Rescher's Idealistic Pragmatism PDF

Rescher's Idealistic Pragmatism
Author(s): Laurence Bonjour

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Jun., 1976), pp. 702-726
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
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RESCHER'S IDEALISTIC PRAGMATISM

LAURENCE BONJOUR
X here can be little doubt that systematic philosophy is undergoing

a resurgence. In particular, recent years have witnessed a growing
tendency on the part of major analytic philosophers to forsake rela
tively piecemeal treatments of narrowly circumscribed topics in favor
of more ambitious systematic discussions of traditional philosophical
issues. One of the latest adherents to this trend is Nicholas Rescher.
In a series of four books, three already published plus one forth

coming, Rescher offers what is clearly intended as a fairly compre
hensive philosophical system, embracing central issues of epistemol
ogy, the philosophy of science, and metaphysics. Rescher calls his
system "Idealistic Pragmatism," and the elements of this label are
reflected in the titles of the individual books: The Coherence Theory of
Truth, The Primacy of Practice, Conceptual Idealism, and Methodo

logical Pragmatism.x
In fact, Rescher's system divides rather neatly into two compon
ents, which seem to be only loosely connected with each other, one
of them predominantly pragmatic and one predominantly idealistic.
The pragmatic component is an elaborate and highly complicated

epistemological theory, expounded mainly in CTT and MP, which of
fers a coherentist account of epistemic justification together with a
pragmatic meta-justification or validation of this account. The

idealistic component, presented mainly in CI, centers around the
thesis that our ordinary common sense conceptual framework in
1 The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1973) [CTT]; Conceptual Idealism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973) [CI];

The Primacy of Practice (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973) [PP];- and
Methodological Pragmatism (forthcoming from Basil Blackwell) [MP].
References to these books will use the indicated abbreviations, and will be
placed in the text. References to CTT, CI and PP are to pages, unless

otherwise noted; references to the not yet published MP are to chapter and
section. (Rescher describes the last three books, those published by Black
well's, as his "Idealistic Pragmatism trilogy," excluding CTT; it seems quite
clear, however, from cross-references and from overlap of content, that CCT
belongs with the others and is distinguished from them only by virtue of
having a different publisher.) I wish also to thank Professor Rescher for

making the manuscript of MP available to me.
703
IDEALISTIC PRAGMATISM
volves essential reference to mind, and thus that the world-as-we
conceive-it is conceptually (though not ontologically) mind
dependent.2 Since it is the former component, the epistemological

theory, which appears to have the greater philosophical importance,
most of this study will be devoted to it. A brief sketch and critique
of Rescher's rather idiosyncratic version of idealism will be offered
in the final section.
I
The basic task of a theory of empirical knowledge may be divided
into two parts.3 The first is to provide a general account of epistemic
justification, of the conditions under which believing or accepting an
empirical proposition is epistemically rational. Here there are many
specific problems, but the most important is a general structural

problem which may be called the regress problem. It is obvious that
much epistemic justification is inferential in character: one proposition
is shown to be justified by inferring it from other propositions which
are offered as reasons for accepting it. But these justifying premises
must themselves be justified, and if they too are justified inferen

tially, a seemingly vicious regress threatens in which the justification
of any proposition presupposes the logically prior justification of other
propositions, which in turn presupposes the still prior justification
of still further propositions, etc., with the apparent result that no
proposition is ever justified. Any adequate epistemology must pro

vide a solution for this problem, and the character of that solution
will have a major impact on the basic structure of the epistemological
theory.
The second part of the epistemological task is to provide a

higher-level justification or rationale for the account of epistemic
justification offered in the first part. Since it is epistemic justification
which is at issue, this must ultimately involve showing that proposi

tions which satisfy the proposed standard of justification are true or
at least likely to be true. Here one main problem is what may be
2 The fourth book, PP, is a collection of relatively independent essays
which supplement, and sometimes duplicate, the material in the other books.
3 Rescher's epistemological discussion is primarily concerned with
empirical or factual truth, though he does have some interesting things to

say as well about logical and conceptual truth. In the limited space of this
study, only the former can be considered.
704
LAURENCE BONJOUR
called the input problem. The system of knowledge is linguistic or

conceptual in character; but the world is non-linguistic and non
conceptual, for the most part. Thus if the cognitive system is to
truly depict the world, it seems evident that there must be some
sort of contact between the two; and this must involve, if we put
aside extreme versions of idealism, some sort o? input from the world
into the cognitive system. The problem is to say what form this
input takes and how it integrates with the proposed standard of
epistemic justification.
The standard way of dealing with the twofold task just described
is the foundationalist theory of knowledge. This view is best under
stood as a direct and indeed seemingly inevitable response to the
regress and input problems. In its most typical version, the founda
tionalist theory holds that most empirical propositions are justified,
if at all, by virtue of being inferable from a set of basic propositions
which are "given" in "immediate experience." The justification of
these basic propositions, in contrast, allegedly does not depend on
inference from other empirical propositions, so that the regress of
empirical justification terminates when they are reached. The input
problem is then solved by appeal to the doctrine that in such immedi
ate experience the mind is directly confronted with non-conceptual,
an sich reality. And thus the second part of the epistemological
task is discharged by claiming that such basic propositions, since
they merely formulate what is revealed in this mind-world confronta
tion, are infallibly true?so that their inferential consequences,

given an acceptable mode of inference, are at least likely to be true.4
Rescher's epistemological theory, like much other recent work in
the theory of knowledge, represents an explicit attempt (CTT 207ff.)
to find an acceptable alternative to this traditional foundationalist

view. Clearly such a non-foundationalist alternative must deal satis
factorily with the regress and input problems, since it is these

problems which constitute the main motivation and argument for
foundationalism. Thus, these two problems may serve as a conven
ient framework for presenting and assessing Rescher's position.
4 Various recent versions of the foundationalist view make weaker
claims on behalf of basic propositions, e.g., claiming only incorrigibility
rather than infallibility and weakening the claim of direct confrontation
with the world. The way in which such views propose to deal with the
input problem and the second part of the epistemological task is often left
very obscure.
705
The basic ingredients of Rescher's position are three key ideas,

all of them in one way or another opposed to the main thrust of
traditional foundationalism. Two of these are familiar weapons in the
anti-foundationalist arsenal: systematic coherence and pragmatic suc
cess (though Rescher offers novel interpretations for both of them).
The third key idea, at once the most original and most problematic
element of Rescher's position, is the idea o? epistemic stratification:
It becomes essential to recognize the fact that a claim which is "one
and the same thesis" insofar as its substance or content is concerned
may enter into the cognitive sphere ... at very different levels.
At the outset, its status can be that of a mere assumption (whose
sole initial basis is that of a regulative postulate or conjecture). It
may then gradually come to be raised to the status of a reasonably well
substantiated contention. . . . Therefore it may become a firmly es
tablished thesis and finally even a known fact. Such a cyclic revalida
tion or cognitive upgrading of theses is a by now familiar aspect
of our approach. . . . (MP VII, 5)
As we shall see, this notion of epistemic stratification is an essential
part of Rescher's solution to the regress problem. It allows him to

introduce justifying premises under the rubric of presumptions or
postulates or assumptions, thereby avoiding the immediate problem
of how they are to be justified as truths. But it should be clear
that such an approach runs a serious risk of question-begging, since
even counting a proposition as a presumption seems to require some
sort of justification. Whether Rescher's actual account of these

matters finally avoids question-begging will be considered in more de
tail later on.
The main outlines of Rescher's view are as follows. In CTT,

he offers what he calls a "coherence criterion of empirical truth,"
in which the main ingredients are the notion of epistemic stratification
and a very non-standard conception of coherence. In MP (and also

to some extent in CTT and PP), he offers a general account of the
meta-justification of such criteria of truth (which, however, makes no
explicit reference to the particular criterion of CTT); the main

ingredient of this account is the appeal to pragmatic success, but
both epistemic stratification and a more standard conception of coher
ence are also involved. It is clear that these two accounts cor
respond roughly at least to the two parts of the epistemological task
distinguished above, and that pragmatic success is for Rescher the

basic input from the world into the cognitive system. But there are
two major problems in Rescher's position which will require more ex
706
LAURENCE BONJOUR
tended discussion. One is how he proposes to solve the regress

problem, over and above the appeal to epistemic stratification which,
as suggested above, is inadequate by itself. The second is his precise

stance toward the second part of the epistemological task: in various
places (e.g., MP II) Rescher seems to argue that no purely "theoreti

cal" meta-justification of a criterion of truth is possible; but a major
part of his account seems to constitute precisely an attempt at such a
theoretical justification (albeit one in which the fact of pragmatic

success is a crucial premise). We shall have to return to these issues
below.
II
The first topic for consideration is Rescher's "coherence criterion
of truth." As the phrase "criterion of truth" suggests, what Rescher
offers in CTT is not a coherence theory of the meaning or nature of
truth. Any such view is rejected at the very outset, and in fact
Rescher has little to say here or elsewhere about the nature of truth
beyond a rather vague endorsement of the correspondence theory

in the guise of the "semantic conception of truth" (see CTT 5-9;
MP VI, l).5 What is offered instead is an "authorizing criterion"
of empirical truth, the satisfaction of which is held to give ration
ally adequate, though not logically conclusive, grounds for a claim of
empirical truth?such a criterion thus constituting a standard of

epistemic justification.
The idea of a coherence standard of epistemic justification or
criterion of truth, though possessed of a long and distinguished
history, has generally been rejected in recent epistemology on the
basis of apparently overwhelming objections. The most prominent of
these is the multiple coherent systems objection. There are, it is

argued, indefinitely many, equally coherent systems of propositions,
each in conflict with the others; and any internally consistent proposi
tion will be a member of at least one such system. Thus if coherence
5 Though what Rescher takes the semantic conception to amount to is
left very unclear. In CI, moreover, Rescher claims to have abandoned

"the correspondence theory of reality," the idea that truth requires
correspondence to an extra-theoretical reality, in favor of "a coherence
theory of reality." We are told, however, that this does not require the
abandonment of the correspondence theory of truth, but only its reinter
pretation (CI 167-71). This obviously leaves the significance of Rescher's

endorsement of the correspondence theory even more in the dark.
707
were the sole standard of epistemic justification, the sole authoriz

ing criterion of truth, then all of these systems would qualify as
rationally acceptable, forcing either a complete agnosticism or else an
arbitrary choice among them (see CTT 48-50). Rescher's response

to this threatened reductio ad absurdum is the introduction of the
concept of a datum:
A datum is a truth-candidate, a proposition taken not as true, but as
potentially or presumptively true. It is a prima facie truth in exactly
the same sense in which one speaks of prima facie duties in
ethics. . . . (CTT 54)
It is with these data that a proposition must cohere (in a sense yet to be
explained) in order to satisfy the proposed criterion of truth; thus the
multiple coherent systems objection is at least provisionally avoided.
According to Rescher, the following sorts of propositions are ex

amples of data: first-person sensory reports and memory reports; the
testimony of other observers; historical records of various sorts; prob
able consequences of already accepted propositions; hypotheses with
enough initial plausibility to be worthy of serious consideration.

He denies that any single criterion of datahood can be given, but seems
to suggest that there will be a large and heterogeneous set of such

criteria.
The main issue, however, is how the choice of data is to be

justified. Rescher's data, unlike those in the most standard versions
of foundationalism, are not claimed to be infallibly true or even to have
sufficient warrant to satisfy the minimum requirement for knowledge;
there is merely some small epistemic presumption in their favor. But
even this small presumption needs some sort of justification, if the

epistemic results derived from it are to be non-arbitrary. If the
appeal is to criteria of datahood, then the question arises in turn of
how such criteria are justified, etc., thus leading to a version of the
regress of justification discussed earlier. One solution would be a
weak version of foundationalism in which the basic beliefs are held
to have only a small degree of initial warrant, rather than being

infallible.6 Given his anti-foundationalist inclinations, it seems likely
6 Rescher sometimes seems to think that the only problem with
foundationalism is that the basic propositions are claimed to be certain or

infallible. But this seems mistaken. Many recent versions of foundational
ism make no such claim of certainty. And in any case, the basic problem
is how any degree of epistemic warrant, however minimal, can be
underived and yet not merely arbitrary.
708
LAURENCE BONJOUR
that Rescher would want to avoid such a weak foundationalist view,

but he comes very close to slipping into it in some places, especially
in CTT. Whether he has a clear alternative to propose will be con
sidered later.
If then the conception of data is tentatively accepted, subject to
later reconsideration, the next question is how coherence with the

data is to be understood. Rescher's answer, surprisingly, is that a
proposition coheres with the data if it is a consequence of the data
?though the consequence-relation involved is, at the least, a very
unusual one. More familiar sorts of consequence relations are un
suitable for Rescher's purposes, since on his account the set of data is
virtually certain to be inconsistent, the main reason being that it is to
include, as we have seen, all competing hypotheses which have a
serious claim to acceptance. Thus, Rescher needs a consequence

relation which will avoid the unacceptable result that all propositions
are consequences of such a set of data.

The proposed solution involves two steps. First, the data are to
be segregated into maximal consistent subsets (hereafter m.c.s.), i.e.,
into the largest subsets which are possible while retaining consistency.
These subjects, and their deductive consequences, are the closest

one can come to satisfying the truth-claims of all the data; they thus
represent our epistemic alternatives relative to that set of data.

What is now needed is a way of selecting one or more of these m.c.s. as
epistemically superior to the others. If this could be done in an

epistemically justified way, then the consequences of the preferred
m.c.s. might be regarded as consequences, in avery extended sense,
of the original data?and, hence, classified as true by the proposed
truth-criterion. Thus, second, Rescher offers four7 alternative

methods for choosing such a "preferred" m.c.s.; these methods are
the core of his coherence criterion of truth.
Forty pages of CTT are devoted to explaining these methods

and illustrating them with an abundance of schematic examples taken
from the propositional calculus. But in spite of this very elaborate

discussion, the methods seem extremely dubious. (Rescher clearly
wants to claim that these methods, or something approximating
them, are actually involved in the cognitive practice of science and
7 This leaves out of consideration a fifth method, based on expected
utilities, which Rescher himself rejects.
709
common sense, but no real support is ever offered for this claim.8)
In brief outline, the methods are as follows. Method I: Certain
propositions, which may or may not be included among the data,

are treated as "designated theses," and those m.c.s. preferred which
either (a) are consistent with, or (b) entail these propositions.

Method II: The m.c.s. is preferred which contains numerically more
of the data propositions than any other. Method III: Numerical

probabilities may be available for the data or may be assigned
according to the principle of indifference; on this basis resultant
probabilities may then be calculated for each m.c.s., and the m.c.s.
preferred which possesses the highest resultant probability. Method
IV: It may be possible to assign "plausibilities" to the various data
propositions, i.e., numerical rankings which reflect the relative
strength of their epistemic claims; the preferred m.c.s. could then be
the one (a) which contains most or all of the highest ranking proposi
tions, or (b) whose lowest ranking propositions are higher ranked

than those of other m.c.s., or (c) whose average plausibility is the
highest. Rescher does not explicitly opt for one of these methods
over the others, suggesting that each will be of service in appropriate
contexts; in general, however, he seems to favor the plausibility

method as being the most widely useful.
There are several serious difficulties with these methods of m.c.s.
preference, which threaten to vitiate Rescher's whole enterprise.

The first is simply that of choosing in a non-arbitrary way among
the various methods and among the different variants which are of
fered for two of them. Rescher says very little about how such a
choice is to be made, offering only a vague appeal to context; this
seems obviously inadequate in a general epistemological theory.9 A
second difficulty is that all of the methods are heavily influenced in
their results by the precise way in which the data are formulated,
8 This is, in fact, a major lacuna in Rescher's discussion. Obviously
a pragmatic defense of such a criterion of truth must presuppose that it has

actually been employed in practice.
9 In fact the criterion of truth presented by Rescher in CTT grows out
of an earlier work devoted to the problem of counterfactual and hypothetical
reasoning [Hypothetical Reasoning (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1964)],
and two chapters of CTT are devoted to the application of the criterion of
truth in the more restricted areas of counterfactual reasoning and informa
tion processing. In these more limited applications such an appeal to context
might well be unobjectionable.
710
LAURENCE BONJOUR
including even such trivial matters as whether two propositions are

listed separately or combined into a conjunction. Rescher has nothing
to say about any preferred method of listing the data or about how
such a preference could be justified. A third difficulty is that all
of the methods except II (which is most subject to the second dif
ficulty) require that the propositions in question be somehow assigned
unequal epistemic status prior to the operation of the criterion, rather
than merely being listed as prima facie truth candidates, all on the
same footing. A truth criterion or standard of justification which
demands such detailed epistemic differentiation as an input will ob
viously be difficult to apply without question-begging. This difficulty
thus aggravates the already serious problem of how the selection of
data is to be justified.10
Paradoxically enough, these weaknesses in Rescher's criterion of
truth seem to derive, at least in part, from his striking neglect of
most of the elements which are involved in the traditional concep
tion of coherence. As employed by the classical idealists and by

various recent philosophers, coherence is a very rich notion which
includes far more than mere consistency. The rough idea, of course,
is that a set of propositions is coherent to the extent to which its

members fit together into a relatively tight system. The connecting
links in such a system are variously described as relations of infer
ence, of mutual confirmation, or of explanation. Now it is clear that
Rescher's eschewal of this traditional conception of coherence is quite
deliberate: he regards it as unacceptably imprecise and obscure, and

intends to construct a more rigorous, formalized substitute (CTT
vii). But his substitute seems to take no note of the various
systematic relations among propositions (besides consistency), which

are the basis for the traditional conception, and instead treats the
data-propositions more or less in isolation from each other in terms of
individual probabilities, plausibilities, etc.11 The result seems

inadequate as an ingredient in a systematic epistemology and even
10 Part of Rescher's answer here is that such epistemic differentiation

will result from previous applications of the criterion. But this does not ex
plain how we get started in the first place.
11 Rescher might want to claim that these systematic relations be

tween propositions are somehow reflected in the assignment to them of
plausibilities; but then his criterion would, to the extent that method IV is
employed, presuppose rather than explicate the traditional conception of

coherence.
711
more so as an account of coherence. (As we shall see below,

Rescher does employ something much closer to the traditional con
ception of coherence in the meta-epistemological account of M P.)
Ill
Whether or not these problems concerning Rescher's proposed
criterion of truth can be solved, there remains the task of providing
a justification or rationale for the criterion, of showing that it is indeed
an acceptable criterion of truth.12 As noted earlier, Rescher's ap

peal is to the pragmatic success which is achieved through the use
of such a criterion and through acting upon its results. How exactly
this pragmatic justification of a criterion of truth is to be understood
depends crucially on the proper interpretation of the following argu
ment, the "Wheel Argument," which claims that it is impossible to

establish a direct link between a criterion of truth C and truth itself.
Such a justification could be achieved

in only one way: by looking on the one hand at C -validated propositions
and checking on the other hand if they are in fact truths. But if C
really and truly is our [working] criterion for the determination of
factual truth, then this exercise becomes wholly pointless. We cannot
judge C by the seemingly natural standard of the question whether
what it yields as true is indeed actually true, because we ex hypothesi
use C itself as the determinant of just this. (CTT 239 = PP 2 = MP II,
2; the bracketed word is added in PP and M P.)
Thus no non-circular justification of this sort is possible. According to
Rescher, this argument

shows in as clear a manner as philosophical argumentation admits of
that our standard of factual truth cannot be validated by somehow
showing that it does indeed accomplish properly its intended work of
truth determination. (CT 239; cf. PP 2 and MP II, 2, in which there

are slight changes.)
What exactly is this "Wheel Argument" supposed to show?

There are two possible interpretations of the argument, one consider
ably more radical than the other, between which Rescher seems to
12 As mentioned above, the discussion in MP makes no very explicit
reference to the particular criterion of truth set out in CTT, but instead
constitutes a general account of how any such criterion of truth might be
justified. This inevitably produces some obscurity about how exactly
the two books should be fitted together. Thus, the account offered here is,
to a certain extent, an idealized reconstruction.
712
LAURENCE BONJOUR
waver. On the weaker interpretation, what the argument shows is

that the second part of the epistemological task cannot be accomplished
in a direct, empirical fashion by simply checking to see if at least most
of the propositions which satisfy the criterion of truth or standard
of justification are in fact true. Thus, if a theoretical connection be

tween a criterion of truth and truth itself is to be established, this
must be done indirectly, presumably on a partially a priori basis.
And such an indirect argument, with the pragmatic success of the
criterion as a crucial premise, seems to be exattly what Rescher
offers in the central chapters o? MP. On this interpretation, the
pragmatic appeal is not an alternative to a theoretical justification,
but rather an intermediate step in such a justification.
On the more radical interpretation, in contrast, what the argu
ment shows is that no theoretical justification of a criterion of truth
is possible, even indirectly. In chapter II o? MP, Rescher argues

extensively that human cognitive activity has two distinct categories
of purpose, "the theoretico-cognitive" and the "practico-active," and
goes on to claim that since a criterion of truth cannot, according to the
Wheel Argument, be justified by reference to the former, the

justificatory appeal must be to the latter. This suggests that the
pragmatic appeal is ultimate, and hence, that a theoretical skepticism
is inescapable. On such a view, the second part of the epistemological
task, as described above, cannot be completed: one cannot show that
the proposed standard of epistemic justification (or criterion of truth)
will, if adopted, even probably lead to truth, but only that its results
are pragmatically successful. This much more extreme view is also

suggested by other things that Rescher says in MP (see especially
MP X); and it fits well with some of the more extreme expressions of
idealism in CI.
Which of these two interpretations of the Wheel Argument

Rescher finally intends is unclear. But the discussion here will
concentrate on the first, weaker interpretation?both because much
of Rescher's discussion, including especially the "metaphysical deduc
tion" of a criterion of truth (considered later in this section), seems
to make clear sense only on that interpretation, and because the

weaker interpretation seems to be all that actually follows from the
argument.
Pragmatism has many forms. The most familiar of these is what
Rescher calls thesis pragmatism: the view, most prominent in James,
according to which practical success provides direct validation for
713
particular factual theses. The standard objection to such a view is of

course that no link between practical success or utility and truth can
be established. Rescher develops this objection to thesis pragmatism
in a great deal of detail, providing a variety of useful schematic
examples (MP IV). His alternative version of pragmatism is
methodological pragmatism: the view that it is cognitive "methods"

(such as the coherence criterion of truth), rather than individual
theses, which are to be justified via an appeal to pragmatic success:13
On this approach,then, the linkage between pragmatic utility and the
truth of theses is broken apart, and methods are inserted into the
gap that opens up. Pragmatic considerations are never brought to bear
on theses directly. The relationship becomes indirect and mediated:
a specific knowledge claim is supported by reference to a method,

which in its turn is supported on pragmatist lines. . . . (MP V, 2)
It should be clear without elaborate discussion that this version
of pragmatism avoids many of the difficulties which beset thesis

pragmatism. The inherent generality of a criterion of truth and the
generality which would consequently have to pertain to its success

undercut the sort of obvious counter-examples which can be con
structed for the other view. But to avoid counter-examples does not
yet establish a positive connection between pragmatic success and

truth at the level of methods. Rescher attempts to establish such a
connection by providing a "metaphysical deduction" to show that it is
very likely that a criterion of truth whose adoption leads to prag

matic success in fact produces predominantly true results.
The basis for this "deduction" is a formidable body of "meta
physical" theses concerning the community of inquirers and the world
in which they operate, which may be briefly summarized as follows.
The inquirers are both active and reasonable: they act and their
actions are guided by their beliefs. There is interaction between
the inquirers and their world: each has a genuine impact on the
other. Nature behaves in a uniform fashion; and it is also non
conspiratorial: it is indifferent to the success or failure of the in
13 Rescher likens the relationship between methodological pragmatism
and thesis pragmatism to that between rule utilitarianism and act
utilitarianism. It is, of course, a familiar objection to at least some forms

of rule utilitarianism that the set of rules which would maximize utility would
contain only one member: the act utilitarian maxim itself. If this were so the
difference between the two forms of utilitarianism would be illusory; and
one might wonder whether the same is true of the two forms of pragmatism.
714
LAURENCE BONJOUR
quirers' endeavors. On the basis of these assumptions, Rescher

argues as follows:
When one views man as a vulnerable creature in close interaction with
a hostile (or at best neutral) environment, it is?to be sure?con
ceivable that action on a false belief or even set of beliefs might be
successful, but it surpasses the bounds of credibility that this might oc
cur systematically, on a wholesale rather than retail basis. Given a

suitable framework of metaphysical assumptions, it is effectively
impossible that success should crown the products of systematically
error-producing cognitive procedures. . . . Inquiry procedures that
systematically underwrite success-conducive theses thus deserve to be
recognized as adequate and credited with a significant measure of
rational warrant. . . . (MP VI, 7)
One difficulty with this rather sketchy argument is that it seems

to need a more elaborate account of truth than Rescher has in fact
provided. Beyond that, there are two further, related questions to be
raised about the argument, questions which bear on one of the central
problems in Rescher's whole position. One concerns the epistemic

status of the "metaphysical" theses outlined above: are they to be
viewed as a priori truths, as empirical theses in need of justification,
or what? Rescher's answer is that initially they are merely pre

sumptions, rationally acceptable for the moment, but subject to reas
sessment in light of subsequent developments. The second ques

tion concerns the other ingredient of the argument, the clearly factual
claim that acting on the output of a given criterion of truth does

indeed lead to pragmatic success. How is this claim to be established
without appeal to some other, and thus prior, criterion of truth?
Rescher's answer is that the needed factual claims about the applica
tion of the criterion in question and the success resulting from

such application are to be regarded, not as established facts, but
rather as data, merely plausible truth-candidates, in the sense dis
cussed earlier (CTT 247-50 = MP III, 2). Thus, data play two quite
distinct roles in Rescher's epistemology, serving both as inputs to the
coherence criterion of truth and as inputs to the "metaphysical

deduction" of the acceptability of that criterion.
Once again the appeal here is to the idea of epistemic
stratification. Needed premises which are not available as truths are

introduced instead as "presumptions." But this cannot be the end of
the matter. Some sort of justification is needed for such presump
tions, so as to impose restrictions on this otherwise blatantly question
begging maneuver.
715
IV
Rescher's account of how such presumptions are justified, and of
the related concept of epistemic stratification, is the most complicated
and difficult part of his position. What is really at issue here, of

course, is his ultimate solution to the regress problem. The appeal
to epistemic stratification can effectively defer this issue at a par
ticular point in the discussion; it also has the effect of partially
diluting the problem by replacing the demand for the justification
of alleged truths with the less exacting demand for the justification
of presumptions and truth-candidates (though this is a genuine gain
only if the "methods" for moving from claims of plausibility to full
fledged claims of truth are acceptable). But epistemic stratification
cannot solve the regress problem. If no justification is finally of
fered for the initial choice of presumptions and data, then no matter
how thoroughly and repeatedly these are reassessed in terms of each
other by such methods as the coherence criterion of truth, the result
will still be epistemically arbitrary.
Rescher's response to this fundamental issue is unfortunately
far from clear. One main theme is an appeal to circular justification
and thus ultimately to systematic coherence. Thus, in discussing the
justification of the metaphysical presumptions which are involved in
the "metaphysical deduction," Rescher offers the following justifica
tory circle: the presumptions justify an inquiry procedure, a criterion
of truth; this criterion of truth justifies various factual theses; and
these factual theses are then used to justify the original metaphysical
presumptions. The three elements "must all fit smoothly with one
another in a careful dovetailing" (MP VII, 1). (Ultimately the
picture is even more complex, since there is a second, interlocking

circle to be considered, involving the direct pragmatic assessment of
the criterion of truth; this will be discussed below.) To the obvious
objection that such a justificatory circle is vicious, so that no real

justification can result from it, Rescher replies that the course of the
justificatory argument is not linear or sequential, in which case the
circle would indeed be vicious, but rather "comprehensively syste

matic, placing its several elements into a coordinative framework
which unites them within one over-all nexus of mutual substanti
ation" (MP VII, 1). The rough idea behind this rather opaque re
mark seems to be that each of the elements is justified by virtue of its
716 LAURENCE BONJOUR

relation to the others in the total context of a coherent system, so
that it is the system which is epistemically primary and upon which
the justification of the elements ultimately depends.14 Applied to the
related issue of the justification of the data, such a view would

presumably mean that the various criteria of datahood are themselves
justified by appeal to other elements of the system and eventually

to coherence. This non-linear, holistic conception of epistemic justi
fication avoids the regress problem at the level of particular

propositions; but the issue of what justifies the acceptance of such a
coherent system still remains.
Unfortunately, however, Rescher has a second answer to the
charge of vicious circularity which must be considered, one which
at least appears to lead in a different direction: the circle is merely
apparent because when the justifying argument returns to the same
place, it is "at a different cognitive lever (MP VII, 9). Thus what
is actually involved is not a circle but "an upward spiral"?or

rather, when the second, interlocking circle to be considered below is
included,
a pair of interlocked, ascending spirals. The present approach to
epistemic validation finds a "double-helix" configuration to lie at the
core of human cognition even as it lies at the core of human life
itself. . . .
Circularity is thus circumvented through the operation of a key
difference not in the theses used, but in their epistemic status.
(MP VII, 9)
The motif of epistemic stratification is by now familiar. We begin

with presumptions and data, and by playing them off against one
another through the use of Rescher's coherence criterion of truth or
more standard conceptions of coherence, we arrive at more and more
firmly established results. But the important point for present

purposes is that on this second, rather picturesque conception, the
circle does not genuinely close and justification appears to be linear?
after all, a spiral is a linear, albeit curved, configuration.
Thus on this second view, apparently, the question of what
justifies the initial presumptions and data (at the bottom of the spiral)
is not to be answered by an appeal to circularity and eventually

14 This is a standard idealist theme, most clearly developed by
Bosanquet in Implication and Linear Inference (London: MacMillan, 1920).
Rescher further elaborates such a view in "Foundationalism, Coherentism,

and the Idea of Cognitive Syst?matisation," Journal of Philosophy (1974),
695-708.
717
to coherence in the way just suggested. What then is the alternative?

The most obvious suggestion, the only one with much plausibility, is
the weak version of foundationalism mentioned briefly in section II,
which would hold that the initial presumptions and data possess a
small degree of initial or intrinsic epistemic warrant?warrant which
does not derive in any way from inference or coherence or pragmatic
considerations. There are many places, especially in CTT, where

Rescher seems to suggest such a view. In particular, he compares
his view to the one suggested by Russell and by Goodman (CTT
116n), and the Russell-Goodman view seems clearly to be just such a
weak version of foundationalism.15 Indeed, if one considers CTT by
itself, in isolation from MP, the weak foundationalist interpreta
tion is the most natural. But, nevertheless, it is highly doubtful
that Rescher really intends to espouse a version of weak founda
tionalism, even in CTT. Besides running counter to his explicit anti
foundationalist animus,16 such a view would be extremely difficult to
defend within the context of Rescher's other views. The problem of
showing that such attributions of initial or intrinsic warrant are not
merely arbitrary or ad hoc, already serious enough for any version of
foundationalism, would be hopelessly exacerbated by the attribution
of such warrant not only to sensory and memory reports, as in
orthodox foundationalist views, but also to "metaphysical theses,"
competing hypotheses, historical reports, reports by other observers,
etc. No doubt all of these things are indeed warranted; but to claim
that their warrant is initial or intrinsic, and therefore not in need of
the sort of discursive rationale which generates the regress problem,
is to beg too many important epistemological questions.
If such a weak foundationalist view is put aside, the holistic,
coherentist view outlined above seems to represent the only very
plausible interpretation of Rescher's position on the regress prob
lem, in spite of conflicting passages like the one quoted above. There
remain, however, several problems concerning such a view. One of
15 See Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1948), part II, chapter 11, and part V, chapters 6 and 7; and
Nelson Goodman, "Sense and Certainty," Philosophical Review 61 (1952),
160-67. See also the useful discussion of the Russell-Goodman view in Israel
Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967),

chapter 5.
16 Unless Rescher is opposed only to those versions of foundationalism

which claim certainty for their basic propositions; such a view is at least sug
gested by the paper cited in note 14, above.
718
LAURENCE BONJOUR
these is ad hominem. As we saw earlier, one main aim of CTT is

the construction of a substitute for the traditional conception of coher
ence, one which is less obscure and more rigorous. But now it turns
out that the meta-justification of the criterion of factual truth which
employs this allegedly more rigorous notion in fact makes very heavy
use of precisely the traditional conception of coherence which was
earlier eschewed. Given the weaknesses, discussed above, of the sub
stitute conception of coherence, this seems to throw the whole project
of CTT into question.
A second problem is that Rescher provides very few details of
how the various sorts of presumptions and criteria of datahood are
to be justified by appeal to coherence, and in many cases it is most
unclear how exactly this might be done. How, for example, is the
criterion of datahood which counts competing hypotheses among the
data to be justified by appeal to coherence? What exactly would a
coherentist justification of the initial plausibility of memory reports
look like? Or one for sensory reports? The suggestion is not that
such a justification cannot be given, though that is what a founda
tionalist would no doubt claim, but rather that the details are at
least far from obvious and that there may well be difficult
problems involved. Thus, Rescher's solution to the regress problem,

even if otherwise acceptable, is at best a pretty vague promissory
note.
The most serious problem, however, is how the appeal to coher

ence is itself to be justified. Why should the mere fact that a body
of data and presumptions, a set of metaphysical theses, a truth
criterion, etc., form a coherent system be a reason for according them
epistemic warrant? And how, if at all, does such a coherent system

receive that input from the non-conceptual world which is clearly a
sine qua non of empirical knowledge? As we know, Rescher's

answer to these questions is in pragmatic terms. It is time to look
more closely at the details of that answer.
An essential part of Rescher's pragmatic meta-justificat
coherentist epistemology is the "metaphysical deductio
above, the conclusion of which was that the results of a p

successful truth criterion are very likely to be true. This
however, even if unobjectionable in other respects, can
719
resolve the questions raised at the end of the last section concerning
the justification of the appeal to coherence and the relation of the

coherent system to the world; this is so because the argument takes
placewithin the cognitive system and is itself dependent on the overall
coherence of that system. Thus the multiple coherent systems objec
tion, which was dealt with at the level of the criterion of truth by ap
peal to the conception of data, now recurs for the cognitive system as
a whole. Why cannot there be many coherent cognitive systems, each
with its own truth criterion, its own body of metaphysical presump
tions, its own internally justified criteria of datahood, and its own
"metaphysical deduction" showing that the results of its truth criterion
are likely to be true? Such systems, despite containing "metaphysical
deductions," would have no effective input from the world and would
fail to be justified.
The solution to this problem, according to Rescher, is that there
are two justifying circles (or spirals), not just one. One circle,
sketched above, is theoretical in character, involving a fitting together
of metaphysical theses, a criterion of factual truth, the factual results
which derive from that criterion, and, presumably, criteria of data

hood, into one coherent system. The second circle is allegedly a prac
tical circle, involving the criterion of truth, the theses it validates,
actions based on those theses, and the pragmatic success or failure
which results, in terms of which the criterion is reassessed. These
two circles interlock: the same truth criterion and factual results
are involved in each; the pragmatic success involved in the second

circle is an essential premise for the "metaphysical deduction" of the
first circle; and the data through which the pragmatic success of
the second circle is established are ultimately justified by the theoreti
cal coherence of the first circle. Thus justification depends on the

fact that both circles close and interlock smoothly.
With respect to the input problem and the ultimate issue of

justification, however, the crucial point is that although most of the
elements of these interlocked circles are within our control, and hence
potentially subject to arbitrary manipulation, the element of prag

matic success, according to Rescher, is not:
In short, while we can change how we think and act, the success or
failure attendant upon such changes is something wholly outside the
sphere of our control. In this crucial respect, our cognitive and active
endeavors propose and nature disposes. . . . Here we come up
against the ultimate, theory external, thought-exogeneously inde
pendent variable. . . . (MP VII, 3)
720
LAURENCE BONJOUR
Thus it is pragmatic success which finally constitutes the vital input
from the world into the cognitive system?what Rescher calls a

"reality principle" (MP VII, 3). Because this essential element is
controlled by the world and not by us, the other elements which are
adjusted, via the two interlocking circles, so as to cohere with it

qualify as likely to be true. The epistemic justification which results
from coherence thus depends essentially on the fact that one of the
elements in the coherent system represents direct input from the

world. It is in this light that the "metaphysical deduction," if other
wise acceptable, may be claimed to constitute a genuine solution to
the input problem and to the second part of the epistemological task.
There are two serious problems, however, with this pragmatic

meta-justification, problems which in one form or another afflict
every version of epistemological pragmatism. The first pertains to
the "metaphysical deduction": the connection between pragmatic suc
cess and probable production of truths by one's truth criterion is

not, finally, as close as Rescher seems to think. No doubt a truth
criterion which yielded results which were utterly discordant with
reality would not lead to pragmatic success; but how close to the
truth such results would have to be in order to be successful would
seem to depend enormously on the particular world in question and
the particular needs and purposes of the beings which inhabit it. It is
far from obvious that a criterion which produced only very approxi
mately accurate results could not, in some circumstances, be more
pragmatically successful than one whose results were more accurate
?especially since Rescher allows the criterion of truth in question to
consist of a disjunctive set of partial criteria which apply to differ
ent areas of inquiry (MP VII, 4). One specific instance of this
problem is whether Rescher's approach would not sanction, as a part
of one's criterion of truth, the rule that in theological contexts
one should believe whatever is most satisfying. Rescher seems to
want to say that such a partial criterion is unacceptable because its
results have no implications for action (MP VI, 7); but this is far
from evident.
The second and more serious problem derives from the fact that
the element which actually fits into the two interlocked circles of
Rescher's cognitive system is not finally pragmatic success itself?
not pleasure, satisfaction, survival, etc., themselves?but rather the
belief or judgment that these have been achieved. This is obvious
enough for the theoretical circle. But it is also true even for the
second, practical circle, so long as the pragmatic reassessment of the
truth criterion which is involved there is conceived as a rational,

deliberative process in which we decide to alter our truth criterion
because we realize that the results it produces have been pragmatically
unsatisfactory. But while the actual occurrence of happiness or

unhappiness, pleasure or pain, etc., is indeed beyond our control as
Rescher claims, the same does not seem obviously to hold for our
beliefs about such matters. This is a serious problem for Rescher
as long as he is interpreted in a non-foundationalist way. As we saw
above, his answer to the question of how to provide factual claims
about pragmatic success without begging the epistemological question
is to treat such claims as data. But if the choice of data is made in
terms of criteria of datahood which are in turn justified by appeal to
coherence, we have another justificatory circle which seems un

deniably vicious: the acceptance of the coherent system is justified
by its pragmatic success, the claim of pragmatic success by appeal
to criteria of datahood, and the criteria of datahood by appeal to
coherence with the rest of the system. Hence, the multiple coherent
systems objection has not been satisfactorily answered. What is to

prevent any cognitive system at all, no matter how pragmatically
unsuccessful and utterly out of touch with reality it may be, from
containing criteria of datahood in terms of which claims about its
pragmatic success are classified as plausible?thus providing a basis
for a "metaphysical deduction"? Thus beliefs or judgments about
pragmatic success turn out not to constitute genuine input from the
world, but instead are merely one more element within the system?
one which can hence be arbitrarily manipulated at will, so long as the
other elements are appropriately adjusted. Rescher's pragmatic

meta-justification of his epistemological position fails.
It is hard to find any solution to this second problem which

remains within the general confines of Rescher's position, as inter
preted above. One solution would be a return to some variety of
foundationalism according to which claims about the pragmatic suc
cess resulting from a given cognitive system possess, directly or
indirectly, at least some degree of epistemic warrant which does not
derive from coherence and ultimately from pragmatic considera
tions. It seems likely, however, that the acceptance of such a founda
tionalist view would render Rescher's pragmatic appeal superfluous.
A different possibility would be to retain Rescher's general con
ception of a coherent system, one of whose elements represents direct
721
722
LAURENCE BONJOUR
input from the world, but look for a different and more satisfactory
epistemic element to play this crucial role. From this perspective,

it is noteworthy that Rescher largely neglects the traditional source
of contact between a cognitive system and the world: observation.

Sensory reports are, as we have seen, included among the data, but
this inclusion and the way in which it is apparently justified fails
to acknowledge the very special status of observation relative to the
input problem. The crucial point is that it is not only pragmatic
success which is beyond our manipulative control; given a particular
conceptual framework and a particular "set," the spontaneous ob
servational belief which results is equally beyond our control. Of
course such an observational belief, once it occurs, is subject to ac
ceptance or rejection within the cognitive system; but so are beliefs
about pragmatic success, which must apparently be derived from
some sort of observational mechanism in any case. Considerations
such as these suggest a view, otherwise rather like Rescher's, in
which observation, rather than pragmatic success, is treated as the
basic input from the world into the cognitive system. Such a view
could be developed along foundationalist lines; but a coherentist ver
sion also seems possible in which the degree of warrant attributed to
particular kinds of observational beliefs is decided within the coherent
system.17
VI
The remaining component of Rescher's system, to be considered

here only very briefly, is his version of idealism, expounded mainly
in CI. Rescher describes his conceptual idealism as "a form of ideal
ism of the 'Hegelian' type" (CI xi). The central theme is the thesis
that
the concepts we standardly employ in constituting our view of reality?

even extra-mental, material reality?involve an essential (though gen
erally tacit) reference to minds and their capabilities. . . . (CI 3)
Thus, the world, as we conceive it, is conceptually (though not

ontologically) dependent on mind. This thesis seems relatively in
17 For an attempt to develop a coherence theory along these lines, see
my paper "The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge," forthcoming

from Philosophical Studies.
723
nocuous at first glance. But the results which Rescher claims to

derive from it are anything but innocuous:
. . . the way in which [physical objects] are known by mind?the
conceptual framework ... in terms of which one standardly con
ceptualizes them?is such that as conceived in these mind-invoking
terms they can exist only for mind. (CI 15)
We are accordingly led to a coherence theory of reality that sees verid

icality as lying in coherence. The 'is really true' is not a matter of cor
responding to an in-principle inaccessible mind-independent reality,
but is determined wholly on the phenomenal side, as fitting in with
everything we can learn about the world through observation and
theory. (CI 168)
The conception of an altogether mind-independent reality is not self

contradictory, but is an essentially empty idealization. (CI 154)
These Kantian-sounding theses are supposed to follow in some way

from the thesis of conceptual dependence, though the argument is not
particularly clear.
Rescher himself characterizes his overall argument in the follow
ing way:
The starting point is to establish the mind-dependency of purely
hypothetical possibilities, and then to argue that an appropriate
explication of the concept of a 'law of nature' inherently involves re
course to hypothetical possibilities that also manifest lawfulness as

mind-invoking. Proceeding beyond this point, it will be argued that
the conceptions of causality, particularity, and space and time all in
volve an implicit reference to lawfulness which renders as mind
invoking this entire spectrum of concepts operative in the 'standard
view of the world.' (CI 26)
The discussion here will focus on the two crucial steps in the argument:
first, the discussion of purely hypothetical possibilities; and, second,
the discussion of laws of nature.
By "purely hypothetical possibilities," Rescher apparently means

purely logical possibilities; the contrast is with other modes of pos
sibility, such as dispositional possibility or counterfactual possibility,
which are grounded in some way in actual things. The argument
that such purely hypothetical possibilities are ontologically mind-de
pendent is extremely simple and straightforward. Ex hypothesi
such possibilities do not exist in the real order, i.e., they are
possible rather than actual. Nor is it "feasible," Rescher claims, to

hold that they exist in some sort of Platonic realm (though he gives
no real argument here). Hence they can exist only as objects of

conception or thought, and are thus mind-dependent (CI 32-3).
724
LAURENCE BONJOUR
This rather ingenious argument by elimination is not compelling.
Rescher asks, in effect, where logical possibilities exist, and con

cludes that they can only exist as objects of mind. But the answer to
the question is surely that they do not exist at all; they are merely
possible. And there seems to be no reason why their status as pos

sibilities should somehow require ontological grounding in the actual
world. Moreover, there are serious difficulties in Rescher's own solu
tion. It seems to lead to a psychologists view of logical truth.

Furthermore, the account seems circular. As Rescher realizes, it will
not do to say that logical possibilities depend for their existence on
actual acts of conception, since clearly there are possibilities
which no one will ever actually conceive. Thus, he is forced to qualify
his position by saying that hypothetical possibilities are dependent

for their existence, not on actual acts of conception by actual minds,
not even on possible acts of conception by actual minds, but on pos
sible acts of conception by possible minds. And this seems flatly

circular, despite Rescher's claim to the contrary.
The thesis of the mind-dependence of possibility is one main pillar
of Rescher's idealism. The other is the claim that laws of nature are
conceptually, though not ontologically, mind-dependent. Rescher of

fers two different arguments in support of this thesis. The first is that
since, on the standard account, the lawfulness of a law of nature

resides essentially in its having implications for counterfactual (i.e.,
possible) cases, this lawfulness, like the possibilities it involves,

exists only for mind. This argument thus relies on the thesis of the
mind-dependency of possibilities already rejected above.
Rescher's other argument for the mind-dependency of laws of na
ture is epistemological in character. He argues that the instantial

evidence which is typically offered for a putative law of nature is
inductively insufficient to warrant its counterfactual force. This is so,
according to Rescher, because induction can only warrant claims about
actual (though unobserved) cases, not about counterfactual cases.

One problem with this argument is that it relies on a very limited
conception of induction, ignoring more powerful conceptions which
have been offered in recent literature.18 Moreover, it is far from
clear, on any conception of induction, how one can justify including
18 E.g., by Harman. See his book Thought (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1973).
725
actual but unobserved cases in the scope of a generalization without

at the same time justifying the inclusion of counterfactual cases.
In any case, Rescher's solution to the problem is to claim that
the lawfulness of a law is not discovered empirically, but is instead
the result of a "transfactual imputation": "we, the users, accord toa
generalization its lawful status, thus endowing it with nomological
necessity and hypothetical force" (CI 82-3). He insists, however,
that such an imputation is not arbitrary, but must be "well-founded,"
where this well-foundedness includes both the factor of agreement
with the empirical evidence and the factor of systematic coherence,
of fitting together with other laws to form a "rational structure"
(CI 86-7). But there is a dilemma here: either the elements of
empirical evidence and coherence together suffice to warrant a gen

eralization as a law, in which case the mind-dependent element of
imputation is lost; or these factors together are insufficient, in which
case the decision to impute lawfulness is arbitrary within the limits
imposed by well-foundedness. Rescher seems to opt for the second

horn of this dilemma (CI 89-90), but such a view is very dubious,
both in its own right and because it is by no means clear that the two
elements of well-foundedness, taken together, are insufficient to

establish a generalization as a law; Rescher's earlier argument for
evidential insufficiency took account of only the factor of empirical
evidence.
Thus in these two crucial instances, logical possibilities and laws

of nature, Rescher has failed to make out a convincing case for
mind-dependency. Since these two claims of mind-dependency are
the basis upon which the remainder of his position rests, that too is
rendered problematic.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, there are serious substan
tive problems in Rescher's Idealistic Pragmatism, problems likely to
resist easy solution. In conclusion, however, it seems appropriate
to consider a problem of a different sort, one which is perhaps even
more destructive of Rescher's overall project in these books. Al

though Rescher's aim is clearly systematic and the issues he dis
cusses are systematic, his discussion itself is often most unsystematic.
Part of the problem is the artificial division into four volumes of

material which should have occupied one or at most two; despite
Rescher's obvious intentions to the contrary, it is very doubtful if
any of these books, except perhaps CI, can be adequately under
726
LAURENCE BONJOUR
stood in isolation from the others. Thus the attempt to present

them as separate works inevitably generates much unclarity, some of
which is not resolved even when they are considered together. But
even apart from the unfortunate effects of the multi-volume format,
Rescher's presentation is a good deal less orderly than it might have

been. Crucial topics such as the justification of presumptions, the
exact significance of the Wheel Argument, or the precise claim

made by conceptual idealism are treated fragmentarily in many dif
ferent places, so that it becomes extremely difficult to piece together
a complete account?especially since the various partial accounts are
by no means always in harmony with each other. In many places,
indeed, the order of exposition seems to correspond more closely
to Rescher's order of discovery than to any considered expository
strategy. The result is that although these books contain a wealth
of interesting arguments, insights, and technical innovations, a
genuinely coherent philosophical edifice emerges only dimly, if at all.
University of Texas at Austin.

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Rescher's Idealistic Pragmatism

Author(s): Laurence Bonjour

RESCHER'S IDEALISTIC PRAGMATISM

X here can be little doubt that systematic philosophy is undergoing

In a series of four books, three already published plus one forth

Truth, The Primacy of Practice, Conceptual Idealism, and Methodo

The pragmatic component is an elaborate and highly complicated

pragmatic meta-justification or validation of this account. The

1973) [CTT]; Conceptual Idealism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973) [CI];

placed in the text. References to CTT, CI and PP are to pages, unless

having a different publisher.) I wish also to thank Professor Rescher for

volves essential reference to mind, and thus that the world-as-we

conceive-it is conceptually (though not ontologically) mind

dependent.2 Since it is the former component, the epistemological

specific problems, but the most important is a general structural

must themselves be justified, and if they too are justified inferen

proposition is ever justified. Any adequate epistemology must pro

The second part of the epistemological task is to provide a

which is at issue, this must ultimately involve showing that proposi

3 Rescher's epistemological discussion is primarily concerned with

empirical or factual truth, though he does have some interesting things to

called the input problem. The system of knowledge is linguistic or

tion, are infallibly true?so that their inferential consequences,

to find an acceptable alternative to this traditional foundationalist

factorily with the regress and input problems, since it is these

The basic ingredients of Rescher's position are three key ideas,

of our approach. . . . (MP VII, 5)

As we shall see, this notion of epistemic stratification is an essential

part of Rescher's solution to the regress problem. It allows him to

sort of justification. Whether Rescher's actual account of these

tail later on.

The main outlines of Rescher's view are as follows. In CTT,

and a very non-standard conception of coherence. In MP (and also

explicit reference to the particular criterion of CTT); the main

respond roughly at least to the two parts of the epistemological task

distinguished above, and that pragmatic success is for Rescher the

tended discussion. One is how he proposes to solve the regress

as suggested above, is inadequate by itself. The second is his precise

places (e.g., MP II) Rescher seems to argue that no purely "theoreti

theoretical justification (albeit one in which the fact of pragmatic

beyond a rather vague endorsement of the correspondence theory

empirical truth?such a criterion thus constituting a standard of

these is the multiple coherent systems objection. There are, it is

left very unclear. In CI, moreover, Rescher claims to have abandoned

abandonment of the correspondence theory of truth, but only its reinter

pretation (CI 167-71). This obviously leaves the significance of Rescher's

were the sole standard of epistemic justification, the sole authoriz

arbitrary choice among them (see CTT 48-50). Rescher's response

the same sense in which one speaks of prima facie duties in

ethics. . . . (CTT 54)

According to Rescher, the following sorts of propositions are ex

enough initial plausibility to be worthy of serious consideration.

to suggest that there will be a large and heterogeneous set of such

The main issue, however, is how the choice of data is to be

even this small presumption needs some sort of justification, if the

to have only a small degree of initial warrant, rather than being

foundationalism is that the basic propositions are claimed to be certain or

is how any degree of epistemic warrant, however minimal, can be

underived and yet not merely arbitrary.

that Rescher would want to avoid such a weak foundationalist view,

later reconsideration, the next question is how coherence with the

include, as we have seen, all competing hypotheses which have a

serious claim to acceptance. Thus, Rescher needs a consequence