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Employee
Relations
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486
Received September 2001
Revised January 2002
Accepted January 2002

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Norwegian workforce
involvement in safety offshore
Regulatory framework and participants'
perspectives
Susan M. Hart

Memorial University of Newfoundland, St John's, Newfoundland, Canada

Keywords Offshore arrangements, Oil industry, Regulations, Safety, Norway, Employees
Abstract Highlights Norwegian regulatory framework with its employee participation tradition.
Posits a response of the UK government was the introduction of new offshore regulations with a
required need for safety meetings and elected safety representatives. Recognizes, in Canada, that
moving into the production phase of the offshore oil industry triggered a renewed interest in
offshore safety. Concludes Norway's amended offshore oil and gas regulations of 1998 placed
heavy emphasis on workers' input to enable all the changes to take place in a correct manner.

The benefits of workforce involvement in the offshore oil industry regarding

communication, motivation and operational efficiency are recognized in the oil
and gas industry (Burnett and Tait, 1996; Forest and Reisz; 1994; Ling, 1995;
Royle, 1985), and, more recently, for safety as well (Bryden and Gibson, 2000;
Solomon, 2000). The industry's interest in workforce involvement in safety was
increased significantly after Lord Cullen (1990) noted its advantages in his
investigative report of the 1988 Piper Alpha offshore oil platform disaster in the
North Sea. He also highlighted the Norwegian regulatory framework with its
tradition of employee participation. The UK government's response was to
introduce new offshore regulations requiring safety meetings and the election
of safety representatives.
In Canada, the move into the production phase in the offshore oil industry
triggered a renewed interest in offshore safety. Vigilance in this area was
understandable, due to the Ocean Ranger disaster in 1982 when a semisubmersible drilling rig capsized and sunk off the Newfoundland coast, with
the loss of 84 lives. The Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Labour
(1997) called for a Norwegian-style emphasis on workforce involvement in
safety and health, advocating regulatory reform for the provision of similar
rights and powers. Not surprisingly, the Federation of Labour also highlighted
the empowerment of Norwegian safety representatives due to their
unionisation, quoting Lord Cullen in this regard:
I am prepared to accept that the appointment of offshore safety representatives by trade
unions could be of some benefit in making the work of safety representative and safety
committees effective, mainly through the credibility and resistance to pressures which trade
union backing would provide (Cullen, 1990, Vol. 2, p. 376).
Employee Relations,
Vol. 24 No. 5, 2002, pp. 486-499.
# MCB UP Limited, 0142-5455
DOI 10.1108/01425450210443267

In 2000, during an international conference on health, safety and the

environment in the petroleum industry, an offshore union speaker reiterated

the need for unionised worker involvement through representation on joint

health and safety committees (Green, 2000). The Offshore Industry Liaison
Committee (OILC) made the same argument plus a call for improved regulatory
rights similar to those in Norway, to ensure management recognition of the
impact of a high stress workplace on safety and health (Stephenson and
Malloy, 2000). OILC's campaign to increase the power of offshore safety
representatives has gained particular relevance since the industry introduced
their ``Step Change'' safety programme in 1997. While cautiously
acknowledging that workers can sometimes use the new emphasis on
workforce involvement to improve safety, for OILC the initiative is undermined
in an era of cost-cutting and without job security in a largely non-unionised
workplace (see OILC, 1998; 2000a,b,c).
A similar strand of criticism, to be remedied by regulatory reform based on
the Norwegian approach, exists in the academic literature (Hart, 2000a;
Woolfson et al., 1996, 1998, 2000). Woolfson et al. (1996) noted that when the
onshore safety regulations were extended offshore in 1989, the whole workforce
were to elect their representatives, a process advocated by the industry as more
democratic than their union appointment onshore. Whereas this legal
framework adversely affected industrial relations in the British offshore sector,
in the Norwegian case, offshore regulations consolidated the role of unions in
the safety regime (Ryggvik, 1998). However, as the European Union legislation
now stipulates all employees and not just unions should be consulted over
health and safety matters, the UK regulations will likely remain unchanged
(Woolfson et al., 1996).
There is also a management-focused perspective in the academic field
(O'Dea and Flinn, 2000; Mearns and Thom, 2000), which advises a ``top down
process on safety'' (Mearns and Thom, 2000, p. 5). Leadership and senior
management commitment are emphasised, although workforce involvement is
seen as an important indicator of senior management competence in developing
a positive safety culture. A slightly more critical perspective emerged in a
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) study by Spaven et al. (1993) of the
effectiveness of the British offshore safety representation regulations. Despite a
widespread structural framework for representation, problems were identified
concerning an unwillingness of workers to stand for election; tension over the
role of representatives, between the representational and monitoring function
and between operator and contractor management; limited use of HSE and
union resources; insufficient power and training; and inadequate response to
issues raised, especially from onshore management.
There is, then, a clear practitioner and academic interest in offshore
workforce involvement in safety, and, in many cases, its implementation in
Norway. The Norwegian model is unique in an international context. The
regulations require an unusually high level of worker involvement, achieved
through the use of safety delegates and committees. Moreover, unions are
thoroughly integrated into the safety regime, reflecting the emphasis on
tripartite decision making in Norwegian public policy. Although there is some

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coverage of Norwegian worker involvement in the context of regulatory reform

(Cooper, 1997; Hart, 2000a; Ryggvik, 1998, 2000; Woolfson and Beck, 2000;
Woolfson et al., 1996, 1998), the aim of this paper is to explore the views of the
participants involved in Norway's offshore safety regime.
This focus on representatives is featured in previous onshore safety studies
(Walters and Gourlay, 1990; Kirby, 1998), but, apart from union material,
offshore coverage is limited to the HSE study in the UK (Spaven et al., 1993),
and is not prominent in existing work on the Norwegian regime (at least, in the
English language). Ryggvik's research (1998, 2000) is crucial in understanding
the historical, legal, economic, social and political framework of the regime and
this paper is seen as complementing his work. It also fits alongside a paper by
Atkinson (2000), a senior safety delegate on the Frigg offshore oil and gas field,
whose experience with worker involvement offshore was clearly positive:
. . . the active involvement of the workforce . . . has benefited both the operator and the
employees in such areas such as safety related matters, flexibility of operations and personnel
and cost reduction (p. 1).

Methodology
Given the focus on participants' voices and the need to probe further than the
formal framework to understand the process in practice, a qualitative
methodology was selected. Selection of the Statfjord field was made on the basis
of access; it is extremely difficult to travel offshore for research purposes. In this
respect, the author would like to acknowledge the assistance of the Federation of
Offshore Oil Workers Union (OFS) and their full-time representative at Statoil,
who had worked on Statfjord B for 12 years, been a senior safety delegate
during his employment there, and who accompanied me offshore.
Information was collected during a four day stay on the Statfjord A and B
offshore oil and gas platforms operated by Statoil in the Norwegian sector of
the North Sea, and while onshore in Stavanger during June 2000. Some of the
background material was gathered while visiting Oslo, Stavanger and Bergen
in 1999. Research interviews were conducted with safety delegates,
management and union representatives on the working environment
committees, full-time union safety representatives for Statfjord, as well as
union staff specialists. To aid in understanding how Norwegian worker
involvement operated in practice, participants were asked which factors they
felt facilitated and/or hindered the effectiveness of the working environment
process. Two representatives of the government regulatory body, the
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) were also interviewed, one of whom
was its expert on working environment committees. Finally, documents from
Statoil, unions, and the NPD were analysed.
The paper continues with an overview of the Norwegian regulatory
framework for worker involvement in offshore safety and health, a short piece
on Statoil and the working environment structure on the Statfjord platforms,
before moving on to the participants' views on its effectiveness. After a brief
consideration of the regulator's perspective, the paper ends with a discussion

and conclusion section which identifies two major themes arising from the
research: the questioning of union influence and the adverse impact of
organisational change.
Worker involvement in the Norwegian working environment
legislation
In Norway, the requirements for worker involvement in health and safety are
enshrined in the Working Environment Act, 1977 (NPD, 1999) and related
regulations for Safety Delegates and Working Environment Committees
(Directorate of Labour Inspection, 1977). The Working Environment Act
(WEA) lists three objectives:
(1) To secure a working environment which affords the employees a full
safety against harmful and physical and mental influences and which
has safety, occupational health and welfare standards that are concurrent
with the technological and social development of society at any time.
(2) To secure sound employment conditions and a meaningful work
situation for the individual employee.
(3) To provide a basis whereby the enterprises themselves can solve their
working environment problems in cooperation with the organizations of
employers and employees and with control and guidance from public
authorities (NPD, 1999, Section 1, p. 7).
According to the WEA, any organization with more than ten employees must
have safety delegates for each department and shift, with a senior safety
delegate to coordinate their activities. A safety delegate's rights include
consultation over the planning and implementation of safety programs,
information at all times, attendance at labour inspections, and the power to stop
dangerous work without any liability for losses suffered as a result (NPD,
1999). This power to stop production in the high cost context of oil and gas
production injects real meaning into the concept of worker involvement.
The WEA also requires that workplaces with over 50 employees establish
working environment committees with equal employer and employee
representation and the inclusion of (non-voting) safety and health personnel.
Those with between 20 and 50 employees must have a committee if either of the
parties request one, and any senior safety delegates must sit on it. According to
WEA regulations, the committee has decision-making powers as well as being
advisory, and it:
. . . [shall] participate in preparing programmes for safety and environment work . . . inspect
the enterprise to chart and evaluate the need for safety and environmental measures . . . give
advice concerning the priority ranking of the enterprise's plans . . . and may propose new
measures (NPD, 1999, p. 10).

It also has the power to force the employer's compliance to the WEA and the
right of access to any labour inspection and police inquiry documents.

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The thrust of this legal framework is comprehensive worker involvement.

For example, in the offshore working environment regulations, the purpose of
joint ``local working environment committees'' on each installation is not only to
``ensure co-ordination of the protection and environment efforts within the
individual enterprises'' but also to ``provide all employees, irrespective of the
individual employment conditions, with a real opportunity to take part in and
exercise influence on the protection and environment work at each person's
own workplace'' (NPD, 1997, Section 11). This requirement takes account of the
complexity of employment relations arising from the increasing number of
contractors offshore as well as the operating company, which has overall
responsibility for the field. Furthermore, the latest offshore working
environment regulations (NPD, 1998) strengthen the role of safety delegates
and working environment committees, adding an extra tier of committee to coordinate at the oil and gas field level (Section 28). In a section entitled
``Employee participation'', these new regulations state:
It shall be ensured that the employees and their elected representatives are given the
opportunity of participation in matters of importance to the working environment of the
enterprise (NPD, 1998, Section 25 [Regulations]).

The guidelines make it clear that:

Employee participation is required in all phases of the activities, i.e. design, fabrication,
installation, operation, modification and removal of installations. Employee participation
means that the employees and their elected representatives shall be given a real possibility to
exercise influence on the working environment of the enterprise. This includes both safety
delegates and trade union representatives. (NPD, 1998, Section 25 [Guidelines])

And they elaborate as follows:

In practice such participation is ensured through the partaking in processes of submitting
comments when proposals etc. are circulated, and in decision-making processes, as well as
through exchange of information. The employees should be given opportunity to take part in
the definition of working environment objectives and requirements and in the
implementation of evaluations, analyses and charting activities with relevance to the working
environment of the employees. Furthermore, the employees and their elected representatives
should have opportunities to participate in the shaping of methods, procedures and
instructions which will be of significance to their own work situation. They should be given
opportunity to participate in development work which is relevant to the arrangement and
organization of the work of the enterprise (NPD, 1998, Section 25 [Guidelines]).

Worker representation as defined in the regulations means both safety

delegates and trade union representatives. In fact, unions have the right to elect
safety delegates. If there is more than one union, then the union representing
the majority of workers appoints the delegate, or the unions who together
represent the majority will jointly appoint the delegate (Directorate of Labour
Inspection, 1997; Government and Labour, 1995).
Statoil and the Statfjord field
Statoil, although established in 1972 as a 100 percent government-owned
company, was partially privatized during 2001. Operating revenues for the

company in 1999 totalled NOK 140 billion (24.7 billion Canadian dollars), its net
profit for the year was NOK 3.4 billion (0.6 billion Canadian dollars), and at
December 31 1999 the company had just over 17,000 employees. It is a leading
player on the Norwegian Continental shelf, with nine producing fields on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf and substantial oil and gas reserves in other
countries (Annual Report and Accounts, Statoil, 1999). Strategically, the
company:
. . . is now implementing a number of measures to become more competitive . . . Major
restructuring involves divesting roughly 20 percent of Statoil's assets. Cost reductions
totaling NOK 4 billion on an annual basis are being pursued from 1998 to 2001 . . . An
international effort will be maintained.

The Statfjord field has been in production for over 20 years, and the company
noted that: `` . . . this field has been by far the most important source of revenues
for Statoil over many years (Annual Report and Accounts, Statoil, 1999, Inside
cover).
The safety delegate system on the Statfjord platforms (A, B and C) follows
the line management structure, so each department, for example, logistics
(lifting, supplies etc.), has three safety delegates (VOs), one for each shift. There
are three senior safety delegates (HVOs), one for each shift. Safety delegate
meetings are held every shift, led by a senior safety delegate, and the platform
manager attends all of these. The safety delegates raise concerns relevant for
that particular shift and any other issues they think should be referred to the
next level of structure, which is the working environment committee at each of
the three platforms in the Statfjord field (called AU meetings). These AU
meetings are held once a month. Normally, a senior safety delegate from one
shift attends, as well as union and management representatives and safety and
health personnel.
Any issues that cannot be resolved at the platform level are referred to the
onshore coordinating working environment committees for Statoil's Statfjord
field, which meet four times a year. There are two of these onshore coordinating
committees. One of them is made up of Statoil representatives only (called SAMU) from the three platforms; the other includes contractor companies'
representatives from all three platforms (called K-AMU). The senior safety
delegates from each platform sit on these onshore, field-level, coordinating
committees. Chairs of the S-AMU and K-AMU committees alternate yearly
between a senior safety delegate and the vice president of the Statfjord field;
sometimes, the K-AMU committee will have a management representative of
one of the contractor companies as chair.
Turning to union representation on the platforms, there are two industrial
unions which compete for largely the same workers, and a small number of
specialized unions. The Norwegian Oil and Petrochemical Workers Union
(NOPEF), affiliated with LO, the mainstream umbrella organization, is now the
largest union presence on Statfjord, with an overall membership in the industry
of 17,000 in catering, drilling and oil service, supply terminals and service,
operations and maintenance, administration and marketing and miscellaneous

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other groups (NOPEF, 1999). The OFS, affiliated to a smaller, non-political

federation, called YS, currently represents a total of 4,700 workers in operating,
drilling, catering, well testing and service, construction and maintenance, and
shipping companies (OFS, undated). The other, smaller unions on Statfjord are
the Lederne, representing the supervisors and technicians; NIF, which
represents the civil engineers; and NITO, which represents the other engineers.
Participants' perspectives: working environment committee
members and safety delegates on the Statjford platforms
The production manager sitting on the K-AMU coordinating committee for the
Statfjord field listed the following as facilitators of effective working
environment committees: the importance of highly qualified safety delegates;
managers educated in working environment rights and duties; the will on the
part of both union and management representatives to solve issues at the
platform level; and sufficient time given to safety delegates for safety work.
The labour relations manager on the committee also thought training of all
members to be important and that issues should be solved at platform level, but
pointed as well to the need for early involvement of the committee in company
developments, adequate time allowed for members to prepare for meetings, and
rules in order for the process to work properly.
While the labour relations manager focused on internal barriers to
effectiveness, such as a lack of rules regarding process and attitudinal
problems, for example, lack of trust, the production manager began the
interview by discussing what he called ``lots of organizational change''
throughout Statoil, but especially on the Statfjord field. He remarked: ``. . . there
is less oil and everybody is feeling the pressure''.
The production manager also referred to potential conflict due to the
overlapping structures of the union and the working environment system,
causing complexity and bureaucratic delay. He wanted separation of the safety
delegate and union representative functions. Asked for his concluding
comments, he did say, however, that on the whole management enjoyed ``very
good communication'' with unions and safety delegates in the field, which
would stand them in good stead with all the changes coming up.
Having asked the same opening question as to what makes the safety
delegate and working environment committee system work effectively and
what prevents it from being effective, it is instructive to note the different
perspective of the safety delegates and full-time union specialists interviewed,
compared with management. In essence, they felt that although the regulatory
rights of safety delegates and working environment committees were very
good and still did protect workers' safety and health to a degree, the current
effectiveness of the system was in question.
To elaborate on this view, what follows is based on a group interview
conducted in the coffee-break/lunch room of the maintenance crew on the
Statfjord A platform. The primary respondents were a senior safety delegate
and member of the Statfjord field level working environment committee

(K-AMU), who was also the deputy leader of a union affiliated to the
mainstream umbrella labour organization (LO); and two safety delegates, both
shop stewards. After the introductions, the senior safety delegate moved
straight away to highlight what he saw as the biggest problem undermining
the effectiveness of the working environment committee system: new forms of
work organization recently introduced in the Statfjord field. It is worth noting
that the workers present apparently agreed with this man's comments
throughout the interview, with different people joining in when they thought
their thoughts were relevant or useful.
In his view, the negative impact of organisational change, largely driven by
cost cutting, could not be resolved through the working environment
committee system. This was because the factors at work were outside the
committee's control, being larger ``social, political and economic trends'' which
drove Statoil in a particular strategic direction, namely, a push for more
efficiency and competitiveness in the context of pressures at the board level to
privatize the government-owned company. In this connection, one of the safety
delegates remarked:
These are global influences. The company doesn't want to spend money on old installations.
They want to build new ones in other [cheaper] parts of the world . . .

The safety delegates gave examples of where they thought that a crucial safety
problem, raised in the safety delegate meetings and working environment
committees, had been rejected by Statoil as impossible to change, and there was
very little anybody could do about it. One problem identified was that: ``they
had lost the fight to keep Polycrown'' (a ``flotel'' moored alongside Statfjord A,
connected by a gangway). Even though platform management had agreed to
keep the accommodation unit, the decision had been reversed at a higher level
in Statoil. It was pointed out that platform A was the oldest platform, with a
broadly similar lay out as the doomed Piper Alpha, the UK rig which had
exploded in a fire-ball in 1988. Despite this, it was equipped only with the oldstyle davit-launched boats instead of the free-fall lifeboats required by
regulations in newer platforms. Statoil was modifying platform A by adding an
accommodation module, a move safety delegates said was not satisfactory
from a safety perspective, in spite of some changes in the location of the
production process to contain a possible fire or explosion. Although Polycrown
was due to be sold and removed in October 2000, the safety delegates remarked
that they had managed to delay this outcome for five years.
The other safety problem raised was the most talked about and was
elaborated upon considerably by the two safety delegates present, with
endorsement by the senior safety delegate. It concerned the cutting of the
original maintenance crew and the introduction of a mobile crew, which moved
between all three platforms. All platforms differed slightly in age and design,
and it was now difficult for maintenance workers to identify with and develop
specialized knowledge about any one platform. Moreover, the few permanent
workers left on any one platform, in the absence of the mobile crew, were

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unable to properly carry out any regular maintenance. For example, the oldest
platform, Statfjord A, needed a considerable amount of maintenance on the
flow lines and it was impossible for the one fixed worker left on the platform to
do this work adequately, causing stress for that individual in addition to
potential safety hazards. The safety delegates had taken up the problem in the
committees but were unable to change the new pattern of work.
They also stated that the maintenance budget had been reduced, and jobs
were left standing for too long. And they were now expected to do the planning
and purchasing of the materials for the job, as maintenance supervisor jobs had
been cut. Overall, then, the safety delegates reported increasing pressures along
with a higher safety risk.
Turning to the full-time union specialists in safety and health, both with
previous experience as senior safety delegates, they also identified new forms
of work organization as the biggest barrier to effective working environment
committees. One, a union leader in the drilling contractor company Smedvig,
outlined the problem as:
Less people doing more jobs . . . The push to be more efficient . . . You can introduce more
automated equipment, but you can't just cut people, because of the need for both routine and
breakdown maintenance.

The safety delegates had apparently raised this issue at working environment
committees and subsequently with the NPD, but had not had any success so far
because of the drive to cut costs. The other union specialist elaborated:
New organizations . . . so small so few people [who] don't have any time . . . in the push for
low manning. New flat organizations with a very small hierarchy . . . they've taken out first
the line leaders . . . Or merged positions, such as the job recently changed to a ``working
environment coordinator'', who used to be nurse. Now this is a double function two jobs in
one and nurses are not independent as they were before.

Elaborating on his comment that: ``working environment committees play their

part, a little bit, but [they] are not very successful'', one union leader spoke of
other safety problems not addressed despite the safety delegate and the
working environment committee system. In this connection, he quoted the NPD
as being ``afraid of a major accident'' resulting from cost cutting and lower
manning levels. In fact, an article in the NPD's quarterly publication had
expressed concerns about the increased risk of accidents due to cost cutting
and downsizing, especially where it affected ongoing maintenance on the older
installations (Hagland, 1999). The union representatives referred to a recent
incident, where 60 percent of the deluge system in a production area on a
Statfjord platform was discovered as dysfunctional during a routine
maintenance inspection, constituting a major risk of explosion in case of a fire.
One specialist spoke of continuing problems with the (drilling) mud processing
area, even though it had been raised in the committees:
Since day one it has been a problem . . . a small area [with] fumes, noise, damp, chemicals and
poor air quality . . . it took two years to get a sink in . . . Also, although there is a new lowtoxic oil base . . . when you mix the mud with other chemicals, we don't know what chemicals

are given off. When we pump it down in the hole it is under pressure and at a high
temperature when it comes back, we just don't know how dangerous the gas is. This is a
potential danger on both fixed and mobile rigs.

The cement mixing room, another small working area, was hot and noisy as
well as having high levels of vibration. The safety delegates had recommended
a redesign so that the worker would not be sitting directly on top of the cementmaking unit, a suggestion talked about but not acted upon: ``On paper, there is a
plan, but the money is not there yet . . . ''. At this point, a union executive
member in the room remarked: ``[The safety delegate system] works better on
paper than it does in real life. It is mainly to do with money.''
The union experts commented that if the top level managers in Statoil
understood the problems they could save money ``at the other end'', that is,
reducing the levels of sickness from stress, joint problems and chronic fatigue:
Those who started, we now see what they have gone through. Now we know what the cost
has been . . . offshore work is very hard and older co-workers lose their health certificates . . .
Maybe people cannot get old on this job . . . they are not able to retire.

As we would expect, both respondents pointed out how important it was to have
union-appointed safety delegates, in direct contrast with the management view:
First of all, you have to have a strong trade union behind you. You have to know the
regulations very well. We are very well regulated in this country, but you have to have the
guts to use it, with the trade unions in the background to keep the pressure on.
Weaker trade unions mean weaker safety delegates.

However, they saw the rivalry between the five unions at Statoil as an important
barrier to the effectiveness of the working environment committees, a problem
that had been evident ever since the original union on Statfjord, the OFS, had
split into a number of unions. A central point of tension was the different political
positions of two of the offshore unions, one affiliated with the mainstream
umbrella organization, LO, which has close connections with the government
Labour Party, and the other with an independent, and more radical, umbrella
organization, YS. Recently, this tension had increased due to their opposite
positions regarding the advisability of union appointed safety delegates: OFS
strongly advocates an integrated model and NOPEF accepts the separation of
safety delegate and union representative role, as recommended by management.
Views of union staff specialists, beyond the workplace level, were consistent
with those of Statoil's representatives, highlighting the adverse impact on
safety of cost cutting and new patterns of work in general. NOPEF and OFS
staff experts argued that safety was being compromised to cut costs, and gave
two examples: a helicopter crash in 1997, with the loss of 12 lives, caused, they
argued, by Statoil removing a ``flotel'', leading to the daily shuttling of workers
and impossible pressures on the maintenance and coordination systems; and a
badly below-standard semi-submersible rig which was allowed to operate in
Norwegian waters for a number of months before regulatory enforcement
eventually took place. OFS, in particular, was worried about the weakening of
union control over safety due to increased contractual employment and the

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resulting change in patterns of work. Moving to the national level, the LO's
representative on the tripartite ministerial board responsible for implementing
NORSOK, the Norwegian equivalent of CRINE (the UK oil industry's campaign
to reduce costs), remarked during an interview that if staff are reduced: ``safety
becomes much more important'', explaining that workforce involvement is
crucial to ensure there were no unanticipated hazards. He saw new technology
and work organization as big challenges for labour, but stressed the
advantages of Norway's collaborative model of decision making in finding
solutions.
The regulators' perspective
Significantly, NPD officials interviewed raised concerns similar to those of
Statoil's safety representatives. In general, they were concerned at the
reduction in the number of safety supervisors and the new team structures in
the industry, which made it difficult to gain a maintenance overview because
there was no specific coordinating mechanism. As in other oil companies,
Statoil was introducing new forms of work organization along with new
information systems. However, new systems designed for modern installations
(for example Statoil's new floating production vessel, Asgarde A) needed
modification when introducing them to older, more traditionally designed
installations such as the Statfjord platforms, which are fixed to the seabed. In
fact, the NPD had issued orders to Statoil to ensure ``consequence analyses''
were conducted with adequate worker involvement, which they decided was
insufficient initially. Subsequently, NPD's working environment specialist was
seconded to Statoil, and both officials acknowledged the company's later efforts
to address the working environment ramifications of organizational change at
the strategic level.
The working environment expert referred to the growing tension in the
industry between those, mostly in management and the mainstream offshore
union, NOPEF, who believed that the safety delegate function should be
separated from the union representative role, versus those, mostly in the
independent union, OFS, who saw the integration of the two roles as essential
for effective worker involvement. He pointed to the complications caused by the
difference between the operating assumption of consensus in the working
environment process and conflict of interests in union representation.
Nevertheless, he saw the integration of roles as essential in ensuring as powerful
a channel of influence as possible for the individual offshore oil worker.
Discussion and conclusion
Two main themes emerge from this research. One is on the role of trade unions,
and is reminiscent of an earlier UK debate over the extension of onshore
regulations to the offshore. In response to management opinion, there is a
division at Statoil between the largest, mainstream offshore union and its
smaller, more militant rival, about the advisability of trade union officials
working as safety delegates. This increasing tension adds to union rivalry

already present offshore and undermines worker involvement. It could well be

that a single union at the Frigg platform facilitated the positive worker
involvement and cooperative labour relations and safety climate, described by
Atkinson (2000). Nevertheless, according to the regulator's expert, the integrated
model is potentially the more powerful channel of worker involvement. This
position is consistent with research from other countries comparing unionized
with non-unionized workplaces (Reilly et al., 1993; Ontario Advisory Council on
Occupational Health and Safety, 1986), research on the effectiveness of safety
representatives onshore (Kirby, 1998; Walters and Gourlay, 1990) and is implicit
in the HSE report authored by Spaven et al. (1993).
It remains to be seen whether the strong role trade unions have played in
offshore safety continues in the face of increasing pressure for separate
working environment and trade union structures. Given the traditional
tripartite system of decision making in Norway, the questioning of the
legitimacy of unions' integration into the offshore safety regime revealed in this
research is of significant interest. It may well be a symptom of a general
weakening of Norwegian unions' economic and political power offshore
(Ryggvik, 1998), together with their marginalisation by highly quantitative and
technical safety management systems (Bonde, 1994) and by an increasing trend
towards contractual employment (Hart, 2000b).
The second theme focuses on new patterns of work. Although the Statfjord
field is aging, it is still in the production phase. Statoil has introduced a new,
smaller, flatter and flexible organisation structure to cut costs and increase its
competitiveness, in order to position itself for privatization and growth. The effect
of this new strategic direction on maintenance, and in turn, safety, on the aging
platforms emerged as a serious concern for the safety delegates and working
environment committee members. For the worker representatives interviewed at
Statfjord, this issue virtually overshadowed any other consideration. They
believed that their influence in the workplace was undermined to such a degree
that it would be reasonable for us to question the model of worker involvement
conceptualised in the Norwegian regulatory framework.
Platform management interviewed also identified organisational change as
a challenge, although they did not report any major concerns about safety per
se. However, both NPD representatives pointed to the possibility of safety
ramifications being marginalised by oil companies in their enthusiasm to
introduce new forms of work organization alongside new information systems
in their drive towards efficiency. They specifically mentioned the difficulties
they had identified with Statoil's organisational change initiative.
As the LO representative remarked during his interview, the challenge of
new forms of work organization is not only a Norwegian issue. Woolfson et al.
(1996, 1998) have pointed to its potential problems in the UK offshore. It is also
a prominent theme in the TUC's survey of onshore safety representatives
(Kirby, 1998), which concluded that cost cutting and associated new forms of
work organization have led to increased stress at work, and a general failure to
consult representatives as required by the regulations.

Norwegian
workforce
involvement
497

Employee
Relations
24,5
498

In conclusion, the Norwegian amendments to the offshore oil and gas

regulations in 1998 place a heavy emphasis on worker involvement in all the
changes taking place in the offshore industry, and this may well dove-tail with
what the NPD sees as an erosion in employee participation due to industrial
restructuring and the tendency for strategic decisions increasingly to be made in
countries far away from Norway. As one NPD official remarked: ``the tradition
of labour involvement is challenged by the new merger processes''. In any event,
there is still a progressive regulatory framework in Norway, and a further study,
preferably including other platforms, will be of interest to ascertain to what
degree these high standards of worker involvement are being met in practice in
the offshore as the pace of competition and organizational change increases.
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