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Ordinary Appeal Rule 40 MTC To RTC Republic v. Luriz G.R. No. 158992 January 26, 2007
Ordinary Appeal Rule 40 MTC To RTC Republic v. Luriz G.R. No. 158992 January 26, 2007
RULE 40
MTC to RTC
Republic v. Luriz
G.R. No. 158992
January 26, 2007
FACTS:
Sps. Luriz filed an ejectment case against Claval at MeTC. According
to Luriz they are the owners of the property at QC by virtue of TCT
issued in the name of Urakami and 2 deeds of sale 1st deed from
Urakami to Balingit then 2nd deed from Balingit to Luriz Clavel
contended that the owner of the property was Philippine Orthopedic
Center (POC) and has been in possession since 1953, and
authorized its personnel to occupy the 4 cottages built therein.
Moreover, said that cannot rely on the TCT because already burned
during the fire in the office of the Register of Deeds, and therefore,
must first be reconstituted MeTC ruled in favor Luriz and ordered
Clavel to vacate premises and pay reasonable compensation for
use and occupancy.
MeTC granted motion for execution by Luriz. Clavel through
OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. MeTC dismissed petitioners Notice of
Appeal for failure to file required appeal fee and alos denied Motion
to Fix Supersedeas Bond. Deputy Sheriff took possession of lots and
ejected all POC personnel Clavel filed MR questioning dismissal of
Notice of Appeal was denied again which prompted him to file with
RTC a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition
to annul the Order and Writ of Execution but was dismissed, so
appealed the same with the CA. Republic of the Philippines filed for
Motion for Intervention. CA affirmed decision of the RTC because
filed appeal fees 3 days after reglementary period for filing an
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure to pay
proper docket fees within the reglamentary period? NO paid fees
within the reglamentary period
HELD:
Requirement in order to perfect an appeal:
1. Notice of appeal must be filed within 15 days from the
notice of final judgment or final order appealed from.
2. Notice of appeal must be filed with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order, and served upon the adverse
party.
Petitioner Encarnacion is the registered owner of 2 lots totalling 707 sq. m located at
District 1, National Hi-way, Cauayan, Isabela. These originally formed part of the
tract of land belonging to Valiente.
TIME LINE:
1982: Valiente sold land toMallapitan.
1985:Mallapitan sold the land to Magpantay. Respondent Nieves entered into the
possession of the land without the consent of then owner Magpantay.
1992: Magpantay died.
1995: Widow of Magpantayexecuted an Affidavit of Waiver, waving her right over
the property in favor of her son-in-law Petitioner Encarnacion.
1996: Petitioner Encarnacioncaused the subdivision of the land into two lots and the
issuance of titles in his name.
February 1, 2001: Petitioner Encarnacionsent a letterdated Febuary 1, 2001
demanding that the respondent vacate the subject property.
February 12, 2001: Demand letter was delivered by registered mail to the
respondent. Notwithstanding receipt of the same, respondent still refused to vacate
the subject property.
March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment, damages with injunction
and prayer for restraining order with the MTC of Isabela. In his Answer, respondent
alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a portion of the
subject land since 1968 and that the issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of
petitioner was tainted with irregularities.
2001: the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment in favor of the
Petitioner Encarnacionordering the defendant to vacate the land. Respondent filed an
appeal with the RTC Cauayan, Isabela. The RTC reversed the judgment and said that
the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case. The Court of Appeals likewise ordered a
remand of the case to the RTC because the case involved an accionpubliciana (RTC
jurisdiction) and not an unlawful detainer (MTC jurisdiction).
ISSUE:
Is the case one for accionpubliciana or uinlawful detainer? ACCION
PUBLICIANA. HENCE, CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED IN THE RTC
FIRST AND NOT THE MTC.
HELD:
1. The actions that may be brought to recover possession of property may be
accioninterdictal or publiciana. Accioninterdictal, under which the case of unlawful
detainer falls is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year. Accionpubliciana, on the other
hand is an action for the recovery of the real right of possession, which should be
brought in the proper RTC when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year.
2. Based on the distinctions, the important element that determines the proper action
to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property is the length of time of
dispossession.
3. In the case at bar, Petitioner Encarnacion became the owner of the property in
1995. He filed the complaint for ejectment in 2001. Considering that the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year, the proper action was
an accionpubliciana. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly remanded the case to the
RTC of Isabela.
4. The RTC however should have not dismissed the case. Pursuant to Section 8, of
Rule 40 the RTC still should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on
the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction over it.
Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the
case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to
the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of
justice.
Canlas v. Tubil
G.R. No. 184285
September 25, 2009
FACTS:
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by respondent Tubil against
petitioners Canlas before the MTC. Tubil alleged that the he was the owner of the
property and petitioners Canlas built a house on the land owned by him and are
currently occupying the same. Respondents sent a demand against the Petitioners
ordering them to leave the premises on Jan. 2004, upon the petitioners failure to do
so, respondent thus filed an action for unlawful detainer before the MTC on June of
the same year.
Petitioners, on the other hand, argued that the MTC is without jurisdiction
over the subject matter because the cause of action if one for accion publiciana
which is beyond the MTCs jurisdiction.They also avered that they have been open,
continuous, adverse, public and uninterrupted possession of the land for more than
60 years, that respondents title which was issued pursuant to a Free Patent which
was dubious, spurious and of unlawful character and nature.
Siding with the allegations of the petitioners, the MTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the action being an accion publiciana was beyond its
jurisdiction.The RTC also affirmed the judgment of the MTC.
Respondent thus filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the RTCs Decision, and ordered the RTC to render a decision on the merits
based on the entire record of the proceedings had in the Municipal Trial Court,
pursuant to par. 2 of Section 8 of Rule 40 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1. Which court has jurisdiction? MTC
2. W/n Rule 40 is applicable in the case at bar? Since it is the MTC that has
jurisdiction over the case, Section 8, Rule 40 does not apply.
HELD:
If the case is one for unlawful detainer, then the action was properly filed in the
MTC. However, if the suit is one for accion publiciana, original jurisdiction is with
the RTC, which is mandated not to dismiss the appeal but to decide the case on the
merits pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
In order to determine which court has jurisdiction, one must look at the nature of the
action and the allegations in the complaint. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover
possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but
became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.An
unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies in the
proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought
within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to
physical possession.
On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the
right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. If at the time of the filing of the
complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of
possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one
of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.
In the case at bar, the respondent alleged that she was the owner of the land
in question and she tolerated the Petitioners use of the land because the petitioners
were her relatives.She sent the demand letter on January 12, 2004, and filed the case
on June 9, 2004, which is still within one year from the time the last demand to
vacate was made.
Therefore, the MTC had properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. Thus,
Section 8 (2nd par.) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which orders the Regional Trial
Court not to dismiss the cases appealed to it from the metropolitan or municipal trial
court which tried the same albeit without jurisdiction, but to decide the said case on
the merits, finds no application here.
Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. v. Booc
G.R. No. 143331
October 5, 2007
FACTS:
7 Siblings: Sheikding, Rufino, Felisa, Salvador, Jose and Roque Booc
decided to buy LOT 69-A in Quezon Ave., Iligan City from Nicolas
Abarca.
Because they had unequal contribution to the purchase price, the
siblings formed 5 Star Marketing. Their respective company shares
reflected their contribution in the purchase price of the lot.
1982: When the original structure was razed by fire, the siblings
built a 4 storey building. G/F and 4 th floor occupied by Rufino, 2nd
floor by the family matriarch, Ong Chuy Tiok, and the 3 rd floor by
Shiekding. All of them were RENT-FREE.
Late 1980: the matriarch insisted that the PR, James Booc, and son
of Sheikding to be allowed to use of the G/F for his business. Use
was still RENT-FREE.
1993: 5 Star and James had a lease agreement, where the latter
became the lessees of the spaces occupied by Rufino and that of
de Leon Gun Store.
Several years later: the BOD of 5 Star passed a resolution
terminating all the rent-free arrangements in the building until
March 31, 1999. Future occupants will pay the corresponding
rentals and enter into a lease agreement with 5 Star.
Despite notice and repeated demands, James did not negotiate and
enter into a lease agreement with 5 Star, nor did he vacate the G/F
door 2 (with 40K rental/mo. beginning Apr. 1 99).
5 Star filed Unlawful Detainer case against James in the MTCC.
During the proceedings, PR and his counsel filed a MOTION TO
RESET the preliminary conference because PRs counsel had an
unpostponable personal engagement.
MTCC denied the motion to reset. PR failed to appear in the
preliminary conference and pursuant to the summary procedure in
Unlawful Detainer, Petitioners was entitled to judgment. MTCC
favored Petitioners and the PR was ordered to vacate and pay
rental until possession is restored to petitioners. PR filed an MR, but
was denied.
PR filed an appeal via Rule 40 to the RTC. RTC: remanded the case
to the MTCC claiming that procedure should be relaxed in the
interest of justice, because PR was effectively denied of his day in
court when MTCC rendered judgment solely based on the complaint
of the plaintiff.
Petitioners filed an MR but was denied, hence this Petition for
Review under Rule 45 to the SC.
ISSUES:
W/N the RTC properly remanded the case to the MTCC or should it
have decided the case based on the record, pleading, memoranda?
HELD:
RTC should have decided the case based on the record, pleading,
memoranda. Before explaining the ratio: the Court held that this
case should have been filed in the CA with due regard for the
hierarchy of courts. On this score, the SC couldve outrightly
dismissed the case, but in the interest of justice, in view of the
clear mistake of the RTCs decision, the SC took cognizance of the
case.
The avowed objective of actions for FEUD, which have purposely
been made summary in nature, is to provide peace, speedy and
expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor for a
long time, thereby insuring the maintenance of peace and order in
the community, otherwise the party illegally deprived of possession
might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a measure of
self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the same by
force and violence.
The Court on occasion grants the relaxation of procedural rules
when the appellant substantially complied with the formal
requirements. In this case, the reason for the counsels absence did
not warrant an excuse. Further, the PRs absence during the
preliminary conference was not explained at all. MTCC correctly
decided the decision on the basis of the complaint pursuant to the
summary rules of procedure in FEUD actions.
On the REMAND: The Court notes that the decision and order of the
RTC are for remanding the case to the MTCC on the mistaken
conclusion that there was denial of due process for failure of the
respondent to present his evidence. As discussed above, the
decision of the MTCC on the basis of petitioner's complaint is fully
warranted. Furthermore, the RTC should have decided the case on
the merits, as an appeal before it, and not prolong the
determination of the issues by remanding it to the MTCC. It must be
emphasized that in cases governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, no hearing is conducted; rather, the parties are required
to submit their respective position papers. On appeal to the RTC,
the parties are required to submit their memoranda. The RTC
should have decided the appeal on the basis of the records
elevated by the MTCC, as well as the memoranda of the parties. To
remand it is a superfluity and contrary to the summary nature of
the case. Finally, had the RTC decided the case in the manner
required, the result could only have been to affirm the MTCC
decision, since respondent did not contest it on the merits.
All told, therefore, the decision and order of the RTC must be set
aside and the decision of the MTCC must stand, there being no
contrary evidence presented by respondent, and the fact of
ownership by petitioner of the building being undisputed.
Banares v. Balising
328 SCRA 36 (2000)
FACTS:
Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares,
Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen
criminal cases for estafa filed by the private respondents.
After the petitioners were arraigned and entered their plea of not
guilty, they filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned cases on
the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the
failure of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa under Section 412 in relation to Section
408 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 18 of the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the ground that they
failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to
the Lupong Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It
added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the case to
the Lupon amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use
the said ground as basis for dismissing the cases.
Municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen
criminal cases against petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to
Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
More than two months later, private respondents filed a Motion to
Revive the abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners,
stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation
had already been complied with.
Petitioners filed a Comment and Opposition to Motion to
Revive claiming that the Order of the municipal trial court,
dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the cases had long
become final and executory; hence, private respondents should
have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to revive
MTC granted the Motion to Revive. Petitioners questioned the order,
claiming that the prior dismissal had already become final and
executory.
ISSUE:
Whether the said order became final and executory -YES
HELD:
premises
of
the
property
located
at No.
3
Intsia
Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a
final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the
shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. The
purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly
secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the
probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the
specific
property
located
at No.
3
Intsia
Road,Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of
the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not
subject to an appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong
mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for
employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have
been dismissed.
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal
did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This
means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal
from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.
Mangaliag v. Pastoral
G.R. No. 143951
October 25, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the RTC
against petitioners Mangaliag and Solano. This complaint alleges
that the Serquina and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries
and permanent deformities from the collision of their tricycle with
the petitioners dump truck and the gross negligence, carelessness
and imprudence of the petitioners in driving the dump truck.
Respondents seek damages in the form of medical expenses
amounting to P71,392.00. Respondents also claim P500,000.00 by
way of moral damages, as a further result of his hospitalization, lost
income of P25,000.00 or the nominal damages, and attorneys fees.
Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. After pre-trial
conference, trial on the merits ensued. After the respondent rested
his case, petitioners testified in their defense. Subsequently,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. They alleged that since the
principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls
within the jurisdiction of MTC. Petitioners maintain that the courts
jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the amount of actual
damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as moral,
exemplary, nominal damages and attorneys fee, etc.
The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for
damages is the main action, the totality of the damages sought to
be recovered should be considered in determining jurisdiction. He
relied on Administrative Circular No. 09-94 which provides that in
cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. . .
the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court Also, the petitioners defense of lack of
jurisdiction has already been barred by estoppel and laches. He
contends that after actively taking part in the trial proceedings and
presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and
legally improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was
denied. Subsequently, they filed a petition for certiorari with the
SC.
ISSUE:
Whether a direct recourse by petition for certiorari to the SC from
the order of the RTC is proper?
HELD:
Feb 18, 1985, the RTC issued an order REFERRING the case
to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, pursuant to PD 31 and 1038.
Puertollano filed an opposition to the motion for referral
before he got notice of the decision, and another MR when he
received the order. On April 2, 1985, he also filed a notice of appeal
of the order and the case was elevated to the IAC.
In Jan 28, 1986, IAC rendered a decision on the appeal of the
order of referral, dismissing it.
ISSUE:
W/N the appeal to the IAC is premature because there was still an
unresolved MR.
HELD:
No. The appeal was considered premature as there was still a
motion for reconsideration pending before the trial court which had
yet to be resolved. However, considering that thereafter a notice of
appeal from the order was filed by petitioners, the legal effect
thereof is that petitioners abandoned their motion for
reconsideration and opted for the remedy of appeal. The appeal,
therefore, is not premature.
ISSUE:
W/N the order was an interlocutory order that may not be appealed.
HELD/RATIO:
No. It was considered by the SC as final order.
The order sought to be appealed is interlocutory and not final in
character for it only seeks a preliminary determination of the
relationship between the parties by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
The issue of whether an order is a final order is its effect on the
rights of the parties. A final judgment, order or decree is one that
finally disposes of, adjudicates or determines he rights, or some
right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on
some definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes
them until it is reversed or set aside. No doubt said order settles
definitely the issue of whether the case should be referred to the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos.
316 and 1038 so that no further questions can come on the issue
before the trial court except the execution of the order. Said order
concludes the right of private respondent to such referral until it is
reversed or set aside. It is thus a final order that is appealable.
Side note: However, the court held that the law invoked mandates
the court to refer this type of case to the Sec of Agrarian Reform
and a mere ejectment cannot and should not defeat the rights of
the tenants.
Samala v. CA
363 SCRA 535 (2001)
FACTS:
In Oct 1990, a Super Saint bus sideswept a Yamaha motorcycle
along Panamitan Highway in Cavite. Romulo Ocampo was riding at
the back of the motorcycle driver. As a result of the impact, he was
thrown several meters away and sustained serious physical injuries
on his neck and left leg. The culprit bus, after hitting the
motorcycle, sped away. The driver, Babista, did not even lend
assistance to the victim. (Hit and run!!) Ocampo was confined and
had to receive treatment for months.
So in Dec 1990, Ocampo filed with RTC Naic, Cavite a complaint for
damages against the driver and the owner of the bus, Ildefonso
SAMALA.
On May 15, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
Ocampo, awarding to him actual, consequential, moral, exemplary
and other kinds of damages and fees. On Oct 16, 1995, petitioners
SAMALA and Babista filed a notice of appeal, which was denied by
the trial court the next day because the 15-day period to appeal
had elapsed.
On Nov 24, 1995, petitioners filed with the TC a petition for relief
from order denying appeal, reasoning that they failed to file on
time because the notice was entrusted to Jose Samala, Jr. but he
suffered from diarrhea on Oct. 11-12 and could not leave the house
and nobody could attend to the filing of the notice. He filed it on
Oct. 16 thinking that the period had not yet lapsed.
The TC denied the petition for relief because the reason was not
compelling enough. So the petitioners filed a notice of appeal to
with respect to the 2 orders (Oct 17 and the one denying relief from
judgment).
Thereafter, Ocampos motion for writ of execution was granted
while the petitioners filed a MR, in which they prayed for denial of
the writ of execution and elevation of the records of the case to the
CA for review. MR denied. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the CA. CA denied this. MR was also denied.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in refusing to grant petitioners relief from order
that denied their appeal from the judgment of the TC. (whether the
failure to file the notice of appeal was excusable negligence in the
first place)
HELD/RATIO:
FACTS:
CHED received a letter from the Chairman of Professional
Regulatory Commission inquiring whether Indiana Aerospace
already acquired university status in view of its advertisement as
such in Manila Bulletin. Upon investigation, it was verified from SEC
that Indiana School of Aeronautics failed to amend its articles of
Incorporation to change its name to Indiana Aerospace University.
Thus, CHED ordered it to desist from using the term University.
Prior thereto, Indiana Aerospace filed a complaint for damages with
a prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CHED, on the other hand
filed a motion to Dismiss. The lower court dismissed the Motion to
Dismiss and Granted Indianas prayer for Preliminary Injunction.
Likewise, Indiana Aerospace filed before the lower court a Motion to
declare CHED in Default. CHED filed a Motion for Extension of Time
to File its Answer. The lower court ruled on Indianas motion to
declare CHED in Default and directed it to present evidence ex
parte.
CHED filed with CA a petitioner for certiorari arguing that RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its Motion to
Dismiss and in declaring it in default despite its filing an Answer. CA
ruled that Indiana had no cause of action against CHE since it failed
to show that it had been granted university status by CHED, and
ruled that CHED should not have been declared in default since its
Answer had long been filed before the lower court ruled upon
Indianas Motion to declare it in default.
Indiana claims that the Petition for Certiorari of CHED should have
been dismissed by CA because it was filed out of time and was not
preceded by a motion for reconsideration in the RTC.
ISSUE:
Was the certiorari petition properly and timely filed?
HELD:
CHEDs Petition for Certiorari was seasonable filed. In computing its
timeliness, what should have been considered is the date when the
respondent received the Order declaring it in default. In the case at
bar, CHED was able to comply with the 60-day reglamentary period
to file its Petition for Certiorari.
As to its contention that a motion for reconsideration should
precede the petition for certiorari, the general rule is that the lower
court should be given the opportunity to correct itself and thus a
motion for reconsideration should precede a petitioner for
certiorari.
However, exception to such are: a) when issues are purely legal; b)
public interest is involved; c) extreme urgency; d) special
circumstances so warrant. In the case at bar, regulation of
Petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did
not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private
respondents the right of way. For failure to appeal the decision of
the trial court to the Court of Appeals,
petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those
granted in the decision of the trial court.
Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has
not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the
lower court.
Custodio v. CA
253 SCRA 483 (1996)
FACTS:
December 10, 1980: Private respondent Samara purchased a
$40,000 draft from
Citytrust, the payee being Thai International Airways. The drawee
was Marine Midland Bank in the US.
December 23, 1980: Samara executed a stop-payment order of the
bank draft
instructing Citytrust to inform Marine Midland about the order
through telex. Citytrust transmitted the message to Marine Midland
the next day and followed it up with a cable, which the latter bank
acknowledged to have received on January 14, 1981 stating in its
receipt that it has noted the stop-payment order and has not paid
the bank draft. Citytrust credited back Samara's account for U.S.
$40,000.00 due to the non-payment.
July 3, 1981: Citytrust re-debited Samara's account for $40,000
upon discovering that Marine Midland had already debited
Citytrust's own account for the same amount allegedly on
December 22, 1980, Despite the alleged discovery, however, there
is evidence to show that Marine Midland informed Citytrust through
a letter of the non-payment or non-encashment of the bank draft as
of August 4, 1981. It is also shown that Marine Midland even
confirmed in a telex letter dated August 31, 1981 that the bank
draft had not been paid as of that date.
Samara sued Citytrust & Marine Midland to recover the $40,000
debited from his account. Marine Midland contended that it had
already paid the bank draft on December 22, before it received the
stop payment order. The court ruled against it, however, holding
that it was bound by its letters admitting knowledge of the stop
payment order and compliance with it. The trial court ordered
Citytrust & Marine Midland to pay Samara jointly and severally the
sum of $40,000 plus 12% interest and other interests and
damages. Marine Midland, the proximate cause of the damages,
FACTS:
Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected
thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig,
Metro Manila. As an access to P. Burgos Street from Santos
property, there are two possible passageways. The first
passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20
meters distance from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos street. Such
path passes through Custodio & Santos properties. The second
passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff
Mabasas residence to P. Burgos street. In passing thru said
passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank
and with 5-6 meters in length has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants
occupying the premises and who wereacknowledged by plaintif
Mabasa as tenants. Because the tenants were denied of a way
through P. Burgos street, due to the fencing of the petitioner
neighbors, they asked for a right of way to be given to their lot.
The trial court ordered spouses Custodio and Santoses to grant the
spouses Mabasa the right of way provided they pay proper
indemnification. On appeal, spouses Mabasa were given indemnity
for damages which they incurred. Custodio & Santos appeal to the
SC, questioning the grant of RoW to Mabasa and the award of
damages.
ISSUE:
Can Custodio & Santos still question grant of RoW?
HELD:
would then pay Citytrust whatever amount the latter would have to
pay Samara.
Citytrust and Marine Midland appealed the decision separately.
Marine Midland
successfully petitioned the CA to reduce the award (as far as
Marine Midland was concerned) to $40,000 plus 6% interest.
Citytrust, on the other hand, appealed all the way to the Supreme
Court but was unsuccessful. The original (12% interest) award
becoming final and executory, the trial court ordered the judgment
executed against Citytrust. Citytrust appealed, arguing that its
liability should be the modified one (obtained by Marine Midland).
The CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N Citytrust can claim that as it was adjudged to be jointly and
severally liable with Marine Midland, the reduced liability the latter
obtained inured to its benefit as well.
HELD:
REDUCED LIABILITY FOR MARINE MIDLAND ONLY, BUT
SMALLER LIABILITY WILL BE ENFORCED IN THE END.
It must be noted that two defendants, Marine Midland and Citytrust,
filed cross claims against each other in their answer. Citytrust
alleged that the proximate cause of the injury should be attributed
to co-defendant Marine Midland when the latter failed to promptly
inform Citytrust that the demand draft Citytrust issued was really
paid by Marine Midland on December 22, 1980. For its part, Marine
Midland alleged that Citytrust did not properly advise it of the
actual circumstances relating to the dates of payment of the draft
and of the receipt by the latter of the stop-payment instructions.
The rights and liabilities of both parties concerned are not so
interwoven in such a manner that their defenses are similar and
that a reversal of the judgment as to one should operate as a
reversal to the other.
The fact that the petitioner previously filed a cross-claim against
Marine Midland does not make the former a party in the latter's
appeal where all reliefs granted to the plaintiff and/or to the
petitioner who was a co-defendant are up for review. The rights and
liabilities of Citytrust as a defensive cross-claimant, which alleged
that the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff was the
wrongful action of Marine Midland, have already been litigated
before the trial court which ordered full reimbursement in favor of
Citytrust. Until petitioner Citytrust appeals for the review of the trial
court decision either in part or in toto, its rights and obligations as
pre-determined cannot generally be affected by an appeal of a codefendant.
There are two final judgments arising from one and the same basic
claim of Mr. Samara. The obligations arising from the same stop
payment order on the same U.S. $40,000.00 bank draft are sought
to be enforced by the two conflicting final and executor judgments
(the 12 % interest one against Citytrust, the 6% one against Marine
Midland). Since Samara effectively has the right to choose which
defendant to hold liable (solidary liability), it would amount to
enforcement one judgment while a violation of the other.
This cannot be allowed. It is also unfair for Marine Midland, the
source of the damages, to be allowed to pay a smaller amount.
Therefore, the modified (smaller) liability should be executed.
Marawi Marantao General Hospital, Inc. v. CA
349 SCRA 321 (2001)
FACTS:
Private Respondents Marawi-Marantao General Hospital, Inc. and
Atty. Macapanton K. Mangondato filed complaint against the
petitioner Social Security System, with the RTC of Lanao del Sur, for
specific performance with damages. The respondents allege that
the parties executed a deed of conditional sale where petitioner
transferred and conveyed unto private respondent Mangondato,
the disputed property, covered by a TCT under the name of
respondent hospital, but that respondent Mangondatos repurchase
thereof having been consummated, the petitioner refused to
execute a deed of absolute sale. Later on, petitioner declared the
said deed of conditional sale a nullity. Private respondents then
prayed for the execution of an absolute deed of sale.
The Court ordered for the execution of an absolute deed of sale.
Private respondents filed a motion for partial execution, serving a
copy of said motion on petitioner. However, petitioner failed to
appear, considering that as of said date, he had not as yet been
served with a copy of the Decision and a copy of private
respondents motion. Nevertheless, the court issued an order
granting the motion for execution. A writ of execution was issued,
and a notice of garnishment served. Petitioner filed an urgent
motion for reconsideration and immediate stay of execution, which
was denied. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, however failing to
indicate when it received a copy of the decision of the court. It also
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which court also nullified
the order and writ of execution issued by the lower court. Petitioner
thereafter filed an amended notice of appeal, quoting only the first
item in the decision of the lower court, placing ellipses in lieu of the
other items.