1.

1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of Russias foreign policy is determined
by its pretensions of being a superpower that influences the fate of the world. In the first half of the
90s, the difficult and volatile economic and political
situation in the country forced its leadership to limit its foreign policy to influencing the former Soviet
Union states. Russia wanted the Western powers to
give it special rights over the former Soviet Union
states, including the right of holding its peacekeeping military operations on their territories in order
to protect the Russian-speaking population. Without entering into an open conflict, the Group of Seven countries refused to support Russias proposals
on dividing the spheres of influence.
In the 90s, Russia was constantly interfering in the
internal affairs of neighboring countries. There is a
great number of documented examples illustrating
Russias policy in relation to its brothers from the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In 1992,
the relations between Russia and Ukraine escalated
in connection with the problem of dividing the Black
Sea Fleet and the question of the status of Crimea. Up
until the summer of 1994, Russia basically waged a
cold war against Ukraine. Relations between the two
countries somewhat improved after the election of
Ukrainian PresidentLeonid Kuchma. However, even
in 1997, Russia did not abandon its claims against

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Ukraine. The stubborn unwillingness of the Russian

side to demarcate (make clarifications on the map)
the border with Ukraine is a telling indication of
that. With the stabilization of the political situation, Russia resumed the struggle for leadership in
world affairs. Since the end of 1993, its position on
major international issues has been increasingly at
odds with the position of the US and NATO. From
1994 to 1996, Russia was the only major power
that supported the Great Serbian policy in the Balkans.
Russiasimperial ambitions raised concerns in Central and South-Eastern Europe. The Baltic states
saw a warranty against interferences in their internal affairs in joining NATO. Between 1995 and
the first half of 1997, Russian leaders unsuccessfully tried to prevent the expansion of NATO in the
East by threatening the West with the beginning of
a new large-scale cold war. Finally, in May 1997,
Russia signed an agreement with NATO, in which it
agreed with the joining of new members andwas
granted the right to participate in NATOs decision-making. NATO, in turn, pledged not to deploy
its nuclear weapons in the East.
In general, Russias foreign policy shows that when
there are less internal problems, it tends to increase the threat to its neighboring countries security.

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2.1 RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian
Federation declared itself the successor state of the
Soviet Union, and thus inherited a permanent seat
on the UN Security Council. American experts actively participated in the development of Russias economic reforms in order to help it make the transition
from a planned to a market economy. During the
transition period, the US has provided humanitarian
aid to Russia (operation Provide Hope). Relations
between Russia and the US improved, but not for
long.
During the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright to Russia in January 1999, she and Russian
Federation President Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed the
commitment of the U.S. and Russia to build bilateral
relations based on equality, respect and consideration of each others interests. It was emphasized
that the importance of constructive cooperation between Russia and the U.S. was a stabilizing factor in
international affairs. The two leaders spoke in favor
of further progressive development of multifaceted
relations between the two countries at all levels and
noted that any differences in approaching certain
issues must not obscure the fundamental strategic
goals of both Moscow and Washington. Albright confirmed the willingness of the U.S. administration to
support reforms in Russia.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic, social and political crisis in Russia, and the dramatic fall

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of its inter national influence and military-political poten tial led to the fact that the U.S.
became the only world leader. Many political experts believe that this period showed
the weakness of Russia, and as a result, its numerous concessions and failures of diplomacy.
These failures include: the uranium deal in 1993,
the Budapest Memorandum declared in 1994,
which did not prevent the expansion of NATO, and,
in particular, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act
on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security.
Russias weakness was also revealed in terminating
military alliances and reducing its activity in Eastern Europe and other regions and in a number of
trade agreements.
Russia expected that with the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact, NATO would also be dissolved sooner or later. However, the credibility of the popular
statement that Gorbachev was given solid guarantees of NATOs non-expansion, which were later
violated, are extremely doubtful. Gorbachev even
expressed the intention of the Soviet Union to join
NATO in order to undermine it from within. Furthermore, in December 1991, Yeltsin told U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that he hoped for the
future merger of the armed forces of the CIS and
NATO. However, in 1999, NATO accepted the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Hungary, and in 2004, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
and Bulgaria.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Image source: Newsweek

This fact and the U.S. operation with its allies
against Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq caused
confusion in Russia about building relations with
the United States. On the one hand, after the terrorist attack that took place on September 11, 2001
in the United States, Russia joined the anti-terrorist coalition led by the United States; on the other hand, on June 13, 2002, the United States denounced the 1972 ABM Treaty, justifying it with
the need to have protection against pariah states.
As noted by journalist Peter Baker, at the beginning
of his first presidential term, George W. Bush was
inclined to work with Vladimir Putin. Bush believed
that there was no real threat coming from Russia to
the United States. In 2001, an expert on Russia, Michael McFaul, advised Bush to lure Russia into a proAmerican camp, and Bush agreed, arguing that
someday

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

we all will have to deal with the Chinese.

In 2003, Russia, France and Germany actually led
the camp of countries opposed to theU.S. actions against Iraq. At the end of 2004,the relations
between Russia and the U.S.experienced an unprecedented cold snap related to the events in
Ukraine (the Orange Revolution).
According to political expert Edward Lausanne,
Putin started out with a very pro-Western policy.
Lausanne added that at first, Putin even hinted at
the possibility of joining NATO as well as abandoning Russias military bases in Cuba and Vietnam. After September 11, he suggested that the U.S. and
Russia should have closer military and political cooperation as well aswork on the development of
an anti-terrorist alliance. However, almost all of his
initiatives were rejected. This was followed by the
Munich Speech and other harsh statements.
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2.2 RESUMPTION OF CONFRONTATION

The main problematic issues between Moscow and
Washington include Russias help to Irans nuclear
program, energy security, the situation in Georgia,
Ukraine, and Palestine, and the U.S. deployment of
its missile defense systems in Europe. Many Russians believe that under the pretext of democracy,
the United States has been funding several Russian
non-governmental organizations and political parties, and in fact, wants to bring a crisis similar to
the Ukrainian oneinto Russia. On May 4, 2006, U.S.
Vice President Dick Cheney gave a speech in Vilnius, which now many call the VilniusSpeech, similar
to Winston Churchills Fulton Speech. According to
Cheney, the U.S. was not satisfied with Russias use
of its mineral resources as a foreign policy weapon
of pressure as well as violation of human rights and
the destructive actions of Russia in the international
arena. Russias refusal to cease its cooperation with

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Iran, Syria, North Korea, Belarus and other countries

raised concerns in the U.S. and led to a permanent
Russian-American conflict in the UN Security Council.
At the beginning of 2007, the conflict between the
United States and Russia raged with even greater
intensity due to U.S. intentions of deploying the elements of its missile defense systems in Poland and
the Czech Republic. According to the U.S. administration, this action was aimed at protecting Europe
from North Korean and Iranian missiles. The Russian leadership categorically rejected this explanation. On February 8, 2007, U.S. Defense Secretary
Robert Gates said that the United States should
be prepared for a possible armed conflict with Russia. In turn, at the Munich Security Conference on
February 10, 2007, Vladimir Putin sharply criticized
U.S. foreign policy.

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Image source: uci.edu

Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces General Solovtsov also said that if the elements of
the U.S. missile defense system were deployed
in Eastern Europe, Russia would denounce the
Intermediate-Range
Nuclear
Forces
Treaty.
On July 14, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin
signed a decree on the suspension by the Russian
Federation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe and related international agreements. Analysts believe that this decision was the
first step of the Russian leadership toward a radical
change in the military-political situation in Europe.
In an accompanying certificate of the document, it was
stated that the decision had been made due to the extraordinary circumstances, affecting the security of
the Russian Federation. These, in particular, include:

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1. The exceeding of the CFE Treaty limitations by

Eastern European states joining NATO as a result of
the alliances expansion;
2. NATO countries failure to comply with the political commitment adopted in 1999, which accelerated the ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty;
3. The refusal of the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, which had joined NATO,to participate in the CFE Treaty and, as a result, the appearance of weapons on the north-western border with
Russia, which were free from the restrictions on
the placement of conventional weapons, including
weapons of other countries;
4. The planned deployment of U.S. military bases
in Bulgaria and Romania.

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2.3 US INTELLIGENCE PREDICTS WORSENING

OF U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
The Director of National Intelligence(the unit
that brings together allU.S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA),retired Admiral Michael
McConnell, speaking at a hearing in the U.S.
Senate with a report on threats to U.S. national security, said the tightening of Russian leaderships policies would inevitably lead to an increased
antagonism between Moscow and Washington.
The report stated that, according toU.S. intelligence,
Russia had gotten back to its struggling towards de

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mocracy. This was evident in the increasing control

over society and political parties to the point that
the next leader of the country would be merely appointed. According to the report, Putin was facing
massive pressure from the countrys law enforcement officials, who accused the U.S. of humiliation that had befallen Russia in Washingtons attempt to slow down Moscows development. The
source of such pressure from law enforcement officials was the extremely high prices of energy resources.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Image source: New Republic

According to McConnell, the current state of the
Russian economy and politics strengthened Russias confidence in its abilities, and as a result increased defense spending and continues to pursue
foreign policy goals that are not always consistent
with the goals pursued by the Western countries.
He believed that such a course would be implementedthrough the 2008 presidential election in Russia
and would be accompanied by the strengthening
of authoritarian tendencies in its domestic politics.

ation of weapons of mass destruction, energy and

the development of democracy in the Middle East.

That allowed Michael McConnell to conclude about

the future intensification of rivalry and antagonism between the U.S. and Russia, especially on
the territory of the former Soviet Union states, as
well as the weakening of cooperation in such areas as the fight against terrorism, non-prolifer

Gates, speaking before the Senate Appropriations

Committee, reiterated that one of the reasons why
the United States should develop its armed forces
lies in Russias and Chinas modernization of their
armies.

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McConnells criticism coincided with other similar statements of senior U.S. political and military
leaders. Speaking at the same hearing in the U.S.
Senate, the director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Meyplz,
reported about Russias efforts to use outer space
for military purposes.

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2.4 RUSSIA AND GEORGIA

There was a new round of confrontation between
Russia and the United States beginning with the invasion of Georgian troops in South Ossetia in August
2008. Russian troops cleared the territory of the unrecognized republic from the Georgian army and for
several days kept bombing military facilities on the
Georgian territory, including Tbilisi, the capital of
Georgia. After that, Russia officially recognized South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, which had always been part
of Georgia, as independent states. The existence
of the NATO-Russia Council was then questioned.
Francis Fukuyama, one of the worlds most renowned
futurologists, noted that there is a possibility of
a renewal of the Cold War, which meanswe would
be dealing with a Russia that could not be trusted
and that at any moment could resort to military
force. The difference is only in the fact that, unlike
the Soviet Union, Russia is more integrated into the
global economy, and that is why its more vulnera

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ble. This fact imposes certain constraints on Russias actions which did not exist during the Cold War.
In July 2009, at the briefing dedicated to the policy
of the outgoing administration of George W. Bush,
his National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley,
speaking about U.S.-Russian relations formulated
by the results of the past few years, said: On Russia, President Bush has worked to shift Americas
relationship from the rivalries of the Cold War to
partnering with Russia in areas where we share
common interests -- while managing our differences in a frank, consistent, and transparent way.
Among the achievements, Hadley highlighted
U.S.-Russian cooperation in the field of nuclear
disarmament, non-proliferation of WMD in the
resolution of Iranian and North Korean issues, and
maintaining negotiations to achieve peace in the
Middle East.

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Image source: The Telegraph

There had been a preparation for the visit of U.S. President Barack Obama to Russia in
2012, but his meeting with Putin was canceled.
In 2013, the examples of differences between Russia
and the U.S.included the situation in Syria and North
Korea, missile defense, the condition of non-profit organizations in Russia, the Magnitsky Act and the aw
of Dima Yakovlev. On the night of May 13, 2013, the
Federal Security Service arrested CIA agent Ryan Fogle, who served as the third secretary of the political
department of the U.S. Embassy in Russia, during his
recruitment of one of Russias secret service agents.
Russias granting of asylum to Edward Snowden
was viewed as an open hostile action by a num

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ber of Americans. The special statement of the

White House on Obamas cancelled visit to Moscow in September 2013 noted the absence
of any progress during the past 12 months in
such issues as missile defense and arms control, trade and economic relations, issues of
global security, human rights and civil society.
In early March of 2014, with a sharp deterioration
of the relations between the two countries in connection with the so-called Crimean crisis, Secretary
of State John Kerry said during a televised interview that the reset thing was in the past. We
entered another phase of relations with Russia. It
was noted that relations between the U.S. and Russia had been at their worst since 1991.

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3.1 SOME ASPECTS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN

POLICY AFTER MARCH OF 2012.
On September 3, 2012, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published his own article in the newspaper
Izvestia, dedicated to the creation of the Common
Economic Space between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. This is the first program article of Putin as prime
minister and as a future president concerning foreign
affairs. It became a subject of the discussion about
the prospects of forming a new foreign policy of the
Kremlin as a result of Putins return to the presidency.
Putins decision to run for president triggered a wave
of discussions on the possible revision of Russian
foreign policy priorities. The article in Izvestia was
hailed as evidence of that. It was interesting for people to do a review of Russias foreign policy implemented during Dmitry Medvedevs presidency and
to evaluate possible changes to Russias main directions in connection with the future election of Putin.
Over the years of his presidency,Medvedev proved to
be quite active in matters of foreign policy. The main
and most productive direction was the new relationship with the U.S., the so-called reset, the main
success of which was the signing of the START Treaty.
The achievements of Medvedev also include the reduction of emotional negativity between the two
countries and his attempts to build new institutions
of interaction: the first negotiations on military-technical cooperation, the establishing of a bilateral presidential commission, and the existence of cooperation in modernization (Skolkovo office in Silicon
Valley). In addition, Russia was a close partner of the
U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan and gave the green

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light for the beginning of the NATO operation in

Libya. On Iran, one of the most sore subjects
for the U.S., Moscow went to meet Washington
halfway by freezing the delivery of S-300 missiles, supporting UN sanctions and noticeably distancing itself from the regime of Ahmadinejad.
This entire set of foreign relations was far from a consensus for the Russian elite. Putin negatively reacted to Russias position on Libya in the UN Security
Council (the discussion between Putin and Medvedev on this issue became one of the most striking evidences of the differences between the two leaders)
and advocated for a more cautious approach on Iran.
It must also be pointed out that in the summer of
2009,Putin spoke out against Russias early accession
to the WTO. The prime minister also almost never
commented or promoted Medvedevs European security project, not paying much attention to the establishment of an international financial center and
did not take over the functions of negotiating with
other countries of the partnership formodernization.
All that had grounds to say that the nature of Russias
foreign policy would change after the election of Putins presidency. It is important to highlight a few key
points. It could be assumed that in public relations,
the topic of post-Soviet integration would be actively promoted, while the issues of relations with the
West would merely becomea background. The limited capacity of the reset became clear after the
signing of an agreement on strategic offensive arms.

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11

It was not possible to come up with any new substantive agenda topics for cooperation, nor to find
common ground on missile defense, which had
been particularly irritating Moscow. Moreover,
the position of both Russian leaders here are relatively close. In July 2012, Kommersant newspaper, citing its own sources, wrote that according

to Medvedev, the talks on missile defense

had reached a deadend. Thus, the prospect
of an impending new conflict between Russia and the U.S. and the return of Putin to being the president of Russia, showed much
greater possibility for yet another cold peace.

Image source: Der Spiegel

Considering that the Western direction has always
been more difficult for Putinand that resources for
influence were far greater in the post-Soviet space,
it was not surprising that the goal was to focus on integration projects in the CIS countries. The Customs
Union had become one of the priorities of Putin, whose
government was actively engaged in its implementation. In addition, the prime minister took a much
12

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

tougher stance on Ukraine. As an example,

Medvedev tolerated the joint venture between
UkrainesNaftogaz and Russias Gazprom, while
Putin openly lobbied the absorption of the Russian gas monopoly from Ukrainian companies.
However, during the presidency of Medvedev, Russia
began a sharp contradiction with Belarus, which had
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experienced an oil war in late 2010. Medvedev was

always much distant when speaking about the CIS. In
general, his policy toward the post-Soviet space was
low-key, if not to mention, of course,such key events
in Medvedevs foreign policy such as the war in Georgia in August 2008 and the consequent recognition
of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Putin, preparing to return to the presidency, was
betting on the Eurasian integration project. He
stood up for the CIS, calling it a source of new integration organizations such as the EEA, the CSTO,
and the Union of Russia and Belarus. The Russian
Prime Minister would present the project of the
Eurasian Union, which was the starting point for
the EEA birth, as the beginning of building a new
pole of global power, which would be based on the
integration mechanisms of the European Union.
It took Europe 40 years to go from the European
Coal and Steel Community to a fully developed European Union. The formation of the Customs Union
and the Common Economic Space is much more dynamic, as it considers the experience of the EU and
other regional organizations, Putin said in the article.
However, Putins project looks more populist today:
the creation of supranational bodies, and particularly
a single emission center for a single currency, seems
impossible at this moment, while the contradictions
between potential participants in such a union seems
too deep. Moreover, unlike the EU, Russias claims on
non-formal domination, which would be inevitablyformalized, deter many post-Soviet countries, and
the project is seen as Moscows attempt to expand
its influence beyond its borders.
The situation with Ukraine is even more difficult. In
2012, the Ukrainian issue became one of the most
acute in Russias foreign policy and was concentrated
on Moscows attempts to force Kyiv to make a choice

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between the EU and Russia, drawing Ukraine into

the Customs Union.Putins article showed that
such attempts would become more active.
The important point is the fact that during the
election campaign in Ukraine in 2010, Putin sympathized with YuliaTymoshenko, while Medvedev
more effectively interacted with former Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovych (these candidates
were completely opposite to each other). Putin assured that the choice between the EU and the Eurasian Union was false, and in fact, the integration
into the Eurasian Union would allow its members
to quickly integrate into the EU.
I think this is a false fork. Were not going to build
a wall and counter anyone. Eurasian Union will be
based on universal principles of integration as an
integral part of the Great Europe united by the values of freedom, democracy and market laws, Putin wrote. The potential conflict with Ukraine could
only grow amid the above-mentioned difficulties.
For Asian regimes, Putin offered a guarantee of political stability and
military intervention in case of revolutions from
the botto mup. CSTO unitswould play the main role
in such a case. However, not many believed in the
capacity of the CSTO, particularly after its inaction
against the revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Putin said he
expected Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to connect to
the integration into the Eurasian Union.
However, the sources of Kommersant in the Foreign Ministry of Kazakhstan explained that Astana
had not been eager to see Kyrgyzstan among the
Customs Union, and hence, the Eurasian Union.
Kazakhstan had already spent a lot of money for
the resettlement of the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border, but
after the entry of Bishkek into the Customs Union,
the borders of the union would have to be revised,

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13

and it was unlikely that anyone would compensate

the costs incurred by Astana.
During Putins regime, the competition and opposition between Western and Eastern countries has
once again been aggravated, despite the fact that
before he was elected, Putin had been avoiding the
anti-Western rhetoric. However, it has been known
that his surroundings and the entire conservative
elite as well as security forces tend to be more anti-Western. Against this background, it became evident that the first vice-speaker of the Federation
Council, Alexander Torshin, as he himself admit

14

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

ted, after reading Putins article, decided to initiate

the creation of the Eurasian Court of Human Rights.
He was one of the authors of the bill on the right to
check the Russian Constitutional Courts decision
about the Strasbourg court for compliance with
the Russian Basic Law.
Putins article in Izvestia was primarily addressed
to the internal audience, which was nostalgic for
the days of the Soviet Union. However, at the same
time, the article was seen as a striking confirmation of concerns about possible changes in foreign
policy in connection with the change of president
in March 2012.

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3.2 LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND THE

FUTURE OF RUSSIAN-U.S. RELATIONS
The topic about the Ukrainian-Russian conflict
dominated the discussions of international affairs
at the Faculty of International Relations during the
XXIV seminar at St. Petersburg State University
Russia comes closer to China because of despair
The official theme of the seminar was 70 years
after the war: lessons of the past and future of
the Russian-American relations. The discussions
tone was given by the topics of the roundtables:
U.S.-Russian relations: conflict and the possibility of a compromise, Regional aspects of the Russian-American rivalry and Russia and the United States in the modern world order. However,
it doesnt matter what aspect of international policy was discussed; all Russian and U.S. as well as
Chinese experts, who joined them later, put the
events in Ukraine into the center of the discussion.
Associate Professor of American Studies of the Faculty of International Relations of St. Petersburg State
University Ivan Tsvetkov, who holds a Ph.D. in historical sciences, said that the relations between the U.S.
and Russia had never been warm and had been characterized by predictability before Kyivs Euromaidan.
It was a systemic attitude, he said in a conversation
with a correspondent for Voice of America. That
was, at the very least, Russian partial recognition
of the U.S. world leadership. We criticized them,
pointed at the facts that we did not like, but agreed
that there was a system of rules that comes from
Washington and determines international relations.

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Now, judging by Putins statements, in particu lar

in the film Crimea: The Way Back Home, Russia has
decided to end the system of international relations
and does not take anyones opinion into account:
not from Washington, nor London or any other major capital of the West. This statement, by the way,
is not reflected on our expert community, but still it
is a very important statement, said Ivan Tsvetkov.
At the same time, according to experts, Russia is
now in solitude. It is not that such an approach is
not supported by the Americans, but even the quasi-allies of Russia like China, India and Brazil are also
not willing to exit the current system of international relations, which is led by the U.S. And it turns out
that after the events in Ukraine, Russia is not challenging the U.S., but rather the established system.
However, the Russias appeal to other countries to
escape from this system has not been responded by
anyone, because, unfortunately, Russia has nothing
to offer in return, except for the claims that it is a
great power and is able to act as a leader, said Ivan
Tsvetkov, Associate Professor of American Studies.
Commenting on the so-called Eastern turn of Russian foreign policy, the expert notes that the bias
towards Southeastern Asia, and in particular China,
is not a manifestation of a deliberate strategy of the
Russian leadership, but rather a forced step. This
is happening because of despair. As of today, China
is the only full-fledged counterweight to the United
States. And if we quarrel with the United States, we
will inevitably fall into the arms of China and begin
living by their rules, he said to Voice of America.

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15

Image source: CNN

The best way is to promote the expansion of NATO
Aprofessor at Cornell College in Mount Vernon,
Iowa, Robert Givens, was present among other U.S.
participants. He said that among his students, there
are a lot of descendants of Russian immigrants, but
he can recognize them only by their names. They
are well adapted, and position themselves as American citizens of Russian origin, Professor Givens said.

This is not surprising because in order to understand the roots of any inter-state conflict, it is necessary to know the history, cultural characteristics
of both sides, to get acquainted with the documents, and it is very desirable to do it in the original language. Therefore, I cannot tell whether the
current interest to Russia is friendly, or vice versa,
negative. Rather, it is a research, Professor of Cornell College said.

In general, according to the American expert, due to the Ukrainian crisis, there has
been a significant increase in the interest of
the U.S.scientific community toward Russia.

As to Russian interference in Ukrainian affairs, according to Givens, For the United States, this conflict plays the most important role in its internal
political debates. Especially with the presidential

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RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

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election campaign around the corner. Of course, our

administration has always stressed how important the
Ukrainian issue is. But I think that, after all, for Russia,
these events are far more important than for us, he said.

A correspondent for Voice of America asked the

deputy director of the Institute of the U.S. and Canada Studies, Valery Garbuzov, to comment on this
survey.

He added that, according to his observations, the Russian government is currently not seeking to increase
its zones of influence in the neighboring country.

I think that the current mood in Russian society

is reflected truly, Garbuzov said. And this is due
to the events of the past year in Ukraine, Russias
policy towards Ukraine, the rhetoric of the Russian
authorities as well as all the media, and above all
Russias television. This rhetoric contains a negative
assessment of the Western position, and especially
the United States position. It is very clear that it is
reflected in the Russian mass consciousness that
is not capable to critically process the information
offered to them, Garbuzov pointed out.

Because the larger the part of Ukraine controlled

by the Russian Federation, the more the rest of the
country aspires to join the West, first and foremost NATO. Russia has repeatedly stated that it is against
the NATO expansion, but there is no better way to
contribute to this process than to conquer new areas of Ukraine, Givens stated. He concludes that
the current situation is in the best of interests to the
Kremlin.
Allied relations will cease to exist
On the opening day of the XXIV Russian-American
seminar, the results of the survey by the Levada Center were published. According to sociologists, 59% of
respondents believe that Russia has a reason to fear
the United States, while over the past eight years,
the proportion of those who look at the U.S. with
fear has risen from 47%.
The Russians interviewed by the Levada Center consider that the main threat from Washington is the
possibility of preventing the development of their
country. Such respondents have accumulated to
48%.
Forty percent of the respondents believe that the
U.S. wants to establish control over the Russian economy, 36% believe it wantsto impose its foreign ideas
and values, and 31% see the possibility of a military
invasion of the U.S.Army with the occupation of the
country following.

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The expert added that, to his knowledge, a similar

survey on the attitude to Russia was conducted in
the United States, in which it turned out that almost the same number of Americans negatively
viewed Russia, its foreign policy and Vladimir Putin.
So we can talk about the mirrored data of sociology in our country and in the United States, he said.
And he adds that now everything will depend on
how the Minsk Agreement is adhered to in eastern
Ukraine and on the progress of the upcoming election campaign in the United States. I think that
some progress will take place as the U.S. Congress is
surprisingly unanimous when it comes to Ukraines
matters. And the unanimity between Democrats
and Republicans is a very rare thing in recent
years, ValeryGarbuzov said and added, Now, in
the U.S., a lot depends not only on the president,
but also on Congress, and both are anti-Russian.
According to the expert, at the end of his second
term, President Barack Obama may demonstrate a
gesture of goodwill against Russia to go down in history as the leader of peace. But there is a big doubt

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whether this trend will be picked up by the new master

of the White House, Valery Garbuzov emphasizes.
And he concludes that, in his opinion, the period
of friendly relations between Russia and the United States, similar to those that existed during the
Second World War, will not happen again. However, that will not interfere with their cooperation
on issues in which the positions of Moscow and
Washington are the same, or more or less close.

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In almost every speech during the seminar, there

was hope that the next seminar will bring more
positive conclusions than this one. However, we
cannot be sure if this will happen, and if the XXV
Russian-American seminar will be held at St. Petersburg State University, all this will depend on
the resolution of the crisis in eastern Ukraine.

(C) VALUEWALK 2015

3.3 PUTIN, THE U.S. AND UKRAINE: PUTIN HINTED

THAT IF THE U.S. SUPPLIES MORE WEAPONS TO
UKRAINE, THE WAR WOULD ESCALATE
Putin hinted that if the United States supplies weapons to Ukraine, the offensive of the Russian troops
and the pro-Russian rebels would be inevitable.
He stated this at a press conference in Budapest:

According to our information, the US has already

supplied weapons to the territory of Ukraine. I
am deeply convinced that whoever and whatever weapons will supply, the number of victims, of
course, may be increased, but the result will be the
same as today.

Image source: mil.gov.ua

(C) VALUEWALK 2015

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4.1 TODAY
U.S.-Russia Diplomacy: Ukraine is important, but not
more important than Iran
The assistant secretary of state for European and
Eurasian Affairs at the United States Department of
State, Victoria Nuland, said to dig deeper for the
full implementation of all aspects of the Minsk Agreement and urged Ukraine, Russia and international
mediators to resolve the eastern Ukrainian conflict.
Nuland said in Moscow that the U.S. could support
the implementation of the Minsk Agreement. And
it looks like the other participants in the process
dont have anything against it. The United States
did not participate in the negotiations in Minsk in
September 2014 and February 2015 in the Norman format (Germany - France - Ukraine - Russia).
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, anticipating his talks with Nuland, shared his vision on
the role of the United States.He said that the focus should be on how Washington is influencing
Kyiv to not allow disruption in power scenarios and seeks to start a political process through
direct dialogue with Donetsk and Lugansk.

Nulands visit to Moscow and the recent meeting betweenU.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
and Vladimir Putin as well as the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrovwas viewed by observers as
the resumption of the dialogue between the
United States and Russia, which stopped after the Ukrainian crisis and has led to the most
dramatic aggravation of the relations between
Moscow and Washington since the Cold War.
The day before her visit to Russia, it had become known about the capture by Ukrainian
armed forces of the two Russians, who are believed by the authorities of Ukraine to be the
Russian military men. We welcome the Ukraine
governments public statements that they are
being well taken care of and that the International Committee of the Red Cross... will be allowed access to them, Nuland said in Moscow.
Nuland also said that there was no intention
in Kyiv to resume hostilities in eastern Ukraine

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