SUBJECT: TOPIC:

Date Made:
Digest Maker:
Torts
Quasi-delict defined
August 26, 2016
Dan Delfin
CASE NAME: Mendoza vs. Arrieta
PONENTE: J. Melencio-Herrera
Case Date: June 29, 1979
Summary:
A truck hit a jeep, which swerved forward and hit a Mercedes Benz. In the criminal case, the truck
driver was found guilty of negligence, and the jeepney owner/driver was absolved of liability. The
owner of the Mercedes, sought to recover damages from the driver/owner of the jeepney and the
owner of the truck. Hence, he filed civil actions against the two. However, these were dismissed by
RTC saying that while it is true than an independent civil action for liability could be prosecuted
independently of the criminal, ROC requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made.
Otherwise, one is barred from instituting such. SC disagreed. As to the question of w hether or not the
civil action to recover damages should prosper, SC said YES for the truck owner and NO for the
jeepney owner/driver. The action against the truck owner is based on quasi-delict, and therefore is not
barred by the decision in the criminal case. Meanwhile, the action against the jeepney owner/driver
was based on civil liability ex delictu. Therefore, the decision in the criminal case had already
extinguished such liability.
Detailed Facts:
Vehicles/People involved:
1. Edgardo Mendoza Mercedes Benz
2. Rodolfo Salazar Private jeep
3. Felino Timbol Gravel and Sand truck (Driver: Freddie Montoya)
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On Oct. 22, 1969, a three-way vehicular accident occurred along McArthur Highway, Bulacan.
It involved a Mercedes Benz driven by petitioner, Mendoza, a jeep driven by respondent,
Salazar and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent, Timbol, driven by Montoya.
As a result, two separate Informations for reckless imprudence causing damage to property
were filed against Salazar and Montoya (driver) with the CFI of Bulacan. (Criminal Actions)
At the joint trial, petitioner testified that Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved
and hit his car. He further testified that before impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and
that he was not aware that said jeep was bumped from behind by Montoyas truck.
Petitioners version was adopted by Montoya. On the other hand, Salazar claimed that after
overtaking the truck, he flashed a signal indicating intention to turn left but was stopped at the
intersection by a policeman directing traffic. He said that while the jeep was on a stop, it was
bumped by Montoyas truck causing him to be thrown out of the jeep which then swerved and
hit petitioners car.
CFI: Montoya was guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence and was to
indemnify Salazar for P972.50. Salazar was acquitted, in view of findings that the collision of
Salazars jeep and petitioners car was the result of Montoyas having hit the jeep from behind.
After termination of the criminal case, petitioner filed a civil case against jeep-owner/ driver
Salazar and truck owner, Timbol for recovery for damages.
Timbol filed a Motion to Dismiss the civil case claiming that such was barred by prior judgment
in the criminal case.
CFI dismissed the complaint against Timbol as well as Salazars. The judge said that while it
is true than an independent civil action for liability under Art. 2177 of NCC could be
prosecuted independently of the criminal action, the Rules of Court requires an express
reservation of the civil action. Otherwise, one is barred from instituting such.
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Issue:
1. W/N the failure of petitioner to reserve his right to file a separate civil action constitutes a bar from
instituting said action NO
2. W/N the civil action to recover damages from truck owner Timbol and jeepney driver Salazar
should prosper YES against Timbol (truck owner), NO against Salazar (jeepney driver)
Holding:
1. No.
CFI wrongly invoked Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC:
Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only preponderance of evidence.
In Garcia vs. Florida, SC already ruled that this section was inoperative for being contrary to the spirit
of the specified articles. Also, the provision was only meant to be procedural but made an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law.
Justice Barredo also observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a
civil liability distinct from the civil action arising from negligence under the RPC, no reservation need
be made in the criminal case. Therefore, Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in
character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate.
2. YES, the Civil action for damages against truck owner Timbol should have prospered.
For a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur:
(1) it must be a final judgment;
(2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over subject matter and over parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter
and Identity of cause of action.
Though the first three requisites of res judicata are present, there is no identity of cause of action
between the Criminal Case and the Civil Case.
In the said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but
for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. More importantly, in the
criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal
negligence under Article l of the RPC, whereas the civil case is based on quasi-delict under Article
2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.
There is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (under RPC) and
responsibility for fault or negligence (under articles 1902 to 1910 of Civil Code). Further, the same
negligent act may produce either civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a
separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
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In this case, petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict
because it was established that the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep to petitioners car was caused
either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee.
As for the jeepney driver, Salazar, NO. The charge was correctly dismissed.
Inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party
has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa is deemed simultaneously instituted with
the criminal action, unless expressly waived/reserved for separate action by the offended party.
From the circumstances, it seemed that petitioner opted to base his cause of action against jeepney
driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by the criminal suit against
Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination.
Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil
action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the Criminal Case.
On the note, it is clear that under the facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held
liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. Salazar was acquitted from the criminal case,
and along with it was his civil liability arising therefrom. Inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action
against jeep driver Salazar is ex-delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil
action must be held to have been extinguished.
Ruling:
Case against Timbol is to proceed. The dismissal of the complaint against Salazar is upheld.

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