BP22 SpousesTorresvMedina

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 157547. February 23, 2011.]

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, petitioners, vs. ELVIN *(1) CHAN
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J :
p
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from
the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22).
Antecedents
On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information charging the late Eduardo
Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 275381
entitled People v. Eduardo Simon. The accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or
draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value Landbank Check
No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of
P336,000.00 said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the check or
to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days
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CD Technologies Asia, Inc.
Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013
after receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1(2)
More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan
commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the
principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment (docketed as Civil Case No. 915-00). 2(3) He alleged in his
complaint the following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
2.
Sometime in December 1996 defendant employing fraud, deceit,
and misrepresentation encashed a check dated December 26, 1996 in the
amount of P336,000.00 to the plaintiff assuring the latter that the check is duly
funded and that he had an existing account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, xerox copy of the said check is hereto attached as Annex "A";
3.
However, when said check was presented for payment the same
was dishonored on the ground that the account of the defendant with the Land
Bank of the Philippines has been closed contrary to his representation that he
has an existing account with the said bank and that the said check was duly
funded and will be honored when presented for payment;
4.
Demands had been made to the defendant for him to make good
the payment of the value of the check, xerox copy of the letter of demand is
hereto attached as Annex "B", but despite such demand defendant refused and
continues to refuse to comply with plaintiff's valid demand;
HTScEI
5.
Due to the unlawful failure of the defendant to comply with the
plaintiff's valid demands, plaintiff has been compelled to retain the services of
counsel for which he agreed to pay as reasonable attorney's fees the amount of
P50,000.00 plus additional amount of P2,000.00 per appearance.
ALLEGATION IN SUPPORT OF PRAYER
FOR PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
6.
The defendant as previously alleged has been guilty of fraud in
contracting the obligation upon which this action is brought and that there is no
sufficient security for the claims sought in this action which fraud consist in the
misrepresentation by the defendant that he has an existing account and
sufficient funds to cover the check when in fact his account was already closed
at the time he issued a check;
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7.
That the plaintiff has a sufficient cause of action and this action is
one which falls under Section 1, sub-paragraph (d), Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court of the Philippines and the amount due the plaintiff is as much as
the sum for which the plaintiff seeks the writ of preliminary attachment;
8.
That the plaintiff is willing and able to post a bond conditioned
upon the payment of damages should it be finally found out that the plaintiff is
not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. 3(4)
On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary

attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through the sheriff attaching
a Nissan vehicle of Simon. 4(5)
On August 17, 2000, Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application
to charge plaintiff's attachment bond for damages, 5(6) pertinently averring:
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On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the

pendency of another action between the instant parties for the same cause before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed thereat as Criminal Case No.
275381-CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, . . .
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While the instant case is civil in nature and character as

contradistinguished from the said Criminal Case No. 915-00 in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch X (10), the basis of the instant civil action is the
herein plaintiff's criminal complaint against defendant arising from a charge of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as a consequence of the alleged dishonor in
plaintiff's hands upon presentment for payment with drawee bank a Land Bank
Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 in the amount of P336,000
drawn allegedly issued to plaintiff by defendant who is the accused in said case,
a photocopy of the Criminal information filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor
of Manila on June 11, 1997 hereto attached and made integral part hereof as
Annex "1".
It is our understanding of the law and the rules, that, "when a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute
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it separately . . . .
On August 29, 2000, Chan opposed Simon's urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiff's attachment bond for damages, stating:
1.
The sole ground upon which defendant seeks to dismiss plaintiff's
complaint is the alleged pendency of another action between the same parties
for the same cause, contending among others that the pendency of Criminal
Case No. 275381-CR entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon"
renders this case dismissable;
2.
The defendant further contends that under Section 1, Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the filing of the criminal action, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action which the plaintiff does not contest; however, it is the
submission of the plaintiff that an implied reservation of the right to file a civil
action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for violation
of B.P. 22 in Criminal Case No. 2753841 does not at all make any allegation of
damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery of
damages; on top of this the plaintiff as private complainant in the criminal case,
during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not represented at all by
a private prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution
on the criminal case to prove damages; all of these we respectfully submit
demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the right of the plaintiff to file a
separate civil action for damages;
3.
The defendant relies on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court which mandates that after a criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action; however, the defendant overlooks and
conveniently failed to consider that under Section 2, Rule 111 which provides
as follows:
aTcIEH
In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
In as much as the case is one that falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines as it is based on fraud, this action therefore may be prosecuted
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independently of the criminal action;

4.
In fact we would even venture to state that even without any
reservation at all of the right to file a separate civil action still the plaintiff is
authorized to file this instant case because the plaintiff seeks to enforce an
obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable
instruments law. The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to enforce his
liability as drawer in favor of the plaintiff as payee of the check. Assuming the
allegation of the defendant of the alleged circumstances relative to the issuance
of the check, still when he delivered the check payable to bearer to that certain
Pedro Domingo, as it was payable to cash, the same may be negotiated by
delivery by who ever was the bearer of the check and such negotiation was
valid and effective against the drawer;
5.
Indeed, assuming as true the allegations of the defendant regarding
the circumstances relative to the issuance of the check it would be entirely
impossible for the plaintiff to have been aware that such check was intended
only for a definite person and was not negotiable considering that the said check
was payable to bearer and was not even crossed;
6.
We contend that what cannot be prosecuted separate and apart
from the criminal case without a reservation is a civil action arising from the
criminal offense charged. However, in this instant case since the liability of the
defendant are imposed and the rights of the plaintiff are created by the
negotiable instruments law, even without any reservation at all this instant
action may still be prosecuted;
7.
Having this shown, the merits of plaintiff's complaint the
application for damages against the bond is totally without any legal support
and perforce should be dismissed outright. 6(7)
On October 23, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon's urgent motion
to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff's attachment bond for damages, 7(8)
dismissing the complaint of Chan because:
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xxx
After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to

GRANT the Motion to Dismiss and the application to charge plaintiff's bond for
damages.
For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
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relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity
in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in
one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
other. . . .
A close perusal of the herein complaint denominated as "Sum of
Money" and the criminal case for violation of BP Blg. 22 would readily show
that the parties are not only identical but also the cause of action being asserted,
which is the recovery of the value of Landbank Check No. 0007280 in the
amount of P336,000.00. In both civil and criminal cases, the rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts, are identical.
Plaintiff's claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to
pursue this civil case owing to the fact that there was no allegation of damages
in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no private prosecutor during the
presentation of prosecution evidence is unmeritorious. It is basic that when a
complaint or criminal Information is filed, even without any allegation of
damages and the intention to prove and claim them, the offended party has the
right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is made or
unless in the meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil action.
. . . The over-all import of the said provision conveys that the waiver which
includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under
Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and express. And
this must be logically so as the primordial objective of the Rule is to prevent the
offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused.
Indeed, the evidence discloses that the plaintiff did not waive or made a
reservation as to his right to pursue the civil branch of the criminal case for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the defendant herein. To the considered view of
this court, the filing of the instant complaint for sum of money is indeed legally
barred. The right to institute a separate civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. . . .
DEcSaI
Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff's submission that the

herein case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under
Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules, to
wit:
"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of criminal case provided the right is
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reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall

proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence."
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

1.
Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis pendentia";
2.
Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on

August 14, 2000;
3.
Charge the plaintiff's bond the amount of P336,000.00 in favor of

the defendant for the damages sustained by the latter by virtue of
the implementation of the writ of attachment;
4.
Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost

dispatch to the defendant's physical possession the vehicle seized
from him on August 16, 2000; and
5.
Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,000.00 by

way of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Chan's motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 2000, 8(9)
viz.:
Considering that the plaintiff's arguments appear to be a mere repetition
of his previous submissions, and which submissions this court have already
passed upon; and taking into account the inapplicability of the ratio decidendi
in the Tactaquin vs. Palileo case which the plaintiff cited as clearly in that case,
the plaintiff therein expressly made a reservation to file a separate civil action,
the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the
dismissal of Chan's complaint, disposing: 9(10)
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
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SO ORDERED.
On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by

petition for review, 10(11) challenging the propriety of the dismissal of his complaint
on the ground of litis pendentia.
In his comment, 11(12) Simon countered that Chan was guilty of bad faith and
malice in prosecuting his alleged civil claim twice in a manner that caused him
(Simon) utter embarrassment and emotional sufferings; and that the dismissal of the
civil case because of the valid ground of litis pendentia based on Section 1 (e), Rule
16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was warranted.
On June 25, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, 12(13)
overturning the RTC, viz.:
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As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first
is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired
through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the
personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be
compensated through indemnity which is also civil in nature. Thus, "every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising
from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is
either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a)
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the

recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Rule 111, Section 2 further states:
cIECTH
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
entered in the criminal action.
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However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability

under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act
or omission, the rule has been changed.
In DMPI Employees Credit Association vs. Velez, the Supreme Court
pronounced that only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the Supreme
Court held:
"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the
independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers
only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from
the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted
separately without a reservation".
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3.
When
civil
action
may
proceed
independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34,
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on
December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no
vested rights in the rules of procedure. . . .
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-124, an independent civil action for
damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas
under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if
there was no reservation as to its filing."
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It must be pointed that the abovecited case is similar with the instant
suit. The complaint was also brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of
the Civil Code and committed by the respondent in the issuance of the check
which later bounced. It was filed before the trial court, despite the pendency of
the criminal case for violation of BP 22 against the respondent. While it may be
true that the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to
independent civil action became effective on December 1, 2000, the same may
be given retroactive application and may be made to apply to the case at bench,
since procedural rules may be given retroactive application. There are no vested
rights in the rules of procedure.
In view of the ruling on the first assigned error, it is therefore an error to
adjudge damages in favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 13, 2001 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108
affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioner is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
On March 14, 2003, the CA denied Simon's motion for reconsideration. 13(14)
Hence, this appeal, in which the petitioners submit that the CA erroneously
premised its decision on the assessment that the civil case was an independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code; that the CA's reliance on
the ruling in DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative Inc. v. Velez 14(15) stretched the
meaning and intent of the ruling, and was contrary to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure; that this case was a simple collection suit for a sum
of money, precluding the application of Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 15(16)
In his comment, 16(17) Chan counters that the petition for review should be
denied because the petitioners used the wrong mode of appeal; that his cause of
action, being based on fraud, was an independent civil action; and that the appearance
of a private prosecutor in the criminal case did not preclude the filing of his separate
civil action.
Issue
The lone issue is whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of
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the unfunded check (Civil Case No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence on the
Propriety of filing a separate civil action based on BP 22
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22
can give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr., 17(18) holding:
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Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to

another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,
indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage,
loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the
penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of
Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every
crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty
party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the
damage, and indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil.
265).
CDEaAI
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Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of
the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless
check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and
empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only
the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a
separate civil suit. To do so may leave the offended party unable to recover
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even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant
drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to
provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
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However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a

bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall
be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make
such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without
specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees
therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be
required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by
the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to
file such civil action separately shall be allowed. 18(19)
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved,
which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint
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or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or

exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not
yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the
trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of the Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the
cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party.
It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
SEACTH
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect
when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless
applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not
violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, or arise from, procedural laws. 19(20) Any new rules may validly be made to
apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to
an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, 20(21) except that in criminal
cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser
quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of
the offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post
facto under the Constitution. 21(22)
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation
of any assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court
Circular 57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997.
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding,
the following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and
prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes
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the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:

1.
The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and
no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or
recognized. 22(23)
2.
Upon the filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based upon the amount of the
check involved which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed, in
accordance with the schedule of fees in Section 7 (a) and Section 8 (a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court as last amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94
effective August 1, 1994. Where the offended party further seeks to enforce
against the accused civil liability by way of liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, he shall pay the corresponding filing fees
therefor based on the amounts thereof as alleged either in the complaint or
information. If not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the amount of such fees shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
3.
Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial
thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent
procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in
the actions as thus consolidated.
4.
This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation and shall take effect on November 1, 1997.
The reasons for issuing Circular 57-97 were amply explained in Hyatt
Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation, 23(24)
thus:
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We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the
amount of the checks was also impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the present revised Rules,
the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no
longer needed. The Rules provide:
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Section 1.
Institution of criminal and civil actions.
(a) . . .
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts
alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on
the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions.
EHcaAI
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It
specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the
complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because
of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the
Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This
rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22
cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily
no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses
the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and
sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof.
The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection
based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition
of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal
and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be
stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate
Copyright 1994-2014
15
filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a
separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate
civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance
when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed
ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed
that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the
dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and
time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final
disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where
petitioners' rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the
trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of
B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to
the case at bar. 24(25)
The CA's reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez 25(26) to

give due course to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal
Case No. 275381 was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution
for estafa, is not on all fours with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of
BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result
in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, 26(27) the
procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct
crimes are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended
party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may institute an
independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, 27(28) as
DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the
Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil
action to claim the civil liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon
the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
To repeat, Chan's separate civil action to recover the amount of the check
involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently
maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
B
Aptness of the dismissal of the civil action
on the ground of litis pendentia
Copyright 1994-2014
16
Did the pendency of the civil action in the MeTC in Manila (as the civil aspect
in Criminal Case No. 275381) bar the filing of Civil Case No. 915-00 in the MeTC in
Pasay City on the ground of litis pendentia?
For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the
concurrence of the following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be
identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two
requisites, the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil. 28(29)
ASEcHI
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381
ineluctably shows that all the elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the
parties in the civil action involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and in Civil Case No.
915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the information in Criminal
Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both alleged that Simon
had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to "cash,"
thereby indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the
facts upon which the reliefs sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And,
thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case would necessarily bar the other by res
judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon the same claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil
Case No. 915-00 on the ground of litis pendentia through its decision dated October
23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err in affirming the MeTC.
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari, and,
accordingly, we reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of
Appeals on June 25, 2002. We reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in Pasay City.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, **(30) Abad, ***(31) Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
Copyright 1994-2014
17
*
**
***
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
Misspelled as Elven in the caption of the petition and in the rollo.

Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales who is on leave per
Special Order No. 925 dated January 24, 2011.
Additional member per Special Order No. 926 dated January 24, 2011.
Rollo, p. 31.
Id., pp. 35-37.
Id., pp. 35-36.
Id., p. 24.
Id., pp. 38-46.
Id., pp. 47-49.
Id., pp. 50-54.
Id., p. 56.
Id., pp. 76-79.
Id., pp. 80-88.
Id., pp. 89-97.
Id., pp. 23-27; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired), and
concurred in by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired) and Associate Justice
Mario L. Guaria.
Id., pp. 29-30.
G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 72.
See note 19, p. 16.
Rollo, pp. 105-109.
G.R. No. L-78911, December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 325.
Bold emphasis supplied.
Cheng v. Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 155, 164-165.
Aldeguer v. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. 502; Ayala de Roxas v. Case, 8 Phil. 197.
Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution; Cooley's Principle of Constitutional Law, p. 313.
G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 454, 459-461.
Supra, note 14.
E.g., Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 338,
343.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Taningco v. Taningco, G.R. No. 153481, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 735.
Copyright 1994-2014
18
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 166730. March 10, 2010.]
SPOUSES FERNANDO TORRES and IRMA TORRES, petitioners,
vs. AMPARO MEDINA and the EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF of the RTC
of Quezon City, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J :
p
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari, 1(32) under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the August 30, 2004 Decision 2(33) and
January 18, 2005 Resolution 3(34) of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
75847.
The facts of the case:
On July 28, 1994, respondent Amparo Medina (Medina) wrote a letter 4(35) to
the Office of the Sheriff, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, applying for
the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of the property of petitioner spouses
Fernando and Irma Torres (Spouses Torres) which was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-61056 (354973) and which is subject of a Deed of
Mortgage 5(36) dated December 20, 1993.
On May 27, 1997, the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff issued a Notice of
Sheriff's Sale 6(37) and, on June 30, 1997, sold at public auction the subject property
to Medina being the highest bidder thereof. A Certificate of Sale 7(38) was thereafter
issued to Medina.
Copyright 1994-2014
19
On September 21, 1999, the Spouses Torres filed a Complaint 8(39) before the
RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage conducted by the Ex-Officio Sheriff. The same was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-99-38781.
In their Complaint, the Spouses Torres raised the following causes of action, to
wit:
a)
the December 20, 1993 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage does not contain a
period or term; hence, performance of the obligation has not yet become
due as there is a need for judicial determination of the period or term;
acHCSD
b)
the June 28, 1994 Statement of Account is not the loan contemplated by
law; therefore, it cannot serve as basis to foreclose extrajudicially the
mortgage;
c)
the credit transaction is either void or unenforceable due to breach of

Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 3765, otherwise known as "The Truth
in Lending Act";
d)
Since appellee sued appellants for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
there could arise a situation of double recovery of damages which is
proscribed by law. If the extrajudicial foreclosure will be allowed and if
appellants will be made to pay the amount of the checks subject of the
criminal suit under B.P. Blg. 22, it would result in the unjust enrichment
of appellee. 9(40)
On July 20, 2000, Medina filed a Motion to Dismiss 10(41) raising the grounds
of res judicata and forum shopping. Medina argued that the Spouses Torres had filed
an earlier Complaint 11(42) praying for the annulment of the real estate mortgage
involving the same property and which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-18962
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 216. Medina contended that said complaint
was already dismissed as evidenced by the RTC's Decision 12(43) dated March 7,
1997.
On December 27, 2001, the RTC issued an Order 13(44) granting Medina's
motion to dismiss the complaint. The RTC ruled that res judicata was present and that
the Spouses Torres were guilty of forum shopping, to wit:
Thus, it is plain from the foregoing that the present action is identical to
the case filed by plaintiffs against the defendant before the Regional Trial Court
Copyright 1994-2014
20
of Quezon City, Branch 216, hence, res judicata lies. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 216, dated March 7, 1997, has
become final; the aforesaid court which rendered said decision had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; the decision was on the merits; and there
is an identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action between the present
action and the case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
216.
The Court also notes that while the plaintiffs here alleged separate
causes of action in the instant complaint, they are actually using the very
same grounds they have brought before Branch 216 of this Court to
support their claim to annul the foreclosure proceedings. The validity of
the real estate mortgage is again being assailed to ask for the annulment of
the foreclosure proceedings conducted over the mortgaged property. It
must be remembered that the validity of the real estate mortgage has been
sustained by the decision in Civil Case No. 94-18962 which decision has
already attained finality. The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the
form of an action but on whether the same evidence would support and establish
the former and present causes of action. Plaintiffs cannot avoid the application
of res judicata by simply varying the form of their action or by adopting a
different method in presenting it. 14(45)
ACTISE
The Spouses Torres appealed to the CA, which, in similar fashion, ruled that
res judicata had already set in, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated December 27, 2001 is hereby
AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED. 15(46)
The Spouses Torres then filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16(47) dated
August 30, 2004, which was, however, denied by the CA in the Resolution 17(48)
dated January 18, 2005.
Hence, herein petition, with the Spouses Torres raising the following
assignment of errors, to wit:
A.
Copyright 1994-2014
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT

IGNORED THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN CIVIL CASE NO.
Q-99-38781 AROSE MUCH LATER THAN THE CAUSE OF
ACTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-94-18962. HENCE, FORUM
SHOPPING AND RES JUDICATA DO NOT APPLY.
21
A-1.
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT RES

JUDICATA EXISTS IN THIS CASE, THE SAME WILL
NOT BE HONORED IF ITS APPLICATION WOULD
CONSTITUTE A SACRIFICE OF JUSTICE IN FAVOR OF
TECHNICALITY;
B.

FAILED TO RULE THAT THE CAUSES OF ACTION CANNOT
BE IDENTICAL IF THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN ONE AROSE
AFTER THE JUDGMENT IN THE OTHER;
C.

FAILED
TO
RULE
THAT
THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AMPARO MEDINA CONTRAVENES THE
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
CODIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 22 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE,
AND WOULD AMOUNT TO DOUBLE RECOVERY EVEN AS
THE B.P. BLG. 22 VIOLATIONS ARE STILL PENDING IN THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY;
D.

FAILED TO RULE THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
AMPARO MEDINA HAS ELECTED HER REMEDY WHEN SHE
SUED PETITIONER FERNANDO TORRES ON A B.P. BLG. 22
VIOLATION, AND ENGAGED THE SERVICES OF A PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR TO PROSECUTE THE SAME. THE FILING OF
THE B.P. BLG. 22 VIOLATION BARS AND EXCLUDES THE
REMEDY OF FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE. 18(49)
The petition is not meritorious.
ATcaID
At the crux of the controversy is the determination of whether or not res

judicata bars the filing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38781.
Civil Case No. Q-94-18962 vis-a-vis Civil Case No. Q-99-38781
As borne from the records of the case, the Spouses Torres first instituted Civil
Case No. Q-94-18962 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 216, which, among
others, prayed for the nullity of the real estate mortgage, dated December 20, 1993.
On March 7, 1997, the RTC issued a Decision 19(50) dismissing the complaint
thereby upholding the validity of the real estate mortgage, the dispositive portion of
Copyright 1994-2014
22
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
DISMISSING the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of merit;
2.
Ordering the plaintiffs, spouses Fernando Torres and Irma Torres,
to pay defendant Amparo Medina, the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS as and by way of attorney's fees and to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED. 20(51)
The Spouses Torres appealed said Decision to the CA.

On February 18, 1998, the CA issued a Resolution 21(52) dismissing the
appeal, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appellants'
motion for extension of time to file appellants' brief is hereby DENIED for
being filed out of time. The appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 22(53)
The Spouses Torres then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was,
however, denied by the CA in the Resolution 23(54) dated August 6, 1998.
Aggrieved, the Spouses Torres then sought relief from this Court.
On July 5, 1999, the Court's First Division issued a Resolution 24(55) denying
the petition of the Spouses Torres. On August 16, 1999, the First Division issued
another Resolution 25 (56) denying the motion for reconsideration. On September 7,
1999, an Entry of Judgment 26 (57) was rendered.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." 27(58) Res judicata lays the rule
that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction,
is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in
the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit. 28(59)
AcSCaI
Copyright 1994-2014
23
The elements of res judicata are:

(1)
the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties;
(3)
the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. 29(60)
In their petition, the Spouses Torres do not dispute the presence of the first
three elements. They, however, dispute the presence of the last element, specifically
arguing that the evidence necessary to establish the cause of action in Civil Case No.
Q-99-38781 is different from that of Civil Case No. Q-94-18962. The Spouses Torres
conclude that the evidence is not identical so as to place the causes of action within
the prohibition based on res judicata. 30(61)
This Court is not persuaded.
To reiterate, in Civil Case No. Q-99-38781, the Spouses Torres raised the
following causes of action:
a)
the December 20, 1993 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage does not contain a
period or term; hence, performance of the obligation has not yet become
due as there is a need for judicial determination of the period or term;
b)
the June 28, 1994 Statement of Account is not the loan contemplated by
law; therefore, it cannot serve as basis to foreclose extrajudicially the
mortgage;
c)
the credit transaction is either void or unenforceable due to breach of

Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 3765, otherwise known as "The Truth
in Lending Act";
d)
Since appellee sued appellants for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
there could arise a situation of double recovery of damages which is
proscribed by law. If the extrajudicial foreclosure will be allowed and if
appellants will be made to pay the amount of the checks subject of the
criminal suit under B.P. Blg. 22, it would result in the unjust enrichment
of appellee. 31(62)
Copyright 1994-2014
24
This Court has previously employed various tests in determining whether or

not there is identity of causes of action as to warrant the application of the principle of
res judicata. One test of identity is the "absence of inconsistency test" where it is
determined whether the judgment sought will be inconsistent with the prior judgment.
If no inconsistency is shown, the prior judgment shall not constitute a bar to
subsequent actions. 32(63)
SCDaHc
This Court finds that the first three causes of action inevitably deal with the
validity of the real estate mortgage. Although the Spouses Torres do not admit it, the
conclusion is certain in that any affirmative relief that this Court may grant on said
causes of action would affect the validity of the real estate mortgage; an issue which
could no longer be revived, as the same has been settled.
In Civil Case No. Q-94-18962, the Spouses Torres already assailed the validity
of the Real Estate Mortgage dated December 20, 1993 as evidenced from the reliefs
sought for by them, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Court to render judgment as follows:
1.
Declaring the . . . Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated 20
December 1993 (Exhibit E) void;
2.
Declaring that . . . all RCBC checks issued pursuant to the Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage dated 20 December 1993 as likewise void;
3.
Directing defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
the annotation of the real estate mortgage in TCT No. RT-61056; . . . 33(64)
In dismissing the Complaint, the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 94-18962
was categorical in upholding the validity of the instrument, to wit:
The contention that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December
20, 1993 should also be annulled being the fruit of the previous voidable
contracts deserves scant consideration. The same was found to have the
essential elements of a valid contract . . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
Corollarily, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, dated December 20,

1993, being perfectly valid, defendant Amparo Medina has the right to its
registration in her favor. . . . 34(65)
Copyright 1994-2014
25
It bears stressing that the doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two
different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or
question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them
are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties
or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on
either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed
by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be
conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in
issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their
privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in
issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required, but
merely identity of issues. 35(66)
ITDSAE
Based on the foregoing, the validity of the real estate mortgage can no longer
be attacked, more so because the decision in Civil Case No. Q-94-18962 has become
final and Entry of Judgment has already been entered in our books.
It therefore goes without saying that the foreclosure of the mortgage is a right
given to Medina as the same is embodied in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
That it is further understood that if the MORTGAGOR shall well and

truly perform the obligation above contracted then this Mortgage shall be null
and void; otherwise, it shall remain in full force and effect and may be
foreclosed extrajudicially under Act 3135 as amended. 36(67)
Thus, this Court finds no error in the decisions of the lower court and the
appellate court declaring that there exists, in fact, res judicata. As succinctly put in
FELS Energy, Inc. v. Province of Batangas, 37(68) res judicata, as a ground for
dismissal, is based on two grounds, namely:
(1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that
there should be an end to litigation republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the
hardship on the individual of being vexed twice for the same cause nemo
Copyright 1994-2014
26
debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A conflicting doctrine would subject the public
peace and quiet to the will and dereliction of individuals and prefer the
regalement of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation
of the public tranquility and happiness. 38(69)
Anent the fourth cause of action in Civil Case No. Q-99-38781, this Court
finds that the Spouses Torres had already raised, in Civil Case No. 94-18962, the fact
that eleven (11) counts of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 violations are
pending with Branch 36, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. 39(70)
Thus, the RTC is correct in its observation that res judicata lies, as the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) checks referred to in the complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-99-38781 are the very same documents subject of Civil Case No.
Q-94-18962. 40(71)
The foregoing findings notwithstanding, the Spouses Torres contend that the
election of Medina from sue them for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 bars Medina from the
remedy of foreclosure of mortgage. The Spouses Torres, citing Bank of America NT
& SA v. American Realty Corporation (Bank of America), 41(72) thus argue:
. . . the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and
not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the
other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit
for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of
mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by
the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but
with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
42(73)
AEaSTC
The argument of the Spouses Torres is misplaced. The doctrine found in Bank
of America, and in related cases, finds no application to the case at bar, as the filing of
a B.P. Blg. 22 case is not the "collection suit" contemplated by law and jurisprudence,
which bars a mortgagee from later on electing to foreclose the mortgaged property.
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes
or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit
Copyright 1994-2014
27
or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both
such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
It bears stressing that in Que v. People, 43(74) this Court stated that the clear
intention of the framers of B.P. Blg. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless
check malum prohibitum. In prosecutions for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 therefore,
prejudice or damage is not a pre-requisite for conviction. In the later case of People
v. Nitafan, 44(75) this Court ruled that the agreement surrounding the issuance of the
checks need not be first looked into since the law has clearly provided that the mere
issuance of any kind of check, regardless of the intent of the parties, i.e., whether the
check is intended merely to serve as a guarantee or deposit, but which check is
subsequently dishonored, makes the person who issued the check liable. The intent of
the law is to curb the proliferation of worthless checks as a means of payment of
obligations.
That B.P. Blg. 22 is not the "collection suit" contemplated by law can be seen
by the fact that the law seeks to punish the mere issuance of a "bum" check
notwithstanding the presence of damage or prejudice to the offended party.
Lastly, the Spouses Torres also argue that the equitable principle of unjust
enrichment bars the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, in the wise:
If private respondent Amparo Medina were to be allowed the
extrajudicial foreclosure that she caused to be conducted, and eventually owned
the properties covered by TCT No. RT-61056 (354973) and at the same time is
awarded the sum of Php4,730,000.00 (including interest) in the eleven (11)
counts of B.P. Blg. 22 violations now pending at the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 36, then she would have recovered twice the same loan
transaction that took place in the first quarter of 1993. Private respondent
Amparo Medina will be twice richer. 45(76)
Again, these arguments are misplaced. In Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 46(77)

notwithstanding petitioner Lazaro's claim that she had already paid her obligation,
this Court still found her liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, thus:
That the obligation of Marlyn Lazaro to complainant Chua has been
extinguished by the conveyance by the former of her car to Chua does not also
justify the cancellation of the indemnity awarded. It should be noted that BP 22
Copyright 1994-2014
28
provides that a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
dishonored check may be imposed by the court. In the case of Esler vs.
Ledesma, this Court stated that a fine is a pecuniary punishment imposed by a
lawful tribunal upon a person convicted of a crime. Clearly, the fine provided
for in BP 22 was intended as an additional penalty for the act of issuing a
worthless check. This is the only logical conclusion, since the law does not
require that there be damage or prejudice to the individual complainant by
reason of the issuance of the worthless check. 47(78)
DcaECT
There can be no double compensation as the indemnity award is distinct from

the underlying obligation of the check. Thus, a person guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22
may be subject to imprisonment or a fine at the discretion of the court and the fact
that the underlying obligation has been paid is of no moment. There will be instances,
of course, that the court will also order the guilty party to pay the face value of the
check if the underlying obligation has not yet been satisfied; however, the same will
not apply to the case at bar, as Medina has already been compensated for the loan
after foreclosing the mortgage. The Spouses Torres will, therefore, only have to pay a
fine or suffer imprisonment if found guilty in their pending cases for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 subject to the rule of preference embodied in Supreme Court Administrative
Circular 12-2000. 48(79)
The Spouses Torres argue that res judicata should not apply if it will sacrifice
justice to technicality. 49(80) Indeed, as cited by the Spouses Torres, this Court has
on occasion disregarded the application of res judicata, however, this Court finds that
the same consideration should not be given in herein petition.
In the first place, the Spouses Torres only filed their complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-99-38781 after more than two years had already lapsed from the time the
ex-officio sheriff sold the property in question at public auction. The foreclosure
proceeding was an action in rem, and therefore, the Spouses Torres cannot feign
knowledge thereof. More importantly, the Spouses Torres were not completely left
without any remedy as they still had the right of redemption, which expired one year
from and after the date of the registration of the Certificate of Sale. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, this Court must assume that no attempt to redeem the
property was undertaken by the Spouses Torres and that they simply allowed their
right and remedy to lapse by their inaction.
In addition, the Spouses Torres have already lost their right to question the
validity of the real estate mortgage, for most part due to the negligence of their
counsel. 50(81) More importantly, the decision upholding the validity of the real
Copyright 1994-2014
29
estate mortgage is already final; hence, the same can no longer be questioned in
another proceeding by simply varying the form of the action, or adopting a different
method of presenting their case. 51(82)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The August
30, 2004 Decision and January 18, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75847 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
Rollo, pp. 8-25.

Penned by Associate Justice Lucenito N. Tagle, with Associate Justices Eloy R.
Bello, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-38.
Id. at 40-41.
Records, pp. 32-34.
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 3-7.
Rollo, p. 33.
Records, pp. 63-73.
Id. at 74-80.
Id. at 81-85.
Id. at 172-176.
Id. at 175-176. (Emphasis supplied.)
Rollo, p. 38.
CA rollo, pp. 110-121.
Id. at 134-135.
Rollo, pp. 13-14.
Records, pp. 81-85.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 101-102.
Id. at 103-106.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
Manila Electric Company v. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., 425 Phil. 65,
78, citing 46 Am. Jur. 514.
Copyright 1994-2014
30
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, 441 Phil. 551, 563
(2002).
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103412, February 3, 2000, 324 SCRA 560,
565, citing Casil v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 264, 276 (1998).
Rollo, p. 16.
Id. at 33.
Tan v. Valdehueza, No. L-38745, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 61, 64.
Records, p. 146.
Id. at 84-85.
Heirs of Clemencia Parasac v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 159910, May 4,
2006, 489 SCRA 498, 517-518.
Records, pp. 35-36. (Emphasis supplied.)
G.R. No. 168557, February 19, 2007, 516 SCRA 186.
Id. at 201.
Records, p. 144.
Id. at 175.
G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA 659.
Id. at 668-669.
G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 160, 165.
G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79, 84.
Rollo, p. 20.
Id. at 727. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As discussed in Jao Yu v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 134172, September 20,
2004, 438 SCRA 431, 438-439: Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg.
22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
ought not be deemed a hindrance.
Rollo, p. 16.
Refer to First Division Resolution dated July 5, 1999, Spouses Fernando V. Torres
and Irma Torres v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 134592.
Salido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76671, May 17, 1989, 173 SCRA 429, 435,
citing Penalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 311-313 (1911).
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31
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 158177. January 28, 2008.]
SPOUSES BENITO LO BUN TIONG and CAROLINE SIOK
CHING TENG, petitioners, vs. VICENTE BALBOA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J :
p
The spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng (petitioners)
charge Vicente Balboa (respondent) with forum shopping.
On February 24, 1997, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila (Branch 34), Civil Case No. 97-82225 for Collection of Sum of Money
against petitioners. The amount sought covers three post-dated checks issued by
petitioner Caroline Siok Ching Teng (Caroline), as follows: Asia Trust Check No.
BNDO57546 dated December 30, 1996 for P2,000,000.00; Asia Trust Check No.
BNDO57547 dated January 15, 1997 for P1,200,000.00; and Asia Trust Check No.
BNDO57548 dated January 31, 1997 for P1,975,250.00 or a total of
P5,175,250.00. 1(83)
On July 21, 1997, separate criminal complaints for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. No. 22) were filed against Caroline before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Manila (Branch 10), covering the said three checks. These
cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 277576 to 78. 2(84)
On August 11, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision in Civil Case No.
97-82225 finding petitioners liable, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants ordering the latter:
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32
1.
To play the plaintiff the sum of P5,175,250.00 plus 6% interest

per annum until full payment;
2.
To pay the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney's

fees.
3.
To pay the cost of suit.
The counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 3(85)
Thereafter, in a Decision dated December 5, 2001 rendered in Criminal Case

Nos. 277576 to 78, the MTC acquitted Caroline of the offenses charged for failure of
the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The MTC, however,
found Caroline civilly liable in favor of respondent for the amounts covered by these
checks, to wit:
WHEREFORE, accused Caroline Siok Ching Teng is acquitted of the
charge for violation of BP Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is ordered civilly liable to the
offended party for the amounts of the checks subject of the three informations
herein, i.e., P1,200,000.00, P1,975,250.00 and P2,000,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 4(86)
Petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the MTC Decision praying for the
deletion of the award of civil indemnity, but it was denied by the MTC per Order
dated April 12, 2002. Thus, Caroline appealed to the RTC, which docketed the case
as Criminal Case Nos. 02-204544-46.
In the meantime, petitioners brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on appeal
the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 97-82225, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 61457.
In the assailed Decision dated November 20, 2002, the CA 5(87) dismissed the appeal
for lack of merit and affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. The dispositive portion of
the assailed CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding no reversible error
in the appealed Decision dated August 11, 1998 of Branch 34 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 97-82225, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit, and said Decision is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED. 6(88)
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33
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but this was denied
per Resolution dated April 21, 2003. 7(89)
On May 8, 2003, the RTC as an appellate court, rendered its Decision in
Criminal Case No. 02-204544-46, modifying the MTC Decision by deleting the
award of civil damages. 8(90)
Now before the Court for resolution is the Amended Petition filed under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the CA Decision dated November 20, 2002 and
Resolution dated April 21, 2003, on the lone ground that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO RECOVER TWICE FOR THE
SAME OBLIGATION ON ACCOUNT OF THE SAID PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S DELIBERATE FAILURE AND REFUSAL TO INFORM
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT THE CIVIL OBLIGATION BEING
SUED UPON IS THE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS WITH THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, AND FOR WHICH THE CIVIL
OBLIGATION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ADJUDGED. 9(91)
Petitioners contend that the assailed CA Decision and Resolution should be

reconsidered and the RTC Decision dated August 11, 1998 dismissed as respondent's
act of filing Civil Case No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78
constitutes forum shopping.
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other court would
render a favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party against whom an
adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and
possibly to get a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by an appeal or a
special civil action for certiorari. 10(92)
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of
the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions;
(2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the
same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration or will constitute litis pendentia. 11(93)
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., 12(94)
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34
the Court ruled that there is identity of parties and causes of action between a civil
case for the recovery of sum of money as a result of the issuance of bouncing checks,
and a criminal case for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the
dismissal of the civil action so as to prevent double payment of the claim. The Court
stated:
. . . The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, reform or rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The
purpose, meanwhile, of the civil action is for the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he
sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. Hence, the
relief sought in the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No.
00-01-00300 is the same as that sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is,
the recovery of the amount of the checks, which, according to petitioner,
represents the amount to be paid by respondent for its purchases. . . .
This was reiterated in Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corp. v. Demetria, 13(95)

where the civil case for the recovery of the amount covered by the bouncing checks
was also ordered dismissed.
In Hyatt and Silangan, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97
effective September 16, 1997, which provides:
1.
The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
This was later adopted as Rule 111 (b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved,
which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint
or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
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Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not
yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the
trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The foregoing, however, are not applicable to the present case. It is worth
noting that Civil Case No. 97-82225 was filed on February 24, 1997, and Criminal
Cases Nos. 277576 to 78 on July 21, 1997, prior to the adoption of Supreme Court
Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997. Thus, at the time of filing of Civil Case
No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, the governing rule is Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1.
Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
xxx
xxx
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from an offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless
(1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or (2) there is a reservation to
institute a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal
complaint. 14(96) Since respondent instituted the civil action prior to the criminal
action, then Civil Case No. 97-82225 may proceed independently of Criminal Cases
Nos. 277576 to 78, and there is no forum shopping to speak of.
Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil
liability in cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed
ahead of the criminal case. Thus, in the Hyatt case, the Court noted, viz.:
. . . This rule [Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure] was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P.
22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no
filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the
intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and
Copyright 1994-2014
36
sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The
inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly
lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases.
Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil,
only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy
laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action.
The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means
that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is
filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is
when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously
observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of
the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and
time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of
the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners' rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. (Emphasis
supplied)
Moreover, the RTC, in its Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-204544-46,

already deleted the award of civil damages. Records do not disclose that appeal had
been taken therefrom. There is, therefore, no double recovery of the amounts covered
by the checks or unjust enrichment on the part of respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
November 20, 2002 and Resolution dated April 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Corona, *(97) Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Records, pp. 3-9.

Rollo, p. 193.
Records, p. 262.
Rollo, p. 125.
Per Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestao, with Acting Presiding Justice Cancio C.
Garcia and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
Copyright 1994-2014
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6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
*
CA rollo, p. 132.
Id. at 162.
Rollo, p. 196.
Id. at 71-72.
R & E Transport, Inc. v. Latag, 467 Phil. 355, 371 (2004).
Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corporation v. Demetria, G.R. No. 166719, March
12, 2007, 518 SCRA 160, 168.
G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 454.
Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corporation v. Demetria, id.
Sanchez v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 155309, November 15,
2005, 475 SCRA 97, 113.
In lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 484 dated January
11, 2008.
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38
Endnotes
1 (Popup - Popup)
*
Misspelled as Elven in the caption of the petition and in the rollo.
2 (Popup - Popup)
1.
Rollo, p. 31.
3 (Popup - Popup)
2.
Id., pp. 35-37.
4 (Popup - Popup)
3.
Id., pp. 35-36.
5 (Popup - Popup)
4.
Id., p. 24.
6 (Popup - Popup)
5.
Id., pp. 38-46.
7 (Popup - Popup)
6.
Id., pp. 47-49.
8 (Popup - Popup)
7.
Id., pp. 50-54.
9 (Popup - Popup)
8.
Id., p. 56.
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10 (Popup - Popup)
9.
Id., pp. 76-79.
11 (Popup - Popup)
10.
Id., pp. 80-88.
12 (Popup - Popup)
11.
Id., pp. 89-97.
13 (Popup - Popup)
12.
Id., pp. 23-27; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona (retired), and
concurred in by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired) and Associate Justice
Mario L. Guaria.
14 (Popup - Popup)
13.
Id., pp. 29-30.
15 (Popup - Popup)
14.
16 (Popup - Popup)
15.
See note 19, p. 16.
17 (Popup - Popup)
16.
Rollo, pp. 105-109.
18 (Popup - Popup)
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40
17.
G.R. No. L-78911, December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 325.
19 (Popup - Popup)
18.
20 (Popup - Popup)
19.
Cheng v. Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 155, 164-165.
21 (Popup - Popup)
20.
Aldeguer v. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. 502; Ayala de Roxas v. Case, 8 Phil. 197.
22 (Popup - Popup)
21.
Sec. 22, Art. III, 1987 Constitution; Cooley's Principle of Constitutional Law, p. 313.
23 (Popup - Popup)
22.
24 (Popup - Popup)
23.
G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 454, 459-461.
25 (Popup - Popup)
24.
26 (Popup - Popup)
25.
Supra, note 14.
27 (Popup - Popup)
26.
E.g., Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, G.R. Nos.155531-34, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 338,
Copyright 1994-2014
41
343.
28 (Popup - Popup)
27.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
29 (Popup - Popup)
28.
Taningco v. Taningco, G.R. No. 153481, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 735.
30 (Popup - Popup)
**
Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Conchita Carpio Morales who is on leave per
Special Order No. 925 dated January 24, 2011.
31 (Popup - Popup)
***
Additional member per Special Order No. 926 dated January 24, 2011.
32 (Popup - Popup)
1.
Rollo, pp. 8-25.
33 (Popup - Popup)
2.
Penned by Associate Justice Lucenito N. Tagle, with Associate Justices Eloy R.

Bello, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-38.
34 (Popup - Popup)
3.
Id. at 40-41.
35 (Popup - Popup)
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4.
Records, pp. 32-34.
36 (Popup - Popup)
5.
Id. at 35-36.
37 (Popup - Popup)
6.
Id. at 41.
38 (Popup - Popup)
7.
Id. at 42.
39 (Popup - Popup)
8.
Id. at 3-7.
40 (Popup - Popup)
9.
Rollo, p. 33.
41 (Popup - Popup)
10.
Records, pp. 63-73.
42 (Popup - Popup)
11.
Id. at 74-80.
43 (Popup - Popup)
12.
Id. at 81-85.
44 (Popup - Popup)
13.
Id. at 172-176.
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43
45 (Popup - Popup)
14.
Id. at 175-176. (Emphasis supplied.)
46 (Popup - Popup)
15.
Rollo, p. 38.
47 (Popup - Popup)
16.
CA rollo, pp. 110-121.
48 (Popup - Popup)
17.
Id. at 134-135.
49 (Popup - Popup)
18.
Rollo, pp. 13-14.
50 (Popup - Popup)
19.
Records, pp. 81-85.
51 (Popup - Popup)
20.
Id. at 85.
52 (Popup - Popup)
21.
Id. at 99-100.
53 (Popup - Popup)
22.
Id. at 100.
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54 (Popup - Popup)
23.
Id. at 101-102.
55 (Popup - Popup)
24.
Id. at 103-106.
56 (Popup - Popup)
25.
Id. at 107.
57 (Popup - Popup)
26.
Id. at 108.
58 (Popup - Popup)
27.
Manila Electric Company v. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., 425 Phil. 65, 78,
citing 46 Am. Jur. 514.
59 (Popup - Popup)
28.
Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, 441 Phil. 551, 563
(2002).
60 (Popup - Popup)
29.
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103412, February 3, 2000, 324 SCRA 560,
565, citing Casil v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 264, 276 (1998).
61 (Popup - Popup)
30.
Rollo, p. 16.
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45
62 (Popup - Popup)
31.
Id. at 33.
63 (Popup - Popup)
32.
Tan v. Valdehueza, No. L-38745, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 61, 64.
64 (Popup - Popup)
33.
Records, p. 146.
65 (Popup - Popup)
34.
Id. at 84-85.
66 (Popup - Popup)
35.
Heirs of Clemencia Parasac v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 159910, May 4,
2006, 489 SCRA 498, 517-518.
67 (Popup - Popup)
36.
Records, pp. 35-36. (Emphasis supplied.)
68 (Popup - Popup)
37.
G.R. No. 168557, February 19, 2007, 516 SCRA 186.
69 (Popup - Popup)
38.
Id. at 201.
70 (Popup - Popup)
39.
Records, p. 144.
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71 (Popup - Popup)
40.
Id. at 175.
72 (Popup - Popup)
41.
G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999, 321 SCRA 659.
73 (Popup - Popup)
42.
Id. at 668-669.
74 (Popup - Popup)
43.
G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 160, 165.
75 (Popup - Popup)
44.
G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79, 84.
76 (Popup - Popup)
45.
Rollo, p. 20.
77 (Popup - Popup)
46.
78 (Popup - Popup)
47.
Id. at 727. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
79 (Popup - Popup)
48.
As discussed in Jao Yu v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 134172, September 20,
2004, 438 SCRA 431, 438-439: Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg.
Copyright 1994-2014
47
22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
ought not be deemed a hindrance.
80 (Popup - Popup)
49.
Rollo, p. 16.
81 (Popup - Popup)
50.
Refer to First Division Resolution dated July 5, 1999, Spouses Fernando V. Torres
and Irma Torres v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 134592.
82 (Popup - Popup)
51.
Salido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76671, May 17, 1989, 173 SCRA 429, 435,
citing Penalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 311-313 (1911).
83 (Popup - Popup)
1.
Records, pp. 3-9.
84 (Popup - Popup)
2.
Rollo, p. 193.
85 (Popup - Popup)
3.
Records, p. 262.
86 (Popup - Popup)
4.
Rollo, p. 125.
Copyright 1994-2014
48
87 (Popup - Popup)
5.
Per Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestao, with Acting Presiding Justice Cancio C.
Garcia and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
88 (Popup - Popup)
6.
CA rollo, p. 132.
89 (Popup - Popup)
7.
Id. at 162.
90 (Popup - Popup)
8.
Rollo, p. 196.
91 (Popup - Popup)
9.
Id. at 71-72.
92 (Popup - Popup)
10.
R & E Transport, Inc. v. Latag, 467 Phil. 355, 371 (2004).
93 (Popup - Popup)
11.
Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corporation v. Demetria, G.R. No. 166719, March

12, 2007, 518 SCRA 160, 168.
94 (Popup - Popup)
12.
G.R. No. 163597, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 454.
95 (Popup - Popup)
Copyright 1994-2014
49
13.
Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corporation v. Demetria, id.
96 (Popup - Popup)
14.
Sanchez v. Far East Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 155309, November 15,
2005, 475 SCRA 97, 113.
97 (Popup - Popup)
*
In lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 484 dated January
11, 2008.
Copyright 1994-2014
50

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 157547. February 23, 2011.]

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

after receiving said notice.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary

On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the

While the instant case is civil in nature and character as

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

independently of the criminal action;

After study of the arguments of the parties, the court resolves to

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

Even assuming the correctness of the plaintiff's submission that the

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves to:

Dismiss the instant complaint on the ground of "litis pendentia";

Dissolve/Lift the Writ of Attachment issued by this court on

Charge the plaintiff's bond the amount of P336,000.00 in favor of

Direct the Branch Sheriff of this Court to RESTORE with utmost

Direct the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of P5,000.00 by

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

On September 26, 2001, Chan appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) by

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the

Rule 111, Section 2 further states:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

Institution of criminal and civil actions.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

The CA's reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez 25(26) to

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.

Jurisprudence 1901 to 2013

Misspelled as Elven in the caption of the petition and in the rollo.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc.