Andrew S.

Terrell
Public Policy History

Policy Piece: New “S.T.A.R.T.” Issues - Jan Lopatka, “Obama and Medvedev Set to Sign
Disarmament Treaty,” Reuters, 7 April 2010.

As part of President Barack Obama’s initiative to decrease nuclear armaments, the United

States and Russia signed the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) on Thursday 8

April 2010. The timing for this signing between Obama and Medvedev is presumed to be an

example for other countries attending the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in mid April.

Steve Pifer of the Brooking Institution noted “if the United States and Russia were to show up

with no agreement and between the two of them controlling 95 percent of the weapons, it’s pretty

easy for the non-nuclear states to say, ‘well you’re not doing your part, why should we?’”

Without downplaying the significance of Obama’s New START, however, the ratification of the

treaty is, nonetheless, dependent upon the 2/3 vote in the US Senate. New START is expected to

undergo stringent criticism because of its implications on national and international security

capabilities. The issue with this newest treaty, specifically, is whether New START’s assumption

that there need to be symmetry between the United States and Russia is safe for the global scene.

On the one hand, America’s international security obligations currently exceeds that of Russia.

However, on the other side of the debate, is the aim to reduce nuclear deterrence as part of

Obama’s initiative laid out his inaugural year.1

Strategic Arms Treaties are anything but new to the United States and Russia, however,

the context in which each successive treaty and addendum are ratified follow trends of economic,

1Jan Lopatka, “Obama and Medvedev Set to Sign Disarmament Treaty,” Reuters. 7 April 2010. Available on-line at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6365Y420100407; Baker Spring, “Senators Should Listen up to John
Bolton’s START Smarts,” Heritage Blog: The Foundry, Available on-line at http://blog.heritage.org/2010/04/20/
senators-should-listen-up-to-john-boltons-start-smarts.

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political, and technical plausibility. Given this, the New START may fall victim to the failing

economic situation and avoid ratification until the next Congress in 2011. What policymakers

need to recognize are the changes in the geopolitical stage from the Limited Test Ban Treaty in

1963 to 2010, even the changes from START I in 1991. Additionally, the US military and

nonconventional warfare systems are amidst a technical evolution as well. Each factor must be

weighed carefully to ensure the United States can meet the new standards without losing “teeth”

in the international community and that it can maintain responsibilities for defense with its

allies.2

Strategic Arms negotiations began in the late 1960s and culminated in the Non-

Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) into 1972. The issue

restricting much success for these early attempts at strategic arms negotiations was largely state

willingness, and the fact that talks were mostly geared at literal limitations instead of sincere

disarmament. Amid the height of the Cold War race for arms, SALT I recognized how defensive

systems, such as Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, were spurning exponential growth in numbers of

offensive tactical weapons. Largely the initial efforts to halt, or at least check the growth of

strategic arms met with little success. These weapons were also points of contention for U.S. and

Soviet disarmament proposals. Neither side was willing (or perhaps not able politically) to

freeze quantity and characteristics of offensive and defensive weapon systems. Another problem

unaccounted for in early talks was China’s successful nuclear missile test in 1966. This served

largely to defend missions to employ antiballistic missile systems around Moscow and the

United States in 1966 and 1967. It was presented as a new level of deterrence against the

2“Discussion: New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.” Defencetalk. April 2010. Available On-line at http://
www.defencetalk.com/forums/military-strategy-tactics/new-strategic-arms-reduction-treaty-start-10190/.

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Chinese threat asserting that the system would protect against “the improbable but possible

accidental launch of an intercontinental missile by one of the nuclear powers.” It was not

popular among the American public as it furthered the arms race buildup.3

We can see how early talks were limited in scope and ultimate success by viewing the

times retrospectively. For instance, politically neither side wanted the other to be advancing in

antiballistic technology without the other being able to, even though officials on both sides

played with the notion of halting constructions. Public opinion, in America at least, by 1968 was

against added expenses because of the extreme funding going towards the Vietnam War and the

continuing global exchange problem. Technology at this time was also moving towards

revamping existing deployment schemes and adding more capabilities to unconventional warfare

plans. These factors disallowed reduction, and arguably, even limitation agreements and

proposals.4

Beginning talks on limitations again in November 1972, the United States and Soviet

Union entered into negotiations known as SALT II. This round of talks focused on creating a

long-term comprehensive treaty “providing broad limits on strategic offensive weapons

systems.” President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev agreed to a basic structure in

1974 at Vladivostok where both sides would cap 2400 equal aggregate nuclear delivery vehicles,

3“U.S. Studies Appeal to Soviet for a Halt on Missile Defense,” New York Times, 15 December 1966; “US Will
Suggest Missile Moratorium at Geneva,” New York Times, 19 December 1966; “Soviet Antimissile System Spurs
New U.S. Weapons,” New York Times, 5 February 1967; “$19.3-Billion Lost on Missile Work: Programs Never
Completed or Systems were Obsolete,” New York Times, 13 May 1967; “Missiles and Atom: Why the US Chose a
‘THIN’ A.B.M.,” New York Times, 24 September 1967; “Senate Coalition Seeks to Block New Missile Net,” New
York Times, 14 June 1968; “The Arms Race: Too Much of a Bad Thing,” New York Times, 6 October 1968;
“Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I),” Arms Control Association, Available On-line at https://
www.armscontrol.org/documents/salt.
4“Texts of President’s Message and Analysis of $169.2-Billion Federal Budget,” New York Times, 25 January 1967;
“$19.3-Billion Lost on Missile Work: Programs Never Completed or Systems were Obsolete,” New York Times, 13
May 1967.

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1320 Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles, halt on construction of new land-

based ICBM launchers, and broad limits on deployment of new technologies in strategic

offensive arms. SALT II was limited, like SALT I, because of plausibility concerns. This round

was negotiated after the fall of Bretton Woods and economic restraints were pushing for

advancement of higher technology deployment and reentry vehicles. Aside from these

technological and economic variables, political plausibility concerns included Ford’s expected

short tenure in office, Jimmy Carter’s lack of political capital after the Panama Canal Treaty,

Soviet troops in Cuba, the Iranian hostage crisis, Carter’s poor relationship with Congress and

for the Soviet’s their invasion of Afghanistan. All of these political issues raised questions of

Carter’s competence in foreign affairs which was also a large reason for his failed election

campaign in 1980. There was too much of an emphasis on human rights and peace for the

American public and the backlash from interest groups and Congress. Ultimately SALT II was

never ratified, but both sides agreed to abide by what their executives signed in 1979 as long as

the other party did as well.5

In 1991, President George H.W. Bush signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START) which entered into force in December 1994 to expire In December 2009. START

counted all delivery vehicles as one and limited deployment for the Soviet Union and the United

States at 1600 in addition to the 6000 warhead limit. Both sides were allowed to collect

information on the others from satellites and free information transfers. This treaty was

acceptable for the Soviet Union because it (as a state) realized its time was ending and the

5“Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II),” U.S. State Department: Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation, Available On-line at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5195.htm; Mitchell K. Hall, “Review: The
Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Arms Control: the SALT II Treaty Ratification Debate by Dan Caldwell,” The
Journal of American History 78, No. 4 (March 1992) 1528-1529.

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economy could not support strategic defenses on the scale of prior decades. Additionally,

Reagan and Bush had been outspending the USSR in the 1980s in hopes of accelerating its

decline. As Bush entered office, he laid out his plans for a new world order that included

disarmament to a degree. The political climate in both states, and the world at large was

different and amid a drastic change into the post Cold War era. This allowed for such a reduction

treaty to even be discussed. Whereas SALT was plausible only in scope of limiting weapons,

START sought literal reduction in addition to limitations. This is significant because the HW

Bush administration was overseeing the fall of the Soviet Union which was unlike any previous

presidential administration and unlike any since those years. The climate is different in 2010,

and this must be part of the plausibility concerns as ratification is considered.6

As early as 2006, the George W. Bush administration began discussing options with

Russia over a replacement treaty. At the time, neither the United States nor Russia wanted to

extend START in its current form as some provisions in the treaty interfered with military

programs. The same problem faces the 2010 new START deliberations. Neither the W. Bush

nor Obama administration sought to continue the initial START treaty for the allowed five year

extension. In allowing START to dissipate in December 2009 without a working replacement

until this April 2010, both sides have shown that the geopolitical climate, the new global

economy, and technological concerns have advanced far past what was covered in 1991. The

options for Obama and Medvedev remain to extend START (thought neither want to in its

current form), or allow it lapse even though new START was signed by executives it requires

6 Conn Caroll, “This Treaty was Over Before it STARTed,” Heritage Blog: The Foundry, 8 April 2010, Available
On-line at http://blog.heritage.org/2010/04/08/this-treaty-was-over-before-it-started/; “The U.S. Senate, Not the
U.N., Will be the Judge of this Treaty.” Heritage Blog: The Foundry. 1 April 2010, Available On-line at http://
blog.heritage.org/2010/04/01/the-u-s-senate-not-the-u-n-will-be-the-judge-of-this-treaty; Amy Woolf, “Strategic
Arms Control after START: Issues and Options.” Congressional Research Service, 4 March 2010, Available On-line
at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40084_20100304.pdf.

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both legislatures in Russia and the United States to go into effect, or even pursue a completely

new kind of treaty over Obama’s Transparency aims to better build confidence between the two

nations and “lead by example” for other states. 7

What we see from surveying the successes and failures of strategic arms treaties, is that

three large factors continue to be significant variables in ratifying executive signatures: political

and geopolitical, economic, and technological plausibilities. Though Obama and Medvedev

have signed the new START, these factors will be deliberated for some time in Russia and the

United States because legislatures have to question the feasibility of limiting their states to the

new directives. What is going to hold up ratification in 2010 in America is the questionable

credence of Obama with regards to state defense capabilities under this new treaty, and the

transitional period for the Armed Forces currently in progress. In his favor, however, is

economic plausibility; the United States is likened to the Soviet Union in 1991 where we now

may be in a position to accept such a reductionist treaty because we can’t afford to keep up with

our own expenses. This creates a scenario unlike past treaties and talks and may allow Obama’s

new START to be ratified quicker than conservatives are expecting.

7iBid, “Factbox: Key Elements of Obama’s New Nuclear Strategy,” Reuters. 6 April 2010, Available On-line at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6353UH20100406; Owen Graham, “Senate Should Uphold Reagan’s
Vision on Arms Control,” Heritage Blog: The Foundry. 30 January 2010. Available On-line at http://
blog.heritage.org/2010/01/30/senate-should-uphold-reagan’s-vision-on-arms-control; “Q&A: New START,” BBC
News. 8 April 2010, Available On-line at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8605857.stm.

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Bibliography

Carroll, Conn. “This Treaty was Over Before it STARTed.” Heritage Blog: The Foundry. 8 April
2010. Available On-line at
http://blog.heritage.org/2010/04/08/this-treaty-was-over-before-it-started/

_____. “The U.S. Senate, Not the U.N., Will be the Judge of this Treaty.” Heritage Blog: The
Foundry. 1 April 2010. Available On-line at http://blog.heritage.org/2010/04/01/
the-u-s-senate-not-the-u-n-will-be-the-judge-of-this-treaty.

“Discussion: New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.” Defencetalk. April 2010. Available
On-line at http://www.defencetalk.com/forums/military-strategy-tactics/
new-strategic-arms-reduction-treaty-start-10190/.

“Factbox: Key Elements of Obama’s New Nuclear Strategy.” Reuters. 6 April 2010. Available
On-line at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6353UH20100406.

“Factbox: Reaction to New U.S. Nuclear Policy.” Reuters. 6 April 2010. Available On-line at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6354K820100406.

Graham, Owen. “Senate Should Uphold Reagan’s Vision on Arms Control.” Heritage Blog: The
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arms-control/.

Holmes, Kim R.. “Crashing Obama’s Nuclear Wedding.” The Washington Times. 1 April 2010.
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Lopatka, Jan. “Obama and Medvedev Set to Sign Disarmament Treaty.” Reuters. 7 April 2010.
Available on-line at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6365Y420100407.

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“Q&A: New START.” BBC News. 8 April 2010. Available On-line at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8605857.stm

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Sanger, David E. and Peter Baker. “Obama Limits When U.S. Would Use Nuclear Arms.” The
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_____. “Senators Should Listen up to John Bolton’s START Smarts.” Heritage Blog: The
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“Treaty Between the United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II).” U.S. State Department: Bureau of
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