ETUDES PLATONICIENNES IV Les puissances de I'ame selon Platon Publication annuelle | dela \ Société d’fitudes Platoniciennes \ Publié avec le concours de l'Instituto de Estudios Clasicos sobre la Sociedad y la Politica Lucio Anneo Séneca, du Dipartimento di Filosofia dell'Universita degli Studi di Lecce et de l'Université de Paris X - Nanterre (équipe d'accueil “Textes, Histoires Et Monuments, de U'Antiquité au Moyen-Age”, umr ArScAn, 7041) Paris Les Belles Lettres 2007 { { iL‘DOXA anv EpistéMé as Moves OF ACQUAINTANCE IN Repusuc Vv Jan Szae “The interpretation of Plato's distinction between epistémé and dosa is notori- ously dificult, One of the reasons for thsi that Plat has different uses for these two terms and often uses them in ways that are far removed from the meaning we moderns tend to connect with the concepts of knowledge and belief. “The usual contemporary distinction beoween knowledge and (mere) true belief relates to the quality ofthe justification or evidence che rue belief in question is based upon. This kind of perspective does occur in Plato. One of the targets of philosophical dialectic is to provide a foundation for our judgments about con- Crete actions situations or rules that require the application of some general action guiding concept like, for instance, ‘just. The ability to know if certain course ‘Gf action, ina given situation, would be just presupposes, according to Plato, a lear and reliable grasp of what justice is — an understanding of justice which is {rue to its objective essence. Thus the grasp of such an essence (or eides, Form) is Viewed by Plato asa necessary prerequisite for a justified belief concerning the jus- tice oF injustice ofa particular action, and he is ready o apply knowledge-words like eidenai ot gndnai to judgments about particular actions in that perspective (e.g. Rep. 5200). But there are also contexts where he restricts knowability to the Forms as pure intellectual objects and classifies the whole realm of perceptible bodies together with their movements, changes and transient properties as things that are mere Vaxasta (i.e. merely objects of doxa, incapable of becoming objects of genuine Iknovledgelepstimd)- One important example for this can be found in Republic 4768 ff, a passage that I will examine in this paper. Apparently it uses the “argue tment from opposites (which could also be called an ‘argument from context-rela- tivity) in avery questionable way by arguing from the eo-presence of opposites in the ease of natural and social instantiations of a Form to the conclusion that such instantiations don’t even allow for an unqualifiedly érue judgment and thus can- not be objects of knowledge. Another striking example is the passage in imacus, 37B, which asserts that the world-soul achieves nous (insight) and epistéme with254 JAN SZAIF respect to the intellectual realm (to lagistikon)), but with respect to the perceptible realm (co aisthéton) only doxa and pists (the latter being a type of non-epist cognition with a higher degree of truth-approximation and rcliabifity). Yet in the Tionaeus-passage, ruth and stabilty/tliability (to bebaion) are attributed to the doxai of the world-soul, as one would expect since the world-soul has direct cog- nitive access to everything that happens within ‘its body’, ie. the physical cosmos. So here it cannot be the lack of truth, and not even that of reliability, which sep- atates daxa from epistémé. So there seems to be an outright inconsistency in Plato's ideas about know- ing. On the one hand, he denies chae there can be knowledge about particulars in the sensible world, on the other he affirms that the person who has grasped the essence of a certain property can also know with respect to a particular whether or not it exhibits this property. But this impression of a contradiction may subside if it turns oue that he is using different, yet compatible concepts of knowledge that gp along with different concepts of dosa. Such a solution seems certainly possible with regard to the Timaens-passage. ft has been a recutring theme in Plato scholar- ship during the last three decades that Plato's concept of epistémeé, in many contexts, is a concept of understanding. Understanding can be taken as conceptual under standing or as scientific or theoretical understanding (explanation), but for Plato these are two sides of the same coin, because he conceives theoretical knowledge as the result of dialectic, and hence as the result of a systematic effort of working toward adequate concepts that are true to the underlying essences or Forms. He contends that the only fully ational ‘cosmos’ which can become totally transpar- ‘ent or flly understood is the realm of pure intellectual objects. The physical world does not allow for perfect understanding, because there is only partial and imper- fect rationality in its stuctures and movements.” Accordingly, the object-range of perfect theoretical understanding isthe world of pure intellectual entities, and the core of this understan ‘one’s conceptual understanding which has been per- fected through the elucidation of the Forms and their interrelations. So if one uses the words “epistémé” and “doxa” as names for cognitive states that differ according to the level of insight or understanding they can provide, then Plato’ restriction of epistémé to the realm of Forms isa consequence of his views on the insufficient rationality and cognitive accessibility of the physical cosmos. This view is compatible with the claim that a person who has achieved adequate under- standing of a certain concept or property and has a cleat, non-deceptive percep- tion ofa particular situation or object, can recognize that this situation or object exhibits a certain property and can know this to be the case—in a different sense of knowing which does not imply full rational transparency of the object in all ts properties and relations but only a well-founded judgment that answers to some specific question regarding the object. 1. CE J.M.E. Moravesky "Understanding and Knowledge in Plato's Philosophy”, Neue Hefie fir Phileopbie 156 (1979), 53-69 ; Julia Annas, An lnireduction to Plates Republi, Oxford 1981 ; Myles Burnyeat, Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge, in B. Bet (ed), Arizorle on Science. The “Postetior Analytics”, Padua 1981, 97-139. 2. CE Rep. 527D-530C, Tim, 476 ff des platonttennes1¥DOXA ET EPISTME AS MODES OF ACQUAINTANCE 255 ‘The phenomenon of the co-presence of opposites does not pose areal challenge to the possibility of true and well-founded judgments about conerete instances. Plato himself in Rep. IV, 436B-437A, shows how to handle this. In this passage he elaborates the point that an object cannot exhibit opposite properties or move- _ments except in different respects. The apparent co-presence of opposite determi- nations should not “disturb” us (436B), since ic can always be dissolved by way of an analysis which either points toa difference in respect or reveals that the oppos- ing properties or movements have two different bearers. In a section of the intro- ductory conversation of the Parmenide:(129A-B), ic is also emphasized that in the case of particular objects the co-presence of opposites does not pose any real phil- ‘osophical problem since it is always possible to differentiate between the respects in which the opposites occur. The text, moreover, points out that there is no prob- em with a lack of truth when one or the other of the opposites is ascribed to the ‘object in question. In both cases we have a true statement (129D2).. In the light of chi, che argument in Rep. V; 476E ff, proves to be very puz- cling. Ie seems to commit the very mistake of inferring from the co-presence of opposites the impossibility of an unequivocally true ascription of, say, beauty with respect toa particular instance of beauty. "The consequence would be, ir seems, that even people with an adequate conceptual understanding of beauty or largeness would not be able to apply these concepts to particular instances so as to produce true judgments. Thus they would also not be able co know if this or that particu lar instance is something beautiful or something large (given that truth is a neces- saty condition of knowledge). This result seems incompatible with, for instance, a well-known passage in the context of the simile of the Cave (Rep. 520C) where the text cleatly states that someone who has gained philosophical insight and returns to the ‘cave (je. is willing to confront again the social and natural realty), wi be able to recognize the exemplifcations of the Forms in the ‘cave’ and will know what participates in what. What is more, this result would run afoul, it seems, of. the whole tendency of the Socratic quest fora reliable foundation of our practical judgments through the conceptual clarification of Forms. The practical side of dia- lectic remains a major concetn of Plato in the Republic and beyond. [eis only sup- plemented, not pushed aside, by the contemplative ideal of knowledge that seeks falfllment in a complete rational penetration of reality achievable only with respect to the ‘noetic’ cosmos of che Forms.’ Whereas the Timacus passage is compatible with the possibility of true and well-founded judgments about concrete objects and situations, the Rep. V passage seems o go too far and to impair the applicabil- ity of philosophical knowledge for practical purposes. “There is another serious difficulty posed by the argument in Rep. V.Itdistin- gushes epistemé and dasa as two diferent powers (dunameid) ofthe soul. That seems to contradict the affirmation later in Rep. VII (518A-519B) that the rational fac- tly (the “eye ofthe soul”) is one and that it can achieve only doxa-type competence as long as it remains focused on the physical and social world, but will produce 5. Cf Jan Seal, Platons Begriff der Wabrbeit, 24 ed., Frelburg/Miinchen 1998, 163- 168, 307-315, on the influence of practical and contemplative ends on Plato’ conception of knowledge. ‘des platoniconnes 1| | | | | \ | 256 JAN SZAIF epistémé once it has been “turned around” and refocused toward the realm of intel- lectual objects through the efforts of dialectic. Tn my subsequent remarks I will provide an analysis of che argument in Rep. Vp 476E-480A, and comment on the meaning of doxa and epistémeé in this context ‘and their function as powers. My main contention will be that daxa and epistm? Ghoul be construed here as different qualities of (conceptualized) acquaintance suhose achievement or cognitive value is a Function of the ontological quality of their objects. First some remarks about the context of the argument that I am going to ana Iyze : In 473CD, Socrates has disclosed with his contention that philosophers should be the political rulers. Socrates (whose persona serves asa personification of the ideal philosophical inquirer in che dialoguc) wants to base the justification of this contention on an explanation of the true nature of philosophers (474B). He ‘tarts with an analysis of the meaning of the word “philosopher” 25 “lover of wis: Gom/learning”, emphasizing that concepts of the form “lover of F” imply cha the person is inclined to love and appreciate all types or instances of ehat which is E ‘Thus only someone who loves all kinds of learning can count as a lover of wisdom! learning. Glaucon objects (475D1-E1) that this would enlarge the scope of philos- phy 20 sco include the interests of people who want xo watch each new dheatical show (philothearone) or are Fond of insignificant crafts and knacks (tchudria). Socrates replies that che philosophers—the tre ones (475E3)—are indeed! lovers of shows/sight?, but ofa specific kindof sight, namely the sight of truth (es alétheias ililorheamones, EA). (With respect to this turn of phrase one should beat in rind ‘that the Greek word for truth—alétheia—can ‘be used to name ‘reality’ from the point of view that it can become an object or content of knowledge. Knowledge is always knowledge ofsome truth. I will come back ro this point later) ‘With this answer, Socrates has hinted that the curtsity which is exhibited by the lovers of theatrical shows and tnphilosophical crafis does not concern ‘the ‘ruth’ and thus eannot count as genuine love of wisdom or learning since wisdom and learning relate to truth, His ensuing discussion focuses on the “overs of sights sand sounds’ who are clearly enough identified asthe lovers ofthe dramatic petfor- rances (475D5.8)—people who believe that those products of poetry ate the best source for an understanding of beauty, justice and virtue. So in the background swe perceive che recutent Platonic theme that not poetry (or the ares in general) but only philosophy can truly educate.‘ His argumentation exploits the concep- tual link between love of knowledge and love of truth (cf. 485B-D). If as he tries to show, the exploits ofthe lovers of sights and sounds’, and of other peopl sin lar to chem, donit lead to acqualntance withthe ruth, cheir kind of learning’ can not belong to the scope ofa genuine love for cruth and learning. “Theatrical shows provide (amongst other things) examples of beauty (think of the musical and lyrical parts ofthe Greek drama) "The ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ TCE Myles Burnyeat, Culture and Society in Plato Republic, ins The Taner Lew. reson Human Values, vol. 20, ed. by G. B. Petetson, Salt Lake City 1999, 215-324, About the vocabulary of thea, thebria ec. sce also A. W. Nightingale, Spectacles of Tiuth in Clasi- ‘al Greek Philosphy: Theora in its Cultural Contest, Cambridge 2004. audes patonclenes 1°DOXA EF EPISTEME AS MODES OF ACQUAINTANCE 257 will appreciate that each such performance gives them some new examples of beauty and thus enriches their experience of beauty. They think thar this will increase and deepen their understanding of beauty. Yet Socrates points out that they are inca- pable of seeing” and appreciating the “nacute of the beautiful itself” (476B). They acknowledge the existence of the many instances of beauty yee ate unable to grasp “beauty itself”. Being unaware of the reality of the Form behind these instances, they mistake mere images forthe real thing, With this state of mind, says Socrates, they ate similar to dreamers who take dream-images for teal things. They are in a stare of mere dasa (opining) and subject to a fundamental eror regarding the nature of reality. This is very different with philosophically educated people. They realize tha a cerm like “beauty” denotes a Form and that the instantiations of beauty in the world of ‘becoming’ are only images ofthis. The latter will be able to discern. the Form of beauty and the chings that participate in it, and they will not con- fuse the Form and its participants. Thus they will know (gigndskein) (476CD).— Note that the knowledge attributed to the knowing person includes the ability to discern the participants. So the possibility of some sort of knowledge with regard to objects in the sensible realm is affirmed here, yet as a corollary of the knowl- edge of the Form. ‘Let us call che argument in 475E-476D, which I have just summarized, the Doxa-as-Dreaming-Analogy (DDA). Ie characterizes the doxastic state of mind a5 state of deception and the objects a person in cis state is acquainted with as being deceptive or ‘untruc’ insofar as they (like dream images) conceal theie nature as mere copies. The only way to overcome this deception is philosophy and its prac- tice of dialectic, since only dialectic can make us aware ofthe reality of the Forms. (The word “dialectic” serves Plato, roughly, as the name for whatever may be the appropriate argumentative method or methods of investigating our concepts and the underlying objective Forms.) DDA presupposes the truth of the theory of Forms. Nows since the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ don’ recognize the ruth of this assumption, they wont have to follow this argumentation. From their point of view itis not a mistake to consider the many instances of beauty as the only reality che term “beautiful” stands for. The subsequent argument (467E7-480A13)° is addressed to a hypothetical represen- 5. There fs tremendous amount of literature on this text, I wort be able to discuss che conflicting views here in any deuil. Important contributions include: R.B. Allen, “The “Argument from Opposites in Republic V>" in Review of Metaphyics 15 (1961), 325-335 5 Julia Annas, fe cit, 190-241 ; Myles Burmyeat, Plato On Why Mathematics is Good for the ‘Soul in'T. Smiley (ed.), Mathematics and Necesity (Proc. Brit. Acad. 103), Oxford 2000, 1- 81 ; Nicholas Denyer, Language, Thought and Falchood in Ancient Greck Philesophy, Lon- ddon 1991, 46-67 ; Gail Fine, Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-Vi, in S. Everson (ed), Epistemology, Cambridge 1990, 85-115 ; Loyd Getson, Knowing Persons. A Study in Plato, New York / Oxford 2003, 148 ff (jet ep. the critic comments in T. Butler, “Identity and Infilibiliry in Placo’s Epistemology.” Apeiron 39 (2006) 1-25); Francisco Gonzales, “Propositional as Objects? A Critique of Gail Fine on Knowledge and Belief in Republic Vo" Phroneis 41 (1996), 245-275 ; J.C.B. Gosling, “done and dananns in Plao’s Repu- bic” Phronesis 13 (1968), 119-1305 Andreas Gracser,“Platons Auffassung von Wissen tund Meinung in Poltia V" Pilesphiches Jabrbuch 98 (1991), 365-388 5B. E, Hest, “A Fides patonciennes W258 JAN SZALF tative of those ‘lovers of sights and sounds’, and itis intended asa gentle (476E1) refutation of their conviction that che kind of realty they acknowledge could be the basis of genuine knowledge, a refutation that does not rely on the acceprance of the theory of Forms.* Yer it would be wrong to reduce the function of this argument to its dialectical role as a refutation of the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’. The core ofthis argument is a scheme of correlations between three cognitive states or ‘powers’ (dunamets) and three ontological categories. I wil call cis scheme CS and the argument based on it CSA. [cis important to note that CS lays important groundwork for a whole sequence of arguments and similes thac will folow in books VI and VIL. Therefore it isalso no mere accident that Socrates brings in the Forms ata certain point of his argumentation although, at first sight, this might seem inconsistent with his professed aim of refuting the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ without presupposing the theory of Forms. The refutational part of his argument, directed against the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’, can indeed stand without reliance on the theory of Forms. But Socrates’ argumentation is atthe same time also addressed to Glaucon and Adeimantos, his two philosophically educated and sympathetic interlocutors. For them Socrates connects the scheme CS with the theory of Forms as. starting- point for his subsequent more complex explanations concerning the relation of ‘ontological categories and epistemic modes. ‘We can break down CSA as follows : Section (a), 467E7-477B9, begins the exposition of CS. ‘the ontological cate- ‘goties he distinguishes are (1) that which (perfectly/unqualifiedly) #, (2) that which issand-is-not, and (3) that which é not at all (or in no way). (The corresponding, ‘cognitive ‘powers’ are knowledge (gnésisepisémé), doxa, and ignorance (agndsia) — this last one rather being a specific form of absence of cognitive power. The ontological categories of things that perfectly are and of things that are-and-are- not will later (in section [d) be equated with the Forms and their natural or social instantiations respectively. “The basic idea of this scheme (which obviously harks back to the three ‘ways! distinguished by the Presocratic Parmenides?) can be represented in chs tab Conception of Truth in Republic V,” History of Philosophy Quaterly 17 (2000), 311-332; Jaakko Hintkka, Knowledge and its Objects in Plato in J. M. E. Moravesi (ed), Patterns in Plato Thought, Dordrecht 1973, 1-30 ; Charles Kahn, “Some Philosophical Uses of to be’ in Plato,” Phromess 26 (1981), 105-134 ; Yvon Laftance, La thévrie platonicienne de la dost, MorucealParis 1981 ; Joba Palmer, Platos Reception of Parmenides, Oxford 1999, 31 87 ; Peter Stermer, "Das Kinderttsel vom Eunuchen und der Fledermaus,” Pidsephi- hes Jab 92 (1985), 79-97 Gregory Viasto, Matonic Studies, 2™ ed. Princeton 1981, 43-57, 58-75. 6. This was emphasized by Gosling lo. ct, 120 f, and is also a basic premise of Fines interpretation (loc. cit, 87). 7.Cf. Joho Palme, foc. ct, on Plato's use of ParmeniDOXA ET EPISTEME AS MODES OF ACQUAINTANCE 259 cs Typeof cognitive dimamis — Object (relatum) of she 1) knowledge (gndsslepistémé) what (perfectly/unquali- (= a Form] fiedly) is 2) dex what is and is not [= a mere exem- plification, not the Form itself} 3) ignorance (agnésia) what in no way is {= ‘nothing’] Section (b), 477B10-478A5, explains the concept of a power (dunamis) and tries to validate the claim that episém# and doxa, qua cognitive powers, must relate to different ranges of objects and result in different cognitive achievements. ‘On this basis section (c), 478A6-E6, sets out why we have to identify the objects-range of dasa, asa falible cognitive state intermediate between knowledge and ignorance, with the things that are-and-are-not. Section (d), 478E7-479E9, explains what sorts of objects belong to the care- gory of the things that are-and-are-not. The answer is that the things the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ recognize asthe only reality viz. the many instances of the Forms, are things which are-and-are-not. In the course of this explanation the talk of being versus being-and-not-being, which had remained very vague up to this point, acquires a mote concrete meaning, Thanks to this, it also becomes clearer why the mix of being and not-being is supposed to thwart epistemic cognition. ‘The final section (e), 479E10-480A13, catties the argument to the conclusion that people lke the ‘lovers of sights and sounds should be called philadoxoi (lov- cas of doxa) instead of philosophei. ‘A number of questions need to be raised with respect to CS. 1) How can the navure of the corrclations between the cognitive diinameis and their eypes of objects be spelled out in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions ? For instance, the ontological characteristic of unrestricted being seems to function as a necesary condition for something's being an object of epistémé. Is that so also in the case of complete non-being and agndsia ? 2) What is the sense of “dunamis” here ? 3) What isthe sense of “to be” here, and do the ontological categories define non-overlapping sets of objects ? 4) In which sense is dasa said to be fallible and epistémeé infallible? If we answer all chese questions, then we can hope to reach a well-founded conclusion regarding the nature of the epistémé and doxa as represented in this . 1 will frst tackle the third question regarding the concept of being (and I will have to be rather ‘doctrinal’ because there is no room here for discussing Plato's concept of being in decal) “tudes platonictennes IV260 JAN SZAIF Ad 3:1 is helpful co distinguish between an abrolute and a copulatve use of “is” ot “being”. Being is attributed “absolutely” in a statement of the form “A is” Ie is Used fora copulative function in sentences ofthe form “A is B” (where “B” can be replaced either by a gen singular erm). tFthe second term is a genera ttm, ‘we also speak of predicative being. If it isa singular term, the statement expresses an identity relation. ‘The “is” (ti) which is predicated “absolutely” could mean either existence or veridical ‘being the case’, according to the established usages in Ancient Greek. Ieis, however, esential to note that ofien Phto understands ‘being’ aiributed absolutely, as equivalent co ‘being something’ such thatthe word “something” fune- tions like a variable for general terms, In this case, the absolute use of*to be” indi cates predicative being, Prediative being is closely connected with veridical being, because if some xi Bit is also she cae that xis F"Thus a verdical instance of being, ice, the om in the sense of a state of affairs which obtains and can be known, can ‘unfold’ into an instance of predicative being (x being F).* CSA is an example for the absolute use of “to be” and “not to be" indicating predicative being and not-being with a veridical connotation. Take the example of an instance of beauty. Section () tells us that this is an example of something which IS and IS NOT, because it is and is not beautif—or because itis both true and false to say of ic chat i is beautiful. (We might think of Helen being compared to some other, more beautiful entity, ot viewed form some unfavorable perspective). Accordingly, something which is beautiful and in no way isnot beautiful, would be an example of a thing which unqualified 1S (i.e. without a mix with not-bein). For Plato, chis oncological description singles out the Form of the beautiful ~ the Beautiful-itself, —OF course this means that this talk of unrestricted being pre- supposes the possibility ofthe ‘self predication’ of Forms.” The "sin such a state ‘ment oscillates in a problematic way between predication and identity. But cither Way itis copulative’, not existential, Also in the case of the negative limic concept ofthat which in no way is («noth- Jing) (477A3-4, 7, cf. 478B12-C4) we have to think of the copulative use: ‘This pseudo-object is nothing or in no way, because there is no way to characterize‘ predicatively, Hence, when Plato speaks of things thac are and things that are-and-are-not, the predicative or (more generally) copulative sense of being” isto be understood. Yer this cannot be the whole story. The Forms, which are the example of things that ARE, can also be characterized in a negative way. For instance :“The Beautiful itselfis not ugly.” Or : “The Beautifl itself isnot perishable.” Plato’ examples and 8. On the terminology of ‘being’ in Ancient Greek and in Plto in particular of, Chars Kaho, On the Theory of the Verb “To Be, ix M. K. Mutite (ed), Logic and Ontology, New York 1973, 1-20 ; idem, “A Retuin 40 the Theory of the Verb e and the Concept of Being,” Ancient Philosophy 24 (2004), 381-405; idem, "Some Philosophical Uses oft be! in Plato,” Plroness 26 (1981), 105-134 ; Lesley Brown, The Verb “To Be’ in Greek Philoso- ‘Phy Some Remarks, in S. Everson ed.) Language, Cambridge 1994 ; Seal, Plats Begriff er Waihi «loc. ct, paso. 9. Ch John Malcolm, Plato on the Sef Predication ofthe Forms, Oxford 1991, for a comprehensive survey and analysis of the postions on ‘self predicaion in Plato, Fades atouclnnesDOXA ET EPISTAME AS MODES OF ACQUAINTANCE 261 comments (478E-479D) suggest chat a Forms undiluted mode of being consists in the face that the Form is what itis unequivocally, since it perfectly excludes any contrary quality. The many instantiations of this Form, on the other hand, don’ perfectly exclude contrary qualities. In some way or other they exemplify not just ness, but also the opposite of Fness, and thac is why theit mode of being is indis- tinct and, as it were, “ambiguous” (ef. 479B11-C5). To put it in a slightly more formal way : For any predicative content For Fuess : Only F-itself is unequivo- cally F (ie. without any aspect of being not-F), all other objects that are F are also not F In 479C3-5, the argument reaches an even more radical analysis ofthe sit- uation : Because the contrary characteristics cancel our each other and yet obtai somehow, itis not possible to fiemly conceive the thing in question as F or nor F or both or neither, Although ic is not nothing at all it eludes any firm cognit hhold. (Nove that we are talking here about instances, say, of beauty as instances of beauty. The question is not if Helen, as Helen, does allow for any sore of firm cog- nitive acquaintance, but if this instance of beauty, concepcualized as an instance of beauty, can be firmly represented as such.) “Thus the ontological status of perfect/unrestricted being (to pantelis on) is based on the fct cha sucha ching is perfeedy determined since the descriptive (or ‘cidetic) content thanks to which i is decermined is noc qualified or cancelled out by the co-presence of a contrary eidetic content. Accordingly we can also say that “unrestricted being’ here stands for perfect determinateness. Do these ontological categories define exclusive sexs oF objects? An object might be perfectly determined in one respect and not so in another. CSA exploits the phenomenon that in the case of properties that constitute paits of opposites the ascriptions ae often context-sensitive or ‘perspectival’. Nothing is lage or small, absolutely, but only from a certain perspective, vi, depending on what counts as small or large in the given context. Yet ascriptions of descriptive contents like ‘being human ox being a finger ate not perspectival in this way (523CD). Also they cat’t come in paits of opposites (enantia, polar concraties) for the simple reason that such individuative terms don't have opposites. Therefore Plato’ argument in Rep. Vani apply to such characteristics. Hence, as far as that goes, his argu- ‘ment is open for the possibility that the same object is perfectly determined and hence a ‘knowable’ in one respect, yet in another respect a mete doxaston.!° To be sure, other passages in his middle-period works articulate the thought that sensi- ble objects in general and in all respects dontt qualify as objects of episémé (prob- ably as a consequence of Plato's views concerning the unity and imperishabilicy ‘of an object of epstémd).! So, in the end, the two clases of objects are meant t0 bee exclusive, bur that doesnt yet follow from the distinction between perspectival and non-perspectival being, 10. CE Annas, do. cit, 193-211. 11. Already the brief recapitulation in 485AB of the esultof CSA shifts tothe ancithe- sis berween things tha always are and thing that ae subject co coming.into-being and pas- sing-aways which does affect the stats of individuative propertics —For a comprehensive discussion of Pltonie arguments for the existence of Forms ef. Gail Fine, On Ideas. Arisoe (es Criticism of Plats Theory of Forms, Oxford 1993. Fudesplatonicionnes 17262 JAN SZAIF Ad I:Regutding the correlations in CS we have to differentiate between terms for cognitive states like “knowledge” (episémé) and terms for dispositional attri- bbutes like “knowable” (gudston) which contain a modal component. At the out- set of his argument Plato introduces the correlations (1) and (3) : With respect to (1), he claims that if somebody knows something, this must be something which IS (or unqualifiedly 1S). He also states that that which unquelifiedly IS is unqual- iffedly hnowable, This statement is not fiee of ambiguity since it can mean that being implies knowability (Le. is a sufficient condition of knowability), but may also be taken to mean that being is logically equivalent to knowability (i. is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of knowability). Later it becomes clear that the argument presupposes that unqualified being is not only a sufficient, but also a necessary condition for knowability, for Socrates claims that knowledge is “set ‘over that which is” and has the function to know of that-which-is which way it is (477B10 f, 478A6). Given chat unqualified being is a necessary condition for knowabiliy, it follows that all instances of knowledge are, each of them, ofsome unqualified being or other. “Thus we get the following two contentions, of which the first is meant co imply the second : ') Forall objects x : if and only ifx 1S (unqualifiedly), is it possible that there be some epistemic cognition y which is of ii) For all cognitive states y : ify is an epistemic cognition, then there is sore object x, such that y is ofx and x IS (unqualifiedly). ‘The frst i a claim regarding the ‘knowability’ ofthe objects in the first onto- logical category. The second is a claim about the kind of object the coy state of epitémé requires. Undiluted being is a necessary and sufficient condition of knowability and a necessary condition for becoming an object of somebody's actual episémé : ‘What about correlation (3)? Plato claims that that which IS NOT (anything at all) is completely unknowable (panté; agnéston). Yer total lack of being is not only sufficient for a rota lack of knowability, iis also a necessary condition for it, since only that which in no way is (something or other) will be completely inaccessible to any kind of cognition, Of something which IS, there ca be knowledge, but of something which IS NOT anyching at all, there must be ignorance. Plato hints at this asymmetry by adding an “ex anankés" in the case of agnésid’s ‘being set over rnon-being’ (477A9, 478C3) which he doesn't do in the other cases “Thus we obtain the following claims : ili) For all objects x: ifand only x is not (anything at all), is it necessary that there be ignorance (i.e. no cognition at all) oF x. iv) For all cognitive states y : if there is some object x, such that y is ofx and x IS NOT (anything ae all), then y isa state of ignorance. Let us turn to correlation (2). Here we ate not dealing with a total absence of ‘cognition, but with a different type of cognition and a different kind of cogni- tive accessibility of an object. The same way as epistémé correlates with that which 1S, doxais said to correlate with that which IS AND IS NOT. Both are character- ined as different cognitive ‘powers’ which requite a different type of object accord- ing to the ontological distinction berween undiluted being and being mixed with ides platonttennesDOXA EX KPISTEME AS MODES OF ACQUAINTANCE 263 nnot-being, ‘Thus we can attribute to Plato the following two claims which match the claims () and (ii) regarding epistémé : (The second claim, which is about the object of doxa, is meant to be implied in the frst claim aboue the cognitive acces- sibility of objects of that mixed kind.) ¥) For all objects x : Fand only fx és and isnot, is it possible chat there be some doxastic coggition y which is of . vi) For all cognitive states y : ify is a daxastic cognition, then there is some object x, such that y is of and x és and is not “The suggestion that epistémé and dexa are two different cognitive ‘powers’ with different ranges of referential objects seems very strange to modern readers who also seems incompatible with remarks in other contexts in the Republic and elsewhere which affirm the possibility of (ome sort of) knowledge with respect to conctete instantiations and of opinion with respect to Forms. I can refer back to my introductory remarks. Even the immediately preceding pas- sage which contains DDA turned our to imply the possi respect to concrete instantiations. “There is no way out of this conundrum if we construe the ‘object’ of the cog- inguished here as the referential objects of propositional cognition, i.e. as that about which something is known or believed. May be a closet exa nation of the way in which Plato conceives epistémé and daxa as ‘powers’ will pro- vide us with an alternative, Ad 2:Placo’s argument in section (b) about ‘powers is built upon an assump- tion (A) about the general identity criterion for types of ‘power’ formulated in 4772-5. It can be rephrased in this way : ‘A:(0) Powers’ (dunameis) ace the same in kind if and only if they relate to the same objects and achieve the same things 5 (2) ‘powers’ (dunamei) differ in kind if and only if they telae to different kinds of objects and achieve different things. ‘The “and” printed in italics in (2) is the puzzling feature in this assumption, but itis also crucial for the argumenc because the intended conclusion can be obtained only if this “and” is kept and not replaced by an “or”, For the texe will argue from the premise that doxa has a different kind of achievement (and hence is adiffer- ent kind of dunamis) to the conclusion that its objects must also be different from those of epistémé. This inference would not be possible if we had an “or” instead of an “and” in 2). This means that Plato does not acknowledge the possibility of ewo lunameis achieving different things with regard tothe same kind of abject. But why should that possiblity be excluded ? Ths certainly looks question-begging and thus represents a very questionable move in this argument. Yet we may try to add some extra explanation to the argument tha would justify the exclusion of the possbil- ity chat powers can achieve diferent things with respect to the same relata, Assumption (A) can make sense only if the object range is conceived of as intrin- sically connected with the kind of function or achievement of the power in ques- tion, Later metaphysical terminology developed the concept of a ‘formal’ object : A formal object is the type object of afaculy, ability or power that matches its defin- ing function, activity or effec. If we speak of the ability to slap and the ability to Budesplatonicennes 1V264 JAN SZAIF caress their formal objects would be chae which is capable of being slapped or that which is capable of being caressed. Of course the same person car be slapped and caressed. The ‘material’ objects, hence, can be the same. But there is stil the differ- ence of the formal objects as defined by the kind of power of ability. ‘Can we suppose that something like this is going on here ? The only illustrative ‘examples he mentions are sight and heating (477C3). Unfortunately, he does not sive us any further indications as to how he wants us to use these examples. The easiest way of specifying their formal objects would be to call them the visible and the audible. A more sophisticated answer would identify the visible with, say, col- ots and shapes, the audible with sounds. Now there is an additional complication, “The examples Socrates gives in section (d) of CSA. suggest thac we are invited to consider the objects of dasa and episémé as not only formally, but also materially distinct: as two non-overlapping sets of objects, via. Forms on one side and tran sient or mixed instances on the other. IF we link the faculties of sigh and hearing. to colors and shapes or sounds respectively, we would also obtain non-overlapping sets of objects. But this is rather an exception. It is obviously not crue in general that abilities or faculties define non-overlapping sets of objects, and we dont have to burden the argument here with such an extravagant assumption. ‘The premise that he needs in section (c) does not imply a stronger claim than that the object- anges of dose and epistémé are Formally distinct, That they are also matetially dis- tinct and even exclusive sets of objects, this is a consequence of the ontological chorismos between the Forms and their physical and social instantiations, a thesis which is not argued for inthis passage. Now if we want to get clear about as what kind of power daxa and epistéme are conceived here, we have to understand how ther formal objects are characterized. “There are basically ewo possibilities. If we construe doxa and epistémé as types oF propositional cognition, then their formal objects (the ‘opinable’ and the ‘know- able’) would have to be identified as propositional contents or as propositionally steuctuted states of affairs. This would allow for a fairly straightforward answer to the question how these two types relate to two formally distinct object-ranges : Since knowledge implies truth, whereas opinion does not, knowledge is of rue propositional contents (or existing states of affairs) while opinion is of true or false propositional contents. Unfortunately this solution, supported by Gail Fine and others!, does not square with the way the objects of knowledge and opinion ate described in section (d)—not as propositional contents (like that Helen is beau- siful) but as Forms and as physical or social instantiations of a Form (like beauti- fil ching) 12. CE. Gosling lo: cit, Fine, Knowledge and Belief. Alc. ct). 13, Defenders of the view thatthe objects which cpstiné and casa ate set over are pro [positions refer 479104, where the text specifies the objects of dova as “ta ton polln pla rnomina halon te prt ka tn allo”: “the many nomima of the mulkade with respect to what is beautiful e ceten, Fine, for instance, translates “nomima” as “belief” (loc cit, 92). Yet " nomimon” can also denote that which isan object of belief or acknowledgement, In the present context, the word “nomimen harks back to what was sad about the ‘lovers of sights and sounds’ in che preceding passage DA : that they “acknowledge (nomizel) many beaut things’, bur not the beautiflitselF(476C2-3). So the nomima ae the things ack- ‘ces platontctonnes 1V= DOXA EF EPISTEMB AS MODES OF ACQUAINTANCE 265 “The alternative isto read this distinetion as one between types of abject-cop nition oF acquaintance. ‘The usage which relates the nominal constructions “doxa tines" and “epistéme tinos” (knowledge of something) or the verbal constructions “dovaecin tf and “gnonalleidenai 1? (knowing something) to object instead of propositional contents is well established for Plato, the Theactetus in particular pro- viding ample evidence for that. But does that also tally with the way he describes the achievement of epistémé and dox in CSA? The claim that we are dealing, here with types of object-cognition is easier to establish with respect to the concept of epistémé. The type of object that corre sponds co epistémé (or gnina) is said to exhibit unrestricted, unqualified being. and the reason indicated for this is that such a mode of being allows for a firm and stable cognitive grasp (pagids noésa, 479C4). Since his examples for perfect beings are Forms (the Beautiful itself etc), we can infer that he has in mind the kind of acquaintance with a Form that reveals the essence that can be ascribed to the Form—i his distinction is indeed about modes of acquaintance. This kind of acquaintance would be the achievement of a progress in coneeptual understanding as aimed at by philosophical dialectic. “Yet one can object that the achievement of epistém? is paraphrased as “so on _ntinai bis echei” (S78A6). Isnt this stating that the knowledge in question knows “with respect to that-which-is, how it is", and wouldn't this knowing how it is (or what its like) be an instance of propositional knowledge ? Now, this Greek phrase is actually somewhat ambiguous between an objectual and a propositional con- strual: It can certainly be construed in the way just cited. But since “so on” ("chat which is") functions here also as the object of “grdnai”, the more adequate transla~ tion seems to be “knowing that-which-is as itis”. Yet this point is not rally deci- sive. However we construe this phrase, there is no incoherence in describing the epistemic acquaintance with a Form F-itself such that it implies that one knows ‘what this Form is like. Some formulation like that could even be used with respect to some strictly non-propositional knowledge-by-acquaintance as conceived by Russell [Fsomebody is acquainted with the color red, they can certainly be said to know ‘what red is ike’, although ehe content of this knowledge is not express- ible in a proposition. Moreover, Platonic theory of object-cognition with respect to Forms should not be construed in this Russellian manner anyway. To begin with, even if not all forms are definable according to Plato, some at least are. And in their case i is possible to reproduce the content of one’s acquaintance in a defini- ‘owledged by them. In chs case, then, the “pei” after “nomima” doss not mean “about” Coast point to an object of reference ofa belief (that which the beliefs abou), but more ‘raguely indicates the respect: ‘In respect of beauty, chy acknowledge nothing ele chan the many inscances of beauty which re and are not beautfl’ 14. For the possibility of a non-propostional construction of doxazein cf Saif, Pla tons Begriff der Wahrheit .\loe. cit), 357 fA general grammatical analysis for che verbs of knowing is povided by John Lyons, iractunal Semantic. An Anabsis of Pre ofthe Vocab- ery of Pla, Oxford 1963. 15. This is the way Comiford and G.M.A Grube (revised by C:D.C. Reeve) eansare it.The amt Taot removed by the parallel formulation in 477B10-11. Although the word-order is slightly diferent, the syntactical structure i the same, Huaes platonictennes 1V266 JAN SZAIF tional formula (with some qualifications though—I will come back to this point at the end of my paper). itis possible to construe epistimé as a mode of acquaintance or object-cog- nition. If in the light of this, itis granted that we are dealing here with a classi- fication of modes of object-cognition or acquaintance, i Follows that we have to construe daxa as acquaintance with natural of social instantiations of Forms, since doxais described as being of such instantiations. “The formal object of dena is characterized by its mode of equivocal being which cannot be determined as being either F or not-F ot both or neither (479C3-5), so that the acquaintance with such an object can provide only an unstable appearance (Phainesthai, 47947, B2, 4), nota firm and stable intellectual grasp (noéai). What then is the characteristic achievement (the ho apergazetai) of doxa with respect to this type of object ? Plato says no more than that doxa’s activity is daxazein (478A8) and that it takes place with respect to what is-and-is-not. This does not give us any additional informacion since the meaning of the verb doxazein depends on how we are sup- posed to understand the achievement of daa. The clue we are looking for may lie in the connection between daxa and changing appearance highlighted in section (@). An object of doxe appears, say, beautiful and is, hence, conceived of as bea tiful. But while the grasp of some perfect being like the beautiful itself as beau ful/beauty is stable, the conceptual representation of a doxastic instance is unstable as this object can also appear ugly {e. g. if we change the context and compare it to something much more beautiful, or if we see it from a different aspect). Both types of cognitive grasp represent their object as being F, bue only when the object is unqualifiedly F, is this representation fully warranted, while in the mixed onto- logical case the object eludes this representation as being F since it manifests itself both as F and as not-F. “Thus we can say that, according to CSA, the cognitive achievement of the activ. ity of doxazein is a certain kind of conceptualized representation of an object which is not unequivocally F, as being F. tis a mode of representation of being which falls shore of its object and is unstable because its object lacks genuine being. Is representational truth is equivocal and transient the same way as the instantiated being which ic represents is equivocal and transient.—IF this is the ‘achievement? of doxa, it does not seem much of an ‘achievement at all, rather a lack of a cogni- tive achievement. But this is of course the point Plato wants to drive home. This cognitive mode has no real value. To be sure, it is better than total agndsia, which che cognitive state in which nothing is presented to the mind—just a total lack cof cognition, a black screen, asic were, complete darkness. There is more light’ in doxa than in agndsia (cf. 478C13-14). But it is only, as it were, a flickering light, a mix of light and darkness, presenting a certain mode of being to the mind and then canceling it out it again. 1 chink that this incerpretational strategy of construing epitémé and dasa as two kinds of acquaintance with things that are or appear Bis the only way to provide a reading which stands in agreement with the text and does not lead into the absurd ‘consequence that it is impossible to form an opinion about a Form of that one cannot know anything about concrete objects. When philosophers (as conceived Brudespatonictennes 1V |je DOXA EX EPISTEME AS MODES OF ACQUAINTANCE 267 in che Republic) assess presumed participants of ‘F-itself” in the physical and so world, they will not simply represent chem as being or not being F. They will dis- tinguish between the underived being-F or the Form and the derived being, F that is based on ‘participation’ in F-itsel, and they will specify the relevant respects in which the case in question qualifies as an exemplification of (derived) being-F . In other words : They won't base their judgment on the simple and deceptive app ance of the thing as being F. Theirs will be a differentiated judgment whose main cognitive basis is acquaintance with the Form itself. ‘Ac this poine I want to add some more general remarks as to why Plato both- crs co distinguish epistémé and dosa as two levels of acquaintance with being-F. As Julia Annas has tightly pointed out, the argument in Rep. V presupposes a certain understanding of knowledge and tries to develop a concept of daxa as its counter part.!6 Now, if episémé is conceived as perfecred conceptual understanding, rooted in the adequate and firm cognitive grasp of the essence or Form denoted by the ‘concept-word in question, then we ought to expect that daxa stands for some defi- cient mode of conceptual understanding, So what isthe poine of dex asa deficient mode of conceptual understanding, an epistemological theory focused on the idea of the possibility of frm and objec- tive conceptual understanding ? Let’ take up again the point about context-relativ- ity and imagine a litle example of our own. Ifa lover of beautiful sights stands in front of a painting of Helen and exclaims : “She is beautiful !", an uncompromis- ing Dlatonist in cheit company would of course retort tha this is nothing compared to the beauty of a geometrical construction. Another, more amiable philosopher ‘might come to the aide of the lover of sights and submit : “Well, with respect to her looks and as a human being, itis certainly fair to say that she is extraordi- natily beautiful” If che lover of sights accepts that, they are already on the way to becoming aware of the distinction between Forms and mixed instances. This more sophisticated judgment is immune against the argument from context-rlativity because it specifies the relevant context or respect and thus qualifies the attribution ‘of the property in the appropriate way. It does more than just articulate a mode of appearance. Ithas analyzed the appearance by situating it in is context. This kind of realization of context-dependence isthe frst step toward understanding why the universal content denoted by the concept-word cannot be identical with any of these derived instances or their sum. Yet people who havent yet opened chemseves to the impact of Socratic dialec- ‘ic, wll rely for their understanding of concepts like beauty, justice, or largeness, cn their acquaintance with what they see as uncontroversial or outstanding exam- ples, When Socrates asks someone to explain what justice is, or what beauty i, they will firs cite such examples (types ot tokens), because it is examples of that kind which their understanding of the concepts in question is based upon. In the ‘case of value-concepts, poetic productions play a significant role for the Greeks in providing such socially accepted examples. (This refers us back to the ‘lovers ‘and sights and sounds) Yee like the orators and politicians, the poets as wel lack insight into the real nature of the values in question and thus cannot provide any reliable guidance, When Soctates scrutinizes such examples presumed to be ‘clea’ 16. Cf Annas, le. ct 193. ‘hades platoniciennes 1V268 JAN SZAIF instances of something which is F, it turns out thac their appearance of bei not clear at all because a change of context will ern the appearance into its con- trary. He will ry to make his interlocutors realize that they lack genuine under- standing of the property or value in question as long as they rely solely on their acquaintance with socially accepted examples. Yet he will grant that their deficient ‘understanding is more chan cotal ignorance (agndsia). They are in an intermed- ate state which is not knowledge but at least provides some starting-points in the quest for real understanding, So from the point of view of a theory of conceptual progress, one needs to dis- cuss this mode of acquaintance because itis the basis of our insufficient conceptual understanding before the onset of philosophical investigation. It is easy to show how. from this point of view, CSA fits into the context of the central books of the Republic, which are inspived by an ethical and pedagogical idea according to which the objectivation of our leading concepts is of paramount significance for the real- ization of human happiness. Genuine conceptual understanding requires that one become aware of the existence of Forms and of the derivative character of detet- ‘minations in the physical and social world. This is the theme of DDA. Genuine conceptual understanding would have to have the character ofa firm and sta- ble acquaintance with a descriptive content and should not be subject ro changes according, ro context and perspective. Yet the instantiations in the physical and social world cannot provide this because their mode of being is context-relative and unstable. This is the theme of CSA. Only the person who is acquainced with the Form itself and has a clear representation of icin his soul will be competent to judge upon and produce things that instantiate the Form in the physical and social world. ‘This isthe theme of the passage that immediately follows upon CSA. (484A-D). Ie provides the epistemological justification for the contention that the philosophers alone are entitled to rule over a human commonwealth. These three aspects ofthe description of the doxastic state of mind and its objects (ie. the con- cealment of the underlying reality of the Forms, the instability of appearance, the insufficiency as models or standards for judgment and production) together pro- vide the basis for the subsequent epistemological and pedagogical discussions in books VI and VIT about how we can advance toward a genuinely true conceptual representation of reality and value. Ad 4) As to the remaining question ia which sense epistém is infallible and dove fallible Tcan now confine myself to some brief comments. In a way, the answer can be very simple : Since the doxastic representation is not crue without quali- fication, it cannot be called infallible. The episteraic acquaintance, on the other hand, provides a firm and stable representation which is crue ofits object with- ‘out any restriction and cannot turn into something false. Yee che temark in 477 that doxa is apt co fal while epistéme isnt, is likely to have a wider scope. It seems to characterize the doxastic state of mind in general, ie. the cognitive condition that we are in as long as we have not gained an objective foundation for our con- ‘cepts and rely on examples instead. The lack of adequate and reliable concepts is a the source of mistaken judgements. People whose understanding of justice is based solely on their acquaintance with supposedly clear instances of justice and BrudesplatonitennesDOXA EV EPISTEME AS MODES OF ACQUAINTANCE 269 who tty to extrapolate from these to new situations with the help of similarities and analogies, may be lucky enough to hit upon a cight answer here and there. But they may quite as well go wrong, noc having grasped the essence of justice. To be sure, also someone with perfected conceptual understanding can go wrong if their information about the details ofthe sieuation is insufficient. But the cause oftheir error does not lie in their knowledge of the Form. In that sense, genuine concep- tual knowledge is infallible. In my introductory remarks I mentioned the problem that CSA distinguishes, «pistimt and doxa as eo different powers (dunameis) of the soul, while lavet on, in Rep. Vil, 518A-519B, he stresses that the rational dunamis of the soul (the “eye of the soul”) is just oe and that itis not implanted into out soul by philosophical or scientific education, but has been active all along if with respect to the inappropri- ate kind of objects. ‘The word “dunamis” is used in many different ways by Plato. In the passage in Rep. VII “dumamis” means a faculty, indeed she rational faculty of the soul. Yet in the text in Rep. V that sets out CSA, it is crucial not to interpret “dunamis" as “faculty”. His examples of sight and hearing are misleading in that respect because they are faculties. In the Rep. VII passage, Socrates grants that the tational faculty, when i applies itself co the objects and processes of the social or natural world, can achieve a high degree of shrewdness and sharpness of mind with respect to these, even though it has not been enlightened by philosophy. This is a kind of competence which is based on experience and socially transmitted ideas, but without real understanding regarding the basic ethical concepts that should lead ‘one’s pursuit of private and public happiness. There are several striking passages in books VI and VII that situate this sort competence at the level of doxa.’” So, from the point of view of Rep. VI, 518A-519B, the one rational faculty can and does produce daxa-type cognition. Furthermore, there isa clear thematic sequence that links CSA with this passage in Rep. VIZ. The Sun follows up on the description of epistémé and doxa as different cognitive states and powers, describing them as dif ferent achievements of the intellectual faculty (represemted as an analogon to the visual faculty) that corselate with the ontological quality of the object of acquain- tance such that only an object which exhibits “truth and being” allows for epistémé. “The imagery of the Sun is then integrated into the much more complex imagery of the Cave, and the passage in Rep. VIT which emphasizes the unity of the rational faculty, belongs to Socrates’ comments about the meaning of the Cave. So all ths, taken together, makes ic quite clear that also doxi, as described in CSA, is a product of the rational core of the soul when it is in a deficient condi- tion, ‘The rational faculty of the soul, which is metaphorically named as ‘eye of the sou!’, can produce cognitive states with different levels of cognitive ‘power’ or force’. Only epistemic cognition is able to present an object ro the mind that allows for a firm and unequivocal grasp. Doxa does not achieve that. I want to conclude with some general remarks on the concepts of truth and knowledge'® (as acquaintance with Forms) and about the problem of the assert 17, CE Rep. 488C-E, 493A-C, SIGE-SI7A; 517. 18. On the relation between Plato’ concept of ruth and his epistemology cf: Seaf, Platons Begriff (lo. et), 72-324 (see also idem, Der Wrbitsberiff i der Masschen eudespatonicionnes IV270 JAN SZAIF ibility of knowledge in order to shed some mote light on the background of CSA. ‘When Socrates started his reasoning as to why the kind of ‘learning’ which is pro- vided by theatrical performances or minor crafis, should not count a8 genuine inter- «est in knowledge, he hinted at the connection between the concepts of knowledge and teuth, calling the philosophers lovers of the sight of the truth’ (475E), and he implied thac the kind of experience such performances and crafts can pros itrelevant for the achievement of knowledge because it ean grant no acquaintance with ‘the truth’ At the same time, his remark also points forward to one ofthe cen- tral thematic lines that can be followed through books VI and VII: The idea that the orientation toward truth and genuine being is the defining characteristic ofa philosophical pre-disposition and a philosophical life,"” and that the main goal of the whole curriculum of mathematical and philosophical subjects for the Future philosopher-rulers, the crucial end of their cognitive ascent, is to let the students become acquainted with ‘the truth’. The concept of ‘truth in play here sto a large extent determined by the basic epistemological and metaphysical idea of Plato’, via. the idea that real knowledge and understanding must be based on an objec- tive clarification of our concepts and that this can be achieved only by becoming squainted with the underlying objective essences or Forms. Plato has adjusted his talk of truth to the purposes of his epistemology and ontology of Forms, A very important factor, in chis connection, for Plato’ understanding of the ‘etm ‘ruth’ is his tendency to see truth as the relacum of knowledge (epistémé). As hhe points out in his discussion ofthe theory of Forms in the Parmenides, knowledge is supposed to be “of the truth” (ts aléheis, Parm. 134A). In cis turn of phrase, «alisheiais understood as realty which can become known. Since Plato conceives «piattmé primacily as conceptual clarification on the basis ofa specific type of object- cognition, viz. cognition of the Forms, che corresponding concept of alétheia as nowable reality is not conceived as the counterpart of assertoric truth (which would be something like facts or existing states of affairs). Rather he uses the phrase ‘the truth’ (or interchangeably “that which is cue”, ta aléeh) to name the whole realm. of Forms." The Parmenides passage is an example For that because it treats alétheia as the genetic object of generic epistémé, but the different Forts as the objects of the different kinds of epitémé (c.g. knowledge of justice, which is knowledge of the Form the Just). In a similar manner, though only implicitly, che fist of the ewo Antike', in M. nets, idem (eds.), Der philesophische Wabrhetsbegriff in seiner Geschichte, Berlin New York 2006, 1-32,). Two recent incresing attempts at cucidating the role of «léhcia a the simile of the Sun (which is pivotal for our understanding the cole of this concept inthe Republic) are Franco Ferrari, “La causlitd del bene nella Repubblica di Pl tone," Elences,22(2001), 5-37 :B.E. Hest, "Plo and the Spit Personality of Ontooge- ical Aletheia”, Apron 37 (2004), 109-150, 19. CE Rep. 4858-487A, 489E-490D, Rep. 535 DE (se also Legg. 730C f.). On this ‘topic, f Jan Szalf, Die Aletheia in Platons Tugendebre, in M. van Acketen (ed), Plton Vere seen, Penpelsiven der Forschung, Darmstadt 2004, 183-209. 20, Bg. Rep. 525C5-6, 526B2-3, 527B9, E2- 21, CE Phd. 8448, Symp. 21245, Rep. 51984, Phde,247D4, 248C3-4, 2495. This "usage is also incorporated into the thre cénteal smiles of the Republic ef. Rep. 508D4-6, 510A9, SLE, 515C2, D6-7). ues platonttennes WYDOXA ET EPISTEME AS MODES OF ACQUAINTANCE on arguments in Rep. V(DDA) identifies ‘the truth’ with the Forms by identifying the ability to see or contemplate ‘the truth’ with the ability ‘see’ che Forms. Yer in the context of Plato’ theory of Forms, ‘truth’ does not only function as the notion for knowable realty. When Plato identifies the Forms with ‘the cruth’ (2 alétheia) or ‘that which is teue’ (ta aléhé), which he does frequently in the books Vi and VII, we ate also supposed to understand that only the Forms are what they are in a not-derivative way, while the being of the instances we are at frst familiar with, is only derivative, only a copy of that which is the only ‘rue F’, the essence itself, Also the idea of the Form’s pure and undiluted being-whac-itis, not com- promised by the admixture of contrary properties, is supposed be an aspect of the ‘ruth of the Forms, (The linguistic basis for these connotations of the word “true” is the attributive use of “true”).* “These very specific aspects of ontological truth restrict the application of this term to objects and, moreover, to a specific ontological category of objects, the Forms. This concept of truth is adjusted to the purposes of his metaphysical epi temology of acquaintance with Forms. (It needs to be mentioned that beside this theoretically loaded concept of truth there is also a much more down-to-earth usage of “true” in the Republic and elsewhere meaning assertoric truth—a concept that he cantt renounce ie wants to uphold che applicability of the knowledge of Forms to concrete objects in the sensible word. Yer this meaning does not yet get Plato's full philosophical attention in the Republic.) Now, if the teuth that can become the content of the epistemic representation isa set of intellectual objects, not of propositions, does this mean thac the truth which can become known is not assertible at all ? For Plato, knowledge is fist and foremost knowledge-wha, i e. che grasp of essences. ‘That is why the passage in the Parmenides breaks down truth (alétheia), as the generic object of knowledge, into Forms. In CSA, Plato speaks of ‘knowing that-what-is as tis. Yet in the case of a Form knowing the thing as it és is knowing what it és. It is the kind of knowledge Plato's Socrates aims at when he discusses questions like “What is beauty 2”. Now, the grasp of such an essence is typically described by Plato asa kind of acquaintance (witness che pervasive use of visual met- aphors in passages that describe the cognitive ascent to the Forms). On the other hand, iis also a methodological principle of dialectical enquiry that it should try to provide a definition of the Form in question, a definition that can be asserted and defended in an argumentative exchange. So his type of acquaintance cannot, be torally disconnected from assertbility. Yer how it connects with assertibility, ‘seems to be a rather complex issue in Plato. A Form, in Plato, is a reified essence such that the content of which the Form is supposed to be the one and only pure instantiation can be asctibed to the Form itself (che so-called ‘self-predication’ of the Form). Therefore the content which is is particular prominent in 510A, 520C, Symp. 212A (se alo Rep. 484CD, 533A, Cra 439AB, Soph. 240A). Phe. 67AB explicitly assers the conceptual connection between truth end purity (o elitrina). CE. the use of “eiltrinds” in Rep. V, 479D5. 23. CE. Anna, lo. ct, 192. Budesplatontcennes IV272 JAN SZAIF that as which the Form becomes known, can also be asserted ofthe Form. This is the minimum of aserbility whichis fllilled even by simple, unanalyzable Forms. Yer such an assertion in which the unanalyzable content is predicated of itself, ‘would have no more information value regarding the content of this Form than a tautology. Thus this propositional formulation would certainly be secondary to the pre-propositional acquaintance with the Form and not be able to express the truth which has become known, in an informative way. In the case of analyzable Forms, the question what it iscan be answered with an informative definitional statement, Yer even here it seems that this propositional articulation is somehow secondary to the familiarity with the Form which cannot be established simply by learning a definitional formula. Otherwise philosophical instruction would be easy and could cor memorizing definitional formulae. This is definitely not Plato's position, The ways in which dialectic can establish knowledge of and acquaintance with Forms, are not the topic of this paper though. I want to end by summarizing what I see as three defining characteristics of Plato's concept of epistéimé that are in the background of the arguments in Rep. V. First, knovledge is conceived primarily as a type of object-cognition or acquain- tance, with Forms as objects. Secondly, this object-cognition is primarily a kind of knowledge-what and as such the foundation for a perfected conceptual under- standing which is adequate in virtue of being true to the Forms. Thiedly, cis kind of object-cognition connects (in ways that need further investigation) with the ability to assert and rationally defend statements about the Form in question (and ‘ultimately about the whole nevwork of Forms"), In contrast ro this, dowa is under- stood as a developmental stage of conceptual understanding in which a person has nothing but derivative instantiations to rely upon—instantiations of F-itself whose being-F is context-depended and transient. These derivative instantiations will turn ‘out not to provide a reliable bass if someone in this condition is confronted with the question what iis to be an F. Not being acquainted with that which i ‘rue—via the original itself behind che transient images, the one pure and faultless instance of being-F—clinging instead to examples in the natural or social world which are accepted by the multitude without a sufficient rational foundation, they will not stand up to the dialectical test. 24, This isa point hac I have not couched upon at al in this paper: Is the reason why in Plato knowledge as concepcual understanding based on acquaintance with the Forms connects with knowledge as systematic understanding, This becomes mote transparent in Plato later dialogues. (Yet see Jan Smif, “Paton iber Wahrheit und Kohirens;" Archie fir Gehichte der Vhilesophie 82.(2000), 119-148, on the role of the systematiciy of dalecti- cal knowledge in the Republic) ‘Fudes platonteonnes W