nk nha ht ti 1 The Politica! Economy of Capabilities Accumulation: The Past and Future of Policies for Industrial Development Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dost, and joseph E, Stiglitz “Thete wasa time when ‘industria polices, for both developed and developing counizies were bad words not to be spoken elther in public or in private by teepectable people. It was the time of the (in}famous Washington Consensus" ‘pn development—dominant among international policy makes in the last part je ewerteth centary-—with ts market fundamentalism, made of an invar- dnt tcipe good for all macro diseases less government, fiscal sweat and teas priviaations et) ir tum grounded ina very naive and blackboxee microeco-" fouls (the merce fl take care of tself...ence do not mess around with tmncro behaviors At last, the realization ofthe impressive fires ofthe recipe ‘Gee, revealingly, World Bank, 2008 and 2008) nas finally sobered up a signi tant shate of both economists and policy makers (although: with significan Sxeeptions in both camps). Indeed, atthe time this book is sent to the pub- . “ama hitting the would fnanclal markets s forcing even the most stubborn believer inthe miraculous properties of markets’ to accept markets as they exist and not as they are portrayed in economic textbooks ‘This book however, is not about beating a dead horse—notiithstanding the sy hotee stil running sround—ane concemsonly tangentially the socalled Thugmented Washington Consensus’, Cat is the revisitation of the former cone with a much greater emphasis on ancillary institutions. Rather, this book {S about industilat policies seen as intrinsic fundamental ingredients of all development processes. Witness to that, every experience of successful indus: tralization, ranging ftom Geemany and the USA, almost rwo centuries ago, all tie way to Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, China, and India nowadays. The notion of ‘industrial policy’ is understood here in a quite expansive mannet. It comprises polices affecting ‘infant industry’ support of variousMario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, and Joseph E. Stig ‘Kinds, but also trade policies, selence and technology polices, publicprocurement, policies affecting foreign direct investments, intellectual property rights, and the allocation of financial resources. Industrial policies, in this broad sense, ‘come together with processes of ‘institutional engineering’ shaping the very ‘nature of the economic actors, the market mechanisms and rules under which they operate, and the boundaries between What is governed by market inter. actions, and what is not. The accumulation of capabilities in the great industrial transformation ‘The contributions to this book analyze from different angles the role played by industrial policies, in the foregoing broad sense, and by institution building within that great transformation borrowing Karl Polany/'s (1944) expression = leading fom traditional, mostly rural, economies to economies ctiven by industrial activities (and nowadays also advanced service), able systematically to lear how to implement and eventually how to generate new ways of producing and new products under conditions of dynamic increasing returns, Such a ‘great transformation’ entails a major process of accumulation of know Jedge and capabilites, atthe levels of both individuals and organizations. Cer. {alnly, part of such capabilites builds on education and formally acquited sis (what in the economists’ jargon often goes under the heading of ‘human capital), However, at least equally tmporaanty, capablltes have to do with ‘the problem-solving knowledge embodied in organizations concerning, for example, production technologies, marketing, labor relations, at wll a6 ‘dynamic capabilities’ of search and learning Many contributions to this volume can be read in this perspective, which Jinks with a growing literature on technology, innovation, and development (see, among others, Amsden, 2001; Bel and Pavitt, 1993; Chang, 2002; Chang and Cheema, 2002; Cimoli and Dosi, 1895; Dosi, Pavitt, and Soete, 1990; Mytelka, 2007; Nelson, 1982 and 2004; Reinert, 2007). More precisely, many Of the chapters which follow tackle the impact of various forms of ps intervention upon the rates and directions of knowledge accumulation during the catch-up process and the ensuing effects upon the patterns of production and trade, ter-technological and intersectoral diversity of opportunities That sectors and products matter in terms of learning opportunites is increas- ‘ngly recognized well beyond the ‘structuraliss’, Kaldorian and evolutionary 2 ‘The Poti! Economy of Capabities Accumulation a ch, Caps he concur was rill pt onward @at om Peds (9s Kaldor 1S, Dos. Feit ad Sete, 190; Fea, 1994 ene, "9 o Hausman an Kiger, 206; ad Hausmann ad tock, 2000 the bean that spec eno an pce ects an po re ter Because hey ental deren lamin opportunities and also di oa income elasticities of demand. Thus, today's specializations influence fomortow’s productivity growth, chances to innovate, and demand potential: see tporte a bit on the point in Chapter 2, by Cimol, Dsi, Nelson, and Salient del on in Dos Fit a Set 0990, th te ese ‘owe 1t, ‘industrial policies are a predicament’—as Hausmann and Rodrich Pinner put because counties inetably have the cole of tering thelr “tre ats ofp ccamaston an ogee tpt of pe ton ard wae, Even the choke of not having any (mpl or xpi) nds tl oly a hole in sl tht the acceptance of the eure ‘Paaona divsion of Inelectual and physical labor, and with that th ‘iret cstrbuton of earning opportunites, Ricardo versus List inded In Chapter 4 by Reinert (se also Reinert, On the isue—as we are remin cm 7 faced back to the very origin of modern 2007}—there sa divide, which can bet gin of modern pa ony eve ew pro tomate gous ea, scence n the ‘evealed comparative advantages one cou i past aan altemative vlew traceable bak even beyond Hamilton and List Sig tat he ‘productive fore paon con ad must be porosetaly Constructed, and that current comparative advantages are a luxury that only technological and market leaders can afford (indeed a major asset that they can Sol, = Trnappens tat quite a fev ofthe contort tls volume bea aye bev gute ity wit ts later ew and show —ve Ho eae ac ary of plies and insttions nave been being the earlier catch-up successes of, for example, Korea and Taiwan and more yar cna a na Knowledge and business orgat umulation of knowledge and capabil- ‘We have already mentioned that the accumula bik ie oes ental but isnt exassted by, the upgrading ofthe sls of workers ane technicians, Needless to sy, sch educational efforts ae of paramount importance. And so is the construction of broader social capabilities in sense of Sen (1985). However, there sa fundamental organizational dimension‘Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dos!, and Joseph E. Stiglitz jn such a process, as the whole body of literature from business economics inspired by capabili-based theories of the firm as begun to reveal (for an ‘overview, see Dosi, Marengo, and Faillo, 2008). It is not only or not even primarily an issue of entrepreneurship, which the lack thereof, contrary to ‘common wisdom, might not be a peculiarity af underdevelopment. The pres cencéOf imaginative entrepreneurial efforts of economic survival under hard- stp, and ever the level of enteepreneariat sopmistication of Sica Mafia Gr the Medellin Cartel, bear witness that entrepreneurship" as such might not be a ‘widespread bottleneck for development, Rather, the bottleneck is likely to concern much more some persistent ‘inability to seize opportunities’, para phrasing Albert Hirschman (1958), regarding the productive nianipulation of knowledge, especially when such manipulation has a complex collective dimension, ivolving also the intra-organizational coordination of several actors carrying diverse pieces of knowledge and most often diverse interests fon seemingly ‘entrepreneurship’ vs. “intrapreneurship’ within incumbent firms, see Chapter 18, by Hobday and Perini). Indeed, organization building is one of the most difficult tasks facing developmental industrial policies. The idea that a Toyota, a Samsung, a ‘Tata, an Embraer can just naturally spring up out of a multitude of peasants, just due, again, to the 'magic of the market’, isa fairy tale that few ought to be ready to believe In fact, the characteristics ofthe producers in the catching-up process, their organizational sophistication, and also their nationality (whether ‘domestic of foreign) matters alot in terms of learning patterns (see Amsden’s ‘Chapter 15). ‘Technological learning: a primus inter pares, not a magic bullet ‘We have been arguing that she changes in the pattems of accumulation and procesing of information and knowledge are at the cote of development puters: the “unbound Prometheus” systematically improving technological nd owenizational Knowledge has been a crucial deus ex machina of eatty industnalzaton almost thre centuries ago, and also of subsequent episodes of development (Landes, 1969; and Cipola, 1965; ct also Landes, 1999; Free. man, 1982; Reinert, 2007; Rosenberg, 1976; Mokyr, 1990; and Neson, 2005). However this ft fom being the identification of some image bullet” a fact fconomic hstonans investigating the ‘European exceptionalism’ andes 1990) leading te the industrial Revolution do point i the advances of tecnica {nowedge 3 a crac fctor inthe industrial take-off, However, the European industlization precisely listrates that not even technological advances dre such 2 magic bullet. Many of the technological advances “upon which the Industrial Revolution drew were originally developed, or at least equally known, in other regions, China being 9 prime example. ‘European 4 ‘The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation exceptionalism’ was made possible by a conjunction of complementary coné tions ranging from the ‘scientific attitude’ of inquiry about nature which fos- ered knowledge accumulation and its codification and diffusion, all the way to the characteristics of the political structure and the relations between rulers Jind subjects In this vein, C. Freeman (2008, which puts together an ensemble Of his classic contributions) suggests that national systems of innovation ad production develop and advance (or do not) on the grounds of the co-evolu- fonary dynamics among five sub-domains, and related institutions, governing, {i the generation of sciemtfic knowledge (he is talking primarily of ‘frontier countries}; (ii) the development, improvement, and adoption of new artifacts land new techniques of production (that is the domain of technology) (i) the “cuniomic machine which organizes the production and distribution of goods, services, and iicomes, and together, information flows and pattems of incentives ‘amongst economic agents; (v) the politica! and legal structure; and, finally, (7) the cultural domain, shaping values, norms, and customs. Co-evolutionary dynamics Several scholars are indeed adding substance (implicitly ot explicitiy) to this ‘grand political econcmy’ program: we have already mentioned a few contri- butors to the technology-focused literature, but the ‘grand view’ takes on board the complementary importance of the political economy of iabor relations, income ciaims, prove:t) ris, and Indeed, of culture (working our way back ward, from Mokyt, 2009; North, 2005; Greif, 2006; and Boyer, 1988; all the way. to Karl Marx and Adam Smithy ‘Tis is not the place to discuss in any detall the long history of industrializa- tion in general. Suffice it to say that if there is some truth inthis co-evolutionary story, such truth does not apply only to the Low Countries four centuries ago oF England three centuries back. It does apply equally well toall the later episodes of, industrialization and subsequent self-sustained growth, The co-evolutionary, point is indirectly revealed by the overall shaky results stemming from the {quest for overarching invariant instiautional preconditions for growth or invariant policy recipes for it." (On the contrary, the co-evolutlonary account rests on the sorts of congn- cence conditions between ingredients (including state variables which influence the subsequent dynamics) and processes wherein feature prominently the matchings or mismatchings between capabilities accumulation and the institutions governing the distribution of information and the incentive structures of any one economy. (Incidentally, note that if this view is ccortect, and successful episedes have been the outcomes of different combi- hnatorics among institutional set-ups and learning dynamics, their essence is not likely to be statistically captured by heroic ‘reduced form’ estimations in.Mario Cimol, Giovanni Dos!, and Joseph E. Stiglitz 2 iat fr some pesmi or dng , oF diving acon of aieental pow suppmelly sll tom endoge e Sra ene invatant i el ieee Byway ofa station, conser the onder thelagostesof the ndeying dave the ferent pevormances of Eas Ale an! Latin aoe ak 1900 temzedip ale ining upon Deas ees ea ad ecm, 28 here ot can fins nor tea ae ee sich agnosis of the sgifcanty diferent eeneea soe Pema esrb ne msaconioa cf neal totes and tens of echologeal scan oe fe the pattems of investments in ICT), Together, they also omen we Ss stan serps ang easton, icone ase Ce tin we aes pe tate ane a ‘i igi yts an anos sans ef "staal esa ‘oye pate oor taughareaneer re rai na many a neq chines ae Table 1.3, at he rot of diferent as Asan an a re East San and Latin Arercn performances: dergences oral stems novation and production nthe T98Ds ano 0 asta 2s (as America| ‘paring edecaten stem wh igh propoon Oxon education ater ‘Fengnering sues oer Oo og ‘apd growth of sent and tec actntesat slow nth sagan ako pansion sch Ro ‘Geta and ter eo ace ecateeyatin of rdicn dean, ween of Rab nse oS teswithin te fim ene marketing (epecaly Srl sets mang or Development of suong sence techrcogy ‘Wiskening of scence. technology ifastnictire inasrucire Strong inven offpanese modes of Coniningnuence of xtsated sananeran an tein cain ‘move ‘manseemene ‘ect eer {ene omelet nest ie mance Siw development torn Song ae a roving secon nates wth wa cern na elton nae th ow expos Mor antral, pats t peciaton erin 7 soba eantons Saco ne rons gn oi perpionemcnance irlgy Lewitt omens 7 Loventienatnntain ‘apie oly corned Fram genre protection with ants sng tecelogie ag ard ‘een sleguardsIo wi mat gone ereratangrerselng even unde rgines of th Scan HT! iment ret: mate (ot e380) “ he epataran core aaibton ey unequalincome btn —and Sous aeration Brena, nd aba (199) nd ean GO) ‘The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation ‘of how policies and institution-building have shaped both the accumulation of technological and organizational capabilities and the political economy in which it is embedded, Taking a centennial perspective, Reinert identifies a kind of Invariance in the inspiring principle for successful catching-up policies, namely a philosophy of emulation vis-a-vis world technological leaders, irrespective of revealed com- parative advantages. (More on that in the conclusions to this book) This applies to pre-Industrial Revolution England; nineteenth-century Germany from the Zollwrein onward; the United States since its constitution; Japan, starting from the Meiji restoration well into the second half of the twentieth. century; post-WWII Korea; and also the policy antecedents of current successes fof China and India, On the later, see the (deliberately controversial) chapters below by Singh and Dahiman (Chapters 11 and 12 respectively). ‘A historical topography of policy experiences is in Di Maio’s contribution (Chapter 5), while Peres (in Chapter 7) traces the somewhat shy comeback of industrial policies—ridden of implementation huedles—in Latin America afer the apotheosis of the "Washington Consensus’ (and the experience ofits fled promises) Some chapters reconstruct the role of both macroeconomic and industrial policies along the history of a country’s development: see Castro on Brazil, Kosacoff and Ramos on Argentina, and Singh on India, (Other contributions explicitly compare different countries or groups of them in their performances and try to identify the role of policies underlying the lfferent patterns of specialization and growth: see Palma on the comparison of East Asia versus Latin America, and Dahlman on a comparative assessment of both policies and outcomes of India and China, Another group of contributions addresses, so to speak horizontally, specific policy domains. So, Akyuz revisits the Importance of trade policies for local industrial development and assesses the consequences of the newly introduced. constraints in their use stemming from the WTO regime of intemational, ‘exchanges, But even granted ‘infant industry protection’ (something that indeed Is not granted any longer), what are the organizational loci where learning occurs and how does thelr nature affect knowledge accumulation? Entrepreneurship, incumbent organizations, and development bday and Perini analyze the role of entrepreneurship in the development process, dispelling also the myth of a diffused entrepreneurial potential for industrial development hidden in marginality and compressed by bureaucracy and ted tape. As we already mentioned, developed capitalist economies have no ‘monopoly of entrepreneueial efort. A distinguished feature of industrial econ fomies, however, is that a significant share of such effort is devoted to theMario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosl, and Joseph E. Stiglitz ‘manipulation and improvement of products and production technologies, and the development and maintenance of organizations able to implement them. These are the types of entrepreneurial and managerial abilities required by the reat transformation, And indeed, as Amsden’s chapter argues, most often the accumulation of technological and managerial capabilities has historically oc ‘curred within domestic firms rather than within subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms, One of the reasons for this phenomenon (which is not going to disap- ‘peat see also the remarks in Chapter 3 by Castaldi,Cimoli, Correa, arid Desi) is tbat even when MNCs are an important source of capital investment, they. often carry a relatively limited technology transfer, with the most tacit forms fof knowledge and a good deal of R&D activities being kept in developed. ‘countries (indeed, often near the corporate headquarters). One could say that MNCs tend to bring in higher ‘static capabilities’ but also often entail greater bbstacles to local ‘dynamic’ learning capabilities. Institutions supporting the great transformation ‘We have repeatedly emphasized knowledge accumulation as a central process within any industriaization strategy, occurting to a good extent but not excl sively within business firms. As Chapter 14 by Mazzoleni and Nelson shows, the ‘process when it occurs effectively—is supported and nurtured by the activities ‘of applied research, training, consultancy, and adaptation of technologies to local conditions undertaken by universities and public iaboratories. ‘Technological leaming, of course, does not happen in thin air, but rather goes hand in hand with investment in physical equipment and intangibles. And, in tum, that requires the mobilization of financial resources and their transfer to industry. By now the economics profession is well aware of the implications of the fundamental informational asymmetries underlying industry financing, be it via credit or via equity (cf. Stiglitz and Welss, 1981). This applies in general, and even more so to Industralizing countries, How did earlier industralizers cope with such endemic and massive ‘informational imperfections’, and what ‘may that experience teach current catching-up countries? The question is addressed in Chapter 16 by Colin Mayer drawing upon the early history of industrialization of England and Germany. The literature often emphasizes the difference between a supposedly market-based (and equity-based) English sys- tem and a credit-based German one. The chapter argues that the differences were less pronounced than it appears at a frst glance, even if the two system: differed in the ways equities were intermediated. In fact, the crucial point— entailing also a major normative lesson for ‘institutional engineering’ in devel- ‘oping countries—concems the development of institutional arrangements fostering relations of trust In equity intermediation (incidentally, note also ‘The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation shat, notwithstanding ‘globalization’, these relations are bound to have an ntsinsically ‘local’, possibly national, or even regional, dimension) ‘The appropriability of knowledge and the opportunities for imitation ‘Technological learning throughout the catchingvup process, and especially in its eatly phase, involves a lot of imitation, reverse engineering, marginal modi- fications of products ane processes, and straightforward copying (the point has finally come through even the official discourse of some international organ- izations: see World Bank, 2008; and ECLAC, 2008). It has been so in the past in England vis-vis the Netherlands, in the US vis-a-vis England, in Japan vis-i-vis, the developed West, and itis so nowadays in the case of China, However, the possibilty of successfully undertaking such activities of imita- tion in the broadest sense depends, first, on the absorptive capabilities of the various counties (cf, Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, who write about firms, but the notion can be easily extendee to countries composing interrelated ensem- bles of firms and complementary organizations). Absorptive capabilities funda- mentally concem the ways in which past achievements in knowledge accumiiation influence future iearning potential (and, as such they impinge also on the degrees of path-dependency that the process of capability-building splays) ‘Second, given whatever absorptive capabilities, the easiness of imitation is, modulated by the degrees of appropriabiity of the various technologies—b¥ which we mean a measure of the ability of the originators/owners of the process and product technologies to Keep to themselves the relevant under- lying knowledge and/or the ensuing claims to the economic benefits coming. tom the exploitation of such knowledge. It happens that quite often appro- priability conditions depend to a large extent on the nature of technological and production knowledge itself (cf. Dosi, Marengo, and Pasquali, 2006, and. the literature cited therein). Imitating a Boeing or an Airbus is likely to be hard in itself irrespective of the legal conditions of knowledge appropriation, while these conditions might greatly affect the possiblity of reproducing a new chemical entity. However, appropriablity conditions are also affected by the tegitnes of intellectual Property Rights IPR). Clearly, other things being equal, tighter IPR regimes imply harder conditions for Imitation, The issue is dis- cussed in Chapter 19 by Cimoli, Corlat, and Primi. Historically, imitative activites by catching-up countsies have occurred under quite lax conditions regarding the international enforcement of IPR, especially with regard to then. developing countries, So, for example, until the mid-nineteenth century the United States was not recognizing patents to non-nationals and the pro- domestic bias continued long after. Germany and Japan originally allowedMario Cimali Giovanni Dosi, and Joseph E. Sti utiity pul, covering also minor Improvements over state-of heart wears most often protecting local ‘creative imitators. In fies lke pharmaceatalsindeed the technological area where (FR count most— eaarrmas uk aly and Switzevahd (the headquarters of some major drugs sa pnt) recognized {PR altogether only around three decades ago. ‘Things have damatially changes since, with the current scene featuring seins ssements and an unexpected novel aggressiveness of US and European companies in their IPR protection even against seemingly marginal Infoimgemeatsand even atthe cost Of work! moral outrage, asin the case of arn aervial drugs, Does all tS change the Imitation opportunities of airgap counees? Iso, general, Or only in some technologies? While this bosk bot focused primarily 0n this Issue, the evidence discussed in Chrno cai and Primi’s chapter Seems to suggest that a tighter IPR enforce- shen rege has effects on the imitation/calching-up process that range seen reap irelevant and the quite harmful: certainly, the positive sign is harelly to eseen on the screen. Incentives and rents in the political economy of learning “The reader wll have already noticed that the thread of our argument rests more gn noon such as knowledge, information, capabilities, and learning rather than incentives. This is also what distinguishes this line of interpretation of development poceses from anothe One inspired by the principle of ‘getting he inven ight and everyehing Wil follow’. The thrust of our argument i that, given whatever Incentives, “eatting how to seize technological and or finlzational opportunities’ isa fundamental driver of industialization, Granted that however, the two dimensions are far from orthogonal {@.As discused in detafl in Chapter 13 by Khan and Blankenburg, the politcal aennomy of sxe) industralzaion entails the compatibility of technological ind ongantatonal strategies with the pollical constraints arising from the distribution of power among socal Ups (and often also fypm external influ. ences, including, of course, foreigh economic and political entities). In this fespect, the 0 paradox of the politcal economy of development is that thove supposedly in charge of leading the development strategies are the very sroups which have huge vested inteests in and derive huge rents feom, the Status quo, Hence the need to engineer What the authors call ystems of institu. onal cempuson lending momenta to imitation, productivity growe, pro- ‘Guction exguson, and eventually Innovation. In tur, this involves the political ilty directly or indiecty allocate developmental rent to the ators Of the ‘ret tansformation’ (and aso withdraw them according to perform ghee), Thisisi fact what has happened in many Far Eastern countries, but not in most Lain American ones. And the comparison also vividly illustrates the 10 ‘The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation Gecumstances under which unleashing the rent-seeking gente of capitalism has tunleashed also the ‘Unbound Prometheus’ of technological progress as distin- guished from those other circumstances whereby it just triggered the search for rents fl stop ‘Stick-and-carrot and rent governance issues emerge also at the more iecumscribed domain of market regulation and competition policies, ad- caressed in Chapter 17 by Possas and Borges. The framework is broadly speaking ‘Schumpeterlan’, In that the virtue of competition policies is judged against the yardstick of the performance dynamism that a particular market structure fosters, rather than in terms of the standard textbook triangles of static allocation and welfare measures. At early stages of Industral ccevelpment, infant industry considerations militate against the viability of ‘competition policies either as a rent-curbing stick or an innovatlon-enhancing carrot, Thus, other institutional devices should be in place in order to govern “developmental rents’ and spur the ‘developmental compulsion’ discussed by Khan and Blankenburg, including performance-telated allocation of finance, foreign currency, subsidies, and diverse taxation regimes. The frst three decades cof Korean industrialization are a good case in point. And older historical ex- perience reinforce it: competition policies have typically been introduced In all, catching-up countries well after the initial industraliztion drive—in the US as \vell as in Germany, Italy, and Japan, However, Possas and Borges argue that above a certain threshold of development competition policies become (or at least ought to become) an important ingredient of industrial polices, often ‘under negligible trade-offs between rent-cerbing and incentives to innovate, # ‘The consistency conditions among macro policies and industrial policies Industral policies, in the broad definition adopted here, area constant presence in all historically observed successes in industralization. However, they require compatible macro polices, including exchange rates, taxation, fiscal policies, public investment, governance of the labor market, and income distribution, This is another crucial facet of the political economy of industralization. It 4s also a theme recurrent In several chapters, especially these analyzing the experience of single countries or comparing them (see in particular Chap- ters 3-10, by Palma; Kosacoff and Ramos; and Castro respectively). There is more dramatic way to make the same point: there are combinations of macro policies which are bound to suffocate industrial development and sterilize most, ‘opportunities of success of moze technology- and industry-oriented policies, even when tried. The point is well illustrated by the application of the ‘Washington Consensus’ policy package in Latin America (with the partial uesi, and Joseph E, Sigh Mario Cimoli, Giovanni exception of Brazil), with its devastating effects on industrial production cap. acity and technological capabilities—which often disappeared together with the firms that were carrying them (for some evidence cf, also the chapter by Castaldi et al.) This is even more striking when the effects of the Latin American macro shocks are compared with the outcomes at industrial level of much less oxtho= ddox responses to financial and exchange rate crises such as in Korea and other Far Eastern economies. We discuss these examples in Stigitz (2002 and 2006). Certainly, the sudden liberalization process together with orthodox macro policies in Latin America had a massive weeding out’ effect. However, there is ro guarantee—either in biology or even less so in economics—that a major selection shock allows any one species to survive, And in fact what happened in. South America (outside Brazil) was that in the aftermath of the shock one found, piles of rubble where before cne had a variegated, even if often inefficient, industrial structure, with few survivors—except in some natural-resource ‘based activities (these activities have experienced a boom in the recent past driven by the spectacular increase in demand for energy and raw materials ‘especially by China, but a big question mark remains concerning their ability 1 lead the industzalization of whole countries: we shall come back to the issue sn the conclusion), How much are the lessons from the past helpful for the future? In our ew there litle doubt tha he historical lessons point out the crucial importance of various ensembles of Industral polices and institionbulling effos In nurturing capabilities accomolation and indus development Indeed, the chaptes which follow add several original Insights to such ev. dence, However, even granted that, elas resort ofthe skeptic rss inthe viet that even what applied to the past will ot apply to te future the mage that was not performed by the Washington Consens policy medicines glng to Come around nonetheless sa natal by-product of gobalzation In order 0 Adress this conjecture tn the chapter by Casall eta. we set the cunt trends against secular bacground evidence on the international dstabution of innovative activites, the pattems of technological diftsion, the structure of international trade Hows and income growth, One major mesage ofthe analy i that dieryence and hetergeety have been and continue tobe the dominant tendencies in the world economy. Second and related, nowt standing the type, thee appears to be alot of sloballzation of (shorter) finance but eatvel te, any In erms of tecnologia capalites In act Ae could well be that under conditions of dyna increasing etuns, more international openness of capital and tae ows might well naturally" induce vergence actos regions and counties Hence, tn our, als the continuing 2 ‘The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation importance of measures of discretionary policy intervention able to trigger and fuel what we have called the ‘great industria transformation’ ‘Cleary, the international conditions have changed compared to when, say, the United States was taking its first steps toward catching-up, and even compared to when Korea or Taiwan were entering the international scene. The WTO and the TRIPS agreements are putting some novel constraints on what polices can land cannot do with respect to both their domestic industry and to trade flows. Furst-workd companies are as aggressive as ever before in the defense of their proprietary technologies. The very emergence of China as a major industrial player has profoundly changed the pattems of opportunities and constraints, facing other actual or would-be industializers. Despite all of the above being, true, the processes of knowledge accumulation and industrial development con- ‘nue to require relatively massive doses of public policies and institution- building to mold a national political economy friendly to technological and ‘organizational learning, Somte of the basic building blocks of such policies wil be spelled out in the conclusion, Notes hs and Warner (1997) isa known short example of the genre: more specifically on the fle of institutions and policies within the ‘new political economy’ style of inter- pretation, ch, the somewhat diverging views of Acemogh, Johnson, and Robinson 2001), Eastesiy and Levin (2003), Rodsk 2008). For a sharp etique of mono-ausal explanations of underdevelopment, see Adelman (2001), together with a few other ‘contributions to Melee and Stig: (2007). 2, Are these patterns going to persist also under the current ‘globalized regime’ of pro- “suction? in fact the evidence suggests a igniBcant increase in the intemationalzation fof R&D activities (ct the evidence critically reviewed in Narula and Zanfei, 2005). Hovsever such paters involve primarllyinta-OECD investments. Whe the question, ‘open, we tend to believe that the weakness of the incentives, If any, 10 purposefully transfer major ‘dynamic capabilites’ of innovative search to newly in- Austrakising countries—including China—is Ukely to persist also the mare 3. In fact, another task force of the IPD is currenely preparing a report on the subject, References Acemogly, D, Jolnson,S., and Robinson, J. (2003) "he Colonial Origins of Economic Development: Aa Empirical Investigation". 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