Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn
legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

EN BANC

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that

the present controversy subject of the instant petitions whether
the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives
falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and
whether the resolution thereof is a political question has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view
that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

G.R. No. 160261

November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR.
AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no
matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may
appear to be, over the determination by the independent
branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their
respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself
provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often
frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among
these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution

is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy
spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first
instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of
resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its
resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to,
not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy,
this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate
doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances
which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper
the official acts of each of these three branches must be given
effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican
government, intended as they are to insure that governmental
power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a

relationship of interdependence and coordination among these

branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting
and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of
governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest and
well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its

Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may
be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the

House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation.
When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not
vote. No person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and

subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to

law.

the said Committee that the verified

complaint and/or resolution, as the case
may be, is not sufficient in substance.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on

impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the
Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28,
2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions
between these two Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are
shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II

RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of Initiating

Impeachment. Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least onethird (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.

Section 16. Impeachment

Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In
cases where a Member of the House
files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a verified
complaint that is endorsed by a Member
of the House through a resolution of
endorsement against an impeachable
officer, impeachment proceedings
against such official are deemed
initiated on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified complaint
and/or resolution against such official,
as the case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the House
votes to overturn or affirm the finding of

In cases where a verified complaint or a

resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at
least one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the
Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official
more than once within the period of
one (1) year.

Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of

Impeachment Proceedings. Within a
period of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated as provided in Section 16
hereof, no impeachment proceedings,
as such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a

Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." 3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the

House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance

with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that
the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this
effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of
the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of
the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First
District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District,
Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of

Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as
it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one
year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr.,
alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of
the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th
Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment
complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been
violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28,
2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V,
Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof
be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et.
al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or
strike it off the records of the House of Representatives, and to
promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and
(3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the

Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting

respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice
or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for
Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public
funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further
proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that
this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring
petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v.
PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second
impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as
taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their
petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House
of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and
transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint,
and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F.
Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as
members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal
interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment
proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and
any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming

that they have a right to be protected against all forms of
senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an
obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and
the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that
(1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment
complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be
declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and
the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying
and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a
writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and
agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin
T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar,
both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature
is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves
paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the
House Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment
complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a
citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N.
Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to
enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules
be declared unconstitutional and that the House of

Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with

the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays
in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu
Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and
Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all
citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of
succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a
writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the
Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second
impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as
unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts
of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the
fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio
Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for
Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and
that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a
direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the
Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ
prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from
receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due
course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer,
alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella
and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment
complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as
they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief
Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and

Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have an
abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they
are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the
House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the
Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the
second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without
alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second
impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not
the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance
with law and that the House of Representatives does not have
exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays
in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of
Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging
that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in
its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives
be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the
Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting
the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint
as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the
respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void
and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon
be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against
the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the

same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the

impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and
160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate.
Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed
for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and
160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar
relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No.
160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a
legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of
the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but
it was not carried because the House of Representatives
adjourned for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date,
the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the
Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were
filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug
offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer.
Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him
to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in

its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the
petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and
the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the
petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the
petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.;
and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In
addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to
maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting
for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would
render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or
its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear,
much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which
is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally
mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date,
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion
to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that
"the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings
and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate
as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases,
including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be
recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of
the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this
Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier
consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their
comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c)
include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through
Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating

that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature

and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of
the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented
before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an
impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the
Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal
issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for
Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status
quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the
ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in
a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the
petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition
in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol
ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for
Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World
War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator
Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's
Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici
curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator
Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo

Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by

this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at
what time; and whether it should be exercised by this
Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases
of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on
Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive
issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad
arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of
the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them
to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or
not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential prerequisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have

been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These
matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the
power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial
branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present
1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively
expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present
Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII,
Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice
Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement,
the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only

constitutional organ which can be called upon

to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations
and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism
by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of
powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the
limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution
are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the
United States where no express constitutional grant is
found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its
historical origin and development there, has been set at
rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than
one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating
power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication
from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself

has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary

as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates
to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under
the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review
is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary
does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary
in the determination of actual cases and controversies
must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.24(Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to
"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the

power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights

which are legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial
review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its
Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries."
To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by
Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in
declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the
constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of
the United States generally, but those only which shall be
made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of
the United States confirms and strengthens the principle,
supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are bound
by that instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its
express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial
review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally
infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor
and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the
executive and legislative branches of our government in fact
effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7
of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with

the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review
is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks
and balances which, together with the corollary principle of
separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for
the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle
in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and
is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow
from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them
to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law, and
hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the

maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and

the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them."33 To him,
"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in
that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb
grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities
of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block
letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the
following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent,
former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will
read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or
instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a

product of our experience during martial law. As a
matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past,
but the role of the judiciary during the deposed
regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government,
which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor
general set up the defense of political questions and
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is,
the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up
the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court
said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to
pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels
that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment
upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of
power of the agencies and offices of the government
as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty

to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such

matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant
petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself
which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our
search for its meaning. We do not of course stop
there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed
that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given theirordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case
the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as
much as possible should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter
it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the
need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this

principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this

wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration.
Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought
to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the purpose sought
to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason
and calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where,
speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. MelencioHerrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping
with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people
in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this
Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention

could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person
without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all
other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this
Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional
construction that no one provision of the Constitution
is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which
will render every word operative, rather than one which
may make the words idle and nugatory.45(Emphasis
supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult

the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of
the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had
only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when
the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individual members, and as indicating the reasons for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of
our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it
safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional
refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial
review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the
Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the
coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De
Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot
assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or
incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is
beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the
Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely
excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2)
necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine
constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment

proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely
heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in
the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is
inappropriate since it runs counter to the framers' decision to
allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to
try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under
which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary;
and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US
Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review
in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American
jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the
Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as
provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues
pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion
of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave
abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the
Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional
questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the
American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no
longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited
persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is
concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n
resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the
Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United

States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In

the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical
cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine
Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while
the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the
Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly
provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also
a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution
and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the
House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While
the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the
House of Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive
power to initiate impeachment cases,55 provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section
3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include
the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year
bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call
upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle
that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment
of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the
perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted
the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows
that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it

provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language

of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through
the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v.
Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that
the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review,
are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for
writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform nonministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised
the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus,
in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within
the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of
the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable
controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a
resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it
held that the resolution of whether the House representation in
the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza
v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives
in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments
is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that
although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested

exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of

the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by
the National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective
of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such
member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges
of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that
the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings
would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts'
power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass

upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of

legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the
original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions,
contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the
Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal
injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General
Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners
have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded
standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in
cases involving paramount public interest70 and transcendental
importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the
need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan

of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing

transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule
exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to
vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case
of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant
petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-ininterest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of
civil procedure73 while the latter has constitutional
underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding
standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling
in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus
standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real
party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is
important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular
plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue.
Although all three requirements are directed towards
ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the
merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the
proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law
because in some cases suits are brought not by parties
who have been personally injured by the operation of a
law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Hence the question in standing is whether such parties
have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the

court so largely depends for illumination of difficult

constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in
interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled
to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured
by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a
violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the
contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights
as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in
a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession
which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional
acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers
and legislators when specific requirements have been met have
been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must
be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must
appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, 78 the mere fact
that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a

claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is
a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of
judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It
is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to
all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or
not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to
grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation
that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of
any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives
has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial
taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the
mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any
member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of
law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not
suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a
reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional
issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore,
behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve
the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of
all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to
fully protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to
deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a
judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members
of the class whether or not they were before the court. 89Where it
clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently
represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the
numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class
suit ought to fail. Since petitionersadditionally allege standing as
citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the
sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U.
Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance,
the following instructive determinants formulated by former
Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1)
the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2)
the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court
is satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of
transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude
on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to
craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as
when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the
public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the
requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is
totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the
existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can

take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege

any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While
intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the
courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in
G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise
the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the
part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this
Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No.
160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that
"they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members
of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found
the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310
were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-inIntervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue
of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the
Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed
by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga

Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in
the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were
hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene
for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of
view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that
submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President
does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit
as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are
transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly,
Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the
herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate
all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to
Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to
argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same
must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he
failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's
suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve
the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is
"being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protection against abuses of legislative
power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to

allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement
of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar
does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what
was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate
legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of
the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is
questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the
second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed
before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the
instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiaeformer Senate
President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent
need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the
final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should
first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P.
College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice

of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second

impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines
that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for
members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the
Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to
the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming
that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice
can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a
motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by
the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure
the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity.
Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only
place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of
the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue to
suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies
from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this
Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither
the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the
power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality,
whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as
said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier
quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot
be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance,
what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris

Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly
without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of
taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In
some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political
question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial
review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political
nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed
jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the
landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which
raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified,
hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine
and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a
Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question
doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the
Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he
became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's
power of judicial review and its application on issues involving
political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I
suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest
among the three major branches of the service. Since the
legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the
judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or

commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience

which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful
of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the
body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by
the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will
read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or
instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a
product of our experience during martial law. As a matter
of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role
of the judiciary during the deposed regime was
marred considerably by the circumstance that in a
number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set
up the defense of political questions and got away
with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus,
that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the

government set up the defense of political

question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of
the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am
sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this
situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the
Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I
will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on
the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am
not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September
22, although the proclamation was dated September 21.
The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was
that the administration had apprehended and detained
prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when
martial law was announced on September 22, the media
hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media
could not publish any story not only because our main
writers were already incarcerated, but also because those
who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal
threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The
1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1,
1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the
Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of
the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation
of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional
Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of
them was our very own colleague, Commissioner
Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was
taken over by representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days,
they finished what the delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish
for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution
was presented to the President around December 1,
1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a

plebiscite which suspended the operation of some

provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited
discussions, much less public discussions of certain
matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably
to allow a free discussion on the draft of the Constitution
on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January
1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague,
Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the
draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with
such a telling effect that Malacaang felt the danger of its
approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the
holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would
consult the people in a referendum to be held from
January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be
submitted in the referendum were not announced until the
eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed
supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of
what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or
barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence.
The questions to be propounded were released with
proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers
given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes
cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with
the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the
referendum be suspended. When the motion was being
heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice
delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President
declaring that the new Constitution was already in force
because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in
the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately
after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded
to the session room where the case was being heard. I
then informed the Court and the parties the presidential
proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had
been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the

presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense
put up by the government was that the issue was a
political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from
January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the
draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the
Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of
them had been notified of any referendum in their
respective places of residence, much less did they
participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw
any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire.
So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there
had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a
plebiscite. There is a big difference between a
referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of
justices upheld the defense that the issue was a
political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the
case. This is not the only major case in which the
plea of "political question" was set up. There have
been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was
rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to

perform its functions, it faced the following questions:
What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main
function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts
of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There
are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a
husband complained that his wife was unwilling to
perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell
your wife what her duties as such are and that she is
bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her
physically to discharge her main marital duty to her
husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but
they are so personal that to enforce them by actual
compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I
provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
government, the Supreme Court has, also another
important function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three branches: the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one
is supreme within its own sphere and independent of
the others. Because of that supremacy power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of

power of the agencies and offices of the government
as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1,
which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming
that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on
the subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief
Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power,
thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term
"judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in
the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower
courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The

Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial
power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said,
refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question
as to whether the government had authority or had
abused its authority to the extent of lacking
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a
political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to
decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to
be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new
numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do
away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an
abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it
is not intended to do away with the political question
doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought

to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman
will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the
reason being that the definition that we might make
may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the
problems arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the
fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale
of judicial power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not
only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated
by the mere specter of this creature called the political question
doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however,
that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there
are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions"
and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the
reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be
maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not
truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of
the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases
taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political
following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus, this Court, speaking through Madame
Justice Irene Cortes, held:
105

The present Constitution limits resort to the political

question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice
Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that
this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover,
as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question
doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction
to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with
the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz,
this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection
becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x
x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are
justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political
questions, however. Identification of these two species of political

questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard.

The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve
a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for questioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or thepotentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3)
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are
not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in
that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the
others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the
American concept of judicial review is radically different from our
current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether
they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question
from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,

then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or

instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second
impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed
in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House
Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund
is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue
would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination
is a purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an
intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six

grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high
crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In
fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other
high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative
examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or
even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court
to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the
scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

shown that the essential requisites of a judicial

inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus,
there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination,
the constitutional question must have been opportunely
raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of
the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality
unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.

Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing
the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided
whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on
Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not
pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to
be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised,if the
record also presents some other ground upon which
the court may rest its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left
for consideration until a case arises in which a
decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and
32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of
due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all

seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint,
collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the
outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial
issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related
cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue
that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is
invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a
legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative
inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being:
(a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in
aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation
of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the
independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s
claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative
inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the

second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said

issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of
legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than
is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion
is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have
raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not
be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of
legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court
in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of
both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided
therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure"
and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the
right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right
not be compelled to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners

Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the
second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of
Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in
that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not
filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With
the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the
signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the
same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point
to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which
states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of
Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the
Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment
complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment
and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least
one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not
having complied with this requirement, they concede that the
second impeachment complaint should have been calendared

and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section

3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong
who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to
apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed
and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants,
signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of
impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least onethird of the members of the House of Representatives
as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated
by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files
a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal
and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional
issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling
considerations militate against its adoption as the lis
mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the
fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in
G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt
this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant

consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts
of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts
presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as
unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made
easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra
have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the
latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they
are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues,
inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the
instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of
the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI
of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on
the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has
the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again,
this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the
power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue
that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume
jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members
thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very
much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to
pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House
of Representatives are subject to them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an

option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined,
because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction
be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be
shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the
Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this
Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant
petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas,
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not
be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a
dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our
system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge because no other office has the authority to do
so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested
party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter
"not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable
duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness." 129 After all,
"by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a
member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and
morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For
this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to
render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or
power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to
resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of
interest had already been settled in the case ofAbbas v. Senate
Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the
respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification
or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing
and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of
them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein.
This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its
three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought,
leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the

substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of
his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute's competence, the
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and
ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform,
but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that
the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty
which it alone has the power to perform, the performance
of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by
its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions
that the framers of the Constitution could not have been
unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would
inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such
possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992
elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24
seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution
provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to
the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought.
Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust
and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and
Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no SenatorMember of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case
before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may,
as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the

resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his

personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely
saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent
its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three JusticesMembers alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held
that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court,
particularly a majority of them, is nothing short ofpro
tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a
judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that
judge is the one designated by the Constitution to
exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with
the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their
judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the
judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of
judicial independence. The proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave
the Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it
cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its
entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the
Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan
cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial
review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of

legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate
only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy
between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature
could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions
of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. This rule has found most varied application.
Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds,
one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest
court of a state challenging its decision of a question
under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed
because the judgment can be sustained on an
independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute
upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured
by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule,
none is more striking than the denial of the right of
challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right.

Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in

the performance of his official duty will not be
entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed
the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to
have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained
although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its
citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of
its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided (citations
omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following
categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only
as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other
ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by
reason of the operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of
constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by
this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument
for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of
impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between
the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid
the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and
humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and
abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to
remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this
argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its
judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the
judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As

correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court
to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just
because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court
refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative
or executive act is not regarded as settled until the
Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of
the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical
effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to
grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the
necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act
explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a
decision for the respondent and validation, or at least
quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was
split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant
the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing
constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes
that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in
a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no
reason to believe that any of the branches of government will
behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval,
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the
fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well
guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, towit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our
system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then
law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of
men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers
by those acting under its authority. Under this system,
[public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought
"to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist
encroachments by governments, political parties, or even
the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De
Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of
our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does
not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House
of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not
possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article
XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways,
to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any
member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at
least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials
could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had

not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as

the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of
the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in
order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the
Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually
became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the
meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by
Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado)
as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the
instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added
that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on
the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate"
as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution
means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as
dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the
first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that
of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the
instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single
act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a
middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the
articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle
consists of those deliberative moments leading to the
formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning
or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral
to the Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon

by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice
Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the
House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note
that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings"
are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier,
but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a
time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution
is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding
the procedure and the substantive provisions on
impeachment, I understand there have been many
proposals and, I think, these would need some time for
Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to
the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings,
copies of which have been furnished the Members of this
body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of
the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government which took charge of the last impeachment
resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For
the information of the Committee, the resolution
covers several steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the
Speaker committee action, calendaring of report,
voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate,
trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving

for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make
of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing
of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The
procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And
what is actually done on the floor is that the
committee resolution containing the Articles of
Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by
the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts
on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in
the case of the impeachment proceedings of President
Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary
submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the
Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body
who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on
Style could help in rearranging these words because we
have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing
with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the
U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The
proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I
have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has
already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this
on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a
reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My
reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is
only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of
the House of Representatives of the United States
regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage

to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from
lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to
initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,)
and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the
phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the
letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with
OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE
ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the
initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the
United States is concerned, really starts from the filing
of the verified complaint and every resolution to
impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the
direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the
Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam
President, that my amendment will not vary the substance
in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United
States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics
in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was
clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of
Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with
the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiaebrief,
Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in
deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as
contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to

settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing
of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment
proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a
verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI
of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the
same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used
in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however,
that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the
complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas
clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional
provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period
of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment
proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common
verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is
"impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is
"impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo
singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the
term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal

controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted

first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all
its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense
that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding"
must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium,
means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive
noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not
in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1)
there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the
House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a
Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may
either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution
of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution
must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4)
there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of onethird of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members
upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House
"initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he
or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case"
before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is
not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for
trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the
beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates
on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the
House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation
or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a

verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on

Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its
ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor
proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of
the House shall be necessary toinitiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment
proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the
line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year," it means that
no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the
meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that
the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and
sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people
read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse
meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as
sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a
body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3
(1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading
of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo
singula singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with
"impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the

impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial

action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third
of the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there
is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once
the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not
sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before
the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3
of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a
meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this
Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in
the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v.
Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions
(referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's
our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly
recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing
said case, he states that this Court likened the former members
of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in
their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more
about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present

petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court
who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief
Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide
has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons.
Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal
opinions now given by members of the Constitutional
Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations
and proceedings thereof.

corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be

calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under

Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and
only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing
impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that
Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of

impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall

promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules
on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot
contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules
were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its
power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business
within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the

House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated

against the same official more than once within a period
of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution
which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress
had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the
Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the
province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and
that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior"
of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice)
Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice
Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in
nature. InArroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin,
Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this

Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house to

determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further
that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which
is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all
matters of method are open to the determination of the
Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice
Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was
even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting
there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of
the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed
by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree
that we will trivialize the principle of separation of
power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at
bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation
of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against
the interposition of judicial power on cases involving
breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v
Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before
the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first
defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to
review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that
each house may determine the rules of its proceedings."
It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House
had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of

the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a
quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be
noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and
reported to the Speaker with the names of the members
voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal,
230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this
rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of
this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his
own motion resort to for determining the presence of a
quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of
their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such
a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With
the courts the question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House, and it
is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to
pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e,

whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined

by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it
did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not
violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow
its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of
the principle of separation of powers.154

Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to

strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of
government or any of its officials done with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has
elongated the checking powers of this Court against the
other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators
being elected by the people.156

xxx
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling
reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up
abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new
and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US
Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts
in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from
judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political
question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded
and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted
to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline
to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the

The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty

of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the
capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission
to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by
our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to
abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to
annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of
discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court
from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by
our distinct experience as nation, is not merely
evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the
1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional
violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under
the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this
Court is mandated to approach constitutional
violations not by finding out what it should not do but

what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn

duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the
case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters
of our power to review violations of the rules of the
House. We will not be true to our trust as the last
bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to
exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity.
To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe
the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened
other branches of government to denigrate, if not
defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the
view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino
and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue
reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In
resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history
should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the
instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of
private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon
v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply
provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No
limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to

impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives

since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several
provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be
exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution
is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by
the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution
of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House
Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was
filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003
violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of

impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer

within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is
always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our
individual and collective consciousness as a people with our
characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course
this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the
Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have
proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a
dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to
be the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions
had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the
impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with
their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter.
Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to
the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for
a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the
governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived
resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically
asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and
form with respect to the prosecution by the House of
Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the
subject respondent public official. When the present petitions
were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the
same clamor for non-interference was made through what are
now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move
that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far
as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the

impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is

concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the
Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for
its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial
review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the
construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental
law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
constitutional material which only this Court can properly and
competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clearcut allocation of powers under our system of government. Faceto-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the
Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it
to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself
with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime
of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny
and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had
none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this
Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great
branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the
judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and
legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the
beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our society
upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the
Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed
ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling
on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice.
Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other
courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to
resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities
involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice
over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to
benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or
speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered judgment
according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted
to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the
highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the
validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the
limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the
inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case
in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now
from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely
incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a
case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic
precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men
before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of
its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands.
Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality
that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality
other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real
meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous
cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither
is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the
Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than
anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights
irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt
been put to test once again by this impeachment case against
Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted
to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what

many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it

is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found
answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important
that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only
to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force
and aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83815

February 22, 1991

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and

CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform;
CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture;
LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as
Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDOEZ, as Secretary of
Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and
Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of Local
Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National
Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary;
JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of Public Works and
Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science
and Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade
and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of
Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary of Health;
REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and
Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as Commissioner
of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the National
Economic Development Authority, respondents.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and

Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 83896

February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 1988 1 and are
being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive
Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent
provisions of the assailed Executive Order are:

Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions

of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary
or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this
limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees,
or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is
the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive official of the
Executive Department holds more positions than what is
allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more
than two positions other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the
government in government-owned or controlled
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of
the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect,
allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions
in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation
therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides as follows:
2

financially interested in any contract with, or in any

franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits
public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the
other public officials enumerated in the list attached to the
petitions as Annex "C" in G.R. No.
83815 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 83896 from holding any
other office or employment during their tenure. In addition to
seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order
No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines further
seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the extraordinary writs of
prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporary restraining
order directing public respondents therein to cease and desist
from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple
positions other than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution
and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems and other
forms of privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned
positions, and compelling public respondents to return, reimburse
or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may have
received from such positions.
3

Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines

charges that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and selfexecuting" provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of
Justice Sedfrey Ordoez, construing Section 13, Article VII in
relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23,
1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, declaring that Cabinet
members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant
secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in
the boards of government corporations: (a) when directly
provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of
Justice who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed
5

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of

the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be

by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their

respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the
President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days
before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated
Executive Order No. 284.
6

Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both

DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they
allegedly "lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and the
general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article IXB. This "strained linkage" between the two provisions, each
addressed to a distinct and separate group of public officers
one, the President and her official family, and the other, public
servants in general allegedly "abolished the clearly separate,
higher, exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to
the prohibition against multiple jobs for the President, the VicePresident, the members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and
subalterns, who are the leaders of government expected to lead
by example." Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2) provides:
7

Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ
Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and clarified
by DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No.
155, series of 1988, being the first official construction and
interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of Section 13, Article VII
and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB of the Constitution, involving
the same subject of appointments or designations of an
appointive executive official to positions other than his primary
position, is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that
9

10

Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion

No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently constitutional. It is worth
noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and DOJ
Opinion No. 155, series of 1988 construed the limitation imposed
by E.O. No. 284 as not applying to ex-officio positions or to
positions which, although not so designated as ex-officio are
allowed by the primary functions of the public official, but only to
the holding of multiple positions which are not related to or
necessarily included in the position of the public official
concerned (disparate positions).
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being
challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in
the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1)
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in
Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil Service Commission
applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general
and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to
Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President,
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants.
There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President,
Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the
Government admits of certain exceptions. The disagreement
between petitioners and public respondents lies on the
constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that
because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must

be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the
Vice-President being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet
under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the
Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public
respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII
makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the
broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under
Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB which, for easy reference is
quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and
the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times,
and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced
the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision
and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
11

The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their

deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or
boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned and controlled corporations,
became prevalent during the time legislative powers in this
country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
pursuant to his martial law authority. There was a proliferation of
newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned
and controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and
other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members,
their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as
members of the board with the corresponding salaries,
emoluments, per diems, allowances and other perquisites of
office. Most of these instrumentalities have remained up to the
present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials
who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of selfenrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in government
was strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang
Pambansa. This condemnation came in reaction to the
published report of the Commission on Audit, entitled "1983
Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations, Self-Governing Boards and
Commissions" which carried as its Figure No. 4 a "Roaster of
Membership in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."
12

Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of

propriety and morality in government service were the data
contained therein that Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the
governing boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies,
instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of twentythree (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco,
Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of
fourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B.
Ancheta and Jose A. Roo of twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba,

Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of eleven (11) each;

and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Pea of ten (10) each.
13

The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious
causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore
quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming
sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
convened as it was after the people successfully unseated former
President Marcos, should draft into its proposed Constitution the
provisions under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if
not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple
governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly
observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the deliberations
in these cases, one of the strongest selling points of the 1987
Constitution during the campaign for its ratification was the
assurance given by its proponents that the scandalous practice of
Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the government
and collecting unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom
would be discontinued.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7,
Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the
holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants from holding any other office or employment
during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution
itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies
of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the
framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President and his official family in so far as holding other
offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned. (C O O L)

Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section

13, Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the
disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from
holding other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VI,
"(N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government . . .".
Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed
forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any
capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their
subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by
respondents provides "(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government."
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications
to hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an
office or employment in the government and government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast
is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not
being qualified by the phrase "in the Government." The
prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is
therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office
or employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence
provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, allembracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other

public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress,

members of the civil service in general and members of the
armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to
treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter
with the President and his official family was also succinctly
articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner
Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and
debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service
prohibitions, originally found in the General Provisions and the
anticipated report on the Executive Department. Commissioner
Foz Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the
President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise
more powers and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints on them
are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their
case."
14

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7,
Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot
possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7,
Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying
phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory
and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers
of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the

President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies

and assistants with respect to holding other offices or
employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents'
interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the
exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would
obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the
Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive
Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one
hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank
immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other,
may hold any other office or position in the government during
their tenure.
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question
would render certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This
observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under
Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or
employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but who as
an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is
absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure." Surely,
to say that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to
Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB would render meaningless the
specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing the VicePresident to become a member of the Cabinet, and to act as
President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the
President shall not nave been chosen or fails to qualify. Such
absurd consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two
provisions under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of
Article I-XB providing the general rule and the other, i.e., Section
13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same
manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB be construed visa-vis Section 13, Article VII.
15

16

It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no

one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing

upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so

interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole
purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can
be made to stand together.
17

18

19

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and

must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory.
20

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution

is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, VicePresident, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the
government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition
must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of
Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood
as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment.
Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is
prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer
only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to
wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2)
and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section
8 (1), Article VIII.
21

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or

employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must
not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional

compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and

as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The
reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office"
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials. To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to
absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the
Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council
reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24,
1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary,
and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and
Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which
would then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and
members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries, would also be prohibited.
22

23

The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board

of Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC)
or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA),
both of which are attached to his department for policy
coordination and guidance. Neither can his Undersecretaries and
Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary
Board. Neither can their respective undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be
assisted by lower ranking employees in providing policy direction
in the areas of money, banking and credit.
24

25

Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended

such absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a
continuously operative charter of government, is not to be
interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable;
and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be
avoided.
26

To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to

be interpreted as covering positions held without additional

compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as

required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office.
The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It
refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not
expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an
"act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office,
and without any other appointment or authority than that
conferred by the office." An ex-officio member of a board is one
who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and
without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express
provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the
Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority.
27

28

29

30

The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an exofficio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and
Inspection Board, thus: "An examination of section 2 of the
questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman and
members of the Board to qualify they need only be designated by
the respective department heads. With the exception of the
representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order
to be designated they must already be holding positions in the
offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does
not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs,
cannot, under the act, be designated a representative from that
office. The same is true with respect to the representatives from
the other offices. No new appointments are necessary. This is as
it should be, because the representatives so designated merely
perform duties in the Board in addition to those already
performed under their original appointments."
31

32

are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of

the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry
Authority and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
34

If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental,

remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to
the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions
would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the
Constitution. An example would be the Press Undersecretary
sitting as a member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to such positions
which confer on the cabinet official management functions and/or
monetary compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships
or directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, VicePresident, Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which
are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices
or appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise
and skill in their respective executive offices is a practice longrecognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the
demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and
coordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch
in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and
implementing laws affecting national interest and general welfare
and delivering basic services to the people. It is consistent with
the power vested on the President and his alter egos, the Cabinet
members, to have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. Without these additional duties and functions being
assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the
governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or
instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by their primary functions, they would be supervision,
thereby deprived of the means for control and resulting in an
unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.
35

The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the

order of importance and thus means chief or principal function.
The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the
plural. The additional duties must not only be closely related to,
but must be required by the official's primary functions. Examples
of designations to positions by virtue of one's primary functions
33

It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties

or functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional
duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of
the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation
part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has
no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the
said position. The reason is that these services are already paid
for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance
attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officiomember
thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the
primary function of his principal office in defining policy in
monetary and banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction
of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not
entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the
form of a per them or an honorarium or an allowance, or some
other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such
additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the
proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B, originally found as Section 3 of the General
Provisions, the exception "unless required by the functions of his
position," express reference to certain high-ranking appointive
public officials like members of the Cabinet were
made. Responding to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople,
Commissioner Monsod pointed out that there are instances when
although not required by current law, membership of certain highranking executive officials in other offices and corporations is
necessary by reason of said officials' primary functions. The
example given by Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of
Trade and Industry.
36

37

38

While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople

may be used as authority for saying that additional functions and
duties flowing from the primary functions of the official may be
imposed upon him without offending the constitutional prohibition
under consideration, it cannot, however, be taken as authority for
saying that this exception is by virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of
Article I-XB. This colloquy between the two Commissioners took
place in the plenary session of September 27, 1986. Under
consideration then was Section 3 of Committee Resolution No.
531 which was the proposed article on General Provisions. At
that time, the article on the Civil Service Commission had been
approved on third reading on July 22, 1986, while the article on
the Executive Department, containing the more specific
prohibition in Section 13, had also been earlier approved on third
reading on August 26, 1986. It was only after the draft
Constitution had undergone reformatting and "styling" by the
Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions
became Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and reworded "Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position. . . ."
39

40

41

What was clearly being discussed then were general principles

which would serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of
specific constitutional provisions on the matter. What was
primarily at issue and approved on that occasion was the
adoption of the qualified and delimited phrase "primary functions"
as the basis of an exception to the general rule covering all
appointive public officials. Had the Constitutional Commission
intended to dilute the specific prohibition in said Section 13 of
Article VII, it could have re-worded said Section 13 to conform to
the wider exceptions provided in then Section 3 of the proposed
general Provisions, later placed as Section 7, par. (2) of Article IXB on the Civil Service Commission.
That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the
President and his official family is by reason of the legal principles
governing additional functions and duties of public officials rather
than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B At any rate, we

have made it clear that only the additional functions and duties
"required," as opposed to "allowed," by the primary functions may
be considered as not constituting "any other office."
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates
and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort
thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution
when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not
talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon
its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers's understanding thereof.
42

1wphi1

43

44

It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that
the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, VicePresident, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants
from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in
the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts
held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their
office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule
laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere
personal opinions which cannot override the constitution's
manifest intent and the people' understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in
relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions

that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries

may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two
(2) positions in the government and government corporations,
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical
consequences that will result from a strict application of the
prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the
operations of the Government, considering that Cabinet members
would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio capacity, by
reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As
earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the
executive official concerned without additional compensation as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his
office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within
the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With respect to
other offices or employment held by virtue of legislation, including
chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to say that
the feared impractical consequences are more apparent than
real. Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is
more than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized
knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be
derived from a department head's ability and expertise, he should
be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the
distraction of other governmental offices or employment. He
should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and
energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may
result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages
to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and
expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and economic
development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained
from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in
more than what he can handle.

Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the

court hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local
Government Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel
V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and
Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately
relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in
the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to the other
named respondents, the petitions have become moot and
academic as they are no longer occupying the positions
complained of.
45

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may

be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to
emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that
"in cases where there is no de jure,officer, a de facto officer, who,
in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged
the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments
of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary,
fees and other compensations attached to the office. This
doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it
seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an
officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one
for such services. Any per diem, allowances or other
emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual
services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be
retained by them.
46

47

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the

petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby
declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,

JJ., concur.
Sarmiento and Grio-Aquino, JJ., took no part.

The Filipino
First
Policy enshrined
in
the
1987
Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its bid to
acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC)
which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents
maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an
implementing legislation for its enforcement.Corollarily, they ask
whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA
PRINCE
HOTEL, petitioner, vs.
GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE
OF
THE
GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE
COUNSEL, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The
winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy
51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent
GSIS state I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH
GSIS/MHC 1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth
below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the
Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares

and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified
Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the
GSIS/MHC the Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract
specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the Manila
Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC
PARTNER The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic
Partner after the following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later
than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on
Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel)
are obtained.[3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered
by Renong Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995
petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirtythree Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the
bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which
respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent

GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the
sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on
prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting
and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the
Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The
case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici
curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential
of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become
a part of the national patrimon y.[6] Petitioner also argues that since
51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a
government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of
respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction
involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered
by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII,
1987 Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of
the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of
the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has
matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules
mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be

awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of
principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and
requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said
provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down
conditions under which business may be done.[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila
Hotel does not fall under the termnational patrimony which only
refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine
wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the
first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of
the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have
transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not
make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation.What is more,
the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate
and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable
since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be
considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition
of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution,
petitioner should have questioned it right from the beginning and not
after it had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the

bidding rules which provides thatif for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the
privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only
takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching
bid is premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be
awarded the block of shares and the condition giving rise to the
exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken
place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of
discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its
discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse
its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as
petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws
for the governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme,
imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation.[10]It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes
certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a
law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or

contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive

branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null
and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of
policies and principles. Their provisions command the legislature to
enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely
establish an outline of government providing for the different
departments of the governmental machinery and securing certain
fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A provision which
lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which
is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed
or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is selfexecuting if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have
been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly
upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments,
and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one
more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is
why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary
is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by
simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from
discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this
question as the Chairman of the Committee on
Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a
preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who
are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To
qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner
Rodrigo? Is it to remove the word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS as against whom? As against aliens or
over aliens ?
MR.

NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is

understood. We use the word QUALIFIED because
the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay
down conditions under which business may be
done. For example, qualifications on capital,
qualifications on the setting up of other financial
structures, et cetera (underscoring supplied by
respondents).

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in
such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but
simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not
precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without
impairing the self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may
still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly
granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective
in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability
is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be selfexecuting. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,
further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
[17]
Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that
the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of
Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first
and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not
self-executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises

fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still
needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph,
then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be
self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in
order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one
part and non-self-executing in another.[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain
constitutional provisions are merely statements of principles and
policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation [20] speaks of constitutional
provisions on personal dignity,[21] the sanctity of family life,[22] the vital
role of the youth in nation-building,[23] the promotion of social justice,
[24]
and the values of education. [25] Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions on social justice and
human rights[27] and on education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare, [30] the
sanctity of family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in nationbuilding[32] and the promotion of total human liberation and
development.[33] A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows
that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely
guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest
that they are only principles upon which legislations must be
based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and

patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it

means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce
such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission[34] explains The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved
and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources
but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to
our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we
should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other
natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our
people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the
term patrimony pertains to heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks
of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to thecultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when
it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly
Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become
the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine
history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site
of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth. Dubbed as theOfficial Guest House of the

Philippine Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors

who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The
Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During World War II
the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into
a military headquarters. When the American forces returned to
recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the Japanese together
with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand. Thereafter,
in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970
the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous
international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent
and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup
d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President
of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute
witness to the triumphs andfailures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence
and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises
the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the
hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being
sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the
Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. [38]
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as
used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of
which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

xxxx

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to

the Nolledo amendment. And the amendment would
consist in substituting the words QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES
OR
CORPORATIONS
OR
ASSOCIATIONS
WHOSE
CAPITAL
OR
CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY
SUCH CITIZENS.

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the

amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT
OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY,
THE
STATE
SHALL
GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the
word Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents,
will include not only individual Filipinos but also
Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by
Filipinos.[40]

xxxx
MR.

MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the

proponent is agreeable, but we have to raise a
question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus

-

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an

individual Filipino. What about a corporation wholly
owned by Filipino citizens?

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request

Commissioner Nolledo to please restate his
amendment so that I can ask a question.

MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting
it if we say that the preference should only be 100percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may refer only to individuals
and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.

[39]

NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,

PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE
STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS.

MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign

enterprise is qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects

than the Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be
preferred?

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when

a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a
qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so

considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified
bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with
its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner
has been found to be possessed of proven management expertise in
the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing
proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. [44]

MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]

Expounding further on the Filipino
Commissioner Nolledo continues

First

Policy provision

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST,

it will be SHALL - THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This
embodies the so-called Filipino First policy. That
means that Filipinos should be given preference in the
grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering
the national patrimony.[42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional
Commission regarding the subject provision was still further clarified
by Commissioner Nolledo[43] Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in
all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST
Policy x x x x This provision was never found in previous
Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be
given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the
common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential
treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counterproductive and inimical to the common good.

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the

Constitution by arguing that the subject provision is not selfexecutory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision - by
the government itself - is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of
reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the
Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution
which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of
their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot
simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the failure
to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine,
the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional
government is apt The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement
laws, including the Constitution, even before Congress acts provided that there are discoverable legal standards for executive
action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable
laws. The responsibility for reading and understanding the
Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of Congress. If it
were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the
Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by

a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional government

operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again
is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC
could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State acting
through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed
out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of
the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In
constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered state action covered by the Constitution
(1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to
make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that
the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of state
action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into
by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command. [46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to
the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After
all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional
mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the
three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case
the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government
instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the
higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly
provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts,

and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First

Policy provision
of
the
Constitution
bestows
preference
onqualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an
assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the winning
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award
yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to
abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which
are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the
bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be
nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in
constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the
fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution
lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any
reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[47] Certainly, the
constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block
of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot
conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid
in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino
will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policyprovision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while

this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding

rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of
the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy
may discourage foreign investors.But the Constitution and laws of
the Philippines are understood to be always open to public
scrutiny.These are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore
desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies
or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations
under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.

indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the

government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays
down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is
left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares
of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well.The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with
petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped

from questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was
well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were
invited to the bidding.But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if
no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the
highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us,
while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding
because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet
matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the
right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its
earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign
firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners
matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It

is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a
guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it
be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution
will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of
upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to
defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court
to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign
investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more
business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for
Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the
Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not
been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional

safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist
on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino
group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and
bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the
Constitution is regrettable.Thus we would rather remedy the

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to

substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive
about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature,
the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions
perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development x x x
x in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts First
Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and
its partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to the

effect that that injunction again demonstrates that the Philippine legal
system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business
of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set
itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its
bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution
or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never
shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and illinformed criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its
business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the
character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material
values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be
pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For the
Constitution
enshrines
higher
and
nobler
non-material
values. Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the
proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing
so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond
judicial review when the Constitution is involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines
being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in
the Filipino people and from whom all government authority
emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people
must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such
basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is
merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just
any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property
in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has
hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the

Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of

states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their
desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official
visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of
twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has
become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a history
of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the
shaping of a country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the
determined efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia - to a total stranger. For,
indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche
to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in
whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for
some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage,
which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be
gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is
sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the
nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other
hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national
patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and wellmeaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of
the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And
this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting
the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to
respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents
GOVERNMENT
SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE
and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching
bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel

Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the

necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may
be necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M.
PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as members
thereof, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No. 6132,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M. GONZALES,petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC, respondent.

Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.

Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant
Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr., and Solicitors Raul I.
Goco, Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres
and Guillermo C. Nakar for respondents.
Lorenzo Taada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel
Pelaez as amici curiae.
MAKASIAR, J.:
These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief
were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners
Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the
Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral
argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. After
the Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the respondents,
hearings were held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae,
namely Senator Lorenzo Taada, Senator Arturo Tolentino,
Senator Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued
orally.
It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution,
passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a
Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments
to be composed of two delegates from each representative
district who shall have the same qualifications as those of
Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of
November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code.

After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the
November elections of that year, Congress, acting as a legislative
body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid
Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in toto the provisions of
said Resolution No. 2.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent
Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid
Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the
convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned
among the existing representative districts according to the
number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a
representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates,
who shall have the same qualifications as those required of
members of the House of Representatives," 1 "and that any other
details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of
delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall
be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall
not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution." 2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body,
enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2
and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No.
4914. 3
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law
as well as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5,
and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the
constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132
practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner
Gonzales.
I

The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public
officers and employees, whether elective or appointive, including
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as
officers and employees of corporations or enterprises of the
government, as resigned from the date of the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on
the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of
and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the
Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due
process or of the equal protection of the law. Likewise, the
constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was
upheld. 4
II
Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we
sustain the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by
Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad
law-making authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly,
because
1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent
Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution,
has full and plenary authority to propose
Constitutional amendments or to call a convention
for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each
House in joint session assembled but voting
separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a
constitutional convention were passed by the
required three-fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent
Assembly of such plenary authority to call a
constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the
doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers

essential to the effective exercise of the principal

power granted, such as the power to fix the
qualifications, number, apportionment, and
compensation of the delegates as well as
appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for
the election of delegates and for the operation of
the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all
other implementing details indispensable to a
fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4
already embody the above-mentioned details,
except the appropriation of funds.
3. While the authority to call a constitutional
convention is vested by the present Constitution
solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the
implementing details, which are now contained in
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No.
6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress
acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such
implementing details are matters within the
competence of Congress in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which power
encompasses all matters not expressly or by
necessary implication withdrawn or removed by
the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. And as lone as such statutory details do
not clash with any specific provision of the
constitution, they are valid.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such
implementing details after calling a constitutional
convention, Congress, acting as a legislative
body, can enact the necessary implementing

legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is

expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as
amended by Res. No. 4.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such
implementing details may be vetoed by the
President is no argument against conceding such
power in Congress as a legislative body nor
present any difficulty; for it is not irremediable as
Congress can override the Presidential veto or
Congress can reconvene as a Constituent
Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the
required implementing details.
III
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the
apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with proportional
representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the
intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any specific provision of
the Constitution with which it collides.
Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the
Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such
apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of
population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a
Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one delegate
for, each congressional district or for each province, for reasons
of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. If the
framers of the present Constitution wanted the apportionment of
delegates to the convention to be based on the number of
inhabitants in each representative district, they would have done
so in so many words as they did in relation to the apportionment
of the representative districts. 5

The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot

possibly conflict with its own intent expressed therein; for it
merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as
a Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which
provides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned among the
existing representative districts according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two
delegates for a representative district. The presumption is that the
factual predicate, the latest available official population census,
for such apportionment was presented to Congress, which,
accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation to
effect the desired proportional representation.
The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored
by Senator Pelaez which is now R.A. No. 6132, submitted to this
Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it based its apportionment
of the delegates on the 1970 official preliminary population
census taken by the Bureau of Census and Statistics from May 6
to June 30, 1976; and that Congress adopted the formula to
effect a reasonable apportionment of delegates. The Director of
the Bureau of Census and Statistics himself, in a letter to Senator
Pelaez dated July 30, 1970, stated that "on the basis of the
preliminary count of the population, we have computed the
distribution of delegates to the Constitutional Convention based
on Senate Bill 77 (p. 2 lines 5 to 32 and p. 3 line 12) which is a
fair and an equitable method of distributing the delegates
pursuant to the provisions of the joint Resolution of both Houses
No. 2, as amended. Upon your request at the session of the
Senate-House Conference Committee meeting last night, we are
submitting herewith the results of the computation on the basis of
the above-stated method."
Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same
could still be a valid basis for such apportionment.6 The fact that
the lone and small congressional district of Batanes, may be over-

represented, because it is allotted two delegates by R.A. No. 6132

despite the fact that it has a population very much less than several
other congressional districts, each of which is also allotted only two
delegates, and therefore under-represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone,
does not vitiate the apportionment as not effecting proportional
representation. Absolute proportional apportionment is not required
and is not possible when based on the number of inhabitants, for the
population census cannot be accurate nor complete, dependent as it
is on the diligence of the census takers, aggravated by the constant
movement of population, as well as daily death and birth. It is
enough that the basis employed is reasonable and the resulting
apportionment is substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4 fixed a
minimum of two delegates for a congressional district.

While there may be other formulas for a reasonable

apportionment considering the evidence submitted to Congress
by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, we are not prepared to
rule that the computation formula adopted by, Congress for
proportional representation as, directed in Res. No. 4 is
unreasonable and that the apportionment provided in R.A. No.
6132 does not constitute a substantially proportional
representation.
In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the
apportionment law, which was nullified as unconstitutional,
granted more representatives to a province with less population
than the provinces with more inhabitants. Such is not the case
here, where under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 Batanes is allotted
only two delegates, which number is equal to the number of
delegates accorded other provinces with more population. The
present petitions therefore do not present facts which fit the
mould of the doctrine in the case of Macias et al. vs. Comelec,
supra.
The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is
recognized by the Constitution itself when it directs that the

apportionment of congressional districts among the various

provinces shall be "as nearly as may be according to their
respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one
member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const., emphasis supplied). The
employment of the phrase "as nearly as may be according to their
respective inhabitants" emphasizes the fact that the human mind
can only approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot
effect an absolutely proportional representation with mathematical
precision or exactitude.
IV
Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue
deprivation of liberty without due process of law and denies the
equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected
delegate from running "for any public office in any election" or
from assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch of
the government government until after the final adjournment of
the Constitutional Convention."
That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a
public office, is axiomatic under our constitutional system. The
State through its Constitution or legislative body, can create an
office and define the qualifications and disqualifications therefor
as well as impose inhibitions on a public officer. Consequently,
only those with qualifications and who do not fall under any
constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly elected or
appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for the
questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the
perverting influence of self-interest, party interest or vested
interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing
solely in the interest of the nation his high and well nigh sacred
function of formulating the supreme law of the land, which may
endure for generations and which cannot easily be changed like
an ordinary statute. With the disqualification embodied in Sec. 5,

the delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining leverage

for concessions in the form of an elective or appointive office as
long as the convention has not finally adjourned. The appointing
authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for his own
proposals. Not love for self, but love for country must always
motivate his actuations as delegate; otherwise the several
provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or
special interests, subversive of the welfare of the general
citizenry. It should be stressed that the disqualification is not
permanent but only temporary only to continue until the final
adjournment of the convention which may not extend beyond one
year. The convention that framed the present Constitution
finished its task in approximately seven months from July 30,
1934 to February 8, 1935.
As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in
the constitutional provision prohibiting a member of Congress,
during the time for which he was elected, from being appointed to
any civil office which may have been created or the emolument
whereof shall have been increased while he was a member of the
Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VI, Phil. Constitution.)
As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding
objective of the challenged disqualification, temporary in nature,
is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as
such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to
their representation and commitment to the people; otherwise, his
seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be
deprived of a voice in the convention. The inhibition is likewise
"designed to prevent popular political figures from controlling
elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the appointing power,
to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or
attempt to control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.)

Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A.

No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant
to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.
The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the
Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is based
on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is
germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members
of the same class. 7 The function of a delegate is more far-reaching
and its effect more enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or
any other public officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of
the land which delineates the essential nature of the government, its
basic organization and powers, defines the liberties of the people,
and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional
amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No other public
officer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress
unless they themselves, propose constitutional amendments when
acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor
repugnant to the sense of justice of the community.
As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of
the law, which is to insure that the proposed amendments are
meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the
enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice.
Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the
convention who will be elected on the second Tuesday of
November, 1970.
V
Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both
petitioners as violative of the constitutional guarantees of due
process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions,
freedom of assembly and freedom of association.

This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process,
equal protection of the laws, peaceful assembly, free expression,
and the right of association are neither absolute nor illimitable
rights; they are always subject to the pervasive and dormant
police power of the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve
appropriate and important public interests. 8
In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the clear
and present danger test to determine whether a statute which
trenches upon the aforesaid Constitutional guarantees, is a
legitimate exercise of police power. 9
Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:
1. any candidate for delegate to the convention
(a) from representing, or
(b) allowing himself to be
represented as being a candidate
of any political party or any other
organization; and
2. any political party, political group, political
committee, civic, religious, professional or other
organizations or organized group of whatever
nature from
(a) intervening in the nomination of
any such candidate or in the filing
of his certificate, or

(b) from giving aid or support

directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against
his campaign for election.
The ban against all political parties or organized groups of
whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined to
party or organization support or assistance, whether material,
moral, emotional or otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in its provisos
permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of the
members of his family within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not
more than one for every ten precincts in his district. It allows the
full exercise of his freedom of expression and his right to peaceful
assembly, because he cannot be denied any permit to hold a
public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section
may or will be violated. The right of a member of any political
party or association to support him or oppose his opponent is
preserved as long as such member acts individually. The very
party or organization to which he may belong or which may be in
sympathy with his cause or program of reforms, is guaranteed the
right to disseminate information about, or to arouse public interest
in, or to advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies or
constitutional proposals for amendments.
It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is
so narrow that the basic constitutional rights themselves remain
substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid
infringement of the aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by
petitioners.
In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court
unanimously sustained the validity of the limitation on the period
for nomination of candidates in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No. 4880, thus:

The prohibition of too early nomination of

candidates presents a question that is not too
formidable in character. According to the act: "It
shall be unlawful for any political party, political
committee, or political group to nominate
candidates for any elective public office voted for
at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days
immediately preceding an election, and for any
other elective public office earlier than ninety days
immediately preceding an election.
The right of association is affected. Political
parties have less freedom as to the time during
which they may nominate candidates; the
curtailment is not such, however, as to render
meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of
legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly
narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their
freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for
such a purpose. We sustain its validity. We do so
unanimously. 10
In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that
the period for the conduct of an election campaign or partisan
political activity may be limited without offending the
aforementioned constitutional guarantees as the same is
designed also to prevent a "clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process." 11
Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations,
associations, clubs, committees or other group of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding
political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting

votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or

against any candidate or party; and (c) giving, soliciting, or
receiving contributions for election campaign either directly or
indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b), and (c), R.A. 4880), the
abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six members of
this Court, which could not "ignore ... the legislative declaration
that its enactment was in response to a serious substantive evil
affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of
happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless
curbed or remedied. To assert otherwise would be to close one's
eyes to the reality of the situation." 12;
Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said
case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, failed to muster the
required eight votes to declare as unconstitutional the limitation
on the period for (a) making speeches, announcements or
commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of
any party or candidate for public office; (b) publishing or
distributing campaign literature or materials; and (e) directly or
indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party specified in
Sec. 50-B, pars. (c), (d) & (e) of R.A. 4880. 13
The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil
exists today and is one of the major compelling interests that
moved Congress into prescribing the total ban contained in par. 1
of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, to justify such ban. In the
said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court gave "due
recognition to the legislative concern to cleanse, and if possible,
render spotless, the electoral process," 14 impressed as it was by
the explanation made by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo
Taada, who appeared as amicus curiae, "that such provisions were
deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the
necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and
present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and
substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption

as well as violence that of late has marred election campaigns and

partisan political activities in this country. He did invite our attention
likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies for
an admitted malady requiring governmental action, on the legislature
primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should the cure prescribed by it,
unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be ignored or
disregarded." 15

But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement
of the electoral process, as conceded by Senator Pelaez, the
basic motivation, according to Senate Majority Floor Leader
Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino
amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is
to assure the candidates equal protection of the laws by
according them equality of chances. 16 The primary purpose of the
prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present danger of
another substantive evil, the denial of the equal protection of the
laws. The candidates must depend on their individual merits and not
on the support of political parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino
and Senator Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor
candidate has an even chance as against the rich candidate. We are
not prepared to disagree with them, because such a conclusion,
predicated as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our recent
political history and experience. Both Senators stressed that the
independent candidate who wins in the election against a candidate
of the major political parties, is a rare phenomenon in this country
and the victory of an independent candidate mainly rests on his
ability to match the resources, financial and otherwise, of the political
parties or organizations supporting his opponent. This position is
further strengthened by the principle that the guarantee of social
justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution, includes the
guarantee of equal opportunity, equality of political rights, and
equality before the law enunciated by Mr. Justice Tuazon in the case
Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration. 17
While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not
wrong per se it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of its

broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala

prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such
act is the party or organization support proscribed in Sec.
8(a),which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association
as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated.
Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be
better attained by banning all organization support." 18
The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass the
balancing-of-interest test. 19
In the apt words of the Solicitor General:
It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the
threshold of rewriting its Constitution in a hopeful
endeavor to find a solution to the grave economic,
social and political problems besetting the country.
Instead of directly proposing the amendments
Congress has chosen to call a Constitutional
Convention which shall have the task of
fashioning a document that shall embody the
aspirations and ideals of the people. Because
what is to be amended is the fundamental law of
the land, it is indispensable that the Constitutional
Convention be composed of delegates truly
representative of the people's will. Public welfare
demands that the delegates should speak for the
entire nation, and their voices be not those of a
particular segment of the citizenry, or of a
particular class or group of people, be they
religious, political, civic or professional in
character. Senator Pelaez, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Codes and Constitutional
Amendments, eloquently stated that "the function

of a constitution is not to represent anyone in

interest or set of interests, not to favor one group
at the expense or disadvantage of the candidates
but to encompass all the interests that exist
within our society and to blend them into one
harmonious and balanced whole. For the
constitutional system means, not the
predominance of interests, but the harmonious
balancing thereof."
So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional
Convention will not be deflated or frustrated, it is
necessary that the delegatee thereto be
independent, beholden to no one but to God,
country and conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent
lies in the election of delegates who, because
they have been chosen with the aid and
resources of organizations, cannot be expected to
be sufficiently representative of the people. Such
delegates could very well be the spokesmen of
narrow political, religious or economic interest and
not of the great majority of the people. 20
We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal
protection of the laws is not unduly subverted in par. I of Sec.
8(a); because it does not create any hostile discrimination against
any party or group nor does it confer undue favor or privilege on
an individual as heretofore stated. The discrimination applies to
all organizations, whether political parties or social, civic,
religious, or professional associations. The ban is germane to the
objectives of the law, which are to avert the debasement of the

electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among

individual candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of
equal protection of the laws.
The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in
advantages because of their machinery and other facilities,
which, the individual candidate who is without any organization
support, does not have. The fact that the other civic of religious
organizations cannot have a campaign machinery as efficient as
that of a political party, does not vary the situation; because it still
has that much built-in advantage as against the individual
candidate without similar support. Moreover, these civic religious
and professional organization may band together to support
common candidates, who advocates the reforms that these
organizations champion and believe are imperative. This is
admitted by petitioner Gonzales thru the letter of Senator Ganzon
dated August 17, 1970 attached to his petition as Annex "D",
wherein the Senator stated that his own "Timawa" group had
agreed with the Liberal Party in Iloilo to support petitioner
Gonzales and two others as their candidates for the convention,
which organized support is nullified by the questioned ban,
Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the group moving and
working in joint collective effort" they cannot "exercise effective
control and supervision over our
leaders the Women's League, the area commanders, etc."; but
with their joining with the LP's they "could have presented a solid
front with very bright chances of capturing all seats."
The civic associations other than political parties cannot with
reason insist that they should be exempted from the ban;
because then by such exemption they would be free to utilize the
facilities of the campaign machineries which they are denying to
the political parties. Whenever all organization engages in a
political activity, as in this campaign for election of delegates to
the Constitutional Convention, to that extent it partakes of the

nature of a political organization. This, despite the fact that the

Constitution and by laws of such civic, religious, or professional
associations usually prohibit the association from engaging in
partisan political activity or supporting any candidate for an
elective office. Hence, they must likewise respect the ban.
The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to
associate or join with others or join any existing organization. A
person may run independently on his own merits without need of
catering to a political party or any other association for support.
And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy does not
evoke sympathy from any political party or organized group, must
be afforded equal chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino
and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate
with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility of
purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if elected.
Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of
Senator Taada for the invalidation of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A.
No. 6132, demonstrating once again his deep concern for the
preservation of our civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
We are not persuaded to entertain the belief that the challenged
ban transcends the limits of constitutional invasion of such
cherished immunities.
WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied
and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1,
thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional. Without costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION

(PHILCONSA), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224:
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with
preliminary injunction.
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28196

November 9, 1967

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and
AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28224

November 9, 1967

1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing

Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any act that will result
in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the
constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1
and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines, approved
on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing
ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor
General from passing in audit any disbursement from the
appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913; and
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate
and the House of Representatives passed the following
resolutions:

1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that

Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be
amended so as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the
present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned
among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to
the number of their respective inhabitants, although each
province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to
said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2)
elective delegates from each representative district, to be
"elected in the general elections to be held on the second
Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the
same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and
members of the House of Representatives to become delegates
to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting
their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by
the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913,
providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in
the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for
approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be
held on November 14, 1967.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the
hearing thereof, on October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General
appeared on behalf of respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David
and counsel for the Philippine Constitution Association
hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA were allowed to
argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr.
Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision in this case
be deferred until after a substantially identical case brought by
said organization before the Commission on Elections,1 which
was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in

all probability, be appealed to this Court had been submitted

thereto for final determination, for a joint decision on the identical
issues raised in both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the
PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R. No. L28224, for review bycertiorari of the resolution of the Commission
on Elections2 dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases
were deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon
the filing of the answer of respondent, the memorandum of the
petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent in L-28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a
Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have
instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all
citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although
respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer
denying the truth of this allegation, upon the ground that they
have no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth
thereof, such denial would appear to be a perfunctory one. In fact,
at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General expressed
himself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits of the
issued raised in said case.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization
the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the
Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or
onslaughts from whatever source. Despite his aforementioned
statement in L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor
General maintains that this Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is
"merely political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator
Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission on
Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition
therein, was allowed to appear before this Court and objected to
said petition upon the ground: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction
either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the
legality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b)

that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render in operational

the legislative department; and c) that "the failure of Congress to
enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal
effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected
thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court
speaking through one of the leading members of the
Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of
Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel declared that "the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between
the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof." It is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,5 this Court
characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one,
declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given
number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed
amendment to the Constitution which was being submitted to
the people for ratification satisfied the three-fourths vote
requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent
has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of
the Senate,6 Avelino vs. Cuenco,7 Taada vs.
Cuenco,8 and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9 In the first,
we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the
Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this
Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary
for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election,
by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of
votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2)
Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second
party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we
declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to
apportion the representative districts for the House of
Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not

been made as may be possible according to the number of

inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory,
advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised
were political questions the determination of which is beyond
judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress.10 It is part of the inherent
powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours11 to make, and, hence, to
amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose
amendments to the Constitution merely because the same
explicitly grants such power.12Hence, when exercising the same, it
is said that Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives act, notas members of Congress, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as
such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same
function,13 for their authority does not emanate from the
Constitution they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments
to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their
authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that
they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are
within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush
aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that
ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature
of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, 14 the
power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently
political character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress
acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution
essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial

review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with
the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,16 the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are
unanimous on this point.
THE MERITS
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for
that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of
this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may
be proposed, either by Congress, or by a convention called by
Congress for that purpose. In either case, the vote of "threefourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately" is necessary. And, "such
amendments shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions
are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed
amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to
propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen;

2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose

amendments or call a convention therefore but may not avail of
both that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention
at the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the
Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be
aspecial election, not a general election, in which officers of the
national and local governments such as the elections
scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be chosen;
and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in
which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the people
for ratification, must be held under such conditions which,
allegedly, do not exist as to give the people a reasonable
opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of
said amendments.
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution, which provides:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall
be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as
may be according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one
Member. The Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment
shall have been made, the House of Representatives
shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by
law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the
qualified electors from the present Assembly districts.

Each representative district shall comprise, as far as

practicable, contiguous and compact territory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960;
that, no apportionment having been made within three (3) years
thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of
its Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members,
likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de
facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the
disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution,
as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an
apportionment within three years after the enumeration or census
made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill, which became Republic
Act No. 3040,17 purporting to make said apportionment. This Act
was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the ground that the
apportionment therein undertaken had not been made according
to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the
Philippines.18
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of
the failure of Congress to make a valid apportionment within the
period stated in the Constitution, Congress became an
"unconstitutional Congress" and that, in consequence thereof, the
Members of its House of Representatives are de facto officers.
The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the
constitutional provision on "apportionment within three years after
the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise," is
mandatory. The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to
make said apportionment does not justify, however, the
conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation rendered
Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have
become de facto officers.

It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935,

Congress has not made a valid apportionment as required in said
fundamental law. The effect of this omission has been envisioned
in the Constitution, pursuant to which:
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the
House of Representatives shall have the same number of
Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly,
who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the
present Assembly districts. . . . .
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration
of the period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails
to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it
implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with
the representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of
said period.
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the
elections held in 1935. This theory assumes that an
apportionment had to be made necessarily before the first
elections to be held after the inauguration of the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The assumption, is, however,
unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and
nobody could foretell when it would be made. Those who drafted
and adopted the Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore,
that the three-year period, after the earliest possible enumeration,
would expire after the elections in 1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the
Constitution, particularly those on the legislative department,
were amended in 1940, by establishing a bicameral Congress,
those who drafted and adopted said amendment, incorporating
therein the provision of the original Constitution regarding the
apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have
known that the three-year period therefor would expire after the
elections scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941.

Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and

ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of the
amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision
concerning said apportionment and the effect of the failure to
make it were expected to be applied to conditions
obtaining after the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even
after subsequent elections.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the
last enumeration was submitted to the President on November
30, 1960, it follows that the three-year period to make the
apportionment did not expire until 1963, or after the Presidential
elections in 1961. There can be no question, therefore, that the
Senate and the House of Representatives organized or
constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that
the Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the theory
of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three years,
or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at
least, those of the House of Representatives, became illegal
holder of their respective offices, and were de facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year
period without a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or
repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the
House of Representatives, and are not aware of any rule or
principle of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither do
they allege that the term of office of the members of said House
automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in
Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In
fact, neither our political law, nor our law on public officers, in
particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory
duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in the
forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election
Law relative to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were
not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make
an apportionment within three (3) years after the census of 1960.

Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably held

in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions
creating Congress with a House of Representatives composed
of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts
as they existed at the time of said elections remained in force,
we can not see how said Members of the House of
Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to the
failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment
within the period aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the
impeachment of the President, the Vice-President, the Justices of
the Supreme Court and the Auditor General for, inter alia,
culpable violation of the Constitution,20 the enforcement of which
is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main function.
This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such
mandatory duty, the title to their respective offices remains
unimpaired, until dismissal or ouster pursuant to a judgment of
conviction rendered in accordance with Article IX of the
Constitution. In short, the loss of office or the extinction of title
thereto is not automatic.
Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of
Congress are merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the
contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and
void. In fact, the main reasons for the existence of the de
facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons
holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be,
likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public as distinguished
from the officer in question is concerned.21 Indeed, otherwise,
those dealing with officers and employees of the Government
would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their
title to the positions they hold,before dealing with them, or before
recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even if
they should act within the limits of the authority vested in their
respective offices, positions or employments.22 One can imagine
this great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in
the absence of the de facto doctrine.

As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be

assailed collaterally.23 It may not be contested except directly,
by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts
be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de
facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an
indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de
facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid,
insofar as the public is concerned.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at
bar because the acts therein involved have not been completed
and petitioners herein are not third parties. This pretense is
untenable. It is inconsistent withTayko vs. Capistrano.25 In that
case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge
Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the
reason that, meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement.
This Court held that the objection could not be entertained,
because the Judge was at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can
not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko was not
a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko was one
of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge
Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much less
rendered decision therein. No rights had vested in favor of the
parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's
objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is
concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein contested
and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing
else to do in connection therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under
consideration is untenable.
Available Alternatives to Congress
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress
may either propose amendments to the Constitution or call a
convention for that purpose, but it can not do both, at the same
time. This theory is based upon the fact that the two (2)

alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive

"or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other
circumstances and none has brought to our attention
supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the
term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa,
when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.26
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose
amendments to the constitutional provision on Congress, to be
submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967,
whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to consider
proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other
words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of
R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed
under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification
several years before those that may be proposed by the
constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although
the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they
were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other.
In other words, they were notpassed at the same time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the
history thereof anything that would negate the authority of
different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of
the same Congress to pass the same in, different sessions or
different days of the same congressional session. And, neither
has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of
authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional
convention to propose amendments, why not let the whole thing
be submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing
some specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification before
said convention is held? The force of this argument must be
conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken
by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming purpose
thereof to permit Members of Congress to run for election as
delegates to the constitutional convention and participate in the

proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress.

Whether or not this should be done is a political question, not
subject to review by the courts of justice.
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of
the Court.
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for
Ratification in a General Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for
that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of
this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election"
therein referred to is a "special," not a general, election. The
circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution
had been submitted to the people for ratification in special
elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so
under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in
general elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of
the proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the
people's approval independently of the election of public officials.
And there is no denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the
merits and demerits proposed amendments is likely to be
overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the
choice of personalities involved in general elections, particularly

when provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen. But,

then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of
holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public
officer. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose
either alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without
qualification, in the abovequoted provision of the Constitution.
Such authority becomes even more patent when we consider: (1)
that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection
of candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the
word used in Article V of the Constitution, concerning the grant of
suffrage to women is, not "election," but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1
of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a
special election. Some members of the Court even feel that said
term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any "election,"
general or special, of public officers. They opine that
constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such
important, if not transcendental and vital nature as to demand that
the attention of the people be focused exclusively on the subjectmatter thereof, so that their votes thereon may reflect no more
than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits
of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted
by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan
political considerations that are likely to affect the selection of
elective officials.
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the
attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal conditions
are, however, one thing. The question whether the
Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment
to the people except under such conditions, is another thing.
Much as the writer and those who concur in this opinion admire
the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe
thereto without, in effect, reading into the Constitution what they
believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from
the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter
of sheer speculation.

The majority view although the votes in favor thereof are

insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional
as ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is,
however, otherwise.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the
People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution?
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved
on March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry
shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the
amendments in question. Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 4913 provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the
election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be
posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and
provincial office building and in every polling place not later than
October 14, 1967," and that said copy "shall remain posted
therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in
each polling place, to be made available for examination by the
qualified electors during election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on
Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available
copies of said amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever
practicable, in the principal native languages, for free
distributing:" and

(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the

back of the ballots which shall be used on November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are
palpably inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement
that proposals for amendment be "submitted to the people for
their ratification," and that said measures are manifestly
insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people
of the amendment sought to be made.
These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the
people of the subject submitted to them for ratification, from the
original Constitution down to the Parity Amendment. Thus,
referring to the original Constitution, Section 1 of Act No. 4200,
provides:
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto,
shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and
in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen
days prior to said election, and a printed copy of said
Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall
be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and
provincial government office building and in each polling
place not later than the twenty-second day of April,
nineteen hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain posted
therein continually until after the termination of the
election. At least ten copies of the Constitution with the
Ordinance appended thereto, in English and in Spanish,
shall be kept at each polling place available for
examination by the qualified electors during election day.
Whenever practicable, copies in the principal local
dialects as may be determined by the Secretary of the
Interior shall also be kept in each polling place.
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:

Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the

Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three
consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said
election, and the said Article V shall be posted in a
conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial office
building and in each polling place not later than the
twenty-second day of April, nineteen and thirty-seven, and
shall remain posted therein continually until after the
termination of the plebiscite. At least ten copies of said
Article V of the Constitution, in English and in Spanish,
shall be kept at each polling place available for
examination by the qualified electors during the plebiscite.
Whenever practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the
Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the
1940 amendments, is of the following tenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and
Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A
printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in every municipal, city, and provincial government
office building and in every polling place not later than
May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty, and shall
remain posted therein until after the election. At least ten
copies of said amendments shall be kept in each polling
place to be made available for examination by the
qualified electors during election day. When practicable,
copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be
kept therein.
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No.
73 is to the effect that:

The said amendment shall be published in English and

Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official
Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A
printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous
place in every municipal, city, and provincial government
office building and in every polling place not later than
February eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and
shall remain posted therein until after the election. At
least, ten copies of the said amendment shall be kept in
each polling place to be made available for examination
by the qualified electors during election day. When
practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as
may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall
also be kept in each polling place.
The main difference between the present situation and that
obtaining in connection with the former proposals does not arise
from the law enacted therefor. The difference springs from the
circumstance that the major political parties had taken sides on
previous amendments to the Constitution except, perhaps, the
woman's suffrage and, consequently, debated thereon at some
length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand, said
political parties have not seemingly made an issue on the
amendments now being contested and have, accordingly,
refrained from discussing the same in the current political
campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have taken place
on a rather limited scale on the latest proposals for
amendment, have been due principally to the initiative of a few
civic organizations and some militant members of our citizenry
who have voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot,
however, be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of
the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or
unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those
existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the
acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those
that take place subsequently to the passage or approval of the
law.

Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment,

the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the
submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14,
1967, depends in the view of those who concur in this opinion,
and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the minority
upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are
such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or
the substance of said proposals, which is under R. B. H. No. 1
the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of
Representatives, from 120 to 180, and under R. B. H. No. 3
the authority given to the members of Congress to run for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto,
to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their
seats in Congress. We who constitute the minority believe
that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that
said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160
of the proposed maximum of representative districts are actually
apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the
Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that they are not
interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful
reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear
vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more
sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading
the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places,
the copies kept in the polling places and the text of contested
resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the ballots they will
use.

It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may

fail to realize or envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the
work of the Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our
Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell such effect with certainty.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the
Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R.
B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as
legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions
of delegates to the Convention.
We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished
and esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that
such factors affect the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that
of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, not theauthority of Congress to approve
the same.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power
to strike down acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending
the confines set forth in the fundamental laws is not in derogation
of the principle of separation of powers, pursuant to which each
department is supreme within its own sphere. The determination
of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be
submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within
the legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily
shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting
Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done
something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter
thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human
endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would
be constitutional and valid. Six (6) Members of this Court believe,
however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of
the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of
declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3
unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases
must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed

for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so

ordered.
Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few
words on the question of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF
ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS
G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA
SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO
SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V.
BORRA, Intervenors.
Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.
Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and
Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for
respondent Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention.
Intervenors in their own behalf.

BARREDO, J.:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent

Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite
on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional
amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of
the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be,
submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic
Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and

the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said

resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as
they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the
acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and
to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention
resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent
only the COMELEC, the Count required that copies thereof be
served on the Solicitor General and the Constitutional
Convention, through its President, for such action as they may
deem proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its
answer joining issues with petitioner. To further put things in
proper order, and considering that the fiscal officers of the
Convention are indispensable parties in a proceeding of this
nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the
expenditure of funds appropriated by law for the Convention, the
Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant
and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the
petition was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon
Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist petitioner's
action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication
of arguments and even possible confusion, and considering that
with the principal parties being duly represented by able counsel,
their interests would be adequately protected already, the Court
had to limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the
delegates to the Convention who, more or less, have legal
interest in the success of the respondents, and so, only
Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S.
Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria,
Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all

distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to

intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of
brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be
duly and amply represented and protected. At any rate,
notwithstanding that their corresponding motions for leave to
intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the
pleadings filed by the other delegates and some private parties,
the latter in representation of their minor children allegedly to be
affected by the result of this case with the records and the Court
acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials
in the extensive study that has been undertaken in this case.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional
Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions
of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a
constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a
convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely,
Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on
March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to
the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said
resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act
6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention
to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines, to be composed of two elective
Delegates from each representative district who
shall have the same qualifications as those
required of Members of the House of
Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the
Convention shall be valid and considered part of

the Constitution when approved by a majority of

the votes cast in an election at which they are
submitted to the people for their ratification
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to
represent the different cities and provinces fixed originally in
Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970,
the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its
preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of
committees and other preparatory works over, as its first formal
proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on
September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the
morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved
Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF
ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING
AGE TO 18
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the
1971 Constitutional Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the
Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as
follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be
exercised by (male) citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise

disqualified by law, who are

(twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or
over and are able to read and
write, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for one year and
in the municipality wherein they
propose to vote for at least six
months preceding the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part
of the Constitution of the Philippines when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in
November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers
only to the age qualification for the exercise of
suffrage shall be without prejudice to other
amendments that will be proposed in the future by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other
portions of the amended Section or on other
portions of the entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the
use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or
from its unexpended funds for the expense of the
advanced plebiscite; provided, however that
should there be no savings or unexpended sums,
the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the
equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado
Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the
Convention implement (the above) resolution." The said letter
reads:

September 28, 1971

The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed
Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic
Act No. 6132 otherwise known as the
Constitutional Convention Act of 1971, may we
call upon you to help the Convention implement
this resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on
condition that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake
the printing of separate official ballots, election
returns and tally sheets for the use of said
plebiscite at its expense;

(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its

own security measures for the printing and
shipment of said ballots and election forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be
delivered to the Commission in time so that they
could be distributed at the same time that the
Commission will distribute its official and sample
ballots to be used in the elections on November 8,
1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from
intervenors' Governors' statement of the genesis of the above
proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an
order forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement
the Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines
which were approved by the President who then
transmitted them to the Commission on Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed
a report on the progress of the implementation of
the plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7,1971,
enclosing copies of the order, resolution and
letters of transmittal above referred to (Copy of
the report is hereto attached as Annex 8Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7,
1971, the Convention approved a resolution

authored by Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao

Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention
from November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to
permit the delegates to campaign for the
ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of
the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon
are hereto attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A
Memorandum, respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed
Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose
Ozamiz confirming the authority of the President
of the Convention to implement Organic
Resolution No. 1, including the creation of the Ad
Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in
connection with said implementation.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof
subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and
effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a
plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight senators and all
city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8,
1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and
tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said
resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and
holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power
lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may
not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1,
Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in
question cannot be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all of the other amendments to be
drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand,

respondents and intervenors posit that the power to provide for,

fix the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the
ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper
to propose is within the authority of the Convention as a
necessary consequence and part of its power to propose
amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such
amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner
as the Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's delicate
task now is to decide which of these two poses is really in accord
with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the
question of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is
a political question and that the Convention being legislative body
of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned
by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the
courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the
respondent has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact,
respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the convention
expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer
acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of
the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21
SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being
divided in their opinions as to the other matters therein involved,
were precisely unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously,
distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of
the portions of Our decision they have quoted or would misapply
them by taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court
regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts
of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that
matter, those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose

of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly

is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that
very case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel
any lingering misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but
comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court
thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63
Phil. 139, 157), this Court speaking through
one of the leading members of the Constitutional
Convention and a respected professor of
Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel declared
that "the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra),
this Court characterizing the issue submitted
thereto as a political one declined to pass upon
the question whether or not a given number of
votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed
amendment to the Constitution which was
being submitted to the people for ratification
satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the
fundamental law. The force of this precedent has
been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief
Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino
v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949), Taada
v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias
v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14,
1961). In the first we held that the officers and
employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are
under its supervision and control, not of that of the

Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the

second, this Court proceeded to determine the
number of Senators necessary for quorum in the
Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by
Senators belonging to the party having the largest
number of votes in said chamber, purporting to
act, on behalf of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein of two (2)
Senators belonging to the first party, as members,
for the second party, of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared
unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to
apportion the representatives districts for the
House of Representatives, upon the ground that
the apportionment had not been made as may be
possible according to the number of inhabitants of
each province. Thus we rejected the theory,
advanced in these four (4) cases that the issues
therein raised were political questions the
determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to
propose amendments thereto is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines). It is part of the inherent powers of
the people as the repository sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art. 11,
Constitution of the Philippines) to make, and,
hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly
grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV,
Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and

members of the House of Representatives

act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of aconstituent assembly.
When acting as such, the members of Congress
derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike
the people, when performing the same function,
(Of amending the Constitution) for their authority
does not emanate from the Constitution they
are the very source of all powers of
government including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent
assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the
members of Congress derive their authority from
the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that
they do not have the final say on whether or not
their acts are within or beyond constitutional
limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set
the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet
that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and
to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity
is stressed by the fact that the Constitution
expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, (And,
inferentially, to lower courts.) the power to declare
a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the
Constitution), despite the eminently political
character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of
Congress acting as a constituent assembly
violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable
not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review,
and, to the extent that this view may be
inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v.
Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be deemed

modified accordingly. The Members of the Court

are unanimous on this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate
authority, the Convention is not supreme. Nowhere in his petition
and in his oral argument and memoranda does petitioner point
otherwise. Actually, what respondents and intervenors are
seemingly reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention
of 1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its
existence and derives all its authority and power from the existing
Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not been
called by the people directly as in the case of a revolutionary
convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new
government born of either a war of liberation from a mother
country or of a revolution against an existing government or of a
bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat. As to such kind of
conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely
without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such
conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the
Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez
refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the
current convention came into being only because it was called by
a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent
assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present
Constitution which provides:
ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session
assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for the purpose. Such amendments
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when

approved by a majority of the votes cast at an

election at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed
with extra ordinary powers generally beyond the control of any
department of the existing government, but the compass of such
powers can be co-extensive only with the purpose for which the
convention was called and as it may propose cannot have any
effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by
the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its
officers and members are not immune from attack on
constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force
and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence
of the Convention notwithstanding, and operates even within the
walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal
operation and the performance of its task to propose
amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of
restraint or control by any other authority than itself, it is equally
beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or
members can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this
country the equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech
and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing
Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such Convention validly
pass any resolution providing for the taking of private property
without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any
tax, impost or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to
a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a controversy
between private individuals or between such individuals and the
state, in violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may
not and cannot validly assert, much less exercise, in the light of

the existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an

act of the Convention be assailed by a citizen as being among
those not granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing
Constitution, who can decide whether such a contention is correct
or not? It is of the very essence of the rule of law that somehow
somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such a grave
constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or we
would have to confess that the integrated system of government
established by our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no
intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their
learning, experience and craftsmanship in constitution-making.
We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We
have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice Concepcion in
Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and
reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of principle in the
opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara
vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of
power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties
between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmark of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production our Constitution is of

course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as
much as it was within the power of our people,
acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and
function as a harmonious whole, under a system
of check and balances and subject to specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would
be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment and the principles of
good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied
in our Constitution are real as they should be in
any living Constitution. In the United States where
no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at
rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more
than one and half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by
clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of
our Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers or

government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not
in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited
to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt
at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to strike conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its functions
is in this manner the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed

through their representatives in the executive and

legislative departments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal
checks of power provided in our Constitution, it
ought not the less to be remembered that, in the
language of James Madison, the system itself is
not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty ...
the people who are authors of this blessing must
also be its guardians ... their eyes must be ever
ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ...
aggression on the authority of their Constitution."
In the last and ultimate analysis then, must the
success of our government in the unfolding years
to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds
and hearts than in consultation rooms and court
chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by
resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed
the election of the herein petitioner to the said
body. On the other hand, the Electoral
Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day
for the filing of protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly; notwithstanding the previous
confirmations made by the National Assembly as
aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the
resolution of the National Assembly has the effect
of cutting off the power of the Electoral
Commission to entertain protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, submitted after December
3, 1935 then the resolution of the Electoral

Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere

surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as
contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its
proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9,
1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed
said date as the last day for filing protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, should be
upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy
involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral
Commission on the other. From the very nature of
the republican government established in our
country in the light of American experience and of
our own, upon the judicial department is thrown
the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral
Commission as we shall have occasion to refer
hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a
specific purpose, namely, to determine all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission
may not be interfered with, when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, it does not follow
that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional
mechanism adopted by the people and that it is
not subject to constitutional restriction. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate

department of the government, and even if it

were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between departmental powers
and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases. Discarding the English type
and other European types of constitutional
government, the framers of our Constitution
adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the
judicial department. In some countries which have
declined to follow the American example,
provisions have been inserted in their
constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising
the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is
taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be
the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition,
courts are bound to assume what is logically their
function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland
of 1921 expressly provides that courts shall have
no power to examine the validity of statutes (art.
81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution
contained a similar declaration. In countries
whose constitution are silent in this respect,
courts have assumed this power. This is true in
Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa.
Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3,
Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of the
Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and
Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the
Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts
are established to pass upon the validity of
ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the
present controversy shows the necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of

authority between two agencies created by the

Constitution. Were we to decline to take
cognizance of the controversy, who will determine
the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided
and undetermined, would not a void be thus
created in our constitutional system which may in
the long run prove destructive of the entire
framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon
principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of
the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the
present case, this court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission
as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice
Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted do not apply
only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular
departments of the government but to all such conflicts between
and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the
one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent
body, like the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and
the Constituent assemblies constituted by the House of
Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or principle
whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any
of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should
not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of
delegate elected directly by the people, since at best, as already

demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under

the terms of the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the
jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes without
saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the
Convention or that the Convention is subject to the control of the
Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are
subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon
principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is
within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the
existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner,
respondents and intervenors have joined in this case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of
the petition. Is it within the powers of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment reducing
to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the
Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form
provided for in said resolution and the subsequent implementing
acts and resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case
demand the most accurate and unequivocal statement of the real
issue which the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has
very clearly stated that he is not against the constitutional
extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a
matter of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in Congress such
a proposal, and that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by
him to prevent that the proposed amendment here involved be
submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in filing

the petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent,

Whenever he can, any violation of the Constitution of the
Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or in
connection with the most laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the
Court sees it, the specific question raised in this case is limited
solely and only to the point of whether or not it is within the power
of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the
people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the
abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form
provided in said resolution as well as in the subject question
implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its
officers, at this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a matter
of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to
adjourn sine die, and is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of
considering other reforms or amendments affecting other parts of
the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1
itself expressly provides, that the amendment therein proposed
"shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on
other portions of the amended section or on other portions of the
entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may
say or do, in this case should be understood as reflecting, in any
degree or means the individual or collective stand of the
members of the Court on the fundamental issue of whether or not
the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote, simply because
that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt in the
mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it constitutionally
permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part so that the said
proposed amendment may be presented to the people for their
approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and
enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to the absolute
necessity, under the fundamental principles of democracy to
which the Filipino people is committed, of adhering always to the

rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose

cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect of
the problem before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971
itself was born, in a great measure, because of the pressure
brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various
elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their incessant
search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about
meaningful changes in the structure and bases of the existing
social and governmental institutions, including the provisions of
the fundamental law related to the well-being and economic
security of the underprivileged classes of our people as well as
those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural
resources and the national patrimony, as an alternative to violent
and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving
aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at times have justifiably
or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas
and campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the
rest of the people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy
and violence; what they really want are law and order, peace and
orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they strongly and urgently
feel must be done to change the present order of things in this
Republic of ours. It would be tragic and contrary to the plain
compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself
in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other
than the imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable
provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger
measure than when it binds other departments of the government
or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the
Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the
Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in
appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking down
any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are
resolved to discharge that duty.

During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the
urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the point of being
convinced that meaningful change is the only alternative to a
violent revolution, this Court would be the last to put any
obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional
Convention. If there are respectable sectors opining that it has
not been called to supplant the existing Constitution in its entirety,
since its enabling provision, Article XV, from which the
Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only of amendments
which shall form part of it, which opinion is not without persuasive
force both in principle and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view
is that only the collective judgment of its members as to what is
warranted by the present condition of things, as they see it, can
limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention
may propose, hence the complete substitution of the existing
constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority.
Desirable as it may be to resolve, this grave divergence of views,
the Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in
which it should discharge its constitutional duty in such premises.
The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in which
respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to
have them squarely passed upon by the Court do not necessarily
impose upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views
thereon. The Court considers it to be of the utmost importance
that the Convention should be untrammelled and unrestrained in
the performance of its constitutionally as signed mission in the
manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may
step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the
Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that it would
be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly
demonstrable violation of the existing Charter. Withal, it is a very
familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions
are to be resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no
alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely on the
principle of respect that the Court must accord to the acts of the

other coordinate departments of the government, and certainly,

the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in
that regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already
made it clear that the Convention came into being by a call of a
joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the
Constitution, already quoted earlier in this opinion. We reiterate
also that as to matters not related to its internal operation and the
performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to
the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are
all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now
We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments
to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of
Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the
framers of the Constitution took care that the process of
amending the same should not be undertaken with the same
ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution
making is the most valued power, second to none, of the people
in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding
fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of the
succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the
Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other
conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within the country
and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken
in preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for
which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without
adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that
correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less
importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must
be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation.
From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original
constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any
limitations, restraints or inhibitions save those that they may
impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of

subsequent conventions called to amend the original constitution.

Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that their handiwork is
not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for
reasons purely personal but more importantly, because written
constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for some
time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be
adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they
must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated
by more or less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a
rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and
conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people
themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And
when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the
original constitution, it does not lie in the delegates of any
subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and
disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and
omnipotent as their original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in
any degree the number and nature and the scope and extent of
the amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose.
Nor does the Court propose to pass on the issue extensively and
brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or not the power
or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to
be proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative and as
such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether the said
power can be exercised concurrently by the Convention with the
Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it does not
perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question, grave and
important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even
of a consensus among the members of the Court in respect to
this issue creates the need for more study and deliberation, and
as time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons,
November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the
plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will refrain from making any

pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a

more appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the basis of this
decision is as important and decisive as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any
limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution
which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a
plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic
Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the
condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed
by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a
single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the
amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only
the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that the
plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for
ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized
by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the
Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null
and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:

1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is

sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a
constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may
propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit
as to the number of amendments that Congress or the
Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely
provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many
"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or
amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of
Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says
"an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the
wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already stated,
amending the Constitution is as serious and important an
undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any amendment
of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only
because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious
instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the
government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately
formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive
articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and
national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people,
on the other. lt is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any
country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its
other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled
by them for the purpose. Once the original constitution is
approved, the part that the people play in its amendment
becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to
them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an

integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its

entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their
vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole
document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of
the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is
submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution,
in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed
amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or
any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to
its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question.
Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the
questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of
reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be
concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of
the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to
be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other
considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on
the proposed amendment, although it may already be observed
that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the
voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are needed
under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in
the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will
ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future
action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows
what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the
Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do
not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would
be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later
on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of
voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country
into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the

Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial

changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of
the existing social and political order enshrined in the present
Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite
intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age
upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish
and of which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for
the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be
validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but
ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the
context of the present state of things, where the Convention has
hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to
present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot
comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the
present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article
XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as
to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject
the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible
frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors
themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the proposed
amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the
election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the
Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be,
in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members
of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble
work of the Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court

want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow

these eighteen years old to vote. But like the Convention, the
Court has its own duties to the people under the Constitution
which is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties
Whether or not the mandates of the fundamental law are being
complied with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of the
conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it
has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the
constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention's
Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the
Convention implementing the same violate the condition in
Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or
plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the
Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the
people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding
that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same
should be submitted to them not separately from but together with
all the other amendments to be proposed by this present
Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is
granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of
the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the
respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No.
695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents
Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the
Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any
action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of
the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this
decision immediately executory. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976

VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and
ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and
HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued

Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October
16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the
people's continued opposition to the convening of the National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and
replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a
legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:

MARTIN, J,:

(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with

preliminary injunction relates to the power of the incumbent
President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the
present Constitution in the absence of the interim National
Assembly which has not been convened.

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you

approve the following amendments to the Constitution? For the
purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the
effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of
Article XVI of the Constitution.

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued

Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on
October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the I .
assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the
period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by
the President of his present powers.1

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President

issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031,
amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring
the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031
repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of
which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2

1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an

interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang
Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise
provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the
Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of
the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age
elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the
incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional
representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors
shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from
each region or sector and the, manner of their election shall be
prescribed and regulated by law.

2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers

and its members shall have the same functions, responsibilities,
rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the members
thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power provided in
Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30
days from the election and selection of the members, convene
the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions
until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent
President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he
shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim
Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its
functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers
and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five.
Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the
Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise
all the powers and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of
the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall
be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime
Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister) if he so
desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy
Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative
powers until martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister),
there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof,
or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular
National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any
matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate
action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the
necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall
form part of the law of the land.

7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently

constituted but their functions, powers, and composition may be
altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the
Supervision of the Commission on Elections may be called at any
time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of
the people regarding any important matter whether of national or
local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of
these amendments shall continue in full force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent
President shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by I
majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive
supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V.
SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite
on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential
Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments
to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031,
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise,
control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled
on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for

respondent Commission on Elections, The Solicitor General
principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the
issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of
this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent
President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to,
or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under
Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son
RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714,
to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to
the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative
powers under Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as
a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed
amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation
renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President
need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing
15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens
of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of
merit.

I
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus
standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential
Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that
the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such
nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries
as a in result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers,
laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be
enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by
an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4
The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all
appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031
appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its
provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as
taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public
money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the
validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as
regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it
sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority
upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired
into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a
pure political one, lying outside the domain of judicial review. We
disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and
ratification, raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where
the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose
amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of
transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the
prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National

Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook
the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential
Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the
regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force
and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees
is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2),
Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court
en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word
in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and
hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to
determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the

legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy
refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is
definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the
Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional
authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a
constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on
the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a
downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If
the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as
the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the
procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. 10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing
his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's
authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the
procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people
ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy
of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their
sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the
amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in
1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been
followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people

themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the

Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that
power, a power which includes the competence to determine
whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been
observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a
posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the
people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior
constitutional cases underline the preference of the Court's
majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending
process as one of non-political impression. In the Plebiscite
Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the
legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino
people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a
political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the
issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification
Cases 12involving the issue of whether or not the validity of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. announcing the Ratification by
the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political
question, the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was
dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable.
Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, Thus,
in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the
respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree
No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the
ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or
not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they
claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously
declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With Identical
unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971
habeas corpus cases, questioning Our authority to determine the
constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in
Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it

adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned

and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and
expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the
political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The
return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by
the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief
Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support
thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in
support on the political question theory advanced in said habeas
corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this
Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally
untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned
habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare
decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."

II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2)
The National Assembly may, by a vote of twothirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a
convention to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of,
this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which
shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision.

In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly

instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that
amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly,
upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,
may, by a majority vote of all its Members,
propose amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the
constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period
of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be
initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the
Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a
Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in
an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of
the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may
be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National
Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that
the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of
discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly. Speaking for the majority opinion in that case,
Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention intended to
leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with
the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country."
Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that
Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to
the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions,
they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent
President was given the discretion as to when he could convene
the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the

sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it

be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was
rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening of the
interim National Assembly soon found support from the people
themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the
ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people
voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In
the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies
("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the
convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the
referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of
whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened
was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and
delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed
automatically members of the I interim National Assembly, were
against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973,
the people had already resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state
undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that
body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating
when engaged in the amending process.16 Rather, it is
exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental
charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in
Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the
National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the
legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of
constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not
legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made
between constitutional content of an organic character and that of
a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy,
not of law. 17Such being the case, approval of the President of any
proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the
President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary
cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition
or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19

III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the
Philippines is a crisis government today are more or less
concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he
concentration of government power in a democracy faced by an
emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the
doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has
generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the
government be parceled out among three mutually independent
branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to be
destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise
any two or more types of power, and certainly a total disregard of the
separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47,
'the very definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of
powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental action.
By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an
insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action in behalf of
the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the
life of any government when all powers must work together in
unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary
union of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one
man. The more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional
system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their
fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis
potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government.
In the former the all-important harmony of legislature and executive
is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to
confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established
and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship. The power of the
state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must
also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal
limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive

in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside the
ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies for which the
legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such
broad emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the
government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the
crisis may be ended and normal times restored.

2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial

law is now a conceded valid at. That sun clear authority of the
President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory
Provisions, thus: 23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly
and shall preside over its sessions until the
interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall
continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives
under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five
Constitution and the powers vested in the
President and the Prime Minister under this
Constitution until the calls upon the interim
National Assembly to elect the interim President
and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then
exercise their respective powers vested by this
Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions,
and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the
land, and shall remain valid, binding, and effective
even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of
this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders,
decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
incumbent President, or unless expressly and
explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly.

"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional

Convention delegate, "that the Constitutional Convention, while
giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim
National Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be
convened soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of
legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the
lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire
governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an
extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which
extends over a period of time. The separation of executive and
legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinct obstruction
to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive
power is not too much a cause for as the steady increase in the
magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been
called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which
involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and
economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional
constitutional law just confines the President's power as
Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national
forces, yet the facts of our political, social, and economic
disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same,
indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take
emergency measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally
consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition
period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter
fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And,
in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer
convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's

preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to

propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim
National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of
the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the
sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim
National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the
Constitution and of law for the President to assume that
constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his
assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is
yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the
legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason
why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct,
although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is
not to say that the President has converted his office into a
constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the
legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not
convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in
operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative
upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people
to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its
very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to
propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the
President to shy away from that actuality and decline to
undertake the amending process would leave the governmental
machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a
destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis
government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these
parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete
forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all,
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the
President now, are mere agents of the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the
referendums of January 1973 and February 1975, the people had
already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The
Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian,
the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the

Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000

barangays, about the same number of Kabataang Barangay
organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces,
3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the
prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim
National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting of martial
law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of
Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim
Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October
16 . 28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under

Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19

cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the
Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng
mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the
people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed
amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial
law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the
submission of the proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led
the President to initiate the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent
issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions
(proposed amendments) to the people in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16.

V
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary
state is easily seen. In the Philippines, a republican and unitary
state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat
people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the
Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular

sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the

people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus write
into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in
the absence of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because,
as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all
experiment." 34 "The necessities of orderly government," wrote
Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be

permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution

is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when
they adopt it. 35

2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to

the people to exercise their sovereign power as constitutional
legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed,
proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are
the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into
enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the
powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those
proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a
referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people
themselves implemented only by the authority of the President.
Indeed, it may well be said that the amending process is a
sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the
procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The
question - (1) Do you want martial law to be continued? - is a
referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate.
This was prompted by the desire of the Government to reach the
larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to
guide the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For
the succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only
those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the
plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the
new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the
votes of those 18 years old and above which will have valid bearing

on the results. The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously
asked to answer the referendum question and the plebiscite question
does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing
objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue, which is of
current one and submitting to them for ratification of proposed
constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year
olds and 18-year olds above) is readily dispelled by the provision of
two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one containing the
ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another
containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and
above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age
and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters
eighteen years and above contained in another ballot box. And, the
results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately prepared for
the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. 38

2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a

"plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely consultative in character. It
is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues
submitted to the people foe their consideration, the calling of
which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power
of the President. 39It is participated in by all citizens from the age of
fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feebleminded, or ex- convicts . 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves
the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding
the election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is
not imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of
the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime
of martial law stultifies in main the freedom to dissent. That
speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the
observation of Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild
character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be

sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain

grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The for the
referendum-plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing
freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself had
announced that he would not countenance any suppression of
dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a
"yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the
issues at hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters soon found their way to the
public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the
proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973
Constitution, which is already a settled matter. 43 Even government
employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to
participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on
the referendum-plebiscite issues. 44

VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3
weeks is not too short for free debates or discussions on the
referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They
are the issues of the day. The people have been living with them
since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The
referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial
law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for
discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for
constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum
Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for
the publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette
of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before
the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The
constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the
complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was published in only three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the
scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional

amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the reelection

of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the
Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No.
517). And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional
amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence
of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No.
73)." 45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no
provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held,
but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v.
Miller, 46 the United States Supreme court held that this matter of
submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant
conditions, political, social and economic," which "are essentially
political and not justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant
cases, the President, may fix the time within which the people may
act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as
unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the
natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in
time; second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity
therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable
implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and
disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but the expression of
the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done
contemporaneously. 47 In the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of
the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the
felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment
may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived,
and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by
proper body
IN RESUME
The three issues are

1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees

Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under,
the environmental circumstances now obtaining, does the
President possess power to propose amendments to the
Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the
people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments
within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper
submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and
Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee,
Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes
Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the
question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V.
Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view
that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate
Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices
Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted in the negative. Associate
Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting
opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents
from the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the
Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as
to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices
Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the
view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the
proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate
Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however that

the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices

Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question
is political and therefore beyond the competence and cognizance
of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in
Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices
Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the
President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to
propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair
and proper submission with sufficient information and time to
assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by
this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and
Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to dismiss the
three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate
opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result.
Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted to grant
the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said
petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and

MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO
PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as
founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL
ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitionersintervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special
attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people
of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars, before the
drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional
Commission itself, through the original proponent 1 and the main
sponsor 2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative". 3 Indeed it is,
for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of
proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its members and (2) by a constitutional convention. 4 For this and the
other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to
this petition.

On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin

filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter,
COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin
Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said
Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general
and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all
Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners
and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at
the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a group of citizens desirous to
avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he
and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to
exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution;
that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required
in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be
established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal
election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by
individual signatories; that before the Movement and other
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and
dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be
issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people
of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the

said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be

affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation,
under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be

amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article
VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the
petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which consist
in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions
concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM
LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4
OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE
X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be
submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve
per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it
will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given
the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through
its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his
own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting the
case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the
following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra;

representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms,

Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator
Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and
the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin
filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following
arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on
people's initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact,
Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing
and Regulating Constitution Amendments by
People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator
Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still
pending before the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three
systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation.
However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other

modes of initiative, which are specifically provided

for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people's
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino
stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege
speech delivered before the Senate in 1994:
"There is not a single word in that law which can
be considered as implementing [the provision on
constitutional initiative]. Such implementing
provisions have been obviously left to a separate
law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the
effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws
and not constitutional amendments because the
latter take effect only upon ratification and not
after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on
16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, is ultra
vires insofar asinitiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC
has no power to provide rules and regulations for
the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the
Constitution to pass the implementing law.

(5) The people's initiative is limited

to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term
limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore,
outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated
funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC
nor any other government department, agency, or
office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for
prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC
grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by
PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general
re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to
mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would
be incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the
transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the
issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure
and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's
suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to
comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten
days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining
public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin
Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa
from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend
the Constitution.

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra,

filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that:

METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.COMELEC,

ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL

EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY
FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)"
IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION
FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE
COMELEC.

4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST

4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE
INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSORSANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY
PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT

BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE
COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE
ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF
ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED
TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF
THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING
SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE
PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS
P2,571,200.00;

5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300

PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991
PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD
BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE
OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416
WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO
LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY
PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES
FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."

3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE

COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS
DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY"
PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY
JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE
COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S

SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A
PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC
THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES
AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY
TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS
ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS
ANNEX E, PETITION);

7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE

TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT
ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A
FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A
RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE
DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO
WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP.
412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL.
CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS,
S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own
behalf a Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion that the
instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he
filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory
Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature
campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to
gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the
substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is
a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The
absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is
not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for
the validity or sufficiency of laws.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically

provides that the proposition in an initiative to
amend the Constitution approved by the majority
of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the
COMELEC the power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve
a revision of, but mere amendment to, the
Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few
specific provisions of the Constitution, or more
specifically, only those which lay term limits. It
does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire
document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin
considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for
only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there
will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay
Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a
priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of
the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also
on 2 January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:

(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia,

people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its
Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms,
recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its
Section 3, which enumerates the three systems
of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution
and defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its
Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the
Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the
Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735
because, being national in scope, that system
of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator
Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions
of the law when he claimed that nothing therein
was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent
nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not
deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials
constitutes a mere amendment to the
Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly
issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and
under the Omnibus Election Code. The rulemaking power of the COMELEC to implement the
provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by
this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. COMELEC.

On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the
temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned
Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order
filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the
latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private
respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment
he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for
Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and
allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20
January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January
1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a
Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition
in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition
in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a
mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change from a
political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to
one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the
change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization
of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing
equal access to opportunities for public service and
prohibiting political dynasties. 19 Arevision cannot be
done by initiative which, by express provision of
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited
to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the
President and the limits provided for all other

national and local elective officials are based on

the philosophy of governance, "to open up the
political arena to as many as there are Filipinos
qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to
break the concentration of political and economic
powers in the hands of a few, and to promote
effective proper empowerment for participation in
policy and decision-making for the common
good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to
negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987
Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the
purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-ofinterest situation. Initiative is intended as a
fallback position that may be availed of by the
people only if they are dissatisfied with the
performance of their elective officials, but not as a
premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself
to be called the enabling law that implements the
people's initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties
who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency
before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the
contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the
same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the
signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per
legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may
oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g)
the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the
signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the
appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the
holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of
funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there

being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no

jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be

rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without
authority to legislate the procedure for a
people's initiativeunder Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains
to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does
not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as
the former does not set a sufficient standard for a
valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that
implements the people's right to initiate constitutional amendments.
This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a
sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the
COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to
promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he
contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication
because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated
under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in
an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative
which is signedby the required number of registered voters. He also
submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot
avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them
is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's
role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination
of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision
of a plebiscite, if warranted.

On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to

Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which
it attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following
arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law
mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot
substitute for the required implementing law on
the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal
defect in that it does not have the required
number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the
Constitution, which can be proposed only by
Congress or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting
the Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by
the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by
LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK
and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco
and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a
nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments
on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring
LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible
period of three days from notice, and the respondents to
comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from
receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.

At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued

on the following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light
of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far
filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act
Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor,
was intended to include or cover initiative on
amendments to the Constitution; and if so,
whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers
such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing
the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and
Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
national and local officials, as proposed in the
draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an
amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance
of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely
intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and
dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing
municipal election officers to assist Delfin's
movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the

publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed

Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to
take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty
days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of
the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention
wherein it adopts the allegations and arguments in the main
Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have
dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause
of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions
of both the Journal and the Record of the House of
Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No.
21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the
proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee
on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill
No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their
Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter
filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to
this special civil action.

For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall

first take up the fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial
procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no
serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this
Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is
a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an
affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition filed by private
respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes
imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding
any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule
65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the
proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary
judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the
purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from
usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally
vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this
case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the
highly divisive and adverse environmental
consequences on the body politic of the
questioned Comelec order. The consequent

climate of legal confusion and political instability

begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of
constitutional law is threatened by the political
ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the
paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC
a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently
because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the
oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to
submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December
1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering
Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the
attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of
hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure
to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the
petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2
of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant to desist from further

proceedings in the action or matter specified

therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because
the said petition is not supported by the required minimum
number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts
that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required
number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case
may likewise be treated as a special civil action
for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his
Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a
procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of issues raised. In the landmark
Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed
aside this technicality because the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,

INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.

has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot

exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.

Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.

This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the

draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the
Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7
(Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of threefourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise

of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas,
a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot
operate. Thus, although this mode of amending
the Constitution is a mode of amendment which
bypasses congressional action, in the last
analysis it still is dependent on congressional
action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative

as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the
Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of
amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation
of the concept of initiative which it denominated as
Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam
President. May we respectfully call
attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we
submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed

provision governing the matter of

initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I
quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of
the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative
upon petition of at least ten percent of the
registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the
original Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for
carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President,
just two simple, clarificatory
questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of
initiative upon petition of at least
10 percent, there are no details in
the provision on how to carry this
out. Do we understand, therefore,
that we are leaving this matter to
the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right,
Madam President.

FR. BERNAS. And do we also

understand, therefore, that for as
long as the legislature does not
pass the necessary implementing
law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was
also taken up during the
committee hearing, especially with
respect to the budget
appropriations which would have
to be legislated so that the
plebiscite could be called. We
deemed it best that this matter be
left to the legislature. The
Gentleman is right. In any event,
as envisioned, no amendment
through the power of initiative can
be called until after five years from
the date of the ratification of this
Constitution. Therefore, the first
amendment that could be
proposed through the exercise of
this initiative power would be after
five years. It is reasonably
expected that within that five-year
period, the National Assembly can
come up with the appropriate
rules governing the exercise of
this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter
is left to the legislature the
details on how this is to be carried
out is it possible that, in effect,

what will be presented to the

people for ratification is the work
of the legislature rather than of the
people? Does this provision
exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not
exclude that possibility because
even the legislature itself as a
body could propose that
amendment, maybe individually or
collectively, if it fails to muster the
three-fourths vote in order to
constitute itself as a constituent
assembly and submit that
proposal to the people for
ratification through the process of
an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand
from the sponsor that the intention
in the proposal is to vest
constituent power in the people to
amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely
correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with
the underlying precept of the
proposal in terms of
institutionalizing popular
participation in the drafting of the

Constitution or in the amendment

thereof, but I would have a lot of
difficulties in terms of accepting
the draft of Section 2, as written.
Would the sponsor agree with me
that in the hierarchy of legal
mandate, constituent power has
primacy over all other legal
mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner
is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the
sponsor agree with me that in the
hierarchy of legal values, the
Constitution is source of all legal
mandates and that therefore we
require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and
in the amendments of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is
nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order
to underscore the primacy of
constituent power we have a
separate article in the constitution
that would specifically cover the
process and the modes of
amending the Constitution?

MR. SUAREZ. That is right,

Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the
sponsor inclined, as the provisions
are drafted now, to again concede
to the legislature the process or
the requirement of determining the
mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of
implementing this could very well
be placed in the hands of the
National Assembly, not unless we
can incorporate into this provision
the mechanics that would
adequately cover all the
conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the
aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND
not to REVISE the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal
was suggested on the theory that
this matter of initiative, which
came about because of the
extraordinary developments this
year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the
Constitution as embodied in
Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of
initiative should not extend to the

revision of the entire Constitution,

so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am

seriously bothered by providing
this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor
be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning
Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1,
instead of setting it up as another
separate section as if it were a
self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be
amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process
of initiative is limited to the matter
of amendment and should not
expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of
the Constitution. That was the
sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the
Committee was attempting to
distinguish the coverage of modes

(a) and (b) in Section 1 to include

the process of revision; whereas
theprocess of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would
only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those
were the terms envisioned in the
Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter
introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the
Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam
President. I propose to substitute
the entire Section 2 with the
following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I
have modified the proposed
amendment after taking into
account the modifications
submitted by the sponsor himself
and the honorable Commissioners
Guingona, Monsod, Rama, Ople,
de los Reyes and Romulo. The
modified amendment in
substitution of the proposed
Section 2 will now read as follows:
"SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS
TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A

PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE

PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER Of REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST
BE REPRESENTED BY AT
LEAST THREE PERCENT OF
THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL
BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE
YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President,
considering that the proposed
amendment is reflective of the
sense contained in Section 2 of
our completed Committee Report
No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified
amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative
act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under

Commissioner Davide's
amendment, is it possible for the
legislature to set forth certain
procedures to carry out the
initiative. . .?

legislative body must diminish or

impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of
the Constitution can the
procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?

MR. DAVIDE. It can.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the
Commissioner's amendment does
not prevent the legislature from
asking another body to set the
proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner
is correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular
right would be subject to
legislation, provided the legislature
cannot determine anymore the
percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the
procedures, including the
determination of the proper form
for submission to the people, may
be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not
destroy the substantive right to
initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified

amendment strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to
NOT REVISION of the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure,
Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first
question: Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line 1
refers to "amendment." Does it not
cover the word "revision" as
defined by Commissioner Padilla
when he made the distinction
between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not,
because "amendments" and
"revision" should be covered by
Section 1. So insofar as initiative
is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision." 38

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of

proposing amendments through initiative must be more rigorous
and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to

be made that under this proposal,
what is involved is an amendment
to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily
require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of threefourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher
number. Moreover, just to submit
the issue of calling a constitutional
convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the
import being that the process of
amendment must be made more
rigorous and difficult than probably
initiating an ordinary legislation or
putting an end to a law proposed
by the National Assembly by way
of a referendum. I cannot agree to
reducing the requirement
approved by the Committee on the
Legislative because it would
require another voting by the
Committee, and the voting as
precisely based on a requirement
of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might
present such a proposal, by way
of an amendment, when the
Commission shall take up the
Article on the Legislative or on the
National Assembly on plenary
sessions. 39

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to

amendments, and the final version, which the Commission
approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam
President. Section 2, as amended,
reads as follows: "AMENDMENT
TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A
PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST
BE REPRESENTED BY AT
LEAST THREE PERCENT OF
THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT
UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL
BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER
THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE
YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE EXERCISE OF THIS
RIGHT. 40

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions

was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986.41 Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration,
Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was
withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again approved
on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the
approved Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per
centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by
law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The
Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the
present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of
initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise
of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative,
like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to
us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to
implement the exercise of the right than through the passage of a
statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the
last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to
substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then
reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.

with
The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on
Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing
the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on
how [the right] is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended
to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The
Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis
of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No.
497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House
Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No.
497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of
Article X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt
with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions
of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee
consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft
bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the
Senate 50and by the House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill
is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of
Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the
right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC,

Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the
people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a
delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor
relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to
initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as
to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier,
initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals
to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to
"directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this
section was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which
solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and
referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and
enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act
defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and
mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that

Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements

as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative,
the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition
forinitiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires,
among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the
petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended,
in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c)
reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided
therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered
voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not
more than one hundred (100) words which shall
be legibly written or printed at the top of every
page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"

only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted

earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply
means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to
fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the
primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our
reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and
Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for
doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the
initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is "national
initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local
initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law,
ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of
initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of
the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms

xxx xxx xxx

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a
petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should
have been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is
not accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs
(b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to
the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition

approved by majority of the votes cast in an
election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification and
proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis
supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to
indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments;
thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited
people's organization, as defined by law, may file
a petition for indirect initiative with the House of
Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions
of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum,
which could be petitions for both national and
localinitiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under
subtitle III on Local Initiative and Referendum is
misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and
local initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act
shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved
pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution
or want of capacity of the local legislative body to
enact the said measure.

Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and
care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiative
and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving
them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on
the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent
the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the
following:

(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act

thereon, and the invocation of the power of initiative as a
consequence thereof;

(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the

petition and the contents of the petition;

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;

(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;

(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its

official in the local government unit concerned as to whether the
required number of signatures have been obtained;

(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the

required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the
proposition;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of

the proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which
must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official

Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of
registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body
concerned;

(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections,
merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b)
defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the
enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in
an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected by
the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the

number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides
for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more
important or the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735
thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip
service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and
cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or
as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari
potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section
28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under
Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising
quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a

form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above.

However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be
a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the
law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b)
fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both
requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the
power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT
PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate
rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under
R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for
the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C
of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is

authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the

"sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING
THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full
compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to
initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested
upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution
must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not
contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin
himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that
the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the
petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative
only after its filing. The petition then is theinitiatory pleading.
Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en
banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel
before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of
the petition; 63(2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics
Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each

legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the

establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its
election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election. 66

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A.
No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The
respondent Commission must have known that the petition does
not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for
which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number.
Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a
mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996,
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of
whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and
local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be
permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose

amendments to the Constitution should no longer be kept in the
cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength.
Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the
right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith
DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996
is made permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but
is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA
6735").

EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153

October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER

WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31
August 2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC")
denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987
Constitution.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelveper
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least three per centum(3%) of its registered
voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative
Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due
publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the
following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES
VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING
THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERALPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE
XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE
ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE
OTHER?

Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely
Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"),
with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended

Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7

The Ruling of the COMELEC

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying
due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an
enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the
Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling
in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of
the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC
Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to
give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to their petition
since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the
Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to
that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an
expression of the "will of the sovereign people."

Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing

pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's petition.
The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying
on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold
the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding
precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the
Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the
signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino
Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the
percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of
the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as
provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one
subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on
26 September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the
Court considered the case submitted for resolution.

In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the

Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show
cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the
COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the
Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction
in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an
opposition-in-intervention.

The petitions raise the following issues:

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor

General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to
grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor
General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its
implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the
system of initiative."

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling

in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and

The Issues

1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative;

3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.

The Ruling of the Court

There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's
initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the
present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino
Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of
the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no
grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on
Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain
the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition," thus:

MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say

some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment ready to be shown to the people when
they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed,
Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft
is ready and shown to them before they sign. Now,
who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam
President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them and they are asked
whether or not they want to propose this constitutional
amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino
can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of
the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready
and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal
on its face is a petition by the people. This means two

essential elements must be present. First, the people must author

and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the
proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written
on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to
the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the
time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of
signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of
people's initiative from the United States where various State
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all
States15 which allow initiative petitions,the unbending
requirement is that the people must first see the full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their
assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition
that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained
in several decisions of various courts. Thus, inCapezzuto v.
State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals,
declared:

[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if

the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and
more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription
requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A
person permitted to describe orally the contents of an
initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer
having actually examined the petition, could easily
mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying,
or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that
might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems
particularly acute when, in this case, the person
giving the description is the drafter of the petition,
who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it
gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the
ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon
explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to
amendments by initiative commonly are described in
similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text
requirement is to provide sufficient information so
that registered voters can intelligently evaluate
whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x
(publication of full text of amended constitutional provision
required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x
x the section which is proposed to be added to or
subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have
this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be
required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of
signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and
failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the
initiative void.19

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state

that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the
relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the
people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign
on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the
Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must
sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the
people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private
capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not
disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages
and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people.
The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people
and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The
proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the
signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The
proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full
text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with
this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a
copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26
September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11
October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral
arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in

intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete

Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the
signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum
are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:

Province:

City/Municipality:

No. of

Legislative
District:

Barangay:

Verified
Signatures
:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF

ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERALPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO
ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND
ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE
XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987
Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the
petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my
support for the filing thereof.

Precinc
t
Number

Name
Last Name, First
Name, M.I.

Address

Birthdate
MM/DD/Y
Y

Signature

Verification

the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative

clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

2
3

Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the

signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino
Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed
copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed
on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group
also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30
August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied
that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his
answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of
the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25
August 2006 petition.

4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0

_________________
Barangay Official
(Print Name and Sign)

_________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the

Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet.
Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul
Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court
on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people
approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature
sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed
changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of

The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they
prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when
they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B.
Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006
petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed
with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended]
Petition in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for
and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 200602 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of
signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution
No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the "Official
Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has
posted the full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF

THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON
CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE
AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE
1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common
stand on the approach to support the proposals of the
People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria MacapagalArroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the
ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed
by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of
the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime
in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on
Charter Change created by Her Excellency to recommend
amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its
final report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political
developments in Congress which militates against the use
of the expeditious form of amending the 1987
Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional
members and the failure of Congress to amend the
Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has
unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform
agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum
without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the
same;

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY

RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF
THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS
(SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A
MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special
meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park
Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner
Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30
August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the
Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through
people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the
1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative
Commission24 arevastly different from the proposed changes of
the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August
2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative
Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions.
The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary
and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution,
provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not
touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect
only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the
introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006
or more than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006
petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not

establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation

of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six
months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the
contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on
the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution
No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the
Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the
COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized
that the proposed amendments alleged in the Petition,
more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph
2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were
inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their
proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the
petition because the amended petition was what they had shown
to the people during the February to August 2006 signaturegathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of
25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect
their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition
or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that
they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with
the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege
in their present petition before this Court that they circulated
printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature
sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication
that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the
signature sheets.

It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-inInterventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they
circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC,"
thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here
there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h.
Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.]
Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature
sheets circulated together with the petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed
to have understood the proposition contained in the
petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people
"the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an
afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and
Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not
contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated
Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the
petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended
petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during
the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of
the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum,
stating that "a signer who did not read the measure attached to
a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the
ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The
Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed
changeattached to the petition signed by the people. Even
the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the
proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same

authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign

on the petition itself.

of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people

who signed the signature sheets.

Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed

amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the
initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the
Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with,
or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's
citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their
feet.

Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories

could have received with certainty one copy each of the petition,
assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty.
Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each
signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have
circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space
for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these
100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum
number of people who saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.

It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed,

circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signaturegathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they
filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than
candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and
circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or
amended petition. Nevertheless, even assumingthe Lambino
Group circulated the amended petition during the signaturegathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating
only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly
admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft
petition they filed more than six months later with the
COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked other
supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he
could not state with certainty how many additional copies the
other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this
Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself
caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11
October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that
"petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of
100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25 This
admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond
any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text

With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be

physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million
signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the
signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the
Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories
the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than
one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the
signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not
contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of
the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the
signature sheet of such attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino
admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission
binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a
mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the
signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance
with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in
the initiative clause of the Constitution.

For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed
the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed
changes before signing. They could not have known the nature
and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will
be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be reelected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function
indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the
present members of Congress, decide to call for new
parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the
interim Parliament will determine the expiration of
their own term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed
changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even
indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people
who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were
proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes
are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or
divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he
and his group assured the people during the signaturegathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would
be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed
changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However,
the text of the proposed changes belies this.

The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions,

as found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the
election of the members of Parliament, which shall be
synchronized and held simultaneously with the
election of all local government officials. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular
Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local
elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the
regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local
elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of
the proposed changes, could have easily written the word "next"
before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This
would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament
would be held in the next local elections following the ratification
of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word
"next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for
the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local
elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the
expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent
members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond
their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond
the five-year term of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations
of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group
deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire
nation.

This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present
initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal
representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the
signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed
changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million
signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes
would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the
people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes
mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article
XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of
these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene
to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
(Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this
provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people should
simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision
invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from
the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this
as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an
unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the
people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no
to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that
effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find
unacceptable.

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify

the entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter.
Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida
declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal
constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit.
The very broadness of the proposed amendment
amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know
what it is voting on - the amendment's proponents'
simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x
x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the
proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot
language in the instant case fails to do that. The very
broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state
what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement
that proposed amendments embrace only one subject.
(Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air
Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska warned
against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of
the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent
are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the
deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an
initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for
"inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-byinitiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate
independently of any structured or supervised process. They
often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while
remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing)
provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed,
initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to
present their initiative to potential petition-signers and
eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the

initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process

for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative
proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from
the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for
further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim
Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the
signature sheets could not have known that their signatures
would be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim
Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section
4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again
the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed
changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of
the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the
discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution.
With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the
interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise
again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this
rush in amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The
signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments
or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament
to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or
revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the
nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an
initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the
people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed
changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino
Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed
Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:

Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010

shall be members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth
day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain
as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not
schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010.
However, there is no counterpart provision for the present
members of the House of Representatives even if their term of
office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of
half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the
House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30
June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010.
Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the
President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections
for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister
will come only from the present members of the House of
Representatives to theexclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against
the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets could not have known that their signatures would be
used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not
have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after
30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime
Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first
showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments
is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud
on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an
initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a
petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an
issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the

text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the

people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed,
faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the
wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not
personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this
trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text
of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people
before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the
petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the
initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast,
Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the
Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or

(2) A constitutional convention.

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of
amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress
upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is
through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a
people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes,
applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution."
In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode,
applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This
distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of
the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us
last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed
provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now
covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report.
With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section
2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on

the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about

because of the extraordinary developments this year, has
to be separated from the traditional modes of amending
the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of initiative
should be limited to amendments to the Constitution
and should not extend to the revision of the entire
Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this
process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to
accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2
as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a
self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited
to the matter of amendment and should not expand
into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of
the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed
by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a)
and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of
revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to
amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms
envisioned in the Committee.

MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you,

Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner
Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision"
as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made
the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments"
and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the
Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's
initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution.
Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold
from the people the power to propose revisions to the
Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they
are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the
United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32 the Supreme
Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by
amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to

the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws

and amendments to the Constitution' and does not
purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It
is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be
accomplished only through ratification by the people of a
revised constitution proposed by a convention called for
that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the
scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter
termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if
such measure became law a substantial revision of our
present state Constitution would be effected, then the
measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate
until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional
convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v.
Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the
manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can be
altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or
other change only through the use of one of the specified
means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a
difference between an amendment and a revision; and it
is obvious from an examination of the measure here in
question that it is not an amendment as that term is
generally understood and as it is used in Article IV,
Section 1. The document appears to be based in large
part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the
'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by
the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the
1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the
Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses
required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of
adoption, x x x.

While differing from that document in material respects,

the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless,
a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not
such a measure as can be submitted to the people
through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the
requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention
called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x
xxx
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a
people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to
amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally
prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor,
even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a
deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution
itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative
Petition No. 364:34
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can
only be revised or amended in the manner prescribed
by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to
revise a constitution in a manner other than the one
provided in the instrument is almost invariably
treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x
x "While it is universally conceded that the people are
sovereign and that they have power to adopt a
constitution and to change their own work at will, they
must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according
to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where

the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the

method by which the people may alter or amend it, an
attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the
self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the
Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure
compliance with the clear command of the Constitution that a
people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an
amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino
Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition
should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an
amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest
cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental
difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions
contained therein for its revision indicate the will of
the people that the underlying principles upon which
it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding
nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term
"amendment" implies such an addition or change within
the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it
was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle
in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of
powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also

revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the

constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved. Revision
generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but
not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts
have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the
qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed
change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines
only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether
the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental
plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances."39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino

Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment.
Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul
two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the
Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire
Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the
Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging
the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the
structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of
Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus
constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition
alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checksand-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of
the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system,
involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino
Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the
changes will radically alter the framework of government as
set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a
leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific
and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an
amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions

deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress

specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are
judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original
intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire
document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all
implications for the entire document, to determine how and to
what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch
from the presidential system to a parliamentary system
would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the
entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a
bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its
effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the
amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on
whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the]
proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions
of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down
the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as
follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the
1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
Legislature affects not only many other provisions of
the Constitution but provides for a change in the form
of the legislative branch of government, which has
been in existence in the United States Congress and in all
of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest
days. It would be difficult to visualize a more
revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a
Senate is basic in the American form of government. It
would not only radically change the whole pattern of
government in this state and tear apart the whole
fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the
physical facilities necessary to carry on government.

xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed
amendment were adopted by the people at the General
Election and if the Legislature at its next session should
fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the
numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would
result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments
the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos
would prevail in the government of this State. The same
result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of
Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court
and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too
numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to
the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the
hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the
Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was
to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the
State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date
document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we
were to hold that it could be amended in the manner
proposed in the initiative petition here.43 (Emphasis
supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to
the present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only
seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also
seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments. The
initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections
of the Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from
a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's
present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the
Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino

Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the

structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between
"amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of
substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative
body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution,
substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of
the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However,
the same substantive changes, when proposed through an
initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are
made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation,
profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their
theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the
constitutional provisions expressly provide for both
"amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators
and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions
expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of
the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is
based on the actual experience of the people, that on one
hand the common people in general are not expected to
work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution
because that is not their occupation, profession or
vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and
constitutional convention delegates are expected to work
full-time on the same matter because that is their
occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference
between the words "revision" and "amendment"
pertain only to the process or procedure of coming
up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the
constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between
"amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in

the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x

(Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a
constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed
changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative,
the changes would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus,
the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in
the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a
constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However,
since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the
proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of
changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of
the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where
the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are
clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such
categorical intent and language.45 Any theory espousing a
construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant
consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating
inconsistencies in the form of government established in the
Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring
and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the
flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory
advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural
change in government does not constitute a revision justly
deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative
proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to advance
without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply
to changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His
theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a

procedure by which the legislature can propose a

revision of the constitution, but it does not affect
proposed revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure
constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that
cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They
assert that the distinction between amendment and
revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject
matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are
not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution."
They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching
changes outside the lines of the original instrument,
including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights
and radical restructuring of the government's relationship
with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that,
because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the
most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the
trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section
2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior
approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII,
section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by
initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court
concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be
accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of
Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII,
section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court
said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1,
authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of
amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no
similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the
constitution." x x x x

It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating

to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the
constitution which provides the means for constitutional
revision and it excludes the idea that an individual,
through the initiative, may place such a measure before
the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article
XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional
revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which
negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language
of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at
one end green for amendments and at the other end red for
revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and
difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or
revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far
end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present
initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of
powers among the three co-equal departments of government,
requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and
articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of
the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the
change may generally be considered an amendment and not a
revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18
years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly,
a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies
from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.49

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of

sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific
provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the
structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances
among or within the three branches. These three examples are
located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red
end where the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an
amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one
sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the word
"republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article
II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of
government and the fundamental ideological basis of the
Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be
examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other
provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government,
the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the
underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or
several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with
recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A
revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but
also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus,
constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake
revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's
initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative
bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments
and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2
of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President, with the

exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of

the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended
and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other
Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to
26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case,
they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is
irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails.
This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However,
the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory
Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating
that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier
provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two
irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended,"
which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment,
petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral
arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a
"surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of
statutory construction so that the later provision automatically
prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not
as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed
Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision
in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the
proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary
system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved
in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government."

Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do

the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to the
Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models,
which are among the few countries withunicameral
parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to
the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government
the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian,
Australian, or Malaysian models, which have
all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the
signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of
government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant
for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in
many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution
through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in
the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's
initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present
initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's
initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with
the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of
initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal
of Santiagowill not change the outcome of the present petition.
Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively

ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the
Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to
the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be
resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical
consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass
upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved
on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement
the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the
Constitution, this will not change the result here because the
present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first
comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even
before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735
which requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the
total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of
RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as
signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August
2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the
COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B.
Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and
amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and
Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the
Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million
signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition
and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition
filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic
requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.

The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section

10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than
one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x."
The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions,
mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments
or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally
unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present
initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735
prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate.
Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will
still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion
in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the
COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling
inSantiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC.52 For following this Court's
ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants
outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate
its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by
PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves
the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation.
No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or

revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of

amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the
Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by
every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows
today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the
constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant
political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in
the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door
constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3
percent of the total votes cast53 approved our Constitution in
a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is
the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of
the people's sovereign will. That approval included the
prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million
signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our
Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in
their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the
Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change,
which means subverting the people's sovereign will and
discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot
and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution,
this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and
protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of
the people.

Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let

the people decide" cannot override the specific modes of
changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself.
Otherwise, the Constitution the people's fundamental covenant
that provides enduring stability to our society becomes easily
susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering
signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases
to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's
voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for
constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their
"people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of
the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This
forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice"
or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect
the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's
sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to
defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this
constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered
signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a
desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.