Troubling Proxy Relationships: When Rebels Turn Against

Their State Sponsors

Milo Popovi,
PhD student
International Relations and European Studies Department,
Central European University, Budapest;
E-mail: Popovic_Milos@ceu-budapest.edu;
Phone: +3630-286-6184

Draft only. Please do not cite without the authors permission.

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Slave, I before reasoned with you, but you have proved yourself unworthy of my
condescension. Remember that I have power; you believe yourself miserable, but I can
make you so wretched that the light of day will be hateful to you. You are my creator, but
I am your master; obey! (Mary Shelling, Frankenstein, Ch. 20)

After the 1967 war, King Hussein allowed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its
factions to establish bases on Jordanian territory hoping that an asymmetrical warfare against
Israel will compensate for the weakness of Jordans conventional forces. Yet the kings alliance
with the rebels proved to be short-lived and deadly instead of fighting against Israeli troops the
PLO and especially its leftist factions gradually turned against their sponsor. Following a series
of sporadic clashes between the Jordanian army and the guerilla in the mid-1970, the gap
between the master and its protg dangerously widened. On 1 September 1970, after king
Husseins convoy came under fire the authorities depicted the event as a deliberate assassination
attempt and accused Palestinian rebels of conspiracy to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy. The
violence intensified as the security forces raided Palestinian refugee camps in Amman in search
for the alleged conspirators. More than a week later, in a deliberate act of defiance against its
sponsor a PLO faction hijacked three international planes, landed them in Jordan and blew them
into pieces after releasing the passengers (Sayigh 1997, 258). When the rebels openly shunned
Kings sovereignty by proclaiming the Irbid area in northern Jordan a liberated zone it was the
last drop in the kings glass. The sponsorship infamously ended on 16 September when King
Hussein imposed a martial law and when the Jordanian army drove the entire PLO
headquarters out of the country. A short civil war between Jordan and the PLO became known as
Black September.
2

Evidently, the Hashemite Kingdom had nurtured the entity beyond its control which
ultimately turned against its master. But the puzzle is what conditions contributed to such a
disastrous result. The armed conflict with Jordan was the most costly policy and the PLO had
other strategies at its disposal such as to rely on Egypt or Syria for strategic support or to simply
move to Lebanon (which the group was eventually forced to do). Given the simultaneous
fighting against Israel, the costs of acquiring another enemy by angering Jordan were
tremendously high and promised no obvious gains for the PLO. Since the PLO was at a time of
grave threat, why did it turn against its ally? Common knowledge holds that when allies have a
common enemy, the alliance security dilemma is softened by the unlikelihood of abandonment
(Snyder 1997, 317). Some statistical analyses suggest that particularly asymmetrical
alliances are likely to be durable decreasing the likelihood of reneging (Morrow 1991; Leeds and
Savun 2007).1 What factors then encouraged the PLO to renege on their commitments by
pursuing such a defiant and self-defeating behavior? At the same time, it is unclear why Jordan
lost control over the PLOs agenda given that its government was able to implement screening,
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. In theory, Jordan could have used control mechanisms
as border patrols or could have assigned the control of rebels to a third party; likewise Jordan
could have threatened with punishment or abandonment (see Byman and Kreps 2010; Salehyan
2010). Why did then Jordan lose the agenda control over the PLO, and what were the conditions
that contributed to the failure of this sponsorship?
These questions refer to a more general problem underpinning illicit ties between states
and militant groups. The main aim of this project is to explain when rebel groups damage or
break these ties, i.e. under what conditions rebels defect their sponsors. Defection is understood
as actions that rebel combatants pursue to maximize their benefits at the expense of sponsors
1

This finding is not supported in Bennett (1997).

3

broader goals. Given that rebel actions can be self-destructive, why then some rebel groups ever
turn against their sponsors? When do other groups pursue policies short of armed confrontation
that defy the orders of their sponsors? And when do these groups desert their sponsors? Why
some groups only defy orders, while other desert or even turn against their benefactors? Is
defection avoidable and when?
If so, why have other rebel groups, assuming the same opportunities, refrained from such
a behavior? Under what conditions do some rebel groups remain obedient to their external
masters? The Black September in Jordan is perhaps the most extreme example of how rebels
can go rogue. A brief look at the Table 1 below indicates that other forms of defection also
inhibit illicit sponsorships. Some militant groups such as the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) or Lashkar-eToiba followed the PLOs violent path; others like Hekmatyar Gulbbudins mujahideens pursued
defiant policies while some as the Greek Communist Party (KKE) decided to abandon their
master; other militants as the Kashmiri-based Jaish-e-Mohammed have largely remained loyal to
its sponsor.
Conflict scholars mostly assume that external interventions in armed conflicts are a zerosum game they can either succeed when interveners accomplish certain goals or fail when
these goals are not met. Similarly, conventional wisdom holds that interventions are usually
third-party military and/or economic incursions into internal affairs of foreign countries aimed at
shifting the balance between the government and the rebel group(s) (Regan 2000, 10). To
accurately understand how external interventions develop, however, we need to consider alliance
dynamics between external interveners and rebel groups, and particularly conditions under which
sponsored rebel groups are willing to break their commitments to external governments in the
course of a an ongoing rebellion. We also have to consider cases in which rebels oppose policies

of their masters, and cases in which rebel defection can be expected yet it does not occur. In
particular, are there factors that cause some rebel groups to pursue risky confrontational policies
toward their masters, and others to remain obedient and avoid defection, given similar
opportunities?
While the issues of external intervention and the relationship between governments and
rebels are interesting in themselves and relevant for conflict studies, they both are essentially
important because of their impact on the resolution of armed conflicts on whether or not the
termination of state-sponsored illicit arrangements can contribute to peace.
Table 1: State Sponsorship of Rebel Groups
External Sponsor(s)
India

Rebel Group
Tamil
Tigers
(LTTE)

Period
1982-1991

Target Country
Sri Lanka

Defection/Form
Yes/Intrusion

Pakistan

Hekmatyars
Mujahideen

1979-1992

Afghanistan

Yes/Defiance

Yugoslavia
Soviet Union

Greek
Communist
Party (KKE)

1945-1948

Greece

Yes/Desertion

Pakistan

Lashkar-eToiba, a major
Kashmiri
separatist group

1993-Present

India

Yes/Defiance;
Intrusion

Pakistan

Jaish-eMohhamed, a
major Kashmiri
separatist group
Renamo

1993-Present

India

No

1980-1994

Mozambique

No

South Africa

Narrative
1991, after Rajiv Gandhi
brokered peace agreement in
1987 the LTEE felt betrayed
and killed him in a suicide
attack.
In 1986, against Pakistans
orders to fight Soviet troops
Hekmatyars group clashed
with rival groups over
power in Afghanistan.
In 1948, the KKE decided to
side with Stalin in an
ideological dispute between
USSR and Yugoslavia
In 2008, the group carried
out bombings in Mumbai
killing many civilians in the
middle of the Pakistan-India
rapprochement. In 2002, the
group was involved in a
failed assassination attempt
against Pakistans President
Musharraf.
The group is operative in
Kashmir and is reported to
closely follow orders from
Islamabad.
The group was successfully
controlled until the peace
agreement was reached
leading
to
the
5

demobilization of Renamo

Why Study Sponsorship of Rebel Groups?

Studying state sponsorship of rebels and particularly conditions under which these illicit ties go
astray is important for several reasons. First, foreign sponsors with a stake in the outcome of a
conflict can become serious obstacles to peace. Sometimes such a regional power ... may see its
interests best served by the prolonging of a stalemate until the situation forces a settlement it can
accept, rather than commit itself wholeheartedly to the course of conflict resolution (de Silva
and Samarasinghe 1993, 14). In particular, scholars demonstrate that external support to the
combatants is likely to lead to a bloodier civil war (e.g. Lacina 2006). External support can
encourage opposition groups not to easily give up violence and can make them less sensitive to
civilian needs. Sponsored rebels are argued to be more ruthless toward the population than other
opposition groups (Weinstein 2007). It is, therefore, imperative to identify factors that weaken or
break these illicit ties.
Second, we need to understand conditions under which rebels defect their sponsors in
order to shorten the duration of armed conflicts. Sponsored rebels groups may become spoilers
(Stedman 1997) and infinitely block the peace process. Although external support may not be
fundamental for rebel victory, some authors argue that the rebellion is unlikely to be curbed
unless the sponsorship is ended (Leites and Wolf 1970, 24; Trinquier 2006, 77). Extraterritorial
sanctuaries can increase the length and severity of civil wars (Salehyan 2009), but other sources
of dependence on external governments can infinitely block peace process. Consider the political
friction between externally supported Hamas which governs the Gaza strip and the Fatah which
rules the West Bank. Owing to the Iran-Syria patronage, Hamas nurtures a rejectionist attitude
toward the Israeli-Palestinian process and a confrontational policy toward Israel. Prior to the
6

2008 peace agreement, Hamas was involved in shelling Israeli towns and its militant wing is
argued to be equipped, trained and funded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Early this year,
Hamas has accepted a reconciliation accord with Fatah that provides for creation of a joint
caretaker Palestinian government (Guardian 05/04/2011). However, it seems unlikely that the
group would renounce its militant ideology in the long-term given its financial dependence on
Iran. In order to pacify Hamas, policymakers should consider the ways of weakening its ties to
the Islamist Republic rather than contain its activities.
Third, the sponsorship of rebels can cause conflict spillovers to neighboring countries
(Salehyan 2009). Rebels can carry out reprisals against the population and infrastructure of their
former sponsors from neighboring countries. Prior to the US war on terror, Al Qaeda attacks
against US embassies in the Middle East were conducted from Afghanistan and Sudan.
Afghanistan was bombed on several occasions during 1990s and invaded in 2001 by the US as a
punishment for supporting Al-Qaeda. In addition, rebel activities against their former patrons can
seldom lead to civil war. In 1970, for instance, the drift between Jordan and the PLO resulted in
a short-term intrastate conflict. Another example is KLA uprising against their former hosts
Macedonia in 2001 which led to a full-blown civil war. Therefore, understanding the factors that
contribute to the termination of delegations can provide a window to better conflict management
strategies, both in the short and long terms.
Dependent Variable
This dissertation deals with important puzzles that lie at the core of these external patronrebel relationships. On the general level, it asks about the conditions under which state
sponsorship of rebels goes awry why and when external governments lose control over actions
of their protgs. On a micro level, this project investigates why rebel groups behave opposed to

or against the interests of their sponsors despite an ongoing conflict with the target government,
and particularly under what circumstances do the sponsored groups defy orders of their sponsor,
desert from cooperation or domestically challenge their masters?
In general, these policies signify the sponsors loss of political control over the rebel
group and I refer to them as defection. Defection is a set of disruptive policies exercised by the
sponsored rebel organization aimed at diminishing or abolishing the external governments
control over the organizations use of force even at the expense of rebels physical survival. This
phenomenon describes situations where a government delegates the use of violence to a rebel
organization to carry out particular assignments against the target country. The government
endows the group with political, military and financial support in return for a control over the
rebel organization, strategies and operations. The minimum core of control is generally nonautonomous rebel use of force. If autonomy is regarded as a matter of compliance to the goals of
the sponsor government, then defection includes rebel acts of non-compliance which can take
three forms: defiance, desertion, and intrusion. The last two are evidently expressions of rebel
independence, although defiance can also be understood as such.
I see defiance as the act of open resistance to or disregard for sponsors authority.
Defiance can be either static, when the rebels are evading duties assigned by the sponsor
government, or dynamic, when the rebels conduct actions forbidden by the sponsor. Defiance is
measured as complaining and shirking. In 1984, after South Africa signed the Nkomahi peace
accords with Mozambique, which were supposed to terminate two countries support for
insurgent groups, Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and African National Congress
(ANC), RENAMO for the first time criticized Pretorias move and threatened with disobedience.
Persistent clashes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyars Hezb-e-Islami with other militant factions rather

than with the Soviet army during Afghan civil war (1979-1989) were against the US and
Pakistani instructions (Bergen 2001, 69), and therefore constitute the defiance. Although
defiance is the mildest type of non-compliance, if ignored by the sponsor it can easily backfire.
Desertion is the threat or withdrawal of allegiance or responsibility to the sponsor
government. While desertion indicates the loss of sponsors control over the groups use of force,
it differs from hostility as it does not automatically assume the rebels will align with sponsors
adversaries. For instance, Libyas proxy during Qaddafis intervention in Chad (1978-1987), the
Transitional Government of National Unity-GUNT, broke ties with its sponsor but continued
fighting against the Chadian government. Similarly, the KKE abandoned Yugoslavia but it did
not engage in armed actions against its government.
Intrusion is the most severe form of non-compliance when the rebel group uses entrusted
resources against sponsors sovereignty. The key difference between defiance and intrusion is in
motivation: while the former may illustrate economic considerations or survival, the latter is
always driven by enmity toward the sponsor. Intrusion is measured as switching sides, coup
d'tat, targeting civilians and usurpation of sponsors territory. The Maronite Christians not only
abandoned Syria amid Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, but they also switched sides by
aligning with Tel Aviv. Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, two Kashmiri groups
sponsored by Pakistan, are known for their alignment with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban whom
Islamabad has been fiercely fighting. Finally, the installation of parallel institutions on sponsors
territory, plots or assassination attempts on life of government officials and unauthorized
violence against sponsors citizens all can be also subsumed under defection.
Literature Review

Conflict scholars have noted that third-parties often become involved in armed conflicts
including the material assistance to rebels. Previous research into the factors that affect the onset
and consequences of external intervention is large but it does not properly address the topic of
the external intervenerrebel relationship. The scholarship has produced three broad research
agendas regarding external interventions in armed conflicts: (a) causes of external intervention;
(b) consequences of interventions; (b) proxy wars.
The first body of literature takes the relationship between external governments and
domestic rebels for granted and concentrates on why states intervene in armed conflicts. A
realist-driven approach depicts external interventions as realpolitik; great powers use
interventions as a means to achieve strategic goals (Morgenthau 1967; Feste 1992; Scott 1996).
These goals can be offensive when governments intervene in order to weaken their rivals (BalchLindsay and Enterline 2000) or defensive when the aim of intervention is to export ones
interests abroad to achieve stable surrounding (Peceny 1999). The decision to intervene in
support of rebels is often driven by opportunities to loot resources (Ross 2004; Trumbore 2003).
More powerful countries are likely to intervene in armed conflicts as they can materially
support such adventures (Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering 1994). The most powerful states will
also intervene in their former colonies to protect their interests (Lemke and Regan 2004). On the
other side, scholars identify domestic reasons for intervention. Carment and James (1995) argue
that the decision to intervene in civil conflicts is driven by ethnic affinities between the external
intervener and the rebel group. Following this path, Saideman (2001) and Gleditsch (2007)
contend that governments intervene in other states internal affairs when their ethnic kin is
threatened. Similarly, Saideman and Ayres (2008) suggest that domestic reasons drive irredentist
policies toward those states in which the intervener shares ethnic ties with the respective national

10

minority. Regan (2000, 44-47) argues that governments decision to intervene is often based on
rational calculation of national interests and institutional restraints. Finally, some authors stress
the importance of structural conditions. Regan (1998) finds that the intensity of conflict and the
flow of refugees prompt governments to intervene in another states internal affairs. Elbadawi
and Sambanis (2000), find that more severe civil wars increase the likelihood of external
intervention. Elsewhere Regan (2000) suggests that third parties are less likely to intervene when
the intensity of a civil war is high and more likely to intervene when a humanitarian crisis is
imminent. Holl (1993) argues that external players are likely to become involved in civil wars as
these conflicts approach termination. Although it is impossible to mention all respective studies,
the crux of the first research agenda is that third parties are frequent interveners in civil wars due
to self-interested motives, domestic reasons or structural conditions. Most importantly, this body
of scholarship acknowledges that states can offer support to rebels but it does not analyze the
nature of this relationship.
The second research agenda pays more attention to consequences of external
interventions on the civil war duration. Regan (2000; 2002) examines whether armed conflicts
with outside interventions are more likely to last longer than those without interventions and the
findings suggest they do. Other studies anticipate that external interventions will accelerate
conflict termination (e.g. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). Whether conflicts are persistent or
short-lived also depends on the recipient of external support. Collier, Hoeffler and Sderbom
(2004) show that external interventions on the rebel side tend to reduce the length of civil war.
Accordingly, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) indicate that military interventions on the side
of the government increase duration. Regan (2002) and Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) also
analyze the length of armed conflicts where both sides receive external support; they find that

11

these interventions are likely to perpetuate civil wars and lead to conflict stalemate. This research
agenda offers important insights into the consequences of biased external interventions. Yet
similar to the first research agenda this strand of literature does not address how the
relationship between interveners and the opposition groups evolves beyond the governments
decision to intervene on their behalf.
This is partly because the two research agendas assume that external governments
intervene in armed conflicts due to motives or structural incentives but with little control over the
rebellion.2 Rebels presumably retain their decision-making autonomy in the face of third-partyintervention. External governments can use diplomatic, economic or military means to curb
armed conflicts but they are regarded as largely peripheral to the rebel agenda. The third body of
literature referred to here as proxy wars challenges this assumption and places the external
intervener-rebel dynamics at the heart of its research agenda. The aim is to explain causes of
such ties (Bapat 2007ba; Bapat 2007b; Bapat 2011; Byman et al. 2001; Byman 2007; Byman and
Kreps 2010; Salehyan 2009; Salehyan 2010; Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011), the
impact of delegation of war to rebels on the onset and duration of armed conflicts (Salehyan
2009; Schultz 2008), the fate of externally backed groups (Carter 2009) and problems associated
with choosing appropriate rebel groups and controlling them (Bapat 2006; Byman and Kreps
2010; Mendelsohn 2011; Corbin 2011; Salehyan 2010; Schultz 2010).
However, the majority of these scholars scantly address adverse consequences of state
sponsorship of rebels. A handful of studies bring moral hazards of external interventions to the
scholarly fora without assessing the underlying factors. Salehyan (2010, 502) uses principalagent framework to argue that externally supported rebels can shirk their duties by downplaying

Similar interventionist framework is present in the literature on trans-ethnic ties and global politics (e.g. Cetinyan
2002; Davis and Moore 1997; Jenne 2007; Trumbore 2003).
12

their masters orders, they can behave in ways that are clash with the interveners goals, or they
can use granted resources against the external government. He suggests that these side effects
can be mitigated through quasi-institutional means external governments may discipline their
protgs via embedded advisors and trainees (Ibid, 505). These liaisons can more effectively
select and punish rebels for their egregious behavior by offering sticks and carrots. Byman and
Kreps (2010) offer a more detailed picture of tensions in the state sponsorship of militant groups.
They argue that these tensions can result from different payoff structures, the asymmetry of
information and high costs of monitoring. Apart from shirking behavior, they also note rebels
can pursue actions embarrassing to their sponsors, deny control to their sponsors, drag their
masters into wars, undermine peace efforts and challenge their benefactors domestically (Ibid, 79). Byman and Kreps suggest that these problems can be partly overcome in the selection process
by choosing rebel groups with similar preferences such as those with shared ethnicity or
ideological affiliation. On the other hand, they concur with Salehyan that certain level of
institutionalization can be fruitful as embedded advisors can monitor and report back to the
government. Finally, they suggest that the tensions in the state-rebel relationship can be
remedied with the support to multiple rebel groups by pitting them against each other external
governments may bolster their loyalty.
While these insights are important first steps toward understanding state-rebel alliances
they are speculative given that the authors provide interesting narratives short of in-depth
analysis. We still lack proper conceptualization and measurement of rebel strategies toward
sponsors; both authors mention potential instances of rebel defection but do not offer any
typology. Likewise the literature on external interventions is without explanations as to why and

13

under what conditions state sponsorship of rebels goes astray. For these reasons, my project
starts from a scratch and in the next section I propose an approach to this important topic.
Approaching the Topic
Although some members of the committee have previously suggested that small N case-studies
should be my starting point, I decided to first construct a dataset covering the instances of rebel
defection and cooperation. I made this decision because potential cases were so heterogeneous
that I could not reasonably control for many differences using Mills methods or the comparative
method. Controlling for these differences might not be problematic if theories on state-rebel
alliances were available.3 Since we lack this knowledge, I decided to take a bottom-up approach
and see what correlations I can find among various cases informed by the statist theories on
alliances and alignments. With these findings in I can proceed to unraveling causal patterns in
particular cases. In the next section I discuss about two cases that can serve as preliminary
representatives of rebel behavior until statistical results (hopefully) offer more precise directives.
For the universe of cases I rely on two datasets: the Non-State Actors (NSA) Dataset
compiled by K.S. Gleditsch, I. Salehyan and D. Cunningham (2008), and the UCDPs External
Support in Armed Conflict, 1975-2009. Previous research on intervention or external support has
mainly used the Correlates of War (COW) data by Small and Singer (1982) and Sarkees (2010),
the Third Party Intervention Data by Regan (1996, 2002), the Overt Military Intervention Data
(OMID) by Tillema (1989, 1991), the International Military Intervention Dataset (IMI) compiled
by Pearson and Bauman and updated by Kisangani and Pickering (2009). These datasets are
inappropriate for my project because they only include information on troop support. Both the

Theories on state alliances and especially on abandonment may be useful proxies. However, I can already identify
two major differences with respect to state-rebel ties. First, statist alliances are not necessarily characterized by
power asymmetry while state sponsorship of rebels is. Second, state-to-state security commitments are open whereas
state-to-rebel are secretive and illicit and thus always in the shadow of deniability.
14

NSA and ESAC include a wider range of external involvement than troops and disaggregate the
actors providing the support. In the ESAC types of support are distinguished between warring
and non-warring means. The warring means are troops whereas the non-warring can take a
variety of forms, including access to territory, access to military/intelligence infrastructure,
weapons, material/logistics, training/expertise, funding/economic support, intelligence material,
other forms of support, and unknown type of support short of troops. Also, the ESAC goes one
step further coding the period during which the support was offered.

Illustrative Cases
Ever since the Greek civil war intensified in 1946, Yugoslavia had been the main sponsor of the
communist rebellion.4 Unlike cautious Stalin (and to some extent USSRs proxies, Albania and
Bulgaria,) who aimed to constrain the rebels in fear of American intervention, Yugoslavia agreed
to host the Greek Communist Party (KKE) on its territory. The Tito government regularly
supplied the guerilla with arms and helped the KKE build its armed forces. During 1946, for
instance, Yugoslavia helped the KKE arm, mobilize and organize 20,000 fighters, while the
Soviet government only advised political activity and rejected the escalation of conflict
(Stavrakis (1989, 136-137; 142). During 19471948, Yugoslavia provided the bulk of food
supplies, clothing and armaments to the movement while the support from USSR was modest,
lopsided and slow (Ibid, 164). Stalin was against the rebellion and ready to gradually disengage
from the Greek civil war. During his meeting with Edvard Kardelj, a top-rank Yugoslav official,
Stalin asserted that the rebellion had no future and demanded the cessation of support by the
militant Yugoslavs (Djilas 1962 181-182).
4

Close and Veremis (1989, 102) indicate that from 1946 to late 1948 the Yugoslav government sent plenty of
German weapons to their Greek protgs: 35,000 rifles, 3,500 machine guns, 2,000 bazookas, 7,000 anti-tank guns,
10,000 mines, clothing for 12,000 people and 30 wagons of food.
15

In June 1948, relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia soured over Titos
disobedience to Moscow. Despite the tremendous support from the Yugoslavs, the KKE sided
with Moscow in the ideological quarrel between Tito and Stalin. When the Soviets and their
proxies denounced Tito for imperialism and excommunicated Yugoslavia from the Eastern
block in mid-1948, the KKE followed their suit. Tito reiterated by expelling the KKE from safe
heavens and cutting their supplies. Jammed between the strengthened Greek security forces and
the Soviet passivity, the communist rebellion in Greece failed miserably the following year. One
of key reasons for the defeat of the communist insurgency was the KKEs abandonment of
Yugoslavia in the critical stage of the Greek civil war (see Barker 1990, 298). As alternative
sanctuaries in Albania and Bulgaria were cursed with rough terrain and poor infrastructure, the
Yugoslav bases were fundamental to the preservation and survival of the insurgency. The KKE
decision to defect the Yugoslav government its main benefactor even though the groups
survival was at peril is puzzling.
This leads to a second, more general puzzle: the ability of external states to control some
rebel groups, and not others. Consider a more contemporary example. In early 1990s, Pakistans
powerful Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) trained and armed a variety of militant
Kashmiri groups to fight Indian government. Among these organizations, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
and Hizb-ul-Mujhideen (HM) stood out as the most powerful, effective and loyal of Islamabads
proxies. Support for militant groups in Kashmir fighting for separation from India was expected
to shore up the campaign in favor of the provinces integration into Pakistan. LeT and HM were
regarded as key assets in this struggle since they had the largest membership among the
Kashmiri sponsored groups (Schofield. 2003, 200). In addition, their loyalty to the ISI was
undisputed (Shaikh 2009, 174; Lieven 2011, 223). The key difference between the two

16

movements, however, was constituency to which they appealed: while HM was often
characterized as a group with a strong indigenous support, LeT was argued to have considerably
more foreign adherents (Schofield 2003, 201). This would favor greater HMs involvement in
domestic affairs and eventually its struggle against the Pakistani regime. However, it is LeTs
systematic spread of charitable network throughout the country and the power of this network to
mobilize and organize unrest that became a serious challenge to President Musharrafs regime
(Lieven 2011, 224). On the other hand, although linked to influential domestic actors such as
Jamaat party, HM has shown little interest in Pakistani politics and carries out ISIs orders
exclusively in Kashmir. A further indicator of Pakistans loss of control is LeTs alliance agenda
which runs against Pakistans: LeT seeks to establish an Islamic Caliphate of all Muslimmajority states surrounding Pakistan, and has trained other Islamist militants groups in Pakistanheld Kashmir and Afghanistan (Terrorism Monitor 06/02/2006). Anatol Lievens observation
nicely describes troubles which Pakistan faces regarding LeT:
From my talks with Pakistani military and intelligence officers it is clear to me that,
having done so much to build up Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistani security forces are now
very afraid of the creature they helped create, of its possible sympathizers within their
own ranks, and of the dreadful consequences if it were to join with the Taleban and the
sectarians in revolt against Pakistan (Lieven 2011, 229).

In contrast, HM works closely with ISI and regularly carries out a number of operations against
Indian military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. The group also occasionally strikes at civilian
targets in Jammu and Kashmir but unlike LeT has not engaged in terrorist acts elsewhere. It
appears that this organization has a very narrow agenda that only uses its resources for the total
control of Kashmir. Why did the two groups under the same patron develop such diverging

17

policies? Why did LeT became so autonomous and threatening to Pakistans interest with its
Islamic grand strategy, whereas HM remained loyal and confined to Kashmir?
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