Arvin Alaigh

Kants Categorical Imperative and its Implications for Duty

One of Kants most prominent contributions to the discipline of philosophy comes
in the form of the categorical imperative. Kant viewed this rule as an objective rule on
how we ought to treat morality. Crucial to the derivation of morality, and thus the
categorical imperative, lies rationality. Kant maintains a deontological approach to
morality, meaning that it is focused on rules, as well as duty. He holds that moral value
ought to be ascribed to actions themselves, rather than the events that follow. Events are
often arbitrary followings of a multitude of actors and factors interacting; it would be
problematic to hold agents responsible in the face of such chaos. Thus, the only way we
can truly realise responsibility is by examining the intentions of actors, as this is
something that can be objectively and uniformly considered. In this paper, I will first
examine the role of duty, before embarking on a discussion regarding moral worth.
In one of his most prominent works, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,
Kant outlines what exactly constitutes morally good people those who act from duty.
His universal imperative of duty, also known as the Categorical Imperative is defined as
the following: Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a
universal law of nature. The Categorical Imperative is known as the supreme principle of
morality, and serves as a test to know what actions are permissive. Prior to making a
decision, Kant believes that individuals ought to try and imagine their action(s)
universalized as laws of nature; if the action in not in line with rationally determined
moral conceptions, that action is wrong and an agent should abstain from performing it,
and the Categorical Imperative can help illustrate this. He distinguishes two separate
kinds of duty: perfect and imperfect duties. Individuals must act in accord with perfect
duties, as they are in line with traditional conceptions of morality. For example, when
interacting with individuals, it is a perfect duty to not lie and always tell the truth.
Primarily, it is wrong in that it goes against the rationally determined conception of
morality. If the maxim of lying was universalized, the notions of lying and truth could not
possibly exist; as a result, the maxim cannot be upheld. It is important to emphasize that
individuals must act in accordance with perfect duties, primarily of due to the
requirements of morality; however, checking for logical contradictions that arise when a
maxim is universalized may serve as an effective test to know what actions are
permissive.
Kant also categorizes some duties as imperfect, and similar to perfect duties,
imperfect ones are based on rational conceptions of morality. Though imperfect duties
still remain objective in a technical sense, there exists much more discretion on exactly
how one can discharge them. One of Kants examples of imperfect duty concerns the duty
of helping others. He imagines a world in which every individual lived for him/herself,
and did not bother interfering in anybody elses affairs. A certain individual sees others
struggling, yet does not help them, thinking, What does it matter to me? This universe
contains solely self-interested agents, not willing to hurt or harm others under any
circumstances. Though it is possible to universalize this maxim to create such a world, it

would not be in any way desirable, nor would it be in accord with acting according to
rational conceptions of morality. Man will inevitably need anothers help, and living
solely for oneself is not morally ideal. For these reasons, helping others is an imperfect
duty. As exemplified, imperfect duties differ considerably from perfect duties. Their
flexibility denotes that they are wide, while perfect duties are narrow. This indicates that
imperfect duties are less precise and demanding in their function than perfect ones.
Another difference comes in the respective purposes of the duties perfect duties are
negative, as they restrict agents, dictating what they should not do, while imperfect duties
are positive, in that they actively prescribe actions for agents to commit. For example,
perfect duty commands that agents ought not lie or steal, while imperfect duty maintains
that they should cultivate talents and help others.
Kant further distinguishes acts done in opposition to duty, in accordance with
duty, and from duty. There has been some controversy in regards to his notion of acts
done in accordance with duty. In Grounding, he presents an example of the following: a
shopkeeper decides he ought not overcharge his customers. The shopkeepers reasoning
is selfish. If he overcharges his customers, then they will not return to the store. If he
acted from duty, the shopkeeper would not overcharge his customers, on the grounds that
it is the morally incorrect thing to do. Though the end result is the same, i.e., no customer
is being overcharged, it is attributed to a different reason. Thus, the shopkeeper is acting
in accordance with duty, but his actions are not of the same moral worth as they would be
had acted from duty. In his paper, Kants Good Will and Our Good Nature, Tom Sorrell
cites some difficulties in accepting Kants definition of moral worth. It appears that Kant
owes nothing, in terms of moral worth, to benevolent feelings, to an amiable
temperament, or even what is good in human nature.1 Kants example of the shopkeeper
involves an obvious difference between acting in accordance with duty and acting from
duty. The shopkeepers selfish motives are clearly not of the same, or greater, moral
worth as someone who, against his inclination, acts morally because it is his duty to do
so. But let us assume an example in which the shopkeeper is not overcharging out of his
own benevolent, good nature. He is still not acting directly from duty, as his benevolent
inclinations fall in line with duty. Is it then counter-intuitive to assert that this natural act
of benevolence is of less moral value than an unnatural act, fabricated, and emerging out
of a sense of duty? Kant does address this possible counterargument: since a principle
which is not moral, although it may now and then produce actions conformable to the
law, will also produce actions which contradict it.2
Sorrell describes two basic models of interpreting Kants duty and moral worth: the battle
citation model, and the fitness-report model. The former holds that each individual action
is to be either wholly motivated by duty, or by another motivation. This creates a rigid
binary in which all actions are cleanly classified. The latter model maintains that it is
possible for actions to be motivated in part by duty, and in part from other sources of
motivation. This paradigm is much less absolute than its counterpart. The battle citation
model is widely read into Kants Metaphysics of Morals, a work that he wrote nearly a
decade later, while the fitness-report model is assumed within the Grounding. However,
1 Sorrell, 81.
2 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals

Sorrell presents an alternative reading that he purports as much simpler and flexible
across both works. He begins by describing the purity of moral duty that Kant mandates
when considering the moral worth of an action. Kant acknowledges that good that arises
from inclination, even in instances of honour, deserves praise and encouragement,
although ultimately, it still has no true moral worth.3 However, the notion of acting
under legal contexts presents a complication. For example, is the act of paying taxes done
due as a result of duty? Do citizens comprehend that it is their legal obligation to do so
and thus pay taxes? If so, then we can safely say that they are acting morally. However, in
the vast majority of cases, citizens pay their taxes due to the adverse consequences of not
doing so; as a result, Kant would not see these as having the same moral fortitude. The
complication arises when considering the possibility that both duty as well as inclination
may play a role in determining action. Sorrell calls on Kants discussion of promises to
assist in delineating the difficulties, as well as presenting solutions. Sorrell details, the
obligation to keep your promises is a moral one he says, even though (as [Kant] thinks)
the law that creates the obligation is originally jurisprudential rather than ethical.4 The
law dictates that one must uphold contracts; though the law itself may be considered
subjective, the act of keeping promises is inherently moral. In this sense, we are overdetermined to act in a certain way. Kant specifies that the duty in the form of inherent
morality trumps the external compulsion: the idea of duty alone is sufficient of itself as a
motive.5 So, in the aforementioned example, there is no difference between an
individual who pays his taxes, not out of any fear of punishment, but out of moral
obligation, and an individual who pays his taxes out of both moral obligation and fear of
punishment, which, although represents a certain type of legal duty, Kant would consider
it merely an inclination. Taken differently, there is no difference between an individual
who pays his taxes out of moral obligation alone, and an individual who pays his taxes
out of moral obligation, as well as his benevolent spirit to assist the state.
I believe that Sorrell presents one plausible approach to Kants problematic treatment of
moral worth. It helps to answer one aspect of Kants moral theory that has appeared to be
problematic; that is, it may be counter-intuitive to morally value a willing actor acting
from duty, as well as in accordance with duty, less than an unwilling actor, acting solely
from duty. Sorrell adds another dimension to the discussion. In certain situations, we can
call on the moral duty that may accompany the inclination, which would standardise the
moral worth, thus eliminating the problem of counterintuitive attribution of moral worth.
However, in most instances of this problem, we will not have the possibility of calling
upon duty to equalise the moral worth. In instances of positive action in accordance with
duty, strictly based on inclination, we are still posed with the aforementioned issue. Kant
recognizes that the possible issue here, and the only response that his logic allows for is
that these instances are few and far between. While this is by no means a comprehensive
rebuttal, it is all that the firm, deontological theory allows for.

3 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals

4 Sorrell, 84.
5 Kant, Groundings for the Metaphysics of Morals