register of Deeds upon
verified petition of the party who caused the registration of the lis pendens. In this
case, the lis pendens was cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon the request of
Alfredo. There was no court order for the cancellation of the lis pendens. Neither did
Elvira, the party who caused the registration of the lis pendens, file a verified
petition for its cancellation.
-0SPOUSES MELCHOR and SATURNINA ALDE, Petitioners,
vs.
RONALD B. BERNAL, OLYMPIA B. BERNAL, JUANITO B. BERNAL, and MYRNA
D. BERNAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 169336
CARPIO, J.:
Facts

March 18, 2010

In 1957, Adriano Bernal, father of Ronald, Olympia, Juanito and Myrna had in
his possession a property which was later surveyed and designated as Cadastral Lot
No. 1123, Cad 1119-D, Case 8 in 1992. In 1994, Adriano secured a loan from
Melchor and Saturnina Alde and turned over physical possession, occupation and
cultivation of 3 hectares of the property to Spouses Alde. Then Adriano had later
sold the property to Spouses Aldo.
On 18 October 1994, OCT No. AO-7236 was issued in the names of the
Bernals. OCT No. AO-7236 originated from CLOA No. 00073938 issued by the
Department of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657. Then, in April
2002, respondents demanded from petitioners P50,000 as additional consideration
for the property. Respondents also informed petitioners, for the first time, of the
existence of OCT No. AO-7236. Petitioners rejected respondents request since they
already bought the entire property in 1994 and requested that respondents should
turn-over to them OCT No. AO-7236.
Issue
WON the respondents can claim ownership over the disputed portions of the
property.
Ruling
The respondents claim ownership of the property based on OCT No. AO-7236.
However, a certificate of title is not equivalent to title. In Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of
Appeals: By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document
[the Original Certificate of Title or the Transfer Certificate of Title]. Petitioner
apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle
of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best
proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of
title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or
that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired
interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration
is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept
of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeable.
In this case, respondents cannot claim ownership over the disputed portions
of the property absent any showing of how they acquired title over the same.
Accordingly, the property must be reconveyed in favor of petitioners. An
action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful
owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of
another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to
him. However, since petitioners did not make a direct attack on the validity of OCT
No. AO-7236 and had not asked for the cancellation of the original certificate of title

as required by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, this Court cannot cancel
OCT No. AO-7236 and order the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of
petitioners. Any direct attack on the validity of a Torrens certificate of title must be
instituted with the proper Regional Trial Court. This case originated in the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court. Even if the Court will consider petitioners counter-claim as a
petition for the cancellation of OCT No. AO-7236 and, thus, a direct attack on the
certificate of title, the MCTC still does not have jurisdiction over the cancellation of a
Torrens title.