Farnese Motion To Dismiss

Case 2:16-cr-00199-CMR Document 34 Filed 10/21/16 Page 1 of 87
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
Criminal Action No. 16-199-2

Hon. Cynthia M. Rufe
LAWRENCE FARNESE
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ORDER
Upon consideration of Defendant Lawrence Farneses Motion to Dismiss, his
Memorandum in support of said Motion, and any response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that
the Motion is GRANTED.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3), the Indictment is hereby
DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
By the Court:
Dated: ___________________
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Cynthia M. Rufe
United States District Judge

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v.
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LAWRENCE FARNESE
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DEFENDANT LAWRENCE FARNESES MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

Defendant Lawrence Farnese, by and through his attorneys, respectfully moves to dismiss
the Indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3). The grounds for this motion
are fully set forth in the attached Memorandum.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Mark B. Sheppard_______

Mark B. Sheppard (PA ID No.: 50480)
Arianna G. Goodman (PA ID No. 318542)
Michael C. Witsch (PA ID No. 313884)
MONTGOMERY, MCCRACKEN,
WALKER & RHOADS, LLP
123 South Broad Street, 28th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19109
Telephone: (215) 772-1500
Facsimile: (215) 772-7620
Peter Goldberger (Pa ID No. 22364)
LAW OFFICE OF PETER GOLDBERGER
50 Rittenhouse Place
Ardmore, PA 19003
Telephone: (610) 649-8200
Facsimile: (610) 649-8362
Counsel for Lawrence Farnese
Dated: October 21, 2016

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v.

LAWRENCE FARNESE
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LAWRENCE FARNESES

MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

Telephone: (215) 772-1500
Facsimile: (215) 772-7620
Ardmore, PA 19003
Telephone: (610) 649-8200
Facsimile: (610) 649-8362

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
II.
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 1
A.
B.
COUNTS TWO THROUGH SEVEN (AND THE RELATED

OBJECTIVE OF THE COUNT ONE CONSPIRACY) MUST BE
DISMISSED BECAUSE THEY DO NOT ALLEGE A COGNIZABLE
THEORY OF MAIL OR WIRE FRAUD. ............................................................. 1
1.
The Indictment Fails to Charge a Cognizable Theory of

Traditional Money-or-Property Fraud ....................................................... 3
2.
The Expenditure was Proper Under Pennsylvania Campaign

Finance Law and Thus Cannot Form the Basis for a Scheme to
Defraud ...................................................................................................... 6
3.
The Indictment Fails to Charge a Cognizable Theory of Honest

Services Fraud ............................................................................................ 9
a.
The Indictment lacks any proper allegation of bribery (or

kickbacks) as required to establish honest services fraud
after Skilling................................................................................. 10
b.
The Indictments honest services bribery theory raises the

same constitutional problems as proved fatal to the
McDonnell prosecution ................................................................ 14
(i)
First Amendment ............................................................. 14
(ii)
Vagueness ........................................................................ 17
(iii)
Federalism ........................................................................ 20
COUNTS EIGHT THROUGH THIRTEEN (AND THE RELATED

THEORY OF TRAVEL ACT BRIBERY. .......................................................... 21
1.
2.
The Travel Act Counts Fail Because the Indictment Does Not
Adequately Allege an Underlying Violation of Pennsylvania Law........ 23
a.
The Philadelphia Democratic Party Organization ....................... 24
b.
Long Standing Rules of Statutory Construction Require the

Rejection of the Governments Expansive Reading of Party
Official ......................................................................................... 24
The proper interpretation of Party Official is also supported by

the contemporaneous comments of the Model Penal Code scholars
who drafted it ........................................................................................... 26
-i-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page
3.
III.
To interpret the statutes definition of Party Official to

encompass committee people is a substantial departure from prior
law ............................................................................................................ 29
C.
The Governments Application of the Bribery Statute To Internal

Workings of Party Affairs Raises Constitutional Concerns ................................ 30
D.
18 Pa.C.S. 4701 Violates Farneses Due Process Rights Because the

Statute Is Void for Vagueness.............................................................................. 31
E.
The Federal Government Attempt to Apply the Pennsylvania Bribery

Statute in a Manner in Which it Has Never Been Applied Raises
Significant Federalism Concerns ......................................................................... 32
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 34
-ii-

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v.

LAWRENCE FARNESE
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LAWRENCE FARNESES

MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT
I.
INTRODUCTION
For the reasons set forth more fully below, Defendant, Lawrence Farnese, by and through
his attorneys, respectfully move to dismiss the indictment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3).
II.
ARGUMENT
A.
COUNTS TWO THROUGH SEVEN (AND THE RELATED OBJECTIVE

OF THE COUNT ONE CONSPIRACY) MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE
THEY DO NOT ALLEGE A COGNIZABLE THEORY OF MAIL OR
WIRE FRAUD.
The indictment charges defendant Lawrence Farnese (and his co-defendant Ellen
Chapman) in Counts Two through Six with committing wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
1343, on either of two theories (money-or-property fraud and honest services fraud, the latter
under id. 1346). Count Seven similarly charges the defendants with committing mail fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341 (likewise on either of the same two theories). Finally, Count One
charges the defendants with engaging in a single, multifaceted conspiracy, in violation of 18
U.S.C. 371, to commit all the offenses charged in the substantive counts, including the mail
and wire fraud schemes charged in Counts Two through Seven. For the following reasons, these
counts fail to charge any cognizable federal offense. The substantive counts must therefore be
dismissed, and the conspiracy count dismissed in part, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
12(b)(3)(B)(v).
The indictment in this case alleges the devising of a single mail and wire fraud scheme,
but as described (Count One, at 3 [11.a]; Counts Two through Six, at 8[17]; and Count Seven,
at 10[20]) that scheme had multiple aspects. Insofar as this alleged scheme fell within the
honest services extension of the definition of scheme or artifice to defraud, 18 U.S.C.
1346, it had as its alleged victims various Democratic Party entities: the Democratic Party of
the City and County of Philadelphia (see Indict. 2, at 1), the members of the Democratic
Party, the Democratic Eighth Ward,1 and the Eighth Ward Democratic Committee. The
objective of that aspect of the scheme is said to have been a deprivation of the rights of those
entities to the honest services of [Farneses co-defendant Ellen] CHAPMAN through bribery.
The traditional money or property aspect of the alleged scheme, on the other hand, had as its
alleged victim the Friends of Farnese (which was a political campaign committee in support of
Farneses initial 2008 election and his 2012 bid for re-election to a second term in the State
Senate; see Indict. 8, at 2; hereinafter FoF). The objective of this second aspect of the scheme
was allegedly to obtain money from the campaign committee. Each of the indictments fraud
counts thus alleges that a single offense (mail or wire fraud) was committed in either or both of
two rather different ways.
The substantive counts then allege that the defendants on particular occasions used the
interstate wires (sent emails) four times (Counts Two through Five) and caused the
transmission of an interbank transfer of funds ($6000 from the FoF account to Bard Colleges
account) (Count Six), in payment of a check to Bard in the same amount, drawn on the FoF
1
The Eighth Ward is a geographical area of the City as determined by the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas. There is no such entity as the Democratic Eighth Ward.
account, that had been mailed (Count Seven) a week earlier. Each use of the wires or mail was
allegedly done for the purpose of executing the ... scheme, as prohibited by the cited statutes.
Indict. 18, at 8; 21, 10.
The defense does not claim or suggest that it is improper to join two disparate legal
theories for the commission of one offense in a single count in this manner, but only points out
that the two theories of fraud in this case requires separate analysis. If one theory is invalid, it
must be stricken from the affected counts. See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130 (1985). If
both are invalid, as we claim, then the substantive fraud counts must be dismissed, along with the
conspiracy count insofar as it alleges the mail and wire fraud objectives.
1.
The Indictment Fails to Charge a Cognizable Theory of

Traditional Money-or-Property Fraud.
The fraud counts allege, in pertinent part, that Farnese and Chapman schemed to defraud
the Friends of Farnese (FoF) and obtained money from the committee by causing an
interbank wire on July 19, 2011, of $6000 from the FoF account to the account of Bard College
(Count Six), in payment of a check that the defendants had FoFs treasurer write and mail on
July 12, 2011, to Bard College in the same amount (see Count Seven, and Indict. 15.l., at 62).
The indictment alleges that these funds served to defray the tuition for co-defendant Chapmans
daughters participation in a study-abroad program. Id. The indictment further alleges that
Farneses objective in authorizing this expenditure from the FoF account was to help win
Chapmans support in Farneses 2011 effort to be elected as leader of the Eighth Ward
Democratic Committee. Indict.15.a.-c., at 4-5.3 Nowhere does the indictment allege that any
false or fraudulent pretense, representation, or promise (as prohibited by the cited statutes,
2
Paragraphs 1-15 of Count One are incorporated by reference into each of the other counts.
Chapman was one of approximately 58 members of the Eight Ward Committee eligible to
participate in the election of the County Committeeman and other Ward officers.
1341, 1343) was made to FoF (or to anyone else) to induce FoF to part with these funds and
for the defendant(s) thus to obtain the funds from FoF. See Indict. 15.k., at 6 (a consultant to
FoF allegedly directed the treasurer of FoF to send a $6000 check to Bard marked with
Chapmans daughters name and identification number).4 These averments do not make out a
money or property violation of the mail or wire fraud statute.
A money or property violation of the mail or wire fraud statute requires the allegation
(and eventually, proof) of a misrepresentation (that is, a false statement, representation or
promise) that is designed to deceive a person of ordinary prudence, see United States v.
Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 535 (3d Cir. 1978), which is material to the transaction, and which is
used to obtain property from the victim. 3d Cir. Model Jury Inst. 18.1341-1 (2014 rev.). In
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 357-60 (1987), the Supreme Court adopted a unitary
reading of the mail and wire fraud statutes, under which some sort of misrepresentation is
always required; there are no covered schemes to defraud other than by false statements. (The
substantive law governing wire fraud is the same as that for mail fraud. Pasquantino v. United
States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 n.2 (2005); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1999).)
The indictment in this case alleges in statutory language that the scheme to defraud
sought to obtain money from FoF by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations
and promises, but despite pages of detailed factual averments it never descends to particulars
(Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962)), as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1), to
advise the defendants what misrepresentation the defendants allegedly communicated (and to
The indictment goes on to allege that sometime in the following year, the defendants caused FoF
to file a campaign finance report with the City of Philadelphia and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
reporting a $6000 expenditure by FoF to Bard College in the form of a donation, without mentioning
either CHAPMAN or her daughter. Indict. 15.m., at 6-7. This averment does not allege that the 2012
filing somehow served to defraud FoF of money or property.
whom) to induce the victim committee to part with its funds. See United States v. Bergrin, 650
F.3d 257, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2011). Without an allegation of a particular misrepresentation, the
Court could not assess (as required by Neder) whether the alleged falsehood could properly be
found to be material in the context of the case at hand. Indeed, from the recitation of facts in
the Indictment, the only reasonable inference is that FoF, through its Treasurer, knew precisely
that the payment was made to Bard, and who the beneficiary of the payment was (written on the
re line of the check). It is impossible to fathom from this Indictment how the grand jury thinks
FoF was induced by any misrepresentation to part with the $6000.
To the extent that the government might point to subparagraph 15.m., referring to the
filing a year later of a campaign finance report, the cited statement was not made to FoF but
rather by FoF, and therefore cannot conceivably have been made for the purpose of obtaining
any of the committees money by fraud. See United States v. Ratcliff, 488 F.3d 639, 645-46 (5th
Cir. 2007) (holding that subsequent efforts to conceal alleged campaign finance violations did
not amount to a scheme to obtain the alleged victims money or property through
misrepresentations, and thus did not constitute a scheme or artifice to defraud). Nor does that
subparagraph of the indictment allege that the nature of the expenditure was falsified or
misrepresented, even if somehow a later statement in a public filing could constitute the essential
means of the money-or-property fraud alleged in this case, which it cannot. All it claims is that
certain details were omitted from the disclosure. As recognized by the Court in Ratcliff, this
allegation cannot cure an indictment that fails to allege that the purpose of the filing (false or not)
was to deprive FoF of money or property.
For these reasons, insofar as any of the counts rely on a money-or-property theory of mail
or wire fraud, those counts must be dismissed.
2.
The Expenditure was Proper Under Pennsylvania Campaign Finance

Law and Thus Cannot Form the Basis for a Scheme to Defraud.
Counts Six and Seven must also be dismissed for the additional reason that the
expenditure at issue was, in fact, legitimate under Pennsylvania campaign finance law.
Otherwise legitimate campaign expenditures cannot serve as the basis for a mail or wire fraud
prosecution. Federal law must not be construed to criminalize local political activity that is
authorized by state law.
Prior to 1978, legally-permitted expenditures of Pennsylvania political committees were
required to fit within strict limits imposed by Section 1606 of the original Election Code of June
3, 1937, P.L. 1333, 25 Pa.Stat. 3226 (as amended by the Act of June 3, 1943, P.L. 851, adding
subsection Ninth). This section expressly enumerated specific categories of expenditures that
were permitted.5 If the expenditure fell outside of these categories it was impermissible.
That section provided:

No candidate or treasurer of any political committee shall pay, give or lend or agree to pay
give or lend, directly or indirectly, any money or other valuable thing or incur any liability on
account of, or in respect to, any primary or election expenses whatever, except for the following
purposes:
First. For printing and traveling expenses, and personal expenses incident thereto, stationery,
advertising, postage, expressage, freight, telegraph, telephone and public messenger service.
Second. For the rental of radio facilities, and amplified systems.
Third. For political meetings, demonstrations and conventions, and for the pay and
transportation of speakers.
Fourth. For the rent, maintenance and furnishings of offices.
Fifth. For the payment of clerks, typewriters, stenographers, janitors and messengers actual
employed.
Sixth. For the transportation of electors to and from the polls.
Seventh. For the employment of watchers at primaries and elections to the number and in the
amount permitted by this act.
Eighth. For expenses, legal counsel, incurred in good faith in connection with any primary or
elections.
Ninth. For contributions to other political committees
In 1978, as part of the comprehensive revision of the Election Code, Pennsylvanias

approach to regulating campaign expenditures was totally reversed. Under the new law, instead
of being prohibited unless authorized, all expenditures are now permitted unless expressly
forbidden. Section 1606 was repealed. A new section 3254.1 was added, which states the general
rule: No candidate, chairman or treasurer of any political committee shall make or agree to
make any expenditure or incur any liability except as provided in section 1621(d). The latter
section of the act, codified at 25 Pa.Stat. 3241(d), places only one limitation on expenditures:
(d) the word expenditure shall mean:
(1) the payment, distribution, loan or advancement of money or any
valuable thing by a candidate, political committee or other person for the
purpose of influencing the outcome of an election; . . . .
Act of Oct. 4, 1978, P.L. 893, section 1621 (boldface emphasis in the statute; underlined
emphasis added). Thus, a campaign committee can spend its funds in any way which the
committee deems will beneficially influence the outcome of an election.
Because the current definition eschews specific categories of expenditures and instead
broadly permits any expenditure made for the purpose of influencing an election, expenditures
may lawfully be made to influence any election, including future elections. This interpretation is
explicitly approved by the Pennsylvania Department of State in its Campaign Finance
Frequently Asked Questions (page 2, posted December 22, 2010):
The expenditure does not have to influence a particular election;
rather, the expenditure just has to be made in an effort to influence
an election. Expenditures that are made to influence the outcome
of future elections are considered election expenditures.
Pennsylvania Department of State, Campaign Finance Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.dos.pa.gov/votingelections/candidatescommittees/campaignfinance/documents/faq/c
ampaignfinancefaq.pdf.
Under the purposefully broad definition of expenditure in the revised Election Code,
the Friends of Farnese donation to Bard College for scholarship support was a permissible
expenditure as a matter of Pennsylvania election law. The expenditure was consistent with the
well-established practice of candidate-authorized political committees making donations for the
benefit of constituents within their districts. Moreover, the governments allegation that the
payment was intended to influence an internal ward election, does not materially affect the
legality of the expenditure itself. Even if the payment were expected to influence Chapman to
support Farneses effort to become ward leader, it would have been permissible if the committee
believed that Farneses achieving that position in the ward would advance his prospects for
reelection to the state Senate.
Farnese does not suggest that the Election Code permits expenditures that are prohibited
by a state criminal law. But as discussed elsewhere in this brief, the indictment fails to allege a
violation of the state bribery statute, properly construed. The definition of party official in 18
Pa.C.S. 4501, reaches only persons with some managerial responsibility rather than all
persons who are in some way connected with a political party. Model Penal Code and
Commentaries Part II, 240.1, at 31 (ALI 1980). Because the indictment does not, and indeed
cannot, allege that a ward committeeperson (which is the lowest level of party operatives) falls
within the class of persons having some managerial responsibility in the Democratic Party,
the governments rabbit in the hat theory that the payment to Bard was an improper
expenditure fails.
A similar situation was confronted by the Second Circuit in United States v. Pisani, 773
F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1985). There the Second Circuit addressed the question of whether the personal
use of campaign funds and the subsequent false reporting of it could form the basis of a scheme
or artifice to defraud. The Court held the answer was no to both questions.
In Pisani, the government alleged a fraudulent scheme to obtain, divert and embezzle
funds unlawfully from the defendants campaign account and to conceal the diversion through
the filing of an alleged false campaign finance report. In reversing the mail fraud convictions,
the Court stated:
At the heart of this issue lies the question of whether New York
law required Pisani to use moneys contributed to his campaign
fund solely for campaign purposes, and prohibited him from
putting them to personal use. The government contends that
applicable New York law did prohibit personal use of campaign
funds, and that Pisani's conceded use of some of them for personal
purposes constituted embezzlement and conversion. Pisani
contends, and we agree, that at the time of the events in question,
nothing in New York law prohibited a candidate from using
campaign funds for personal purposes. Consequently, the
"fraudulent scheme" charged in the indictment was not established
at trial, and those campaign fund mail fraud counts on which Pisani
was not acquitted must be dismissed.
773 F.2d at 407.
Using campaign funds for purposes that are permitted under state election law cannot
serve as a basis for a federal fraud prosecution on any theory. The payment at issue here fits
squarely within Pennsylvanias definition of expenditure. Accordingly, the mail and wire fraud
charges must be dismissed.
3.
The Indictment Fails to Charge a Cognizable Theory

of Honest Services Fraud.
In addition to the money-or-property theory, Counts One through Seven also charge mail
fraud, wire fraud and conspiracy violations based on the honest services provision of 18 U.S.C.
1346. This novel and dangerously expansive application of the honest services theory has no
more validity than the governments property fraud approach.
9
To avoid the otherwise compelling argument that 1346 is unconstitutionally vague, the
Supreme Court in Skilling v. United States, construed this provision as being limited to the
doctrines solid core: ... offenders who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participated in bribery or
kickback schemes. 561 U.S. 358, 407 (2010). Here, the indictment avers the payment of a bribe
in breach of the defendants (or possibly just of co-defendant Chapmans) fiduciary duty to the
Philadelphia Democratic Party. Even before Skilling, the Third Circuit had narrowly interpreted
the honest services fraud provision to disallow prosecutions against local political party officers,
rejecting the governments theory that they, like public officials, owed a fiduciary duty to the
general citizenry. United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 110-18 (3d Cir. 2003). In reaching this
decision, Chief Judge Becker emphasized the serious federalism and First Amendment problems
inherent in using federal criminal law to regulate the internal affairs of a county political party.
Id. at 117-18. The Supreme Court unanimously vindicated that constitutional perspective when,
at the end of last Term, it overturned the conviction of a state governor for bribery, prosecuted
under an honest services fraud theory, for failure to confine the prosecution within strict and
narrow bounds. McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. , 136 S.Ct. 2355 (2016). These same
limitations apply to the instant case and require dismissal of Counts One to Seven.
a.
The Indictment lacks any proper allegation of bribery (or

kickbacks) as required to establish honest services fraud
after Skilling.
The honest services aspect of the indictment in this case does not stay within the bribeand-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 409 (referring to McNally
v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)). Neither defendant had a legally enforceable fiduciary
duty to the Democratic Party of Philadelphia (or any of its subsidiary units for the Eighth Ward),
nor does the indictment properly allege otherwise. Likewise, the provision of a financial reward
to a member of a political partys ward committee by a candidate for office, in an effort to win
10
her political support, was not recognized as a kind of bribery in the pre-McNally honest
services case law, as required to come within the narrow bounds allowed by Skilling. See 561
U.S. at 399-408. For these reasons, the honest services fraud allegations of this indictment cannot
stand.
The indictment alleges that defendants Chapman and Farnese were members of the
Eighth Ward Democratic Committee, and that Farnese, a state senator, was also a candidate in
2011 for the position of Ward Leader of that committee. Indict. 6-7, at 2. The indictment
further alleges that the duties and responsibilities of ward committee members are set forth in
the Rules of the Democratic Party of the City and County of Philadelphia, and that these rules
provide that ward committee members must act in the best interests of the party. Indict. 5, at
2 (quoting but not citing Rules of the Democratic Party of the City and County of Philadelphia,
Rule VII., Art. I, E). The Rules of the Democratic Party of the City and County of
Philadelphia are attached hereto as Exhibit A.
The defendant in Murphy was the Chairman of the Passaic County, N.J., Republican
Party. In that capacity, he essentially controlled the functioning and decision-making of the
countys administration and governmental bodies. 323 F.3d at 104-06. Yet the Court of Appeals
held that his de facto power gave rise to no fiduciary duty to the public. In the course of its
decision, the Court summarized the arguments made by an appellant in a similar case that arose
in the Second Circuit, writing, Margiotta had contended that the statute should only reach public
officials, who owe a fiduciary duty to their constituents, and not party officials, who only owe a
fiduciary duty to their employer, the political party. Id. at 111. The Court of Appeals did not
purport to adopt the suggestion that a party officer, per se, might owe a fiduciary duty to the
party, and particularly not where, as here, the officer(s) in question were not employees of the
11
party (unlike Margiotta, apparently) but rather volunteer community activists in the political
arena. What the Third Circuit concluded and held was that for a fiduciary duty of an individual
who is not a public official to be enforceable in a federal criminal prosecution, that duty and
relationship must be affirmatively and expressly created and defined by state law. Id. at 116.
Here, the indictment refers to the rules of the Democratic Party but not to any state law as
purportedly creating a fiduciary duty,6 and to the defendants knowledge there is none. For this
reason alone, the honest services theory in this case fails.
Even if there was a state-law-based fiduciary duty here (which there is not), the
governments honest services theory in this case would fail for lack of any foundation in preMcNally case law. It is not enough to simply label something a bribe and thereby declare it to
be within the bounds of post-Skilling honest services law. The conduct must be conduct that was
generally recognized as bribery in the body of mail fraud case law on which Congress (according
to the Supreme Court in Skilling) is presumed to have relied when it enacted 1346. As Chief
Judge Becker pointed out for the Third Circuit in Murphy, there was in fact only one such prior
case, United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), see Murphy, 323 F.2d at 111,
which was decided by a 2-1 vote over a strong dissent by a well-respected jurist. And far from
being generally accepted and followed, Margiotta was rejected by the Third Circuit after careful
analysis in Murphy. As Judge Becker put it, The prosecution of a private party official is,
however, a horse of another color. 323 F.2d at 111.
The Third Circuit in Murphy also expressly rejected the governments suggestion that a states
criminal bribery law could serve as the source or reference point for that duty. 323 F.3d at 115.
Additionally, defendant notes that Party Rule VII makes the duty to act in the best interest of the party
enforceable not within the legal system but through removal by vote of a majority of the entire Ward
Committee. In this way, consistent with the First Amendment right of association (discussed below), no
one outside the committee is empowered to judge what should be deemed to be in the best interests of
the party.
12
The recent Supreme Court decision in McDonnell reinforces this conclusion. Governor
McDonnell was indicted for bribery under the honest services fraud provision, as in this case.
(He was also indicted for Hobbs Act extortion (18 U.S.C. 1951) in the form of bribery, just as
the defendants here have also been charged with bribery under the Travel Act, id. 1952.)
McDonnell is based on the further aspect of the Skilling rationale which stated that the narrowed
scope of honest services fraud, limiting it to bribes and kickbacks, would draw its content not
only from the pre-McNally case law, but also from federal statutes proscribing and defining
similar crimes. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412. The Supreme Court in McDonnell thus carefully
imported into the notion of bribery as a form of honest services fraud each a strict and narrow
construction of the official act element from 18 U.S.C. 201, the law prohibiting bribery of
federal government officials. 136 S.Ct. at 2367-72.
In McDonnell, the Court ruled out including as the prohibited conduct analogous here
to co-defendant Chapmans vote on the ward leadership question such informal actions by a
public official as taking part in a typical meeting, call or event. Id. at 2368-69. The Court
concluded that an official act had not only to be focused and concrete but also to involve[]
a formal exercise of governmental power. Id. at 2370. In the present case, there was no exercise
of governmental power at all. Relying on one of its own prior 201 decisions, the Court held
that the need to avoid the absurdities of convicting individuals on corruption charges for
engaging in such conduct was an important reason to settle upon a strict interpretation of
official acts. Id. The Court did not for a moment suggest that non-governmental actions of a
political party, at such a low level as the ward, might fall within the core preserved by its stillrecent Skilling decision. Nor is there any similar federal criminal statute regulating the internal
affairs of private associations, much less political parties, from which a limiting principle could
13
be imported, as the Court did in the public-official context of McDonnell.

Instead of holding honest services fraud within tightly defined boundaries, the
government in this case once again seeks to break through any limitations with even more adventurous theories of federal prosecutorial power to police the internal functioning of the political
system at the local level. See id. at 2372-73. Impermissibly, the governments approach would
again grant 1346 a standardless sweep. Id. at 2373. Because the indictment in this case
neither remains within the bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law, Skilling, 561
U.S. at 409, nor admits of any limiting principle derived from analogous federal bribery law, as
in McDonnell, Counts One through Seven must be dismissed, along with the Count One
conspiracy to the extent it relies on this theory.
b.
The Indictments honest services bribery theory raises

the same constitutional problems as proved fatal to the
McDonnell prosecution.
The decisions in Murphy, Skilling and McDonnell were informed by constitutional

considerations that prompted the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court to resolve any doubts
against expansion of the scope of the honest services aspect of the mail and wire fraud statutes,
when employed to impose federal standards on the conduct of the internal affairs of local
political actors and entities. The same considerations apply here to cement the conclusion that
Counts One through Seven must be dismissed.
(i)
First Amendment
The charges against Farnese and his co-defendant implicate a First Amendment right, that
is, the freedom of association. As recognized by the Supreme Court, the activities of a political
party are protected by the First Amendment as a key form of association in our electoral
system. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008);
14
see United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d at 118 (application of honest services statute to chair of
county political party implicates First Amendment freedom of association); United States v.
Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1496-97 (3d Cir. 1988).
Given the First Amendment context here, a strict limitation on application of the honest
services provision to political party activities is essential. A state criminal law is overbroad in
violation of the First Amendment if a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statutes plainly legitimate sweep. Washington State
Grange, 552 U.S. at 449 n.9 (internal citations omitted); see also Gibson v. Mayor & Council,
355 F.3d 215, 226 (3d Cir. 2004). Political parties have always had the right to decide their
leaders, candidates, and electoral strategies. E.g., Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent.
Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975). The Philadelphia
Democratic Party has the right to manage its internal affairs without fear of federal intervention.
The overbreadth here is apparent from a Third Circuit explanation of how bribery is
different from an illegal gratuity: What distinguishes a bribe from other payments that would
not constitute violations is that a bribe is offered with the intent to influence an official
act. United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 245 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting jury instruction). As
applied to an unpaid party volunteer, this construction highlights the First Amendment argument.
Everything the political party does involves creating and supporting a structure for supporting its
candidates for office and influencing official government action in accordance with its
principles. A criminal statute that targets such activity must be narrowly framed to avoid
impinging on that First Amendment associational interest, either personally or on behalf of the
party.
15
Just as elected officials in our system are also politicians who must cater to constituents,
and must not be dissuaded from participating in democratic discourse, McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at
2372, so, too, unpaid local political party activists, like the defendants, play a vital role in our
democracy. The exercise of discretion by politicians and party officers on a partisan basis,
unless expressly prohibited by law, is part and parcel of the American political system. This First
Amendment-protected political activity may include the spending of campaign funds to benefit
party activists, again unless clearly prohibited by law. This case, as described in the indictment,
involves nothing more than routine internal party affairs. This is particularly true in light of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Courts decision in Bentman v. Seventh Ward Democratic Executive
Committee, 218 A.2d 261 (Pa. 1966), which draws the line of permissible state government
regulation of political party affairs at only those actions that bear a Direct and Substantial
relationship to the performance of Public functions by the political party. Id. at 266. An internal
ward election lacks any relationship with a public election. Let alone a direct or substantial
one.
The funds involved in this case, it is alleged, came from FoF, his political campaign
committee. As discussed, Pennsylvania election law specifically permits payment, distribution,
loan or advancement of money or any valuable thing by a candidate, political committee or other
person for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election. 25 P.S. 3241(d)(1), 3254.1.
If in Farneses judgment, and that of his campaign treasurer, it would advance his prospects for
reelection if he were chosen as the leader of the Eighth Ward, then his campaign committee,
FoF, could expend funds in its discretion to party activists to further that objective. Under this
provision, there was nothing improper or fraudulent about the alleged activity.
16
The Third Circuit expressly acknowledged the potential misapplication of the honest
services statute in violation of such considerations, also as applied to a political partys leader, in
Murphy, 323 F.3d 117 (quoting Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 140 (Winter, J., dissenting). The
governments dangerous theory here would criminalize many activities accepted as a matter of
course in local politics, such as the provision by candidates to party leaders of walking around
money and payments for printing sample ballots. Parties protected right to associate would be
invaded without the required countervailing compelling government interest, an interest that
cannot possibly exist given, among other things, the federalism arguments discussed in a later
section of this brief. For this reasons, coupled with the others discussed here, Counts One
through Seven should be dismissed.
(ii)
Vagueness
As reinforced by the Supreme Courts decision in McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2373, a

narrow construction of the honest services statute is also required to avoid the problem of
vagueness, enforceable as a violation of the Fifth Amendments Due Process Clause. See
generally Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. , 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) (criminal sentencing
statute held unconstitutionally vague); Skilling, 561 U.S. at 402-03 (explaining vagueness
doctrine). Because, as already noted, the statute is being invoked in this case in the shadow of
First Amendment associational (political party) rights, a vagueness challenge is not strictly
limited to an as-applied basis, even if it would otherwise be so limited. See Hynes v. Mayor &
Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) ([S]tandards
of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression . Because First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only
with narrow specificity.); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-58
(1988) (Without fair notice of what the law permits and forbids, parties may wrongly be
17
intimidate[d] into censoring their own political speech.); United States v. Woods, 915 F.2d
854, 862 (3d Cir. 1990).7
The unanimous McDonnell opinion tends to reinforce the rule that at least when First
Amendment rights are implicated, the vagueness of a criminal statute may be assessed on its
face, and the Court is not limited to an as-applied approach. 136 S.Ct. at 2373, citing Johnson,
135 S.Ct. at 2560. Just as in McDonnell, [u]nder the standardless sweep of the Governments
[and lower courts] reading, ... public officials [and political party officers] could be subject to
prosecutions, without fair notice, for the most prosaic interactions. 136 S.Ct. at 2373 (internal
citations omitted).
But for private party officials there is no description of a line between legitimate
patronage and mail fraud. Murphy, 323 F.3d at 114 (emphasis added) (quoting Margiotta, 688
F.2d at 115 & 117 (Winter, J., dissenting)). Absent such a line, to invok[e] so shapeless a
provision to condemn someone to prison does not comport with the Constitutions guarantee
of due process. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2560. Party officials are partisan by nature and are entitled
to pursue their self-interest. See Murphy, 323 F.3d 102. Nothing put the defendants on notice that
their routine acts of patronage, favoritism and mutual political support could be prosecuted as
mail and wire fraud.
Due process requires that the ordinary person in the defendants position for example,
someone volunteering for the local chapter of his or her favored political party be able to find
the line between what is criminal and what is not. After all, [p]oliticians and citizens have a
7
The Supreme Courts recent decision in Johnson appears to reopen the question whether criminal
statutes are generally to be evaluated for vagueness on their face or as applied. Compare 135 S.Ct. at
2560-61 (majority; analyzing statute for vagueness on its face) with id. at 2580-81 & n.2 (dissent, citing,
inter alia, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987), for proposition that as-applied analysis is
required). See also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18 (2010) (suggesting that all
vagueness scrutiny is as-applied).
18
due-process right to know what political activity is legal. Fair notice allows individuals to engage
in politics with full knowledge of the parameters. United States v. McGregor, 879 F.Supp.2d
1308, 1312 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19-25 (1976)).
Nothing in the Duties of the Ward Committee provision of the Philadelphia Democratic
Partys Rules, wrongly cited in the indictment as the source of a fiduciary duty, provides the
needed clarity. That provision merely enables the party to remove a committee person for, as an
example, refusing to support a party-backed candidate, or refusing to distribute nominating
petitions for party candidates, or any other activity that may be considered not faithful" or in
harmony or in the best interests of the committee. This fuzzy language affords a purely
discretionary, procedural mechanism that allows the party to regulate itself, if it chooses to. It
does not provide a standard by which a person could regulate his or her actions in advance, much
less a standard that a jury of ordinary citizens could apply at a trial. As the Third Circuit warned
in Murphy, endorsing the Margiotta dissent, there is no logical rationale for treating private
party officials in the same manner as public officials[,] since such a loose interpretation of the
mail fraud statute creates a catch-all political crime which has no use but misuse. 323 F.3d at
118 (internal citations omitted).
The vagueness doctrine protects against arbitrary prosecutorial power and unchecked
juries both. Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statue
may permit a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their
personal predilections. Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983), quoting Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974), and cited with approval in McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2373. To
extend the honest services provision to encompass this case would violate the constitutional
protection against vagueness. For this reason as well, a narrow construction that excludes the
19
defendants alleged conduct must be adopted. On that basis, Counts One through Seven must be
dismissed.
(iii)
Federalism
The third and final constitutional consideration addressed in McDonnell also comes into
play in the present case. To protect the unique constitutional value of federalism that is woven
into the American Constitution and our system of government, courts must decline to construe
the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal
Government in setting standards of good government for local and state officials. 136 S.Ct. at
2373 (internal citations and additional authorities omitted). Federalism concerns caution against
heavy-handed federal court intervention, particularly where (as discussed below) no clear state
court precedent exists prohibiting the charged conduct in even remotely similar factual
circumstances.
The federal government seeks in this case to intrude into the internal mechanics of a
neighborhoods sub-contingent of a city political party. Politics simply do not get any more local
than the actions that the federal government seeks to regulate here. The use of broadly worded
federal statutes to prosecute matters of state and local concern raises serious federalism concerns.
See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24 (2000) (declining to extend the mail fraud
statute to a wide range of conduct traditionally regulated by state a local authorities).
Federal-state tension is especially acute in prosecutions of local political actors. This is a
principle repeatedly recognized by the Third Circuit in cases such as Murphy and after. See
United States v. McGeehan, 584 F.3d 560, 572-73 (3d Cir. 2009) (such prosecutions demonstrate
that Section 1346 is potentially limitless, and implicates serious federalism concerns, turning
conduct that has traditionally been regulated by the states in their civil and criminal courts into
20
federal crimes); accord United States v. Pannarella, 277 F.3d 678, 693 (3d Cir. 2002); United
States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
To address these constitutional concerns, the Supreme Court has resolved that, absent a
clear statement of Congressional intent, the federal government may not seek to prosecute at
levels traditionally left to the states. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. , 134 S.Ct.
2355, 2088 (2014) ([t]he problem with [governments proposed] interpretation is that it would
dramatically intrude upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction, and we avoid reading statutes to
have such reach in the absence of a clear indication that they do; court must be certain of
Congresss intent before finding that federal law overrides the usual constitutional balance of
federal and state powers).
Pennsylvania has its own system for regulating campaign finance law, which not only
fully regulates the type of activity here, but permits it. Moreover, regulation of local political
volunteers to the extent that such volunteers may be regulated at all must come from the local
and/or state level. Federal intervention is unacceptable overreaching and violates established
principles of federalism.
McDonnells discussion of all three of these constitutional considerations thus reinforces
the statutory arguments for dismissal of Counts One through Seven in this case.
B.
COUNTS EIGHT THROUGH THIRTEEN (AND THE RELATED

THEORY OF TRAVEL ACT BRIBERY.
Counts 1, and Counts 8 through 13 purport to allege conspiracy and substantive

violations of the Travel Act under 18 U.S.C. 1952. Specifically, the indictment alleges that the
defendants conspired, and in fact, employed the use of an interstate facility to promote, manage,
establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishing, or carrying on, of any
21
unlawful activity, namely the Pennsylvania bribery statute as codified at 18 Pa.C.S. 4701.
Because the indictment fails to adequately allege an underlying violation of Pennsylvania law,
these counts must be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B).
The indictment alleges that Chapman solicit[ed] and accept[ed] $6,000 from Farneses
Senate Campaign Committee]. . . in exchange for which CHAPMAN agreed to use her position
as a party official on the Eighth Ward Democratic Committee to vote for Farnese for Democratic
Ward Leader of the Eighth Ward. (Indict. 12, 13.). The indictment further alleges the use of
a facility in Interstate and Foreign Commerce to send certain emails (Counts Eight through
Eleven), mail a check from Pennsylvania to New York (Count Twelve), and cause the
transmission of an interbank transfer of funds (Count Thirteen), all, with the intent to promote,
manage, establish carry on and facilitatea violation of the Pennsylvania bribery statute.
Central to the governments theory of prosecution is the allegation that Farnese and
Chapman, at the time of the alleged offenses, were party officials within the ambit of the
Pennsylvania bribery statute, 18 Pa.C.S. 4701, 4501 (defining party official). ( 6, 7, 12,
and 13). This proffered interpretation of party official however, flies in the face of well-settled
rules of statutory construction and ignores the expressed intention of the original Model Penal
Code scholars who drafted the section which was adopted word for word by the Pennsylvania
General Assembly. It also finds no factual support in the Philadelphia Democratic Party Rules
which sets forth party structure and plainly delineates those party officials (as opposed to ward
committee members) who are in position to direct party affairs.
Finally, to accept the Governments proffered interpretation would be to grossly expand
the reach of Pennsylvania law in such a way as to raise the same substantial First Amendment,
Due Process, and federalism concerns as set forth above. The only interpretation that is both
22
consistent with Pennsylvania law and avoids these constitutional concerns is that which holds
that the Pennsylvania bribery statute does not reach the conduct as alleged.
1.
The Travel Act Counts Fail Because the

Indictment Does Not Adequately Allege an Underlying
Violation of Pennsylvania Law
The Travel Act prohibits using an interstate facility with intent to promote, manage,
establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of
any unlawful activity including bribery in violation of state law. 18 U.S.C. 1952. The initial
inquiry in a Travel Act case is whether the underlying activity violates a state law. United States
v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 1973). In this regard, it is sufficient that the activity
correlate with a listed category of offense (extortion, bribery or arson) and that the conduct
violates any law of the state, however labeled. United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969).
Accordingly, courts must look to state law in order to determine whether the underlying conduct
violates the correlative offense. United States v. Manzo, 851 F.Supp.2d 797 (D.N.J. 2012).
The correlative offense alleged here is the Pennsylvania bribery statute, 18 Pa.C.S.
4701. That statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Offenses defined.--A person is guilty of bribery, a felony of
the third degree, if he offers, confers or agrees to confer upon
another, or solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another:
(1) any pecuniary benefit as consideration for the decision,
opinion, recommendation, vote or other exercise of discretion as
a public servant, party official or voter by the recipient
(emphasis added);
Party official is defined in 18 Pa.C.S. 4501 as [a] person who holds an elective or
appointive post in a political party in the United States by virtue of which he directs or conducts,
or participates in directing or conducting party affairs at any level of responsibility. (emphasis
added). Thus, in order for the alleged conduct to be unlawful as required by the Travel Act, it is
necessary that Chapman was a party official within the meaning of the statute. If not, there can
23
be no violation of state law and the Travel Act counts must be dismissed.
a.
The Philadelphia Democratic Party Organization
The indictment sets out the organizational structure of the Philadelphia Democratic Party.
To the extent it does not do so fully, the party structure is set forth in the Party Rules referenced
in the indictment. There are approximately 66 wards throughout the City and County of
Philadelphia. Each ward is further divided into between 10 and 50 divisions, depending upon the
size of the ward. There are approximately 1686 divisions in all. Two ward committee members
are elected or appointed to represent each division. Collectively, the committee members from
each ward select a Ward Leader (also identified in the Philadelphia Democratic Party Rules as
the Executive Committee member) as well as other Ward officers who are responsible for
organizing the political activities of the party and who represents the ward on the Democratic
Partys City Committee (properly referred to as the County Executive Committee) (Indict.
1-4). The County Executive Committee in turn elects a Chairperson and other officers. Finally,
the indictment alleges that Chapman (one of approximately fifty-eight (58) Eighth Ward
committee members and one of approximately 3,300 committee members city-wide) was a
party official as defined in 4501.
b.
Long Standing Rules of Statutory Construction Require the

Rejection of the Governments Expansive Reading of Party
Official
In matters of statutory interpretation, the General Assemblys intent is paramount.

Commonwealth v. Hacker, 15 A.3d 333, 335 (Pa. 2011) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. 1921(a)). A statutes
plain language generally provides the best indication of legislative intent. Commonwealth v.
McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Pa. 2009) (citations omitted). In this case, the plain language of
the statute requires that a party official must be in position to direct[] or conduct[], or
participate in the direction or conduct of party affairs at any level.
24

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Those cases hold that to conduct the affairs of a RICO enterprise is to take part in operating
or managing those affairs, not merely to have some role in activities of the enterprise.
The indictments application of party official to the defendant also defies logic, and is
contrary to the well-established canon of construction that courts should generally apply
qualifying words or phrases to the words immediately preceding them. Commonwealth v.
Packer, 798 A.2d 192, 198 (Pa. 2002) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. 1903) (emphasis added). Here, any
level of responsibility must be read to qualify the immediately preceding words directs or
conducts or participates in directing or conducting party affairs. Under the governments
construction, the phrase does not qualify the preceding language; it obliterates it.
There is however, a construction that does give effect to all of the words and is consistent
with the plain reading of the statute, namely that the party official must have the power to direct
or conduct party affairs at some level (i.e. National, State, or local). Indeed, this makes good
policy sense as it is only those high-ranking party officials who, by virtue of their position, could
inflict public harm. If the Governments interpretation of party official were correct, then
everyone even those with no control or influence to direct or conduct party affairs would be
included. Surely the Pennsylvania Legislature could not have intended such an absurd result.
2.
The proper interpretation of Party Official is also supported by the

contemporaneous comments of the Model Penal Code scholars who
drafted it.
The Pennsylvania bribery statute was adopted word for word from Section 240.1 of the
Model Penal Code. Likewise, party official, as defined by 18 Pa.C.S. 4501, is identical to
Section 240.0(5) of the Model Penal Code. See Model Penal Code and Commentaries Part II,
240.0(5), at 3 (ALI 1980). Pennsylvania courts regularly look to the Model Penal Code as
persuasive authority for construing the Crimes Code of 1973, that is, Title 18 of the states
Consolidated Statutes. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186 (Pa. 2013) Commonwealth v.
26
Schauffler, 580 A.2d 314 (Pa. 1990); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 417 A.2d 173 (Pa. 1980);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 375 A.2d 331, 334, n.4 (Pa. 1977) (noting, [w]hile the MPC
Comments were not specifically adopted by the legislature and are therefore not binding,
nonetheless they are helpful in resolving problems of interpretation of the Crimes Code
provisions.). In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expressly relied upon the MPC
Commentary to assist it in determining the proper application of the bribery statute in other
circumstances. See, Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136 (Pa. 2014).
The commentary to Section 240.1 of the Model Penal Code could not be more plain as to
the intent of the drafters. In discussing the then controversial extension of the bribery statute to
political matters, the drafters made it clear that they viewed the extension of the bribery statute to
party officials as both limited and distinct from the more expansive reach of the statute as to
public servants. The commentary noted in pertinent part:
(d) Party Official. Section 240.0(5) defines "party official"
to mean "a person who holds an elective or appointive
post in a political party in the United States by virtue of
which he directs or conducts, or participates in directing or
conducting party affairs at any level of responsibility."
Most states traditionally have not dealt with the bribery of
party officials, but a number of the recently enacted codes
have followed the suggestion of the Model Penal Code and
included such persons within the general bribery provision.
Several recent proposals follow suit.
Here, in contrast to public servants, the focus of the Model
Code is upon persons with some managerial responsibility
rather than all persons who are in some way connected with
a political party. Model Penal Code and Commentaries Part II,
240.1, at 31 (ALI 1980).
Here, Chapman and Farnese, as committee members did not, and could not, have had the
requisite managerial responsibility. Pursuant to the Philadelphia Democratic Party Rules cited in
the indictment, committeepersons are responsible for getting the vote out for their political party,
27
distributing absentee and alternative ballot applications before an election, attending ward
meetings, dispersing campaign literature on Election Day, and arranging rides to the voting polls
for voters who are unable to walk or drive. In short, the blocking and tackling necessary to any
retail political organization. See, Exhibit A, Rule VII, Art. 2.
By contrast, those same Party Rules make clear that it is the County Executive
Committee, which is comprised of the elected ward leaders only, that is solely responsible for the
supervision of the organization and management of the Democratic Party . It is the
Executive Committee alone that shall exercise all power and perform all duties in relation to the
nomination of candidates...for public office. It is only the County Executive Committee that is
empowered to fill vacancies for public candidates, and, it is only the County Executive
Committee that may, by majority vote, recommend referral of a ward committee to the
Committee on Organization for actions deemed unfaithful to the Party. See, Party Rules, Rule
VII, Art. 3. As alleged in the indictment, neither Chapman nor Farnese were members of the
County Executive Committee (see Indict. 6, 7).
The definition of party official must be limited to those high-ranking officials who, by
virtue of their position, could exercise managerial responsibility and thus direct party affairs.
This interpretation is the only interpretation that: (1) is consistent with the statutes plain
language; (2) gives effect to all of the words in the statute; (3) follows the express intent of the
scriveners as set forth in Model Penal Code commentary, and makes sense in light of the party
organization. Any other interpretation is erroneous, and contrary to well-settled Pennsylvania
law.
28
3.
To interpret the statutes definition of Party Official to encompass

committee people is a substantial departure from prior law.
The governments attempt to apply the Pennsylvania bribery statute at such a granular
level is unprecedented. In fact, the only reported decision where the Pennsylvania bribery statute
was applied to a party official involved an allegation that a high party official with substantial
influence in the running of the Commonwealth used his influence or promised to do so after the
offer of a bribe. See United States v. Asher, 648 F.Supp. 320, 321 (M.D. Pa. 1986) affd United
States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483 (3d Cir. 1988).8 In Asher, the Chairman of the State Republican
Party was convicted of Travel Act bribery and honest services mail fraud arising from his receipt
of kickbacks from vendors on state contracts contracts that he was in a position to direct as a
result of his high party office. As a result of his managerial control of the state-wide party
apparatus, a he was in a position to influence public decisions.
It is only under these circumstances that the extension of the bribery statute to highranking party officials makes any sense from a policy standpoint. The statute was never intended
to be applied at the level sought here, nor does any public policy support such an unprecedented
expansion of federal prosecutorial power. As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, a criminal
statute must not be construed in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and
involves the Federal Government in settings standards of good government for local and state
officials. United States v. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016) (citing McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987)). It is respectfully submitted that the Court should decline the
governments invitation to do just that.
There, the Chairman of the State Republican Party, a high-ranking official, was charged under the
Pennsylvania bribery statute. Id.
29
C.
The Governments Application of the Bribery Statute To Internal

Workings of Party Affairs Raises Constitutional Concerns.
Historically, courts have refrained from interfering with internal party politics. See Lynch
v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370, 370 (3d Cir. 1965); Valenti v. PA Democratic State Committee, 844
F.Supp. 1015, 1020 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (citing Blank v. Heineman, 771 F.Supp. 1013, 1018 (D.
Neb. 1991)); McMenamin v. Philadelphia County Democratic Executive Committee of
Philadelphia, 405 F.Supp. 998 (E.D. Pa. 1975). This well-founded reluctance to interfere in
[t]he internal management of a political party and internal affairs of [a] party, other than
primary or general elections is founded upon the basic yet fundamental concept:
The freedom to associate for the common advancement of political
beliefsnecessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people who
constitute the association, and to limit the association to those people only.
This precedent indicates that, at least in the absence of a compelling reason,
we must not, in the words of the district court, interfere with a party
determination as to the choice of speakers who are to address any of its
meetings.
Valenti, 844 F.Supp. at 1018 (M.D.Pa. 1994) (emphasis added) (citing Democratic Party of
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)) (internal quotations
omitted). Here, no compelling reason exists to regulate the purely internal political
organizational activity at issue in the indictment.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Bentman v. Seventh Ward Democratic
Executive Committee, 218 A.2d 261 (Pa. 1966) supports this result. There the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court intervened in a dispute over whether to seat two local committeepersons who had
been duly elected in the public primary election. In doing so, however, the Court made clear that
judicial intervention was rare and must be limited to controversies where the issue raised bears
a direct and substantial relationship to the performance of public function by the political party.
218 A.2d at 266.
30
No such public function is at issue here. The local ward election is purely partisan and
fits squarely in the area where governmental intervention is most insidious. In the absence of a
compelling interest, the Court should reject the governments effort to impose its own sense of
morality upon the inner workings of local ward politics. It is not the place for federal prosecutors
to set [] standards of good government for local and state officials. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct.
2355, 2373 (2016) (internal citations and additional authorities omitted).
D.
18 Pa.C.S. 4701 Violates Farneses Due Process Rights Because

the Statute Is Void for Vagueness.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine9 requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal
guidelines, criminal statutes may permit a standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors
and juries to pursue their personal predilections, violating due process. Kolender, 461 U.S. at
35758; accord City of Chicago v. Morales, 571 U.S. 41 (1999). Courts will not construe a
criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will use it responsibly. United States
v. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2373 (2016) (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480
(2010)).
Suffice it to say, if the governments unprecedented expansion of the Pennsylvania
bribery statute is a textbook example of the standardless sweep the Supreme Court has repeatedly
warned against. Here we have the federal government employing an unprecedented
interpretation of state law it in ways in which it has never been and never was intended to be
The constitutional principles set forth in the void for vagueness discussion as it relates to the fraud charges, (see
discussion supra Part II.A.3.b.2) apply with equal force to the Travel Act Counts. As such, they are not repeated
here.
31
applied. If accepted, however, the ambiguity surrounding the reach of the Pennsylvania bribery
statute and specifically its applicability to internal, local ward politics, renders the statute so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269, U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Allowing prosecutors to
fill that ambiguity with no clear guidance is at the heart of the vagueness problem presented by
the indictment.10
This is particularly true where as discussed at length above, the defendant asserts that his
conduct is wholly consistent with long recognized political activity and that the alleged bribe is,
in fact, a permissible expenditure under the Pennsylvania campaign finance regimen. Under
such circumstances, there can be little doubt that Farnese, and countless others active in local
ward politics were not, and could not have been, on notice that their routine, internal partisan
behavior was somehow a federal crime.11 As such, the governments novel and intrusive
application of the bribery statute to the conduct alleged in the indictment must be rejected.
E.
The Federal Government Attempt to Apply the Pennsylvania Bribery

Statute in a Manner in Which it Has Never Been Applied Raises
Significant Federalism Concerns.
The purpose of the Travel Act is a means to aid states in the enforcement of their laws
by enabling the targeting and prosecution of participants in organized crime who avoided State
prosecution by operating their criminal enterprise from outside a States boundaries. United
States v. Manzo, 851 F.Supp.2d 797, 804 (D.N.J. 2012) (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S.
808, 811 (1971)). To comport with our federal system, the Travel Act must be read in a narrow
10
This is also consistent with the rule of construction that requires that any ambiguity in the interpretation of a
criminal statute must be resolved in favor of lenity. Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000) (quoting
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
11
See Brad Bumsted, Feds Charges Against Philly Lawmaker Raise Eyebrows, Trib Live (May 21, 2016),
http://triblive.com/opinion/bradbumsted/10491846-74/farnese-case-estey; Ryan Briggs, Does the Farnese
Indictment Spell the End of Politicking in PA?, City and State Pennsylvania (Jun. 7, 2016),
http://www.cityandstatepa.com/content/does-farnese-Indictment-spell-end-politicking-pa.
32
and restricted fashion in order to maintain [the] a delicate balance between the powers of the
federal and state governments. United State v. Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 797, 805 (D.N.J. 2012)
The federal government cannot usurp state authority via the Travel Act because a state must
first decide that the conduct at issue is illegal. United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 721-22 (9th
Cir. 2008).
The Travel Act was not intended to grant the federal prosecutors unfettered power to
cavalierly apply state criminal law. It was intended to assist states in by incorporating state law
to combat organized crime. That is not what has been alleged here. Yet, the indictment allows
the government to usurp the authority to interpret state law.
As set forth above, there is good reason why the Pennsylvania bribery statute has never
been applied in the manner sought here. Extending the bribery statute beyond high-ranking party
officials would upend the political process and grant federal prosecutors unchecked supervisory
power over the internal workings of local political affiliations. Whether the Pennsylvania
bribery statute applies to the lowest party position, is a question that must be decided by the
Pennsylvania General Assembly in the first instance. Further, the appropriate construction of the
Pennsylvania campaign finance laws should similarly be left to those state officials most familiar
with its regulatory scheme.
The government has failed to properly allege a violation of Pennsylvania state law, which
is required in order to charge a violation of the federal Travel Act. Accordingly, the Court should
dismiss the Travel Act Counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v).
33
III.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendant Lawrence Farnese respectfully requests that this Court grant
his motion under Rule 12(b) to dismiss the instant indictment.
Respectfully submitted,

Telephone: (215) 772-1500
Facsimile: (215) 772-7620
Ardmore, PA 19003
Telephone: (610) 649-8200
Facsimile: (610) 649-8362
34
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Mark B. Sheppard, hereby certify that I caused a copy of the Defendant Lawrence
Farneses Motion Dismiss Indictment and Memorandum in Support of the same to be filed with
the Courts CM/ECF system this 21st day of October 2016, thereby effecting service on all
registered users.

Mark B. Sheppard (PA Bar ID: 50480)
Telephone: (215) 772-1500
Facsimile: (215) 772-7620
msheppard@mmwr.com
35
Exhibit A
RULES
of the
Democratic Party
of the
CITY AND COUNTY

OF PHILADELPHIA
OFFICIAL COPY
(Revised 2014)
ECLF_000001110
RULES
of the
Democratic Party
of the
CITY AND COUNTY

OF PHILADELPHIA
OFFICIAL COPY
(Revised 2014)
ECLF_000001111
l!
Congressman Robert A. Brady

Chairman
Headquarters
219 Spring Garden Street
ECLF_000001112
RULES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

OF THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
A
DEFINITIONS.
Qualifications of Voters Holding Membership in Party Organization
Art. 1 - To Vote for Democratic Candidates at Primary
Art. 2 - To Be Nominated for Party Offices
Art. 3 - To Be Member of any Party Committee
Art. 4 - To Be Eligible for Party Executive Office
RULE I
RULE II
RULE III -
RULE IV -
RULE V
RULE VI
Organization of the Party

Art. 1 - Ward and County Committees
Art. 2 - Membership in Ward Committee
Art. 3 - Membership in County Committee
Art. 4 - County Convention
Art. 5 - Adoption of Rules and By-laws
Art. 6 - Ownership of Records
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
Elections
Art. 1 Art. 2 Art. 3 Art. 4 Art. 5 Art. 6 Art. 7 -
Election of County Committeemen and Ward Officers

Election of Officers and Members of County Committee
Election of Members of State Committee
Election of Delegates and Alternate Delegates to National Convention
Presidential Preference
Nomination of Candidates
Primary Elections
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
Ward Committee Meetings

County Committee Meetings
Place of Ward Committee Meetings
Place of County Committee Meetings
Notice of Ward and County Committee Meetings
6
6
6
7
7
8
Meetings
Art. 1 Art. 2 Art. 3 Art. 4 Art. 5 -
Organization Procedure
Art. 1 - Procedure in Organizing Ward Committees
Art. 2 - Procedure in Organizing County Committee
Contests
Art. 1 - Procedure for Filing Contests in Ward Committees and
County Committees
ECLF_000001113
9
9
10
11
.11

RULE VII - Duties of Committees and Officers
Art. 1 Art. 2 Art. 3 Art. 4 Art. 5 Art. 6 Art. 7 Art. 8 Art. 9 Art. 1 0 Art. 11 Art. 1 2 Art. 1 3 Art. 1 4 Art. 1 5 RULE V I I I -
RULE IX -
RULEX
Recall
Art. 1
Art. 2
Art. 3
Art. 4
Art. 5
Art. 6
Art. 7
15
Duties of Ward Committees

Duties of the Members of the Ward Committee
Duties of the County Committee
Duties of County Committeeman
Duties of Ward Chairman
Duties of Other Officers of Ward Committees
Duties of County Chairman
Duties of First Vice Chairman
Duties of Second Vice Chairlady
Duties of Third Vice Chairman
Duties of Secretary
Duties of Assistant Secretary
Duties of Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer
Duties of the Sergeant-at-Arms
Inability of Refusal of Officers to Perform Their Duty
15
16
16
18
18
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
21
21
21
of Ward or County Officers

- Recall of Ward Officer
- Recall of County Officer
- Filing of Petition for Recall
- Notice of Recall
- Calling of Meeting to Consider the Recall
- Procedure to be Followed at the Meeting on the Recall
- Recall Within Sixty Days of Any Primary,
Municipal, Special or General Election
22
22
22
22
23
23
24
Committees for Ward Committees and County Committee

Art. 1 - Rule Applicable to Ward and County Committees
Art. 2 - Committee on Consent
Art. 3 - Committee on Organization in Wards
Art. 4 - Committee on Organization in County
Art. 5 - Legal Committee
Art. 6 - Campaign Committee
Art. 7 - Other Committees
25
.-.
26
26
26
26
27
27
28
28
Vacancies
Art. 1 - Method of Filing Vacancies
Art. 2 - Membership of Caucus
Art. 3 - Procedure for Calling Caucus
Art. 4 - Procedure to be Followed at the Meeting
Art. 5 - Vacancies in Committee Offices
Art. 6 - Meetings for Filling Vacancies
29
29
29
29
30
30
31
RULE XI -
Voting
32
RULEXII -
Proxies
33
RULE XIII -
Revision of These Rules
34
RULE X I V -
Suspension and Amendments of These Rules
35
AMMENDMENTS
36
ECLF_000001114
RULES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

OF THE
CITY AND COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA
DEFINITIONS
The name shall be "THE PHILADELPHIA COUNTY DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE."
CHAIRMAN - Where the word "Chairman" is used to designate the head of a committee, it shall mean either a
male or female.
WARD COMMITTEE - Where the phrase "Ward Committee" is used, it shall mean the Ward Democratic
Executive Committee.
COUNTY COMMITTEE - Where the phrase "County Committee" is used it shall mean the Philadelphia
County Democratic Executive Committee.
DATES - Where under these rules a date has been set for the holding of any meeting and that date falls on
a Sunday or holiday, the meeting shall be held on the next succeeding day which is not a Sunday or holiday.
Provided, however that the same is not contrary to the Election Code of 1937 or supplements and amendments
thereto.
ELECTORS - A n elector shall be one who is duly registered in the City and County of Philadelphia as a
member of the Democratic Party.
MEMBERSHIP - The membership of a committee shall be understood to mean all of those members of the
committee whose names are enrolled as members of the committee, at the time the matter in question shall have
arisen, and against whom no action for expulsion or suspension is pending and undetermined.
QUORUM - A quorum shall be made up of one-third of those enrolled as qualified members of the organization
or committee. The members present at a duly organized meeting may continue to do business until adjournment,
even though a sufficient number shall have withdrawn as to leave less than a quorum. If a meeting cannot be
organized because a quorum has not attended, those present may adjourn the meeting to such time as they may
determine. If a quorum is not in attendance at the second of such adjourned meetings, those in attendance,
although less than the quorum fixed above, shall, nevertheless, constitute a quorum for the purpose of
proceeding with the business of the said meetings
TIME - Where "time" is designated, it shall mean the time that is being recognized by the Municipal Authority.
DISTRICT - A district is any subdivision of the County as subdivided by the General Assembly, such as
Congressional, Senatorial, Councilmanic and Legislative district, and the wards within the boundaries so fixed
shall comprise the said district.
WARDS A ward is a subdivision of the County as fixed by the courts of Philadelphia.
DIVISION - A division is a subdivision of the ward as fixed by the courts of Philadelphia.
E F F E C T I V E DATE
These rules shall become effective immediately upon final passage and approval.
A
ECLF_000001115
RULE I
QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS HOLDING MEMBERSHIP IN PARTY
ORGANIZATIONS
ARTICLE 1
TO VOTE FOR DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES AT PRIMARY
Any qualified elector, who is duly registered as a member of the Democratic Party, shall be entitled to vote for
Democratic candidates for party offices, delegates and alternate delegates to conventions and nominees for public
offices at the primary elections, provided for by law.
ARTICLE 2
TO BE NOMINATED FOR PARTY OFFICES
Only qualified electors shall be nominated, elected or chosen as members of any committee, or as delegates
or alternate delegates to any convention, or to any party office.
ARTICLE 3
TO BE MEMBER OF ANY PARTY COMMITTEE
No person shall be qualified for membership in any organization or committee under these rules, who is not a
duly qualified .elector and registered as a Democrat in the County of Philadelphia immediately prior to his election
or appointment to the said committee, or who has within a two-year period actively or inactively supported the
candidacy at any general election of any person or persons not on the Democratic ticket.
ARTICLE 4
TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR PARTY EXECUTIVE OFFICE
No person holding an office of profit connected with either the national, state, county or city government,
to which said person has been appointed or retained therein by a head or chief thereof who is opposed to the
principles of the Democratic party (except officers of a judicial character appointed by the courts and their
appointees, notaries public and those holding minority positions under the Constitution and the several Acts of
Assembly of this Commonwealth) shall be eligible for the office of Chairman of the County Executive Committee
or of any Ward Executive Committee, or for membership in the County Executive Committee or Ward Executive
Committee, or hold any party office, unless consent is given by a majority vote of the committee in which he seeks
to hold office or membership.
ECLF_000001116
RULE II
O R G A N I Z A T I O N O F T H E PARTY
ARTICLE 1
WARD AND COUNTY COMMITTEES
The organization of the party shall consist of the following:
(1) Ward Committees.
(2) County Committee.
ARTICLE 2
M E M B E R S H I P I N T H E WARD C O M M I T T E E
SECTION A. All officers of the Ward Committee and those elected to represent the division in which they
reside, who have been duly seated as members of the said Ward Committee, and all other persons who shall
be appointed to fill vacancies in the Ward Committee in accordance with these rules, shall constitute the Ward
Committee.
SECTION B. All members of the Ward Committee representing certain districts shall during their term of
office have the proper qualifications and be resident voters of the district they represent in the said Ward Committee.
SECTION C. Any member of a Ward Committee who, during his membership, has changed his registration
from that of Democrat to any other party, shall forthwith cease to be a member of the said Committee; and any
member who, during such term of membership, shall have been proven after a flill hearing to have supported
directly or indirectly any candidate or candidates on an opposing ticket at any election, shall lose his membership
in the said Committee.
ARTICLE 3
M E M B E R S H I P IN T H E C O U N T Y C O M M I T T E E
SECTION A. All officers of the County Committee and a representative from each of the wards in the
City and County of Philadelphia elected in accordance with these rules, shall constitute the County Executive
Committee with the exception noted under Section b.
SECTION B. Where a. ward contains sixty (60) or more divisions, the County Committee shall be authorized
to divide the said ward into units, either on the recommendation of the County Committeeman of the ward, or on
their own motion. There shall be not less than thirty (30) divisions to a unit and the first additional unit shall be
known as "A" unit of the said ward, the second as "B", etc. The County Committee shall see to it that a separate
committee is set up in each unit for organizing in accordance with the rules above set forth for the organizing
of the Ward Committee. Each unit shall have the right to a County Committeeman to represent that unit in the
County Committee with the same force and effect as if said person had been elected as County Committeeman
for an entire ward; provided, however, that no such division shall .take place within sixty (60) days prior to any
election at which members of the Ward Committee will be elected. The divisions in the new unit shall retain their
already designated numbers.
ARTICLE 4
COUNTY CONVENTION
The County Convention shall consist of the officers of the County Committee, and County Committeemen
from the various wards in the City and County of Philadelphia.
ECLF_000001117
ARTICLE 5
ADOPTION OF RULES AND BY-LAWS
SECTION A. The Ward Committees and the County Committee shall adopt rules and by-laws that are
consistent with the rules of the Democratic State Committee.
SECTION B. In the organizing of a Ward or County Committee and in subsequent meetings of said committee,
the then existing rules and by-laws of the Ward or County Committee, as the case may be, shall govern until new
rules and by-laws are adopted, provided they are consistent with the County and State Committee Rules.
ARTICLE 6
OWNERSHIP OF RECORDS
All the records, books, property, and ownership of records of any of the said Ward Committees or of the
County Committee shall become the property of their lawful successors. The property of the County Convention
shall become the property of the County Committee existing at the close of the convention.
ECLF_000001118
RULE III
ELECTIONS
ARTICLE 1
ELECTION OF COUNTY COMMITTEEMAN AND WARD OFFICERS
SECTION A. The County Committeeman and all officers of the Ward Committee shall be elected at the time
the new Ward Committee is organized on the third Monday succeeding the Primary Election, unless otherwise
provided for in the rules.
SECTION B. At the Spring Primary there shall be elected in each election division two persons, who shall
serve, on and after the third Monday succeeding their election, as members of the Ward Committee in which such
division may be situated.
SECTION C. The term of membership shall date from the time of their enrollment as a member of the new
Ward Committee for a four-year term up to and including the Monday preceding the next Spring Primary Election.
ARTICLE 2
ELECTION OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF COUNTY COMMITTEE
SECTION A. All officers of the County Committee shall be elected on the fourth Monday succeeding the
Spring Primary Election at which the members of the Ward Committee were elected, unless otherwise provided
for in these rules.
SECTION B. The election of members to the County Committee shall be held on the third Monday succeeding
the Primary Election at which the members of the Ward Committee were elected, unless otherwise provided for
in these rules.
SECTION C. Each Ward Committee shall at the time of its re-organization elect, not necessarily from its own
membership, one representative to the County Committee. Such person, however, must be an elector of the ward
he is to represent.
SECTION D. The term of membership shall date from the time of enrollment as a member in the County
Committee for a four-year term, up to and including the third Monday succeeding the Primary Election at which
the members of the Ward Committee are elected, or namely until successors have been elected.
ARTICLE 3
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF STATE COMMITTEE
SECTION A. The members of the State Committee shall be elected to hold office in accordance with Rule 2
of the Democratic State Committee.
ARTICLE 4
ELECTION OF DELEGATES AND ALTERNATE DELEGATES TO THE NATIONAL
CONVENTION
Delegates and alternate delegates to the Democratic National Convention shall be elected at the Spring Primary
of each Presidential year.
4
ECLF_000001119
ARTICLE 5
PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE
At the Spring Primary in 1944, and at every second Spring Primary thereafter, Democratic party electors shall
have an opportunity to express their choice for the office of the President of the United States, as now provided
for by law.
ARTICLE 6
NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES
Candidates for all offices to be filled at a general or municipal election shall be nominated at the preceding
primary election. Candidates to be voted upon at a special election shall be nominated in accordance with Rule
VII, Article 3, Section f
ARTICLE 7
PRIMARY ELECTIONS
A primary election shall be held each year in accordance with the Election Code of 1937, and supplements
and amendments thereto.
ECLF_000001120
RULE IV
MEETINGS
ARTICLE 1
WARD COMMITTEE MEETINGS
SECTION A. At 8:00 P.M., on the third Monday succeeding the Primary Election at which members of the
Ward Committee were elected, all persons claiming the right to membership in the Ward Committee shall meet
at the place designated, to organize the new Ward Committee, unless the newly elected members of the Ward
Committee are unable to obtain their certificates of nomination to the Ward Committee by twelve o'clock noon of
the said third Monday. In such event, the meeting of the Ward Committee shall be delivery of-the certificates of
nomination to those postponed until the Monday evening following the entitled to receive the same.
SECTION B. Regular meetings of the Ward Committees shall be held at least once a month.
SECTION C. Special meetings of a Ward Committee shall be called as follows:
(A) By the County Committeeman as circumstances may require, or
(B) Upon petition filed with the County Committeeman in conformity with the requirements set forth for the
calling of special meetings of the County Committee by petition.
ARTICLE 2
COUNTY COMMITTEE MEETINGS
SECTION A. At 8:00 P.M., on the fourth Monday succeeding the Primary Election at which the members of
the Ward Committee were elected, persons who have been elected to represent the wards in the County Committee
shall meet at the place designated to organize the County Committee, unless the Ward Committees have been
unable to organize as set forth above; in the event the said Ward Committees are unable to organize at the time
fixed, then the County Committee shall organize on the second Monday after the certificates of election are made
available to the newly elected members of the Ward Committee by the County Board of Elections.
SECTION B. Regular meetings of the County Committee shall be held at least once a month.
SECTION C. Special meetings of the County Committee shall be held as follows:
(A) At the call of the Chairman; or
(B) Upon a petition filed with the Chairman requesting a special meeting, and setting forth the purpose or
purposes of the special meeting and the nature of the business to be transacted at said meeting. The petition must
be signed by two-thirds (2/3) of the membership of the said committee and attached to the petition there must
be an affidavit of one of the signers, containing an averment that the signatures affixed to the petition are in
the handwriting of the persons whose names are affixed thereto; and that the signers had full knowledge of the
contents of the petition at the time of the signing .and that the affidavit was sworn to before someone having the
authority to administer an oath or affirmation. It must be filed with the County Chairman. The County Chairman
shall then call a special meeting as requested in the petition, not less than four days nor more than ten days from
the date of filing of the petition.
ECLF_000001121
ARTICLE 3
PLACE OF WARD COMMITTEE MEETINGS
SECTION A. For the purpose of organizing the new Ward Committee, the place shall be the last meeting
place of the preceding Ward Committee, unless otherwise determined by the preceding Ward Committee at a
meeting held on the third Monday preceding the Primary Election at which the members of the Ward Committee
are to be elected.
SECTION B. Regular and special meetings of the Ward Committee shall be held at the place or places
designated by the County Committeeman unless otherwise provided for by the Ward Committee
ARTICLE 4
PLACE OF COUNTY COMMTTEE MEETINGS
SECTION A. For the purpose of organizing the new County Committee, the place shall be the last meeting
place of the preceding County Committee, unless determined otherwise at a meeting to be called by the County
Chairman not less than one week nor more than two weeks prior to the Primary Election at which members of the
Ward Committees are to be elected.
SECTION B. Regular and special meetings of the County Committee shall be held at the place or places
designated by the County Chairman, unless otherwise'provided for by the County Committee.
ECLF_000001122
ARTICLE 5
NOTICE OF WARD AND COUNTY COMMITTEE MEETINGS
SECTION A. Notice of meetings for the purpose of organizing the Ward Committees or the County Committee
shall be at the discretion of the presiding officer and not mandatory.
SECTION B. Notice of regular meetings of the Ward and County Committees is to be given in writing, at
least forty-eight (48) hours in advance.
SECTION C. Notice of special meetings of the Ward Committee shall be in conformity with the requirements
under Rule IV, Article 5, Section d, with the following changes: Where the term "County Committee" is used, read
the term "Ward Committee"; and in the case of an other special meetings notice shall be given at the discretion
of the County Committeeman .
SECTION D. At least seventy-two (72)-hours' notice in writing must be given before an meeting of the
County Committee for filling a vacancy, electing the officers to fill any vacancy in the County Committee, for the
endorsement of any candidate or policy to be supported by the County Committee or for the recall of any officer of
the County Committee. If a meeting must be called in less than seventy-two hours, this provision may be waived
by the vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the enrolled membership, said vote to be taken at the meeting in -question. All
other special meetings may be called on reasonable notice at the discretion of the Chairman. Notices of all special
meetings must specify the purpose for which the meeting is being called and no other business shall be transacted
at the said meeting.
SECTION E. Notices of all meetings are to be addressed to members at the addresses on the role of the
Committee, and the depositing of the notices in the mail or the delivery of the notices to a telegraph company,
shall be deemed service of the notice. The time shall commence from the time the notice is deposited in the mall
or delivered to the telegraph company. This does not apply to cases where the rules have set forth other forms of
notice and service. This is applicable to both Ward and County Committees.
SECTION F. Where circumstances make it .impossible to hold meetings either of the Ward, County, or of
any other committee provided for under these rules, at the place designated, it shall be proper for the chairman
of said committee to procure another place and to notify the members of the committee of the change of meeting
place. However, should this change occur in the organizing of a new Ward Committee or new County Committee,
then the person to preside over the said meeting shall proceed to the meeting place previously designated and at
the time designated for holding said meeting, announce in a loud voice the new address and time for the holding
of the said meeting, and instruct those present to proceed to the new place of meeting.
ECLF_000001123
RULEV
ORGANIZATION PROCEDURE
ARTICLE 1
PROCEDURE IN ORGANIZING WARD COMMITTEES
SECTION A. The last preceding County Committeeman of the ward shall be the presiding Chairman at
the organizing of the new Ward Committee. It shall be his duty to certify in writing to the Democratic County
headquarters his intention, whether he will or will not be able to perform the duties of organizing the said Ward
Committee at the time and place designated. Failure to do so shall be deemed a refusal to act as the temporary
Chairman of the meeting. The said notice must be delivered in person or by registered mail to the Democratic
County headquarters not later than the second Monday preceding the Primary Election at which the members of
the Ward Committee are elected. In the event of the inability or the refusal of the previous County Committeeman
to act or upon his failure to have notified the Democratic County headquarters of his intention to act, then it shall
be the duty of the person who organizes the County Committee to have the preceding Ward Chairman preside,
if available and willing to .act, and if not, to have the next succeeding officer, etc., until a person is obtained to
organize the Ward Committee.
SECTION B. The Chairman who conducts the meeting for organizing the new Ward Committee shall
proceed in regard to the acceptance of certificates'of nomination, seating the parties, claiming membership in the
Ward Committee against whom no contest has been filed, the appointment of acting secretaries, sergeant-at-arms,
tellers, in the same manner as provided for in the organization of the County Committee.
SECTION C. The Chairman shall also handle contests in the same .manner as provided for in the handling
of contests by the County Committee. The Ward Committee cannot be organized until all contests have been
disposed of.
SECTION D. All contests must be disposed of and the Ward Committee organized on or before the Wednesday
preceding the Monday evening on which the county Committee is to be organized.
SECTION E. Failure on the part of any Ward Committee to organize at this time and to elect a County
Committeeman shall constitute a vacancy of a County Committeeman from the Ward. In such cases, the election
of a County Committeeman, as well as the organization of the Ward Committee, shall be referred to the Committee
on Organization of the County Committee. This failure shall not be considered as a contest nor prevent the
organization of the County Committee.
SECTION F. After all contests have been heard by the Contest Committee and acted upon by the Ward
Committee, and all duly elected members have been seated, the meeting shall proceed with the election of officers
in the manner as hereinafter set forth for the County Committee, with the exception -of the officers to be elected
and the order in which they are to be elected.
SECTION G. The officers to be elected, and the order in which they are to be elected are: The County
Committeeman and the Permanent Chairman. After the Permanent Chairman has been elected, the retiring officer,
even though he is not a member of the Ward Committee, shall be entitled to remain in the meeting, but not to
take part in its deliberations. The Permanent Chairman having been elected, the new Permanent Chairman shall
then proceed to conduct the election of the remaining officers: First, Second and Third Vice Chairmen, Secretary,
Assistant Secretary, Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer.
SECTION H. All of the above offices must be elected from the membership of the Committee with the
exception of the County Committeemen. A Ward Committee, however, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote at the meeting
of its organization or by its rules, shall be entitled to elect a female as Vice Chairlady from without the membership
of the Ward Committee and such an election may create, if so desired, the additional office of Vice Chairlady. This
is not to be construed as a limitation on the election of males to the office of Vice Chairman as above provided.
ECLF_000001124

SECTION I. Upon the election of the County Committeeman, a certificate of his election in duplicate shall
be given to the newly elected County Committeeman, signed by all the officers of the. Ward Committee or the
majority of the same, and a certificate in duplicate shall be certified showing the names, addresses and divisions
of all of the newly elected officers of the Ward Committee. One of each of the said certificates shall be forwarded,
on or before the Friday noon preceding the organization of the County Committee, to the County Committee
headquarters and the other given to the County Committeeman.
ARTICLE 2
P R O C E D U R E IN O R G A N I Z I N G C O U N T Y C O M M I T T E E
SECTION A. The County Chairman of the last preceding County Committee shall preside over the meeting
called to organize the new County Committee. It shall be his duty to certify in writing to the Executive Secretary
on or before the first Monday after the Primary Election whether or not he will or will not perform the duties of
Temporary Chairman and organize the County Committee. In the event of his failure to do so, or of his inability
to act, it shall be the duty of the First Vice Chairman to act in this capacity. Should he refuse, it shall be the duty
of the next officer in order to act, or so on down the line until one is available.
SECTION B. The person who will organize the County Committee shall, on or before the Friday preceding
the Monday set for the organization of the County Committee, appoint a Contest Committee and officers for all
other duties pertaining to a contest, as provided for,in these rules. On the night of the organization of the County
Committee, he shall appoint, from those persons whose certificates he has received and against whom no contest
has been filed, two acting secretaries, two tellers and two acting doorkeepers. He shall instruct the secretaries to
make two lists of names of the persons who claim they have a right to membership in the County Committee. One
of the lists shall contain the names of all persons whose seats are uncontested; the other shall contain, if any, the
names of persons whose seats are contested.
SECTION C. He shall then declare those persons whose credentials he has received for membership in the
County Committee and against whom no contest has been filed, to be duly elected members of the new County
Committee. He shall then proceed with the further business of organizing the Committee. The Contest Committee
shall make its report in writing as to all contests ref erred to it. The members of the new County Committee, as
constituted, may either accept or reject the report of the said Contest Committee. The acceptance or rejection of
the report of the Contest Committee must be made separately on each and every contest. If the County Committee
accepts the recommendation of the Contest Committee, the person or persons who have been recommended by
the Contest Committee and, having received the requisite majority vote, are accepted by the County Committee,
shall then become duly qualified members of the County Committee. In the case of the refusal of the County
Committee to accept the recommendations of the Contest Committee, in whole or in part, the County Committee
shall have the right to elect to its membership one of the persons from the ward whose seat is being contested even
though not recommended by the Contest Committee. The acceptance of said person by the County Committee
shall make him a member of the County Committee.
SECTION D. The organization of the County Committee cannot proceed until every contest has been decided
by the County Committee after the recommendations of the Contest Committee have been received. Where a ward
has failed to organize and no certificate of election of a County Committeeman from that ward has been certified
to the County Committee, this shall be deemed a vacancy and not a contest. The matter, after the organization of
the County Committee, shall be referred to the County Organization Committee for the purpose of organizing the
Ward Committee and supervising the election of a County Committeeman from that ward.
SECTION E. All contests having been decided, and those entitled to membership in the County Committee
having been seated, the Committee shall then proceed with the election of the officers of the County Committee
and the completion of its organization. The Committee shall proceed to the nomination and election for the office
of County Chairman. Should there be more than one person nominated, the voting shall proceed in accordance
with the rules hereinafter set forth. The tellers shall tabulate and record the votes, as cast by the members. After
the tellers have agreed, the Chairman shall announce the results of the voting and declare the one who received
the highest number of votes to be elected Chairman of the County Committee. The retiring presiding officer, in the
10
ECLF_000001125

event that he is not a member of the County Committee, shall be given the privilege of remaining in the meeting
without any voice in its deliberations, unless he shall have obtained the consent of the meeting. The newly elected
Chairman shall continue with the organization of the County Committee and the election of the County Officers
as hereinafter set forth.
SECTION F. The newly elected Chairman shall proceed to conduct the election of the remaining officers
in the following order: The First Vice Chairman, Second. Vice Chairlady, Third vice Chairman, the Secretary,
Assistant Secretary, the Treasurer and Assistant Treasurer.
SECTION G. All of the above-mentioned officers must be elected from within the membership of the
committee with the exception of the County Chairman, as provided for above, and the Second Vice Chairlady,
who must be elected either from the membership of the County Committee, any Ward Committee or the State
Committee.
SECTION H. The Chairman shall appoint two permanent sergeants-at-arms.
SECTION I. Within thirty (30) days after his election, the County Chairman shall appoint a Committee on
Organization as well as a Committee on Rules and all other committees as hereinafter set forth.
SECTION J. Certificates of membership shall be issued to each County Committeeman duly seated under
these rules.
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RULE VI
CONTESTS
ARTICLE 1
PROCEDURE FOR FILING CONTESTS IN WARD COMMITTEES AND COUNTY
COMMITTEE
SECTION A. All contests shall be heard in the Ward Committees and in the County Committee as hereinafter
set forth and heard by the said committees in accordance with these rules. Failure to comply with the rules shall
operate to the detriment of the person or persons not complying fully with the rules.
SECTION B. All contests pertaining to the election of the County Committeeman and ward officers shall be
filed with the County Committee. In the case of the election of a County Committeeman, the contest shall be heard
by the Contest Committee. In the case of the election of ward officers, the contest shall be heard by the Committee
on Organization. All contests as to membership in the Ward Committee shall be heard by the membership of
the Ward Contest Committee. In this case the action of the Ward Committee on the report of the Ward Contest
Committee shall be binding, except in the case of the election of a County Committeeman or ward officers.
SECTION C. Appointment of Contest Comn^ittees. The Contest Committees of the Ward Committees and
the County Committee shall be appointed by the persons who shall preside over the organization of the Ward
or County Committee, respectively. The said appointments are to be made on or before six o'clock P.M. on the
Friday preceding the Monday of the organization of the Ward or County Committee, as the case may be. The Ward
Contest Committee shall consist of the person who shall preside at the organization of the Ward Committee and
six other persons to be selected by him from the prospective membership of the committee provided no contest
has been filed against them. In the event of the unwillingness or inability of the person who will preside over the
organization of the Ward Committee to serve on the Contest Committee, or if a contest has been filed against him,
he shall then select a substitute member for the committee and appoint one of the seven members so selected as
Chairman of the committee.
SECTION D. The County Contest Committee shall consist of seven persons appointed by the presiding
chairman from the prospective membership of the new County Committee against whom no contests have been
filed, and whose credentials of membership are duly filed in accordance with these rules. He shall appoint one of
the members so selected, as the Chairman of the committee.
SECTION E. All contests regarding membership in the Ward Committee shall be instituted by filing a petition
which shall contain the names, addresses and the division of the petitioner or petitioners, the names, addresses and
the division of the person or persons against whom the contest is filed, the names of all persons who received votes
for membership in the Ward Committee either as a candidate whose name was printed upon the ballot, or who
was voted for by means of a sticker or by having his name written in, showing the number of votes each person
received according to the official returns, and all other averments or facts which the petitioner or petitioners
rely upon and feel able to prove in support of the contest and claim (if claiming) to the right of membership in a
Ward Committee. The petition shall be signed by the petitioners and shall have affixed thereto an affidavit of the
petitioner or petitioners containing an averment that the facts set forth in the petition are true and correct to the
best of their knowledge and belief and that they expect to prove the same at the proper time. The said affidavit
shall be sworn to before a person authorized to administer oaths or affirmations. There shall be endorsed on the
petition a notice to the contested party of the time, date and place where the Contest Committee, shall hear the
petition of contest. This endorsement may be at the end of the petition or on the back of the petition. Failure to
notify the person so contested, shall constitute a dismissal of the contest so filed.
SECTION F. In the case of filing a contest with the County Committee, the following papers are to be filed:
(A) Certificate of his election to the County Committee; (B) a petition in support of his contest. The petition shall
contain (a) name, address, ward and division of the petitioner; (b) whether or not he claims the right by virtue of
his certificate of election or not; (c) the time, date and place where the meeting was-held at which he was elected
as a representative of the County Committee; (d) that such date, time and place of meeting was in accordance
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ECLF_000001127

with the rules of the County Committee, and, if not, why not; (e) if he is claiming that persons were wrongfully
permitted to vote at the meeting or if persons who were entitled to vote were wrongfully denied the right to vote,
he shall set forth the names of such persons and (f) and all other facts which he feels should be considered in the
determination of his claim of representation.
SECTION G. The petition is to be signed by the claimant and sworn to before a person authorized to administer
an oath or affirmation, setting forth that the facts as set forth in the petition are true and correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief. It should be made up with sufficient copies to be signed by, sworn to, and served upon
any other person or persons claiming the same right to represent the ward in the County Committee or the office
contested. There shall be endorsed on the petition a notice to the contested party of the time, date and place where
the Contest Committee shall hear the petition of contest. This endorsement may be at the end of the petition or
on the back of the petition. Failure to notify the person so contested, shall constitute a dismissal of the contest so
filed.
SECTION H. All contest petitions must be filed with the person who will organize the Ward or County
Committee, who's Contest Committee will hear the contest not later than twelve o'clock noon on the Friday
preceding the Monday on which the respective committee is to be organized. Service of the copy of the petition of
contest and notice of the time of the hearing of the contest must be served upon the person referred to and whose
seat in the committee is being contested not later than five o'clock: P.M. on the Friday preceding the organization
of the committee which will act upon the contest.
SECTION I. In the case of the Ward Committee the original must be served either in person upon the person
who will organize the Ward Committee, or by leaving the same at the legal residence of said person with an adult
member of the household. In the case of the County Committee, the original must be served upon the person who
will organize the County Committee or upon the Executive Secretary. If unable to serve these persons, then it
should be served upon the person in charge of the Democratic County Committee headquarters.
SECTION J. Copies of the contest, both as to the Ward and County Committee, may be served personally
upon the persons whose seats are being contested, or by leaving a copy of the contest at their legal residence.
Where the term "legal residence" is used, it means that residence from which the person to be served, is registered
and which appears in the last registration list printed by the Registration Commission, unless it is definitely shown
by the contestant that another residence is known to be the residence of the contested party.
SECTION K. All contest papers shall be turned over to the Chairman of the Contest Committee not later than
six o'clock on the Friday proceeding the Monday on which the Committee, for which the Contest Committee is
acting, is to be organized. It shall also be the duty of the person who is organizing the committee, to instruct the
acting chairman and all the members of the Contest Committee to meet at noon on the following day (Saturday)
at the place where the Committee, for which the Contest Committee is acting, will meet to organize. The said
Contest Committee shall meet at this time and place to hear all contests, at which time they may continue the
hearings of the various contests to various hours in the day or the succeeding days. All contests must be heard and
the findings of the Contest Committee written up and ready for presentation to the Ward or County Committee at
the time of their meeting for organization.
SECTION L. The Contest Committee must make a separate recommendation of the findings of each of
the contests heard by them. The findings of the majority of the members shall be the findings of the committee.
However, the minority may write a separate report of their findings and recommendations. This report, known
as the minority report, is to be presented to the Ward or County Committee after the majority report has been
presented.
SECTION M. All contestants and contested parties shall be ready at the stated time to present their side of
the case and have all witnesses present without any notice other than herein set forth in these rules. The Contest
Committee may, of their own volition, call witnesses who have knowledge of the matter in controversy and whose
testimony they deem it necessary to hear. Each side shall be entitled to be represented by counsel and to call
witnesses in their behalf, or cross examine any witnesses called by the Contest Committee, or the opposing side.
However, the Contest Committee may limit the number of witnesses that may be called by the principals in their
behalf. Such limitation of witnesses shall apply equally to all of the principals.
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ECLF_000001128

SECTION N. Should a contested party desire to make answer in writing to the charges contained in the
Contest petition, he may do so by answering the allegations categorically and numbering the paragraphs in his
answer to correspond with the paragraphs in the contest petition. He may attach to his answer any exhibit that he
relies upon in his defense.
SECTION O. In the hearing of the contest, the contestants will be confined to the proving of the facts
contained in the contest petition. The contested party shall be confined to the denial or explanation of the facts
contained in the contest petition, or to the explanation of those set forth in his answer. No new matter may be
introduced at the hearing that is not contained in either the contest petition or the answer without the consent of
the majority of the Contest Committee.
SECTION P. In the event none of the contesting parties appear at the time set by the Contest Committee
for the hearing, it shall be deemed that the contest petition has been withdrawn. Should the party contested fail
to appear, the Contest Committee may in their discretion, in his or her absence, proceed with the hearing of the
contest, and make findings accordingly. Failure of the contested party to appear will not be considered as an
abandonment of his or her right to be seated in the committee, or to hold the office contested, or as an admission
of the accuracy and truthfulness of the statements contained in the contest petition.
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ECLF_000001129
RULE VII
DUTIES OF COMMITTEES AND OFFICERS
ARTICLE 1
DUTIES OF THE WARD COMMITTEES
SECTION A. It shall be the duty of the Ward Committees to organize their respective wards and to do all
things necessary to carry on all elections within their said wards.
SECTION B. In divisions where no one has been elected to membership in the Ward Committee, it shall
be the duty of the County Committeeman to appoint two persons in the division to represent the said division in
the Ward Committee. This appointment shall be made within two weeks following the organization of the Ward
Committee. The persons, so appointed, shall have the same powers, rights and duties as if they had been duly
elected to membership in the Ward Committee.
SECTION C. When on account of death, removal or disqualification, there is a vacancy in the entire
representation of a division in the Ward Committee, then the County Committeeman shall fill said vacancies.
SECTION D. The Ward Committee shall ratify the recommendation of the remaining Ward Committeeman
in a division where a vacancy occurs in the representation in the Ward Committee of the said division, provided
that said recommendation shall be made in accordance with these rules and the person recommended has the
proper qualifications for membership.
SECTION E. If at any time in the opinion of the majority of the entire Ward Committee, a member is
unfaithful to the Democratic Party and the best interests of the party, or refuses, fails or neglects to work in
harmony with the Ward Committee, the Ward Committee shall be empowered to remove said person from its
membership and declare a vacancy in the membership of the Ward Committee from the said division, except that
under no circumstance, with regard to a member who is elected pursuant to a duly conducted primary election
conduct occurring prior to such election be the basis of a removal.
15
ECLF_000001130
ARTICLE 2
DUTIES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE WARD COMMITTEE
SECTION A. It shall be the duty of the members of the Ward Committee to take entire charge of the
organization of the Party in their election divisions and attend to all matters necessary with reference to the
registration of Democratic electors of their respective election divisions and with reference to securing a full
expression of the will of Democratic electors at all the general, municipal, primary and special elections, as well
as to perform all other duties herein prescribed for them.
SECTION B. It shall be the duty of the members of the Ward Committee to check any list of names furnished
by the County Committeeman regarding proposed strike-offs and make a report to the County Committeeman
concerning said list as soon as possible.
SECTION C. It shall be the duty of the members of the Ward Committee to furnish the names of persons to
the County Committeeman who are willing to serve as watchers in their divisions for any primary, municipal,
special or general election or for any registration day in the ward.
SECTION D.Tt shall be the duty of the members of the Ward Committee to procure petitions for the
nomination of the Election Officers In their division and have intelligent and reputable electors file papers for the
nomination and assist them in having them filled out, and file them with the County Committeeman at the time
and place requested.
SECTION E. It shall be the duty of the members of the Ward Committee to procure the names of persons
willing to act as clerk at elections where the Democratic Inspector is entitled to a clerk and endeavor to obtain the
services of all other persons for offices to which the Democratic Party may be entitled and to fill any position or
office at an election in accordance with the law.
SECTION F. It shall be the duty of the members of the Ward Committee to see that the election officers go
to receive proper instructions at the County Board of Elections and assist them in obtaining and bringing to the
voting place all election paraphernalia.
ARTICLE 3
DUTIES OF THE COUNTY COMMITTEE
SECTION A. The County Committee shall have supervision of the organization and management of the
Democratic Party in all campaigns, and shall exercise all power and perform all duties in relation to the nomination
of candidates and to general, municipal, primary and special elections in the City and County of Philadelphia not
otherwise specially provided for by law or in these rules. It shall have the care and disbursement of all funds raised
for general campaign purposes.
SECTION B. It shall be the duty of the County Committee to insure that the Democratic Party has proper
representation at the Registration Commission on all Traveling Registration Boards and to see that watchers'
certificates are procured for Democratic workers in accordance with the law, to represent the Democratic Party at
the office of the Registration Commission and all places at the time when the Traveling Registration Boards shall
be registering electors in the various wards.
SECTION C. It shall be the duty of the County Committee through its officers to supply to the County
Committeeman for circulation in his ward nominating petitions in sufficient number for the nomination of all
party officers, election officers and for all other candidates who may be endorsed.
SECTION D. It shall be the duty of the County Committee, through its officers, to see that vacancies which
occur in the various districts and wards are filled in accordance with the law and these rules.
SECTION E. It shall be the duty of the County Committee in the case of special elections to see that district
caucuses are held in accordance with the law and these rules to nominate candidates to be voted upon at the
special election to be held in their district.
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SECTION F. It shall be the duty of the County Committee to ratify or reject the recommendation by any
listrict of persons to fill vacancies that have occurred in offices for which nominations have been made and which
ire to be voted upon at a general election, and also to accept or reject the recommendation of the district caucus
or the nomination of any person or persons to be elected at a special election in a district or ward; provided,
towever, in the event the County Committee rejects the recommendation of the district caucus in such cases, the
bounty Committee shall refer the matter to the district caucus for a further consideration and recommendation,
md should the County Committee again reject the recommendation of the district caucus, the County Committee
>hall then make the required nomination in the aforesaid instances; provided further, however, that the filling of
>aid vacancies and nominations is carried out in accordance with the rules as hereinafter set forth.
SECTION G. In the event of the failure or refusal of the Ward Committee, County Committeeman or district
caucus to nominate candidates to fill vacancies or suggest watchers to represent its candidates or the party at
my primary, special, municipal or general election, it shall be the duty of the County Committee to attend to the
execution of these duties and functions.
SECTION H. In the event of the failure of any Ward Committee, County Committeeman or district in which
i special election is to be held to nominate candidates to be voted upon at a special election, it shall be the duty of
he County Committee to carry out this function.
SECTION I. In the event that there is no Ward Committee in any ward to attend to any of the aforesaid duties,
he same shall devolve on the County Committee.
SECTION J. Where the County Committee is called upon to fulfill the duties prescribed for a Ward Committee,
bounty Committeeman, a district or district caucus, or where no Ward Committee exists, the County Committee
n carrying out these duties shall have the same power or powers in reference to any or all of the matters as already
liven to the Ward Committee and all other committees. The acts of the County Committee shall have the same
brce and effect as if done by the person or persons, the committee or committees whose duty it was to perform
,uch acts.
SECTION K. If at any time in the opinion of the majority of the entire County Committee, a Ward Committee
s unfaithful to Democratic principles and the best Interests of the party, or refuses, falls or neglects to work
n harmony with the County Committee then the County Committee shall refer the matter to the Committee
)n Organization for consideration and also may, if necessary, dissolve the Ward Committee and instruct the
Committee on Organization to set up an entirely new Ward Committee in the said ward .
SECTION L. The Committee on Organization of the County Committee during the period of reorganizing
he ward, shall have all the duties, rights and powers of a ward committee and their acts shall have the same force
md effect as if they were the acts of a duly constituted Ward Committee.
17
ECLF_000001132
ARTICLE 4
DUTIES OF COUNTY COMMITTEEMAN
SECTION A. It shall be the duty of the County Committeeman to (A) attend an meetings of the County
Committee, regular and special, as well as all regular and special meetings of the Ward Committee; (B) submit
names of watchers for registration days, primary, special, municipal and general election days; (C) obtain removal
cards showing changes of address within the division and file them with the proper authorities; (D) procure and
file petitions covering strike-offs; (E) where the Registration Commission is contemplating or considering the
striking-off of Democratic electors in the wards and the list of said strike-offs has been furnished the County
Committeeman by the County Committee, it shall be the duty of the County Committeeman to have the residences
of the persons whose names appear on the said list checked and make a report to the County Committee. This
report shall indicate (1) whether or not the party still lives in the division at the address on the list; (2) whether he
has moved; if so, the new address, if known; (3) whether or not the person has died; (4) whether or not the person
is in the armed forces; (5) whether or not the person is employed out of the city on a Federal or State job, and
all other essential information; (F) he .shall submit to the members of the Ward Committee from the list he has
obtained from the County Committee (1) the names of all persons recently registered in their divisions; (2) the
names of all persons stricken off the registration list; (3) the names of all persons changing their party affiliations;
(G) where in any division there is an unreasonable number of changes in party affiliation, it shall be the duty of the
County Committeeman to investigate and find out the cause of such changes, and in the case where it is a change
from Democrat to any other party it shall be the duty of the County Committeeman to take steps to prevent, if
possible, any further defections from the Democratic party; (H) he shall stimulate and exhort his committeeman
to be active in the registration of qualified voters throughout the year.
SECTION B. It shall be the duty of the County Committeeman to preside over the organization of the new
Ward Committee and he shall recommend to the Ward Chairman the names of persons to be members of the
various committees to be appointed by the Chairman. In the absence of .the Ward Chairman he shall preside over
all the meetings.
SECTION C. It shall be the duty of the County Committeeman to represent the ward at the County Committee
meetings and to be the exclusive and sole distributor of patronage in his ward.
SECTION D. It shall be the duty of the County Committeeman to appoint a detail man from time to time to
represent him in all matters with the County Committee except in attending meetings of the County Committee.
SECTION E. The said appointment of a detail man shall be in writing and may be revoked at will by the
County Committeeman in writing. The said appointment and revocation shall be addressed to the Chairman of
the County Committee.
ARTICLE 5
DUTIES OF WARD CHAIRMAN
SECTION A. It shall be the duty of the Ward Chairman, with the approval of County Committeeman, to
appoint committees that may be necessary from time to time for the proper conduct of the Ward Committee and
for the interest and advancement of the Democratic Party and its candidates. The membership of said committees
shall be as recommended by the County Committeeman.
SECTION B. It shall be the duty of the Ward Chairman to assist the County Committeeman in attending to
the details of the Ward Committee and to advance the interest of the Democratic Party and its candidates at all
times.
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ECLF_000001133
ARTICLE 6
DUITES OF OTHER OFFICERS OF WARD COMMITTEE
The duties of the other officers of the Ward Committee shall be similar to those of the corresponding officers
of the County Committee, with the exception of the Second Vice Chairman, unless the Second Vice Chairman
shall be a lady. In such an event the duties of the Second Vice Chairlady shall be similar to those of the Second
Vice Chairlady of the County Committee.
ARTICLE 7
D U T I E S OF C O U N T Y C H A I R M A N
SECTION A. It shall be the duty of the County Chairman to preside over all regular and special meetings of
the County Committee as far as possible.
SECTION B. It shall be the duty of the County Chairman to cause to be set up a headquarters and meeting
place of the Democratic County Committee.
SECTION C. It shall be the duty of the County Chairman within thirty days after his election to appoint two
Sergeants-at-Arms and to appoint a Committee on Organization from the membership of the County Committee
and all other committees that in his judgment he considers are necessary and essential to the best interests of the
Democratic Party. The membership of these committees' as to number shall be discretionary with the Chairman,
but they must be selected from the membership of the County Committee with the exception of Campaign
Committees and subcommittees relating to a campaign.
SECTION D. It shall be the duty of the County Chairman to countersign all checks for the disbursement of
any funds of the County Committee. He shall cause to be opened a checking account for the depositing of funds.
SECTION E. It shall be the duty of the County Chairman to comply with the Election Code of 1937 and
supplements and amendments thereto in regard to giving any required notice to the County Board of Elections,
especially in that a written notice, on or before the ninth Tuesday preceding the Spring Primary, shall be sent to the
County Commissioners, setting forth the names of all party offices within the County of Philadelphia to be filled
by election at the said Spring Primary. The County Chairman shall in due time notify the County Commissioners
of the number of sample ballots required for the primary and general elections.
SECTION F. The County Chairman shall have the right at any time when any differences may arise between
himself and any County Committeeman regarding the conduct and management of a ward as applicable to the
interest of the Democratic Party, to refer the same for action by the Committee on Organization. The Committee
on Organization is to act upon the matter in accordance with these rules and report its findings.
SECTION G. It shall be the duty of the County Chairman to make any recommendations to the County
Committee which, in his judgment, are for the best interests of the Democratic Party and its candidates.
SECTION H. It shall be the duty of the County Chairman to receive the recommendations of the various
County Committeemen for the appointment to office and positions of persons from their ward and act upon the
same in accordance with these rules.
SECTION I. In the event that any question arises between himself and a County Committeeman, the County
Chairman shall have the right of referring the matter to the County Committee for their consideration and final
determination.
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ARTICLE 8
DUTIES OF FIRST VICE CHAIRMAN
SECTION A. It shall be the duty of the First Vice Chairman to preside over all meetings in- the absence of
the County Chairman.
SECTION B. It shall be the duty of the First Vice Chairman to assume all duties and responsibilities and
rights of the County Chairman during the absence or inability to serve of the County Chairman. He shall also
assume the duties and rights of the County Chairman, should the said County Chairman through some unforeseen
circumstances be temporarily unable to fulfill -his office as County Chairman.
SECTION C. In the event of the death, resignation or removal of the County Chairman, the First Vice
Chairman shall act as Acting Chairman until a new County Chairman has been elected by the County Committee.
ARTICLE 9
D U T I E S OF S E C O N D V I C E C H A I R L A D Y
SECTION A. It shall be the duty of the Second Vice Chairlady to preside over all meetings at which neither
the Chairman nor the First Vice Chairman is able to preside.
SECTION B. The Second Vice Chairlady shall be Honorary Chairman of all women's county committees
and have supervision over the same and make a report of the activity of the women's committees to the County
Officers and the County Committee from time to time.
A R T I C L E 10
D U T I E S OF T H I R D V I C E C H A I R M A N
SECTION A. It shall be the duty of the Third Vice Chairman to preside over all meetings in the event that the
Chairman, First Vice Chairman or Second Vice Chairlady are unable to preside.
SECTION B. It shall be the duty of the Third Vice Chairman to have charge of organizing voters who have
recently reached their majority and of all activities connected with young Democratic organizations.
A R T I C L E 11
D U T I E S OF SECRETARY
It shall be the duty of the Secretary to keep full and correct minutes of all meetings of the County Committee
and also to keep in permanent form a correct roll of the attendance at all meetings.
A R T I C L E 12
D U T I E S OF ASSISTANT S E C R E T A R Y
It shall be the duty of the Assistant Secretary to aid the Secretary in the discharge of the Secretary's duties and
in the event of the Secretary's absence, inability, or refusal to perform the duties, the Assistant Secretary shall act
as Secretary.
20
ECLF_000001135
ARTICLE 13
DUTIES OF TREASURER AND ASSISTANT TREASURER
SECTION A. It shall be the duty of the Treasurer or Assistant Treasurer to receive, keep and disburse all
sums of money which may be collected or received by the County Committee or by any of its members for
election expenses, in furtherance of the nomination or any person or persons as candidates for public office, or in
furtherance of the election of any person or persons to public office, or to defeat the nomination to public office
of any person or persons, and to keep a just and true account thereof.
SECTION B. All money collected or received by the County Committee or by any of its members for election
expenses, shall be paid over to and made to pass through the hands of, the Treasurer.
SECTION C. Neither the County Committee nor any of its sub-committees, nor members, shall disburse any
money for said election expenses unless such money shall have passed through the hands of the Treasurer and
vouchers have been furnished therefor.
SECTION D. No Treasurer of the County Committee, nor person acting as such Treasurer, shall disburse any
money received from any anonymous source.
SECTION E. The Treasurer shall, within thirty days after each primary and each general election, file an
account of expenses incurred in regard to candidates for offices, voted for by the electors of the State at large, with
the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and for all other offices, with the County Board of Elections, as provided by
law.
SECTION F. The Treasurer shall comply in all respects with the duties and requirements of the County
Treasurer of the political organization as set forth by the Election Code of 1937 and supplements and amendments
thereto.
SECTION G. The Treasurer shall open and maintain a checking account in the name of the organization with
his name as Treasurer in a good, reputable bank.
SECTION H. All withdrawals shall be made by check and signed by the Treasurer. In his absence or inability
to serve, the checks shall be signed by the Assistant Treasurer.
ARTICLE 14
DUTIES OF THE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS
It shall be the duty of the Sergeant-at-Arms to attend all regular and special meetings. He shall maintain order
at the meetings and permit no one to enter the meeting who is not qualified and eligible to be present.
ARTICLE 15
INABILITY OR REFUSAL OF OFFICERS TO PERFORM THEIR DUTY
In the event of the inability or the refusal of any officer of any committee to perform his duties as prescribed
under these rules and upon the further inability or refusal of the officer next to him in line, to act, then the
succeeding officer in line who is able and willing to act, shall perform the said duties or functions. The line of
succession shall be, in the case of Ward Committees, in accordance with the order as set forth for the election of
Ward officers in Article I, Section 6 of Rule e. and in the case of the County Committee it shall be as set forth for
the order of election of County Officers as set forth in Article II, Section 13 or Article e.
21
ECLF_000001136
RULE VIII
RECALL OF WARD OR COUNTY OFFICERS
ARTICLE 1
RECALL OF WARD OFFICER
SECTION A. No recall may be made of any Ward officer or County Officer within sixty days prior to any
primacy, municipal or general election unless as hereinafter provided for.
SECTION B. In the case of the proposed recall of a County Committeeman, the procedure and requirements
as to the petition, number of signers, and the required number of affirmative votes shall be the same as that in the
case of the recall of the County Chairman.
SECTION C. In the case of the proposed recall of the other Ward Officers, the procedure and requirements
as to the petition, number of signers, and the required number of affirmative votes, shall be the same as that in the
case of the recall of the County officers except that of the County Chairman.
SECTION D. The notice to any Ward officer proposed to be recalled shall be the same as that in the case of
the recall of any County Officer.
SECTION E. The procedure and time of serving notice and the holding of the meeting for the proposed recall
of any Ward officer shall be the same as that in the case of the proposed recall of any County officer.
ARTICLE 2
RECALL OF COUNTY OFFICER
SECTION A. The proposed recall of the County Chairman must be initiated by the filing of a petition.
SECTION B. This petition shall contain the name of the County Chairman, whose recall is sought, and the
specific charges and reasons for the recall. This petition must be signed by at least two-thirds of the enrolled
membership of the County Committee. It must have affixed thereto an affidavit or affirmation of three of the
subscribing petitioners before a person authorized to administer an oath or affirmation, containing averments that
the persons whose names appear affixed to the petition personally signed the petition and that an of the signers
had full knowledge of the contents of the petition and that the facts contained in the petition are true to the best
knowledge and, belief of the affiants.
SECTION C. In the case of other officers of the County Committee whose recall maybe sought, the petition
shall be drawn up in the same manner and meet the same requirements as set forth for the petition for the recall of
the County Chairman, with the exception of the number of signers. The requirement as to the number of signers
shall be fifty-one (51%) per cent instead of two-thirds (2/3) of the enrolled members of the County Committee
required in the recall of the County Chairman.
ARTICLE 3
FILING OF PETITION FOR RECALL
In the case of the proposed recall of a County Chairman, the petition shall be filed with the First Vice Chairman.
In the case of the proposed recall of other officers, the petition shall be filed with the County Chairman. A true
and correct copy of the petition shall be served upon the person whose recall is being sought within forty-eight
(48) hours after the filing of the petition.
22
ECLF_000001137
ARTICLE 4
NOTICE OF RECALL
All of the enrolled members of the County Committee shall be given at least seventy-two (72) hours- notice
of the special meeting to be held, to consider the petition for recall. The said notice shall set forth the purpose of
the meeting, the time, date and place of holding the meeting. The place shall be the regular meeting place of the
County Committee.
ARTICLE 5
CALLING OF THE MEETNG TO CONSIDER THE RECALL
The County Chairman or the First Vice Chairman with whom the petition for recall may have been filed in
accordance with these rules, shall call a special meeting of the County Committee in not less than seven (7) days
and not more than fourteen (14) days after the receipt of the petition for the purpose of acting on the petition for
recall.
23
ECLF_000001138
ARTICLE 6
PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED AT THE MEETING ON THE RECALL
SECTION A. The County Chairman or the First Vice Chairman, as the case may be, with whom the petition
has been filed, shall preside over the meeting.
SECTION B. It shall be the duty of the County Chairman or the First Vice Chairman, as the case may be,
to have the Secretary call the roll of the membership of the committee, record those present, read the call of the
special meeting and after its adoption, to proceed on the question of the recall.
SECTION C. One of the signers of the petition shall present the reasons why the person named in the petition
should be recalled and his office declared vacant.
SECTION D. The person whose recall is being sought shall then be heard in his own defense if he desires to
be heard.
SECTION E. After the said person has concluded, the question will be open to other members of the committee
to speak for or against the recall.
SECTION F. When all parties have been heard, then the person whose recall is being sought, shall be given
the right to reply.
SECTION G. The said person whose recall is being sought shall be the only one permitted to speak more than
once on the subject without first obtaining the consent of the committee.
SECTION H. After hearing the pros and cons on the subject and debate having been closed, in the case
of a proposed recall of a County Committeeman, if there are not then present two-thirds (2/3) of the enrolled
membership of the County Committee, the presiding officer shall not proceed in order with the recall, but shall
declare the recall to be lost, due to the failure of two-thirds (2/3) membership of the Committee to be present.
SECTION I. In the case of other County Officers, this procedure shall be followed, with the exception thai
there must be at least fifty-one (51%) percent of the membership present instead of two-thirds (2/3).
SECTION J. The presiding officer shall inquire from the person sought to be recalled whether he desires tc
appoint a teller to assist in the tabulation of the vote. He shall also inquire of the spokesman for the petitioners
for recall the name of a teller to assist in the tabulation of the vote. This being done, he shall appoint the persons
named by both parties as tellers to co-operate with the Recording Secretary in the tabulation of the vote.
SECTION K. At the conclusion of the discussion, the presiding officer shall put to the meeting the following
question: "Shall (name of the person being sought to be recalled) be recalled and his office (the office he holds'
be declared vacant" and advise the member that a vote in the affirmative is a vote for the recall and declaring the
office vacant, and that a vote in the negative is a vote against the recall and against the declaring the office vacant
SECTION L. The presiding officer shall then proceed with the voting by having the Secretary call the roll anc
recording the vote in accordance with the rules set forth for voting.
24
ECLF_000001139
ARTICLE 7
RECALL WITHIN SIXTY DAYS OF ANY PRIMARY. MUNICIPAL. SPECIAL OR
GENERAL ELECTION
SECTION A. Where the recall is desired to be had within sixty (60) days prior to any primary, municipal,
special or general election, before the filing of any such petition for the recall of any officer, whether of Ward or
County, the petitioners must have the consent of the County Committee for the filing of any petition for recall.
SECTION B. A petition for such consent must be filed with the County Committee, setting forth the reason
why it is necessary and urgent that the recall should be made at that time.
SECTION C. The petition shall be immediately referred to the Committee on Organization, which shall meet
within four (4) days after the filing of the petition for the purpose of considering the petition.
SECTION D. If the Committee on Organization by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the entire membership decide
that consent should be given for the filing of the petition, then the petitioners shall be notified and permitted to
file their petition for the recall.
25
ECLF_000001140
RULE IX
COMMITTEES FOR WARD COMMITTEES AND COUNTY COMMITTEE
ARTICLE 1
RULE APPLICABLE TO WARD AND COUNTY COMMITTEES
This rule, and the articles and sections thereof shall be applicable to Ward Committees and the Count;
Committee except in those cases otherwise provided for in these rules.
ARTICLE 2
COMMITTEE ON CONSENT
SECTION A. The appointment of the Committee on Contest, if a Ward Committee, shall be in accordant
with Rule VI, Article 1, Section c, of these rules.
SECTION B. The appointment of the Committee on Contest if a County Committee, shall be in accordanc<
with Rule VI, Article 1, Sections c and d.
ARTICLE 3
COMMITTEE ON ORGANIZATION IN WARDS
SECTION A. The Committee on Organization shall be appointed by the County Committeeman within thirt]
days after the organizing of the Committee. It shall consist of seven (7) members appointed from membership o
the Ward Committee with the County Committeeman acting as chairman.
SECTION B. The Committee on Organization shall co-operate with the County Committeeman and the
Ward officers in building up a militant Democratic organization in the Ward by assisting in getting watchers ir
all instances where the Democratic Party is permitted to have watchers; by assisting In circulating, collecting anc
examining nominating petitions of election officers, party officers, etc., by seeing that they are in proper fonr
beforefiling,by assisting in encouraging members of the Ward Committee to canvass their division: by collecting
andfilingremoval cards; by having those registered who recently moved into the division, by helping to registei
first votes and by other activities that will advance the interest of the Democratic Party and its candidates.
26
ECLF_000001141
ARTICLE 4
COMMITTEE ON ORGANIZATION IN COUNTY
SECTION A. The County Chairman shall within thirty (30) days after the organization of the County
Committee appoint a Committee on Organization, the number of its members'to be at discretion of the Chairman
of the County Committee. He shall appoint one of its members as Chairman of said Committee on Organization.
SECTION B. The Committee on Organization shall have referred to it the following matters: (a) The
organization of any Ward or the election of any County Committeeman from that Ward where the said Ward
has failed to organize on or before the Wednesday preceding the Monday on which the County Committee is
to be organized, for the purpose of supervising the organization of the Ward Committee and the election of the
County Committeeman and its officers; (b) All appeals from the actions of the County Committeeman or any of
the officers of the Ward Committee, where such appeals are allowed: (c) It shall have the right and authority at
the direction of the County. Committee to go into any Ward in order to advance the interest of the Democratic
Party or its candidates and to make any investigation concerning the manner in which the County Committeeman
and County officers are conducting their meetings; (d) Upon the instructions of the County Committee it may
go in and set up a new Democratic organization in the Ward: (e) It shall pass upon all requests for permission to
file petitions for the recall of officers requested within sixty (60) days prior to any primary, special, municipal
or general election; (f) It shall cooperate with the County Chairman and the county Officers in building up
and maintaining a live, militant, Democratic organization throughout the entire city and county. However, all
actions of the Organization Committee shall not become operative until ratified by the County Committee with
the exception of the action of passing upon the recall of a County Committeeman or Ward Officers within the
sixty-day period prior to any election.
ARTICLE 5
LEGAL COMMITTEE
SECTION A. The Legal Committee in Wards shall be appointed on the recommendation of the County
Committeeman. The rules governing the number and duties of the Legal Committee shall be the same for the
Ward as set forth for the Legal Committee of the County Committee.
SECTION B. In the County Committee, the Legal Committee shall be appointed by the County Chairman.
The number of members constituting the Legal Committee shall be at the discretion of the County Chairman.
SECTION C. The Chairman of the Legal Committee under the supervision of the County Chairman, shall
maintain an active, militant legal force to handle all matters of a legal nature that may be referred to the County
Chairman or the County Committee from time to time. He shall represent the County Chairman and the County
Committee in all actions, suits or litigations brought by or filed against the County Chairman or against any of
the County Committee officers in this capacity or against the Democratic County Committee- He shall attend
all hearings before the Registration Commission. He shall also have a sufficient force to be present at the official
tabulation of votes of all primary, special, municipal and general elections and thereby protect the interest of the
Democratic Party and its candidates. He shall do everything to advance the interest of the Democratic Party or its
candidates that in any way requires the service of an attorney. Provided, however, the County Chairman may, at
any time, as well as the County Committee, in his or its discretion, appoint special counsel to represent the County
Officers or County Committee or any of its members.
SECTION D. The section as to the duties of the Legal Committee is in no way to be construed as a limitation
of the right of any County Officer or County Committeeman to employ at his own expense special counsel to
represent him in any proceedings.
SECTION E. The County Chairman shall set up a department in the County headquarters, if possible,
consisting of one or more rooms, which shall be the headquarters of the Legal Committee and from which the
said committee shall function.
27
ECLF_000001142
ARTICLE 6
CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
The Campaign Committee shall consist of all the members of the County Committee, the candidates endorse*
by the County Committee at a primary election, and all candidates of the Democratic Party at a municipal, specia
or general election. The County Chairman shall have the right to add to the membership of this Committee fron
time to time as he may deem advisable. The County officers shall be the officers of the Campaign Committei
and the County Chairman shall have the right to select a Manager, Executive Secretary, Financial Secretary an<
Treasurer for the Campaign Committee.
ARTICLE 7
OTHER COMMITTEES
SECTION A. The functions and powers of all other committees shall be in accordance with the will of th<
County Chairman or the County Committee and where these powers or functions have not been definitely se
forth, not fully set forth, or not been set forth at all, then the rules of Roberts' Parliamentary Procedure shal
govern.
SECTION B. The organizing of committees under Rule IX and the election of its officers shall be done ir
the following manner: The Chairman of any committee shall, within one week after the date of his appointmen
as chairman of the committee, call a meeting of the members of his committee for the purpose of organizing
The time, place and date of holding this meeting shall be fixed by the chairman and set forth in the notice of tfu
meeting.
SECTION C. At this meeting of organization, the members shall elect a Vice Chairman, Secretary and sucl
other officers as the committee may deem necessary for its proper functioning.
28
ECLF_000001143
RULEX
VACANCIES
ARTICLE 1
METHOD OF FILLING VACANCIES
Vacancies existing or happening on the Democratic ticket after the date of a primary, and nominations for
candidates to be voted for at special elections to fill vacancies when, under the Election Code of 1937 and
supplements and amendments thereto, a primary nomination is impossible (i.e., when special elections are not
held at the time of the regular elections and when such vacancy occurs or exists within sixty (60) days of the
regular primary antecedent to such regular election) shall be filled as follows: In the case of county and city
officers, by the County Executive Committee; in the case of members of Congress, delegates to the National
Convention, State Senators, State Representatives, and Councilmen, upon the recommendation of the District
caucus in which the vacancy exists or happens. In the case where the district is composed of one ward, the vacancy
shall be filled on the recommendation of the Ward Leader at a special meeting held for that purpose. Where more
than one ward comprises the legislative district, the vacancy shall be filled at a joint meeting of all ward leaders
in the said legislative district each ward leader shal vote their respective divisions for only one candidate. In the
case of members of the State Committee, the vacancy shall be filled by a caucus of the Senatorial district in which
the vacancy exists. :
ARTICLE 2
MEMBERSHIP OF CAUCUS
The membership of district caucuses such as Congressional, Senatorial, State Representatives, and
Councilmanic caucuses shall consist of the County Committeeman in each of the wards in the district holding the
caucus.
ARTICLE 3
PROCEDURE FOR CALLING CAUCUS
SECTION A. In all instances the district caucus shall be called by the County Committeeman whose ward
at the preceding general election polled the highest number of Democratic votes for the leading Democratic
candidate, unless otherwise provided for by the members of the district.. He shall call the meeting at a specified
time, place and date and preside over the said meeting to organize, at which meeting shall be elected a chairman
(unless the district has previously designated a person to preside over all of their district meetings) and a secretary.
SECTION B. In Legislative Districts which consist of one ward, the County Committeeman shall call a
special meeting, giving written notice setting forth the purpose for calling the meeting, and the time, place and
date for holding the meeting. The officers of the Ward Committee shall preside over this special meeting.
SECTION C. In the case of two or more wards comprising a Legislative District, the County Committeeman
of the ward that polled the largest Democratic vote at the preceding general election shall procure a list of all the
ward leaders in the Legislative District, together with their addresses. He shall have notices sent to all of the Ward
Leaders at the addresses set forth on the lists that he has obtained, calling a joint meeting at a time, place and date
set forth in the notice, and the notion shall also set forth the purpose of calling the joint meeting. The organization
of this joint meeting shall be presided over by the County Committeeman sending out the notice of the meeting.
SECTION D. At the organization meeting, the temporary presiding officer shall appoint two temporary
secretaries, two temporary tellers, shall cause a roll call to be made by the secretary, who shall record those present
from the various wards and call for the nomination of a permanent chairman. The nominations having been made,
he shall proceed to conduct the election of a permanent chairman to preside over the joint meeting. The voting
shall be in accordance with these rules. After the election of the permanent chairman, the meeting shall proceed to
elect a vice chairman, secretary, and such other officers as may be deemed necessary to transact business.
29
ECLF_000001144
ARTICLE 4
PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED AT THE MEETING
SECTION A. The district or legislative caucus having been organized, the meeting shall proceed to select th<
person or persons to be the candidates of the Democratic Party in the district at a special election. The Secretar
shall keep a record of (1) the names of all persons nominated; (2) the number of votes received by each persoi
nominated and (3) the number of persons voting. The person or persons having been selected by the caucus a;
the candidate or candidates nominated, are to be placed on the Democratic ballot to be elected at the genera
municipal or special election, and a certificate shall be issued and delivered to the Chairman of the meeting to bt
filed with the County Chairman, showing the name of the person or persons selected at the meeting.
SECTION B. The certificate of nomination shall set forth (1) that it is a nominating certificate to have the
name (insert the name of the person or persons) placed on the Democratic ballot at the general, municipal oi
special election, as the case may be to be held (insert the date of the election) as a candidate of the Democratic
Party for election to the office of (insert the name of the office or offices); (2) the address, ward, division, and
occupation of the candidate o:r candidates; (3) the names of the persons who were entitled to be present and who
voted at the district caucus-; (4) that the district caucus was called in accordance with the rules of the Democratic
party: (5) that proper notice was given, attaching a copy of the notice of the special meeting; (6) that the meeting
was held as stated in the notice, and if not, why not; (7) the name of the person who acted as temporary chairman
of the meeting; (8) the names of the permanent officers elected together with the names of all persons who
attended and who voted at the meeting; (9) the names of each of the persons nominated, their address and the
votes each received.
SECTION C. This certificate of nomination having been filed with the County Chairman, he shall call a
special meeting of the County Committee for the purpose of accepting or rejecting the action of the district caucus
and the County Committee shall affix to the nomination papers of the district a certificate which shall set forth: (1)
The date of the special meeting of the County Committee; (2) the name of the presiding officer, (3) that a quorum
was present at this meeting: (4) that the County Committee did accept the action of the district caucus and (5) that
the nomination made by the district caucus and the acceptance of the County Committee is in accordance with the
rules of the Democratic County Committee set forth in Rule VII, Article 3, Section f. applicable to the nomination
in question.
Provided, however, that should the County Committee reject the district caucus nomination, the matter in
issue shall be referred to the district caucus for a further consideration and recommendation, and should the
County Committee again reject the recommendation of the district caucus, the County Committee shall then make
the required nomination; and the aforesaid certificate shall so state.
SECTION D. The County Committeeman shall provide that the certificate of nomination of the district
caucus, together with the endorsement of the certificate accepted by the County Committee, is filed with the
proper bureau in accordance with the Election Code of 1937 and supplements and amendments thereto.
SECTION E. This certificate shall be signed by the permanent officers of the County Committee who were
present at this meeting and shall be sworn to by one of the signers as true and correct.
ARTICLE 5
VACANCIES IN COMMITTEE OFFICES
SECTION A. Any vacancy that may occur in the offices of any Ward or County Committee or in the office of
County Committeeman, by reason of death, disqualification, inability to serve, resignation or recall of any of said
officers, shall be filled only after due notice has been given in writing to all members of said committee stating
the existence of said vacancy and the intention to fill the same for the unexpired term at a meeting to be specified
in said notice.
30
ECLF_000001145
ARTICLE 6
MEETINGS FOR FILLING VACANCIES
SECTION A. All vacancies shall be filled by the committees, within thirty (30) days after the vacancy occurs,
at a special meeting to be called by the presiding officer of said committee.
SECTION B. In the event of a vacancy occurring in any office, the next officer in line shall act until the
vacancy is filled.
31
ECLF_000001146
RULE XI
VOTING
ARTICLE 1
Voting on all questions and motions shall be by roll call "ayes" and "nays" unless the secret ballot is decidec
upon by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the members present at the meeting.
32
ECLF_000001147
RULE XII
PROXIES
ARTICLE 1
Proxies will not be permitted unless expressly provided for in these rules and in the Democratic State
Committee rules.
33
ECLF_000001148
RULE XIII
REVISION OF THESE RULES
Should the County Committee at the time of its organization or at any subsequent regular meeting decide that
the rules of the party should be revised or amended, the County Committee shall direct the County Chairman
to appoint a committee on the revision of rules for the purpose of revising or amending the rules and direct the
committee to make a report in writing to the County Committee at a later meeting. The date shall be fixed by
the Chairman of the meeting and notices shall be sent to all members of the County Committee advising them
of the date of the meeting called to receive and act upon the report of the committee on the revision of the rules
and stating that at this time the committee will make its report to the County Committee and that the County
Committee will act on the report.
34
ECLF_000001149
RULE XIV
SUSPENSION AND AMENDMENTS OF THESE RULES
ARTICLE 1
These rules may at any time be suspended at any meeting of the County Committee by a two-thirds vote of
the members of the County Committee.
ARTICLE 2
Amendments to these rules may be made by submitting the proposed amendment to the County Chairman
in writing and a copy of the same being sent to all the members of the County Committee with a notice that the
County Committee at a meeting (time and place set forth in the notice) shall vote upon the amendment. In order
for the amendment to become a part of these rules, it must be ratified by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the members of
the County Committee.
35
ECLF_000001150
AMENDMENTS
Rule X, Article 1
Article 2, Sections A and C
Amended September 24, 1962
Rule III, Article 1, Section C
Article 2, Section D
Amended June 24, 1990
Rule VII, Article 1, Section E
Amended November 1, 2013
36
ECLF_000001151
NOTES
37
ECLF_000001152
NOTES
38
ECLF_000001153
RESOLVED
On May 16, 2014, it was unanimously resolved after a unanimous vote to suspend the rules, and
after it was proposed and seconded, that Rule III, Article 2, Section 3, of the Rules of The
Democratic Party of the City and County of Philadelphia are amended to read as follows:
Section C. Each Ward Committee shall at the time of its re-organization elect, not necessarily
from its own membership, one representative to the County Committee. Such person, however,
must be an elector of the ward he is to represent This section does not apply to incumbent
members of the County Committee and is prospective only.
Changes italicized in bold.
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37
ECLF_000001154
At the discretion of the County Chairman,

any and all County Executive Meetings may
be conducted using electronic or telephonic
transmissions.
(;l(/A*;Mu\tr
^UAJiF
ECLF_000001155
'^
^D/^

Farnese Motion To Dismiss

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Case 2:16-cr-00199-CMR Document 34 Filed 10/21/16 Page 1 of 87

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Criminal Action No. 16-199-2

Case 2:16-cr-00199-CMR Document 34 Filed 10/21/16 Page 2 of 87

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DEFENDANT LAWRENCE FARNESES MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

/s/ Mark B. Sheppard_______

Case 2:16-cr-00199-CMR Document 34 Filed 10/21/16 Page 3 of 87

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Criminal Action No. 16-199-2

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LAWRENCE FARNESES

/s/ Mark B. Sheppard_______

Case 2:16-cr-00199-CMR Document 34 Filed 10/21/16 Page 4 of 87

COUNTS TWO THROUGH SEVEN (AND THE RELATED

The Indictment Fails to Charge a Cognizable Theory of

The Expenditure was Proper Under Pennsylvania Campaign

The Indictment Fails to Charge a Cognizable Theory of Honest

The Indictment lacks any proper allegation of bribery (or

The Indictments honest services bribery theory raises the

First Amendment ............................................................. 14

COUNTS EIGHT THROUGH THIRTEEN (AND THE RELATED

The Philadelphia Democratic Party Organization ....................... 24

Long Standing Rules of Statutory Construction Require the

The proper interpretation of Party Official is also supported by

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To interpret the statutes definition of Party Official to

The Governments Application of the Bribery Statute To Internal

18 Pa.C.S. 4701 Violates Farneses Due Process Rights Because the

The Federal Government Attempt to Apply the Pennsylvania Bribery

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Criminal Action No. 16-199-2

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT LAWRENCE FARNESES

COUNTS TWO THROUGH SEVEN (AND THE RELATED OBJECTIVE

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The Indictment Fails to Charge a Cognizable Theory of

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The Expenditure was Proper Under Pennsylvania Campaign Finance

That section provided:

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In 1978, as part of the comprehensive revision of the Election Code, Pennsylvanias

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The Indictment Fails to Charge a Cognizable Theory

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The Indictment lacks any proper allegation of bribery (or

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be imported, as the Court did in the public-official context of McDonnell.

The Indictments honest services bribery theory raises

The decisions in Murphy, Skilling and McDonnell were informed by constitutional

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As reinforced by the Supreme Courts decision in McDonnell, 136 S.Ct. at 2373, a

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